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## UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL.

## OURSELVES TO OUR CONSTITUENTS.

“Fais ce que doit, arrive ce qui peut.”

AGAIN, comrades, and for the fifth time, it is our welcome office, as your faithful representative, to wish ye the “compliments of the season.” May ye prosper during the year to come, in all your honourable pursuits and wishes. In peace or war, in wisdom, or in love, which is not wisdom, let your march be ever onward and in earnest.—*Carpe viam!*—Time never fled so rapidly as now, nor wore such changeful colours on his wings,—the tints of the chameleon,—capricious and evanescent.—*Carpe viam!*—The beaten track is all but lost, and the new route of renovated intellect is traced by the hoary pioneer’s scythe, levelling, lopping, destroying with indiscriminate sweep. With half the world he “gallops withal,” bearing his fare blinded and breathless towards a goal which ever recedes as they precipitate themselves towards it. “March,” comrades, but march with the measured pace of sense and system;—that calculated pace which gives unity and firmness to your ranks may, virtually as well as figuratively, impart moderation and method to your minds.

Amidst the troubled vista now opened to our own nation, there appear two objects of paramount concern to the *United Service*,—namely, their COUNTRY and THEMSELVES. That the former will never be endangered while the latter have the power to defend it, through every vicissitude, through good or through evil report, it would be folly and injustice to doubt. They have, within man’s memory, repelled the banded foreigner from its shores,—they have struck home for England in every sea, in every region of the globe:—so will they again and again, if need arise.—*Ferre juvat patriis libertatemque tueri.*

For ourselves, comrades, we of the *United Service* have rights to guard, as well as duties to perform;—if we have services to show, we have also claims to sustain; but, while other classes put forward unbounded pretensions, and press tumultuously for power and profit, be it our part to maintain and improve our position and our portion by the irresistible arguments of professional desert, and the public safety. While we are not ignorant of our strength and importance as the constitutional and indispensable bulwark of the country, upon which, at this moment, more than at any former period of her history, the tranquillity, both internal and external, of the British monarchy depends, there exists no thought amongst us but how best to serve the state, and obey its authorities. A Service thus animated and united (we include of course both arms), is not likely, we deem, to incur slight or tampering at the hands of the powers that be, or that may be; while, on the contrary, every motive, both public and professional, points to

the policy as well as propriety of doing its members justice. We crave the attention of the latter to a few practical remarks tending, in our humble estimation, to their benefit.

We are anxious to dispel, by such excitement or exhortation as we can offer, the culpable indifference to professional subjects that, to a certain extent, still prevails in the United Service. We desire to make all ranks sensible of the importance, and now constantly augmenting responsibility attached to the full performance, even of the most subordinate duties; and confident as we are, that justice can no longer be done to the profession of arms, except by men of competent knowledge and information, we would fain induce our brother officers to employ the leisure offered them by these "piping times of peace," or rather of treacherous truce, in order to prepare for the more active and important scenes in which they are soon enough likely to be engaged. A mere acquaintance with the books of regulation is no longer sufficient; for the seed of military knowledge can take root and come to useful maturity only when sown in a soil previously cultivated, not only by those branches of polite learning indispensable to all who would now move in the ranks of gentlemen, but by a familiarity with the different departments of science most closely connected with the art of war.

Let it not be thought that we believe our unsupported exertions equal to such an undertaking; on the contrary, we look upon this Journal as the mere organ of the profession; and our only object, for we are all embarked in the same cause, is to give voice to what we know to be their sentiments and feelings: and as we strive, not only to uphold, but to raise our caste and to defend it against the constant attacks to which the army, at least, is exposed, we hope not merely for their passive, but also for their active support. We do not by this mean to solicit an increased circulation of our Journal,—in that respect it must, like other publications, rest on its merits; but an active support in aiding and forwarding the object we profess to have in view. Let our comrades consider the means at their disposal, and then judge how noble and useful a monument they may themselves raise to the character of the profession, by illustrating and recording the most interesting particulars of the manners, history, locality, natural productions and phenomena of the distant regions they are called upon to assist and protect. The sun never sets upon the standards of England: before his evening rays have left the shores of Ireland, his morning beams have already gilded the spires of Quebec; it is light, on the blue mountains of Australia before darkness has closed over Lake Ontario; and the *reveillé* has sounded at Calcutta before the retreat has beaten at Sidney. We want but your mediation, reader, to make the globe itself tributary to our journal. At present we have space to quote but one example of the utility to be derived from such records of military scenes and travels. Most of our readers will recollect the almost romantic account formerly given in this work, of the march performed by a British regiment, in the depth of a Canadian winter, from Halifax to Montreal; admirably as it was conducted, and bravely as the men bore up against the inclemency of the weather, some loss was sustained and much suffering endured, owing to the perfect novelty of the undertaking; but with the graphic description of the exploit, for it well deserves the name, furnished by our contributor, such a march may, at a

future time, be undertaken with comparative facility; the obstacles to be encountered, and the difficulties to be experienced, are now known, so that the fault will be ours, if we are not prepared to meet and overcome them. In war, knowledge is certainly power.

Connected with the same object, and owing in the first instance to the exertions of this Journal, which sowed the seed and fostered the plant till it became firmly rooted, a Library and Museum of the United Service has been commenced under the auspices of several of the most distinguished men in the country. The advantages and utility of such an institution, it would be needless to recapitulate here: for the mere habit of viewing models and instruments of science, works of art and objects of natural history, not only tend to familiarize us with the objects represented, but to turn and attune the mind by degrees to a deeper and more serious contemplation of the causes from whence sprang the curious productions of nature, and the end to be attained by the models, drawings, and instruments. Every body knows how many instances there are of the genius of artists and men of science having been originally awakened by the inspection of such works: it is not in infancy alone we imbibe the first germ of our ideas through the medium of the eyes; in this respect we remain children to the last. How rich and splendid a collection might be formed by the united exertion of the services must be sufficiently evident, when the boundless sphere of action open to their research is considered. Let us here illustrate the use of such an establishment, by a simple hypothesis only; the power of steam had been long employed before it was successfully applied to navigation: all attempts made to impel ships by its force had failed, and many deemed the case hopeless, till the late ill-used and unfortunate Mr. Bell, of Greenock, fell upon the contrivance of the paddle-wheel; yet was this wheel itself an invention of the sixteenth century; and representations of boats impelled by its means, and worked by men, are to be found in Robert Valturi's book *de Re Militari*, printed about that period. Supposing, therefore, that any one had seen in our Museum, or in any other collection, a drawing of the old paddle-wheel boat suspended near a model of Lord Stanhope's web-footed steamer, the first steam-boat attempted in this country, would not the idea of combining the power of steam with the action of the paddle-wheel have instantly presented itself? Would not the discovery have taken place many years sooner,—and should we not have retained for our native land the honour of an invention that so justly belongs to it? We trust that no gentleman taking that interest in the service which the profession of arms has a right to demand from all those who are directly and indirectly connected with it, will, from mere inattention, leave this valuable institution, and one already so far advanced, destitute of his most zealous aid and support. Government have granted to the Council a small building for this new establishment; but owing to the number of valuable donations received, it has already been found much too small for the purpose intended; and a further change and extension of its locality has been rendered necessary. Though such a grant is a great deal from the Government of a country that has never yet appreciated the value and importance of an efficient army, trusting only to the bravery of the men, to chance and to precedent for forming soldiers when they should be required; and never considering the tremendous expense of blood and treasure re-

sulting from so miserable and short-sighted a system of policy, we, nevertheless, hail this gift as a first step to juster views,—an acknowledgment of the value of the undertaking, and a tacit admission of the principle for which we have ever contended,—that enlightened and well-informed men only can now perform the difficult, as well as dangerous duties, devolving upon the officers of the navy and army:—it is a great point gained.

When we last year communed with you, kind reader, on the management of this our incomparable Miscellany, we expressed our intention of continuing to abstain, as much as possible, from all interference in mere party politics. To a certain degree we have succeeded in this matter, and if not to the full extent of our wishes, the fault has not been with us: our caste was openly attacked; falsehood and misrepresentation, intended to injure the army in public estimation, poured from the disaffected press; principles totally subversive of discipline and subordination were loudly advocated; the troops were called upon to deliberate, instead of acting and obeying; every exertion was made to screen offenders from punishment, and a premium was actually set up for misconduct and infamy. Under such circumstances we should have been culpable had we remained silent, and we consequently turned upon the foe, and smote the best and foremost of the offenders; and, thanks to the goodness of our cause, the defeat of the enemy was as easy as their overthrow was signal and complete. This unpleasant sort of duty is now, in some degree forced upon us, and we have not only to fight the battle single-handed, but, owing to the time that intervenes between the publication of our numbers, to some disadvantage also, because a mass of falsehood may be circulated for the space of an entire month, and fix itself in public belief, before we have an opportunity of contradicting it; and well our enemies know how to avail themselves of such advantages. Formerly the Treasury prints refuted this kind of diurnal slander; but most of the journals who are now supposed to speak the sentiments of the Government, have been so long in the habit of proving their patriotism by abusing the army, that they cannot yet relinquish the laudable practice, and this false position of the Ministerial papers forces us more frequently into the arena of political controversy than our wishes and avocations would otherwise lead us. We repeat distinctly that we are not political partisans; we fight not in the ranks of party, but we defend our profession when assailed, and uphold, to the best of our power, the cause of order, loyalty, and good government. We are no dreamers; we have all our lives been active members of an active profession, have looked upon men as they are, and seen them in situations where no disguise could be worn; we have neither talked nor written ourselves into the chimerical belief that our species is already so wise and virtuous as only to require the total abolition of laws and government in order to stand at once perfect in angelic nature. That all political institutions may admit of improvement is probably true; but change, and still less subversion, is not necessarily reform, however it may be so called; and as long as laws shall be requisite for the protection of property and innocence, so long must an active force exist for the purpose of rendering those laws efficient. Would the men who respect neither person nor property bow down before a parchment act of parliament, unless there was power in the background capable of

giving it effect? But good laws, it seems, have a moral force, totally independent of exterior aid;—that is, if we believe such miserable driving as that outlaws and incendiaries are actually to be restrained from the commission of crimes by the influence of moral feeling!!!—and that too in an age that

—— “ teems with crimes,  
Above all precedent of former times;  
An age so bad, that nature cannot frame  
A metal base enough to give it name.”—JUVENAL.

Let us not deceive ourselves—the country can no longer dispense, even in times of peace, with an efficient and well-affected army. Formerly, before the press could spread delusion, like wild-fire, over the land—when the population were dispersed over a wide extent of ground—when men were in general familiar with the use of arms, and from habit, law, and attachment to their magistrates and superiors, under some control, and amenable to discipline, a force sufficient for the maintenance of order could at any time be collected from the array of the counties and from among the followers and retainers of the nobility. But those times are changed: immense multitudes, not connected by any link of kindness with the aristocracy or magistrates, having no local attachment to the miserable lanes of wretched suburbs, are pressed together in manufacturing towns and districts; competition keeps the best on the constant verge of want; and the least stagnation of trade, change of fashion, or foreign restriction, throws thousands out of bread and employ, and places them at the mercy of those political demagogues and agitators, who watch, with fiendish delight, the progress of sorrow and suffering that makes converts to their doctrines, and furnishes tools for their objects. When we think of the fierce and numerous bands of energetic and daring men that, at a moment of want, any new political mania may assemble in those districts, we candidly confess, that though we entertain the highest opinion of the *natural* goodness, generosity, and ability of the mass of our countrymen, we see no security for permanent domestic peace but in a military force capable of maintaining tranquillity till such temporary paroxysm pass away. We have, indeed, been told that the schoolmaster is to effect all this; but folly flies fast, whilst wisdom moves slowly: and let any one ask how much of the town of Bristol would have been left standing if, instead of the soldier and his sabre, the schoolmaster and his primer had been called in to quell the riot? It is easy to theorize, and unfortunately there are too many who do so plausibly. To theorize wisely is, however, a very different thing.

Under such circumstances, and in an age that, as one of our contemporaries has truly said, “ is eminently political,” and when, as he might have added, the very language of the land must be interpreted by the politics of the speaker, the question is not whether we have at times been politicians like other men, but whether we have been honest politicians: have we allowed our political bias to influence our professional counsel or conduct? have we praised or blamed according to professional or political dictates? have we misstated or misrepresented facts from party motives, or ever attacked private characters for the purpose of forwarding party views?—If we have done none of these things, but proved ourselves consistent anti-destructives, it matters little what our



politics are. Not merely in our articles on promotion, but in fifty other passages of this Journal, did we grapple with the military policy of the government existing prior to the present; and let the party now in power only do justice to the old officers of the navy and army as well as to the services at large, and we shall not be backward in giving them due credit. But empty promises and huzzas professions are lost upon us.

Fortunate as we have been in thus steering clear, to a certain extent at least, of party controversies, we have been more so in avoiding every species of literary bickering: we have had little to complain of on this score, and are honestly conscious of having deserved no less. The transparent malice of some "Rejected Addresser," peering occasionally through a flimsy veil of public spirit, is but an evidence of the march of humbug, and is duly appreciated by the Service and ourselves. If *laudari à laudato* be gratifying, its converse is not less significant.

But already "the star shines faintly on th' ethereal plains," and refreshing to our souls as is this communion with you, courteous, liberal, and enlightened reader, for such, if our reader, you must be, we must, nevertheless, hasten it to an unwilling conclusion. The years we have now travelled together in friendship, though years of peace, have been of deep interest to you, in your professional character, and on that very account attended with no small difficulty to us in the management of this Journal: but times are changing, our mutual troubles are diminishing, though danger may be approaching, the political horizon is clearing at home, whilst darkening abroad. At the very moment we are writing, the cannon of Antwerp seems sounding the knell of departed peace; and new principles, unheard of in the annals of diplomacy, are attempted to be enforced by the strong against the weak. The time has not yet come for speaking in detail of the siege of Antwerp, which, after a month's duration, is still in progress; though, in the usual course of such operations the citadel may have been surrendered ere the publication of these pages. The honour of the garrison and their gallant chief will, at all events, have been nobly sustained.

When such events are in progress—when the angry passions of men seek vent in every quarter—when the wild spirit of innovation is everywhere abroad, and the continent of Europe is thronged with powerful armies, eager to engage, the chances are, that you must, at no distant period, be again called "to the fair field of fighting men." Your future conduct may easily be told by a reference to the past: nor can the physiognomist, the philosopher, or the man of observation, ever look at a British regiment or ship's crew without being struck by the high power and energy (so different from the *mouslachiod* fierceness affected by some of our Continental friends) discoverable in the ranks of British war;—cherish and encourage, therefore, such qualities, in order that you may be able to depend upon them in the hour of battle: repress the bad, for such also you will have to command, and prevent their example from spreading; obtain the confidence of your subordinates by superior knowledge and conduct, and their affection by showing that interest in their welfare and happiness which a just performance of your duty demands. If such has been your behaviour in peace, you may then meet the fiercest onset of war in perfect reliance that British sailors and soldiers will support you to the last. There are great examples, from unforgotten Cressy to unforgotten Waterloo, that must now be acted up

to; and if human intrepidity may not expect to surpass the noble deeds of arms recorded in our ancient annals and achieved in our own time, it is no longer permitted to any of us to fall short of the high standard of excellence that so many of you have aided to establish.

And now farewell—time flies fast, and we must all make the most of it. Get up early in the morning therefore, it lengthens the day, and helps to invigorate both mind and body: skip not your orderly duty, for it is one of importance, and shows besides, the interest you take in the comfort of the men. Have no breakfast mess; it begins the day with too much bustle, and deprives you of the opportunity of showing kindness and hospitality to youngsters and new-comers. Attend to your distance and covering on parade; it shortens the drill; and no man of ordinary capacity should be ignorant of the manoeuvres a month after he has joined. Read our Journal, and study at least two hours every morning; for, as you well know, a great philosopher\* has declared that “all men destitute of ideas are naturally cowards in grain.” At other times walk, sail, fence, hunt, for you are good horsemen, and shoot, but never trespass on a gentleman’s ground; you have, in fact, no right to do so; and the pleasure of killing a few birds is too dearly purchased by exposing yourself to the just remonstrances of the proprietor and churlish warnings of the keeper. When you have permission, shoot like a gentleman in pursuit of cheerful and animating sport, who is satisfied with killing a few brace of birds in good style, and not like a pot-hunter who delights in mere slaughter, and for whom a poultry-yard would be a fitter scene of action than a stubble-field or a mountain side. Always keep your temper: there is nothing so undignified as being in a passion, and addressing language to your subordinates which they dare not resent; and no man is fit to command others who cannot command himself. Drink only three glasses of wine after dinner, unless it be of claret—a greater quantity serves but to fever the blood, and stupify the head; we never met any one so overburthened with sense as to render the drowning of the best part commendable. Finish with a cup of coffee, *à la Française*—the only French fashion we ever knew worth imitating;—it will fit you for your evening study, as well as for conversation. Go to parties; waltz, dance quadrilles, or, if possible, invent something better than these artificial and awkward French exhibitions: dancing is, for men, an art of great difficulty, and requires not only ear, but taste, tact, ease, and good nature; you must, nevertheless, master what you need not practice. Carry on flirtations in the evening,—morning flirtations are dangerous: say pretty things to all the pretty women: display your gallantry and accomplishments—do homage to the sex whom, as a *preux Chevalier*, you are specially bound to honour and protect;—but beware of matrimony, at least as a sub.

At a future time we shall, perhaps, discourse right learnedly on this and other such interesting topics; at present we must conclude by reminding you, that, in justice to your profession, you must stand approved

“In honour, arms,  
Fair mien, discourses, civil exercises,  
And all the blazon of a gentleman.”

Fichte.

## THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF BELGIUM.

At a moment when the eyes of all Europe are turned towards Belgium, a few authentic details touching its military organization cannot fail to interest our readers.

Before proceeding to render an account of its actual state, some preliminary observations are necessary. We must show what it was, before we attempt to describe what it is. For it must be borne in mind, that the present efficient condition of the army, is the work of little more than thirteen months, and that, from an indescribable chaos of confusion and indiscipline, a numerous and well-organized force has sprung up, which, in appearance at least, is certainly equal to the finest corps in the French service.

The wretched state of uncertainty and confusion into which Belgium was plunged from the first outbreaking of the revolution, down to the accession of the sovereign;—the plots, conspiracies, and intrigues that were daily concocting against the constituted authorities;—the utter want of true patriotism or unity of purpose in the great body of the nation, or even amongst its representatives;—the machinations of the clubs and associations, which counted many officers amongst their numbers;—the perpetual attempts to suborn both commanders and soldiers, now by Orangeists, now by republicans, and now by the partisans of one faction or another,—combined with the imbecility of some chiefs, the convicted treachery of others, and the inexperience of almost all,—in fine, from these and other causes inherent to the political state of affairs, every attempt on the part of government to establish a well-regulated military system was completely baffled.

There was no confidence on the part of the soldiers in their chiefs, and no trust placed by the latter in those beneath their orders. No *esprit de corps* existed amongst the body of the officers, no discipline amongst the men. Mutiny and insubordination were ripe throughout all ranks. Heinous military offences were perpetrated with impunity, for the officers, who had for the most part suddenly risen from majors and captains to generals, from subalterns to field-officers, and from serjeants and privates to captains and lieutenants, were generally incapable of fulfilling the duties of their station, possessed no moral influence over their subordinates; and dreaded to enforce obedience or chastise crime, lest they should be denounced as traitors, and immolated to popular vengeance.

These obstacles to the foundation of an efficient system of discipline and organization were enhanced by the violence and impolicy of many members of the National Congress, whose inconsiderate speeches, uttered for the purpose of courting popularity, tended to augment the distrust of the soldiers, and to weaken the efforts made by the executive to introduce confidence and order in the army. Utterly unacquainted with the principles of strategy or the theory of military economy, these deputies, principally advocates, attorneys, or journalists, boldly ventured to discuss subjects of which they betrayed the most consummate ignorance, and poured forth an ocean of wild and visionary speculations, as bombastic as they were dangerous to the interests of the state.

Some there were, who attempted to persuade their countrymen that,

as the Dutch had been ostensibly driven out of the country by a handful of armed citizens, all regular armies were superfluous, and that the hordes of undisciplined free corps or volunteers were fully equal to defend the territory. Others boasted, that the barricades and paving-stones of Belgium were all that was requisite to guarantee her towns against all foreign aggression, and that the mere sight of the ridiculous and unmilitary *blouse* would strike as much terror into the breast of an enemy, as the first thunder of a cannon is wont to inspire fear in the mind of an ignorant savage. Indeed, there was one member, an attorney from Phillipeville, who carried his bombast so far, as to declare it highly problematical, whether Belgium was not in a situation to cope single-handed with all the powers of Europe. This pernicious nonsense met with its reward in the month of August, 1831, and was one of the principal causes that led to the disasters of that epoch.

These impediments were of themselves sufficient to neutralise all the efforts of government to place their army on an efficient footing; but the evil did not rest here. The doctrines of these deputies found a willing echo in the journals. A press, the most unbridled that ever cursed a nation, readily opened its columns to every species of theoretical and visionary folly: it spared no pains, not only to inflate the minds of the people with the most exaggerated and erroneous notions of the national strength, courage, and superiority, over all other countries, but exerted itself to counteract whatever disposition was evinced by the war-minister or commanders, to establish that discipline, without which no army can exist; now by attacking the probity, and now by questioning the patriotism of such superior officers, whose political sentiments were inimical to these wild visions, or whose employment was an obstacle to the advancement of some one or other of their own immediate party. Independent of this, the members of the provisional and succeeding governments had to contend with other obstacles of a most serious nature; for, shortly after the breaking out of the revolution, that is, immediately after the attack on Brussels, the whole of the Belgian regiments disbanded of their own accord: men and officers betaking themselves to their homes, or voluntarily enlisting in the skeletons of three or four regiments which the authorities were attempting to form. The system of military economy established by the Dutch government, in some measure modelled on that of Prussia, was also completely overturned;—for, as the main object of the leading revolutionists had been a union with France, it was determined to adopt the organization of the French army, and to assimilate every branch of the military service to the system of their neighbours.

In the month of August, 1831, the Netherlands army consisted of eighteen regiments or divisions of infantry, each of four battalions; ten regiments of cavalry, of four squadrons each; four battalions of field-artillery, of six, and six battalions of militia or garrison-artillery, of five companies each; with six troops of horse-artillery, a battalion of train, a pontoon brigade; a numerous corps of engineers, including 131 officers of all ranks; and finally, two battalions of sappers and miners. In addition to these, there were two regiments of light infantry, and one of grenadiers of the guard, with ten squadrons of *gens-d'armes*. The general staff under General Constant de Rebecque was numerous, and on a par with the efficient state of the rest of the army, which formed a total of 75 battalions of infantry, 50 squadrons, 60 com-

panies or brigades of artillery, exclusive of train, and engineers, &c. &c. The infantry regiments were enrolled by provinces, and remained stationary in the same garrisons, or their immediate vicinity, during many years. In fact, the major part had not changed its quarters from their first formation, in 1816, down to the summer of 1830. This plan was well adapted for convenience and economy, as far as regarded the militia, who, on being called out for annual training, were thus enabled to join their respective battalions in two or three days; whereas, had the Walloon regiments been quartered in Friesland, or the Zealand divisions in Hainault, the time occupied by the recruits in marching to and from their respective depôts, would have entailed additional inconvenience and fatigue to the men, and would moreover have considerably augmented the extraordinary annual expenditure of government, the time of drill and exercise being limited to a few weeks, and the men receiving pay and rations per march route, from the moment they quitted their cantons;—on the other hand, this system was attended by many bad results: from remaining so many years in the same garrisons, both men and officers were tempted to marry and form connexions with the inhabitants; they were trammelled with families and incumbrances, and became heavy, inert, and never acquired a smart or soldier-like appearance; they considered their stations or garrisons as a home for life, and thus formed numerous local attachments, which always tend to enervate discipline, and weaken that military independence so essential to the mobility and rapid movement of regular corps. The fatal effects of this plan were sorely felt at the period of the revolution, when the energy of the officers and the fidelity of the troops were put to the test.

The garrisons of the various towns being, as we have said, recruited from the surrounding cantons, were connected by ties of parentage or daily intercourse with the inhabitants and neighbouring peasantry. They had their brothers, fathers, mothers, and relations amongst the people, and as they spoke the same dialect, were speedily worked upon to embrace the national cause, and easily persuaded that it would be a grievous crime, towards God and their country, to resist or oppose their fellow-citizens. No arts, no arguments, were left untried either by the priests, whose influence, especially in the Flanders, is almost paramount, or by the agents of the revolution, to inculcate this doctrine. Threats of excommunication, and menaces of every nature were put in force to convert the loyal, whilst every method of bribery and cajolery was made use of to induce the wavering to swerve from their allegiance. Even the post-office and municipal funds were appropriated for the purposes of subornation, and credit subsequently given to the different functionaries for the sums they had thus disbursed.

The success of these machinations was complete; and the rapidity with which this numerous and admirably organized army dissolved, scarcely credible. We were witnesses to one instance of this nature; and, as the same scenes appear to have occurred throughout the whole country, we shall endeavour to describe what we saw, though it would be utterly impossible for any person accustomed to the discipline, regularity, and obedience of our own army, to form the most feeble conception of an outbreaking so strange and unexpected.

On the 27th of September, 1830, at the moment the Dutch troops were expelled—God knows how—from Brussels, by a handful of undisciplined volunteers, public excitement and disaffection was roused to the

highest pitch in the Flanders. But independent of Ghent several other towns still remained faithful, or rather had not yet broken out in open rebellion against the Royal Government: amongst these was Ostend. Here the garrison, which consisted of one battalion of the 6th regiment and a few artillerymen, with these the governor, General Schepern, a brave and experienced veteran, contrived to put down one or two partial risings of the populace, and held the disaffected in check during three days. During this period the soldiers, mostly young militia men, evinced no inclination to desert their colours, and even on one occasion opened a platoon fire on the rioters, who were headed by a man of the lowest and most abandoned character. Finding, however, that his men were harassed by incessant patrols, picquets, and extra duty, and that it was highly important to protect the ammunition and military stores, of which large quantities were deposited in the arsenal, Schepern applied to Major-General Goethals, commanding at Bruges, to march to his assistance. The remaining three battalions of the 6th regiment had been concentrated at that place, where they had also to encounter a popular tumult, and had fired on the populace; but Schepern considered that it would be useless to attempt to retain that populous town in its allegiance with so small a force, whilst it was imperatively necessary to preserve Ostend and its arsenal to the last moment. Indeed, we are at a loss to comprehend the indifference shown by the Dutch government to the conservation of this port. Nothing but that fatality which appears to have attended all their operations at this period, can account for their not having instantly assembled a force on which they could rely, from Flushing, either to secure this fortress, or to retake it after the desertion of the troops; for at any time, during many subsequent days, a handful of resolute men might have carried and maintained it with the greatest facility, especially if supported by two or three vessels of war off the coast, and half a dozen gun-boats in the harbour. The fortress was, it is true, not in a state to stand a siege, but it was the policy of Holland to have made every sacrifice to get possession and preserve a place which would have given them the third key of Belgium, and perhaps have influenced the state of affairs in a manner the most advantageous. General Goethals having, as we are led to believe, listened to overtures from the government *de facto* at Brussels, gladly entered into the views of the governor of Ostend. Bruges was evacuated; and in the evening of the 1st of October, the three battalions of the 6th made their appearance at the gates of the latter, and were immediately marched to the barracks. The evening passed off quietly, though several partial acts of insubordination were remarked. Towards midnight, however, these symptoms of mutiny became more decided; and about two, A.M. on the 2d, the picquets and guards deserted their posts; the men at the barracks rose upon their officers, tore the Dutch cockade from their caps, discharged their muskets in the air or against the windows, trampled on their appointments, cast away or sold their arms and accoutrements for a few styvers, and rushed through the streets in the wildest state of excitement, and, filling the air with shouts and vociferations, appeared in readiness to commit every species of excess. It is but just, however, to say, that not a single instance of plunder or violence took place. Their only anxiety appeared to escape from the regiment; and so expeditious were they, that by three in the afternoon of the same day not a man out of 2600 was to be seen, if indeed we except

General Goethals, a portion of the officers and non-commissioned, with some fifty old soldiers; the rest had disappeared as rapidly as chaff before the wind, either departing for their homes or marching to Brussels, where both officers and privates expected to receive the reward of their desertion by being instantly promoted.

We have stated that no excesses were committed at Ostend: it is no less worthy of remark that we traversed the country, by Bruges, Ghent, and St. Nicholas, to Antwerp, on the following day and night; and although thousands of disbanded soldiers from various garrisons covered the roads, and were scattered through the surrounding villages, we neither encountered the slightest impediment, nor heard of a single instance of outrage or robbery. It must likewise be recollected that at this moment there was no police, no government, no civil or military authorities, and thus crimes might have been perpetrated with the most perfect impunity. These facts are worthy of record, for they are high proof of the morality and peaceable disposition of the people in general.

To return to General Schepern. On discovering the first symptoms of mutiny, having no confidence in his colleague, General Goethals, who was one of the first superior officers that abandoned the Orange colours, and being warned by some of the Belgians, the Governor assembled his countrymen, gave them directions to prepare for immediate departure, and a little before midnight embarked on board a fishing-boat, and made his escape to Flushing, accompanied by the Town-Major, the Commandant of Artillery and Engineers, and such Dutch officers and non-commissioned officers as formed part of the garrison. This escape was timely; for on the subsequent day the Belgians arrested the Dutch officers at Tournay, Ypres, and elsewhere, together with those who were on their route through Bruges to return to Holland. It was Schepern's lot to be less fortunate, a short time subsequent; for having been sent to take the command at Venloo, the populace and garrison rose upon him and the Dutch officers; he was taken prisoner and confined at Brussels, until the Conference effected an exchange of prisoners, and he regained his liberty.

It is impossible for any person who had not witnessed this scene, of which we have merely attempted to give a rapid sketch, to form an idea of the effect produced on the mind by a sight of such an extraordinary nature. Surprise, indignation, and every other sentiment of loathing and disgust, were at once called forth. It is but justice, however, to remark, that many of the Belgian officers exerted every nerve to maintain the discipline of their corps, and literally shed tears of shame and anger at conduct so disgraceful to a disciplined army. But these efforts were vain; and the bursting of a typhon could not be more rapid or overwhelming than the dissolution of the garrisons.

We must apologise for this episode; but it is introduced in order to demonstrate more fully the annihilation of the organized force, and to show the utter extremity to which the revolutionists succeeded in carrying the destruction of all those sentiments of obedience to their officers and fidelity to their colours, that are the most essential duties of a soldier. The leaders and agents of the revolution taught the troops to look on desertion and infidelity to their sovereign as a meritorious act; they studied to impress them with the conviction that obedience to the will of the people, no matter how expressed, was paramount to all other

law or duty, and that the most sacred oaths could be absolved by the mere breath of a few self-elected rulers. They had bribed the men and promoted the officers, holding them up as models of honour and patriotism. It cannot be marvelled at, then, if these pernicious doctrines bore odious fruit, and that the professors and promoters of insubordination should encounter the utmost difficulty in re-establishing obedience, and eradicating the foul seed from the ranks of their disciples.

We have stated what was the proceeding of the infantry. The regiments of cavalry and brigades of effective artillery, the latter of which was principally officered by Dutchmen, were either cantoned in Holland, where forage was more abundant, or were serving with the corps of Prince Frederic and General Cort Heilgers. Thus, although much partial desertion took place, the greater portion remained faithful to the King; and we believe one regiment only, stationed at Ghent, was placed in a situation to desert *en masse*. These, however, availed themselves most abundantly of this facility, selling their horses, arms, and accoutrements, and faithfully imitating the disgraceful example of their brethren on foot.

It must be remembered that we speak as soldiers, not as politicians. As military men we know of but one sacred and inviolable guide, one sole obligation—that imposed on us by our oath; and whether as politicians or soldiers, we can never subscribe to the doctrine that tends to emancipate the soldier from his allegiance, until his sovereign shall have absolved him from his oath, or a regularly-established government demand his services without compromising his honour. We hate military despotism; but we abhor and execrate popular tyranny, and believe that there is no man of common sense who would not select the one which has obedience and order for its foundation, rather than submit to the other which is based on misrule, and embraces in its vortex every element of destruction. In the eye of every honourable man, mutiny and desertion, whether arising from political or moral causes, are crimes that must carry with them contempt and odium. From Marshal Bournont at Waterloo, who abandoned his countrymen on the 18th of June, 1815, down to the miserable Lieutenant of artillery, who escaped on the 13th of November from the Citadel of Antwerp, the stigma must be the same. To inculcate, indeed not to deprecate in the strongest terms any contrary doctrine, would be to sap the root of every principle of honour and duty that should be cherished both by soldiers and citizens. Many of the Belgian officers felt and acted up to this principle; and, however much they may have sympathised in the feelings of their fellow-citizens, however ardently they might have panted for the success of their country's cause, they still continued faithful to the colours of their actual sovereign, until a proclamation from the Prince of Orange left them at liberty to continue in the service of Holland, or to join the standard of Belgium. But these were in the minority: and when they returned to Brussels, and presented themselves to the government, they were looked on with suspicion, and that honourable conduct which ought to have conquered general esteem, was converted into a crime both by the public, and those in whose hands was vested the power of dispensing favours and promotion.

The sudden dissolution of the infantry and cavalry has been shown; as regards the artillery, there is no doubt that the Belgians obtained possession of an immense mass of materiel, which had been left in the



different arsenals; but as more than two-thirds of the officers and non-commissioned officers were Dutch, and not a single general or colonel Belgian, whilst the organized field batteries had retired with Prince Frederic, the Belgians found themselves nearly destitute of every thing that was most essential to commence the reorganization of this corps; consequently, it was with extreme difficulty that they were enabled, in the course of four or five months, to equip four or five brigades of guns. In short, for some months subsequent to the revolution, the Belgians may be said to have been without staff, cavalry, infantry, artillery, or engineers. They had, it is true, a mass of men in uniform and twenty times that number parading in blouses, but these were in a state of consummate inefficiency. They had to create everything afresh, as if no army had ever existed; and though the raw material was there, the talent to mould it into some serviceable shape was utterly wanting. Indeed, down to the month of August, 1831, their armed force, for it scarcely merited the name of an army, presented a picture of incapacity and disunion on the part of the chiefs, and of disorganisation and insubordination on that of the soldiers, not to have been surpassed by the bands under Bolivar and other leaders at the early part of the South American revolution. The want of good officers, especially in an army so far out of proportion to the population or resources of the country, is still felt, and must in some measure account for the necessity under which the government has been placed to admit foreigners into its ranks, and to intrust to them the organization and command of corps. The population of Belgium, according to the most recent census, amounts to 3,740,000; its army, at the present moment, exceeds 115,000 men on paper. By this it will be seen that one-thirtieth of the population is under arms; and, upon a moderate calculation, one out of every ten able-bodied males is enrolled. The Belgian army has been more than tripled since the revolution; and as, before that period, the number of Dutch to Belgian officers was in the proportion of three to one, it cannot be a matter of surprise that Belgium should find herself in a position utterly unable to furnish the requisite number of officers for her augmented army. Latterly the greatest discretion has been shown in the selection of foreigners and the promotion of natives; but under the Provisional Government and its successors, the profusion with which the highest military grades were distributed, is almost inconceivable. Thus we find the famous Van Halen, a retired Russian or Spanish major, promoted at once to the rank of lieutenant-general; Count d'Hane a young major of cuirassiers; Count Van der Meere, who had served as a captain in Batavia; Goblet, a captain of Engineers; de Chasteler, a retired captain of hussars, and Niellon, a director of a theatre, advanced to the rank of major-generals; whilst Kessels, the proprietor of the whale that was exhibited in Paris, and who had held a subordinate situation in the civil-engineer department, was made major, and Charles de Bruckere, a lieutenant of Dutch artillery, colonel in the same corps; with many others, whose rise was not less rapid.

When the unlooked-for and incomprehensible expulsion of the Dutch forces took place, the armed force was under the orders of Van Halen, who had distinguished himself during the attack. At that time the face of the country was overrun by flying detachments of free corps, under adventurers of every class and description, from all parts of Europe, and some of these took advantage to lay the towns and cities under

heavy contribution. The Provisional Government, however, soon felt the necessity of attempting some kind of organization. A war-minister was appointed, and General Goethals called to the head of this department. His ministry was but of short duration; and whilst tumults and riots were daily breaking out amongst the people, the army made no progress towards organization. General Goethals, though a man of no capacity, was an old officer, and had grown grey in the service; he had, therefore, been accustomed to the routine and precision of regular armies, and found the effort of guiding so incoherent a mass beyond his powers, and at utter variance with his antecedents: he was, therefore, glad to give in his resignation, and to escape from a task of such difficulty and ingratitude.

He was succeeded by General Goblet, the present minister for foreign affairs. This officer had served with credit to himself as a lieutenant in the French engineers, and had made several campaigns. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1822, in the Dutch service, in which grade he was overtaken by the revolution. He is said to have accepted the office of minister with reluctance, from a probable consciousness of his being unequal to a task of such extreme difficulty, and from having had no experience in the details of administration: he had, moreover, little talent for debating, and none for extemporaneous speaking. The effort of defending himself against the incessant attacks of the opposition, and bitter diatribes of the press, combined with the impossibility of satisfying the pretensions of several thousand applicants for promotion, and his ill success in enforcing order in the army, quickly disgusted him with the burdens of office, and induced him to resign.

Nothing daunted by the failure of his predecessors, Count d'Hane immediately accepted office; and none but his countrymen could be surprised if a man who had suddenly risen from the rank of major, a rank which he had only attained a few months, without other knowledge or experience than troop details, should have bent beneath the immense weight of responsibility and diversified labour that accumulated around him. Some progress was, however, made during his administration. The army was nominally completed to ten regiments of infantry of the line, two of light infantry, ten battalions of corps francs, or volunteers, and five regiments of cavalry, with ten brigades of artillery. Had General d'Hane been fairly and zealously seconded by those under his orders, much might have been effected; but such was the disunion and jealousies amongst the chiefs, such the negligence, bad faith, and malversation amongst the officers, that when the minister laid an official statement of the army before the chambers, and sincerely believed that he had a disposable force of 55,000 men and sixty pieces of cannon available for the defence of the country, the total amount of effectives did not exceed 28,000, and the half of the artillery was without caissons or reserve waggons, indeed with only a small proportion of horses. Heartily nauseated with the bad success of his measures, and harassed by the same attacks that had affected the previous minister, General d'Hane also retired, and it was no easy matter to discover a successor.

At length the selection fell on General Dufailly, who had commanded a Dutch regiment during the attack on Brussels, and was one of those who had remained faithful to his old colours until he received his dismissal. This officer continued his functions until after Leopold's arrival; and at the moment of the Dutch invasion was still in office.

But the army had made no advance under his administration; and when the Dutch burst into the country, the troops were surprised in a state of indiscipline and destitution that baffles all power of description.

The faults of Dufailly's predecessors now burst into light in all their nakedness; now the country reaped the fruit of the bombastic absurdity of its representatives, and felt the consequence of that insubordination, the seeds of which had been planted by its first government, and nurtured by its orators, journalists, and political unions. The accumulated errors and inexperience of Dufailly's predecessors were of course visited upon him. The defeat of Louvain, the rout of General Daine, and the destruction of the batteries before Antwerp, were visited not on the officers and men who fled without firing a shot, but on the head of the minister. He was pronounced a traitor, and barely escaped falling a victim to popular vengeance at Molaïves, by hastening to join Daine's corps.

We do not pretend to be the apologists of Dufailly's ministry, but at the same time we think he was unfairly judged by his countrymen. There were, certainly, powerful causes for oburgation, but there were also many motives for extenuation. The fault lay more in threats of his predecessors and the inherent vices of the system, than in himself. He might have had the will, but at a moment when no trust could be placed in either generals or officers, the task of cleansing the Augean stable was more than he had talent or energy to execute.

It would not be consistent with the scope of an article of this nature, to enter more deeply into the various political and moral causes, that led to this state of affairs, or those that contributed to maintain them in the same unprosperous position during so many months. But it is fair to observe, that if there was a great deficiency of talent, experience, and energy exhibited by the successive war-ministers, they likewise encountered obstacles at every step, that might have baffled the intentions and defeated the plans of the most mature and enlightened statesmen.

Such indeed was the irritated and inflammable state of the public mind, so inconsiderate the language of the deputies, so virulent and unbridled the workings of the press, that a man was already overwhelmed with odium, crushed with libels, and condemned as unfit for office, ere his appointment was officially announced. In lieu of meeting with some indulgence or consideration, the violence of his assailants augmented in proportion to the difficulties and embarrassments, inevitable results of the great political convulsion that shattered the nation to its very foundation. The truth of Lord Halifax's maxim, that "there are few things so criminal as a place," was amply proved by this proceeding.

It is certain, however, that the nation had legitimate cause for complaint; that something might be, and that nothing was done, to form an efficient army, in despite of the immense supplies which were liberally voted by the Chamber. The ordinary budget for the war department being limited to ten millions of guilders, whilst the extraordinaries exceeded twenty-six, in all thirty-six millions.

Nothing could present a more extraordinary contrast, than was presented by the two belligerent nations. On the one side, the Dutch, firm and united among themselves, rallied round the throne, and forgot all personal dissensions, to combine for the support of the government and the defence of the country. Thinking no sacrifice too great, they

actively and steadily persevered in the process of reorganizing their legions, and could boast, in a short time, of a numerous and fine infantry, a superb cavalry, an admirable artillery, a large body of devoted and obedient officers, and an experienced staff, with magazines, train, transport, hospitals, and every requisite for taking the field.

On the other side, the Belgians, though counting a long list of generals, field-officers, and staff, were without commanders or instructors. Their infantry, though well-clad and armed, were destitute of proper field equipments; were miserably drilled, and scarcely able to execute the simplest evolutions, and these only with painful slowness. The cavalry, though well-mounted, were few in number, and these deficient in every essential point, and totally unacquainted with the commonest service, of patrolling and reconnoitring. The artillery, though composed of athletic and active men, was without officers and non-commissioned, and had no experience whatever in the practice or theory of gunnery. They were without hospitals, commissariat, means of transport, or reserves; in fine, the whole mass were scarcely able to execute a change of front, or formation of squares, without falling into confusion; and were in a condition utterly unfit to oppose an enemy.

Such was the state of the Belgian army on the arrival of King Leopold at Brussels; and scarcely had his Majesty time to inspect one or two divisions, ere they were called upon to rally round his person and defend their territory. On this occasion Leopold availed himself, as far as possible, of the means at his disposal, and displayed a degree of judgment and courage, that plainly showed him to be a gallant soldier and experienced commander. But in spite of the able disposition, and indefatigable exertions of the monarch, who alone seemed to preserve his coolness amidst the chaos by which he was surrounded, it was impossible to offer any effectual resistance; and a total defeat, indeed, anticipated by all those who knew the state of the army and the deplorable incapacity of its commanders, ensued.

Miserable as was the state of the troops prior to the disasters of Louvain, that event completely destroyed the little that had been accomplished during the preceding twelve months, and replunged the army into its original state of confusion. It had, however, one good effect. It showed the urgent necessity of establishing a more efficient system, opened the eyes of the public to the absurdities of *blouses* and *barricades* when opposed to the attacks of regular troops and powerful artillery, and induced the deputies and journalists to remain silent, or to co-operate with the government in the process of regeneration.

Dufailly having resigned, he was succeeded, for a few days, by Count d'Hane, who had acted as chief of the staff during the short campaign, until M. Charles de Broukère, then minister of the Interior, consented to take the portfolio, and with it, to attempt the gigantic undertaking which had baffled all the endeavours of his predecessors. If this officer was deficient in experience, he amply supplied this defect by an indefatigable application to business, and a degree of activity and energy scarcely to be surpassed; and he therefore set to work with an unflinching hand to effect the work of purification.

A new system of organization was adopted. The undisciplined and troublesome free corps were disbanded, and the men enrolled in the

regiments of chasseurs. Some superior officers were superseded, and many subalterns dismissed; for, incredible as it may appear, more than one of these officers bore upon his shoulder the degrading mark of the galleys! We should not have ventured to mention this, had not the fact been communicated officially to the Chambers by the minister himself. All staff-officers were obliged to submit to the ordeal of an examination. Those who possessed sufficient acquaintance with military tactics, were confirmed in their functions: those who failed were posted to regiments of infantry, or dismissed. A military school was established on the model of the French "Ecole Polytechnique." Experienced French officers were sent for to organize the staff, and to superintend the reformation of the different corps. The artillery was remodelled, and the number of guns in each brigade augmented from six to eight. A corps of sappers and miners was directed to be instructed in the duties of that branch of the service. Twenty thousand of the first class of Civil Guards were militised, and sent into garrison to be drilled. Two new regiments of the line, and two of Chasseurs, were added to the infantry, and the number of squadrons augmented from four to six. Discipline and subordination were enforced. Some officers accused of embezzlement, were brought to trial and condemned. In short, in the space of three or four months, new life was imparted to every branch of the service, and the army began to assume an appearance of amelioration that promised the best results; and even thus early in M. de Broukère's ministry, a force of 45,000 effective bayonets, 3000 sabres, and 60 pieces of cannon, were ready to take the field, exclusive of the militised Civic Guards and reserve battalions.

Unfortunately for his country and himself, M. de Broukère's temper and manners were not such as were likely to gain him popularity; and thus, independent of the enmities and jealousies naturally arising from his situation as minister, and above all, from his efforts to purge the army of the many cankers that impeded its healthy constitution, he drew upon himself the animosity of a large portion of the public. We have said unfortunately, for it was admitted on all sides that M. de Broukère was a man of no common abilities, that he possessed rare talents for administration, combined with a most ardent mind and a zealous devotion to the interests of the service.

To reform a revolutionary army—to introduce discipline in lieu of insubordination—to weed out the inefficient and replace them by men at least of common understanding—to raise an efficient force, the wreck of a disorganized mass, discouraged by recent disasters—to establish a wholesome, but not exaggerated confidence, and place the whole body on a respectable footing—to treat with contempt the diatribes of the journals, and personalities of the opposition—and lastly, to pursue with undeviating firmness the line he had traced out for himself, in despite of anonymous threats and open insults, was a task that could only have been accomplished by a man of more than ordinary abilities and determined character. The latter quality, M. de Broukère possessed in an eminent degree; but his naturally ardent temper and abrupt manners, which he could not always command, even in the highest presence, rendered him extremely obnoxious. Thus no effort was spared, either in the chambers or by the press, to vilify and degrade him in public estimation; though both were fain to acknowledge that he had rendered

important services to his country. At length, worn out with the virulence of his opponents, and, above all, disgusted with intrigues of the ultra-Catholics, who dreaded his influence and talents, he at length gave in his resignation, and was succeeded by the French General of artillery, Baron Evain, who, having accepted letters of naturalization, was appointed "Ministre Directeur de la Guerre."

It would not have been easy for the Belgian government to have selected an officer more perfectly qualified to undertake the task of administering this department than this amiable and experienced soldier, whose long and meritorious services had been fully appreciated by the great master of war, Napoleon, as well as Louis XVIII. and Charles X. To a thorough experience and knowledge of all the intricate details of military administration, and an extraordinary facility of availing himself, in the most effective and economical manner, of all the resources placed at his disposal, General Evain adds a passionate fondness for business, great discrimination, clearness, and method, and enjoys the reputation of exemplary probity, combined with the utmost impartiality and mildness of manner. An anecdote of this officer will at once show his powers of organization, and is an additional proof of the decided character of the great soldier whom he then served. We can answer for its authenticity, and we believe its novelty. At the period of the disastrous campaign of Moscow, Colonel Evain was at Paris, where he had been directed to remain, in order to organize and forward the immense supplies of artillery and ordnance stores that were required for the grand army. The celebrated 29th bulletin, from Smorgonj, had scarcely reached Paris, and had been made public but a few hours, when a messenger from the Tuilleries came to Colonel Evain's office, and to his utter surprise informed him the Emperor had just arrived, and forthwith demanded his presence at the Tuilleries. Though thunderstruck at this unexpected intelligence, which at once demonstrated the terrible misfortunes of the French army, Evain hastened to the palace, and was instantly ushered into the presence of his imperial master, whom he found in his travelling dress,—pale, fatigued, with a beard of several days growth, and in an evident state of great mental suffering. He had scarcely time to make his bow or utter a word, ere Napoleon advanced towards him, and abruptly exclaimed, "Well, Evain! you have read my 29th bulletin. It does not tell the worst. It would have been impolitic to have alarmed France. We have not a gun or a caisson remaining; but our resources are immense,—our losses can be repaired." Then after a pause, he added,—<sup>A</sup> "By the first of March I must have six hundred pieces of cannon, horsed and equipped. I know your zeal and activity. You know I must be obeyed." Then approaching close to Evain, Napoleon took hold of his arm, and with a smile, added—"If I have my guns on the appointed day, you shall receive the brevet of Major-General; if not, I will hang you." Without being disconcerted, Colonel Evain replied—"Sire, the time is limited, but our arsenals are well-stored. If your Majesty will inform me where I can procure money to purchase horses, your orders shall be obeyed." "Is that the only difficulty," rejoined the Emperor. Then sitting down to his bureau, he wrote an order for three millions of francs on his private treasury, the contents of which were in the vaults beneath the Tuilleries, and Evain took his leave. On the 1st of March, Evain kept his word, and the Emperor fulfilled his promise.

On coming into office, General Evain ably profited by the judicious arrangements of his predecessor, and the seeds that had been sown by M. de Broukère were rapidly brought to maturity. In the course of a few months the Belgian troops, which had already made most essential progress, were placed on a footing of efficiency and respectability, equal, if not superior in some points of view, to the best-organized continental armies, and leaving little to desire, save greater rapidity in the evolutions of the infantry, and greater perfection in the details of the cavalry, more especially in the cuirassiers. In the meantime, both De Broukère and Evain were most ably and judiciously assisted by the King. His Majesty daily worked for several hours with the Minister and Chief of the Staff, and made constant excursions to inspect the different camps and garrisons. Divisions and brigades were frequently reviewed by him, and there was scarcely a battalion in the service of which he had not personal knowledge, entering with the eye of an experienced officer into the most minute details. This had the effect of stimulating the officers, and encouraging the men, who, having now one rallying point, sedulously and anxiously devoted themselves,—the one to instruct the people, and the other to profit by the lessons of their chiefs. An honourable emulation sprung up amongst the different corps, and the utmost exertions were made by Generals and Colonels of regiments to rival each other in the soldier-like appearance, cleanliness, and precision in field movements of the corps under their orders. If the army and the country owed much,—firstly, to M. de Broukère, for its first organization and resuscitation,—and secondly, to General Evain, for his indefatigable exertions to add an efficient superstructure to the foundation laid by his predecessor,—it was no less indebted to the talents and judicious arrangements of the Chief of the Staff, the French General Desprez. This accomplished gentleman and brave soldier held a similar situation in the African campaign. Moderate in politics, unassuming in manners, intimately versed in the theory and practice of strategy on the most extensive scale, experienced in all the details of military organization, combining a highly cultivated and scientific mind, and a sound judgment, with undaunted courage and indefatigable activity, General Desprez soon succeeded in establishing an efficient staff, and with the king's sanction gave that formation and consistency to the different corps of the army, that was best calculated for convenience, concentration, and rapidity of movement, or deployment in the field: thus most ably seconding the views of the government, and anticipating the exigencies of the country. It is to be presumed that the country is satisfied, for neither the Chambers nor journals have attempted to criticise or complain of any of the dispositions of the General.

Having thus rapidly sketched the march of military affairs, from the first days of the revolution down to the present period, we shall reserve, for another article, a description of the distribution and formation of corps, together with details of the economy of regiments, and the organization of each branch of the service. For the present it will be sufficient to state, that the Belgian government is now able to bring into the field upwards of 90,000 effective infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 144 pieces of artillery fully horsed and equipped.

ON THE DEFECTIVE DISCIPLINE OF THE MERCHANT SERVICE,  
WITH HINTS FOR AMENDING IT.

It has long been a cause of just complaint, with those interested in British merchant-ships, that the legislature should not have considered it necessary to enact more clear and specific laws by which those employed in such service are to be controlled. It is extraordinary that a body of men, who have such immense charge of the property and lives of British subjects, should yet remain, as to their relative duties, (upon a perfect understanding of which the safety of a ship so much depends) so far without legal regulation, that neither the master nor his officers have the necessary authority to conduct their ship with anything like order: nor are the common sailors much better situated, their treatment depending too much upon the caprice of those placed in the equivocal situation of commanders over them. In the event of misunderstanding on the subject of discipline, the consequences are, that the master is entirely at a loss to know the extent of his authority over his crew; and rather than take measures of responsibility upon himself, he is obliged to submit to see his ship conducted in that disorderly manner, that he well knows hazards every moment her safety, as well as being disgraceful and alarming to any passengers he may have on board; a contrary course subjecting him, in nine cases out of ten, to actions at law, which are readily promoted by a pack of low attorneys, whose occupation has arisen out of the very defective and undefined state of the law respecting the duties of British merchant sailors; the system of the Admiralty Court giving them at once the means of seizing a ship, for the most frivolous complaint a sailor may make on the score of wages. I by no means, however, wish to see a seaman deprived of his lien upon a ship for his just claim to his earnings; but it is notorious, that the peremptory manner of proceeding in this court is abused to an alarming extent, and is in its process so oppressive upon owners, that it is on their part almost invariably submitted to without defence; though it is not too much to say, that ninety-nine cases out of a hundred that are brought there by seamen are unjust and vexatious,—the fair inference being, that a seaman's just claims are rarely objected to, especially when it is considered that the payers (owners) are not the parties who set up the defence or objection to settle the seamen's claims,—these originating with the master, who, it is but fair to presume, being a discontented party generally, must have good and strong grounds to advise resistance to such claims. I may appeal to the experience of all owners and commanders of ships for the truth of this. No honest lawyer ever advising a resistance to a seaman's claims, let his conduct have been ever so infamous, his wages are paid, rather than encounter the expense and annoyance incident upon a suit in Doctor's Commons,—an appeal to which is perfectly certain to end in saddling the owners with heavy costs. This dread of appealing to the laws is a sufficient proof of their inefficacy; and the consequences are, not merely a laxity of the necessary order in a merchant-ship, but a direct inducement to oppose everything like order.

That some regulations are necessary to improve the situations of commanders and officers of British merchant-ships, is allowed by all who have any experience of the subject. Unless some laws are enacted



for this purpose, the objection on the part of respectable persons to such a service will continue. No man of education and proper feeling can possibly command on board a merchant-ship at present, without submitting himself to situations hardly to be borne; and if on no other score, some regulations are desirable to induce such a class of men to take charge of merchant's ships—thus rendering the occupation more respectable, and conducing to the safety of the property and persons under their care. For my part, I must say, that unless some very strong and effectual laws are enacted, to keep in proper check a set of men, of whom, however highly we may think in a national view (and no one esteems their qualities professionally more than myself), yet it must be admitted they are, uncontrolled, a lawless set of fellows. I say, that unless something like regulations are enforced on board British merchant-ships, no man who has had experience therein would think of bringing up a tolerably educated boy in such a service, except from necessity.

Laws that would prove effectual may, I apprehend, be framed to ensure good order. The facility of punishing breaches of duty would, in a short time, bring men to submit to such a reasonable and proper control as is essential to the proper conducting of a ship;—circumstances will, however, necessarily arise, when no immediate correction can be applied; but simple enactments, which seamen are certain will be enforced, will in most cases be sufficient to deter. Corporal punishments can rarely be had recourse to on board merchant-ships, nor is it any part of a system I would advocate; though in extreme cases I certainly insist upon a strict right in all commanders of ships to have recourse to this, or any other measure whatever, that may be requisite to put down mutiny; but all such cases must depend upon their own merits.

I would have it clearly enacted as law, that a seaman should not be allowed, under any pretence whatever, to refuse to do his duty, and a prompt compliance with the orders of his superior:—that no equivocation or excuse whatever is to justify him so doing, the penalty being a forfeiture of his wages, and all he may have on board, and the infliction of a punishment, upon conviction before any magistrate, consul, or commissioned British officer, of from one to three months' imprisonment upon bread and water and hard labour (or solitary). It should be imperative upon these authorities to interfere, upon the application of a master, and to take the man out of the ship, and have no option beyond the apportioning of the term of imprisonment, upon a conviction of a mere refusal of duty, proved by two witnesses. The offender should be then sent home, if no means of imprisoning him is afforded on the spot, with his conviction about him, for punishment in England, and the master released from his contract with him.

Such punishment, if it did not put a stop to knocking off work (which, however, I think it would soon do) would, at all events, prevent the unpleasant situation in which commanders and officers of merchant-ships are now placed, in witnessing a man, and often a gang of them, and sometimes the whole crew, deliberately walking the decks, and refusing all orders; and that without the law holding out any promise of punishing them.

I am quite aware that at present magistrates have a power, upon representation of a master that his crew refuse to *proceed* upon the voyage, to commit them to hard labour for a month; though I have

found their worships either very ignorant of such authority, or unwilling to act upon it. I have, under such circumstances, applied upon one occasion, I believe, to all the magistrates of Portsmouth, and experienced a direct refusal from them all to interfere; at length I was referred over to Gosport, where I found a gentleman of information and determination sufficient to commit the people of whom I complained. But when once away from England, this salutary power is left behind: we are committed to the deep, to navigate all over the world, without being able to find another authority to which to appeal for help. Consuls say their authority is too undefined to interfere; nothing short of protesting that actual danger exists, through the mutinous conduct of seamen, can insure you their interference; they usually decline assisting masters of ships, and will continue to do so until some law clearly defines a line of conduct to them. Ships of war are as unwilling to assist us: indeed during peace, when you find them fully manned, and they do not want any of your people, they take no interest whatever in a merchant-ship, and nothing short of downright mutiny ensures you any assistance from them. Neither is your situation found to be much better in British colonies; a magistrate there must attend to the formal complaints of a master of a ship, if he is ready to make affidavit of a breach of the peace; and this is about the extent of their interference: they imprison the man on conviction, during which you are often put to very heavy expenses in supporting him. But in all these cases the mischief remains; you are not released from the engagement with the offender; and after undergoing a slight imprisonment, you must take him on board again: if a desperate bad character, rendered a most dangerous man for the remainder of the voyage, under the master who has been the means of inflicting it. But short of actual breaches of the peace, your whole crew may be in a state of the most complete (and even bordering upon dangerous) insubordination; may abuse the master and his officers from morning to night, work as little as they please, and you are left totally without remedy. I have met with the most extraordinary instances of ignorance of the laws respecting seamen, as they at present exist, on the part of magistrates abroad, as well as naval officers; and consuls are but little better informed sometimes, and especially as regards the articles of agreement between the master and the seamen; these latter are treated with contempt generally, and are oftener declared to be "nothing better than waste paper," than to have any weight attached to them. I believe, indeed, masters of ships very generally think them little better.

The laws require, in fact, remodelling, simplifying, and to be rendered so plain, that even "*a magistrate*" can understand them; and, above all, they require to be framed so as to insist upon the prompt and effectual assistance of all the authorities I have suggested as proper to interfere for the support of order on board British merchant-ships.

Forfeiture of wages is at present so understood by seamen, as to operate upon them with no dread whatever. I have already shown, indeed, how little in practice they have to fear on that score; the fact is, that they believe that all forfeitures go ultimately to Greenwich Hospital, and, therefore, they rightly enough judge (under this impression) that the owners of the ship have no interest in the matter. This is a point that should be set at rest, and seamen made directly acquainted, through the articles of agreement, that if they break their contracts

with the master on any point whatever, their wages are forfeited to the owners' use, who would then have credit for a serious intention of inflicting such forfeitures: this is an important point, upon the efficacy of which I place great reliance. Common sense points out that the proper and legitimate end of such forfeitures should be providing the duty which the seaman forfeiting his wages refuses to do.

I think it clear that its supposed application prevents its controlling seamen, and that this mistaken notion exists very generally (as to its application) there is no doubt. The books of Greenwich Hospital I believe will prove that the amount received under the head of "seamen's forfeitures" is "nil," or next to it; thus showing the law, as to any forfeitures whatever from merchant-ships being of value to that institution, to be altogether abortive.

I therefore repeat that I consider the greatest benefit may be expected to follow a proper understanding in this respect, and that it will effect a salutary control over seamen, beyond any other measures that can be devised; the punishment of imprisonment being added for any refusal to comply with the orders of their superiors. It should be *clearly enacted* that nothing whatever is to justify a seaman, having once entered into an agreement with the master, fulfilling his duty and obeying the orders he receives. If he is oppressed, he must resort to his remedy at law on the conclusion of the voyage; but away from a British port, or not under an English consul abroad, nothing whatever is to justify him refusing the orders of his superiors. Loss of wages and all he has on board (as some compensation to the owners), and imprisonment and hard labour (as due to the public for the consequences it may suffer), being the certain consequence; a commitment for such offence being a bar to all proceedings in the Admiralty Court; cancelling all engagements with him on the part of the master; wherever there is a British consul, or magistrate, or a British man-of-war, it being imperative upon all these authorities to take up the complaint of the master, and no discretion left them as to awarding punishment, beyond choosing between one, two, or three months' imprisonment. The present law which obliges a master to keep a seaman on board until returned to a British port (port of discharge, I believe) is absurd. The contract with such a man should be binding upon the master no longer than the man does his duty; and at an English colony or foreign port where there is a British consul, or encountering a man-of-war, he should be delivered up, and charge taken of him as an offender against the laws, and treated accordingly. I believe a seaman thus treated would not be guilty of a second offence; he would be taught to respect his superiors, and the effect would be to train him as a better man, a better member of civilized society, and likely to adapt himself more readily to the discipline of a King's ship when the public service requires him.

In cases of desertion abroad, the present articles of agreement very properly provide that twenty-four hours' absence without leave shall be considered a total desertion; and the law says that forfeiture of wages, clothes, &c., shall be the consequence. This, although pretty explicit, is not sufficient, as I believe that if a master was peremptorily to refuse a man under such circumstances to return on board, he would run great risk of an Admiralty prosecution, if he left him in a foreign port, supposing the man willing to resume his duties: this should be better understood, as the penalty, upon a master leaving a man unprovided for

abroad, is very severe; I do not know by what particular law made so, but I believe it subjects him to six months' imprisonment, and a heavy fine. The articles of agreement, as at present worded, leaves a man at liberty to absent himself as many times during a ship's stay in a foreign port as he pleases, provided he returns on each occasion within twenty-four hours: it would be only reasonable, under such circumstances, to allow a mulct of his wages, at all events, during such absence. I would suggest, that whenever a man is not found at his duty on board at the commencement of work in the morning, that his day's pay should be forfeited to the owners, and as much more as may be paid for the lieu of a man in his stead, should the business of the ship induce the master to hire a substitute. This abatement of a man's pay no doubt could be made under existing laws, or without any law, is so reasonable, that it could be effectually enforced; and yet I doubt not, if attempted at present, there are hundreds of alongshore attorneys who would readily institute proceedings in the Admiralty Court, upon such deduction being made. It should be specially provided for, as should likewise desertion, namely, that twenty-four hours' absence without leave is sufficient justification in a master refusing, under any circumstances, the man's return on board.

The law should be extended to all voyages whatever, which now only applies to the West India colonies, making all wages a seaman may earn on board a ship he may choose to join abroad, the property of the owners of the ship he deserts from, until his arrival in England; no master being at liberty to ship an English seaman in a foreign port, without he has a written certificate of the man's discharge: the presumption being that, in the absence of such certificate, he is a deserter, therefore his wages recoverable from the master so receiving him, upon application to any magistrate, no equivocation being allowed. Even should the man have agreed to work his passage, the whole amount he may have agreed for, or under any circumstances no less than the current wages, must be refunded; and provided such deserter can be recovered by the master of the ship he leaves, all magistrates, consuls, &c., to aid such recovery, should the master require it, and the interests of the ship induce him to insist upon such man's return.

There remains to notice extreme cases of offence, and such as will sometimes occur from turbulent characters, whom nothing but force can effectually control: these men and their actions no rule can be laid down for; to quell their immediate mutiny and insubordination must be left entirely to the discretion of the commander, to use such means as circumstances place at his disposal, and the nature of the case and the safety of the ship committed to his charge demand. However ineffectual any measures that can be adopted too frequently will be, under the unfortunate circumstances attending such troublesome characters forming an influential portion of a crew, yet was there but certain punishment defined to follow the conviction of violent conduct on the part of seamen on board a merchant-ship, I believe few instances would occur. At present a seaman may, short of personal violence, proceed to any extent of insolence; and let his conduct be ever so insulting and abusive, I do not know that the law awards any punishment for it; he may defy the master and his officers, and use every species of indecent and abusive language before passengers and crew, and I should like any one to inform me how the master is to be compensated for such insults? Nay, even proceeding to personal violence, to whatever extent (short of murder, or attempt

thereat) is, as far as I know, only to be met by action for damages, or common indictment for assault; no sufficient compensation can, in fact, be awarded, but surely some certain punishment should await upon such conduct.

I consider that every seaman on board a British merchant-ship that is proved before a magistrate, consul, or British officer, as having been guilty of mutinous conduct, an assault upon the master, or upon any superior officer (say of the rank of mate) should be committed for trial at the public expense, and if convicted, transported for life; that upon conviction of even personal abuse towards the master, or assaulting an officer, he should be transported for seven years,—some minor punishment being attached to abuse towards any superior whatever,—and upon conviction of refusal to defend a ship before an enemy, or under circumstances of distress, he should suffer death,—loss of wages, and all he has on board of course to be added; and evidence *in all cases* to be immediately taken before the proper officer of the court, to prevent the detention on shore of the master and witnesses, the fear of which tends at present effectually to prevent prosecutions for offences committed at sea.

It is quite erroneous to suppose seamen so indifferent about money that their forfeiture of wages (if they could be brought to believe such forfeiture would be inflicted) would be contemplated by them without its affording some considerable check upon them: it is true that they throw away quickly all they earn, when they get ashore, but I know of no men who think more about being curtailed of their earnings. They notoriously delight in grog, pay, and prize-money; though they squander their hard-earned money in the most thoughtless manner of any people existing; and as respects their clothes, and whatever they may have on board, becoming forfeit—though this may appear an unworthy retention of what can hardly be of any value—yet to them it is a very material loss; and when their derelictions of duty occur soon after leaving port, often constitutes, in fact, all the hold you have upon them: therefore this forfeiture should be insisted upon in addition to loss of wages upon all occasions.

The laws by which they are to be ruled should be embodied in very plain and simple language in the articles of agreement; as short as possible, divested of all technical terms, and *under distinct heads*,—as at present drawn up the articles are not easily read,—and a copy thereof should be invariably placed in some part of the 'twixt-decks, where their attention is likely to be drawn towards it. Their ignorance of the regulations under which they sail should upon no account be admitted as any excuse; they are bound to know the laws of the land; though it is no uncommon thing to find naval officers, and others, set at nought the articles of agreement at present, if you answer to their inquiries, that they have not been read over to the seamen before signing: they must be supposed to know what they have agreed to. And when upon this subject, it may be as well to observe the present frequent omission of a very necessary act to all mutual agreements, namely, the signature of *both parties*: it is not once in a hundred times that the articles of agreement are executed at all by the master. This arises from the form in which they are at present drawn up; commanders of ships not being always very conversant with legal instruments, fancying that all they have to do is to fill up the blanks,

Whilst suggesting more strict laws for the controlling of seamen, I am for giving them all reasonable protection, and wish to remove every cause of which they can have pretence to complain; and to this end I think there should be some better regulation on the score of victualling, on which I consider they are entitled to as clear an understanding, as their officers are to their obedience. There can be no doubt that much just cause of complaint exists on board merchant-ships in respect to provisions: there is too much uncertainty, and too much left to individual caprice, on this important point. I would have this better arranged, so that a seaman should know what he is entitled to, and that point established, he should have every facility afforded him, by the proper authorities abroad, in obtaining his rations: a scale of victualling should be inserted in the articles of agreement, and I would suggest the following:—

Every man and boy to be allowed daily such quantity of bread as he can consume; but upon the option of the master to be limited to one pound, if appearance of waste induces him to weigh it out; two pounds of beef, or one pound and a half of pork; this allowance to be reduced in the Tropics to one pound and a half of beef, and a pound and a quarter of pork; when beef is served out, each person to have three-quarters of a pound of flour, and when pork, one-third of a pint of split peas. On long passages, when it is considered necessary to limit the consumption of water, six pints per day; if the owners choose to serve out tea and sugar, the rations of meat to be diminished half a pound per day: allowance of tea to be considered two ounces per week, and of sugar, ten ounces. When in harbour fresh meat may be served out in the same proportion as salt at sea, but not reduced in quantity within the Tropics, the quality of the meat generally not admitting of such reduction; and in lieu of flour and peas, half a pound of vegetables (a quarter of a pound of leeks or onions) with sufficient quantity of barley, rice, &c., for the soup. Substitutes for any of the above provisions to be issued at the option of the commander, and on these occasions the scale observed in H.M. ships to be adopted as the rule. Spirits to be considered on all occasions "an indulgence;" custom however rendering it almost necessary that a moderate quantity should be issued; but this is to be entirely at the discretion of the master, having reference, in some measure, to the custom of different voyages, but never to be demanded.

I consider every seaman (doing his duty) as fairly entitled to such rations of good quality; and if, through neglect of the owners in not providing a sufficiency of good provisions (or if withheld by the master), a seaman should not have served out to him his full and proper quantity, that upon proof thereof he should be entitled to be paid by the owners double the value of all deficient. Should the quality be objectionable, the complaint to be investigated by consul, or magistrate, or officers' order, and the people paid the full amount of the cost of all such provisions of objectionable quality, even should they have had the regular quantity issued to them, and (from necessity) have actually consumed the same; and the master should be called upon for proof of his having replaced such defective provisions as he may have remaining on board, before he obtains his clearances to go to sea again. These payments to seamen, for defective or deficient provisions, I would have the master called upon to make on arrival at the first port the ship comes

to. A good regulation on this head is of the first importance to the good government of a ship, it being the chief cause of complaint, and the foundation of ninety-nine disturbances out of one hundred.

It will perhaps be thought by some that the foregoing hints for framing laws to govern seamen in the merchant service, by insisting upon implicit obedience, savour too much of a military character. A ship is however in no other way to be properly conducted. The person in charge *must* be the sole judge of what is necessary to be done. Owners look to the master as the only one responsible for the conducting of the ship on all occasions, and his order must be law. If his authority is carried beyond proper bounds, and oppression ensues, let him be made responsible for his conduct to the utmost; but his authority must, notwithstanding, be submitted to for the time. Naval officers should not complain upon their being obliged to support the masters' authority, as already suggested; they may depend upon it that the consequences would be, the saving of themselves a great deal of trouble in the end, by preparing seamen, whilst in the merchant service, for the discipline of a King's ship. No ordinary laws can be sufficient to control men totally out of the reach of the civil magistrate; and this can only be effected by dread of the punishments that await them on arrival in port, or encountering a man-of-war. Through the fear of severe measures, alone, are such a lawless set of beings to be controlled.

I have only, in conclusion, to add one word of advice to commanders and officers of merchant-ships, which is to consider those placed under their authority as entitled to the treatment of rational beings, and to avoid the too common practice of attempting to support their authority by the use of language *which is not borne by any other description of men whatever*. It may be depended upon that this habit is subversive of all order, and the use of it lowers the commanders and officers to a level with the people immediately. A slight consideration of the subject ought to convince any one, that it is only to be attributed to the opinion a body of ignorant people have of a man placed in authority over them that obedience is to be looked for; this enables the influence of the few to control the many, and has upheld governments in all ages, much more than physical force; and there is, it may be relied upon, no such effectual way to secure influence and complete command over a body of seamen, as to impress them with the belief that their commander is really their superior. I look upon seamen to be more especially under the control of this influence than perhaps any other body of men, probably from its being so seldom exercised over them. The most hardened and lawless will rarely venture upon offensive language when addressing an officer who has supported this character in a proper manner; and in cases even of mutiny, personal respect has been found on most occasions to protect officers from outrage. It must, however, be admitted, that an evenness of temper, and steady deportment, is most difficult to be preserved, under the often irritating circumstances in which commanders and officers of ships are placed; but the value of it is unquestionable, and the practice of the navy, according with it more than it did formerly, is proving its effective influence daily, the same being brought to perfection in the army long ago.

A MASTER OF A BRITISH MERCHANT-SHIP.

## IMPRESSMENT.

WE believe there is no thinking man upon whose mind the bare idea of impressment fails to produce, not only a painful conviction of its cruelty and injustice, but an ardent desire, moreover, for the adoption of some means by which the voluntary services of our seamen may (in seasons of danger) be secured to their country, without the barbarous intervention of force or compulsion; and it is, no doubt, a most singular paradox, that a nation like Great Britain,—proud, and justly proud of the freedom of her citizens,—should, in the hour of danger, have that boasted freedom secured by placing,—we had almost said into hopeless bondage,—one of the best and bravest portions of her community.

It is not (on the present occasion, at least) our intention to occupy the time of our readers in tracing the origin of so strange an anomaly in the institutions of a free country, or in pointing out the many moral evils which the practice of impressment in war has entailed upon our maritime population; we shall, therefore, content ourselves with a short discussion, chiefly to show that the measure itself is altogether unnecessary;—that even in the most worldly point of view, setting justice, and morals, and mercy aside altogether, the cost of impressment during the late war was infinitely greater than the expense would have been, had the voluntary and limited services of our seamen been fairly hired and adequately rewarded. Impressment is a question which must presently occupy the attention of the legislature: hitherto, discussion has been most sedulously repressed by every government. The Tories of old did nothing for our seamen, and the Whigs procured their celebrated Jervis act, by which it was declared felony for a free-born British sailor to resist the call of an impress-warrant. The practice of impressment was of much more general application in the earlier periods of our history, and many instances might be quoted of the reckless and high-handed manner in which this part of the royal prerogative was exercised throughout the empire. With this, however, we have nothing at present to do; nor do we pretend to question the legality of the measure; it is the necessity of impressment that we deny, and there is no other argument on which the controversy can for one moment be supported: let us therefore examine this alleged necessity. Some of the advocates of impressment say the system is necessary, because government cannot afford to offer high wages to our seamen in time of war; others contend for the necessity of impressment, because the dangers of battle prevent our sailors from serving in king's ships;—and there was not wanting a gallant admiral in the House of Commons, who, when the question was touched upon a few years ago, manfully stood out for the necessity of impressment, because many distinguished officers had entered the service through that channel. The first of these arguments is well worth our serious attention: they knew little of British seamen who gave heed to the second;—that of the gallant admiral was well replied to at the time,—“many a kidnapped youth has become a wealthy planter in former days in Virginia,—and many a Mameluke has been bought as a slave to recruit the troops over whom he ultimately rose to command. Nobody, however, thinks of maintaining, on the force of these examples, that kidnapping is the best way of breeding respectable colonists, or the slave-market the best supply for the army.”



To return to the first argument in favour of impressment, viz. that government cannot afford to offer high wages for the labour of seamen in war, and is therefore under the necessity of using compulsory means to obtain it, we have already said that it is not our intention to make any observations on the moral evils of impressment: let us therefore investigate this alleged necessity of the measure, as a mere question of political economy, which naturally resolves itself into—whether is it cheaper to hire voluntarily, or compel involuntarily, and under pain, the services of our seamen in time of war? Government has always decided in favour of the latter alternative on the commencement of a war, and never attempted to come into market at the regular price; hence the enormous rise of wages in the merchant service,—not on account of the war-demand for seamen, but in consequence of the violence used to obtain them, which caused multitudes of our best men to expatriate themselves when their services were most required;—while the dread of impressment drove those who remained into hiding in port, when they might have been usefully employed in getting their ships ready for sea. The wages of the merchant service were kept up to a most unnatural height, moreover, because the dread of impressment deterred boatmen, and lightermen, and fishermen, and other half sailors from flocking to sea when prices became inordinately high, and bringing them down to their proper level. The same cause operated in preventing young men of good education and respectable connexions from embarking in the merchant service: men who, no doubt, would have exercised an energetic and beneficial influence on the minds of the common men; and thus intelligence was virtually banished from the merchant service by the system of impressment. Had the rise of seamen's wages in the merchant service in war been occasioned solely by the war demand, a corresponding advance must have taken place in the wages of maritime artizans, shipwrights, sail-makers, &c. who are every bit as necessary as seamen in the equipment of a fleet. No such advance took place till long after the breaking out of the war of 1793; and when a trifling rise did take place in the wages of these men, it was occasioned by the general rise of prices;—the general rise of prices, however, has no effect upon the seamen—food and lodging being always found by his employer.

If concealment, expatriation, and the dread of impressment force up our seamen's wages, say even one pound per month—and they were a great deal higher during the war—above their natural level, all the surplus must necessarily fall upon the nation, indirectly it is true, but in the advanced price of those commodities which are brought hither in ships; which, added to the expensive machinery of impressment, guard-ships, receiving-ships, press-gangs, tenders, &c. &c., will be found to have cost this nation at least four times as much money as would have been required to hire seamen for the King's ships at the regular market-price of labour.

Suppose that, instead of sailors, horses are wanted by government in the breaking out of a war,—say 20,000 horses,—the immediate effect of so large a demand upon the market would, no doubt, be to raise the price of cattle,—but government is willing to give a fair market-price;—what follows?—though for a time there might be considerable difficulty in obtaining the exact size and colour of the horses required,—and though for a time the price of horse-labour would be greatly enhanced,—still the breeders and dealers would be encouraged to go on;

presently the supply would equal the demand—prices would find their level—the dragoons would be mounted upon horses of whatever colour or quality government might think proper to point out, and the pressure on the public would be occasioned more by the rise in general prices (say corn for instance) than by the war-demand. Let us on the other hand suppose, that government says it cannot afford to give the market-price for 20,000 horses,—the plea is necessity; sanctioned, therefore, by ancient enactments, and supported by an armed military police, it goes into the market, and finding no supply can be got under the market-price, immediately takes the horses by force, throws down half the value in return, and justifies the proceeding on the score of necessity,—how would this affect the market? On the very first hint of such a process being in contemplation, would not the proprietors of, and dealers in, valuable horses, ship them off to foreign markets, or place them, if possible, in concealment till this could be effected? Would not the breeders relinquish their unprofitable occupation? Horses, of course, would become scarce; persons engaged upon the road would then be compelled to employ cattle of an inferior description, or such as are blind, broken-winded, or lame; those employed in agriculture and the transit of goods would be forced to employ foreign horses, or such as could not be impressed. All this would raise the price of horse-labour to an enormous extent; while the nation would be indirectly burdened with this unnatural rise in the price of labour, and directly taxed for the maintenance of the armed force, the horse-pressgang as it were, whose business it would be to rob the people under sanction of the laws.

The same argument applies to sailors. Suppose the country were at this moment threatened with a war,—say with the Northern powers,—and that 20,000 men were required for the Baltic fleet—a force, larger by 1512 men than that which fought and conquered at Trafalgar: if no impressment were intended, there would be, on the breaking out of the war, a very considerable force of seamen to relieve the pressure of the Admiralty demand upon the market; all the sailors employed in our extensive trade with Norway, and both sides of the Baltic would be thrown idle the moment war were declared, and of course would help to keep down the pressure of the war demand; but let us suppose impressment to be the order of the day,—this disposable force, with as many others as possibly can, would go into concealment, or flow off to America, with that facility with which sailors, more than any other class of persons, can change their place of location;—while the dread of impressment would deter fishermen, &c. from going to sea, and keeping wages at their natural level.

While government employ coercive measures, the merchants are necessarily forced to meet those measures by the offer of higher wages. Thus government commences, on the breaking out of the war, by impressing all the seamen that can be found afloat. Expatriation and concealment begin: the merchant meets this by offers of higher wages. Government next introduces press-gangs into all the sea-port towns of the kingdom. The merchant is forced, to offer high wages, to induce boatmen, fishermen, nay, even the idle and dissolute of our cities, to brave the terrors of impressment. Government sends the military to assist the press-gangs—higher wages still in the merchant service, to bring over foreigners to do the work of British seamen. Thus coercion and advance of wages go hand in hand. The nation, as we have

already said, is directly taxed for the maintenance of troops, press-gangs, &c., and indirectly burdened by the advanced price of commodities, incident to the unnatural rise in seamen's wages. In the mean time, the navy will be indifferently manned, and the commercial marine will soon cease to be British.

Impressment, therefore, was not only the means of creating an enormous indirect burden on the nation, but also a heavy direct tax. It drove our best seamen into banishment, it excluded intelligence from the merchant service, and consigned our ships to the care of invalids and foreigners. It involved us in an expensive war with America\*—and, finally, like the celebrated decrees of Milan and Berlin, fairly defeated the object for which it was designed. At the close of our protracted struggle with France, while the army had risen to the highest pitch of glory, the navy had absolutely deteriorated; which would not have been the case had those men who were serving at the guns of our enemies (the Americans) been encouraged; nay, had they been only suffered to remain by their native country.

There has been no want of seamen since the peace. That they are good and efficient men, witness Algiers and Navarino. This is chiefly occasioned, because wages have been suffered to remain at their natural level since the peace. Those in men-of-war are at a fair remuneration price; those in the merchant service have since averaged more than from 2*l.* 3*s.* to 2*l.* 5*s.*, from the port of London. Whereas, in the days of impressment, we have known them as high as 6*l.* per month.

It was long ago said by Sir Matthew Decker, "That the Grand Signior cannot do a more absolute act, than to order a man to be dragged away from his family, and against his will run his head against the mouth of a cannon. And if such were frequent in Turkey, upon any set of useful men, would it not drive them away to other countries, and thin their numbers yearly,—and would not the remaining few double or treble their wages?—which is the case with our sailors in time of war, to the great detriment of our trade and manufactures."

We may be asked,—suppose a case of sudden emergency, in which the adequate number of sailors cannot be procured, what would you propose? There have been many expedients suggested in such a case. For our own part, we consider that proposed by the sailors themselves, as much the best. Register, say they, the whole maritime population; let us have limited service, and adequate remuneration; let no convict be sent into the fleet; at the expiration of service, let such as call for it, receive a certificate of exemption, and those who return with a certificate of good and faithful service, some civic honour, say a medal, the freedom of their native place, or a vote in the town or borough to which they belong. And if, in addition to this, premium, promotion, and appointment, were held out to the officers, so that they might become the animating spirits, rather than the scare-crows of those men over whom they are called upon to preside,—there would be no more lack of seamen in war than in seasons of peace and tranquillity.

N. C.

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\* It was the *scarc* for seamen, and the occasional impressment of American citizens, that the people of America resented: this was the popular fuel by which the war was maintained, and without which it would not have gone on for three months.

## THE BRITISH CAVALRY ON THE PENINSULA.

AFTER the affair of Toro, the French retreated rapidly, the line of the Douro having been turned, it was necessary to take up a new line, in which the natural difficulties of the country would assist them in checking Lord Wellington's advance. The French were unprepared for a retreat; Lord Wellington, on the contrary, felt confident in the success of his plans, and had everything ready to follow the enemy. The French retired with so much haste as to prevent our coming up with them, and Lord Wellington did not choose to separate his forces, by which means he might have pressed their rear: the route lay through a fine country, and the march was most agreeable. We were reminded of a little incident by reading a very useful code of instructions, drawn up by Colonel Badcock, and published in a late number of the *Journal*\*. The writer was sent in with a flag of truce, and after riding seven or eight miles, he found the French outpost at Duennas. He approached that town without seeing anything of the enemy; no patrols appeared, and it was not till he arrived within a quarter of a mile of Duennas that he observed a single *chasseur à cheval*, posted upon a little round hill. The trumpeter (his sole attendant) sounded; and as it was evident that if he got round the hill on which the *chasseur* was posted, the view to the town would be uninterrupted, he advanced at a canter, and had already got so far as to see a small picquet of *chasseurs*, and the piled arms of at least 100 infantry, when the *vidette*, not approving of this peep behind the outposts, discharged his carbine. The danger was not great, as the *chasseur* had merely a bird's-eye view of us; but as he commenced loading we deemed it advisable to retire a little, to a position where we were concealed from his view. The cavalry officer of the picquet shortly appeared, and, at the request of the flag, a staff officer was sent for, who, when he arrived, received the letter which it was the object of the flag of truce to deliver. The staff officer was a very fine young man, by name Prevost. He spoke English perfectly, and stated that he had a cousin holding a high rank in our service, to whom he begged a message might be sent, with a petition that his cousin would send him a horse, of which he was in great need. This, however, was not the business for which the flag was sent in; and as Charles Prevost was soon afterwards appointed to the Imperial Guard, he probably got a remount from the emperor. It appeared from the conversation of the two French officers that they had a great respect for the hussar brigade. They said that they had heard how anxious the Prince Regent was for the good appearance of the hussars; and they praised the prince for his consideration and proper military feeling in taking the horses out of gentlemen's carriages to mount his own regiment.

From what we saw in our peep behind the *vidette*, there can be little doubt that Count de Gagan, who commanded the rear guard, was determined not to risk his dragoons in any partial encounters, or affairs of posts. The country in front of Duennas is open, yet he had withdrawn all his posts, and that one immediately in front of the town, and

\* That officer suggests the possibility of an officer with a flag of truce getting a peep behind the outposts.

not above a quarter of a mile distant from it, consisted chiefly of infantry. Nothing of importance occurred till we came into the neighbourhood of Burgos. The retreat was executed by the French without loss, and with great rapidity. They were very much favoured by circumstances. The weather was very fine, the roads good, the line through which they passed was not exhausted, and the crops of green corn furnished forage wherever the army halted, without fatigue to the men, or risk of foraging parties being cut off.

The French army collected in the neighbourhood of Burgos, and Lord Wellington halted his leading column, to enable the army to close up. About the 12th or 14th of June, Lord Wellington made a strong reconnoissance, and dislodged a French corps, which retired upon Burgos. Colonel Grant begged Lord Wellington to allow him to attack the retiring infantry with the hussars; but, in spite of the colonel's pressing solicitations to be allowed to charge, Lord Wellington would not permit it. This movement would probably have established J. M.'s doctrine of the capability of dragoons, well led and ably conducted, being able to break squares of infantry. The writer was sent to reconnoitre the right of the French, taking with him a single well-mounted hussar. He found the French dragoons in occupation of a village with a large plain in front, whose margin was occupied by a line of videttes. That made it impossible to see into the village. Little information could be gained; and the writer retired about half a mile to a slight rise of ground, where he was enabled, with a telescope, to make out the rear of the village. While thus occupied, he directed the hussar to feed his horse,—which might have been done with perfect safety, although, by the carelessness of the man, it led to a ludicrous dilemma. While the horse was feeding by a nosebag, the hussar standing by his side for a moment let go the collar rein while he tightened the girth of his own horse, when the beast galloped off. The writer was disturbed by the hussar's calling out, "Old Tom's loose!" It was a fearful piece of information, within half a mile of the enemy's picket. The horse was indeed concealed from the view of the French videttes by the fall of the ground; but if he galloped a hundred yards, it was all over. And a still more disagreeable circumstance occurred. On looking back, we saw Lord Wellington and his staff approaching at a gallop, and not above a mile distant. We felt aware that had we found an officer of light cavalry in such a situation, our *primâ facie* view would have been very unfavourable to his fitness for his office. The awkwardness of the situation, and the difficulty of explanation, was quite overpowering. The hussar was vainly attempting to catch Old Tom, who allowed him to approach within a few yards, when he went off with a kick and a squeak. We felt assured that the hussar could never do it; and observing that the old rogue had got to a green spot, where there was an abundant vegetation, from its being a well-head, the writer took off his sword, and stealing behind the horse, who was trying to drink, he was able to get hold of some of the horse-furniture; and the horse's fore-legs having sank into the soft ground nearly to the knees before he could disengage himself, he was secured by the head-stalk. A moment sufficed to throw the nose-bag on the ground, and to slip the bit into Old Tom's mouth; when mounting, without fastening a buckle, he was scarcely in his seat when Lord Wellington

ton, rising the ascent from a little brook, was within fifty yards. All was right; and we shall be more cautious in feeding on the outposts.

Lord Wellington was of very few words—no unnecessary ones. “Have you found the right of the French?” “Yes, my lord.” “Where?” “There.” “Get your troop and watch them.” Away went the general, on matters of more importance. We got the troop, and shoved back the line of videttes far enough to see a host of French dragoons, of which we sent notice. The videttes were supported, and throwing out a few skirmishers, we retired out of shot.

We had in the troop a Dutchman, for whom we had a great regard; but some people had taken up a notion that he wished to desert. He was a clever man; and we had soon an opportunity of making use of him, and at the same time of ascertaining his loyalty. The French withdrew their videttes, and were apparently retiring. We sent the Dutchman, Jaen Teer, to skirt the village, and ascertain what the enemy was doing. It was evidently better to obtain information in this way than with a single troop, unsupported, to follow the enemy into a large village, composed of several streets. We saw Jaen Teer perform his duty admirably; and having attained a point whence he saw the whole operations of the French, he came back with the report that several squadrons were retiring through the wood, but that the enemy still retained a post outside of the village. As Jaen had thus been close to the enemy, while he was completely separated from his own people, there could be no doubt that, whatever were his intentions, he had no wish to desert. This was very satisfactory. Alas! poor Jaen was doomed to enjoy his fair fame but a short time. On the following morning he was reported sick. We found that in preparing his mess the night before, he had used some onions which he had found growing in the field, although orders prohibiting the use of wild vegetables, and, above all, of that poisonous herb, the wild onion, had been repeatedly read to the troops. He lived only two days.

On the following day a great part of the army, or perhaps the whole of it, moved to the left, and crossed the Ebro at St. Martin. The French army retired upon Vittoria. A gallant attack was made upon a division of French infantry by the light division, which drove the enemy from a strong position, walking them down.

The army was collected on the 20th, and we visited the outposts that evening, which were held by a brigade of Portuguese dragoons, closely supported by the 4th division. When we got to the picquet, a flag of truce, as it turned out to be, had come to the outposts, and driven in the videttes. The Portuguese had made a proper kettle of fish of it. (We beg to be excused so homely an expression,—it is the most apt which occurs to us; and we do not mean to tell the story, which was abundantly ludicrous.)

On the 21st, the following day, the battle of Vittoria was fought. The field was a beautiful one, and probably the position was a pretty good one, although certainly too extensive for the army which occupied it. The chain of hills on the French left was strongly occupied, and capable of a good defence; but Lord Wellington, by turning the right of the enemy by a flank movement of General Graham's corps, threw them into confusion, and placed them in imminent danger of being altogether destroyed. It has been said that the French army was equal

in force to the British; but we doubt this, excepting in artillery, in which arm the French were probably superior; in cavalry we were decidedly superior, both in quality and quantity: and as above 25,000 men were detached under Generals Foy and Clausel, they were probably inferior to us in troops of the line.

We have seen in some French works, that one of the reasons why Joseph fought at Vittoria, instead of retiring to the strong ground behind Salvatierra, was, that he wished for a field on which he might employ *sa belle cavalerie*,—a worse reason could not have been given for maintaining his position at Vittoria, which was a place of consequence to him, both from its own importance, and as covering the road to Bilboa, as well as those into France. We chanced to meet a curé on the French side of the Pyrenees, at whose house General Merlin had been quartered shortly after the battle, who said that the general was furious, exclaiming against Joseph, and vowing that the matériel of three armies (that is to say the armies of the south, the centre, and of Portugal) had been sacrificed to save fifty *putaines* and their baggage. This is a more likely reason, for Joseph thought more of *ses belles filles* than of *sa belle cavalerie*. Never was a general action in which cavalry was so little made use of. We do not recollect the charge of a single French squadron, nor of their being employed till the afternoon, when they behaved very steadily, and covered their infantry when it was in confusion.

It is more to be lamented that the British cavalry was so little employed. Nothing could surpass the condition of the horses, and nothing had been neglected to put that arm on the most efficient footing. At the close of the action it is difficult to say what might not have been accomplished by a combined attack of the cavalry and artillery; and had the divisions been accompanied by a few dragoons during the battle, they would have been of great use in forcing the retreating columns to form, instead of their being allowed to run off in loose order, by which means they were enabled with ease to get away from our victorious infantry. It unfortunately happened that Sir S. Cotton, who had commanded the cavalry since the battle of Talavera, and who continued to do so to the end of the war, was absent in England, and no one had been appointed in his place. We believe that the gallant Baron Boch was the senior officer; but as he did not appear to take a lead in directing the movements of the body, it is probable that he was not authorized to act as commander of the cavalry.

The squadron to which the writer of these pages belonged was ordered to be ready to escort Lord Wellington on the morning of the 21st, and turned out two hours before daylight. The day was just breaking when Lord Wellington galloped past the squadron, accompanied by a single staff-officer, and went directly towards the enemy's videttes, which were posted along the river Zadora. The first shot fired that day was at his lordship. As the day cleared Lord Wellington repaired to an eminence, from which the posts and most part of the French position could be seen. The covering squadron of course followed; and the writer had the satisfaction of sitting within a few yards of the great chief during the whole time he was directing the attack. It is difficult to describe the perfect coolness, nay, apparent unconcern, with which Lord Wellington gave the most important orders, directing the advance

of a division as he perceived it could act with effect. In the early part of the morning, his eyes were continually directed to that part of the scene where he expected to see the head of Sir Thomas Graham's column appear, which corps was intended to turn the enemy's right, and prevent his retreat by the Bayonne road. Sir Thomas had found the roads worse than had been expected, which occasioned delay; and we believe that the attack was made before his corps appeared. Sir Rowland Hill had been warmly engaged for some time, and had driven the corps opposed to him from its position with considerable bloodshed.

The last order we heard was, that the light division, supported by the hussar brigade, should attack the round hill, which was covered with troops, and which, from the place we occupied, nearly blocked up our view of the valley of the Zadora. As we descended to the foot of the round hill which the light division was to attack, (*i. e.* to carry,) we saw its summit bristling with bayonets. To the top was an ascent of probably three hundred yards. We were behind the 52d, which was formed in echelon, if we recollect rightly; as the hill became steeper, we gained upon the infantry; and before we had proceeded one hundred yards, we were close up to them. The writer was behind Capt. Curry's company; perhaps the reader was acquainted with Hunter Curry,—if so, he will rejoice to be reminded of that gallant, honourable soldier, and warm-hearted friend; if otherwise, we must still beg to be allowed to offer our tribute of esteem to the memory of one whom we held dear. We have seen Curry in many situations,—in all of them we recollect the perfect gentleman, the amiable and agreeable companion. Previous to the Peninsular war, when interesting subjects were rare, he used to give the mess a detail of the events at the camp on the Curragh of Kildare; and if he was attacked for telling an old story, he always managed to silence his adversary by some witty, but always good-humoured remark. As we ascended the hill, he leant upon the neck of the writer's horse, and nineteen years have not effaced the pleasing recollection of the kindly smile and beaming eye of our friend, who, elated by the prospect of again walking down the enemy, said, "If we do not find them at the top of the hill, we shall find them somewhere else." As we approached the crest of the hill, we marched with silence, in momentary expectation of a volley. The French had retired; the hussar brigade was halted and sent to the right, towards the high-road; the 52d proceeded in pursuit, overthrew the French, and forced them back in confusion; and the brave Curry received a mortal wound while in front of his company waving his cap on the point of his sword and cheering his men to fresh deeds of valour. After moving about for some time, the hussar brigade formed in line, at a considerable distance in the rear. The Blues were in the act of dressing their line, when they were observed by the French batteries, which opened upon them, and the second shot killed one of the men.

When the retreat of the French was general, the hussar brigade was ordered to the front. In our movement to the front, we passed a fine brigade of Portuguese infantry formed in line, and proudly advancing through some corn-fields. An English officer who saw the French retiring before the Valerosos, said, in their hearing, "The enemy takes them to be English." Immediately the ensign advanced in front of the line, and waving the white banner of Braganza, shouted



"Viva el principe." It was pretty generally allowed, that under ordinary circumstances, the Portuguese infantry was little inferior to our own,—thanks to the exertions of Marshal Beresford, and the gallant British officers he placed in the Portuguese ranks.

The hussar brigade, was directed to the left of the town; the ground was flat, and apparently well-suited to the operations of cavalry. In passing through it we found it intersected by deep gulleys, so broad as to make it necessary to ride into them. The 15th hussars were in front, and passed a dozen or more of these cuts in their passage round the town, without meeting with any opposition. A few French infantry might be seen here and there. When we had nearly completed the circuit, a gun was brought up within two hundred yards; we saw it unlimbered and loaded, and were in, momentary expectation of a discharge. Our advance, however, was so rapid, although two of the gulleys intervened, that the French had not even time to give us one shot, but passed off at speed.

We now entered upon an uninterrupted plain of some extent,—it was a scene of confusion. We passed through a crowd of broken infantry, who threw down their arms, although probably some resumed them, and got a shot at the hussars when they had passed on. The leading squadrons of the 15th charged some French chasseurs, upset them, and completely cleared the foreground. It was then we perceived heavy masses of French cavalry, who did not attempt to deploy; but Sir Colquhoun Grant discovered that he was accompanied by the single regiment which he had gallantly led into action. A staff officer had, most unwarrantably, stopped the other part of the brigade, and turned it through the town; and had not even given notice to Colonel Grant that he had done so. As soon as Colonel Grant discovered what had happened, he rallied the 15th, and formed line. But any further attack was out of the question; indeed, had the whole brigade been up, the French would have been an overmatch for it. But an attack would have been justifiable, and even advisable, as the British centre was coming up, and would soon have compromised the safety of the French dragoons. As it was, some skirmishing and cavalier sabreing occurred; when Captain Webber Smith's guns arrived, and as soon as he could clear away our men, he opened with canister shot upon the retiring dragoons, who abandoned the whole of the baggage of the French army, waggons, carriages, and packages of every description. The dragoons attempted to carry off some mules, but their loads were too heavy, and they were nearly all taken. In the ditches were seen mules struggling to shake off their cargoes, guns which had been abandoned by the artillerymen, and dying horses which had been struck by the grape-shot. One of the divisions of infantry came up to our right, it was preceded by Captain Norman Ramsay, with some guns. He was pressing forward with as much anxiety, as if the success of the day depended on his personal exertions. As soon as he saw the column of French dragoons he unlimbered, and dismounting, laid one of the guns himself, and marked the effects of its fire, heedless of our friendly cheer; so completely was he engrossed in his own occupation. We feel convinced that no man in the army was more entitled to promotion than this officer; and it was deeply to be regretted that he did not share in the honours which were bestowed for the victory. His valour was

allowed to pass unrewarded, in consequence of a mistake which had been very unintentionally made by a staff officer. He was harshly dealt with, and we should at any other time have told the story as we have heard it; but now, when every foul-mouthed ruffian belches out his venom against the great chief, we cannot join in the cry against a man whose splendid talents are an object of veneration to every military man. Norman Ramsay commanded the admiration of all his companions in arms,—which after all, is the most pleasing reward of merit.

After clearing the obstacles in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, the French dragoons formed, and retired in good order, protecting the broken infantry. Then was the time that an efficient attack might have been made by the British cavalry. No attempt of the sort was made. The army soon after was halted, and encamped in the advance of the town. We are decidedly of opinion, that the close of the battle of Vittoria was one of the finest opportunities ever offered to the cavalry of a successful army. The infantry had fully performed its duty. The arrangements of the Commander-in-Chief had been such, that the enemy could at no time have hoped for a successful termination to the battle. The divisions of the French army were defeated in succession: the whole of the guns, save two, had fallen into our hands, as well as the reserves of ammunition; consequently the French infantry had nothing to depend upon but the cartridges remaining in the soldiers' pouches, which, in many of the divisions, must have been very small. The cavalry of the enemy was very inferior in number to ours; and lastly, the retreat of the French lay through an open country. Had the attack of cavalry been unsuccessful, which is a most improbable supposition, the enemy could not have profited by our failure. The infantry was coming up, and would have prevented the adverse cavalry from taking advantage of their success. But on the other hand, supposing the British horse to have driven the French dragoons out of the field, the infantry mob was at their mercy. Many thousands of them must have been made prisoners, and those who escaped would have only found safety in retiring from the high road; and in the hill country, would have fallen a prey to the guerillas. Is it possible that any one can be so unreasonable as to blame the British cavalry for not taking advantage of these favourable circumstances? We answer yes. There are but too many who find it easy to censure the cavalry; asserting, that the infantry fought a hard battle, and gained a victory, while the dragoons would do nothing.

We recollect hearing of a major of brigade, who threatened to punish a guard for coming a file short, (*i. e.*) to punish the thirty-nine files who did their duty, for the fault of the fortieth which was absent. It is equally unfair to censure the British cavalry, who cannot be accused of remissness in the performance of the duty required of them, and who were most anxious to be employed; and, on that occasion, felt confident of success. By his own genius, and by the bravery of his infantry, Lord Wellington had gained a signal victory. He had freed the north of Spain of the French by one battle. The French were perfectly unprepared for such a disaster, as may be drawn from the state of the garrison Pampluna, which had not two months' provisions; although by economy, and by feeding upon horse-flesh, the place was enabled to hold out much longer. Napoleon was in want of soldiers, and Soult

found some difficulty in getting together an army to carry supplies into Pampluna; which difficulty would have been augmented, had the victory of Vittoria been followed up, and a number of prisoners secured. The only book on the Peninsular war we have at hand is, Colonel Jones' "Account of the War in Spain and Portugal." Colonel Jones states the loss of the French at ten thousand. We should doubt its being so great. As the French had nearly all their artillery (one hundred and fifty-three pieces) in action, the attacking party necessarily must have suffered the greatest loss in killed and wounded; and we never heard of above two thousand prisoners.

So much blame has been attached to the late Sir Harry Burrard for not allowing Sir Arthur Wellesley to follow up the victory of Vimiera, and the censure having been even carried on to Sir Hew Dalrymple's account, for making the subsequent convention, that we must beg to be allowed to institute a comparison between the circumstances of the British army after these two victories. At Vimiera, Sir Arthur Wellesley, known only as the conqueror of Holkar, was at the head of a gallant army of *very* young soldiers. The French had a fine body of cavalry, which had taken little or no part in the action; and a fresh brigade of French infantry arrived from Lisbon just as Junot commenced his retreat. The British had a couple of hundred light dragoons at the beginning of the day, but they had been a good deal employed, and their gallant commander had been killed. At Vittoria Lord Wellington was in a very different position. At Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes, and Salamanca, he had defeated the most eminent of the French marshals. "L'enfant gâté," in his hands, had no longer to boast of the caresses of fortune. The army of Portugal, which proposed to drive the English into the sea, was sent back without inflicting on our armies a third part of the loss it sustained itself. Marshal Marmont, who was considered the most skilful manœuvrer in the French army, was beaten at Salamanca, having been fairly out-manœuvred by the English general, who had, at this period, arrived at the highest point of military distinction. The British infantry felt themselves to be invincible. The cavalry was in beautiful order, and superior in number to the enemy. The French army had lost its guns and stores, and was dispirited by a series of defeats, and, conscious of its inability to check the British infantry, was in full retreat, and absolute disorder. We would ask, which of these two victories might have been followed up with the best prospect of success? It is an idle question, which admits but of one answer. Lord Wellington had accomplished the great object to which his efforts were directed, and he did not descend to what was comparatively of minor importance.

We wish to point out, that the cause of the cavalry doing so little, was not any inherent defect in that body; but Lord Wellington having achieved a brilliant victory, did not choose to commence a cavalry fight; which, if it had terminated honourably to the French, would have been a small off-set to the defeat they had suffered.

## THE SPECTRE OF THE MIST.

At a coffee-house in London I became acquainted with a gentleman whose singular life is worthy of being related. From the first moment I felt interested in the stranger: the naval uniform, and his handsome sunburnt countenance, showed he had visited foreign climes. We generally dined at the same table, but seldom addressed each other. A circumstance, however, brought us intimately acquainted. Indisposition had for some time confined me to my apartment; when I returned to the coffee-room I found my friend in his usual place. He welcomed me with a kind smile, saying, "You have been a long time absent, Sir; I am afraid you have been unwell; and indeed, from your paleness, I fear you suffer still." The restraint which at first existed between us being thus removed, we soon became intimate, and the more I saw of my new friend, the more I esteemed the qualities both of his head and heart. One day he invited me to take a sail with him as far as Greenwich, and we soon reached that noble hospital, which is a refuge for more than two thousand invalid seamen. We had scarcely entered the court when I observed that the eyes of my companion were anxiously in search of some one. With hasty steps he approached an old sailor, with snow-white hair and a weather-beaten countenance, who was seated on a bench warming himself in the sun. The moment the old man saw the Captain, he instantly rose and touched his hat. "Why my old shipmate," said the Captain, "you seem to be lying quietly at anchor here; you have tumbled into a secure and peaceful haven after the storms of life." "Thanks to my King and to you, Sir," said the old man, with a cheerful smile, while he again resumed his seat, "I still sail with a fair wind, and hope to enjoy a few more years yet in this quiet haven. This day twenty-five years since," he continued, with a significant wink, "we little thought to live to see this day, or to reach such a secure port; and to think that I still sail with a fair wind, and have anchorage in this good haven here, to rest from all my toils and cares, is more than I could have looked for. Take it not amiss that I speak thus freely; but our meeting this day brings back many a long yarn." "Yes, yes, Tomkins," said the Captain, "this day twenty-five years since, was a dreadful day; and I would not have given sixpence for either of our lives; but courage and firmness often overcome danger, as the Spectre found who so obstinately persisted in taking up his quarters with us." Tomkins gave a significant nod in reply; and my friend having spoken a few words aside to the old sailor slipped some money into his hand, and we left him.

- On our return my friend informed me that Tomkins had served many years under him; that he was steady and faithful, and that he owed to him his life. This account gave me a desire to hear more of his history, and I requested my friend to gratify me. "Yes," said my companion, with a thoughtful look, "it is indeed a wonderful story, of which I have never yet spoken; but to you, my young friend, I will confide what has never yet crossed my lips:—

"About twenty-five years since I served as Lieutenant on board the *Minerva*. Our ship had gone as convoy to some merchant-vessels

bound to Canton, and it was our intention to return the same way as soon as they had taken in their lading. The season was far advanced, and we were prepared to encounter many dangers. The Captain of the *Minerva* was of a stern and determined character, and so obstinate that he would listen to no one's advice. Avarice was his ruling passion; and from this vice the crew suffered great privations, as he never laid in stores sufficient for the voyage, but trusted to receiving a supply from the merchant-vessels should it be required, without reflecting that if we were to be separated from them, our situation would indeed be dreadful. As we lay at anchor at Java, I thought it my duty to warn the Captain of what might take place; but he replied that it was no business of mine to meddle in matters that did not concern me; and that unless I wished to bring punishment upon myself, I would instantly desist from my impertinent interference. Upon this I was silent, and although we had the fruitful coast of Java before our eyes, yet no one dared approach the island. At length we put to sea, and sailed between Sumatra and Malacca, through the dangerous straits. Here it was that our Captain showed his skill and courage. With the greatest ability he piloted us through the numerous rocks and sand-banks by which we were encircled, and the merchant-vessels followed in our course. We safely passed the dangerous sound; but we had hardly reached the open sea, when a dreadful storm arose, which raged during the whole of the night. Our vessel, though good and strongly built, yet sustained some damage, though fortunately not of much consequence. But you may imagine our horror, when daylight broke, on finding that the ships under convoy had all disappeared. Not a sail was to be seen. For the first time, the captain seemed anxious and discomposed. All on board were aware that the cutter had only provisions for a few days; the evil which I had anticipated had now overtaken us; and with one voice the crew insisted that we should return, and procure provisions at the first port. This proposal recalled the captain to himself. A dark shade overspread his countenance, while, with a voice of thunder, he exclaimed, 'Silence, every man of you! The first who dares to murmur, I shall hang at the yard-arm. I know my duty; I command here; my orders shall be obeyed, though every soul should go to the bottom.' To this none had the courage to reply. I myself could not but wonder at this bold speech.

"For some days we continued to cruise in the Eastern Ocean, without meeting a single sail, and always receding from the coast. The daily rations at length were so diminished that, from exhaustion, the crew were disabled from working the ship. I now remarked that the Captain had become extremely irritable; his countenance alternately changed from the flush of fever to the paleness of death. The orders which he formerly issued with determination, were now given with intemperance; and if not instantly obeyed, the crew were severely punished. Amongst others, Tomkins was harshly punished for a very trifling fault; but on my remarking that this was from the effects of fever, he thought no more of the matter. The same day, the Captain died. His body was the first that was food for the fishes: but many were to follow. Already had the Spirit of Destruction marked us for his prey.

"After the Captain's death, I assumed the command. As I thought it probable that the dispersed vessels were driven to the coast of Sumatra,

I determined to bend our course there, and this determination gave universal satisfaction to the crew. The state of exhaustion, however, to which hunger had reduced us, rendered our reaching the coast so improbable, that a feeling of despondency took possession of us. Notwithstanding all our economy and care in regard to distributing the provisions, to our horror we found that we had only one day's allowance on board; and, even with a favourable wind, we could not expect to reach the nearest coast in less than five or six days. With a heavy heart I watched the ship's course, which, with a slight wind, moved slowly on. The heat now became oppressiye. I was the only one on deck. When twilight began, Tomkins approached with a mysterious look, and said, in a half-whisper, 'Lieutenant, it goes ill with us; in a short time the Minerva will be driven out to the open sea. Have you not remarked the oppressive heat? See how her sails flap together! All hope is past, for there will be a dead calm, which will last for many days.' 'Tomkins,' I replied, 'you yesterday predicted calm weather; it may be so; but may we not be fortunate enough to procure some fish or wild fowl? or perhaps we may fall in with some vessels that will bring us assistance?' 'Sir,' answered Tomkins, with a serious look, 'don't be offended that I speak my mind freely. I am not the man to grumble at the want of provisions. Do you think that an empty larder is depressing to me? that that is the evil I dread? No, no; old Tomkins has suffered that privation too often to be cast down by it. But,' continued he with earnestness, 'there is a spirit coming on board, which is always the forerunner of destruction. Do you see nothing, Sir? Do you not observe something extraordinary upon deck? Hist! it moves!' he exclaimed in a suppressed voice. And now I did remark that the evening mist had assumed a strange and spectral form, which laid itself down upon the deck. 'How, Tomkins!' said I in an ironical tone, 'have you no other grounds for your anxiety than the phantoms which are raised by the mists of the evening? You, who are an old sailor, ought to know that this frequently occurs without any evil agency.' 'Ah, to be sure,' grumbled the old sailor, 'every cabin-boy would stare at me if I did not know that; but a fog in this shape, and upon these seas, is something worse than common evening mist. Have you never heard, Lieutenant,' he continued, 'of the Sea Spectre?' I shook my head. 'Well,' said he, 'I shall tell you of this spirit, of which I have heard from old sailors who have been in these seas. It is well known that this spectre comes on board every vessel which has the misfortune to enter these seas. Over the winds and the provisions has this spirit, which is called the Spectre of the Mist, no power, but only over the wretched crew. It takes its place at the helm, and steers where it thinks fit. This spectre seems every moment to increase in size; it begins to move a few steps from the helm, to which it soon returns, and at every step it takes dooms its victims to death; but if it once reaches the other end of the ship, all hope is lost, and the spectre either brings the captive ship on a rock, or sinks it in the deep.'

"The story of the old sailor appeared so truly ridiculous, that but for our melancholy situation I would have laughed outright. 'Tomkins,' said I, as I turned to go to the cabin, 'I fear not your spectre: we have enough of real evils, without troubling ourselves with a fabulous

spirit.'—'We shall see enough of it by and bye,' grumbled the old man as I left him.

"Want of sustenance, and the fatigue of watching upon deck, had so much exhausted me, that I soon fell into a deep slumber. About midnight I was suddenly awakened by a dreadful tumult on deck;—the noise of voices, the clashing of swords, and the firing of pistols, became tremendous. I flew to the door, but, to my rage and disappointment, I found it locked. This is mutiny,—was my first thought. I called on the mate, the boatswain, on old Tomkins, but no one answered me. I went to the cabin window, and listened attentively; the tumult appeared to be over the gangway. I fired my pistol, but no notice was taken of it.

"It was nearly an hour before the affray ceased; I heard the boatswain exclaim—'Surrender instantly, you rascals! or, as sure as you are imps of Satan, I'll fire the powder-room, though we all should dance in the air together.' This threat seemed to take effect, for I again heard the boatswain say—'Ah! it is well, old boy; and now I will bind you so tight, that the blood will spring out from your finger ends. And now, Tomkins,' he added, 'you may go and free the lieutenant, whom we locked in.'

"In a few minutes the cabin-door flew open, and old Tomkins entered, who told me that the crew had broken open the provision-room, and had helped themselves to all that they found there; and that some of them had entered into a conspiracy to barricade the cabin-door, and leave the vessel to its fate. They carried the stolen provisions on deck, where an unexpected reception awaited them: they were immediately attacked by that part of the crew who would not join in their enterprise, and a severe conflict ensued. In the meantime, some of the mutineers had, unobserved, placed the provisions in the boat, which they instantly lowered into the sea; and having taken possession of it, they were soon joined by their companions, who had the good fortune to fight their way through those who opposed them, and to reach the boat in safety. Deep was the indignation of those who remained at the treachery of their companions. All had taken to flight except four, who had been placed as a guard at the door of the cabin. I immediately ordered lights to be hung out, and sent several shots after the cowardly rascals, which unfortunately missed them, and they soon vanished in the dark. In the gangway we found many dead, and some severely wounded: the first we lowered into the sea, and we bound up the wounds of the latter. Our situation was now indeed deplorable.

"At break of day, as I stood mournfully upon deck gazing upon the calm sea, old Tomkins again approached me, saying, 'Well, Sir, you yesterday laughed at me for telling you the spectre would pay the Minerva a visit; but I don't think that you will again take the old sailor Tomkins for a man who troubles his head with a fabulous spirit.' In truth, I did again observe something standing immoveable by the helm, which appeared like the figure of a very large, tall man. Without waiting to reply to Tomkins' remark, I quickly approached this singular apparition. The nearer I approached it, the more indistinct and shadowy it became. When I reached the place where the phantom stood, to my astonishment it had disappeared; but the instant I left the place, the Spectre re-appeared, and assumed the singular form of an old sailor

in a bending attitude. 'See, Lieutenant,' said Tomkins, 'the spectre makes himself sure of a good prey during this night, because he is seen more distinctly. He will now begin to take command of the ship, which he will keep for days.' I knew not what to think of this matter, but on being called down to the cabin, where two of the steersmen lay mortally wounded, I cautioned Tomkins to say nothing of it to any of the crew, as not a man would stir from horror of the apparition. I found both the wounded men at the point of death. The same day, four more of the crew died, and at midnight we had only twelve men on board the *Minerva*.

"When we sunk the last body in the sea, I looked towards the helm, but the apparition had vanished. Tomkins, who stood beside me whispered, that it would again appear in the evening, and that it would be more distinctly seen than hitherto. We had paid the last honours to the dead, and my unhappy comrades had gone below to avoid the oppressive heat, and I stood lost in thought on our melancholy situation; not a breath of air cooled the burning atmosphere; not a star glimmered in the wide horizon. Our vessel rocked from side to side, the helm had lost all power over her. I now apportioned what remained of our provisions to the crew, for myself I retained none. Tomkins was still the most active and unrepining.

"As soon as I had dealt out the small remains of the provisions, I returned on deck. Here I found my favourite dog, *Cynthio*, who, the moment he saw me, turned with feeble steps towards the helm, and looking stedfastly on the place, began to howl. Sorrowfully I called the faithful animal to me. '*Cynthio*,' said I, 'for many years you have faithfully served your master: you must now receive your death from his hand.' I need not express to you what my sensations were; seizing my pistol, a deep groan followed the shot, and then all was still. The report brought all the crew upon deck. With a bitter sigh I gave the dog to the poor fellows. Their repast was soon prepared, and they all expressed their gratitude for the sacrifice I had made. When Tomkins returned upon deck, he approached me and said, 'Lieutenant, you are a generous man, and spare nothing to your crew.' 'Truly, I have never had that in my power until now,' said I; 'I have done nothing more than you would have done, had you been in my place, Tomkins, for I think you a warm-hearted fellow.' 'But,' answered Tomkins, 'I would rather have kept the dog for another and a worse time, which we may yet see.'

"In the evening I felt some one touch my shoulder; I quickly turned round,—it was Tomkins. 'Our steersman is here again,' he whispered; 'see, how restless he becomes, and how he strides backwards and forwards. Courage will not help us here; those over whose heads he walks, are doomed by him, and he makes himself sure of us also.' I now looked towards the helm, and saw the spectre more distinctly than I had done in the morning. On approaching nearer, I remarked with horror and astonishment two eyeless sockets; and the dark and furrowed countenance of the phantom was meagre and ghastly. With crossed arms and measured steps he paced between the helm and the mast. I summoned my courage to my aid, approached and addressed him; but, he silently continued his walk, without appearing to have observed me. I now drew my sword from the scabbard, and made



a thrust at the unbidden guest, but it only cut the air, and the spectre quietly pursued its wanderings. 'You are right, Tomkins,' said I, as I turned to the old man; 'Satan has taken up his abode with us, and I have no power to drive him away.' With a feeling of terror, which till then I had never experienced, I went forward, leaving the spectre to continue his walk undisturbed. The moon had risen; the heavens were bespangled with stars: Tomkins and I were sitting upon deck, lost in thought, when suddenly a wild song arose from the steerage—without doubt the unfortunate beings were endeavouring by this means to restore their cheerfulness. As I was still in hopes that the spectre would suddenly vanish, I looked towards the helm, but to my disappointment I still saw him pacing backwards and forwards as before. Since the evening I had allowed all the work of the ship to stand, as the famished crew were quite unfit for service; and as no exertions on our part could be of the slightest use. All was now quiet in the steerage. That is the calm of desperation, thought I; and as none of them came on deck to enjoy the cool breeze, I went down to enquire the reason, and to my surprise I found them all in a state of insensibility. They had emptied the last anker of rum; the empty keg lay upon the table, and the unhappy crew were extended on the ground, without any signs of life. At first, I thought it was from intoxication, but on finding behind the empty anker, a bottle with *opium* inscribed upon it, and which was also empty, I soon found that the miserable wretches, to console themselves under their privations, had had recourse to this dangerous and fatal remedy. I hastily called Tomkins, and told him my suspicions: we tried to restore them to consciousness, but without success. 'Sir,' said Tomkins, 'I greatly fear none of these poor fellows will ever come to life again: take notice, 'tis not for nothing the spectre is walking over their heads.' He was right. The same night eight of the unhappy crew died in violent convulsions: but the boatswain and cabin boy became sensible next morning. They told us that they had all partaken of the drug, for the purpose of delivering them from their wretchedness. As they had frequently indulged in the use of opium, its operation was slow, but at length death asserted his power, and by mid-day all was over.

"With a mind full of sadness, I paid the last rites to the dead. Tomkins was still active and cheerful, whilst I, who was much younger, could hardly support myself upon this sorrowful occasion. When all was concluded, I became extremely faint. I threw myself down upon deck; everything appeared to move around me, and I soon fell into a stupor: my thoughts wandered and became unsettled. I dreamt that I was on a fertile coast, and that several persons approached me with the most delicious fruits. A number of slaves came near, bearing in their hands cups of gold, which emitted the most delicious perfumes. From this enchanting vision I suddenly awoke; but on opening my eyes I thought I still dreamt, for Tomkins stood before me, holding in his hand some of the fruit I had seen in my dream. Without enquiry I took part of it, from which I found great refreshment. Enquiringly, I looked at Tomkins, who, in confusion, threw down his eyes. 'How came you by this fruit, Tomkins?' I asked after a pause: 'Did you swim for it to-day, sir?—that's a sign we must be near some coast.' 'Not to-day,' said Tomkins; 'but I swam for it when we lay at anchor

on the coast of Java.' 'Impossible, Tomkins!' I replied, as I angrily sprung up; 'surely you could not have kept this refreshing fruit when so many of your messmates were dying of want?' 'I give you my word, sir,' said Tomkins with a firm voice, 'I have always divided my rations with them: they are now dead; but not from famine alone, but from their wounds, and the opium they drank.' This reply placed the old sailor in a very favourable light. He told me he had overheard my conversation with the captain, in regard to our want of provisions, in consequence of which, when keeping watch during the night, he swam secretly to the shore, bought some fruit, and returned without being missed. He expressed his happiness at having an opportunity of showing his gratitude to me, for having saved him from a punishment with which the captain had threatened him. We now went down to the steerage, where he showed me where he had hid the fruit, and some cocoa-nuts, under an old chest.

"In the evening our spectre friend again appeared: he was even more restless than ever. With rapid steps he quickly strode to the bench where we sat, and with a commanding air he stretched forth his right hand. On his deep furrowed features lay the expression of a fiend. By heavens, my young friend, I have stood the battle's thunder without feeling the terror which seized me at the sight of this spectre! The nearer it approached me, a shudder ran through my veins. The dreadful feeling of expectation which filled me, at every turn the spectre took, became at length so insufferable, that drawing a pistol from my belt, I fired at this wandering spirit; but it had not the least effect on him. 'Of what use is it, sir,' said Tomkins, as I threw myself in deep disappointment by his side, 'no human hand can injure him. We, too, are marked out for his sacrifice, and he is compelled to continue his wandering over the whole ship. If he again comes this way we are lost. You had better now write down the melancholy intelligence, how that the cutter *Minerva* and her crew were sunk into the sea.'

"In the evening the spectre again began its wanderings, which continued till next morning. After we had divided the last cocoa-nut, 'Tomkins,' said I, 'I owe my life to you, and the service you have rendered me is the more to be praised, as you will probably live some days longer, and have nothing left for yourself. Let us, Tomkins, boldly meet death as brave seamen, nor fear the spirit as he stands before us with his threatening looks and gestures.' Upon this I went down to the cabin, to give an account of the destruction of the vessel and the crew. I had just finished my document, which was to be thrown into the sea, and believing my last hour to draw near, I lay down in my hammock, when I was suddenly aroused from my uneasy and disturbed slumber, by the joyful voice of Tomkins, who, rushing into the cabin, exclaimed, 'Hurrah, Sir, our deliverance is near. The spectre has disappeared, and a stiff breeze now fills the sails.' I flew upon deck, and found to my relief, that the dreadful spectre had indeed taken to flight; but I could not restrain a sigh at the loss of the crew, as from want of hands we could make but little way. 'Courage, Lieutenant,' said Tomkins, 'if this wind will not take us to any vessels, it may bring them to us. The phantom has taken himself off, that is the principal thing, and convinces me that we will soon be succoured.' Tomkins was so strong in this hope, that in the evening he hung out

lights, and fired a signal gun ; but, as the morning dawned, not a sail could we descry on the wide and solitary ocean. I now gave up to despair, but nothing could damp the hopes of Tomkins. He ascended to the masthead, declaring he would stay there, till he saw a sail, or die like a brave sailor. This affected me much. I threw myself upon deck, there to await our unhappy fate. I was soon roused from my painful reflections by an exclamation from Tomkins, of 'A sail! a sail! —a sail before the wind!' he exclaimed in breathless haste. The joyful intelligence instantly restored my strength. While Tomkins fired a signal gun, I went up the mast, and there saw, not one, two, or three, but four sail. It was the fleet which we had convoyed to Canton, and, to my great joy, I saw the vessels bending their course towards us.

"I was soon in the arms of my friends. Some sailors who were on board, informed us, that the spectre was the apparition of a Portuguese corsair, who two hundred years ago had drowned himself in the Eastern Ocean, from remorse at having, in the most cruel manner, allowed his crew to die of hunger.

"We returned to England. Tomkins made some new voyages with me, after which we went to Greenwich. He is now nearly ninety years of age: we have not met for a year; and, my young friend, this is the anniversary of that day on which the phantom disappeared, whose presence had caused so much terror."

#### NOTICES OF RUSSIA.

##### A SINGULAR SUPERSTITION.

If the winter is unpleasant in Russia, the summer is not more agreeable. One would not so much mind the excessive cold of the former, and the heat of the latter, if one were but compensated for what one has to suffer in those seasons, by the intervals between the two extremes, by spring and autumn. Spring, with its delightful heralds, is unknown in Russia. To-day the whole country, far as the eye can embrace, lies buried beneath an impenetrable covering of ice and snow; to-day it presents an image of death and of one vast silent grave:—to-morrow the scene is totally changed, as if by magic. The wind has shifted; the atmosphere has become clear, and the sun, of whose existence on the preceding day you were scarcely aware, is already troublesome by its oppressive heat. The mass of snow which covered the whole country to the depth of fathoms entirely vanishes in a few days, and the plants shoot forth vigorously from the ground. The farmer, who, at the beginning of May, can scarcely defend himself from the cold, sows his corn at the end of that month, and before two more months have elapsed the crops are harvested and winter is again at hand. The progress of vegetation is so rapid that you can scarcely enjoy it, and the land which was lately buried beneath deep snow has assumed the nature of a hot-bed. The government of Kasan, for example, one of the most fertile in the empire, has, throughout its whole extent, the richest soil for gardening, and there grows the finest wheat, frequently to the height of a

man. But scarcely is it sown before it has shot up to its full growth, and then its lively green colour turns to the yellow of autumn, and it disappears from the fields, leaving behind nothing but its stubble, which is soon intercepted from view by a thick mantle of snow. Here in the open air flourish, as in a forcing-house, all the productions of the South which require but a short time for their maturity; for instance, the finest asparagus grows wild in damp places, and far surpasses in flavour that reared with so much care in our gardens; and excellent melons, especially the water-melon (*cucurbita citrullus*), such as I have never seen anywhere else, though the peasant sows them like his corn, in the open ground, and then leaves them entirely to mother Nature. On the other hand, such things as require a longer period for their maturity will not thrive here, unless kept in gardens and hot-houses. Our most common plum-trees are reared in separate tubs, like orange-trees, in the green-house, and removed into the open air on the finest summer days only; and the sloe, which with us runs wild in every field, must be treated in the same manner if you would obtain fruit from it. It is nevertheless not uncommon for the heat to rise, for about five or six weeks, to 30° Reaumur in the shade; and the almost incessant presence of the sun during that time renders the abode in the northern provinces not less unpleasant than the excessive cold in winter.

As, at the end of June and the beginning of July, the evening twilight is not nearly over when the morning twilight commences, you may see at midnight, even when there is no moon-light, to read print of moderate size quite conveniently. This, though short yet prolific heat, seems to transform for a few weeks these at other times intensely-cold regions into a tropical country. After ten in the morning all occupations, even of the lower classes, are suspended, and the shop-windows are shut, or merely those facing the north left open. From that hour till three in the afternoon the streets of the towns and villages are completely deserted; as each inhabitant then seeks shelter in his house or garden from the scorching heat, and generally tries to sleep away this interval. The temperature of the air and of the ground is such, that, on coming from a shady place to one on which the sun has been shining, you might fancy yourself at the mouth of a strongly-heated oven. It enervates all the bodily and mental powers to such a degree that you feel indisposed for business of every kind. If, out of ennui, you take up a book or a newspaper, you are presently in a profuse perspiration, which causes you to throw it down again, and to content yourself with gazing listlessly at the four walls of your apartment, and wishing for the return of the better times of the all-penetrating, but at the same time bracing and strengthening, cold.

The summer in this country is further remarkable, inasmuch as, from the end of May to the beginning of September, no rain falls, and thunder-storms are extremely rare. This phenomenon is doubtless owing to the flatness of the country. For five hundred miles and more around Perm and Kasan there is not a hill of any consequence; and the whole tract from Kiew to Ural, for a breadth of five hundred miles, may be called a plain, only here and there interrupted by ranges of gentle hills. The extraordinary fertility, especially of the government of Kasan, to which I have already alluded, is occasioned by the inundation of the Wolga, which overflows annually at particular seasons as regularly as

the Nile in Egypt, and converts the whole country, to the distance of ten miles or more from its bed, for five or six weeks, into an immense sea. These inundations of the Wolga and the other larger rivers, the Wijatka, the Kama, the Kinel, the Irgis, &c. which discharge themselves into the Wolga, render the countries through which they flow at once lively and fertile. At such seasons you may sail, either for pleasure or upon business, in large two-masted vessels, carrying from six to ten guns, and frequently upwards of a hundred passengers, over pastures and corn-fields, to the neighbouring towns, which, on this account, are all seated upon heights; and, when the waters have withdrawn into their accustomed channels, the ground forsaken by them is covered, often a yard deep, with a fertilizing mud, in which, during the hot season, which now sets in, all vegetables grow rapidly and vigorously as in a hot-house. At the same time pools are left behind in the low grounds, where the waters stagnate for several months, become putrid, and generate malignant fevers in the months of July and August in these otherwise healthy countries. *The government of Ufa, in particular, is visited about that time by an intermittent fever, which attacks the patient every seventh day only, but is so violent that it generally proves fatal.* In and about Kasan, also, intermittent fevers, though not of so dangerous a kind, are exceedingly prevalent. In Kasan these fevers are quotidian or tertian, very rarely quartan, and they differ from the agues of other countries in this respect, that the patient experiences scarcely any shivering, but feels a violent twitching in the spine, which is soon followed by excessive heat and violent head-ache, during which the pulse beats like a hammer. For this fever the Russian physicians resort to no other remedy but bark.

While on the subject of fever, I shall take leave to state a few particulars respecting it, which are probably unknown out of Russia. With this disease the Russians associate a most singular superstition. These people in general, not the vulgar only, regard the intermittent fever as a female, who prowls about in the silence of night, seeking the victims of her often very capricious humour. This personage is called *Lichorotka*, and the same name is given to the disease itself. To show the notions of the Russians concerning this spirit in a clearer light, I will repeat the account given me by the late archimandrite (bishop), Israel of Kasan, a man universally respected for his sound understanding and great integrity, in his own words:—

“I was twenty years old,” said he, “and secretary to the convent of Simbersk, the abbot of which had a particular partiality for me: it was he who decided me to adopt the ecclesiastical profession. One evening in the butter-week (at the commencement of Lent), I heard the loud sounds of music and dancing in the adjoining house, and though I was strictly forbidden to leave the convent at night, still I found means to get out unobserved, and reach the window of the room where the ball was held. Though this apartment was on the ground-floor, the windows were too high to permit me to see the merry inmates, and to gratify my curiosity. With difficulty and great fear of detection I at length clambered high enough, and to my great delight obtained a view of the joyous party, among which I should so gladly have been. But my pleasure was not destined to last long: for scarcely had I taken a survey of the gay throng, when all at once a tall, slender female figure,

with a very beautiful face, came forth from the midst of it, with her eyes fixed upon me, and advanced towards the window where I was. An inward presentiment immediately told me that this was Lichorotka, who had so often been described to me by others. I was frightened, leaped down, and sneaked home. I went dejectedly to bed, and some time after midnight awoke in a fever. I was ill with it five weeks, during which my good old abbot visited me daily, and treated me with the greatest kindness. At the expiration of that time, I took it into my head to direct my attendant to bring my old wolf-skin pelisse, which I used to wear on my tours of inspection in winter, from the top of the house, and to spread it for the sake of warmth over my bed. The following night Lichorotka appeared to me in a dream, if however it were a dream, and not a real vision, in the very same dress in which I had seen her five weeks before. She entered my room, and slowly approached my bed. When she was quite close to me, she made a threatening motion with her hand, then raising it to her face, said, with a friendly smile, 'Faugh! how ill that pelisse smells! I shall not stay here any longer, but go to Jessipow.' This was the clerk of the convent, a robust young man, who, during my illness, had performed my duty with the abbot. Next morning, when the abbot came to see me, and I related my story, he told me that I was cured. Seeing me smile somewhat incredulously, he was almost angry, and solemnly protested that the fever would not return, adducing a great number of similar stories to confirm the assertion. Being at length convinced, and feeling more tranquil in consequence, I bethought me of poor Jessipow, who had probably been brought into the same scrape through me and my pelisse. The old gentleman cheered me up, and averred that he knew no instance of Lichorotka being so malicious. In further confirmation of what he said, he sent my attendant to summon the clerk to my room; but what was the astonishment of both, when he came back and told us that Jessipow could not come, because he was confined to his bed with a violent lichorotka! The poor fellow lay ill with it all the autumn, and at the beginning of the winter we buried him."

Hundreds of such stories may be heard in Russia in every family; and I advise foreigners to suppress a smile, or any other token of incredulity, if they would not wish to be taken for free-thinkers or madmen.

Another disease, which I have not met with elsewhere, is still more extraordinary: it is called *Bjelü Karatschki* (white hot fever), but I could never discover the cause of this appellation. I shall here state the individual case of a patient, the late General Serjeew, of Kasan, a highly-polished man, of excellent character, whom I had occasion to see almost daily during his illness, as well as several years before and afterwards. The disease began, as usual, with a certain listlessness and languor, which, however, at first seemed to affect the mind more than the body. The patient, though he has a good appetite, and appears at least to sleep soundly, is overwhelmed with a gloomy melancholy—in which, soon after the first days, the extraordinary notions which he betrays would seem to infer a derangement in the faculty of thought, and in the perception of external objects by the senses, that commonly lasts but for a short time, and often for but a few seconds. In the course of time, these deviations from sound views of things become more frequent and more striking. The body seems now to be affected,

as well as the mind, and the functions of sleep and appetite are disturbed, though the patient is not obliged to keep his bed. General Serjeew attended to his usual domestic avocations, and being fond of society, continued to entertain parties of his acquaintance as usual. It was not long, however, before he became so much worse, that his wife strove to keep away all strangers, and admitted merely intimate friends, who knew and could make allowances for his situation. To these latter he made no secret of his complaint, but, on the contrary, related to them with the utmost frankness at night all that had befallen him in the day. "As, when proper attention is paid to the patient the disorder seldom ends fatally, but subsides in a few months, in many cases in a few weeks, as gradually as it came on, people in general feel little anxiety about it, and await its termination with patience. "I had a long discussion with you this morning," said the General to me one evening, taking me by the hand. I expressed my surprise, as I had not left my house the whole forenoon. "That does not signify," said he smiling; "I have nevertheless had a great deal of talk with you. I was sitting in my library when I heard you coming; I know your step. You rapped at the door, and I had to tell you to come in three times before you heard me and entered. We continued our yesterday's interesting conversation; and though you defended your position so manfully yesterday, you were forced at last to yield. I was tired, I must confess, with the length of our disputation." I said nothing, but the surprise expressed in my looks made him laugh. "Well, well," said he, "I know as well as you do that you were not here, but still we did talk and battle it together stoutly. If the thing would but soon cease, I should not care, for I assure you it is not unentertaining. I wish you had been in this situation, and then you would perfectly understand me. I can accurately distinguish whether it is yourself that enters my door, or whether it is your, or rather *my*, apparition. I am quite aware that in the latter case I am under a delusion; but I am forced, by a kind of irresistible impulse, to give way to this delusion; and then, to be sure, matters get so bad that I do not know what I am about."

At another time I was sitting on the sofa, in conversation with General Serjeew. He appeared quite rational, when, suddenly fixing his eyes on a portrait the size of life, hanging opposite to him, he presently commenced a colloquy with the picture. In about a minute he drew his hand over his brow, and begged my pardon if he had been talking nonsense. We resumed our conversation; and, with the exception of those moments, I could not discover any signs of blightness or false perceptions, such as he exhibited one evening, when, starting up all at once from his table, he began an altercation with some person who, as he imagined, had just entered the room. Had he not told him that he would not have any more to do with him? why then did he trouble him again? &c. A silence ensued, during which he seemed to listen attentively to the reply of the apparition, when he rejoined in a very pertinent manner, as I thought; nor did he cease scolding till he had walked the intruder to the door, and said his *prostshai* (farewell). He then sat down with us again, rubbed his hands, and remarked, "I have been a little flighty again."

One morning when I entered his room, he appeared to be angry with me in good earnest. Such treatment, he said, he had not deserved at

my hands; it was indeed too bad; and the like. I begged him to explain himself; and at length he told me, that the preceding evening he had seen from his window, which looked out upon a fine large piece of water in the middle of the town, a boat, in which I and several others of his acquaintance were singing satirical songs about him. He mentioned with extreme indignation the opprobrious names with which I had hailed him as we approached the window; and, in short, we had provoked him to such a degree, that at last he sprang up, opened the window, and shook his cane at us. Conceiving, from the vehemence of his narration, that he might perhaps be under a delusion at that very moment, I strove to pacify him, by turning the conversation to some other subject, when he suddenly grasped my hand with his usual cordiality, exclaiming—" 'Tis nothing, nothing at all; you are and shall be my good old friend; I merely wanted to see how you would take the story. Only think," continued he, laughing, "that good fellow, Professor——, was here just now; I told it to him, and added, what is very true, that when I shook my cane at him, he called me a *sukinsin* (son of a bitch). The poor man was so alarmed, that he seriously begged my pardon, and promised never to do so again. He was so affected that he could scarcely refrain from tears; and I would lay any wager that he almost believes the whole story."

In this way he went on for two months; and I shall only just relate the termination of the disease, because it may perhaps throw some light on its character. He was lying quietly on his camp-bed after dinner, when his room appeared by degrees to become full of people. According to his account, he seemed to be in a market, where the people were closely crowded, and approached nearer and nearer to the spot where he lay, from which they had at first kept at a distance. Though he had often had visions of the sort, yet this was too much for him. He rang his bell; and on the entrance of the servant sent for his surgeon, who bled him. "After this was done," continued the General, "though the crowd of people in my room was not diminished, yet the individual figures moving about in it became more and more transparent; and what particularly struck me, they seemed to contract themselves from the head and feet towards the middle of the body. At length, nothing was left but the waists, and these were to be seen only as through a misty veil, till at length they too disappeared, and with them vanished every symptom of the disorder."

The gallant General survived five years in excellent health, and at last died suddenly, from the rupture of a blood-vessel. For the information of the faculty, I may add, that he was of a plethoric habit of body, and frequently suffered from the piles.

For the rest, only those patients who enjoy careful attendance in general recover, while persons of the indigent class consider this disease as incurable. Indeed, in the eight years that I passed in the country, I saw no small number of poor people carried off by the disorder.



## THE JAMAICA STATION.

FROM THE JOURNAL OF A NAVAL OFFICER.

THE town of Port Royal is a confined and wretched place; the houses, which are crowded together, are constructed of wood, with balconies and piazzas before them, and are, with few exceptions, stores, liquor-shops, or lodging-houses; and the inhabitants consist of store-keepers, Jews, people of colour, negroes, and a few whites. The fortifications are extensive, and kept in the most efficient state; and the troops have every accommodation the confined space allows.

The dock-yard, situated on the eastern side of the town, is small and compact, with every requisite for a naval depôt, except standing sheers for getting in and out the masts of ships: this deficiency is greatly to be lamented, as the exertion used in the ordinary method is laborious in the extreme, and consequently, in so hot a climate, very detrimental to the health of ships' companies who have to undergo the fatigue. I am satisfied that His Majesty's service would be materially advanced if sheers were erected either upon the wharf or quay of the yard, or in a hulk. I could never understand the reason why this was not done long ago: if fear of the electric fluid striking the sheers was the cause, that might have been remedied by conductors; and if the foundation of the quay was not likely to be sufficiently firm to fix the heels of the sheers and supporting mast, there could not be, that I am aware of, any objection to a hulk. Those who have had the experience of getting in the masts of large ships here, by means of temporary sheers erected on board, must be aware of the fatigue and ill consequence arising therefrom. The weight of a seventy-four's mainmast is about twenty or twenty-two tons; a weight requiring, even with such purchases as are used, great bodily exertion, and must produce a great strain upon the nerves of the men employed. When the *Hercule*, 84, required sheers, spars long enough could not be found, and those brought out for the purpose were obliged to be spliced or joined together by lashings; and the *Theseus*, 74, lost many men by fevers after getting her masts in.

I recollect when that ship was hove down, keel out, alongside of the dock-yard, rather an awkward circumstance occurred to her, but which, happily, was unattended with any ill consequence. Our frigate lay a short distance from the yard. It was just afternoon, when the people had gone to dinner, I was standing on the gang-way, looking at the movements of a marine sentinel, who was strutting at his unusual post on the *broadside* of the big ship, as she lay like a huge leviathan or mammoth reposing; and every now and then, in the buoyancy of his spirits, (his thoughts probably at that quiet moment had taken flight homewards—or he may have been dwelling on the *enseigne* of the corporal, the angular strips—which by anticipation he beheld on his arm,) he would give his musket that sort of flourish which the fugleman uses, regulating the movement of his right foot accordingly, as he turned the extremes of his promenade. I could not help smiling to myself at the seeming felicitous situation of the *royal*, and I was just in the act of turning to make some observation apropos, to a brother Mid, when, to my astonishment, and the poor sea-soldier's surprise, in an instant, up

went the huge ship, with a surge and a swash, that brought all hands on board of the other vessels, upon deck in a moment; some, who were below at the time, thought it was an earthquake, or rather, a sea-quake—whilst others considered the noise as proceeding from some monstrous spouting sea-animal of the *balæna* tribe; another, Pontopodon's *gracken* or *kraken*,—no doubt, however, the poor marine was never more astonished and elevated in the whole course of his eventful life;—in an instant, as the ship righted, he was thrown in an oblique direction upwards, and fell perpendicularly, heels to, souse into the water, where it was fortunate for him that there was not an open-mouthed shark ready to receive him. The poor fellow was soon picked up.

The houses erected for the accommodation of the resident commissioner, the store-keeper, and the master-attendant, are light and commodious buildings; and the different store-houses, sail-lofts, and capstand-sheds, &c. are all excellent. To the eastward of the dock-yard is the victualling-office, and also the cooperage.

The hospital for seamen and marines is situated at the western part of the town, close to the sea, and not far from the parade-ground. I believe, whatever is found necessary in an establishment of this sort, has been amply supplied. There appeared, however, one or two circumstances that should have been prevented: the nurses in the officers' wards were too few, and very inattentive—and the barber, not always to be found. Upon some inquiry, it was ascertained that he was the doctor's servant or slave, and was gone up to his master's pen, and would not return perhaps for a week; so, that the poor sick gentlemen were obliged to retain their beards that time; this should not have been, and I hope has long since been set right. I have no desire to rake up old grievances, but as such things may occur again, it is but right they should be known, to be prevented by those who have the power to see that matters go on properly.

It is singular, that there is not a convalescent-house, although essentially necessary in this climate, where putrid diseases are so prevalent, and more especially as the area within the walls of the hospital is not calculated, or of sufficient extent to afford the comfort desired. It requires no argument to prove the salutary advantage to convalescents in being removed from the place wherein they themselves have suffered, and where their less fortunate comrades are groaning under the torture of disease, or gasping the last breath in the struggle of life, and to be allowed the benefit of daily moderate exercise in an open situation. There is not any circumstance which can tend to quicken the restoration to health, in this country, more efficaciously than the recreation to be found in the retired walks of some quiet spot, where the shade of trees, and the cool refreshing breeze combine to mitigate the fervid blaze of the sun. I have myself been a patient in this hospital for several weeks, and therefore speak from experience: it was, fortunately, in my power, after reaching a state of convalescence, to retire for a short time into the country, to receive the benefit of the air, &c.; and the good effect produced by such removal, I have reason to be satisfied, essentially aided my recovery. But this is a favour enjoyed (at his own expense) exclusively by the officer; the seaman, from the peculiarity of his situation, is necessarily exempt from participation, and he is doomed to remain within the walls of the hospital, amidst the dreadful ravages which dis-

ease is continually producing, until he is restored to such a state of health and strength as to be able to join his ship; or, should she not be in port, of remaining in the receiving-ship until her arrival.

The situation of our scamen, under such circumstances, is one of such moment, as to require no apology from me in introducing the subject here. The value of their services to their country is a sufficient guarantee for any expense the nation might suffer in rendering their condition in every respect as comfortable as possible; and I am well assured, that the humanity of the Lords of the Admiralty needs no other stimulus to exertion, than that their minds should be satisfied the circumstance mentioned is one really requiring attention. There are two spots which appear calculated to answer as a site for such a building: the first is Green Bay, situated to the westward of the Fort Point at Port Royal; and the other, is the largest Cay, I believe called Lime Cay, lying just without the entrance to the harbour: the latter, perhaps, on account of its insularity, and if it be found extensive enough, may be preferred, although it would require two or three years before the trees would rise and spread sufficiently to afford the desired shade. It may be remarked, however, that there are certain trees to be found in this fertile clime, that are of surprising quick growth: such as the bread-fruit, cassias, palmi-Christi, &c. &c., besides parasitical plants that would, in a short time, form arbours impervious to the rays of the sun.

Culinary vegetables might be raised in the garden attached to such a building, and the men, by attending to their culture, would recruit their strength, and, what is of equal consequence, keep their minds employed, whilst enjoying the comfort of such repose.

The excellent Captain Briggs, of the Orpheus frigate, sent all his invalids to this Cay, where tents were erected for their accommodation, and the benefit resulting was equal to the expectations of that worthy and humane officer. Both the situations recommended are open to the sea-breeze, a point most necessary to be attended to in this instance.

It has come to my knowledge, since the above was noted, that there is a ship at Port Royal fitted up as a convalescent vessel; but although this may be very servicable, and preferable to the men remaining at the hospital, yet it is a circumstance universally known and admitted, that sailors, or indeed any other class of persons who may be on ship-board, who have been ill, are never so quickly, or so effectually restored to health, as on *land*.

“ Oh, then, protect the hardy tar,  
Be mindful of his merit,  
And when again you're plung'd in war,  
He'll show his daring spirit.”

It has often struck me, when reflecting on the immense profit which the contractors for vegetables and fruit reap from the supply which they provide for the King's ships, that were government to purchase a certain portion of land in the vicinity of the harbour, and lay out extensive gardens for vegetables and fruits, great saving would be the result; especially during a war, when the consumption of those articles is so immense. Indeed, I see no reason why a government farm or pen for breeding cattle to supply beef and mutton to the fleet on the station, might not, under honest and intelligent overseers, be found of the great-

est advantage. A captain might be appointed as a sort of lord-farmer to the King, with two pursers as assistants, to superintend the distribution of the stock and fruit to the different vessels in port. A small vessel or two might be kept constantly employed in procuring bullocks from Cuba, at a very reasonable rate, and sheep from the Bahamas, where they are sold singly for four dollars, and are equal in flavour to our South-down; swine, too, might be advantageously raised, as well as poultry for the sick; and the hospital furnished with these and other requisites.

At present our men are supplied with fresh beef only, and that frequently so bad, as to be returned or condemned, and hove overboard! If the contractors, who are generally mercantile men, having to purchase the stock and vegetables, &c. with which they supply the ships on the station, from the farmers of the country, yet manage to accumulate fortunes from the speculation, what a saving to the country would follow, were the government to take the concern into its own hands!—That a benefit would accrue equal to the most sanguine expectation, I have not the slightest doubt; and, what is of equal consequence, our men would then be supplied with good meat, and also a variety, which of itself would be no small addition to their comforts, as well as to their healths; for I believe it is admitted, that a change of diet is as essential, in the economy of the body, for the preservation of health, as a change of linen.

According to the aspect of affairs at present, (1831,) as connected with Jamaica and our other West India settlements, I think it does not require the inspiration of a prophet to predict, that ultimately—sooner or later—these must fall into the hands of the blacks. With the probability, therefore, of such a circumstance taking place, perhaps the government, instead of purchasing ground, which eventually it would be constrained to relinquish, might do well to appoint a commissioner and a deputy, a captain and purser, (it has been observed, that officers of the navy who undertake agricultural pursuits, generally prove good farmers,) for the purpose of purchasing stock, vegetables, and fruit for the ships, at second cost, instead of third, as would be the case when contractors are employed: such an arrangement might easily be managed, and a pen hired, (on which the captain and deputy might reside,) near Kingston, to keep a certain number of cattle, &c., as should be found necessary to be always at hand for immediate use; the fruits and vegetables may be bought always in the market, which, in general, is well and abundantly supplied. Even after deducting expenses, it must be obvious that there would be a saving nearly equal to the profits made by the contractors.

The guard-ship, occasionally honoured with the flag of the admiral, the *Old Shark*, housed over, and having her mizen-mast out, will long live in the remembrance of many officers. The "*Old Tub*," as she was usually called, having nearly foundered in a hurricane when commanded by Captain Herring, was so shaken, that she was deemed quite unseaworthy; and accordingly, was patched up and moored off the victualling wharf, there to do good service as long as her timbers held together. She was much too small for, and unworthy of her occupation,—inspiring strangers, especially foreigners, with anything but respect, by the pigmy display of that splendour which should always surround and throw its rays about the dignity of station attached to the highly-immort-

ant post of naval commander-in-chief, either at home or abroad. The mass of mankind are much guided in their notions, opinions, and actions, by the amount of show and pomp which is displayed in the camp, petty court, or floating-palace of a chief, or other great personage:—this is so well known, (and it may be remarked every day, even by those who do not study human nature very deeply,) that we find almost every government, whether civilized, demi-barbarous, or absolutely savage, surrounding their public functionaries with all the splendid and gay attributes (according to their degree of refinement) of power, most likely to attract the eye and impress the mind of the great and the little vulgar with admiration and respect. This seeming indifference to a universally admitted essential point in state affairs was often a subject of conversation, and it was thought extraordinary that a third, or a second, or even a first-rate had not, on so important and extensive a station, been appointed as a stationary vessel for receiving the flag of the Admiral, the line-of-battle ship designed for that purpose being generally at sea.

It is recorded in the annals of this island, that on the 7th of June, 1692, the old town of Port Royal was destroyed by an earthquake, and sank into the water, where it now forms a shoal, situated near the Hospital. It has appeared strange to me, rather as an interested, than a mere indifferent spectator and observer, that some points which seemed clear to every one not in authority, as requiring attention, should, from some motive or other, be neglected—as it has been remarked (and no doubt very often correctly so) that the motives which guide the actions of men in office cannot possibly be clearly understood by the community, but that they have generally sufficient and cogent reasons for such actions,—I do not therefore mean to condemn, in the present instance as negligent, what may perhaps have been an act of wisdom; yet I must own, I, nor anybody else, whom I have heard speak on the subject, could ever dive into the merits of the wisdom which prevented a buoy from being placed upon this said shoal of “Old Port Royal,” as a guidance to our men-of-war; for it must be observed, that although it does not project to any distance from the shore, yet vessels are very liable to touch upon it when shifting berths, going into the fairway, or sailing direct from an in-shore station, with light land-winds, as there is on such occasions a strong out-set from the northward. The Aurora frigate struck upon this shoal in coming in to take an in-shore berth, and she was not hove off again without very great exertion, and receiving considerable damage; and in my time I have seen other ships just touch and swing off, whilst many have but just escaped contact with it. I believe it was eight or ten years after this, and upon some other occasion of disaster, that a buoy was placed upon the extreme of the shoal, but having been coppered to prevent the worms from destroying it, the metal coating soon corroded, and became so nearly of the same colour as that of the water, that it could scarcely be distinguished. It is satisfactory, however, to know, that the position has been marked; and it would be of great advantage if the *six-feet channel* through the *flats*, extending irregularly between the Palizada point, and Fort Augusta, were buoyed. Boats to and from Kingston have often been detained by grounding on these *flats*, which would not happen if the boat-channels were pointed out by floating marks.

The following observations on a Johnny-Newcome's first adventures at

Port Royal are the production of a Mid, long since, poor fellow, gone to

——— "that distant shore,  
Where the pale spectre, Care, pursues no more."

"On first landing at Port Royal, a Johnny Newcome, (as all strangers are there called,) when he steps upon the wherry-wharf on a market-day, will at once imagine himself transported into the company of a community of Bedlamites; — the clangor of uncouth voices which assails his ears, and almost deafens him, is only equalled by the disagreeable effluvia of the half-naked bodies of the wherry and canoe-men, who crowd about him in the most unreserved manner, vociferating in all the modulations that the note of human communication is susceptible of— 'Want wherry, massa?'— 'Want canoe, massa?'— 'True-blue berry de day, massa?'— 'No sea-breeze, massa; canoe beat wherry— uzza fa massa!' Johnny, unable to make head, flourishes his sword; suiting the action to the well-known 'D—n your eyes, stand out of the way, you black rascals!' which is thrown back in a lingo he cannot interpret— 'O ho! d—n yiey a'ready—ki! crab naym yiey by amby!'

"Escaping from this chorus of yells and other agreeables, Johnny finds himself, after a successful squeeze through an alley, where he is almost suffocated, within the market-place, which, in point of scents, may be likened to any besides those of 'Araby the blest': sweets, acids, and all the combinations of animal and vegetable effluvia indescribable, rush upon his olfactory nerves, and, with the strange costumes and still stranger physiognomies of the mixed crowd, the birds, the fishes, and the fruits, display to his wondering eyes the first specimen of a tropical bazaar.

"The dresses of the motley groups which crowd the area almost to repletion, now attract his attention: the young negresses, clothed in red and blue calamancos, with their plump and shining ebony faces, and white regular teeth, are pulling him gently by the sleeve, and directing his notice to their commodities— 'Here, massa, I hab good guaba, good orange, good mango, ebery ting good fa nice young massa, if he please to buy.' A little farther on he is arrested in his progress by a tall, bony black fellow, with a large straw hat upon his head, whose appearance, half wet and half dry, with white patches (salt water crystallised by the sun) over his sable skin, creates Johnny's astonishment, and makes him shrink back as from a leper. He cannot, however, escape; a string of red snappers are held up to his face, whilst the voice of the fisher, sonorous and strong, proclaims, "All fresh, massa; you hab 'em all fa quater dollar." Pushing on, by tacks and half-tacks, Johnny next encounters an old grey-headed, but active negro, dressed in a naval captain's uniform, and having a gold-laced cocked hat upon his woolly pate; he is 'old Rodney; with his mouth awry, and his hand in lieu of a trumpet applied thereto, the veteran bawls out the well-known and welcome Port Royal sound of, 'Pruce! pruce! ripe pruce, oh!'—at the same moment taking his thumb from the top of a bottle, (which he holds in one hand, whilst in the other he carries a *black-jack*,) a pop-gun report follows, the cork just escaping contact with Johnny's nasal organ, whilst he is nearly smothered with froth; a draught of the sparkling beverage, however, amply repays him.

"Having now reached the inner margin of the crowd, Johnny stops

to gaze upon the wonderful scene presented to his inquiring eyes, but he feels strange sensations (proceeding from the all potent draught he has just quaffed); something like distant thunder rumbles within him, a kind of earthquake of the body, and every now and then, as the vaporous fermentation ascends, he feels a twitch in the nose, and which he begins to fancy may be the first symptoms of *la maladie du pays*, whilst the heat becomes oppressive, and the mosquitoes and sand-flies keep the *truce* signal, the *white* handkerchief, in constant motion, but to little purpose. About to seek shelter at 'Goodall's,' he stumbles upon a fat punchy Israelite, who stands purposely in the way, and avails himself of the favourable moment, like a skilful trafficking tactician, to court an introduction, by bows and a 'thousand beg-pardons,' and then going on the other tack—'Sirs, I begs no apologies—it vas mine own fault, I declares; vil you do me de honors to step into mine shops, and takes a little sangarée; you're heartily welcomes, sirs; I shows de ways.' This is a sort of appeal to a stranger's politeness—a *disinterested* hospitality, unusual in more frigid climes. Johnny could not resist it; and, maugre the unsightly Lombardian golden sign, in he steps; but it is 'two to one' if he comes out again under *half-a-joe*!

"Escaping at last from the Jew's clutches, minus a piece of gold, and 'half cocked' with disguised brandy, under the assumed mixture of wine, water, lime-juice, nutmeg and sugar—the fascinating sangarée, he enters the grand rendezvous of the blue-coats, Goodall's tavern: he is met at the door by the host, a greasy, flabby fellow, with a strong obliquity of vision, and wearing merely a white shirt and trousers. This doughty champion of good fare advances towards Johnny, and soon contrives to extract an order for a beef-steak and a *forum* of hock, for both of which mine host is supereminent. Having thus drawn his purse-strings, and satisfied his appetite, Johnny is next introduced into the billiard-room; on entering which, he finds a party 'in shirt-sleeves,' driving about the balls, betting upon cannons that are never made, and levelling the queue in scientific style; he soon catches the eye of 'Black Tom,' (the marker,) who begins to hum a tune—'Man-of-war-buckra,' and to dance a fandango round the stranger, and in a very little time sets the whisper round that there is a Johnny Newcome just arrived; and the usual toast upon such an occasion follows—'*A bloody war and a sickly season*!' Here Johnny loses his *doubloon*, and retires with a head-ache, and it may be added, with many heart-aches, before he is dubbed a *stager*.

"The sequel of his progress is a repetition of similar adventures, in which he always finds himself much reduced in pocket, but advancing in experience, until he arrives at that crisis where novelties cease to appear so to him, and he is no longer so to others."

Perhaps the reader will readily excuse the plain colouring of the above picture, when (if he is not an old stationer himself) he is assured that a more correct one could not have been drawn. Things are greatly altered since the peace, and, I have no doubt, for the better in many respects; but those individuals who were solely dependent on the navy for support, have felt the difference between 'war and prize-money,' and peace without plenty! The accidental fire which nearly razed \* the

entire town, was a dreadful event to the poor inhabitants. The want of society, in the hours of relaxation on shore, generally threw the officers into the company of the coloured females, who, in allusion to their stately deportment and creolian pride, were termed "dignity ladies." There are few people in the world, however, let the shade of complexion be what it may, from that of the fairest *Circassian* to that of the darkest *Papuan*; possessing more feeling or more, friendly hearts, or whose general character has so many fair traits to counterbalance the frailties of human nature. Many officers owe their lives to the care and humane attentions of these tender-hearted females; and it were injustice, whilst speaking of Port Royal and its inhabitants, not to mention them.

In Port Royal harbour there are three long and slender fishes, that are seen in great numbers on the surface of the water, and may be ranked among the peculiarities of this place. They are known by the following names: the guardo or guard-fish (*Gar* fish, *Esox* major); the jack \* (*sword* fish, *Trichiurus Lepturus*); and the ballahou (*piper*, *Esox* minor). The jack is the largest, and appears to be at eternal war with the two others, for which purpose it is armed with rows of sharp teeth, very formidable to its adversaries; it basks on the surface of the water during the heat of the day, in a sort of indolent, unguarded state; but this is merely an assumed position, the better to ensnare its enemies, and to be ready to catch the floating bodies that may happen to pass near it, for the moment anything is thrown into the sea from a ship, it darts with the rapidity of lightning upon it, and seizing it, as quickly retreats. This warrior fish is particularly possessed of a foresight or instinctive quality, which we sometimes see exemplified in different animals, amounting almost to second reason: I mean the sagacity which it displays in avoiding the hook when baited; although voracious in the extreme, it seems aware of the lure held out for its destruction, and avoids it with as much care as the generality of fishes show eagerness to devour it. The situation it takes, immediately in the wake of the ships at anchor, gives another instance of its sagacity; as whatever is thrown overboard passes astern, where he is ever on the alert to glean from the miscellaneous articles such as is suited to his taste, and guards his treasured supply with the jealousy of a miser. No other fish of equal size dare approach; and they have obtained the popular name of *Jack* from the sailors, probably because those eccentric mortals would associate with the sobriquet fancy has bestowed upon themselves, the funny warrior of their own element. The jack is, however, sometimes enticed, no doubt, when hunger presses him, to swallow the treacherous bait; but this is rare, and he is more frequently struck with a barbed lance, or entrapped in a net. The guardo has similar habits with the jack, but yields the palm of victory to its stronger and more courageous opponent; and yet it tyrannizes with unrelenting vigour over the more delicate and less warlike associate, the ballahou. But whilst the various productions of nature in this clime—fertile to infinitude—have always claimed my attention, and been a source of interest and unfeigned delight to my mind, I have never ceased to regret my inability to take that philosophic view of their structures, qualities, and habits, so as to afford me a closer and more intimate acquaintance

\* There are two fishes so called at Port Royal: the tail of the sword-fish tapers to a point, in which it differs from the other jack.



with them. The reader, however, who takes pleasure in these matters, will have nothing to regret, as minute scientific descriptions are to be found in books written for the express purpose.

The most extraordinary animal I have seen in this harbour is the sea-devil (*Lophius maximus*), which frequently weighs 3000 lbs. No doubt it has obtained its name from its hideous appearance, so uncouth and strange, indeed, as to baffle all description. The water of the harbour is at times covered with the medusa, sea-blubber, and sea-nettle, as they are variously termed; some of these attain a great size, and have the appearance of animated pieces of jelly, the body being of an orbiculated convex figure; of a gelatinous substance, semi-transparent, and provided with fringy plicæ tinged with a purple colour. These singular animals are very lively in the water, although their locomotion is heavy; and, from their numbers and constant movements, give an air of unusual animation to the waters of the harbour. They appear to derive their motion and to alter their situation by alternately expanding and contracting the tentaculæ and plicæ.

Thousands of those beautiful little marine animals, called by sailors "Portuguese men-of-war," (*Holothuria physalis*, or *Aretusa* of Brown,) are met with off Port Royal harbour, studding the sea as far as the eye can trace them. The colour is a clear pink, in some parts bordering on lilac, but, from their motion in the water, the shades of the internal membranes often assume a darker purple. This little creature possesses, like the orbicular tribe of zoophytes, the power of deadening the flesh of persons who handle it; but it is very slight and gives no pain, a numbing sensation only being felt; and I believe either common salt or lime-juice applied to the part affected will entirely remove it. This little transparent bladder (which is said to be very like in shape to the human stomach) is so delicate and tender that it soon fades and dies away, when handled or cast upon the shore; it is, like the nautilus, provided with many tentaculæ, some of which are very small. I have been often amused at observing their movements, like a Lilliputian fleet, amidst the agitation of the waves: when the wind has freshened, I have remarked that they lay flat on the surface, and rise again when the gust has passed; but I know not whether this be voluntary or occasioned by the pressure of the wind.

That tiger of the ocean, the shark, is often seen cruising about the harbour; but I do not recollect any person having been injured or devoured by that animal here during the period I was on the station. At Kingston, however, such distressing events often occurred. Several years ago there was a well-known fish of this kind, considered in the light of a pet in Port Royal harbour; it was called "Old Tom of Port Royal," and was fed whenever it approached any of the ships, but was at last killed by the father of a child which it devoured. I was told that, whilst it remained here, no other of the squalus tribe dare venture on his domain; he reigned lord paramount in his watery empire; and had never committed any depredation but the one for which he suffered. The story of Lieut. Fitton's shark is well known.

(To be continued.)

## REMARKS ON THE INVASION AND DEFENCE OF IRELAND,

IN REPLY TO THE ARTICLE ON THAT SUBJECT IN OUR LAST NUMBER.

YOUR last number contains an article on "the Defence of Ireland during the late War," which, though written in a complimentary style, requires some comments.

In the first place, the writer, after saying that Colonel Napier was Chief Field Engineer to the army in Ireland, at the period of Hoche's invasion, proceeds to describe the absurd and unmilitary state of the Engineer's defences in the northern parts, from whence it might be inferred, that under Colonel Napier's superintendence the service had suffered from such ridiculous proceedings and culpable ignorance. Now, Sir, at the period of Hoche's menaced invasion, the late Colonel George Napier was a half-pay infantry officer, residing near Dublin; but his great capacity, his experience, and extensive knowledge in every branch of military affairs, and his commanding character, had in a manner obliged the government of the day to call for his assistance at that critical period. The office of Chief Field Engineer was actually created for the purpose of giving him an opportunity of assisting in the military councils.

A quarrel with Lord Carhampton, the particulars of which may be seen in the Appendix to Moore's Life of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, induced him to refuse the salary; and the departure of the French fleet put an end to his functions in a few weeks after his appointment. It is plain, therefore, that he could have had no hand in the follies of the day described by your correspondent.

The next point upon which I wish to comment is the censure passed upon Lord Cornwallis's military conduct during Humbert's invasion. I think I can convince the writer of the article in question that Lord Cornwallis's military conduct in this instance was quite worthy of his great and deserved reputation.

1st. He censures Lord Cornwallis for having sent a militia force instead of a regular force, to fight the enemy at Castlebar, and has rather loosely described his Lordship as having, *after the affair of Castlebar*, put ten thousand men in motion to stop the progress of eight hundred French troops, whose cause was hopeless.

Humbert's corps was, I believe, nearer eighteen than eight hundred men; but setting that point aside, I shall proceed to give you a short abstract, taken from unquestionable sources, of the real state of affairs and of the conduct of Lord Cornwallis. The rebellion of 1798 had just been crushed, and Lord Cornwallis's wise and humane measures of conciliation were beginning to take effect; but the spirit of disaffection to the Government was subdued rather than crushed, many bands of insurgents were still wandering about, many chiefs still at large, burning to renew the contest, if a favourable opportunity offered; and well knowing, what Lord Cornwallis also was informed of by the Duke of Portland, that two armaments—the one at Brest, the other at Dunkirk—were preparing for the invasion of Ireland.

In this state of affairs, on the 24th of August, intelligence reached the Castle that Humbert had landed at Killala bay. • The information as

to the number was not precise; but they had been well received. The troops were at this time in march for different permanent stations, allotted to them after the late campaign against the insurgents; and the first thing was to order the army to concentrate again, posting, however, sufficient bodies in certain places to check any fresh insurrectional movements.

General Lake was ordered to Galway, to assemble a force there; General Nugent was directed to draw troops from the north, and assemble them on the side of Sligo; and General Taylor, then at Sligo, was directed to feel for the enemy, but not to commit himself. *General Lake was particularly warned not to risk an action before assembling a force sufficient to ensure success*, as the actual state of the country was such, that any check at the beginning might produce serious ill consequences. Meanwhile the late Sir J. Moore and General Campbell's brigades, with some other troops, marched to concentrate at Longford and Athlone, and all troops that could be spared from the garrisons and interior districts were likewise directed upon the Shannon. On the 26th, the troops began to concentrate upon that river, and Lord Cornwallis, although suffering from the gout, arrived in person.

Thus far it would appear, that neither activity nor intelligence were wanting. The enemy was hemmed in on the right and left, by Lake and Nugent; Taylor, with a column of observation, was put upon his track, and the main army was concentrating in his front, and in the centre of Ireland, ready to act whenever circumstances should require its presence; and by its force, and the rapidity with which it was brought together, checking any disposition in the people to rise in favour of the enemy; and so far from Lake being sent with an inferior force to combat the French, he was especially desired to avoid an action. Now began the errors, not of Lord Cornwallis, but of his Lieutenant.

On the 26th he received intelligence that Humbert had not advanced beyond Ballina; but at the same time information arrived that General Hutchinson, who commanded in Galway, had, previous to Lake's arrival, moved from thence, with a small force, to Castlebar, thus courting an action, with troops probably inferior in numbers, and certainly in quality, to the enemy, and at a most critical moment.

On the 27th, news arrived that Lake, having joined Hutchinson at Castlebar, about eleven o'clock at night, and much fatigued with constant travelling, had no time to correct the position of the troops, which was bad, or to make any arrangements; for at five o'clock the next morning he was informed that the enemy was near; and at seven o'clock Humbert, who had made a forced march by the unguarded mountain-road of Barnagee, fell upon him, and totally routed his forces, taking nine pieces of artillery, ammunition, &c. The fugitives did not rally until they reached Holymount, twenty miles from the field of battle. General Hutchinson had detached a good many troops in observation, and had not more than eleven or twelve hundred infantry engaged, and these behaved generally very ill. Yet Humbert's force was inferior, because he had left men in Killala, and during his forced march of thirty Irish miles, had lost nearly half his troops by straggling. The negligence of the British generals was indeed the primary cause of the disaster; for the artillery stood manfully to their guns; Captain

Shortal, a very intrepid officer, who commanded them, was desperately wounded, and taken while firing the last round; and the infantry would, no doubt, with such an example, have behaved better under good arrangements.

The reports of the amount of the French force, and of the numbers of insurgents who had joined them was, however, still very vague. It was said that *many* of Lake's militiamen had joined the enemy, and a report came in that he had been followed up and again beaten at Holymount, which gave some alarm for the safety of Athlone, then incapable of defence; wherefore the army crossed the Shannon, and took post in front of that town on the 28th, and on the 29th marched to Ballinamore, where Lake and Hutchinson joined it.

As no certain intelligence of the enemy's numbers or march could yet be obtained, the army halted, and was organized in brigades; but General Robert Craufurd was detached with a body of cavalry by Ballinrobe to Castlebar, to seek for the French, and to follow them wherever they went. On the 31st the main body also advanced; and on the 1st of September encamped beyond Tuam, where it was joined by General Hunter, with two regular regiments, which caused another halt, as these regiments had marched without stopping from Wexford to Tuam. General Taylor's corps, which had come down from Sligo to Boyle, was now considered too weak, and Lake was sent to command it, taking with him a reinforcement of infantry and sixty cavalry.

Here, then, is a third epoch; the main body having closed in with the enemy, he was confined to a corner, and by means of Craufurd's cavalry on the left, and though Nugent's corps was not yet assembled at Sligo, some militia was there under Colonel Vereker; and thus, with the movement of Taylor's (now Lake's corps) on the right, Humbert was hemmed in on both flanks, and cut off from communication with the other parts of the island.

On the 3d of September the French being by the reports still at Castlebar, the army marched to Holymount, and Lake advanced from Boyle to Trench Park. At Holymount General Craufurd joined, confirming the report that the enemy were still at Castlebar, and it was expected they would fight; but at five o'clock in the evening reports arrived that they had marched from Castlebar, at four o'clock that morning, in the direction of Swinesford; but as their route had not been watched long enough to ascertain whether their march was upon Sligo, Killala, or the Shannon, patrols of cavalry and scouts were sent out to gain intelligence, and Craufurd with his dragoons followed them through Castlebar. Lake also was directed to close upon the enemy and harass him, but not to risk an action. The previous movements had drawn what may be called *the line of investment* down toward the left flank, and in some measure opened a way for the enemy to the Shannon. But as this was a false direction, Lord Cornwallis, contrary to the advice of general officers present, who all wished to march in a direct line after Humbert, resolved to move diagonally upon Carrick-on-Shannon (where he had stores and magazines), by the way of Ballyhaunis and Trench Park; for he dreaded lest Humbert should cross the Shannon by a forced march, and penetrate the county of Longford, where, as well as in Leitrim, he knew that a plan had been laid for an insurrection.

which was ready to break out, and which did, in fact, partially commence a few days after.

The French might thus have penetrated to Dublin, where there was a large party ready to receive them, and then the whole island would have been thrown into commotion, and before it could have been suppressed the armament from Brest would have arrived. On the other hand, if the French wished only to regain Killala, or to take Sligo, a few marches gained by them would be of no consequence.

On this ground Lord Cornwallis, with equal prudence and firmness, moved on the 5th to Ballyhaunis, where he ascertained that the enemy's direction was on Sligo, and that Lake was already at Ballaghy in pursuit. From Ballyhaunis General Moore, at his own suggestion, was sent with two thousand infantry, and some artillery, to reinforce Lake, while the main army marched to Carrick-on-Shannon. Meanwhile, Humbert, moving rapidly, reached Colooney bridge on the 6th, where Colonel Vereker, with three hundred of the Limerick militia, rashly opposed him, and was beaten with the loss of sixty prisoners and two guns; and the French general, instead of pushing upon Sligo, marched to Drumahair, and then turning to his right, did, as Lord Cornwallis had foreseen, make for the Shannon, which he crossed at Ballintra on the 7th, and endeavoured to break down the bridge behind him. But during this time Lake had pursued step by step, and Craufurd with his cavalry first prevented him from breaking the bridge, and then following him over the Shannon, harassed him incessantly.

Lord Cornwallis, having on the 7th heard of Humbert's movement upon Ballintra, recalled Moore (who had reached Colooney), by Boyle-upon-Carrick, and as Humbert was now pushing for Mohil and Granard, the very centre of the disaffected districts, the main army made a night-march, passed the former place before the French, and reaching Johnstown, was thus again placed between the enemy and Dublin. Meanwhile Craufurd, having for two days vexed the rear of the enemy, pressed them so closely, that at Ballinamuck, half-way between Mohil and Granard, Humbert gave up the game, and after a partial action with Lake's advanced guard, surrendered; but it was Craufurd who merited all the honour. The French lost very few men; but, following the inhuman system of the times, no quarter was given to the unfortunate insurgents, and the field of battle was covered with the slain. Some accounts made the number of dead even amount to four thousand!

Thus, Sir, I have shown, first, that Lord Cornwallis, so far from sending Lake with militia to fight the French at Castlebar, did positively forbid him to fight at all.

Secondly, that the ten thousand men were put in motion *long before*, and not after, or in consequence of the affair of Castlebar.

Thirdly, That it was not to crush a few hundred wandering French, but to prevent a great insurrection, and to avoid a dangerous war, that so many men were employed.

Fourthly, That every effort warranted by prudence was made, both by the judicious employment of masses and of moveable columns, to close with Humbert. And when it is considered that the army generally was in a very disorganized and undisciplined state, and that the irregulars were, from their violence, and ferocity, and insubordination, more likely to create, than to suppress a serious insurrection, while many

of the militia were actually joining the enemy, I think it must be admitted, that Lord Cornwallis's conduct was both vigorous, prudent, and military. I know that it was approved of by Sir John Moore at the time, and by other able and practised professional men. His own after-judgment on the affair (and, considering his experience and frank simplicity of character, that should weigh for something in the scale) was, that if it were to do over again, he would have patrolled more carefully to his right, after passing Tuam, by which he should have sooner known of Humbert's march from Castlebar.

As to the French general's conduct, I really cannot see that his marches were so unmilitary. He could only consider himself as an advanced-guard, or as a *corps perdu*. In the first case he should have seized and fortified a place and harbour, which he might maintain until the French army arrived; in the second case his business was to march and strike a sudden blow, rousing the people, and keeping up a turmoil until reinforcements arrived. He considered himself a *corps perdu*, and should certainly have pushed at once, without delay, from Killala, either against Sligo, or into the disaffected districts of Leitrim and Longford; but that first error set aside, it was not very unmilitary, with his small force, to make a forced march, beat a superior force hanging on his right flank, and having thus drawn the main body of his enemy to that side, turn to the left, defeat another body at Coloony, and then passing the Shannon by long marches, endeavour to reach Dublin. If he failed it was because his adversary, with great means, was as active and vigilant as himself.

W. N.

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ON BREAKING THE LINE\*.

"Remember, every arrow thrown  
Comes from a quiver of their own."

WE had long received the story of the influence of Mr. Clerk and his Tactics over the rival destinies of these realms, as an amusing piece of presumption; since we were well aware that his book, however ingenious it might appear to closet tacticians, was but little read or considered by those who supported the honour of the flag. When, therefore, the "Edinburgh Review,"—that unassuming miscellany of bold paradoxes and staggering hypotheses,—demanded, some eight-and-twenty years ago, a token of public gratitude for him who had instructed a Rodney,—we were surprised at the vivaciousness with which the writer could create and "point his moral." "When peerages and pensions," said the autocrat, "are voted with a prudent liberality to every admiral who leads British seamen into battle, is it not humiliating to consider, that the great inventor of Naval Tactics has received no tribute of national approbation or applause! While the humblest of his disciples, the most mechanical interpreter of his instructions, is elevated to the highest pinnacle of popularity and fortune,—is it not unaccountable, that their acknowledged preceptor should be permitted to fall into neglect and oblivion, and to grow old without being visited by one ray

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\* Naval Evolutions; a Memoir by Major-General Sir Howard Douglas, Bart. K.S.C., C.B., F.R.S., &c. &c. &c. T. & W. Boone, 29, New Bond Street, 1832.

of public acknowledgment or distinction?" To this effusion we will merely add,—

"Sure, of the two, less dang'rous is th' offence  
To tire our patience than mislead our sense."

Professional opinion was always, however, against both the claim and the unqualified praise which bedecked an author who had no practical acquaintance either with seamanship or gunnery; but officers then had too much on their hands to be able to trouble their heads on a point which, though it attracted the superficial notice and curiosity of the public, was not seriously considered by its properest critics. Occasionally their sentiments were heard; and he who wrote the shallow strictures upon Admiral Patton's "National Defence of an Insular Empire," in the "Quarterly Review" for November, 1810, exclaims,—“It would have been but justice, however, to the reputation of his countryman, had the gallant admiral excepted ‘Clerk’s Naval Tactics’ from the sweeping observation, that not a single original work worthy of consideration has been published on this subject.” It is plain then that the “gallant admiral” was of a different opinion from the critic, as well he might be\*.

The *otium* attending the general peace, having armed many of those hands with the pen, which heretofore brandished the sword, brought the question again upon the *tapis*; and we flatter ourselves† with having been instrumental in negativing the delusion, and giving a quietus to the fables of the cork-boats and the cherry-stones, and the wallüt-shell fleet, which had been palmed upon the public. But the “moral pointer” of the “Edinburgh,”—than whom no one is better aware that an ill plea must be well pleaded—again levelled his artillery, and he of the “Quarterly” his small-arms, to defend a position which the projector himself would have abandoned, seeing that it was riddled till it was no longer tenable. Out of it, however, they are now altogether driven by Sir Howard Douglas, who lays such an overwhelming mass of evidence upon them, that one is left sprawling like Enceladus under Ætna, and the other receives his *coup-de-grace*. Nor is this all. Some of the lighter skirmishers have been brought to, and made to chant their palinodia. The “Caledonian Mercury” was the first to recant its heresy; and the ceremony was performed in a becoming, candid, and manly manner. The “Literary Gazette,” after producing the “Memoirs of Pryse Gordon,” a *ci-devant* subaltern of marines, as somewhat decisive on *breaking the line*,—now confesses that the statements about Rodney’s landing at Bristol, and hob-a-nobbing with the said Pryse at the Bush Tavern, and his then and there pouring forth his manifest obligations to Clerk, are *proved* to be erroneous, and the whole evidence unfit for reliance. The word *erroneous* is sufficiently soft for the occasion; but we hope that a stronger may be applied to the silly, but injurious anecdote, which the same ubiquitous person is pleased to give of his dining with Nelson at Palermo.

As we strongly recommend the statements of Sir Howard Douglas to the perusal of all our readers, we shall here only sketch the view which he has taken of this contested affair; merely preminising that, to

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\* A testy admiral, returning from a successful achievement, was asked, and we verily believe by the writer of the above-quoted review, whether he had acted upon Clerk’s principles?—“Clerk, Sir!—he be d—d,” was the impatient reply.

† See the various papers on: his subject inserted in our Journal.

the style of a scholar, he adds the high qualities of a skilful tactician, a temperate reasoner, and a diligent searcher after truth,—qualities which are, moreover, warmed by the filial piety which evidently is the ruling motive of the publication. • And he is entitled to a high character for his courage, in openly stepping forward to tilt with reviewers, that • *Ἰερα φаланξ*, which, Scythian like, fights with equal animosity, whether advancing or retreating:—

“ At him, who dares this legion to defy,  
A thousand mortal shafts in secret fly.”

We must begin with an acknowledgment on the part of Mr. Clerk, when he published his first edition in 1790, stating that he had omitted, in the copies printed in 1782, some observations on an oblique attack upon two or three of the rear ships of an enemy to leeward desirous of avoiding battle, “as it was conceived it might be prejudicial to the other parts of the subject to advance anything doubtful, no example of cutting an enemy’s line, in an attack from the leeward, before that time, having been given.” These words are quoted, not with a view of handing out the gross ignorance of naval history which they so broadly display, but to prove that the author of them did not attempt to *teach*, but only to *comment* on the past. Yet he boasts of having imparted in 1780, the theories of attack, both from windward and leeward, to Mr. Atkinson!—“All this”—says Mr. Clerk, “he undertook to communicate to Sir George Rodney, which he could have no difficulty in doing, as I left with him sketches made according to my usual method of demonstration, together with the necessary explanations.” This assertion was first made in 1804, when Lord Rodney, Sir Charles Douglas, and Mr. Atkinson were all dead; yet the reviewers wish to know why these gentlemen did not contradict the Tactician! Besides, the *agere actum* of attempting to raise these witnesses from their cerements, we do not see the necessity for it, as nothing is put in to *prove* that Mr. Atkinson ever revealed the theory to the Admiral. Indeed, he might have been aware of the chill with which old sailors receive the reveries of landmen; and the incident reminds us of having been guilty of this very conduct, in an instance which, *parva componere magnis*, we will mention. During a tiresome close-hauled traverse, in which we were persecuted with an adverse wind and sea, a passenger of many “pretensions,” after sagely comparing his idea of the ship’s course with the bearings on his travelling map, pompously imparted the result of his cogitation to us by saying,—“Be assured you should keep more *to the left!*” It would have been useless to tell this tactician that we could not sail in the wind’s eye, so we gave him a *silent* lesson.

To counteract their slippery tenure in this part of the argument, the imprudent assertors of the glory of the 12th of April being due to the Man of Eldin bring forth the Pennycuik copy of the Tactics, “the margins of which,” says the logical Reviewer, “are covered from beginning to end, with notes in SIR GEORGE Rodney’s handwriting.” This is adduced to make it appear that the Admiral was in possession of that identical book previous to the battle; and that he attached high importance to it, as laying down the particular manœuvre. Now it is *ascertained* that the work contained nothing relating to, much less explanations and demonstration of, any such class of operations as that by which the battle was gained; nor were the annotations by Sir George,



but by Lord Rodney; and written by him so long after his being raised to the peerage as 1789 or 1790! Moreover, these same annotations contain a refutation of his having taken the landsman's advice; inasmuch as he says, that he "told the King, before any of his actions took place, that he would always take the lee-gage," and he gives substantial reasons for so doing. "It is strange," says General Mundy, his son-in-law, "to observe what advantage was taken of the praise which the liberal-minded, generous old man bestowed, in convivial moments, towards the close of life, upon Mr. Clerk's work, and the means that were used to pervert these good intentions."

So far, we have referred chiefly to the Admiral's not being aware of Mr. Clerk's tactics till long subsequent to the action, the success of which is ascribed to the **MAGNIFICENT DISCOVERY**. The same reasoning also applies to the captain of the fleet's having been equally in the dark. On his sister's informing him of the pretensions of the Tactician, he writes a strong letter of contempt, which is admirably lithographed by Sir Howard, though evidently only under a sense of necessity. In this letter Sir Charles says, "The matter in question is too ridiculous and groundless to be seriously treated; it would at best—for as much as I am mentioned or alluded to therein—deserve to be treated as a production of arrogance and impertinence towards me, and my being mentioned therein at all, in the style you say,—as highly injurious towards him who commanded in chief on that celebrated day,—who certainly did not stand in need of any instruction derived, or that could be derived from Mr. Clerk, that I know of. But I have bestowed too much of my little time on this subject, a very ridiculous one indeed. I wonder Mr. Clerk could be so inconsiderate, as at random to draw such inconsequent inferences." "It is he, commanding a fleet or army, in whose mind the ideas rise with the occasion, and who seizes the decisive moment when it presents itself, that gains a decisive victory. Not the dull man, who blindly acts from instructions of others, even the most respectable."

"P.S.—I cannot for my life, devise what conversation between him and me, Mr. Clerk means. If he alludes to any concerning sea-engagements with me, it must have gone in at one ear, and out at the other; for I do not remember any, even the faintest, trace of any such conversation."

Now it will be readily seen, that there were several reasons why Sir Charles, at the time, should have felt particularly delicate as to *publishing* anything respecting advice given to his Admiral; but we may now make known, that so clearly was the thing understood between them that, in consequence of the captain of the fleet being overlooked in the honours awarded after the action, Rodney charged himself, under his own hand, from on board the Montagu, on the 8th of August, 1782, *to procure for him whatever he most wished or desired*. Nor has Sir Howard, after the most careful search among his father's numerous papers, been able to find any reference at all to Mr. Clerk's tactics; but, on the contrary, there are numerous warm testimonials of esteem for, and praise of Sir Charles, from Lord Howe, Lord Keppel, Lord Sandwich, and many others of the most illustrious men of the day, strongly alluding (notwithstanding the deference to the commander-in-chief, which he ever expressed) to the victory of the 12th of April being

chiefly due to the energy with which he had acted. In addition to this, many of the subordinate actors on that glorious occasion have voluntarily come forward to express their conviction that the manœuvre, to which the success of the engagement was owing, originated with Sir Charles on the spur of the moment; and ample proof is produced that the theory of Clerk had not been heard of by any one in the fleet; especially in the letters of Sir Joseph Yorke, Sir Gilbert Blane, Captain Blaney, Sir David Milne, and other distinguished officers.

In the preface to the 1804 edition of the *Tactics*, the author says, somewhat self-sufficiently, "Although Sir George Rodney should be supposed to have had the merit of adopting the manœuvre by which he gained the victory of the 12th of April, without any previous suggestion or knowledge of my ideas on the subject, still it is impossible to deny the efficacy of the method, and that, had it not been for my work, the system on which it proceeded might have remained unknown or unexplained." Yet the system had already been expounded by Paul Hoste, in 1727; and very explanatory diagrams of the method are inserted by Sir Howard, which the professional reader may consult with advantage.

The naked fact stands thus: However much it may have been consonant to Rodney's preconceived opinion, to approach an enemy from the *leeward* (a manœuvre not mentioned in Mr. Clerk's book) he was persuaded by his friend and proper adviser, Sir Charles Douglas, on perceiving an accidental opening astern of the *Ville de Paris*, to break the line, *another manœuvre unmentioned by the Tactician*. The occurrence is thus detailed by Sir Charles Dashwood, in a letter from Torquay, dated 8th July, 1829:—

"I shall simply relate facts, to which I was an eye-witness, and can vouch for their truth. Being one of the aides-de-camp to the commander-in-chief on that memorable day, it was my duty to attend both on him and the captain of the fleet, as occasion might require. It so happened, that some time after the battle had commenced, and whilst we were warmly engaged, I was standing near Sir Charles Douglas, who was leaning on the hammocks (which in those days were stowed across the fore part of the quarter-deck), his head resting on one hand, and his eye occasionally glancing on the enemy's line, and apparently in deep meditation, as if some great event was crossing his mind: suddenly raising his head, and turning quickly round, said, 'Dash! where's Sir George?'—'In the after-cabin, Sir,' I replied. 'He immediately went aft; I followed; and on meeting Sir George coming from the cabin close to the wheel, he took off his cocked hat with his right hand, holding his long spy-glass in his left, making a low and profound bow, said 'Sir George, I give you joy of the victory!' 'Pooh!' said the chief, as if half-angry, 'the day is not half won yet.' 'Break the line, Sir George!' said your father; 'the day is your own, and I will insure you the victory.' 'No,' said the Admiral, 'I will not break the line.' After another request, and another refusal, Sir Charles desired the helm to be put a-port; Sir George ordered it to starboard. On your father ordering it again to port, the Admiral sternly said, 'Remember, Sir Charles, that I am commander-in-chief: starboard, sir,' addressing the Master, who, during this controversy had placed the helm amidships. Both the Admiral and Captain then separated; the former going aft and the latter forward. In the course of a couple of minutes or so, each turned, and again met nearly on the same spot, when Sir Charles quietly and coolly again addressed the chief, 'Only break the line, Sir George, and the day is your own.' The Admiral then said, in a quick and hurried way, 'Well, well, do as you like,' and immediately turned

round, and walked into the after-cabin. The words 'Port the helm,' were scarcely uttered, when Sir Charles ordered me down with directions to commence firing on the larboard side. On my return to the quarter-deck I found the Formidable passing between two French ships, each nearly touching us. We were followed by the Namur, and the rest of the ships astern; and from that moment the victory was decided in our favour.

"You may naturally suppose I was very young at the time; but the circumstances made such an impression on my mind, that they are as fresh in my memory as if it occurred but yesterday; and I much doubt if there is a man now living who saw and heard so much of the transaction as myself, except, probably my friend Sir Joseph Yorke, who was also a brother aide-de-camp."

But even if Mr. Clerk had recommended the evolutions which the British fleet performed, it would still have been no "*magnificent invention*" of his, for numerous similar instances are to be found in history, and especially in our wars with the Dutch. On the 16th of August, 1652, Sir George Ayscue, with his own and nine of his headmost ships, charged through the Dutch fleet; and "*having thus gotten the weather gage,*" attacked them with great bravery. On the 2d of June, 1653, the blue squadron *charged through the enemy*, and Rear-Admiral Lawson bid fair for taking De Ruyter. On the 3d of June, 1665, several squadrons *charged through and through*, without any remarkable advantage; but about noon the Earl of Sandwich, with the blue squadron, "*fell into the centre of the Dutch fleet, divided it into two parts, and began that confusion which ended in a total defeat;*" and in the fight of Solebay, where that gallant Earl lost his life, May 28th, 1672, Sir Joseph Jordan, of the blue squadron, having the advantage of the wind, *pierced the Dutch fleet*, and threw it into confusion. Nay, the very circumstance of there being a signal for this express evolution, shows the rashness of the assertion, that it was unknown till the "*navigator of a fish-pond*" pointed it out. Sir Charles Douglas, as one of the most scientific and able tacticians of his time, must have profited, both from experience, discussion, and study, and was of course well versed in our Naval History; we, therefore, at once accord with Sir Howard's views:—

"Whether my father may or may not have been quickened in his perception by such elementary observations as those of Paul Hoste, and other acknowledged authorities, who had treated of naval tactics, is impossible for me to say. I not only *admit*, but *plead for him*, that he had not *failed* to accomplish himself for his tactical duties by studying *every* professional treatise that had been published on the subject, to store his mind with resources suited to all circumstances, applicable to all contingencies and 'ready' with the quickness of volition. But the circumstances under which he acted, and the advice he gave, are not in point with any previous case; and unless all that I have shown be forgeries, the victory cannot be attributable to any theorist, or to aught but the *occasion which suggested, practically, the idea of standing through the enemy's line*; and my father is no more to be shorn of his beams, by saying that he committed plagiarism on any elementary writer, than that Wellington at Salamanca and Vittoria committed a plagiarism on Guibert, or that Nelson at Trafalgar is to be less honoured than Rodney."

Sir Howard having *proved* that Mr. Clerk's book could not possibly have conduced to the defeat of De Grasse, proceeds to reply to the attempts made to "*fasten down*" upon his father, directly, a knowledge

of Mr. Clerk's *magnificent discovery*,—a position which forms one of the “fundamental facts” by which the Edinburgh Reviewer wishes to establish his case. Professor Playfair, in his memoir of Mr. Clerk, asserts, that this gentleman, in *conversation*, communicated his whole system of tactics, in the spring of 1782, to Sir Charles Douglas, “who went out several months after the admiral.” But the latter is proved by public documents to be utterly false; for they left London together on the 2d of December, 1781, and sailed together for the West Indies on the 15th of January, 1782. What then becomes of the assertion of *where* they repeatedly met, and the persons present? The Lord Chief Commissioner, named as one of the synod, remembers nothing about it! The question naturally occurs—Why did not Mr. Clerk mention such decisive circumstances during the life of Sir Charles? The Baronet on his part, the moment he heard a rumour of the Tactician's vague pretensions, wrote expressly to authorize their contradiction. He did not even know what Mr. Clerk it was to whom the affair alluded; remembering only two persons of that name, both naval lieutenants, neither of whom he had seen for several years. Substantial evidence is now adduced to show, that other officers, besides Sir Charles, have contradicted the “fundamental facts” of the Manual which is IN THE HANDS OF ALL SEA OFFICERS!!! Of these we must quote Sir Charles Dashwood:—“If they (the Reviewers) imagine,” says he, “it has lain dormant in my breast for seven and forty years, and only now brought forward for the first time, merely at the instigation of Sir Howard Douglas, or any other man, they are much mistaken; for I have mentioned it in all societies, wherever it has been the subject of conversation, during the whole of that period.” The “fastening down,” it must be confessed, is conducted and developed with a considerable portion of dramatic skill by the *conspirators* who thereby politically carry offensive operations into their opponent's camp—

“And, to extenuate their shame,  
Make those they injure bear the blame.”

But another peg on which the Professor and the Reviewer hang their frail tissue, as a “fundamental,” is that Sir Charles met the Tactician one day, at dinner, in the house of Mr. Adam, in London, in 1779 or 1780. As Sir Charles was then taking his children to Scotland after the death of his wife, it was very improbable that under such circumstances he would treasure up in his mind the conversation of a landsman upon naval affairs. So intelligent an officer as the Baronet was more likely to instruct Mr. Clerk than be instructed by him; for while the one has manifested his ignorance of naval history, the other has been universally acknowledged as a well-read man and a scientific seaman.

The argumentative and astute “Dean of Faculty,” who, having withdrawn from literary labour, “buckled on his armour,” as he tells us, to defend his forlorn position, most positively asserts, among his “fundamental facts,” that Lord Cranstoun repeatedly heard the “magnificent invention” discussed at the Admiral's table, during the voyage out to the West Indies. But here again facts are against him, and the Major-General's argument is as obvious as the other is subtle. Logbooks and journals plainly prove that his Lordship had been on the station for some time before the arrival of Rodney, and also that he did not join

the Formidable till three days before the engagement. And to add to the absurdity of the "fundamental," Sir Joseph Yorke, Sir Gilbert Blane, and other officers, who were frequent guests at the Admiral's table, declare, that they never heard Mr. Clerk or his manoeuvres mentioned!

It is difficult to pronounce why these points should have been so pertinaciously insisted upon by the "Athenian Squad," unless we call in Dr. Johnson, who says, "That which is strange is delightful; and a pleasing error is not willingly detected."

Having ably, and we think definitively, disposed of the question of *Breaking the Line* on the 12th of April, Sir Howard proceeds, very properly, to pronounce his opinion of Mr. Clerk's actual knowledge of tactics. This is quickly shown to be, scarcely *quant. suff.* to constitute a tactical dictator, whose notions are to form a manual for all sea-officers. It is proved, incontestably, that the Man of Eldin is utterly unqualified in the management both of ships and guns; whence he has formed some strange and erroneous notions in seamanship, and the service practice, capabilities, and comparative effects of naval ordnance. This portion of the exposition is entitled to particular consideration, both on account of the skill with which Sir Howard handles it, and the proof which it affords of the incapacity of Mr. Clerk for conceiving an invention that could affect the naval interests of the empire. These remarks have been brought down upon the Tactician by the bluster and indiscretion of his friends; for had the tactics stood upon their own merits, no one was inclined to deny it the character of a "wonderful book for a landsman to write." After insisting on the importance of knowing *when* and *where* to pour in a heavy cannonade, Sir Howard adds,— "and it is upon the talent with which this is watched, and the promptitude with which advantage may be taken of such an effect, that success will depend. This was magnificently done on the 12th of April, years before Mr. Clerk published anything upon the subject; and now, even with the benefit of that practice upon which he has theorized, he overlooks the real conditions, and would actually set about skirmishing with three-deckers." Sir Howard shows that, whilst animadverting on particular actions, Clerk ascribes *that* to some "imaginary disabilities of cannonade inherent in particular positions," which resulted only from deplorable mismanagement. Nor is it one old evolution only that Mr. Clerk claims the *invention* of; he wishes to father another movement which occurred in Keppel's engagement in 1778. He also gives unwarrantable assertions as demonstrations,—as may be instanced in his affirming that the shot of the lee-fleet are thrown up into the air, and will therefore reach farther than those of a weather-fleet, whose shot, on the contrary, will drop into the water! It is curious that he who thus supports the wasting of our forces on the winds and waves, should be declared "most learned in nautical war," and be held up as a professor "teaching the British navy how to use its force." Old Sam Johnson would have declared the very idea to be sufficient to awaken "the most torpid risibility."

Sir Howard, after minutely refuting many other errors of this "ingenious but erring amateur," refers to his former writings for proof that he had no wish to dissect the Tactician, until he found it became necessary, by the injudicious attempts of Professor Playfair and the Reviewers

to raise their idol upon stilts, to the disparagement of eminent officers, who had fought and won their country's battles long before Mr. Clerk was ever heard of. Besides this, Sir Charles Douglas was said to have purloined "a leaf" from the Eldin book. A bad argument usually follows in the wake of a bad cause: let any man who knows the meaning of *windward* and *leeward*, consult the book, and he will pronounce that it contains no such "leaf." Let him afterwards read the syllogisms of the Reviewers, and he will be convinced that they do not even understand these terms, but assign a meaning of their own to them, essentially different from their received signification among sailors. We can safely repeat, that their curious relation of these marvellous manœuvres was never received, even by the less instructed class of seamen, with that implicit confidence which dissipates doubt; and we know that the most intelligent naval officers have had but one opinion of the Eldin Tactics.

We think that a perusal of Sir Howard's statements will convince any one that Rodney's battle would have been fought and gained, exactly as it was conducted and won, had Mr. Clerk's mother never existed. Tacticians will perceive that his ideas of attacking from the leeward proceed upon incorrect and extravagant presumptions on the one hand, and on erroneous principles and practices on the other.—That so far from having discovered a manœuvre, sound in principle, and therefore universal in practice, Mr. Clerk treats incorrectly a class of evolutions well known to the profession for ages before he was born:—and that, therefore, the pretensions, asserted in his behalf, of having "*invented, matured, and fully explained the manœuvre by which the victory of the 12th of April was gained, before any other person had thought of it,*" and that "*he was more learned and reflecting in nautical war,*" than those who conducted, directed, and gained that great battle—are unjust to the Admiral and his adviser, injurious to the profession, and dangerous to the country, inasmuch as the unsound theory is recommended and advocated in an able and influential journal, which may lead inexperienced, unscientific officers into the Reviewer's error, of a fatal disregard of practical conditions which the author never correctly understood, and which the Reviewer evidently does not comprehend.

The agitated question of "Breaking the Line" is now resolved into fact, and conclusively settled; and a requiem is chaunted over the Eldin claim to a *mark of national gratitude*. Should it be asked why such a claim ever gained so extensive an acknowledgment, the answer is obvious,—*Chi non sa niente, non dubita di niente*; and every one knows that admiration is the nurse of credulity.

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OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND QUALITIES OF THE  
VERNON AND CASTOR,

## AND ON NAVAL ARCHITECTURE IN GENERAL.

BY CAPT. CHARLES NAPIER, C.B., R.N.

NOTWITHSTANDING the ill-natured attacks that have been made on the Vernon and her constructor, Captain Symonds, it is an undeniable fact, that ~~she~~ she has the advantage of the Castor on a wind, and with the wind a-beam; as it draws aft, her superiority is not so decided; and, indeed, the best authorities are of opinion, there is little difference between the two ships: attempts have been made to prove, that the Vernon, being the largest ship, *ought* to sail the fastest, but the fact of the Snake and Water Witch beating both, is a proof, if any were wanting, that such an argument cannot be entertained for a moment. It is true, that going free and blowing hard, the larger ship generally has the advantage; but in this instance it is quite the contrary, and the cause is very evident. The Vernon is much broader in proportion than the Castor, and when that breadth is no longer necessary to keep her upright, and enable her to carry sail, it becomes disadvantageous: this is the true reason of the Vernon not shining so much with the wind in the quarter, and before it, as she does close hauled, and two points free.

It has been asked why the Vernon did not beat the Castor more; but I would ask, why she beat her at all? The answer is simple: Capt. Symonds's mode of construction is preferable to the other for fast sailing.

It is, perhaps, not generally known, that after the experiments made in 1827 by Sir Thos. Hardy, the Lord High Admiral decided that three frigates should be built; one by Capt. Symonds, one by Capt. Hayes, and one by the Navy Board. The interest of that enlightened body, jealous of any interference, succeeded in getting the order cancelled, and three frigates, nearly of the size of the *Endymion*, to carry thirty-six 32-pounders, were laid down. It is fair to suppose the whole talent of the Navy Board was put in requisition to produce fine ships. The Castor has been tried; she is decidedly a fine man-of-war, notwithstanding her abominable stern, and is, I have no doubt, a good sailer.

A change of administration brought Capt. Symonds into notice, and the Vernon, the most magnificent frigate ever built by any nation, was launched into her own element. It is, however, to be regretted he was not confined to a ship of the same length and masts and yards as the Castor, and the question of sailing would have been set at rest for ever.

It appears to me, as the Vernon is the first frigate Capt. Symonds ever built, he could not be expected to produce so perfect a ship as the last built by the Navy Board, with all their talent and experience; but nevertheless, the Vernon certainly does beat the Castor, and it is fair to conclude, as the Snake, built after Symonds's plan, beats his own ship the Vernon, when he has constructed as many frigates as he has brigs, he will produce finer ships than have been built hitherto.

The point of sailing being settled, there is another still more necessary to be determined before the Vernon can be pronounced a perfect ship, or before Captain Symonds's system of ship-building should be adopted.

All old officers know full well, that during war, when ships were kept at sea in winter, blockading enemies' coasts, and frequently obliged to carry a heavy press of sail to get off the land, that some acquitted themselves better than others; many ships kept the sea without straining masts or yards, others were eternally springing and carrying away spars, and straining themselves to pieces. Of the latter class was the *Egyptienne*, and she was in consequence laid up.

Now, I maintain, before the *Vernon* is pronounced a good ship, she ought to be sent into the Bay of Biscay during the winter with the *Castor*, and both should be thoroughly tried in all weathers; then, and not till then, can a final opinion be formed of her qualities; and nothing can be more imprudent than building ships after her until she has gone through that ordeal. They are both, it is true, now in the North Seas\*, but I doubt whether they will be sufficiently at sea to ascertain their respective qualities.

When the *Barham* was cut down, she was pronounced a splendid frigate, and several more were razed before she had experienced a gale of wind; it would, therefore, be advisable to commission the *Vindictive*, and let the three ships be tried in all weathers, and if the *Vernon* proves superior to her in sailing and stowing, and does not exceed her in wear and tear, then Capt Symonds's should be pronounced good; and I think it will be great injustice to him if the *Vernon* is paid off before this trial is made, and it will give a fair opportunity to attack him, and will also give good cause to doubt the prudence of the Board of Admiralty constructing more ships after his plan, till they have had an opportunity of ascertaining, beyond a doubt, that the one built is efficient. When that is settled, I think he ought to be allowed to build a ship on two decks; and as our frigates have now got to such a size as to entirely supersede 50-gun ships, and 64's on two decks, I am of opinion our two-decked ships ought to be built of such dimensions as to supersede three-deckers. If the large frigate of 50 guns is better than the two-decked ship of the same number, I maintain the 100-gun ship on two decks is superior to the three-decker.

Four years ago I sent to the Admiralty a model of a ship of this description: it is now at the United Service Museum. She was 212 feet long, and the same breadth as the *Nelson*. If Captain Symonds's system be adopted, she would be considerably broader; her lower deck was about three feet and a half lower than the *Nelson*, with large scuttles, and no guns; devoted entirely to the ship's company; the middle deck in consequence became the lower gun-deck, having the ports nine feet above the water: she had no poop, and mounted 32-pounders all round; the reduced top weight allowing her to carry so much heavier metal; the orlop deck might either remain as it is, or, if the stowage was too much contracted, it might be fitted as a frigate. In fine weather this ship would throw as heavy a broadside as the three-decker, and in bad weather she would blow her out of the water. When the three 92-gun ships were laid down, I strongly urged the adoption of this plan to the Comptroller of the Navy, but without success. The present Admiralty have adopted it in the *Thunderer*, but she is too small to render it effi-

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\* This was, of course, written prior to the *Vernon*'s orders for the West Indies.  
—Ed.



cient, and her stowage is much cut up; it could be done with more success in the 92's; but should Capt. Symonds build a two-decker, there can be no objection to adopting it in her. If the plan is good in the Thunderer, it will be better in a larger ship, and the only difference of opinion that can exist is about the poop. I should prefer her having two sets of stern windows and no poop, to her having two sets with one; much weight is taken off the ship, and a fine quarter-deck to work her.

Line-of-battle-ship officers are, I know, partial to poops; I served in one without, the *Courageux*, and the only objection was the want of accommodation. In this case the objection is removed; the captain and officers would be as well, and indeed better accommodated than in any other ship on two decks. The ward-room officers would be on the lower gun-deck with stern windows and galleries, and their cabins on the lower deck; the ship would be 'clear for action at all times, and the lower deck guns kept run out, except in bad weather. It is said Capt. Symonds is to build three 92-gun ships on his plan, but I think the Admiralty ought to pause before they incur such enormous expense in ship-building during peace. Constructing ships to rot in our harbours appears to be bad economy. We have now, I believe, upwards of 70 sail of the line; in the event of war it would be quite impossible to man more than 50, with a proportion of frigates and small vessels, in a year, indeed, I believe it could not be done in eighteen months. It is therefore useless having many more than we can arm, and it would be much cheaper, in the event of war, to have recourse to merchants' yards. Contract ships, we all know, were not so good as those built in king's yards, and they would cost more in war than they do at present; but if we add to the construction, the expense of keeping ships in repair, it will be seen that it would be much better to have recourse to the contractors.

Our naval rulers should examine what is the probable number of ships they could fit out in a year, and what the probable number that could be built in that time; and they should regulate the navy accordingly. Keeping a third more than they could man in the event of disasters, the fleet should then be kept in thorough repair, which would give ample occupation to our shipwrights. All those that are good for nothing should be broken up; the old ships worn out, and our slips filled with ships in frame, to be finished as they were wanted to complete the number, the greater part of the small ships of the line should be cut down to frigates, and the small frigates to corvettes, and no more of that description built.

A great deal more attention ought to be paid to steam-boats, and the subject should be much more considered than it is; we have lately built four or five of large dimensions, but they are unfit for every purpose of war, and we still go on building one after another, correcting our errors at an enormous expense, when all this might be avoided by consulting those who had made steam their study. At present we are in the hands of the engineers and the builders, the former quite competent to make good machinery, and the latter to construct fine ships; but neither the one nor the other have any idea of what is necessary to make a steam-boat fit for war.

When we have built half a dozen more we shall probably begin to find out what is wanted, at the expense of some hundreds of thou-

sands of pounds; and this is occasioned by the unwillingness of every Board of Admiralty to pay the least attention to suggestions from officers, unless they happen to be men of influence; and the probability is, that men of that description, having other pursuits, seldom turn their attention to naval subjects. Much credit is due to the present Admiralty for upsetting the bigoted and besotted Navy Board, which had been a curse to the navy for many years, and, from the nature of its formation, rarely could boast of men of talent in their body; but still, something is wanting to ensure the adoption in our service of useful suggestions, and to encourage officers to turn their attention to naval improvements. It is well known, that each lord of the Admiralty has his particular branch to attend to, and he is no doubt fully occupied with his routine of duty, and has little time, and less inclination, to listen to any suggestions that are made to him; and this is not much to be wondered at, when it is considered what a multitude of ridiculous plans are every day presented: this naturally gives them a dislike to listen to anything new, or at least to enter into it, for their minds are made up that it is probably all nonsense; in addition to that, their *amour propre*, as the French call it, is wounded, and they rather feel offended at any person presuming to know better than themselves. All this, I am sorry to say, is quite natural, and I fear the most liberal mind would not be devoid of it. I have often heard officers, when out of office, exclaim against the jealousy of those in, and when they got in themselves, were not one jot better; we must, therefore, suppose it to be a disease of office, and endeavour to find a palatable remedy.

In France, in the office of the minister of the interior there is a *Comité Consultatif*, composed of clever and scientific men, to examine all plans laid before them. Now I think it would be very useful were the Admiralty to appoint a similar committee to sit two or three times a week for the examination of plans on naval subjects\*. The inventors should be allowed to attend, tell their story, and explain their views; those inventions that were approved of by the committee should be laid before the Admiralty, and those that were not should be entirely rejected. This would save the Board much time, would not wound their feelings, would be satisfactory to the inventors, and extremely encouraging to men of science; and there is no doubt but many useful improvements would be brought forward, and many clever men brought into notice who are now totally neglected. This Committee should be changed occasionally, otherwise they would get into all the routine, and be enveloped in the forms of office, and difficult to approach. Their remuneration should be full pay, which is the least that could be given them, and not too much to make it a job.

CHAS. NAPIER.

Purbeck, Nov. 16, 1832.

\* At present, I believe, a committee is appointed to meet once a month.

† We have long since suggested a measure of this nature.—Ed.

## ON THE SETTING OF SAILS.

SINCE every sail is, according to its office, supported at certain fixed or invariable points, its standing well when set must depend on the leading or direction of the remaining supports, which will, generally speaking, be the tack or the sheet, or both.


It has been remarked, that the sheet should draw from the body of the sail, but if we may judge from the standing of many sails, even where pains are taken to make them stand properly, this direction is too vague, and admits of too much latitude in the variation of the direction of the sheet, which, according to some opinions, may still be within the limits understood by the expression "drawing from the body of the sail."

In order that a sail may stand as well as possible, and therefore, under all circumstances, draw most powerfully, it is evident that these two conditions must be fulfilled: first, that all parts of its surface should be equally exposed to the action or pressure of the wind, that is, as nearly as the yielding nature of the material will allow; and, secondly, that it should preserve the same position, or the same figure, whether the wind freshens or slackens.

The centre of pressure of a surface, when the pressure is equally diffused over all parts of it, is the centre of gravity of the surface, and this will be the case with regard to a sail acted on by the wind, whether it be supposed that the wind acts, according to the common theory, in parallel lines on every point of the surface (since the centre of gravity is the centre of equal and parallel forces), or, that having distended the sail, it remains in the hollow, kept in a state of quiescent pressure by the force of the air passing abaft it, and then acts on the sail by its perpendicular pressure at every point \*, for the centre of these perpendicular pressures is likewise that of the centre of gravity of the surface.

It will be evident from the following considerations that the above required conditions will both be fulfilled when the direction of the sheet passes through the centre of gravity of the sail.

If the sail  $ABC$ , having the edge  $AB$ , or luff, fixed at all points, as on a yard or stay, be supposed lying on the ground, and the sheet  $SC$  be pulled, at a slight elevation, so as to lift the sail clear of the ground, then it follows, from mechanical principles, that the only direction in which  $SC$  can be pulled so as to raise equally the two parts of the sail  $CMA$   $CM B$  on either side of the line  $SC$  produced to  $M$ ; or (which comes to the same thing) to stretch the foot and leach proportionally to their lengths, is in the direction of the centre of gravity of the surface  $ACB$ , which is in the line drawn from  $C$  to bisect  $AB$  in  $M$ ; and since when  $SC$  is pulled in this



\* That the latter supposition is nearer the true one than the former, has been remarked from the circumstance, that however fresh it blows, the points of the topsails hang by their own weight whenever the ship becomes steady for an instant, instead of being blown along the sail, as must inevitably be the case if they were hanging in a current of air moving forcibly in that direction.

particular direction, neither side preponderates, it is evident that increasing the weight or pressure of the whole sail equally throughout its surface will cause no other change in the circumstances than an increase of strain in the sheet S C. If the sail be now placed vertically, and the action of the wind substituted for that of its own weight, the conditions, as to the single point of equal pressures on both sides of S C, will remain unaltered, for the wind acts now on the sail exactly as its own weight did before, and the sheet leading through the centre of gravity extends the surface uniformly as it did before, and so in like manner in this position of the sheet, any increase in the force of the wind will produce no change of figure in the sail. The like may be shown of more forces than one.

In a triangular sail this direction of the sheet is at once judged of by the eye, for the centre of gravity of a triangle is in a line drawn from any angle bisecting the opposite side\*, and as, in this figure, the direction of the line is all that is wanted, and not the centre itself, a line drawn from the clue to the middle of the luff determines it, the rounding of the edges making no sensible exception to the rule. It will accordingly be found, that in well-set jibs this condition always holds good, very nearly; the direction of the sheet passes most frequently, indeed, a little below the middle of the luff, the effect of which is, that the clue rising suffers the head of the sail to shake first, which is generally thought advisable.

It is therefore easy to find at once the proper direction of the sheet of a jib or triangular staysail when the tack and head are fixed points, and if the point where the sheet is made fast, or first enters the bulwark, be also a fixed point, then the line being drawn from this point to the luff as before, the sail will be made to stand properly by causing the clue to fall on this line, either by adding to the foot, or cutting away from it, according to the case, beginning from nothing at the tack.

In a similar sail set flying, as a jib-topsail, the tack and halliards, which, by pulling against each other supply the place of the stay, and thereby stretch the sail most in the luff, do not intersect each other in the centre of gravity, but in a point nearer the luff, in the line S C M, and their combined action, or *resultant*, being directly opposed to the pull of the sheet, passes through the centre of gravity.

In a quadrilateral figure the centre of gravity is found, by dividing it by one of its diagonals into two triangles, joining their centres of gravity found as before, and then doing the same by the other diagonal; the point of intersection of the two lines joining the centre of gravity of each pair of triangles is the centre of gravity of the figure. In a sail of such figure, as a gaff-topsail, it becomes still more difficult to judge by the eye alone the position of the centre of gravity; and when this is found, the difficulty still remains of leading the forces of support, which in this case are three, and all of them variable, the sheet, tack, and halliards, so that the sheet, and the resultant of the tack and halliards may pass through it, as it will be found they always do when the sail stands well and preserves the same figure.

If the sheet does not lead properly it is easy to foresee what will take

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\* This done from two of the angles, the intersection of the lines is the centre of gravity of the triangle.

place on any alteration of the force of the wind: thus, if it lead too horizontally, it is clear that the after-leach being slacker in proportion than the foot, will give more as the wind freshens, and the clue will rise accordingly; if too vertically, the foot will, on the other hand, be the part to yield, and the sail thus becoming hollow from the head downwards towards the middle of the foot, the after-cloths become in part a back sail, as may be observed in a boom mainsail when the boom is too short. The first of these defects is the most common, and is the lesser evil of the two, for though it diminishes the power of the sail, yet it causes no leewardly action as the latter does. It is to be observed, generally speaking, in the fore-topmast staysails and foresails of square-rigged vessels. The evil which arises from both parts of the sheet being carried too far aft, is in the case of the foresail partly removed by bousing the standing part lower down by means of a lizard, which causes the resultant, or mean direction of the two parts, to pass more nearly through the centre of gravity of the sail.

It is further to be observed, especially with regard to the small sails, in light winds, and when the ship has some motion, that the change of figure which, it has been seen, must, unless the sail is perfectly well set, take place with every variation in the force of the wind, materially impairs their effect on the ship, since, during the whole time that the sail is undergoing any change of figure, until it is fully stretched by the wind, it is escaping from the action of the wind, and can produce little or no effect at all on the ship\*.

The condition under which a course is uniformly stretched in all parts being, from what has been said, that the directions of the tack and sheet should each pass through the centre of gravity of the sail, clearly shows the impropriety of the too general custom of attempting to get the tacks of new courses close down. The violence done to the canvas in this proceeding is plainly indicated by the great wrinkles which extend right across the sail to the opposite ear-ring, and the consequence of which is, that a course is sometimes to be met with that will stand upon one tack only. Whereas, if instead of employing an extravagant vertical force on one clue only, both were forced alike by degrees, like the topsails, the tack and sheet would be constantly more and more directed towards the centre of gravity of the sail, and the sail, by stretching proportionally in all parts, would always tend to the size and form it was intended ultimately to have.

It is well to bear in mind, that the sail-makers remark, they are frequently called on to alter sails, and especially gaff-top-sails, when the defect was in the setting of them only.

H. R.

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It may here be remarked (though it is a question of cutting, and therefore not directly our present object), that, in every sail not entirely supported at fixed points, if the foot extend abaft a vertical line dropped from the head, it must follow, that in light winds, from the tendency of the after-leach to hang vertically by the weight of the canvass, the foot must be slack, and the sail will form vertical folds, which must be blown out before it can begin to produce headway; but when the foot falls within this vertical line, as in the diagram, every part of the sail is already in a state of tension from its own weight. A great part of the efficiency of the light sails is no doubt lost from a want of attention to similar considerations.

## PLAN FOR THE SUPPRESSION AND PREVENTION OF PIRACY.

MR. EDITOR.—Having lately observed in the London papers, that, notwithstanding the severe but just example made of some pirates taken at Cadiz some time since, *piracy* is still to be dreaded by “such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions,” I beg leave to offer for publicity what I trust will be found a simple and efficacious plan for its suppression and prevention.

Perhaps it may be as well to remind those whose eye it may reach, that it is a subject of no slight importance to us as a humane and maritime people: for, independently of the occasional acts of piracy we hear of through the channel of the public journals, there is too much reason to dread that many of the most horrid acts “are for ever in the bosom of the ocean buried,” the whole crew of some vessels captured being either put to the sword, or, in technical language known to seafaring men, “made to walk the plank,” after which, the vessel is plundered, and, to cut off all clue to detection, sent to the bottom. On these vessels being missed, they are supposed either to have been legitimately captured, foundered, or wrecked; and the authors of their destruction having acted on their favourite axiom, “*il n’y a que les morts qui ne reviennent pas*,” thus find themselves in security.

Should you deem the accompanying Plan worthy of insertion among your valuable and interesting papers, by your sending it forth to the public in an early Number you will much oblige your obedient and humble servant,

GEORGE SMITH, Capt. R.N.  
late of H.M.S. Excellent.

Brighton, Nov. 25, 1832.

### Plan, &c.

GOVERNMENT to cause a manifesto to be printed in all languages common to maritime nations, to be distributed by our consuls, men-of-war, and merchantmen, the present time of almost universal peace being particularly favourable for its circulation over every part of the world, and for obtaining, when required, any assistance from Foreign Powers.

The manifesto to commence by a short address to sailors, reminding them of the horrors of piracy, and offering his Majesty’s free pardon, with a *reward*—say either one, two, or three hundred pounds sterling, British money—to be paid by the government to any person (excepting he may himself have committed murder) who should cause to be arrested and bring to justice the captain of any pirate, or any person who has acted as such on board of any pirate; the manifesto to conclude by stating what constitutes piracy.

As it may appear impolitic, on a *prima facie* view of the matter, to offer a premium to an informer, perhaps it will be sufficient to state, that the common dangers incidental to a sailor’s life are alone sufficiently manifold without the addition of piracy; therefore, considering the infrequency of detection, and the increase of the crime, any means likely to prevent and detect it should not be left untried.

### How the Plan may become efficacious.

It is supposed that, whenever the manifesto is publicly known, no vessel could venture to fit out as a pirate; indeed, it would make it next to impossible to fit out and man a vessel of sufficient force to do any mischief, as it would cause a general distrust, and prevent a crew being kept together.

Should the captain of a vessel first determine to turn pirate at sea, he would be liable to be detected whenever he made his appearance in port, though *disguised* for the purpose of obtaining supplies or information; and it would put a stop to the career of those notorious characters particularly known in South America, who make repeated piratical cruises under the protection of privateers’ commissions, used as warrants for the most atrocious purposes, as they entitle them to the respect due to the flag they bear, and who must be considered “all honourable men” until the contrary is found out, which is generally after they have been parted with by men-of-war at sea. This is an evil especially to be apprehended whenever petty States make

war against each other, and which generally increases after the conclusion of peace, the legitimate occupation and harvest for these men being then at an end.

If this plan were in operation, it is but reasonable to suppose, that, as these piratical vessels are sometimes under the guns of a man-of-war, both at sea and in harbour, some one of their crew, either from the hope of the reward, revenge for ill treatment (no uncommon circumstance), or anxious fear of some one else denouncing them, when it would be too late to save his own life, would come forward and inform against them.

On a man-of-war's meeting a suspicious vessel by chance, or when sent out for the purpose, the manifesto should be read to the crew, and detection might follow.

The manifesto to be taken by a consul or other authority on board of any suspicious vessel in port.

Whenever a merchant vessel was plundered at sea, a man who intended to turn King's evidence *might*, if an opportunity offered before he left the vessel, acquaint the master with the name of the pirate, the commander's name, and his own, and state that of vessel and master plundered, in order to lead to the fact when an opportunity offered to impeach the captain.

It may be urged by some, that the hope of reward might produce false accusers. This may be guarded against by the most rigid investigation before the nearest consul, and finally settling the case in an Admiralty Court, to which the parties should be sent at the expense of Government.

Even supposing that no person was ever *convicted* of piracy by these means, the certainty of the existence of sufficient evidence of the crime committed by a whole crew, consisting, generally, of at least an hundred tongues, tempted by the hope of a large reward to denounce it, would undoubtedly prevent its frequency.

The very many appalling instances of piracy accompanied with murder show the necessity of doing something more than has yet been tried for the sake of humanity, and for the protection of valuable property.

Great Britain is not only looked to for protection against these monsters of the deep, by her own people, but by nations which have been accustomed, for ages to seek protection from her flag; yet, up to the present moment, attempts have been made merely to *detect pirates*, by keeping numerous cruisers, at an enormous expense, on the different stations (whereas a whole navy could not prevent their existence); and when they out-Herod Herod, which is generally somewhere on the wide and trackless ocean, an additional frigate\* is despatched in quest of them. Should she fall in with the object of her search, which can seldom be the case, the captain may permit her to escape to commit other outrages on humanity, for want of proof or means to identify the vessel—a thing of the greatest difficulty, independently of the common ruse with a pirate; that is, to alter her paint or rig, being a schooner to-day, a brig on the morrow; besides which, a desire not to offend by mistake a friendly power whose flag she may be under, and the risk of demurrage, may make, perchance, a captain of a man-of-war overcautious.

It therefore appears absolutely necessary to devise a plan which may strike at once *at the root of the evil*, and thus remove a just cause of reproach to the first of maritime powers.

The above plan has this peculiar feature to recommend it strongly for adoption, *viz.* the pardon and reward suggested could never operate as an *encouragement* to crime, which would be the case, if rewards were held out for denouncing crimes to be committed on shore. As the captain, or man in command, who must sanction an act of piracy, is the *principal* or person for whom the reward is offered, on this hinges the whole practicability of the plan here proposed: neither could it affect the interests of commerce, or incur any expense worth consideration, if a trial were given it.

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\* The Galatea and many others may be mentioned.

## THE INDIAN ARMY.

IN the United Service Journal for September 1831, I have just read with surprise and mortification, an article, entitled "Considerations on the Native Army and general Defence of India,"—surprise, that one who writes apparently with some knowledge of India, should yet be so little acquainted with the merits of some of the various subjects on which he treats;—and mortification, that the character and qualifications of our Sepoy soldiery should be so much mistaken as that the assertions I have just read should have obtained a place, as a leading article in this excellent periodical.

Before this reaches England, or even before this time, I hope some one of our service now at home has taken up the pen to correct the errors of this writer\*; but in case my hope should be fallacious, I cannot refrain from making him a short reply, although it cannot appear for more than a twelvemonth after the date of his "Considerations."

Judging from some passages in this article, I should suppose that the writer had been in India. But if he has, how can he say (at the bottom of page 6) that "the only fortifications we now have are at the presidencies?" Has he forgotten, or did he never hear of the forts of Chunar, Agra, and Allahabad, besides various other places which might easily be put into a very tolerable state of defence? The city of Delhi, too, is surrounded by a wall and ditch, with bastions, and when I was quartered there six years ago the executive engineer was clearing away the old ruins, and other obstructions, to point-blank distance round the walls, so that, though it could not stand a regular siege, it would afford good shelter to a body of troops, and delay an enemy for some time, particularly if he was not provided with heavy artillery, and the other materials for a siege. Not that Delhi ought to be the place where we should make a stand against an enemy; that must be made in the Punjab: but of that hereafter.

In page 3, is quoted a passage from the Monthly Review, to the effect that, in the assault of Bhurtpore, not one of the native regiments could be induced to approach the walls, until the European troops had surmounted the ramparts. I presume that the last siege of Bhurtpore, in 1826, is here alluded to; and I ask, was either the writer of the quotation, or the person who quotes, at that siege? I was, and I can affirm from my personal knowledge, that the Sepoys followed the Europeans closely in the rush up the breaches, and that in the *melée* on the top of the left breach in particular, where the most severe fighting occurred, when the men lost their ranks, and paused to re-form, and charge again, the Sepoys fell in indiscriminately with the British, and charged shoulder to shoulder with them. It may be asked why the Sepoys "*followed*" the Europeans, why they did not lead, or at least why the assault of one of the breaches was not entrusted to them solely. My answer is, that, highly as I estimate the Sepoys, I should never think of classing them with British troops; though I have heard officers of our service, in the enthusiasm of their *esprit de corps*, contend that they are equal to Bri-

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\* The subject was immediately taken up by a competent advocate of the Indian Army—vide No. 38, Jan. 1832.—Ed.



tons ; but these gentlemen, in their excessive *esprit de corps*, had forgotten the *esprit de patrie*. British troops have established their right to be considered the best troops in the world. And I think Sepoys, when commanded by British officers, whom they know, may lay claim, if not to the second rank in the scale of bravery exclusively, at least to a place in that rank, in common with the best troops of continental Europe. I had not the good fortune to serve in Java, not being then in the service; but I have often been told by officers who served there, that the French found it nearly as difficult to stand a charge of Sepoy infantry as they have notoriously always found it to cross bayonets with British infantry. On almost every occasion, when it came to the charge, the French faltered, and then turned, and fled at that terrible sight,—terrible whether in the hands of Europeans or Sepoys—a line of British steel.

European troops then, always forming a part of our armies in India, are always employed to lead the Sepoys into battle, to show them the road to victory ; and when so led, and as I have already observed, commanded by British officers, *whom they knew*, the Sepoys have never been found deficient in gallantry and devotion.

In page 2 of this article, I find various assertions which prove how little the writer knows of the character of the Sepoys, and the constitution of the native army. Near the top of the page he says, “ these also (the Sepoys) having customs and religious prejudices, which keep them so distinct from their British officers as to admit of scarcely any community of feeling or intercourse beyond that which takes place on parade.” Now, in all well-conducted regiments—and I am happy to say that the one to which I have the honour to belong is of that number—there is decidedly more intercourse between the Sepoys and their British officers than between the men and officers of European corps. Has a Sepoy a grievance to be redressed,—does he think himself wronged by a comrade,—he comes to his officer. Does he get into difficulties of any description, he comes to tell his story to his officer : and those who know the Sepoys are aware, that the mere act of listening kindly to the long, roundabout story of a Sepoy, will alone console him, and send him away pleased and comforted ;—indeed, this is sometimes all that is requisite, for they are apt to make a very long story about a very trifling, insignificant business. I know that there are officers in our service, who never trouble themselves about their men, never go near them, and never allow them to come and detail their complaints. But I am convinced that is not the general character of our service ; and in the well-conducted corps, where the officers cultivate acquaintance with their men, and are kind and steady in their behaviour to them, I can most conscientiously aver, that so far from “ much facility for conspiracy being extended to large portions of the army,” the slightest murmur of individual dissatisfaction would be heard and suppressed at once : not suppressed to smother in a hidden fire, but by inquiry and redress.

The Sepoys are keen observers, and excellent judges of the character of their officers ; and when they are kind and just to them, the Sepoys love, and are proud of them. I have often heard them boasting to each other, and to the men of another, and not equally fortunate corps, what good officers they have, and accurately defining the respective qualities of different officers ; and this, when they were not aware that any one else was within hearing.

What I have said above may be considered, in some degree, as an answer to a quotation, which the writer of this article gives in page 2, from the Monthly Review, and which, he says, has been unanswered, and was understood to have been written by a person who had means of good information. I cannot conceive how any one, with good information, could be so bold as to say, that "nothing less than the intrepid promptitude, and the necessary severity with which, when every milder proceeding had failed, the mutineers were attacked, and part of them put to the sword, could have averted the general revolt of the whole Bengal army?" Of course, I understand from this passage, that the writer is of opinion, that the whole Bengal army was at that time ripe for revolt; which opinion I most distinctly and unhesitatingly contradict. If the writer had laid it down as a rule, that mutiny and revolt must be suppressed with a strong hand, I might have agreed with him: though, in the case in question, (the mutiny at Barrackpore in 1825,) there is much to plead in extenuation for the Sepoys. In consequence of some new regiments having just been raised, and the battalions of the old regiments made separate regiments, great changes had taken place in the postings of officers to corps; so that in the particular corps in which the mutiny principally occurred at Barrackpore, there was only one officer present who had been any length of time with the corps, and whom the *Sepoys* knew. And it is a fact, that on the day on which the mutiny broke out, that officer's company refused to join their comrades in their revolt. Moreover, it was known several days before, that dissatisfaction was prevalent among the men; and a letter was written to head-quarters, mentioning this fact. No notice appears to have been taken of this timely information. Had inquiry been instituted, and had the men been pacified by justice being done to them, and the agitators being arrested and punished, the horrible scene of slaughter which had then become necessary might have been spared.

With respect to the causes of dissatisfaction:—the troops were suddenly ordered to march,—to follow strange officers, with whom they were unacquainted, to a foreign country, which their religion, and the traditions of their ancestors, had taught them to believe was inhabited by sorcerers and devils: and, as if to try their patience and obedience to the uttermost, this particular occasion was selected to promulgate new rules, regarding carriage, to the army. The men were ordered to find carriage, &c. for themselves, and if they could not find it, to march without it. Of course they could not procure it: the carters and peasantry would not, unless forced, be prevailed upon by any reward to go to that terrible country of which they had heard so much.

Was it surprising that the Sepoys should be dissatisfied? and was it surprising that, when that dissatisfaction was disregarded, the smothered discontent should presently burst into a flame?

At the bottom of page 3, the writer, a few of whose "Considerations" I am examining, proceeds to make some remarks on the propriety and advantage of replacing a portion of our Sepoy force by other mercenaries; by Arabs, Malays, Caffres, and Ghourkas. Of the Arabs, the writer says, that "the Arab, in physical strength and energy, is equal to the European, and the successful formation of Arab regiments, drilled by European officers, has been shown by the Pacha of Egypt. It is true, however, that the Fellah is more tractable than the native of Arabia."

In this passage it would appear that the writer wishes to leave an impression that the Arabs are capable of discipline, and that it would not be difficult to subject them to the restraint and subordination of a regular army; whilst his last sentence admits the fact, that the Pacha of Egypt's new troops are not all Arabs, but partly composed of a race of a widely different character. It is very true, that some of the native powers in India have been in the custom of maintaining a portion of Arab troops, and these troops have always been distinguished for bravery; but no attempt to bring them under the restraints of discipline has ever yet been successful. They are a proud, wild people, invincibly attached to a roving, unsettled, and predatory life. The Malays and Caffres might be made good soldiers; but they, as well as the Arabs, would be much more expensive than the Sepoys. I had intended to make some remarks upon some other parts of this article; in particular, upon the writer's opinion of the propriety of extending our frontier to the Indus; but what I have been compelled to say in behalf of the Sepoys, although I have compressed my observations as much as possible, has already occupied more space than will perhaps be granted to the lucubrations of

AN OFFICER OF THE BENGAL INFANTRY.

Bengal, 24th March, 1832.

## FOREIGN MISCELLANY.

### HOLLAND.

#### ITS MEANS OF OFFENCE AND DEFENCE.

"The position, which the Dutch army occupies, is extremely advantageous; *Maestricht* constitutes a strong point d'appui for the left wing and a portion of the centre; *Bergen-op-Zoom*, *Breda*, *Willemstadt*, and *Gertruydenberg*, secure the right wing, and the little fortress of *Venloo* can be reduced to quiescence by a blockade. If the Dutch, after all, should be forced to give way before superior numbers, their retreat behind the line of artificial inundations will not be attended with consequences in any respect so disastrous, as a retreat on the part of the Belgians and their auxiliaries; for the cities and towns of Belgium lay naked for the assault of an enemy, and the first battle, which her armies lose, cannot fail to fill the whole population with panic, and infuse fresh vigour into the beleaguered garrison at Antwerp. I have alluded to the '*line of artificial inundations*.' This line, which has been formed with the express design of covering Holland against a northern invasion, includes the territory immediately adjacent to Gertruydenberg, Heusden, Crèvecoeur, Bois-le-Duc, and Grave, together with what is termed The Land of Altena: the whole of this expanse can be laid under water by means of the '*sluice-gates*;' and, latterly, the line has been rendered still more complete by the additional sluice erected south of Werkendam. Any attack upon the populous districts north of these immense water-defences, can, therefore, be only undertaken along the isolated causeways leading from the Long-Straat, and they can readily be rendered of difficult access and avail by means of breaches and redoubts. It has been erroneously conceived that even a slight frost may have the effect of making these defenses useless; but far otherwise. By resorting to the sluices, the water beneath the first coat of ice which forms may be left; this will break up the ice; and then the sluices may be closed again. On the immediate approach of danger, the Dutch government will instantly lay the whole line from Gertruydenberg to Heusden, Crèvecoeur, Bois-le-Duc, and the Long-Straat, under water; and happily this can be effected without any sensible damage to the land, for it chiefly

consists of meadows and pastures, and the water, which leaves no deposit of sand behind it, can be let in gradually. I have not taken into account the strength, effectiveness, and proven gallantry of the Dutch army, and, far beyond these, the determined patriotism, by which not only that army, but the whole nation is animated: the moral strength of this bitterly outraged people offers a certain pledge, that its physical resources will be applied to the utmost of their capability; and I cannot but esteem it as a providential interposition, that the first blow aimed by the 'butcher of Toulouse' against the independence of Europe, should have fallen upon a country in every way so justly entitled to form the vanguard of its salvation. The Dutch sovereign well knows that the hearts of his people are with him, and with this, the secret good wishes of the majority of his Belgian subjects, seconded by cordial prayers for his success from the heart's core of every man of principle throughout the civilized world."—*The Hague, Dec. 1832.*

## HANOVER.

## WATERLOO MONUMENT.

This new and splendid embellishment of his Majesty's Hanoverian capital consists of a column of native sandstone, which, with its pedestal, &c., is one hundred and sixty-two feet in height, and is surmounted by a figure of victory in wrought copper. The pedestal to the column is three-and-twenty feet high, and nineteen feet deep; and this rests upon a pediment of four steps, seventy feet square at the base, and fifty-six feet at the landing. The front face of the pedestal has an entrance door, with a votive inscription over it; and the other three sides bear tablets, on which the names of the Hanoverians who fell at Waterloo are engraved. The shaft of the column is twelve feet and a half in diameter, and a hundred feet in height; immediately over it is a quadrangular superstructure, thirteen feet high, and ten feet and a half in diameter, which is furnished with a balcony, on which a door opens from the interior; and immediately above is the "Victory," standing upon a globe, both together being two-and-twenty feet high. Inside the column is a well-lighted circular staircase of one hundred and eighty-four steps. The figure is represented as bending forward, and holding three laurel crowns in her hands; the head is of very superior workmanship, with features resembling those usually assigned to Minerva. This monument has been three years in construction, and cost, including a grant of a few thousand dollars from the Hanoverian government, nearly three thousand pounds.

## AUSTRIA.

A native writer gives the following as the effective strength of the Austrian army on the peace establishment:—

<i>Infantry.</i>			
30 battalions of Grenadiers, 800 each	.	.	24,000
64 regim. of the Line of 3 battal., each 800 strong,	.	.	153,600
17 do. of Hungarian Infantry,	do.	.	40,800
8 battalions of Yagers (Sharpshooters)	.	.	6,400
			<hr/> 224,800
<i>Cavalry.</i>			
12 regim. of Hussars, 800 strong	.	.	9,600
8 ——— Cuirassiers, do.	.	.	6,400
8 ——— Dragoons, do.	.	.	6,400
4 ——— Hulans, do.	.	.	3,200
			<hr/> 25,600
<i>Artillery and Engineers.</i>			
5 regiments, in all	.	.	20,000
			<hr/> 270,400

In time of war this force is augmented by 120,000 of the Landwehr, who on the same duty as the regulars, as well as by the Hungarian "Army of Insurrection," which consists of 50,000.

"These troops are all raised by conscription (or ballot), in the German, Italian, and Polish provinces: their length of service is limited to fourteen

years; and when the private has been discharged from the line, he again becomes liable to the militia, or landwehr, service. It should, however, be observed, that the Hungarian is exempted from the latter duty by virtue of his national constitution; and likewise, that the Hungarian regiments are composed of voluntary recruits, who enlist for life. The soldiery in the Austrian ranks are amenable to military chastisement, corporal punishments, and the 'gauntlope.' The regiments form in three ranks, the finest men marching at the head, and the light infantry, or riflemen, bringing up the rear; they are subdivided into a centre, and divisions, according to their strength. The organization of a battalion differs from that of other armies; for each division is commanded by a captain and lieutenant captain, holding the first rank, whilst the remainder of the officers hold supernumerary rank only. Another distinguishing feature in the organization of the Austrian army is, that every *zuege* (corps of divisions) is masqued, both right and left, by a file of officers, sergeants, and corporals, who are invariably stationed on one and the same flank. Each company comprises four of these *zuege*."—(*From the Code for the Exercise of the Imperial Infantry.*)

### BAVARIA.

#### GREEK CONTINGENT.

The two squadrons of Hulus, which king Otho takes with him as a body-guard, wear an uniform of dark green, with cuffs, facings, and cap of crimson; the lacing, buttons, &c. being white. The fusileers, riflemen, and grenadiers, are clothed in dark-blue, like the Bavarian guards, except that the lacings, wings, and cuffs are white, as to the fusileers; green, as to the rifle corps; and crimson, as to the grenadiers. The contingent is on its march to Trieste, where it is expected to embark for Greece towards the end of December.

### GREECE.

#### THE HYDRIOT MARINES.

It is notorious, that there is no Greek seamen of more mettle or skill in his vocation than the Hydriot and Ipsariot; the latter of whom has been driven from his insular hearth to seek an asylum in Syra, Egina, and other parts of Greece. They form, both of them, the flower of the Greek marine. The footing on which the crew stands with the captain differs essentially from what is customary amongst ourselves, not only in Hydra, but throughout the merchant-service in Greece; for the whole of the sailors, down to the lowest cabin-boy, are either direct relatives of the captain, or, as foster-connexions, treated as such. They are not paid monthly wages, but are entitled to certain per-centages on the earnings of the vessel, without regard to age. Whilst our own sailors have an interest in lengthening out the voyage, because their bread depends upon its duration, the Greek mariner is anxious to perform it in as brief a space as possible, as the amount of his hire depends upon the number of cargoes he can discharge. It is of no slight advantage, too, that the Greek trader has always a crew, one-third, greater, if not doubly as numerous as that of an European vessel.—(*Letter from Nauplion.*)

### FRANCE.

#### BOARD OF MILITARY SUPERVISION.

By a recent decree, the Secretary of the War Department is to be assisted in future by a permanent board of cavalry and infantry officers, which is to be composed of eight lieutenant-generals, (one of whom is to be chosen President of the Board,) three major-generals, two of infantry and one of cavalry, and a military inspector (*intendant*), or sub-inspector, who is to act as reporter (*rapporteur*). The secretary is to be some field officer. The functions of this board will be to collect, examine, and prepare digests of the reports handed on by the inspectors-general, in the effective services, discipline, training, clothing, equipment, and internal organization of the several corps, to examine every law, ordinance, and regulation which may be proposed, and in general to advise the minister on every subject which he may deem it expedient to lay before them.

DUELS.

At the burial of a young officer of the 34th foot, in garrison at Toulouse, who had fallen in a duel on the 9th of November, Le Jeune, the general in command, addressed the officers of the regiment, as well as those of the artillery and national guard, who assisted at the ceremony, in the following terms:—"Gentlemen, Duelling is a crime, committed against your country, which calls upon you for every sacrifice which you can make to it, beginning with that of your life-blood and your private resentments. That duel, the fatal issue of which has called us to the brink of this grave, has deprived our common country of a gallant defender. M. Mermet, who has been snatched from this world in the prime of life, gave high promise that he would one day defend his country with the same skill and bravery which distinguished the colonel, his father, and lieutenant-general Count Mermet, his uncle, during a series of five-and-twenty years of warfare, through which their breasts and ours formed a rampart to France. I participate in the grief which this premature privation must occasion them; but I cannot do so without recalling to your minds, gentlemen, that we should reserve our courage for active display against our country's adversaries. We should control our own feelings, and exert our influence over those who are placed under our command, towards maintaining the ties of brotherly concord amongst the brave men whom that country calls forward in its defence. The reciprocal confidence which such conduct as this will beget, will redouble their strength and energies—their success and glory."

NAVIES OF FRANCE AND HOLLAND.

A Belgian writer states, that, in 1789, France possessed 261 ships of war, amongst which were 72 ships of the line, and that at that time her population was 24,800,000 souls; but that in 1832, with a population of 34,000,000, she has only 277 ships of war, including 34 ships of the line and 53 frigates and sloops. The decrease has been particularly marked during the last five years, though they have brought no war with them. Holland, at the present moment, has 97 ships of war on foot, 9 of which are ships of the line, and 39 frigates, and her population does not exceed 2,300,000. The latter, therefore, has in proportion a much larger navy than the former, for she has a ship to every 23,711 inhabitants, whilst France has not more than one to every 122,743! The facts and the computation are both minutely curious.

NATIONAL GUARDS.

The official report of the present state of this corps gives the whole number of individuals, who are registered on its books, at 5,729,052, of whom 3,781,206 stand on the list for active service, and 1,947,846 appear as forming the *corps de reserve*. The former consist of 3,695,031 infantry, 10,415 cavalry, 54,723 firemen-sappers (*sapeurs-pompiers*), 19,025 artillery, and 2012 sailors and marine workmen. The infantry (of whom 1,825,938 are civic or *communale*, and 1,871,075 are rural, or *cantonale*) is brigaded into 140 legions of 377 battalions, besides 3405 independent battalions, 12,144 isolated companies, and 4025 isolated subdivisions, not embodied into legions. The artillery musters 650 pieces of ordnance, and is composed of eight battalions or squadrons, 155 companies, and 117 isolated sub-divisions; and the cavalry of 49 squadrons, and 280 fractions of squadrons. That portion of the National Guards, which may be rendered "moveable," embraces the following six

1. Unmarried men, from the age of 20 to that of 35 . . . . .	1,231,033
2. Widows, without children . . . . .	4019
3. Parties, having substitutes in the regular army . . . . .	55,157
4. Married men, without children . . . . .	156,096
5. Individuals coming under some one of the cases provided for by the 145th Act of the Law . . . . .	406,541
6. Married persons, with children . . . . .	393,053

Total 1,945,899

## BELGIUM.

## CHARACTER OF THE BELGIAN SOLDIERY.

In its present state the chief efficiency of the Belgian army centers in the Walloon branch of it. The districts from which this latter is recruited lie upon the French border; their inhabitants speak the same language, entertain the same opinions and predilections, and are characterized by the same manners as their French neighbours; and they possess all the military qualifications peculiar to the French soldier, his quick discernment, his promptness in action, and, to a certain extent, his political prejudices and leanings. But nothing like this holds good with respect to the Fleming. The people of Flanders serve against their inclination; they cannot comprehend the why or wherefore of their being called into service; talk to them of glory, and they call it nonsense; endeavour to move them by a sense of what they owe to the cause of national independence, and the appeal will be chilled down with a feeling of their personal independence, and a selfish regard for their own interests. They care not what government they live under, so long as the fields to which they are, as it were, rooted and chained down by nature, escape the clutch of the spoiler; even let their crops be stripped from under their nose, they will set about the work of ploughing, sowing, and planting *de novo*, and wait patiently and peaceably until harvest-time comes round again. It is impossible to make the Fleming comprehend that he has a government or laws worth fighting for; all sorts and kinds of them are one and the same to his phlegmatic temperament. But no sooner is the Flemish conscript out of sight of his village bell, than the fever of "home" lays burning hold of him; he has not thought, nor wish, nor feeling, nor ambition, but for the moment which shall restore him to his native hearth. This character of his is no more than what is indigenous to every exclusively agricultural country; tear a genuine rustic from his home to make him a soldier, and you instantly destroy his moral efficiency. To this source may be traced the constantly-recurring desertions which have done such cruel mischief to the native force of Belgium; nor is there any one branch of it which has suffered so severely from this cause as the regiments composing the "moveable civil guard," which is principally drawn from a class of men attached by birth and habit to husbandry pursuits. It is an evil of long standing, and continues to baffle the keenest vigilance: there is no remedy for it, but by amalgamating the Fleming in the same ranks with the Walloon. With such difficulties as these, aggravated as they have been by the aboriginal incapacity of the Belgian officers, it redounds greatly to the credit of Leopold and his war department, that they should have anything like the numerous corps of regulars, which they can now muster, on foot. Even the nucleus for it was altogether wanting when the late regent resigned the helm to him, and it is no little proof of his ability, that, in spite of the intrigues, cabals, and difficulties which have beset him from the outset, he has contrived to elicit so much efficiency out of such heterogeneous resources.

S.

## REVIEWS AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *A Memoir of the late Captain PETER HEYWOOD, R.N. By Edward Tagart. 8vo. 1832.*

WE have been somewhat surprised by the appearance of this volume, for it has crept forth as silently, we had almost said insidiously, as though it was shod with felt. We cannot say we approve of it. With the biography of Mr. Marshall, the details of Mr. Barrow, and the sketch of this lamented officer which appeared in our own pages, there was no actual necessity for a further account of proceedings already before the public, unless a strictly professional one had been given. Here, however, we have anecdotes with which the world has been made acquainted, eked out into a book by the insertion of a few letters

which, we presume, the other writers saw no need for publishing. But a ruling motive for this act is very clear;—it is to boast aloud that so excellent a man as Captain Heywood had swerved from the established religion of his country; and the author, editor, or compiler of the pages which tell this, is a Unitarian preacher.\*

While we decline entering upon the delicate question as to the effect of this communication, we may at once assert that it is very uncalled for; and the little additional information respecting the Captain, which has gratified us in this Memoir, is more than lost in the pain we have felt at its jesuitical conclusion.

Nor are we better pleased with the execution of the book. The writer, having but one object in view, is careless in the details, and unequal to the commonest technicalities. He tells us that Heywood embarked for sea-life at the age of fifteen, and yet supplies dates which prove our assertion that he was only thirteen. In the catalogue of surveys, one of the best—that of Cuta—is omitted. He appears to be quite unacquainted with the papers which the Captain published on maritime affairs; and, in many instances, the express wish of the deceased has been trifled with. "Several volumes of MSS.," says Mr. Tagart, "containing memoranda on the subjects of his inquiries, in which theology held a conspicuous place, were destroyed by him a short time before his death. He feared that observations might go forth as his, which, on maturer consideration, he should be inclined to disavow or modify; and which, indeed, were never intended for the public eye. His valued partner would, for her own sake, have gladly rescued some of these precious relics from destruction; but in answer to all entreaties to spare them, he would reply, that hereafter some well-meant affection for his memory might possibly induce a violation of that privacy which it had been his happiness to preserve."

2. *Substance of the Medical Reports upon the Epidemic called CHOLERA.*  
By John Hamett, M.D.\* 8vo. 1832.

Though this book is hardly within our cognizance, still, its author being a naval surgeon, and its subject one of paramount importance, we give it a place amongst our notices.

Dr. Hamett was commissioned by government to proceed in June, 1831, to Dantzic, in order to investigate the epidemic raging in that city. He appears to have applied himself, with equal zeal and diligence, to accomplish the object of his mission, so that he was enabled to return a full report on the history, symptoms, and nature of that dreadful scourge. After the pains and toil of compiling this report, it was natural that Dr. Hamett should hope they would prove neither unserviceable to the profession, nor uninteresting to the public; he was therefore anxious to see his labours published; but it has not taken place. On this occasion the Doctor exhibits his regrets rather strongly, and imputes their non-appearance to the interference of the superintendent-general of quarantine; but perhaps the bulk of the papers may have influenced the question. In this dilemma he has, very properly, printed the substance of the official returns, which he transmitted to the privy council.

For the local situation and statistics of Dantzic, the rise and progress of the epidemic, and the account of its ravages, we must refer the reader to the volume itself. Our space affords us but room to quote the author's conclusions respecting the cholera; and, from the care and skill manifested, together with the authenticity of the documents, we can safely recommend them to the attention of the public.

"1. That it is spontaneously produced in certain weak constitutions, and disordered habits of body, in consequence of some indeterminate combination of certain atmospheric and local states, and occasionally in consequence of different powers of electricity in the air, on such constitutions and marked habits, as may reasonably be inferred from the progress of the disease in certain electrical states of the 'weather.'

"2. That cholera spreads epidemically, but irregularly, still, in accordance with marked personal and local states, more than any other epidemic.

"3. That general infection, in the sense I use it, is produced only by an unfavour-



able state of the atmosphere in certain localities promoting such a state; and *special infection* by the air being rendered still more deleterious on being pent up, and further vitiated by the *effluvia* of dirt or liquid filth, or of being contaminated with the foul air and *effluvia* of several persons, whether affected or not, in close places. But surely these incidental aggravating causes may be fully removed, or partly obviated at least.

"With reference here to contagion or non-contagion by merchandise:—

"The very nature, indeed, of the disease seems to indicate that it is not necessarily propagated by merchandise. Independently, however, of which, there has never been any evidence whatever in Dantzic of its being so propagated; while all the authentic facts, which I have enumerated on this head, in that particular quarter, declare strongly against contagion in this way; to which I would add, as formerly stated, some others of a private nature also strikingly against it."

3. *Practical Remarks on the Building, Rigging, Arming, and Equipping his Majesty's SHIPS OF WAR.* By Rear Admiral A. W. Schomberg. 8vo. 1832.

The name of Schomberg is one of interesting naval recollections; and especially so from the merits of the late excellent man and correct officer, Sir Alexander, as well as those of his two sons, who now hold so distinguished a rank in the service. It is the elder of these who has furnished us with the remarks before us.

Though the rear-admiral has therein afforded nothing strikingly new, yet his observations, being founded on experience, advance our stock of professional knowledge; and there are many hints which will prove so useful both to the builder and the officer, that we strongly recommend their perusal. They are written, as the reader will find, and as the author admits, without the slightest attention to literary minutiae, and are addressed solely to professional men. We have but confined space for noticing the work, and, indeed, the nature of its contents preclude abridgment. Rear-Admiral Schomberg has long advocated an increased breadth of beam to our ships in general, and again stoutly advocates the principle,—but, indeed, most sailors have long been agreed on this point, and it appears that the naval architects are also fetching the same. He wishes, besides, the masts to be stepped, and the rigging to be brought to temporary lanyards before the ports of the upper deck are cut out, in order that the injurious anomaly of placing guns where they cannot be discharged without danger to the shrouds, may be avoided. The general reflections on "gunning" a ship are not broadly dissimilar from the sentiments already expressed in this Journal, and we think that the rage for heavy metal may be carried too far.

The Rear-Admiral is no lover of the "Donkey frigates," or "crebs of ships," as he calls them, and he thinks, as, indeed, does everybody else that we have heard on the subject, that the sooner they are sold out of the service the better. They are not worth cutting down to corvettes, as they want every requisite of men-of-war. We perceive he is not pleased either at turning our beautiful 18-gun brigs into very indifferent ships:—"I suppose," he observes, "it was to make an enemy think them of more force than they are; but this is not a reason sufficient to injure the best qualities of a fine vessel, and our nautical foes have nautical eyes to observe the main and mizen-masts so very close to each other, and to perceive the vessel is not larger than an 18-gun brig, notwithstanding her rig as a ship." He calls for improvement in the small craft of the navy as well as in the great ships, and we think with reason. Why should not the equipment and management of that truly English sea-boat, the cutter, by far the handiest vessel for all services that there is, be more an object? They have ever done good service in attending our fleets, and might still do most of the Channel duty. The objections which the Admiral raises against the "Tennies" are as follow:—"They are insignificant in force as sloops of war, unable to show a gun out of a port in common strong breezes, or their decks would fill with water; they have neither power under water to sail, nor above water to fight; too narrow, too shallow

in depth, and more expensive in proportion in their equipment, than a vessel far more serviceable."

We will subjoin a specimen of the Rear-Admiral's style and reasoning in the following reflections on the

*Official display of the Royal Standard.*

"It is a well-known instruction of constitutional regulation, 'The royal standard is never to be displayed but at the *main-top-gallant-mast-head*, this being the mast to denote naval supremacy.' There is also an instruction—'Whenever it is hoisted, the red ensign shall be worn with it as the ship's colours, instead of the white (Saint George's) or a blue ensign, red being the highest colour.' I have ever read this old instruction to be quite clear and explicit, speaking as an individual and as an officer. I have long considered it an apparent inconsistency, though perfectly unintentional on the part of the service, in the public display of the royal standard, when officially hoisted on any anniversary, to be observed on board his Majesty's ship, where a commander-in-chief's flag is at the *main*. Custom alone, I believe, has made it general, in this instance, to hoist the standard of England at the *fore*, on the anniversary of their Majesty's birth-days, and all other rejoicing days, in order to allow the Admiral's flag to fly at the *main*, by which the royal standard is, unintentionally, degraded. I am prepared for the question from anticipated professional objection, should the above statement cause any, by prompt explanation. Where is the Admiral's flag to be hoisted? *Nowhere*: on that occasion the standard is sufficiently remarkable, and correctly so, to distinguish the Commander-in-chief's ship, for no other ship has any right to wear the standard in sight of the Commander-in-chief, or an Admiral. As a proof of this well-known regulation, flag-ships only are allowed a standard, unless when the King (or any of the Royal family) has embarked in any other.

"There is a difference when the royal standard is displayed, should his Majesty or any of the Royal family be on board, and which, I believe, tends to elucidate, in a clearer point of view, what is here stated. When his Majesty visits an Admiral's ship, or any of the Royal family, the Admiral's flag will be immediately struck, and the royal standard hoisted at the *main*, and saluted with twenty-one guns by the ships of the fleet or squadron present. The Admiral will still command the squadron as an Admiral, but under the supreme command of his Majesty, or under the control of any of the Royal family who may be embarked. No flag, in this instance, can fly at either of the other mast-heads, and the ship will wear the red ensign as her proper colours, as well as all private ships in company, without regard to what the colour of the Admiral's flag is, or at which mast his rank entitles him to carry it. If a junior Admiral is in company, he will wear his flag and proper colours, either red, white, or blue. On his Majesty, or any of the Royal family who may have been on board, leaving the ship, the standard is hauled down, when the Commander-in-chief re-hoists his flag.

"In order to distinguish that the standard is displayed for an anniversary, or the like, and not from any Royal personage being on board, the Admiralty and union flags are hoisted at the other mast-heads. The Admiralty flag is correctly hoisted at the *fo'c'sle*, if the standard is displayed at the rightful mast-head. The union flag, being the colours of the nation, is displayed at both extremes of the ship. The Admiralty flag is the emblematical ensign of the official naval government of the realm. The royal standard is the banner of England and her crowded maps of dominion. In that standard is impaled all the military power of her fleets and armies, the royal, lineal, and illustrious descent of her kings and queens for generations, and every other honour subordinate to that monarch who wears the crown. I have endeavoured to point out what I really believe is done to avoid an apparent inconsistency, arising from an idea, that if an Admiral strikes his flag, his official power of command ceases for that time, and that, in consequence, from his flag being to be worn at the *main*, he cannot hoist it anywhere else, by which means the standard is degraded to a second position—the *fore-top-gallant-mast-head* of the ship. Here is the inconsistency, if any exist. I humbly acknowledge myself inflexible in thinking this to be irregular, according to my judgment of the old established rules and regulations of the naval service. An Admiral's command must cease, of course, if he strikes his flag under any other circumstances than from the official display of the royal standard hoisted on board his flag-ship, all naval and military power being merged in the crown, the continuance of his flag on board, with the standard, is, I believe, unnecessary.

"I will here introduce a few professional and systematical regulations, which I offer for observation, and I hope may be honoured in being read by those high in office in the state, though they may not be adopted.

"1. The royal standard never to be hoisted but at the maintop-gallant-mast-head of his Majesty's ships of war, either on anniversaries or state holidays; when the Admiral and Commander-in-chief's flag, of whatever colour or grade, be struck for that day, and re-hoisted when the standard is hauled down at sun-set. The standard denotes the Commander-in-chief's ship.

"2. On such occasions the Admiralty flag is also to be displayed at the fore, and the union at the mizentop-gallant-mast-heads, as has been customary, denoting that his Majesty is not on board, nor any of the Royal family, for if they are, no other mast-head flag should be displayed.

"3. All junior flag officers in company to wear their flags and proper colours.

"4. All other ships to wear a red ensign when the standard is flying.

"5. All ships of the line, and large frigates, to be supplied with a standard, and on proper occasions, as above, the senior Captain only to hoist it at the main, with the union flag at the fore, and a common pendant at the mizen, a red ensign, as usual, with the standard. The pendant, in this case, would denote that there was no flag-ship in company."

**THE BUCCANEER.**—We have been anticipated in so many competent quarters, as to the pronounced merits of this work, that we have little else to do than to express our cordial concurrence in the universal approbation with which it has been greeted. The *Buccaneer* is a Tale of the Protectorate—including, in its *dramatis personæ*, the doughty Protector himself; and is the first essay in historical romance of Mrs. S.C. Hall, a lady whose "Sketches of Irish Character," we have already said, are imbued with the genius of Miss Edgeworth. In the present production the peculiar talent of the writer is displayed in its best features, and with added force and refinement. It is not in our power to analyse its ingenious and interesting story, which will richly repay perusal.

**THE PORTICAL WORKS OF LEIGH HUNT.**—Though never leaning to the school either of poetry or politics in which Mr. Hunt has figured, we have ever entertained for that writer the respect due to his talents and consistency. The present volume, comprising a selection of his poetry, revised, and precluded by a "good gossiping preface," has been published by a subscription, which we regret to learn has not been so extensive as might have been expected or desired. We, therefore, very cordially recommend its purchase to our book-buying readers, upon the double merits of the author and his book. The *Story of Rimini*, spite of faults of style, which, like other innovations, are "amended or explained" in the new version, must ever be deemed by those who *feel*, rather than criticise, the "fantastic tricks" of the Muse, one of the most charming poems in the English language.

**HISTORY OF ENGLAND.** By SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH. Vol. III.—About two-thirds of this volume had been prepared at the period of the lamented decease of

the eminent author. The manuscripts and memoranda pertaining to the subject, which were left by Sir James Mackintosh, having been purchased by the proprietors of *The Cabinet Cyclopædia*, the history is carried on in this volume to the period of the Spanish Armada, and will be completed, it is affirmed, by "the continuator," in the spirit of his predecessor.

**TURNER'S ANNUAL TOUR.**—This is a noble and a costly volume, bearing the palm from its compeers in bulk, and rivaling the best in its intrinsic qualifications. Mr. Leitch Ritchie again figures in this elegant department of literature, illustrating by his pen the beautiful productions of Turner's pencil. The combination is duly effective. The plan of this work, destined to form an annual series, without reference to the time of the year, is "to illustrate with the pencil and pen all the most celebrated rivers of Europe." The present, or first volume, is dedicated to the Loire; the next will treat of The Seine.

**STANDARD NOVELS, Vol. XXII.**—**FLEETWOOD**, by the Author of *Caleb Williams*, is condensed into this volume. The tale is preceded by an interesting preface by Godwin, who describes, according to the fashion introduced by the Author of *Waverley*, the manner in which Caleb Williams, his *magnum opus*, was "concocted."

**FINDEN'S LANDSCAPE ILLUSTRATIONS OF LORD BYRON, Part IX.**—"Ianthe" would almost tempt us to envy "Petrarch" his "Tomb," take the "Lover's Leap," or, in default of her smiles, seek solitude and, celibacy at the "Cork Convent." "Venice," and the "Castle of Ferrara," are true as beautiful. We should have liked an ampler glimpse of the former.

## CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE PRINCIPAL PORTS AND STATIONS.

Portsmouth, Dec. 19, 1832.

MR. EDITOR,—Since the communications which have been made to the United Service Journal relative to the combined squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm, little has been heard of them at this port. The *Vernon* arrived on the 5th from the Downs, with a Dutch ship which she had detained, and for Captain Sir F. Collier to transfer her to Captain Sir G. Westphall, the *Vernon* being intended to hoist the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir G. Cockburn, as Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies and North America. She has since sailed for Plymouth to refit. Her stay being so short at Portsmouth, I have been unable to ascertain if the late gales of wind which she must have encountered have affected her or not. Sir G. Cockburn is hurried out to his command sooner than was expected, owing to his Majesty's ship *Hyacinth* having brought intelligence of the death of the vice-admiral late in command, Sir E. Colpoys. He had been ill some time, and it is stated that, on landing at Bermuda, he called a consultation of the medical officers on the island, and ascertaining from their report that his dissolution was very soon to take place, he with great calmness made the necessary arrangements for his funeral, and dispatched a vessel to Commodore Farquhar in the *Blanche*, directing him to proceed to Bermuda, and how to act with the squadron. The *Hyacinth* had a run home of only seventeen days. She brought 630,000 dollars on merchants' account, and has since come into harbour, and been paid off into ordinary. The *Druid* has returned from South America, but is ordered to refit and hold herself in readiness for sea. Captain Hamilton's extreme bad health has compelled him to relinquish the command, and the ship is now waiting, or has been, for Captain J. Roberts to join. Report says that her destination is Lisbon, to relieve the *Briton*. The *Druid* is a fine first-class frigate, and since first put in commission has been to England and had a partial refit at Plymouth.

The *Malabar* came up to Spithead on the 6th, and will probably rejoin and relieve the *Spartiate*. The remainder of the squadron are in the Downs, having been driven in by bad weather. Great fears were for some days entertained for the safety of his Majesty's ship *Snake*, but she is now with the others. The *Castor*, *Stag*, *Conway*, and *Rover*, with the *Eagle*, and one other revenue cutter, have detained and sent in several Dutch homeward-bound ships, which are now either at anchor or laid alongside some of the king's hulks in the harbour. It is said that government intend to order moorings to be laid down for all those detained, and have them placed in tiers either in Fareham or Porchester lake—if this be correct, it looks as if their release was not expected very speedily. The officers or crews are seldom seen on shore, although no difficulty is placed in the way of their communicating when and where they please. One day last week they all hoisted Dutch colours at the mast-head, &c., it being a birth-day or anniversary; and the vice-consul entertained the Captains at dinner.

During the 10th, 11th, and 12th of the month, the town was in a great bustle in consequence of a contested election for the borough. The members have heretofore been returned by the corporation, consisting of a select few in the Whig interest. The Reform Bill having greatly increased the number of electors, Captain Charles Napier, C.B., who recently commanded his Majesty's ship *Galatea*, stepped forward, and so early as June last began an active personal canvas. The polling commenced on the 11th, and concluded on the 12th: the gallant captain was defeated by a large majority, as was to be expected, he being nearly a stranger to the inhabitants. Without in the remotest degree wishing to disparage the talents, merit, or fitness, of Captain Napier to fill the office to which he aspired, that of being the representative in parliament of the first naval arsenal in England, it is evident to all reasonable

men, from the numbers which he obtained, that if an admiral of political influence, such as Sir G. Cockburn, Sir J. Gore, Sir R. Stopford, or the present estimable Secretary of the Admiralty, had presented himself, the second member for the borough would either have lost his seat, or been placed in a tottering predicament, as about 200 voters did not poll; and many of those who supported Messrs. Carter and Baring did it for the sake of using their elective franchise for the first time. There were a few broken windows, and some distribution of mud and discourteous language, but otherwise everything terminated quietly.

The *Serpent*, having been fitted at Woolwich, arrived on the 12th; and on the same day the *Sulphur*, Captain Dance, with Governor Stirling on board, from Swan River, having left that settlement on the 12th August. He is the bearer from the settlers of that colony of a memorial to government, in which they have represented that there are about 150 acres of land in corn cultivation, several buildings erected, and great improvements of different kinds in progress; but the original inhabitants have annoyed them, and some lives are lost. They are much in want of labourers of both sexes; and notwithstanding large sums of money have been expended, and great difficulties overcome, there is frequent scarcity of food. The locality is good, and the land, according to the judgment of the present settlers, capable of producing excellent crops of wheat, barley, and oats; and sheep pasturage is excellent.

The memorial embraces a number of other points, which it is not possible to furnish you with in detail; there is one circumstance, however, mentioned, which shows that the religious feeling of the colony is of the right sort, as they apply for some clergymen of the Established Church to be sent out.

The colony was left in charge of Captain Irvin of the 63d regiment, during Governor Stirling's absence...

The *Sulphur* brought letters from his Majesty's ship *Isis*, which describe the loss of the *Borneo*, whaler, at the north part of the Mozambique Channel. She struck on an unknown coral shoal on the 22nd of July last, in lat. 12° 14' S. long. 46° 7' E. The captain (Ross), the surgeon, and one sailor contrived to get to the island of Johanna in an open boat, distance one hundred miles, the third day after being wrecked. The *Isis* fortunately touched at the island and brought them away. The mention of Captain Ross being saved has given rise to a rumour, that it was the Captain Ross, to ascertain whose positive fate such laudable exertions, both in and out of the service, are making at this moment.

The *Cruizer*, Captain Parker, arrived on the 13th, from the East Indies, last from the Cape of Good Hope.

An intimation has been made to the head-quarters of this division of Marines, that in future a field-officer shall accompany all Admirals appointed to command on foreign stations. The official regulation or order has not yet been sent down, but the officers whose turn it may be are in readiness. The foreign stations are, the Mediterranean—the East Indies—the West Indies and North America—South America. Why omit the coast of Africa and Cape of Good Hope?

It is expected that Lieut.-Col. Hornby, R.M., of the Portsmouth division, will embark with Vice-Admiral Sir George Cockburn. This regulation ought to be well considered before it is finally determined on, as several difficulties may be started, viz. How is this field-officer to be disposed of, if the Commander-in-chief should think fit to leave him behind to inspect and brigade of Marines of the fleet which may be in harbour under reef (that being his ostensible duty); for if he is only to sail about with his Admiral, why put an officer of higher rank than a captain on board? Secondly, Where is the field-officer to mess? it cannot be in the ward-room. If a lieut.-col. embarks, his rank in the army, in most cases, will equal that of the captain of the ship; and how is he to be accommodated with regard to cabin, &c.? How is he to share prize-money? as we may now look forward to a war. These questions, and numerous others which have been asked, must all be

fixed permanently, as the appointment is not to be temporary, but take place with every Admiral that goes from England.

At the monthly examination of Midshipmen at the Royal Naval College, held on the 10th instant, the following passed for lieutenants:—Mr. H. J. Julian, Mr. R. M. Donne, Mr. J. Maling, all of his Majesty's ship *Southampton*.

On Tuesday, the 18th, the usual half-yearly inspection of the Royal Naval College took place, previous to the students going home for the Christmas vacation, before a committee of officers, consisting of the naval commander-in-chief, Sir T. Foley, G.C.B., the Admiral Superintendent of the Dockyard, and second in command, Sir F. L. Maitland, K.C.B. Each class of students was examined by the professor and masters, and also by the committee, in the different branches of study. The following were most minutely questioned in geometry, algebra, trigonometry, navigation, astronomy, surveying, gunnery, fortification, &c., and being considered well qualified, and competently instructed in those subjects, were recommended to be discharged into his Majesty's ships.

- |                |             |             |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| 1. Spicer,     | 4. M'Leod,  | 7. Rowley,  |
| 2. Pollard,    | 5. Seymour, | 8. Lang,    |
| 3. Vansittart, | 6. Fowler,  | 9. Compton. |

The first medal was granted to Mr. P. T. Spicer. The second medal to Mr. W. J. Pollard.

There are two employments of importance in which the senior classes of students are daily exercised for six or eight months previous to leaving, not generally known in the service, viz. actual gun practice, and rigging, knotting, splicing, &c. The Admiralty have for some years allowed two six-pounder guns to be placed at the north part of the dock-yard, so that when the tide suits twenty students are instructed by their officers in the duty of loading, priming, elevating, and firing these guns at a target placed expressly for them. The battery is built to resemble a ship's deck, and is furnished with every requisite for guns of that calibre. When tide, or other circumstances interfere, they are instructed in rigging, making small rope, &c. &c. While on the subject of the Naval College, it is a matter of great regret to numerous naval officers that the Admiralty should have thought proper to order the discontinuance of lectures which Mr. Professor Inman daily gave in the School of Naval Architecture, and which were afterwards explained by the mathematical masters. On the first institution of this senior department, in November, 1829, twenty-four naval officers on half-pay, of the rank of Captain, Commander, and Lieutenant, were admitted without any, or very inconsiderable expense to government. (The regulations, &c. to be observed were promulgated by authority in the quarterly Navy Lists.) Between seventy and one hundred officers have thus derived much information, and, in some instances, most valuable instruction, during the twelve or eighteen months attendance. In addition to mathematical lectures, there was a lecture on the practical construction of ships, from that able ship-builder, Mr. Fincham, to whom all the superior class of shipwright-apprentices were articulated, and who has recently been promoted to be assistant-builder of Sheerness dock-yard. The officers, also, had the privilege of attending the gun-practice on board the *Excellent*, and at the laboratory on Southsea Common, to get acquainted with the method of making and filling cartridges, rockets, &c., information which few naval officers, I apprehend, know anything of, it being considered out of their line of action. However, all study of that nature for naval officers is at an end, so far as the Admiralty have to do with it, the building being ordered to be closed, and the inhabitants dismissed.

One end is to be appropriated for the Admiral-Superintendent's offices, and will not be half spacious enough; the other is to form a residence for the Secretary of the Commander-in-chief, when that officer commences his residence in the dock-yard.

As much interest has been excited by the sailing-trial of Lord Belfast's

yacht, the *Water-witch*, and his Majesty's brig, *Pantaloön*, the tender of the Royal George yacht, commanded by Lieutenant Dacres, I send you the statement as it has gone the round of the local papers; I believe it was originally put forth with his Lordship's signature. At eight A.M., November 23rd, the *Water-witch* weighed anchor, and beat out of Falmouth harbour with a strong breeze at S.S.W., under double-reef topsails, foresail, jib, and fore and aft mainsail; shortened sail outside of the harbour, and waited about an hour for the *Pantaloön's* joining. At ten A.M. bore down to close on the *Pantaloön's* weather-quarter; at 11.15, distance short half mile, bearing E.N.E., hauled to the wind on the starboard tack with courses and top-gallant sails set, with a strong breeze at S.S.W. and a heavy sea; in four and three-quarter hours, on making three tacks, beat the *Pantaloön* five miles dead to windward; the *Water-witch* could then have weathered the *Lizard*, when the *Pantaloön* could only fetch a little to windward of the Black Head. On the close of the day, at four P.M., the *Water-witch* bore down to close with the *Pantaloön*; at 4.30 hauled her wind on the weather-beam of the *Pantaloön*; soon afterwards both vessels tacked and stood to the southward, the *Water-witch* keeping her mainsail up; at six P.M. tacked to the westward, wind still blowing strong from S.S.W. They kept company till midnight, the *Water-witch* sparing the *Pantaloön* top-gallant-sails and mainsail; from the darkness of the night they parted. The *Water-witch* showed blue lights, which were not answered--no accident happened to either vessel. The above statement is verified by two Captains in his Majesty's navy and an acting Master of his Majesty's packets at Falmouth who were on board the *Water-witch*.

The troops in this garrison consist of the dépôts of the Royal Fusiliers, 12th, 51st, and 94th regiments--about 120 men of the 12th, under the command of Captain Patton, arrived about a week or two ago, to wait the arrival of the regiment. The 84th and 86th dépôts are at Gosport.

P.

Devonport, 19th December, 1832.

MR. EDITOR,—Little of interest or importance has occurred here afloat since my last, although, on shore, the bustle and excitement in this *virgin* borough has been unprecedented and intense. Before I enter upon that subject I must, however, quote from my Register, that the *Malabar*, 76, returned to the Sound on the 20th ult., but was called out again by signal a few hours afterwards. The *Cornwallis*, 76, was taken out of dock, and the *Forté*, 44, taken in to have her bottom cleaned. On the 25th, the *Druid*, 46, arrived from Brazil. On the 26th, the *Romney* troop-ship arrived from Lisbon, and the *Druid* sailed for Portsmouth. The *Leveret* brig arrived from Lisbon on the 31st. The *Jupiter* troop-ship arrived on the 1st of December, having sprung her fore-yard at sea. The *Leveret* came up Hamoaze on the 2d, to refit. The *Vernon*, 50, came in on the 13th, to refit and prepare for Sir G. Cockburn's flag.

In a former communication I stated that Sir Edward Codrington, the gallant candidate for representing this borough in Parliament, had met with some unpleasant treatment from his opponents; and it is due to the highly honourable and unsullied character of Sir Edward to say, that if the impetuous young men, who so unfairly assailed that gallant officer, did exult for a time, it served only to render their subsequent discomfiture more signal and complete. It happened that very early in this month, on the certainty of a speedy dissolution of Parliament, Mr. Leach, an attorney, the opposing candidate, called his friends together, and without allowing time for Sir Edward to appear, harangued them upon the subject of certain assurances of support which Sir Edward had stated, in an affidavit filed by him in the Court of King's Bench, he had received from Mr. Leach, when he first appeared as a candidate for this borough. Mr. L., however, denied having given such

assurances, and consequently reflected upon the admiral the charge of having sworn to what was not true. Upon receiving, from his look-out-men here, an intimation of what was going on, the admiral<sup>1</sup> was not long in getting under way, and no sooner appeared in Devonport than he called a meeting of the electors. Mr. Leach, who attended, endeavoured to evade, by every art, the direct, straightforward, and pointed questions put by the admiral, when the latter went into such a clear, manly, and convincing refutation of the calumnies against him, supported, too, by the most respectable testimony, that the following resolution was carried by a large majority, viz.—

‘That the upright, candid, and honourable conduct of Sir Edward Codrington, under all the circumstances attendant on, and since, his offering himself as a candidate to represent this borough, coupled with his publicly expressed sentiments on the several important legislative subjects submitted to his consideration from time to time, has been such as to entitle him to our support, and that the most strenuous efforts be made to ensure his return to Parliament.’

After Parliament was dissolved, the day of nomination here was fixed for Tuesday, the 11th inst., and then Sir George Grey, Bart., Sir Edward Codrington, G.C.B., and Mr. Leach, were recommended by their respective friends as fit and proper persons to represent this borough in Parliament; and though the majority of hands for the two first ought undoubtedly to have been decisive, a poll was demanded, and each mustered his strength for the coming day. Sir G. Grey polled numerously, for his cause was never doubtful. The gallant admiral, however, with admirable tact, and knowing the value of a *corps de reserve*, restrained many of his promised plumpers, and polled only sufficient to show the third candidate the weakness of his ground. The result of the day's proceedings, therefore, induced Mr. Leach to resign the contest, leaving to the admiral a triumphant victory ‘without bringing his two-deckers into action.’ The following day the two members were chaired through the towns of Devonport and Stonehouse, a magnificent and imposing procession having been quickly arranged for the purpose, and in which the banners of the ‘silver Grey’ vied in gorgeous splendour with the dazzling whiteness of the admiral's more numerous flags.

Thus Devonport has secured for itself two as able and efficient representatives as it is likely the new Parliament will possess; and it has shown, not only in the selection it has made, but also in the manner the contest has been carried on, through a most arduous and highly-exciting period, that while revelling in the enjoyment of its recent enfranchisement, it would neither exceed the limits of good order, nor transgress the bounds of peace.

We have had dinners given by the friends of each candidate, and Sir Edward, with his characteristic liberality, announced (previous to the election) his intention of giving a ball, which, accordingly, he did on the 17th, when upwards of 2500 tickets were issued, and not only was the royal hotel crowded to excess, but the spacious town-hall was equally well filled. Every delicacy was provided for refreshment; and notwithstanding the various elements which in such a mass were unavoidably commingled, we may truly say, that never before did Devonport enjoy such a happy day.

I remain faithfully yours,

ALPHA.

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Milford Haven, December 17, 1832.

ALTHOUGH the late tremendous gales have filled our port with shipping, driven in by stress of weather, yet little has occurred since our last report worthy a record in the pages of the United Service Journal. The din of hostile preparation, which gives so much appearance of bustle and activity to the eastern arsenals, scarcely agitates a single extra mechanic in the *Ultima Thule* of Milford Haven. The only vessel of war which has entered our harbour since last month, is the Carron, Admiralty steamer, sent hither to



remove the family and effects of Mr. Peako, master shipwright, transferred from Pembroke to Portsmouth dock-yard. Not a single unlucky Dutchman even has been either detained at, or sent into Milford, although our revenue cruisers have been anxiously waylaying them. • On the 30th of November, the Albion, private steam-trader, commanded by Lieutenant John Finlaison, R.N., arrived here, having been struck by a heavy sea between Bristol and Cork, which carried away the larboard horse-stall, a sort of small cabin adjoining the paddle-box, where several deck passengers had taken refuge from the severity of the weather. Such was the prodigious force of this surge, that it dashed the planks to shivers, and swept two men overboard, who, in the darkness and confusion, perished unnoticed, as they were not missed till the following morning, although a spaniel belonging to one of them, which was hurled into the ocean with its master, was heard barking an alarm as it drifted astern of the vessel.

Can you enlighten us upon any of the following reports which have floated down here, it is said, from *good authority*? That it is the determination of His Majesty's Government to commence the new year by a sweeping reduction of expenditure in all the public departments. Several important changes to take place in the Royal Navy. A promotion of flag-officers, including our highly respected superintendent of Pembroke-yard, Captain Charles Bullen, R.N., commanding the Royal Sovereign yacht, who gets his flag, but loses his appointment. An extensive superannuation of all classes under consideration; also the consolidation of the Captains' and Commanders' Lists; the whole to be called by the former title, and to rise by seniority, under particular regulations, it being understood that the last 600 on such list only to be eligible to command sloops of war, and their rate of half-pay to remain as at present. A liberal distribution of ribands also to accompany the before-mentioned arrangements; and the Order of the Guelph to be no longer confined to officers of the army, but conferred, with something approaching to equality, upon the sister service, thus removing an invidious distinction equally distasteful to both.

A convict-hulk, to contain 300 felons, will hereafter be stationed alongside a quay at Pembroke dock-yard, to be guarded by a detachment of 150 marines, from the Plymouth division. Of course, these convicts are to be employed as labourers in lieu of horses or men hired for the purpose.

Instructions have been issued by the Duke of Richmond, directing all post-office packets in future to wear *blue* ensigns and pendants instead of *red*, as heretofore. This regulation is supposed to have reference to some plan now in progress, for preventing private steam-boats assuming the colours and designation of government packets, whether war-office or otherwise—a deception upon the public which has long been complained of, and will no longer be permitted.

The Swallow revenue cutter, commanded by Lieutenant Beatty, is wholly removed from the Milford station; and the Skylark revenue cutter, from Ireland, will hereafter be stationed at Milford, in lieu of the Swallow.

Of the *seven* lazarettes, forming the quarantine establishment at Milford, it is determined to abolish *three*, with a proportionate number of officers and seamen, so as to reduce the whole expense by upwards of 1000*l.* per annum. Only 48 vessels have performed quarantine here, during the past year; but the nucleus of the establishment must be preserved, as this is the only Foul Bill Station for Liverpool, Bristol, and all the other western ports of the empire.

Milford, December 17th.

A REPORT is in circulation, emanating, it is said, from quarters of authority, that the roofs at present erected over the building slips in dock-yards are to be done away with; because, forsooth, such a draught—not of porter, but of air—is generated beneath them, as tends to split some species of timber. Such, however, I can scarcely imagine to be a fact. Surely all their other good qualities are not to be thus sacrificed at the shrine of this one apparent fault. Oh, no; folly only dictates such a presumption. Rather

let the said misfortune (for fault it cannot be) be remedied, which may be easily done by having a partition, made to shift at pleasure, formed and placed at the midship section of each roof. This will remedy every error, and the expense would be but trifling—at all events, decidedly of no consideration, when it is recollected what immense destruction of property, sacrifice of comfort to the workmen, and decidedly less general advantage to ships while lying to season, would naturally arise from such a proceeding.

I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

NAUTICUS.

*Anglo-Hibernian Packet Establishment.*

Ilfracombe, Nov. 19, 1832.

MR. EDITOR,—Your correspondent, Nauticus, (dated Milford Haven, 13th October), appears irritated upon the attempts to question the eligibility of that station for steam-packets. Now, I should be very sorry to see your valuable Journal become the vehicle “for a gladiatorial arena of a paper warfare,” subjected to scurrility; for when a writer is endowed with highly-gifted and talented powers to review and criticise the efforts of humbler scribes, let me recommend good humour or silence, without contemptuous ridicule, which will more effectually stop the lucubrations of an impotent adversary. That the production of *Peregrinator* is hasty, cannot be otherwise than admitted; but a little allowance would probably have rendered the queries more intelligible, and, perhaps, the compositor had a difficulty in decyphering the composition before it went to the press. What the context might naturally have inferred, renders it susceptible of excuse. To me it appears that the intention must have been to follow the question as a note thereto; or if a parenthesis had been used, it would have been thus—(without regard to the impediments at Bristol, &c. &c.); also, that the query appears to be Milford instead of Bristol.

Permit me, however, to revert to the subject, with a hope of being intelligible, on the presumption that some cause has arisen to an expected rivalry with Bristol, and that the means which that port possesses are adequate to undertake the conveyance of the Post-office letter-bags direct to Waterford, in preference to the lengthened inland distance (exceeding 150 miles) from that city to the packet-station at Hobb's point, near Pembroke-yard.

Now, it would appear that the repeated observations of “Nauticus” tend to advocate the superiority of Milford Haven, and perhaps the public are not aware of this plain fact: that the projected pier for the packets was recommended to be erected under the administration of 1827; and the estimated charge given in by that eminent engineer, Mr. Telford, was 24,868*l.*, exclusive of the lands required for its approach, of which the new road was 47,877*l.*, and, I believe, exceeded that sum before the road was completed: the pier or jetty has been proceeded with, but at present its progress is retarded; and, as your correspondent observes, “that unless further aid be given by Parliament to bring the work to a state of completion, that part of the sea wall yet under water will speedily be enveloped in mud, and the job, like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a wreck of the jetty behind.”

It may, therefore, be opined, that not a little opposition is anticipated at the ensuing meeting of a reformed Commons House of Representatives ere a further grant be made by Parliament; and that the total abandonment of the station will eventually ensue, and effect a change in the mode of conveying the mails by hired packets at a very reduced charge in the expenditure, with the advantages of a direct communication from Bristol to Waterford.

If a contradiction to these assertions cannot be made, your correspondent will doubtless admit that the subject is confounding! but, if otherwise, that it will be for him to confute them in *delicate terms*, without the aid of a Syrian Sirocco, or as a tramontane of Demetæ.

Relying on a refutation (if practicable),

I am, Sir, &c. &c.

VINDEX.

## GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL.

*The Spanish Ex-Minister, San Miguel.*

MR. EDITOR,—In consequence of your note attached to General de Alava's letter in the United Service Journal for December, I once for all retract, in the most solemn, the fullest, and most unqualified manner, any imputation derogatory to the character of General San Miguel, supposed to arise out of a passage in the United Service Journal for September of this year, and which I had somewhat negligently adopted from the London Courier of June, 1823.

In reference to the explanation which appeared in my letter in your Number for November, I must still be permitted to look upon the alleged attack as being, in a great measure, fanciful, on the part of those who have thought proper to notice it, but at the same time I impute the sensitiveness which they have shown to a feeling of conscious rectitude, and a wounded sense of honour.

In addition, I am most grateful to General de Alava for having (if not expressly, at all events by the terms and tenour of his letter) relieved my mind from another erroneous impression with respect to General San Miguel, whom I had been led to believe (I cannot now doubt most falsely) to be an officer of the same name who bore a part in the rebellion of the army of the Isle of Leon, who, in 1820, accompanied Riego to Madrid, in the character of aide-de-camp, and who was banished by the government of the Cortes to Zamora, for having, in the boxes of the public theatre, sung the song called "Traga la Pero," (in English, "Gulp it down, you Dog,") composed in allusion to the forced acceptance of the constitutional system by his unfortunate king; and which insult on royal misfortune even the constitutional authorities found themselves unable to tolerate. His Majesty was, I think, in the theatre when this occurrence took place; and the erroneous idea which I had formed of the identity of the ex-Minister and the singer of the "Tragala," in some measure tended to lead me into the original error, for which I take blame.

I most sincerely trust that my *amende* may now be considered so full and ample, as to render the testimony of Lords Heytesbury and Eliot, and of Mr. Ward, unnecessary upon this occasion; and that the affair will now be considered as placed upon a satisfactory footing for all parties; and that as the character of General San Miguel has been fully cleared from aspersion, that no vindictive feelings, or motives, may now be allowed to mix themselves with the discussion.—I am, Sir, your obedient and humble servant,

A ROYALIST.

P.S.—I might have mentioned, as a matter of historical curiosity, that the "band" who avowed themselves the murderers of the Curate Venuesa, and designated themselves as the company of the "Martello," (or "hammer,") (in allusion to the instrument with which the king's almoner was put to death,) when they perambulated the streets in the neighbourhood of the royal palace, after the commission of the murder, sung the "Tragala," to which they kept time by beating on the palace walls with hammers which they carried with them;—this they did in chorus, and generally at midnight. Hence, perhaps, it was that even the government of the Cortes thought it incumbent upon them to punish the offence, which I had falsely been led to attribute to the ex-Minister, San Miguel, and for which I again express the utmost contrition.—R.

*Captain Ricketts, R.N., to the Editor, in reply to the Author of the Naval Sketch Book.*

December 14, 1832.

MR. EDITOR,—I have recently seen, in the new edition of the *Naval Sketch Book*, a review of the little pamphlet I wrote some years back, entitled, "Popularity of the Royal Naval Service." And although, in some respects, I ought, perhaps, to be proud of so favourable a notice from so talented a writer, yet is there a something so grating in the accompanying charge of plagiarism, that not all his laudatory observations, nor even such honied phrases as "practised, sensible writer,"—"agreeable style,"—"staggering broadside," &c., can induce me, for a single instant, to delay the most unqualified denial of the charge; and, indeed, singular as it may appear to him, of ever having seen his book till within the last fortnight or three weeks, or any allusion to it, till long after the date of its publication. And even assuming that there is in reality any plagiarism, still, as both our works are, as I am told, dated in the same year (1826), it remains to be proved with whom the fraud rests; while it will be easily admitted, that rash indeed must have been that plagiarist who could have ventured on such a fraud at a time when the work of the injured party was so fresh in every man's memory; and that such conduct is at utter variance with that displayed in my pamphlet, where every opportunity has been seized to quote and eulogise Sir George Cockburn and others.

With respect to the other criticisms of this redoubtable naval reviewer, it is more in the spirit of mirth than otherwise that I now purpose to notice them.

"We must regret," he says, "that to a very agreeable style, the writer has not (possibly through inattention in his early days to an essential, though unfashionable, part of education) added that logical acumen which would have enabled him to seize many points that have escaped even his zeal for the character and popularity of the service."

Now, Sir, if we were not irresistibly tempted to smile at this humorous and dignified assumption of superiority over an anonymous writer, it would be really a little too bad for any reply whatever. And if there is to be a question of superior *logical acumen* between us, I think I may safely confide my cause to that part of the public who have read both the works in question, merely observing, that with those who prefer close argument to more lax disquisition, the following short extract from the pamphlet alluded to will weigh more in defending the character and discipline of the service than many whole pages of the *Naval Sketch Book*.

"So little were men in general deterred from entering the service by any dread of the discipline, that there were actually in the war 5000 marines more than were counted for the service, though they formed a fifth part of the whole navy;—and be it remembered, all volunteers for a service entirely governed by naval discipline."

A little farther on, our pleasant critic continues,—

"The title of the book is certainly unhappy, as the arrangement in the title-page evinces, which contains almost every topic commented on as proofs of the unpopularity of the service, viz. 'cruelty and oppression,—flogging,—summary conviction,—delay of punishment,—ward-room courts-martial,' &c."

Now, really, Sir, I was not prepared for anything even half so superficial as this censure, conceiving, as I always have, that the title of a book should, as nearly as possible, express the nature of its contents; which, in this case, is not a mere series of eulogiums on the officers, but a concatenation of brief arguments, to prove that the discipline of the navy never had been that vile oppression Mr. Hume and others maintained it was, in parliament; and that the conduct of the seamen and marines themselves was incontestable proof, as well of this important fact, as that this very service was then, at the time of my writing, the most popular martial service under the crown,

I might, it is true, at that moment, when the captains of the navy were basely stigmatized as cruel tyrants, "enamoured of flogging," have confined myself simply to the *defence*, but I chose to take the higher ground, and justly claimed for them all the honour that belongs to the most popular service under the crown. But had I, like himself, been content to simply plead the innocence of the charges, which he says were so commented on by the public, such as flogging, &c. confining myself to mere eulogy,—might not, I ask, this very same reviewer much more justly have charged me with the same sins of an early education, and a lamentable want of that *logical* acumen with which he is, happily, so largely endowed? And if, in avoiding this error, I have devoted distinct chapters to the refutation of distinct accusations, in what respect is my index or title-page to blame?

I think, Sir, this gentleman, or officer, in some part of his work alludes to Blackstone's Commentaries, certainly written in a spirit of eulogy on our constitutional and fundamental laws; yet Blackstone has been so *unhappy* himself as to place at the head of one *whole* volume, *Private*, and at the head of another *Public Wrongs*. And, where this kind of criticism prevails, what shall be said for poor *unhappy* SMITH, who, in his great work entitled *The Wealth of Nations*, has so unhappily headed several of his chapters with "*Expenses of Justice*,"—"*Expenses of Public Works*,"—"*Expenses of Education*,"—and "*Expenses of Supporting the Dignity of the Sovereign*"? Or who shall dare to defend the *Holy Bible* itself, when we very well know that if many of the chapters were appropriately headed, we should have in the index, "*Homicide*,"—"*Parricide*,"—"*Regicide*,"—"*Idolatry*,"—"*Impiety*,"—"*Murder*,"—"*Rebellion*," and the name of almost every unholy crime that disgraces humanity? Nay, Sir, what shall be said for the congruity and luminous arrangement of our exemplary Reviewer himself, when we see in a work entitled a "*Naval Sketch Book*," such inconsistent and inexplicable chapters as "*Opera House Messengers*,"—"*Craniological Wolves*,"—"*Saints*,"—"*Scavans*;" and see, as some will think most unhappy of all, a naval officer majestically or tyrannically wielding the rod of a critical Reviewer.

But it is now time to remark on the charge of plagiarism, which is contained in the following extract from the second edition of the *Naval Sketch Book*; the reviewer having fortunately first got a glimpse of the pamphlet as the sheet was going to the press in 1831.

"Perhaps," he says, "it was hardly possible that the similarity of our objects should not lead this officer into an adoption of similar topics, but we confess his arguments are often so precisely, and his language sometimes so closely our own, that we should suspect he had read the first edition of the *Naval Sketch Book*."

On this passage I shall briefly remark, that the first part of it is as much distinguished by good sense as it is at variance with the conclusion: for what could be more natural than for two naval officers, supposing them both gifted with common sense, always reading the same debates in parliament, and feeling equally indignant at the base libels on the service and their brother officers, and equally desirous of exonerating them, while both were furnished with the same materials, and both perhaps had had experience in the same disastrous mutiny, to adopt, without the aid of any one, the same train of arguments, if not of general language, unless, indeed, the logical education of the one must necessarily act as an extinguisher on the talents of the other. Or what could be more natural than for both of them to lay great stress on the fact, that the seamen themselves in the mutiny punished their own delinquents by *flogging*, and did actually, in that remarkable petition, which stated all their grievances without *complaining* of the discipline, request that a certain description of offenders should be punished "according to the rules of the navy?" Why, Sir, none but an idiot could have omitted facts like these while writing on such a subject; and instead of laying claim to any peculiar merit for reciting them, let the reviewer, like myself, candidly acknow-

ledge, that such facts at the time, and long after the mutiny had subsided, were the constant theme of discussion from the cockpit to the cabin, in every ship in the fleet; while the modesty of those times did not permit any one to arrogate to himself the whole credit of having brought forward so ripe an argument.

So much, Sir, for the *arguments* I am accused of stealing or borrowing; and now, let us turn to the larceny said to be committed on the style and language, which I am accused of having so closely copied. If by the word *language*, be meant the style generally, it is very evident—as both works (so at least I am told) bear the date of 1826, and the printer can prove that he actually received the manuscript of the pamphlet from me at the latter end of 1825—that I must have made wonderful proficiency in learning his style in so short a space of time; while the supposition is in direct contradiction of the term he has applied to me—a “sensible, *practised* writer”—to say nothing of the ridiculous imputation he would subject himself to when praising my “agreeable style.” Or if by *language* be meant merely words, as may be assumed from some words being marked in *italics*, it may be worth while to bestow a few remarks on them; and particularly the words, *according to the rules of the navy*, as they stand forth most prominently. But these, Sir, are the words of the seamen’s own petition, and if, as he seems to say, I have marked them in *italics*, as well as himself, that is by no means wonderful, for I defy any one deeply interested in the subject to read the petition without making a pause, or laying a stress on those very words,—“According to the rules of the navy.” The two other words distinguished by the same characters are *desolate silence*, which were used by me as describing the only silence that could become a powerful engine of penitence, either at sea or on shore; and which *silence* every seaman, however destitute of *early education*, well knows can never be procured in a ship; and therefore there needed no plagiarism to state the fact. And with respect to borrowing from the author of the Naval Sketch Book these *precise words*, it is curious that neither the word *silence* nor *desolate* is (if I recollect right) to be found in the pages alluded to; so that the whole of this last charge must be reduced to the single imputation that I have, while writing on the same subject, contrived to express in *two* words the substance of nearly two pages in the Naval Sketch Book!

I shall now, Sir, conclude, with observing, that for me to have been guilty of so barefaced a plagiarism, as that of which I am accused, at a time when (if published) the Naval Sketch Book must be presumed to have been fresh in the memory, if not in every one’s hand, would not have been the act of a “sensible, practised writer,” master of a “very agreeable style” of his own, and capable of giving “valuable information on subjects but ill understood;” and above all, capable of discharging at his opponents *staggering broadsides*, but rather the act of an individual not merely destitute of “logical acumen,” but scarcely endowed with common sense, or, at least, utterly incapable of concocting arguments for himself, or discovering appropriate words for his most familiar ideas.

With every respect for the real talent of the author of the Naval Sketch Book, whose work has otherwise afforded me a high gratification,

I am, Sir,  
Your most obedient servant,  
WM. RICKETTS, Captain, R.N.

### Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo.

MR. EDITOR,—The letter which appears in your Number for this month, marked \*—, is so evident a misconception of the spirit and meaning of my “Recollections of the Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo” in the previous Number, that it should have been wholly unnoticed, were it not for the writer’s un-

founded imputation of a wish on my part to detract from the acknowledged high reputation of the light division, and that my silence might possibly be construed into an admission of the correctness of the charge. Once for all, I deny having been influenced by any such unworthy motive; nor do I entertain any feeling but that of just pride in the achievements of my countrymen, and sometime fellow-soldiers, of the light division.

If your correspondent will look to Captain Hall's letter in your present Number, he will learn from it—and he needs the lesson—"that the professional character and conduct of every public man, or bodies of men, form clearly a fair matter of controversy;" and that when recording events, or endeavouring to rescue from oblivion actions to which we may have been eyewitnesses, the memory of which might otherwise pass away, it is quite possible to discuss the share which corps or individuals may have taken in such occurrences, without seeking to assail the fair fame of others, and without giving, or intending to give, offence.

Pompous sarcasm, even if witty, would be a poor substitute for facts, and loss of temper is a certain indication of being conscious that our arguments are not likely to have much *weight*. If the misconceptions of your correspondent were not wilful, as I am bound to suppose they were not, he must be the dullest of readers, as he is the most bilious and irritable of writers. As my pen is in my hand, I shall, with your permission, Mr. Editor, offer a few remarks on the letter of \*—, replying to his comments, paragraph by paragraph, *ab initio*, as they stand. In the first place, I have not the honour to belong either to the 5th or 77th regiment, though very sincerely *attached* to both corps. I am a humble multi-coated individual, whose career is of "the things that were," and whose sole knowledge of modern military affairs is derived from the monthly perusal of your interesting journal.

Had your correspondent's perceptions not been clouded, he would have observed, from the first lines of my narrative, that the position which he assumes for himself was the very ground on which I had taken my stand. I was induced to prepare that narrative from the memoranda made by me twenty years ago, by the desire of refuting an "unwarrantable attack" (I thank him for the word) on the third division, contained in an article on the storming of Rodrigo, published in your first Number, and but lately noticed by me; so that, instead of having been the first in the field, I merely stood on the defensive; or if I have pushed my operations a little into the enemy's country, it is all fair in war. If your correspondent will expend half-a-crown in the purchase of your aforesaid first Number, he will likewise find that it contains a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Ridge (the soul of truth and honour) which fully corroborates the most material circumstances of my narrative.

But it seems I have said that, on certain occasions alluded to, the light division owed its hitherto undisputed name to those *two* weak battalions, 5th and 77th. How, when, or where have I said so? Which of us was dreaming when he wrote? The only paragraph of mine which the most crooked imagination could have tortured into such a meaning is the one which shall speak for itself—viz. "I am myself aware that the merit must be divided (and in no equal portions) with the 3RD DIVISION. I remember that at Badojoz, when they failed, the 3RD DIVISION, by taking the castle, gained the town; that at Sabugal, when in a most awkward scrape, *we* (the 3rd Division) rescued them; and where, in their whole career, can they produce one instance to equal in splendour the conduct of the 5th and 77th at El Bodor?"

Again, it is invidiously asserted that I have said it was entirely owing to the 5TH and 77TH that the Light Division were able to walk up the small breach. Refer to my narrative, and you will perceive that I attributed the ease with which the lesser breach was gained by them to the successful assault on the main breach, made by *five regiments* which are named. Was the letter-writer (not

the "polite one") at Ciudad Rodrigo? Does he know how the citadel is situated, and can he tell how, and by what route, this head of a column of which he speaks (A head, I suspect, without either body or tail) contrived to wriggle itself into that vicinity at such a juncture? Did it turn to its right from the lesser breach, and proceed along the ramparts, overleaping in its miraculous and unseen progress, friend and foe? or did it turn by the ramparts on its left, making a detour of near half a mile, and perhaps "chemin faisant," and glove in hand, ushering up the 83rd and O'Toole's people at the river defences? or did it bisect the town, piercing across its centre, but leaving it still in possession of the enemy? It has been admitted by all who saw it, that the little breach was so steep, and narrow at top, that even with nothing more than a 24-pounder drawn across its summit, it might have been long defended by one hundred resolute men against the efforts of an army. It is but reasonable, then, to assume, that there must have been some causes for success auxiliary to the spirited attack of the Lights.

Does your correspondent know the meaning of the term "cutting off the breach," that he attaches so much importance to the act? At the great breach their cuts did not retard us a moment, being easily leaped over, independent of the boards for crossing.

Could \*— have seen Captain Macdougall after his death? I did. He was shot, not blown up.

The attacks on the two breaches were intended to be simultaneous, and the two columns of attack arrived at their points at the same time. Agreed. But on reference to my narrative, and the various documents, your correspondent will observe that the 5th and 77th had a separate duty assigned to them, to perform which they started *a considerable time before* the other troops, and having cleared the ditches of the enemy, they found themselves at the foot of the breach in a situation which left them no option but to do or die. The struggle which they unavoidably commenced was gallantly shared in by the old 94th, which, fortunately, also arrived by a separate route; and though the unaided exertions of the three regiments might have been fruitless, yet the arrival of the main body of the Division on the signal for attack secured immediate success. \*— will therefore please to recollect, that before he (if he was there) had well started for the assault, the work at the main breach was more than half done.

Poor Place, of the 77th, having been absent from Rodrigo in consequence of severe illness, was not likely to speak much about the affair; Dunkin was the last man in the world to have made his own deeds the topic of conversation, and his modest silence does not seem to have been felt or understood by \*—.

For an answer to the next paragraph I need only refer \*— to the "Account of the Storming of Rodrigo," written by an officer of the Light Division, and published in your first Number, and to which my narrative was meant as a counter-statement. At the same time I reject with disdain the imputation of seeking to sully the bright name which the Light Division, or any man or men may have earned for themselves. All the obliquity of construction of \*— does not enable him to show any intention on my part of attaching credit to the two corps he so frequently names beyond that to which they are justly entitled. "Bona pce sua quisque recusat." The despatches of a commander of an army are the last documents to which I would have recourse for the purpose of ascertaining the minor details of the exploits of an army. You may learn from them what was *intended* to have been done, and they will tell you the general result of the operations, followed by the recommendations of a host of men thrust on him in order to obtain promotion. But if my stolid friend puts on his spectacles, he will see I have already mentioned in my narrative, that a full statement of the share which the 77th had in the occurrences of the night was drawn up by *Dunkin* and presented by *Picton*, so that those gallant officers *did* report to Lord Wellington, and Dunkin consequently obtained the C.B. (Sturgeon had nothing



to tell, having only put us on our path.) The report was not, of course, submitted to his Lordship until the omission in the despatch was known to the regiment.

\*— seems to think, because the affair of El Bodon has been frequently quoted by the friends and opponents of a theory "square versus cavalry," and because two gallant field-officers have had a gentlemanly controversy on the subject of some order on that occasion, in no way affecting the events of the day, that in revealing those circumstances he has silenced me for ever: heaven help the man, and the cause to move which he wields his pen!

I think I give \*— the best proof of my being free from ambition, and from thirst of fame, when I tell him I now withdraw from the field, and that I shall not again be tempted to break a lance with him, even by the honour which must attend an encounter with so formidable an antagonist.

You, Mr. Editor, shall be troubled with no more "last words" from me on this subject, as I trust I have sufficiently disposed of your correspondent, who may henceforward perpetrate as many letters as he pleases, with impunity.

Nov. 20th.

C. J. T. S.

### *Qualification of Commanders of the Navy.*

MR. EDITOR.—Your unceasing perseverance in advocating every suggestion that may tend to perfect the efficiency of that right arm of our country's strength—the Navy, will, I trust, ensure the assistance of your valuable Journal, in a cause wherein is most deeply concerned not only the interests of a very large class of officers, but of the service generally.

It has been justly observed of naval men, that they are seldom disposed to appeal against the acts of their professional legislators, however grievous those acts may be: hence they may at least be allowed the merit of bearing their injuries and disappointments in philosophic silence, and with more than ordinary fortitude; yet even the strictest law allows that there may be occasions in which remonstrance is permitted. When, therefore, in addition to neglect and unrequited merit, a public stigma is cast on the services of a large proportion of a whole class of officers, and cast, too, by that board in which is stored the records of their lives of peril and privation, and which ought to be the guardian of their rights, it is indeed an occasion when remonstrance becomes a duty. I allude to the following regulation that has recently emanated from the Admiralty. The Lords' Commissioners of the Admiralty having permitted the Captains commanding His Majesty's ships of the line to nominate Commanders subject to their Lordships' approval, have thought fit to order,—that no Commander shall hereafter be deemed eligible for an appointment to a ship-of-the-line, or other ship entitled to bear a Commander, unless he shall have served three years in the command of a sea-going Sloop of War, or three years as first Lieutenant of a rated ship.

I must here observe, that when it was considered necessary to add an Officer of intermediate rank between the Captain and Lieutenant to large establishments, the Commanders on whom the appointments were conferred were selected for their long service and experience. If the example they set, of performing the duties of a first Lieutenant, has not in every later instance been followed, it was in cases where very young men, without practice, were placed in the situations. Thus it was very necessary that a regulation to ensure the appointment of fully competent Commanders should exist.

The requisite qualification, therefore, for filling the station of second Captain of a ship of the line, being a perfect knowledge of the duties of a first Lieutenant as well as of the management of a large ship, is no such knowledge to be acquired by a man of observation serving as second or other Lieutenant of a ship of the line, as first Lieutenant of a sloop of war, or in any other description of service through which Lieutenants pass; while a first Lieutenant, who passes three years in a rated ship—let it be off Tower-hill, in

Newhaven Creek, or in any guard-ship, that never moves from her moorings, nor has men enough to perform an ordinary harbour evolution—nevertheless acquires all that necessary knowledge? Let it be understood that I am not making an attempt, to undervalue any services, under whatever circumstances they may have taken place. My sole object, and one in which I trust I have the voice of every impartial man, is, to call the attention of those Officers, or other persons, who are entrusted with the power of legislating for the Navy, to occasionally keep in view the golden rule of doing justice to all parties, or, at least, to allow long and laborious service to be a claim for participating in any prospect that may be held out of employment.

Our Sloops of War, since the peace, have had no slight share of fagging to perform; and, as the routine of the service has been as strictly adhered to in them as in any single-decked ships, their first Lieutenants ought not to be considered to have passed their time without having acquired any of the requisite knowledge, as the duty and responsibility of that situation is more or less the same in every man-of-war. Let, therefore, five or seven years active service be deemed a fitting qualification for second Captains; and while the choice is left to the Captains of ships, it is not likely they will risk their honour by selecting an incompetent or inexperienced one. Those Commanders that have acquired a reputation as first Lieutenants, will always be the most likely to be preferred; and the man whose only chance of being again brought forward in the service depends on the assistance of the senior Officer, to whom his merit and talent for such a duty is known, will no longer have to bear the stigma of being stamped as unqualified. Every class of Officers of the present day have had a much longer, though not all of them so brilliant a service as their predecessors; they, therefore, have reason to expect that those services should have a fairer and more liberal consideration. We should not then have proclamations depriving Commanders and others of their old established privileges, but rather encouragement, and a just acknowledgment for valuable services, and for the worn-out a chance of occupying some of the many vacant apartments in Greenwich Hospital, of which Commanders are the only class of active Officers that are deprived.

I remain, Mr. Editor, your very humble servant,

(By law) AN UNQUALIFIED COMMANDER.

### *Efficiency of the Naval and Marine Services.*

MR. EDITOR,—The sound of "War" naturally makes us look to the physical means of carrying it on; and, although many plans have been offered to general notice, through your excellent Journal, I cannot resist submitting to your attention suggestions tending, in my opinion, to improve the two branches of the Navy, which, if *only partially* adopted, would prove greatly and universally beneficial. 1. Enter, at the several sea-ports, smart boys, from 12 to 14 or 16 years of age (unlimited in number), to be regularly trained as seamen and artisans, first placing them with the Commanding Officers of Ordnance, thence in the dock-yards under *Foremen*, as "sail-makers, blacksmiths, armourers, caulkers, carpenters, boat-builders, coopers;" &c. then, as they progress, distribute them to the sea-going ships, where they would learn knotting, splicing, reefing, rigging, fitting, and all other practical parts of their useful calling, under the more immediate superintendence of the Master, his assistant, and warrant Officers. Clothe and feed them merely during their noviciate, or apprenticeship, or until the age of 16; and at the expiration of 6 or 12 months, if ability is discernible, take them on the books as part complement, in the usual way, *retaining* them in flag-ships, as petty officers now are (which, by-the-bye, is about one of the very best regulations ever adopted in the Navy). Whereas, according to the present system, as every old Officer knows full well, there is not one in twenty now-a-days qualified for anything but "school-masters!" mental education seem-

ing all-in-all, while handicraft and seamanship is almost totally neglected at this, the proper period of life for attaining "*useful*" knowledge. I would hold out, too, as a stimulant for exertion, a medal to the boy, and bear him on for *pay* a few months previous to the allotted period. Raise the half-pay of some half dozen of the old Commanders, or first Lieutenants to 10*l.* 6*d.* a-day, and appoint them at the ports as superintendents of this branch of service, and be assured infinite good would be the result. Next, enlist 2000 *farming lads* (as formerly) into the Marines, of from 16 to 18 years of age, giving them a guinea and a half bounty, with *fatigue dress only*, and *never* permit the strength of that corps to be less than 12,000. (See the Noble and Gallant Earl St. Vincent's Speech to that effect in the House of Lords.) Take 20 off the top of the List of Subalterns, and give the rank of Second Captain, at 9*s.* 5*d.*, or even 8*s.* 6*d.* a-day, and reduce the second Lieutenants that number. Here would be a benefit to the individual and the corps, and a saving to the public. It is lamentable to see an Officer, five or six-and-twenty years in the most subordinate grades of his profession. Zeal, cheerfulness, and alacrity, are *indispensable* in carrying on actual duty and hard service; but how, in the name of goodness, can these essentials be blended, or even severally expected in persons desponding with blighted hopes of such far-off preferment? It is care-killing, cruel, and, I pronounce, *nationally impolitic*. Whenever "*War*" actually does occur (which may God of his infinite mercy prevent), my brief suggestions will *then* be seen to bear the stamp of faith. Give the Captains the "thirteen pence a-day" allowed *throughout the army*; restore the two companies of marine artillery; increase, *with discretion*, the *small Retired List* for deserving worn-out old servants, and, during peace, grant the boon of sale to Commandants, with a step of rank after having held their office five years, or give them the option of 25*s.* a-day, unattached; make a promotion of Flag-officers to the year 1806 (for galling indeed must it be to a man of 40 years' service still to leave his land as Captain only), and thus give a *chance* at least for others to attain the climax of their several professions.

H. M. W.

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### *The Office of Judge Advocate.*

MR. EDITOR.—Much has been written on the expediency of separating the judicial and political functions of the Lord Chancellor, and of the incongruity of his accumulated duties. Although no friend to the wholesale reform of innovating demagogues, yet, Mr. Editor, it may be admitted that there is great plausibility, if not sound reasoning, in many of the arguments on this subject, which have been recently presented to the public.

As a military man, I have been led by the train of thought, induced by a cursory perusal of some of these arguments, to a consideration of the many inconveniences which arise to the service from the custom which prevails of filling the office of Judge Advocate General by a political partisan, and from the fact, that the Deputy Judge Advocate is a puisne judge, or occasionally fills the office of one at the Old Bailey. It is not sufficient, Mr. Editor, to enable a Judge Advocate General to perform the duties of his office with advantage to the service, that he should be a sound constitutional lawyer; he ought to be well versed in customs of courts-martial, and to be familiarly acquainted with the orders obtaining in the army. It is, to say the least, anomalous, that there should be three distinct and separate sources of military law. The Judge Advocate claims that his decisions should prevail; the Secretary at War issues instructions, and often interprets clauses in the Mutiny Act and Articles of War; and the Commander-in-Chief circulates orders which, with military men, are necessarily conclusive. It would be no difficult task to produce cases wherein each of these oracles of military law has been at variance, but the doing so might be attended by inconvenience. It is sufficient, for the present purpose, to show that a lawyer, or a statesman,

must have many and serious, if not insuperable, difficulties to encounter, on assuming the duties of the Judge Advocate's office. The chief advantage which a Judge Advocate can derive from legal knowledge must attach to the laws of evidence; in this respect, indeed, military courts ought to conform to the customs of the superior courts of common law; but, Mr. Editor, courts-martial must, in many cases, be guided by the usages of war and the customs of the service. The very oath which the legislature has provided to be taken by members of courts-martial evinces this:—'If any doubt shall arise which is not explained by the said articles, or Act of Parliament, according to my conscience, the best of my understanding, and the custom of war in like cases.' How is it possible that the political Judge Advocate can judge of the custom of war? Is he supposed to be imbued with this knowledge by intuition, although he may have never witnessed a single trial by court-martial, or ever been concerned in the management of soldiers?

It may be that the painful delay, which invariably arises before the promulgation of the sentence of general courts-martial, *held in England*, is to be attributed to the difficulties which the Judge Advocate General has to overcome, from his ignorance of the customs of war, in framing an opinion on the correctness of the proceedings of the several courts; or it may arise from the claims which his political friends may urge upon his time. The Deputy Judge Advocate may, too, be engaged at the Old Bailey, and not enabled to steal a few minutes to bestow upon what he may deem his less urgent and secondary avocations. It is well known that delay never arises from his Majesty, whose assiduous attention to his public duties is notorious, and may be imitated with advantage at many of our public offices. Whatever may be the cause of the cruel suspense in which military men are kept, when under sentence of a court-martial, it is, Mr. Editor, a real grievance which you would serve the army by exposing; weeks, and even months, are permitted to elapse between the trial and the promulgation. At this moment there are men under sentence, on charges affecting their lives, who have been for weeks in suspense, confined to guard-rooms, and to the guard-bed.

If, Mr. Editor, the army has, in other respects, suffered from having political partisans and pious judges as Judge Advocates, it has had many lessons, as to framing charges upon the improved principle of an indictment at the Old Bailey. The late charges have, notwithstanding, been such as to disgust the whole army: those at Bristol, and others recently at Plymouth, and at Guernsey, have been read by military men, only to be laughed at. Mr. Editor, in matters essential to justice, we admit that we are bound by the customs of common law; and the legal rules for ascertaining the meaning of statute laws may be applied to the exposition of difficulties in the Mutiny Act; but, Sir, we want not special pleaders, nor their pleadings. The old form of a military charge is most intelligible to the officer, and to the soldier. The object of a charge ought to be, to inform the prisoner of what he is charged with, and the court of what they are to inquire into; this, then, the Old Bailey indictment is not, with military men, calculated to effect. Lawyers may have one language, military men another; each must, at all events, be supposed to understand his own idiom best; but as, on courts-martial, military men are the accused, and military men the judges, pray, Mr. Editor, exert your powerful influence to rescue us from the perplexities of a jargon which we do not understand, and preserve to us one that we do; for if any doubt shall arise, it is not by the customs of the Old Bailey, nor by the conscience and understanding of the Judge Advocate General, or his deputy, that we are to decide, but by *our* conscience, the best, *of our* understanding, and the *custom of war* in the like cases.

I am, Mr. Editor, very sincerely yours,

AN OLD SOLDIER.

*The Ten-Gun Brig Packets.*

MR. EDITOR,—Nearly four years have elapsed since the hue and cry was let out against the poor little ten-gun brigs employed as packets on the Falmouth station: since that period they have performed their respective duties, in all climates, and all weathers, to the satisfaction of the British merchants abroad, and the public in general. It is allowed by every one, that the mails were never so regular, and so well conducted, as they are at present. There existed at Falmouth, among all classes, a violent prejudice against any men of war being brought in as packets, and for strong reasons, on their side; because, during the war, the private packets were all built at that port. Sailmakers, ropemakers and provision-merchants made large fortunes. Smuggling was carried on to such an extent, that the seamen have been known to keep two servants in their families, and the stewards retired with almost as much money as the commanders. Of course, when the man-of-war packets came into use, and smuggling was put an end to, the shopkeepers joined with the owners of the private packets, and employed the *Morning Herald* paper to cry them down. This happened at the moment when three of them were lost; therefore, they could not have had a finer opportunity to say all they chose to say against them. The *Redpole* was the first example, and never was a vessel so belied in the annals of the service: she sailed from Buenos Ayres with the mails for England, and called at Rio Janeiro to take home another mail, and some specie: a pirate brig, or rather a Buenos-Ayresan privateer of 18 guns, and 120 men, had followed the *Redpole* in her track to Rio. About five days sail from that port she was attacked; Captain Bullock was killed early in the action; and although she had no more than two small guns of a side, yet her crew fought, like Falmouth men, as long as they could, but were overpowered, and every soul butchered, and thrown overboard: she was in a sinking state, and she went down with her colours flying, so that the villains did not get a dollar out of her. This has been lately ascertained at St. Thomas's by a drunken Yankee sailor that was on board the pirate at the time, who denied it afterwards, when sober and brought before the governor. He was then taken off by the Grampus American man-of-war schooner, but not before the whole of his deposition was taken down and given to Captain Walpole, of his Majesty's ship, *Ranger*. This story corroborates exactly two or three others we have heard, and is generally believed too true to be doubted. The next was the *Ariel*, Lieutenant Figg: she was one of the first that was sent in winter-time on the new plan of going to Halifax twice, on the same North American voyage. It is the most cruel thing that ever was done as a change; in the winter season it is a dreadful voyage—bitter cold weather, heavy gales of wind, tremendous seas, strong currents, and a more dangerous coast than any other known on the face of the globe. The men of war on the station are invariably sent away to Bermuda and the West Indies, as the winter approaches. Formerly the packets went to New York first; then to Halifax and home: but now they are obliged to go first to Halifax, then to Bermuda, then back to Halifax again. It was by some strange misrepresentation of the Post-Master to our Post-Master-General, that it was so altered for the worse. Mr. Howe, the post-master, says it works well; he does not care who suffers, while he enjoys his bottle of Newfoundland port, and a blazing fire in his drawing-room; he cared not a fig about the *Ariel*. She was last seen off Sable Island, by a Halifax schooner, in a very heavy gale of wind. Above forty sail of vessels were wrecked along the coast in that gale. The result of all this is, that they are obliged to have two schooners at a great expense—1500*l.* a-year each, to carry the mails from Halifax to New York. So much for the new system working well. As to the *Hearty*, it is supposed that she was lost in a hurricane in the West Indies, where many a finer ship has foundered before her, under similar circumstances.

The Admiralty have it in contemplation to build a set of packets, under the superintendence of Captain Symonds, who will make them comfortable

vessels at sea for passengers, as well as very fast sailers; and it is to be hoped that they will mount their ten or twelve guns and forty-five men; then they will be complete packets, and fear neither a pirate nor any other enemy. Thus having in some measure redeemed the character of those fine little vessels, the ten-gun brigs, as sea-boats,

I have the honour to be

Your obedient servant,

A. MARINER.

*United Service Proprietary School.*

Naval Club, Bond Street, Nov. 30.

MR. EDITOR.—Will you permit me, through the medium of your Journal, to call the attention of the two services to the advantages which may result by the formation of a United Service Proprietary School; at which officers, who are family men, and have a respectable income, may be enabled to insure their children a first-rate education at a moderate expense, and be assured of their associating with lads only of a similar respectability. To effect this, I would propose that the sons of individuals of the rank of field-officers only should be eligible to nomination, or, if this should be considered as drawing the line too close, the sons of junior officers in the two services might be eligible, on their making a declaration to the committee, that their income is not under three hundred pounds a-year, which I consider is the lowest rate of property any person should possess who proposes to pay twenty-five pounds a-year for the instruction of any one of his children; this I am persuaded of from my own experience. In the formation of this school, the errors that have been fallen into by the proprietors of the Naval School may be easily avoided. Among them, the greatest has been, that of endeavouring to unite utility and charity: of four hundred boys, sixteen are to be selected from families in comparative indigence, and who, consequently, cannot have had that surveillance in their infancy, which parents in comparative affluence must desire the companions of their children to have had. I have ever been of opinion that such assimilations are most injurious to children: to the more wealthy it cannot be beneficial, and it is for that class, of the two services, I would suggest this school should be intended. The detailed calculations of Captain Dickson evidently prove, that twenty-five pounds subscription from each proprietor is adequate to meet, ultimately, all the expenses of building a school, and that twenty-five pounds a-year is more than adequate for all the expenses of a lad's board and education. None but married men with families, or at least who have had to bring up sons, should be eligible to be on the Committee. Generals and flag-officers should be honorary vice-presidents, and be eligible to attend extraordinary meetings of the Committees, but not the ordinary meetings; and for all practical purposes, officers of the rank of field-officers would be found most useful for directing the internal management of the affairs of the institution. The object should be to unite economy and respectability. The majority of the married officers find the principle of promotion and the expenses of serving so different from those existing when they entered the army or navy, that I am convinced the majority would desire a general system of education should be adopted, and not merely a professional one.

In the remarks I have made, I would wish to say nothing which may be injurious to the Naval School; I sincerely wish it success; and at the same time, that I feel it is one peculiarly adapted for the poorer branches of the naval service, I should be sincerely glad to see established a school adapted for the more wealthy branches of the two services, who feel great difficulty in coping with the expenses to which the rank they hold necessarily exposes them.

Your obedient servant,

AN OFFICER,

And Subscriber to your Journal.

*Case of Orderly-Room Clerks.*

MR. EDITOR,—The very kind manner in which you have signified your willingness to bring forward the interests of the junior branches of the united services, emboldens me to trouble you with a few observations on a situation lately established in the army, and to beg you will insert them in the United Service Journal.

The reports of the Courts of Inquiry lately held for the purpose of investigating the services of soldiers afford ample proof of the importance of the duties of, and the responsibility which attaches to, the situation of the regimental orderly-room clerk; and Sir Henry Hardinge (then Secretary-at-War) being sensible of the consequences resulting from the situation being allowed to remain a nominal appointment, thus notices it in his Circular, dated "War-Office, 9th July, 1830."

"17. Having had under my consideration the situation of the orderly-room clerk, I am of opinion that advantage will result to the service by selecting a private soldier of the regiment as orderly-room clerk, allowing him the difference between the pay of private and that of serjeant: the soldier thus selected, who shall continue faithfully to discharge his duties for a period of *three* years, will be allowed to rank and reckon service as a serjeant, including the three years of probation; but if at any time he shall relinquish the situation without the approbation of his commanding officer, or is displaced therefrom in consequence of misconduct, he will revert to the rank and pay of a private soldier.

"As a further inducement to good conduct, the orderly-room clerk, after having served *ten* years in that capacity, will receive an additional allowance of sixpence a-day, making his pecuniary advantages the same as those of a colour-serjeant in the infantry, and nearly equal to those of a troop serjeant-major in the cavalry."

While Sir Henry Hardinge was about it, he should have given the rank of serjeant at once to the orderly-room clerk, and placed him upon a footing with the serjeants of the regiment, thus giving the individual a respectable rank to support. Surely his duties may, in point of importance to the public, vie with those of the drum-major and schoolmaster-serjeant, both of whom rank, reckon service, and wear the uniform of serjeant immediately on appointment, without being subjected to any term of probation.

The individual filling the situation of orderly-room clerk must necessarily be possessed of some talent, of some education, and last, though not least, of some principle; and a person of this description would soon become a non-commissioned officer, and would never give up even the rank of corporal for that of *private, with one shilling and eleven pence a-day*, unless accompanied with the regimental appointment of acting serjeant, which has been granted by many commanding officers, but withheld by others. Surely no commanding officer would select for the important and responsible situation of orderly-room clerk an individual whom he considered undeserving the rank of a non-commissioned officer?

Sir Henry Hardinge says, that should the orderly-room clerk at "*any time*" relinquish the situation without the approbation of his commanding officer, or be displaced in consequence of misconduct, he will revert to the rank and pay of a *private*. Does this "*any time*" only apply to the period that may have elapsed after the three years of probation have expired? if it also applies to the three years of probation, I shall only say that no one would regard it: the *private* holding the situation might quit it, and very properly allege as his motive, that was he at his duty in the ranks he might obtain the station of serjeant before the three years would expire, by rising progressively through the grades of acting corporal, corporal, and acting serjeant, and thus possess the rank of a non-commissioned officer during the time he would have remained a private in the orderly-room, the duties of which are the more laborious.

The consequences arising from this regulation are obvious: the orderly-room clerk is obliged (if taken a private from the ranks especially) to associate with the private soldiers; this of course induces him, his comrades, and the non-commissioned officers, to look upon the orderly-room as a discreditable situation, and, as his means will enable him to plunge into dissipation, he will not want some "good friends" to persuade him to "enjoy life," then to neglect his duty, and ultimately to consign the "berth to the devil."

The duties of the orderly-room clerk have never been defined, consequently misunderstandings sometimes exist between him and the serjeant-major; but as the orderly-room clerks have been severely visited for the many frauds that have been brought to light, it is but fair that *he*, and *not* the serjeant-major, should have the charge of the duties of the orderly-room, the latter being considered the adjutant's assistant in maintaining the discipline of the regiment *only*.

The writer concludes with hoping that these observations may meet the eyes of the Right Honourable the Secretary at War, who will at once perceive that the present regulation is injurious to the character, and insulting to the feelings of the individual, and confer upon the orderly-room clerk the rank his situation decidedly entitles him to.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

AN ORDERLY-ROOM CLERK.

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### *A Course Indicator.*

MR. EDITOR,—As the most simple contrivances are sometimes the most useful, I am induced to offer for insertion in your valuable Journal, the following very simple contrivance as a "*Coarse Indicator*," by which a half or a quarter point of the compass may be as easily steered upon as any of the cardinal points. When a *long course* happens to fall upon a half or a quarter point, it is often customary to steer upon the nearest whole point, particularly at night, because there is a greater certainty of the course being correctly steered, the whole points being more conspicuous than the half or quarter points, which are mere specks. It accordingly struck me, nine or ten years ago, that if a hand of very thin bright brass, or of some light material, as dry wood, or pasteboard, painted of a conspicuous colour, were laid upon the compass card, and gently compressed down, so as to preserve it in its place by the cap which screws on at the centre, it might be adjusted to any course required to be steered, and thus relieve the eye of the helmsman, particularly at night, from the incessant fatigue of watching the vibrations of a mere speck, and also enable a person, ignorant of the compass, to steer any given course. Although one arm would suffice to indicate the course, the hand ought to extend quite across the compass card, to preserve its balance. When sailing by the wind, it might be made to coincide with the North and South points, or, if preferred, taken off altogether; but the trifling addition of weight would, I am informed from the best authority, be no impediment whatever to the card traversing. Now, as the vibrations of a long hand are more easily discerned than those of a small speck, I think it will be obvious that this simple contrivance, which any seaman might fashion and apply of some suitable material, is calculated to procure greater ease and accuracy in steering by compass, and may consequently prove useful if generally known.

Your most obedient servant,

CHARLES MORTON, Com. R. N.

Fratton, Portsmouth, October 12, 1832.



*Stand for Mercurial Horizon.*

MR. EDITOR,—I have observed in one of the numbers of your Journal a suggestion for a stand for an artificial horizon. The want of something of the kind, to prevent the wind disturbing the mercury, and to exclude dirt and sand, I have often experienced, and the stand proposed for the purpose is doubtless effectual. Soon after reading the article respecting it, having occasion to use my horizon, a simple substitute occurred to me for this stand, which was nothing more than my pocket handkerchief, folded up in the manner in which it comes from the washerwoman; and placing it under the trough and frame, it answered all the purposes of the stand proposed.

This may very probably have suggested itself often to others, but it is so simple and efficacious, that I cannot help noticing it as worthy of general adoption, and as preferable to the stand, inasmuch as the latter will add to the size of the case containing the apparatus of the horizon; and to those whose gear is already provided, the stand will be always in the way, and add to the traps necessary to take on shore for taking sights.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

A MASTER OF A BRITISH MERCHANT SHIP.

*Steam Chariots of War.*

SIR,—The opinion seems to be gaining ground, that, in the event of another war, an important modification of our naval tactics will result from a general use of armed steam-vessels. Mr. Perkins, I believe, some years ago, exhibited the imposing effects of steam applied to the projection of small iron balls or bullets, in vast numbers, and with considerable impetus, from a stationary engine, such as might be used in the defence of a fortress; but I do not recollect to have seen any proposal for the employment of this powerful agent in the field of battle. Steam has been employed with surprising success on railways, for the conveyance of goods and passengers, and there is little doubt that it will in a short time be made equally serviceable on the common roads of the country; but one of its principal advantages appears to have been scarcely noticed. We all know that in former times chariots of war were highly esteemed for their destructive operation, yet they were found objectionable, and ultimately they were disused on one account, viz.—the great difficulty of managing the horses when frightened or wounded, and the impossibility of impelling them on the pikes of a formidable phalanx. This objection would have a double weight with the modern use of fire-arms. An elephant, too, in modern warfare, as an object of annoyance, would be ridiculous. The great *forte* of steam is its passiveness. Secure the boiler and the machinery from the stroke of a cannon-ball, and you might drive a steam-chariot triumphantly through a regiment. Imagine three or four of these machines driven at a galloping speed through a square of infantry; the director might be seated in perfect safety in the rear of the engine, and a body of cavalry, about fifty yards in rear, would enter the furrows ploughed by these formidable chariots, and give the *coup-de-grace* to the unfortunate infantry. The chariots might be armed with scythes, both in front and flank; and, if the first shock were avoided by the men opening their ranks, they might easily be made sufficiently manageable to wheel round and return on any part of the square which stood firm.

It may have happened, as I am far from the great centre of civilization and invention, that this idea may have already been communicated to you; but, as I have not seen the proposal, and it appears to me that, if carried into execution, it might produce important results, I take the liberty of bringing it to your notice:

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

A CONSTANT READER.

Bombay, 23d July, 1832.

*British Squares broken by Cavalry.*

MR. EDITOR,—Allow me, in reply to Machaon, to observe, that on two occasions at least British squares have been penetrated by opposing cavalry. To the first I alluded at the conclusion of my account of the battle of Dreux; the second took place in 1807, at El Hamet, near Rosetta. I might add, the defeats of Colonels Baillie and Braithwaite, in the East Indies, but I will not, because on those occasions the British infantry were exhausted by the heat of the weather, and fatigued by the length of the action.

Permit me, in return, to ask the opponents of I. M. whether they can adduce a single instance of the repulse of a cavalry charge in which a dozen horses were actually bayoneted?

Yours very obediently,

H. J.

*Titles of Knighthood.*

MR. EDITOR,—Observing in your valuable Service Journal of this month, page 556, a letter headed "Orders of Knighthood," signed "Not a C. B." in which, with reference to the title of C. B., is the following paragraph:—"The government offices, I believe, never fail to use it when addressing officers entitled to the appellation."—I have had the honour to be a companion of the Bath since 1815, and from that period have received many official letters from the Horse-Guards, also commissions from the War-Office; none of which had the appellation of C. B. Your inserting the above

Will oblige,

10th December, 1832.

a C. B.

*Employment of Paddles by Ships of War.*

DEAR MR. EDITOR,—In your valuable Journal for December, page 518, it is asserted by H. F., in opposition to an opinion of Captain Napier, "that paddles will by no means enable a vessel to change her position with celerity sufficient to meet the corresponding movements of a steamer; for the utmost that paddles can do is to move a ship from four to five knots an hour; and as the steamer can move at the rate of ten or twelve, or more than twice as fast, it becomes apparent that the latter can maintain a raking position, in defiance of paddles, sweeps, or tow-boats." Now this proposition is by no means apparent, but the reverse of it is clear enough.

Suppose a steamer takes a raking position right astern of a line-of-battle ship, at the distance of 1000 yards; the ship, by means of paddles, without moving through the water in the smallest degree, but merely by being pivoted one quarter round, brings her broadside to bear on the steamer, to her utter annoyance and discomfort; and the said steamer will have to perform one quarter of the circumference of a circle; the radius of which is the distance between the ship and the steamer, or 1500 yards—nearly a mile, before she can again assume a raking position, with respect to the ship: in short, the ship has only to continue turning round as on a pivot, and the steamer, with all her celerity, will never be able to avoid the broadside of the line-of-battle ship.

I imagine it is only necessary to point this out to H. F., to convince him that he has made an oversight in his calculations; it is so self-evident, that a diagram cannot be required; therefore, unless what I have here advanced can be disproved, Captain Napier's assertion must still remain in full force.

I am, Sir, &c.

London, 10th Dec., 1832.

The original Q in the corner.

*A cheap Distinction.*

MR. EDITOR,—There is every reason for believing that the order of merit which has been so warmly recommended by various individuals in your excellent Journal will never be attended to, and that those officers who have seen service, and those who have not,\* must still remain undistinguished by any mark of public or personal distinction; allow me, therefore, to suggest, with the hope that it may meet with the approbation of the authorities at the Horse-Guard, that a chronological list of the battles fought during the last war should be prepared, and a number affixed to each, and that officers who served in any of the battles may have their respective number attached to their names in the Army-list. This will cost the country *nothing*, and it is an act of justice to which we are as much entitled as those officers who had the good fortune of serving at Waterloo, and who have a W before their names.

I have the honour to be, Sir,  
Yours, truly, and faithfully,

October 20th, 1832.

A GREY-HEADED SUB.

*A Claim on the Service.*

December, 1832.

SIR,—I feel that I am taking rather an unusual course in behalf of an individual personally unknown to myself, but whose merits are known to me through the medium of friends whose opinion I can trust. The person to whom I allude, and whose address will accompany my letter, may be considered as peculiarly connected by family with his Majesty's service; her ancestor having received a sword of honour from William III., and his male representatives, including the father of the lady in question, having uniformly followed the profession of arms. Being left an orphan at an early age, his daughter was robbed of her property by the knavery of her guardian; but, in consequence of her own independent exertions, was enabled, a few years since, to undertake a ladies' school. The number of competitors in her profession has, however, diminished of late her chances of success, and induced her to lower the terms of her establishment very considerably, rather than relinquish her only means of supporting an invalid sister. In the hope of making this lady's name known to those fathers of families among your numerous readers, who may possess the opportunity of forwarding her views in the manner most desirable to herself, I venture upon the bold step of requesting you to give insertion to this plain statement; and I take the liberty of adding privately a list of references, which I think you will consider satisfactory, with a view of assuring you that the request is not made on light grounds. The lady herself, who is a stranger to me save through the honourable report of intimate friends, whose children she has educated, is probably able to name many more of these references. I believe that her uprightness, liberality, and attention to her pupils, will bear the strictest examination.

I have the honour to be, Sir,  
Your obedient servant,

J. H.

\*.\* We insert the above from a purely professional feeling, and hope it may be useful to the party. We are furnished with the address of the writer, and with several references, all highly respectable, which we shall be happy to furnish.—*Ed.*

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;  
OR  
NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

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**AFAIRS AT HOME AND ABROAD.**

THE writs for a general election have been issued, and the returns, at the moment we write, are nearly complete.

We alluded in our last Number to the hostile demonstrations of the French towards the Dutch, by the assembly of a powerful army of the former nation upon the Scheldt at the close of November, for the investment and reduction of the Citadel of ANTWERP. On the last day of that month the active operations of the siege commenced, a summons was sent and spurned, and ground was broken before the place. The attack has been systematically conducted, without the usual manifestations of showy enterprise, as a body, on the part of the French. The defence has been judiciously, resolutely, and devotedly maintained for nearly a month, and to all but the last extremity; the assailants being met foot to foot, and gun for gun, up to the moment that a practicable breach was effected;—when, having done all that honour required, or that duty demanded, the intrepid commander of the Citadel spared his heroic garrison a farther effusion of blood, by capitulating upon honourable terms on the 23rd of December, to an overwhelming foe, served by a crushing artillery. It is to be remarked, that while, according to the accepted rules of military art, and estimating the garrison of the citadel at 4000, a force of 20,000 to 25,000 men would have been deemed adequate to its capture, the place was actually invested and attacked by an army of three times that amount, without let or hindrance from without, and with all means and appliances from within their lines. The interior of the Citadel is represented as a heap of ruins from the furious and inces-

sant bombardment, while the defences are not materially injured by the hostile batteries.

During this exciting process the miserable Belgians looked on, in abject submission to their swaggering patrons—as Caliban kissed the foot of the drunkard, and prayed him ‘to be his god.’

The conduct of General CHASSE has not belied his professions and high reputation. Whether we consider his moderation towards the city of Antwerp, under provocation which, in a military sense, might have fully justified the employment of his tremendous means for its destruction, his noble defence, or his manly surrender, he is unquestionably entitled to the praise of magnanimity.

What the French will next do must depend on the attitude of the northern Powers. The ambitious views and restless spirit of France are not to be checked but by the exhibition or application of irresistible ‘coercion.’

It is our purpose, when the military movements in Belgium shall have been concluded, to present our readers with a complete narrative of those operations, including the regular details of the siege, supplied from personal observation.

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From PORTUGAL there is nothing new. The troops of Don Miguel have taken up their winter quarters in the vicinity of Oporto, which city continued in a state of siege, bombardment, and blockade. Inveterate dissensions prevail amongst the foreign forces of Don Pedro; the English, who comprise amongst them the offscourings of London, being represented as in a state of open mutiny—caused, it is stated, by unnecessary privations, arising from prejudice and breach of faith on the part of Don Pedro.

**NAVAL AND MILITARY LIBRARY AND MUSEUM.**—We have this month the satisfaction to announce the removal of the above institution from Whitehall Yard to more spacious and convenient premises in Inner Scotland Yard. This has been effected by the still fostering hand of government granting the house lately occupied as the Board of Works to this infant and rising establishment.

As the latter period of the past month has been occupied in the removal, and as it will probably remain closed for a short time to get the collections arranged, we omit, from our present Number, the various contributions received since our last. But we should not be duly following up the course we have over pursued, with respect to this institution, if we omitted, on the present occasion, to express a hope that with the commencement of a new year, fresh exertions will be made towards its augmentation, both as regards subscriptions and contributions, by officers of every branch of the United Service. Let it be recollected how trifling is the pecuniary sacrifice required from each officer to constitute a member; while the effects and benefits the institution will confer on the profession are incalculable. But it must be recollected also that it is dependent on numerical strength for its permanence and respectability as an institution worthy the UNITED SERVICE. To those, also, who are at present resting on "good intentions" relative to contributions, we would merely hint that this is just the moment to put them into execution. A considerable accession to the library, museum, and model departments, on taking possession of their new establishment, would give the COUNCIL fresh impetus to proceed more vigorously than ever in the completion of the original design, that of effecting the delivery of lectures on professional and popular science, and which, it is hoped, the present building will admit of.

At the commencement of the year 1833 the number of members amounts to about 3000: we trust this number will be doubled, if not trebled, ere its close. The library extends to 1600 volumes, while the model and museum departments are very respectably furnished, considering the short period of their existence. Let us not, however,

contemplate what it now is, but what it promises to be; let the mind's eye penetrate to the vista through but a few years, and it may perceive an Institution as ornamental as it will be creditable both to the Profession and to the Country.

**EAST INDIA COMPANY'S MILITARY SEMINARY.**—The half-yearly examination took place at Addiscombe, on Friday, the 14th December, 1832, when thirty-six Gentlemen Cadets were brought forward as candidates for commissions; all of whom were passed. Six for the engineers, five for the artillery, and twenty-five for the infantry.

A deputation of Directors, headed by J. G. Ravenshaw, Esq., chairman, and C. Marjoribanks, Esq., deputy-chairman, arrived from London at an early hour, under a salute of eleven guns from the three-pounders. A number of distinguished visitors were present, amongst whom we noticed the Earl of Powis; Lieut.-General Sir George Walker, G.C.B.; Major-Gen. Sir Jasper Nicolls; General Millar, royal artillery; Sir James Shaw; Col. Stannus; Dr. Gregory; Professor Leybourne.

The fineness of the weather was most favourable for the review, with which the business of the day commenced. The soldier-like style in which the little column passed the *General* was most creditable; the manual and platoon, the handling the guns, the sword exercise, &c., were equally well executed. Without doors we did not perceive any great change in the field works; the batteries and the field-bastion, however, show how extremely well they have been revetted and formed, by the way in which they stand the weather. We had hoped to see the portion of a parallel and sap constructed on the inviting piece of ground before the salient angle of one of the bastions, but suppose it is reserved for a future time.

Within doors, we are bound to say that we again experienced the most gratifying spectacle—for the mathematical examination, conducted by Colonel Sir Alexander Dickson, yielded in none that we have ever witnessed at the institution. In the higher branches, Gentlemen Cadets Nash, Pott, John Tombs, Hart, James Johnstone, and

## EXAMINATION AT ADDISCOMBE.

Fast, particularly distinguished themselves by their demonstrations in fluxions, spherical trigonometry, statics, &c.; while there was a considerable portion of life throughout the whole.

Of the Asiatic languages, we profess to be no judge, as our knowledge never extended beyond the *patois* usually picked up by officers of the king's service; but some severe judges present declared their unqualified admiration of the degree of knowledge acquired by some of the class under examination, of whom Messrs. Robertson and Pott took the lead.

The fortification examination was also more than usually animated; the whole class evidently possessed much knowledge, and were most ready in their answers to Sir Alexander Dickson's leading questions.

In surveying and military drawing, the table was covered with well-executed specimens of all kinds—both of brush and pen work. Mr. Kaye's Attack on St. Sebastian, and Mr. John Tombs' Plan of the Ground around Peniscola, in pen work, were particularly noticed.

In landscape drawing, Lowes-water, by Mr. John Tombs; Naples, by Mr. Kaye; a Sunset at Chatmoss, by Mr. Nash; Jaci Castle, Sicily, by Mr. Hart; and some smaller pieces by Mr. Daycock and Mr. Taylor, had great merit.

We have so often described the system pursued at this seminary, that we refrain from again dwelling upon anything beyond a brief outline of the proceedings of the day.

At the conclusion of the examination, the thirty-six candidates were named to their respective services:—Gentlemen Cadets Nash, Pott, John Tombs, Hart, James Johnstone, and Fast, were the six Cadets selected for the engineer corps.

The reports of Sir Alexander Dickson, the inspector of the studies; and of Colonel Houstoun, the lieutenant-governor, to the Court of Directors, on the progress and conduct of the Cadets during the last term, were, on the whole, most creditable to the institution; in the lieutenant-governor's, two points were particularly gratifying, first, the gentleman-like demeanor of the Cadets in the neighbourhood; second, the firm, manly, and officer-like tone

of gentlemen-corporals J. Tombs, Hart, Pott, Fast, and Kaye, on whom the charge of the five classes had devolved during the term. On these two honourable features, the chairman complimented the institution, in his speech at the close of the day. And, considering that this seminary of 150 Cadets is placed in the midst of a teeming population, within eleven miles of London, their gentleman-like character in the neighbourhood speaks highly for the system of discipline pursued at the institution; and knowing well as we do, from experience, the independence of mind necessary to carry on duties amongst our fellow-cadets, we congratulate the five young officers just named, on the honourable terms in which their commanding officer has been pleased to report upon their conduct.

Amongst the models in the model-room, we were struck with one illustrative of the nature of the pressure of earth upon the revetment walls of ramparts; with a calculation for finding the dimensions proper to be given to such walls to enable them to resist the pressure or thrust against them. The principle here detailed, leads to results more satisfactory than that described in Dr. Hutton's Treatise, or in those interesting experiments at the end of the second volume of Colonel Pasley's Elementary Fortification. Dr. Hutton considers only the amount of the thrust exerted horizontally against the wall; but in this model the total amount of pressure or thrust is resolved into two forces, the one acting horizontally, and the other vertically; the former tending to overthrow, the latter to give stability to the wall. We trust that the talented inventor of this new theory and model will permit us, at a future period, to convey to the public his detailed ideas and calculations on the subject. Meantime we may observe, that his theoretical calculations, and the experimented practical results, most closely agree. It is surprising that so eminent a mathematician as Dr. Hutton should have overlooked the vertical pressure above alluded to; and which there is reason to believe, Vauban must have considered in regulating the dimensions of his rampart-walls, as this theory harmonises with

the quantity of masonry expended by him,—much more than that hitherto followed in all modern works of fortification.

### A DIGEST OF THE RULES OF THE PORTSMOUTH ROYAL NAVAL ANNUITANT SOCIETY.

Established at Portsmouth, on the 24th of March, 1831.

And Enrolled pursuant to 10 Geo. IV. c. 56.

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George M'Kinley, Esq.

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### 1. THE PORTSMOUTH ROYAL NAVAL ANNUITANT SOCIETY.

2. Object of the Society to provide a fund for granting Annuities to the Relatives of Deceased Members.

3. The Society receives as its Members, Flag Officers, Captains, Commanders, Lieutenants, Masters, Secretaries to Flag Officers and Commodores, Physicians, Chaplains, Surgeons, Purser, Officers of the Royal Marines, Assistant Surgeons, Second Masters, passed Midshipmen, and passed Clerks, their Widows and Wives.—As in Rule 34.

4. The duties of the Society to be conducted by Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Trustees, Treasurers, an Actuary, Secretaries, Stewards, and thirty other Members.

5. Presidents may convene a meeting.

6. Vice-Presidents to be Members, and preside in the absence of Presidents.

7. Trustees to be Members. All monies to be invested in their names in the Savings' Bank, or other Government securities, and not afterwards to be removed without consent of a General Meeting.

8. Treasurers shall deposit all monies in

the Savings' Bank within six days after its receipt, or be subject to a fine.

9. The Actuary to attend all Meetings, and receipts of payment, conduct the correspondence, keep the books and papers, and perform the duties incidental to his office; shall pay all monies to the Treasurer within seven days when it amounts to 25*l*., except a reserve of 10*l*. for contingent expenses, shall give security for the due performance of his duty, shall be removed by a General Meeting, his salary not to commence till five years after the Society's establishment, when it shall be two shillings for every Member till the number amounts to 1500.

10. One Secretary shall attend each Meeting to assist the Actuary.

11. Stewards shall attend on days of payment, and receive the monies, shall pay the same to the Treasurers on the second day, or be fined.

12. Members of the Committee to be elected annually, two-thirds only to be re-elected, to be in proportion to each rank.

13. A General Meeting to be held annually on the 23rd of April, at Portsmouth, to receive a report of the state of the Society, and elect officers and a Committee for the ensuing year.

14. The Committee shall meet in the months of February, May, August, and November, to audit Accounts, and enforce a compliance with the Rules, where necessary.

15. Members on entering the Society to pay an entrance of ten shillings, and one shilling per annum for each and every year of age they have attained. After the 23rd of April, 1832, no Member to be admitted after 55 years of age, unless double entrances, subscriptions, and disparities are paid, except he be abroad, when he may be admitted till the 23rd of April 1834; but no Officer, after the 23rd of April, 1832 (who may previously have had an opportunity of becoming a member), shall be admitted on his being appointed to a Foreign Station. No Member admitted after 60, except as an honorary one. All subscriptions become due on the days appointed for payment of Naval half-pay, or within fourteen days after. A Member failing to pay within the time will be fined according to Table No. 1; if four quarters in arrear, to be suspended or excluded (*vide next Rule*).

16. Members absent from the kingdom shall pay their money free of expense to the Society; if in arrear, to be fined as in the foregoing rule, and placed on the suspension list; remaining on such list three years, to be excluded; returning within three years, and paying all sums due, with the interest thereon, to be considered as if

never suspended. Dying while on the suspension list deprives the annuitant of all claims.

17. A Member on nominating shall lodge a declaration of the age of himself and nominee, and two certificates of health from medical men, not being partners, except he reside within ten miles of Portsmouth, or within the like distance of any branch committee, when he shall be required to appear personally, with one certificate only. Giving a false statement to elude fines, &c., he shall be expelled, forfeit all sums paid, and his nominee excluded from all benefit.

18. Any person who may join the Society, or a Member taking an additional share, shall, on nominating, pay an additional entrance of one shilling for every 500*l.* invested capital. Persons who may be promoted, and not become Members within twelve months, shall pay the extra entrance, except those who may be promoted on foreign stations, when six months will be allowed after they return to England.

19. If a member nominate a female one year younger, or a male thirty-six years younger, he shall pay an additional sum according to Table No. 2; such sum to be paid once only on each share, or by quarterly payments of not less than 1*l.*; interest at five per cent. to be paid on the remainder.

20. No part of the funds shall become divisible until after the expiration of five years from the formation of the Society: after deducting all necessary expenses, it shall be allowed to accumulate, and form a permanent stock, the interest to be applied as hereafter provided.

21. When payments commence, the annual subscriptions of those Members who have been five years in the Society shall be divided into 20 equal parts, 3-20ths, with that year's interest on the capital (except monies paid in advance and the interest thereon), shall be divided among the annuitants, the remaining 17-20ths to be added to the permanent funds. Every year one additional 20th shall be added to the divisible fund till the end of twenty years, when all subscriptions and interest on the capital shall be divided. All sums, fines, and donations, shall be added to the unappropriated fund.

22. Claimants shall be paid their annuities on the 21st of June every year, from the funds provided in rule 21, which sum shall be equally divided between all the annuitants, provided the sum does not exceed 25*l.* to each claimant, the surplus to be carried to the credit of future claimants—~~this clause to be void after the fifth year's~~

payment.—Should the annuities ever be less than 25*l.* the fractional parts of 1*l.* will be carried to the credit as above.

23. A Member may nominate his wife, legitimate children, grandchildren, parents, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, and consins, being such by consanguinity, to the extent of two shares. No female nominee to be entitled to her annuity during coverture; but in the event of such annuitant's husband's death, she shall receive the benefit arising from every nomination she may be entitled to, provided she shall have complied with the rules in respect to five years' payments, &c. No male nominee, except a father, entitled to an annuity after the age of twenty-one. Should any member wish to provide a second annuity, the nominee must have been nominated five years before entitled to an annuity.

24. Nominees of Deceased Members shall be entitled to annuities at the end of five years, if the Member shall have paid all sums to the end of the fifth year, otherwise such payments to be completed by the Nominee. If any declare their incapacity to do so, the arrears, with interest, shall be deducted from the annuity when due.

25. A Member may bequeath the benefit accruing from his nomination to any other person, during his nominee's life, such person being otherwise eligible.

26. Members dying after the 15th day of March, June, September, and December, shall not be paid for the quarter in which the Member dies; but if before these days they shall receive the portion of such quarter.

27. Monies paid in advance shall, on the death of the Member, be refunded to his annuitant, otherwise no monies can be refunded.

28. A Member who had not nominated, marrying after his entry, may nominate on the class on which he entered; his subscription, previous to marriage, shall be reckoned as part of the five years' nomination; and should he have paid more than five previous to marriage, the excess shall be applied in payment of his disparity sum, if any.—A Member continuing his subscription after the death of his nominee, may nominate a second time on the class on which he entered; but ceasing to subscribe, his class will be according to age on re-entry.

29. Annuitants must transmit (post-paid) a certificate of the death of the nominating Member, and when the annuities are payable, must annually send an affidavit of being alive and unmarried, on or before the 1st of June; failing to do so, will lose their annuity for the year, as no arrears can be paid at any time. All documents must be satisfactory to the Committee.



30. All disputes between Members and the Society, not determinable by these Rules, shall be decided by arbitration, such decision to be final: the parties who lose shall pay the expense, not exceeding the sum of ten shillings for costs. If any Member of the Society shall, at any General or Committee Meeting, bring forward any matter so decided he shall be fined 1*l*.

31. A Member refusing to account for monies or effects, or to deliver up, or misapplying the same, shall forfeit double the value and be expelled; refusing to deliver up any papers when required, shall be fined by a General Meeting.

32. A Member may continue to subscribe although he may have afterwards quitted his Majesty's service.

33. Every Member shall subscribe his name to the Rules, and take a copy thereof; shall receive from the Actuary a certificate of his nomination as a voucher.

34. Widows of Officers, during the first year of their Widowhood (in reference to the 18th Rule), shall not pay any increased entrance; other Widows shall at all times be eligible to provide for their children, being the children of deceased Officers. No Widow can be admitted beyond the age of 55. Wives of Officers may make provision for their children.

35. The rent of the Society's room, purchase of stationery, and other incidental expenses, shall be paid out of the funds. No other charge will be allowed without previous consent of the Committee.

36. Previous to any alteration of these Rules and Regulations, timely notice of the same shall be given to all the branches of the Society (should any be formed), whose number amounts to twenty and upwards, that their views on the subject may be known to the Society, who shall first read the correspondence, collect the votes, an attested copy of which is to be sent to the Society.

37. All monies arising from contributions and fines to be applied to the purposes mentioned in these Rules, and in defraying the necessary expenses attending the management of the Society. Any Officer, misapplying the funds, shall repay the same, and be excluded.

N.B. It is proposed that a bye-law shall be framed to enable the branches to add their votes to the Society's, at Portsmouth, both for and against the measure that may be agitated.

Form of application and Medical Certificate, to be addressed (post-paid) to the Actuary, at the Office, Old Town Hall, Portsmouth.

## GENERAL ORDERS, CIRCULARS, &c. &c. \*

### ARMY.

Officers and Persons in the Receipt of Half-pay, Retired Full-pay, Pensions for Wounds, Allowances to General Officers, to Officers, &c. of Militia and Local Militia, Pensions to Widows of Officers, and to Persons on the Compassionate List, and Allowances as of His Majesty's Royal Bounty.

In consequence of a Bill lately brought into Parliament by the Paymaster-General, Persons entitled to any of the above Allowances, and resident in the United Kingdom, are empowered (in addition to the former modes of receiving their respective Allowances) to draw a Bill of Exchange upon the Paymaster-General of His Majesty's Forces; if, therefore, any of the above Persons are desirous of so doing, it will be necessary to attend to the following directions.

By the Act 3d Will. IV. cap. 106, Officers and Persons entitled to any of the above-named Allowances, and desirous of drawing a Bill of Exchange for the same, upon the Paymaster-General, must signify such desire by Letter, transmitting at the same time the requisite Affidavit or Certificate, addressed to the Paymaster-General, under Cover, in the following manner, (the service, namely, Half-pay, or other Allowance, as the case may be, being inserted in the left-hand bottom corner of the Cover);

<p>To</p> <p><i>The Right Honourable</i></p> <p><i>The Paymaster-General of the Forces,</i></p> <p><i>Whitehall,</i></p> <p><i>London.</i></p> <p>Here insert the Service.</p>
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The Cashier, who has the charge of paying the particular Service to be drawn for, will, as soon as the Allowance in question shall be in the course of payment, dispatch, from the Office to the Person so desiring payment, an Order to draw, with a Form of Bill attached thereto, and such Order and Bill, when returned and presented at the Army Pay Office, duly filled up by the said Officer or Person, will be retained and paid by the Paymaster-General, according to its tenor, in like manner as if it had been accepted.

## MEMORANDUM.

Persons entitled to any of the above Allowances will understand, that they may now make their election of any one of the four following modes for the Receipt of the same:—

By Personal Application at this Office.

Through an Agent duly authorized by Power of Attorney.

By Remittance through—The Collector of Cess, in Scotland; the Collector of Customs, or the Collector of Excise, in any part of the Kingdom.

By a Bill of Exchange drawn upon the Paymaster-General of His Majesty's Forces, agreeably to a Form transmitted.

TERRICK HAULTAIN,  
Accountant-General. •

Army Pay Office,  
23d October, 1832.}

N.B.—The Law above-mentioned, authorizing the Drawing Bills on the Paymaster-General, will not take effect until the 1st January, 1833.

War Office, 12th Nov. 1832.

Sir,—With reference to the Regulation of the 1st of August last. relative to the conveyance of soldiers and their families by coasting, steam, or canal navigation, I am directed to apprise you, that an arrangement has been now made for their conveyance by His Majesty's Post Office Packets at all the stations at which there are any vessels of that description; and that although the Post-Master-General requires that the full cabin fares should be paid by commissioned officers, in order to prevent their conveyance being a loss to the revenue, by their occupation of the space which would otherwise be appropriated to private passengers, yet his Grace is willing to convey, *free of all charge*, non-commissioned officers and privates, discharged soldiers and their families, and the families of soldiers sent to their homes, on the embarkation or de-  
cease of their husbands.

A statement, showing the stations of the several post-office packets, their fixed times of sailing, the average period of the voyage, and the rates of passage money for officers is annexed, and also a form of the Order which is to be delivered to the Agent by persons claiming passages in the vessels in question. I am further directed to express the Secretary at War's desire, that every possible facility may be afforded

to the agents of the packets, both at the places of embarkation and disembarkation, and also to state that officers and soldiers, whilst on board the post-office packets, will not be victualled at the public expense, and that this arrangement, in respect of the packets between Liverpool and Dublin, will not take place until the 25th inst., but on the other stations it is to be immediately carried into effect.

I have the honour to be, Sir,  
Your most obedient humble Servant,  
L. SULIVAN.

Officer commanding —  
Regt. of —.

Statement showing the Places from and to which Conveyances may be obtained in His Majesty's Post-Office Packets, fixed times of Sailing, &c.

Between what Places.	At what Periods.	Average duration of Voyage.	Rates of Conveyance for Commissioned Officers.		
		hours	l.	s.	d.
Liverpool & Dublin..	daily	15	1	7	6
Holyhead & Dublin..	ditto	8	1	1	0
Millford & Waterford.	ditto	11	1	10	0
Port Patrick & Do- naghadee .....	ditto	3	0	8	0
Weymouth & Jersey..	ditto	14	1	1	0
Guernsey & Jersey..	ditto	10	0	5	0

Form of Certificate for Soldiers on Duty, discharged Soldiers and their Families, and the Families of Soldiers sent to their Homes upon embarkation or de-  
cease of their Husbands.

Regiment	Rank and Name.	Names of Women and Children.	<p>I do hereby certify, that the Individuals specified in the margin, consisting of Men, Women, and Children, who are proceeding from _____ to _____, agreeably to _____, are entitled to a passage in His Majesty's Post-Office Packet from _____ to _____.</p>
Dated at _____ day of _____			<p>{ Officer commanding the _____</p>
To the Agent of His Majesty's Post-Office Packet at _____			

Regulation for the Guidance of Commanding Officers, Paymasters, and others, respecting the Allowances for the Conveyance of the Wives, Widows, and Children of Soldiers to their Homes.

The Acts of Parliament having been repealed under which advances were made by the Overseers of the Poor in England, the Treasurers of Kirk Sessions in Scotland, and the Postmasters in Ireland, to the families of Soldiers travelling to their homes by War Office Passes, the Secretary at War has caused the following Rules to be drawn up for the guidance of Commanding Officers, Paymasters, and others, in respect to the mode of issuing the allowances for the future.

1. When a Regiment or detachment in Great Britain or Ireland is ordered to embark for foreign service, if the number of the wives of the Non-Commissioned Officers and men shall exceed the proportion allowed to proceed with the corps or detachment, those not permitted to embark are to be provided with a conveyance home for themselves and their children, not exceeding 14 years of age, at the public expense. If, however, such conveyance cannot be procured upon eligible terms, and it shall be found more advantageous for the public to grant the parties an allowance in money, in order to enable them to travel to their respective homes, an allowance may in that case be issued for the actual distance by the nearest route at the following rates, viz., 1½d. a mile for the wife, and 1d. a mile for each child, not exceeding 14 years, but above 1 year of age, no allowance being made for infants.

2. To the wives or widows of Soldiers, and their children, sent home from abroad, and to the widows and children of Soldiers dying on service in this country, provided they proceed immediately to their homes, a free conveyance, or the like travelling allowance, will also be granted; but in every instance in which the parties can be conveyed by sea, by canal boats, by waggons, or any other mode, more expeditiously and economically than by travelling on foot, such conveyance should be provided in preference to the mileage allowance, it being very desirable that no time be lost on the road home.

3. Besides the free conveyance by land, a personal allowance shall be granted for their subsistence on the journey at the following rates, viz., 2d. for each woman, and 1d. for each child, for every 8 miles.

4. For the period during which the family of any Soldier may be necessarily

detained at a port waiting for a passage, and likewise for the period of their passage, allowances will be granted, agreeably to the rules laid down in the regulation for passages dated the 1st instant.

5. The payments for conveyances of families under this regulation are, in all cases, to be made to the proprietors of such conveyances, or to their agents, whose receipts should be annexed, as vouchers, to the public accounts.

6. Before any payment is made to the wife or widow of a soldier on account of travelling allowance, she should be apprised that if she do not proceed direct to her destination, she will be liable to be apprehended and proceeded against as a vagrant, and that she will also be precluded in future from any benefit to which, by the custom of the service, she would otherwise be entitled.

7. Paymasters of Regiments, Reserves, and Districts, by whom any allowance is paid, are to take care that they limit their issues to such sum only as will take the respective parties to the nearest place on the line of route, at which there is a resident Paymaster or Subdivision Officer, by whom a further issue can be made.

8. The Commanding Officers of Regiments or Detachments will cause alphabetical lists to be made up and transmitted to the War Office, in the form herewith marked, A, for all persons claiming the benefits of this regulation.

9. In cases in which the whole sum to be received by, or paid on account of any family, shall be issued by the same Paymaster, the amount is to be inserted as a charge in his contingent account, the certificate and receipts, Form 14, being annexed as vouchers.

10. When, however, the Paymaster at the place from which the family may proceed to their destination shall issue a portion only of the travelling allowance, he is to alter the certificate, Form B, as therein pointed out, and is to transmit a duplicate, by the earliest post, to the Paymaster by whom the residue of the travelling allowance is to be issued; and when a family proceeds between England and Scotland, or Ireland, the Paymaster at the place of embarkation, who provides the passage, should transmit to the Paymaster at the place of disembarkation, the certificate, Form B, to be by him annexed to his accounts, as a voucher for the passage money, and travelling allowance to the family's final destination.

11. A certificate, Form C, is to be given, for her protection, to every woman, to whom any issue is made on account of travelling allowance, or for whom any

conveyance is provided, and the payments made on her account by the respective Paymasters, are to be invariably stated thereon.

2. Commanding Officers and Paymasters will be aware that all former regulations issued from the War Office on this subject are cancelled hereby.

War Office, Aug. 1st, 1832.

## FORM A.

Regiment of \_\_\_\_\_  
Alphabetical List of Women and Children—(not permitted to embark with their Husbands)—(of the Wives, Widows, and Children of Soldiers sent Home from \_\_\_\_\_)—(or of Widows and Children of Soldiers dying on Service).—(as the case may be.)

Woman's Name.	Her Husband's			Places from which proceeding	Places to which going.	On what account sent Home.	By what mode sent Home.	Remarks.
	Name.	Rank.	Company, or Troop.					
				No. of Children above 1, and not exceeding 14 years of Age.				

I do hereby Certify that the above List of every Particular, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, correct in every Particular. Dated at \_\_\_\_\_ 18 \_\_\_\_\_ Officer commanding the \_\_\_\_\_

FORM B.  
We do hereby certify that \_\_\_\_\_ the \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ of Captain \_\_\_\_\_ Company or Troop of the \_\_\_\_\_ is entitled to travelling allowance or a conveyance [for herself and for \_\_\_\_\_ children] to \_\_\_\_\_, her intended place of residence, she having been \_\_\_\_\_ on the \_\_\_\_\_ of her husband.  
We do further certify that the said \_\_\_\_\_ has signified her intention of proceeding forthwith to \_\_\_\_\_, from which place she is to embark for \_\_\_\_\_, and that she has received the sum of \_\_\_\_\_ for herself, and of \_\_\_\_\_ for her children, to enable her to reach \_\_\_\_\_, the place of her final destination.

Commanding Officer.

Paymaster.

Dated at \_\_\_\_\_, the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 18 \_\_\_\_\_.

I acknowledge to have received from the Paymaster of \_\_\_\_\_ the sum of \_\_\_\_\_, to enable me to proceed with \_\_\_\_\_ children to \_\_\_\_\_.

I further acknowledge to have received from the Paymaster of \_\_\_\_\_ the further sum of \_\_\_\_\_ on account of \_\_\_\_\_.

N B.—When there are no children, or when the women proceed at once to their final destination, the certificates must be altered accordingly.

## FORM C

This is to certify, that the bearer hereof, \_\_\_\_\_ is the wife of \_\_\_\_\_, in the \_\_\_\_\_ Regt. of \_\_\_\_\_, and is entitled to a free passage from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_, and on her arrival to the sum of \_\_\_\_\_, to enable herself and \_\_\_\_\_ children to proceed to \_\_\_\_\_, the place of her intended residence.

The said \_\_\_\_\_ is (here describe her).  
Commanding Officer.  
Paymaster.

Dated at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 18 \_\_\_\_\_.

N B.—The Woman will present this certificate to any Paymaster or other military officer, from whom she is to receive any allowance, and is to retain it until her arrival at her final destination.

War Office, 1832.

Sir,—With a view to the establishment of an adequate and uniform system of reward for the apprehension of deserters from the army on foreign stations, I have the honor to request that you will be pleased to furnish me with a statement in detail of the several sums which have been paid for such service within your command, during the last two years, distinguishing the individuals to whom, and the soldiers on account of whose desertion the rewards have been paid.

I have at the same time to request your opinion as to the course of proceeding it may be most expedient to establish with a view to the prevention of the offence of deserting, as well as for the speedy and economical recovery of deserters to the service, and that you will state what sum you consider sufficient as remuneration and reward to the party for the apprehension of the deserter.—I have the honour, &c.

JOHN HOBHOUSE.

To the General Officer commanding.

**RECORD OF THE SERVICES OF THE TWENTY-THIRD RÉGIMENT,  
OR ROYAL WELSH FUSILIERS\*.**

On the 28th of September, the combined French and American army made its appearance, and Lord Cornwallis having the same evening received assurance of speedy succour from Sir Henry Clinton, withdrew his troops from the outer works, which were, on the following day, occupied by the enemy, and the place completely invested. On the 6th of October, the enemy opened the first parallel, and on the 9th, their batteries commenced firing on our left; other batteries fired at the same time against a redoubt advanced over the creek upon our right, and defended by 120 men of the 23rd regiment and marines, who maintained that post with uncommon gallantry†: soon after 3000 French grenadiers, all volunteers, made a vigorous attempt to storm the right advanced redoubt, and were repulsed by only 130 officers and soldiers of the Welsh Fusiliers, and 40 marines; two other attempts were also made by the French to storm the redoubt, which were also unsuccessful‡. On the night of the 14th, the enemy established the second parallel, and it being evident that the half-ruined works of the town could not stand many hours against its fire, a sortie was determined on. This was made on the morning of the 16th, by a party of 350 men, who gallantly forced their way into two of the batteries that were in the greatest state of forwardness, spiked the guns, and killed about 100 of the enemy. This success was, however, of little avail; the guns having been hastily and imperfectly spiked, were soon restored, and before evening were fit for service. Not a gun could be shown on the works of the town, and the shells were nearly all expended; no alternative, therefore, remained, but to surrender, or attempt to draw off the garrison by the Gloucester side of the river, on which there was only a small French force, which could be easily overpowered. The latter alternative was decided on, and some large boats were, on other pretences, ordered to be in readiness at night. In these a detachment of the army, including a part of the Welsh Fusiliers, embarked, some feached the opposite side, but at this critical moment, the weather, from being calm and moderate, changed to a most violent storm of wind and rain, and drove all the boats, some with troops on board, down the river. Fortunately, they were all enabled to return in the course of the forenoon, but the design of drawing off the garrison was completely frustrated. Meanwhile the enemy's batteries had opened at day-break; the defences were crumbling into ruins, and were already assailable in more than one point. Under these circumstances, Earl Cornwallis, unwilling to expose his men to the carnage of an assault, which could not fail of success, made proposals for a capitulation on the 17th. The terms were adjusted on the following day, and on the 19th the articles were signed; and so terminated the services of the Royal Welsh in the American war, though unfortunately, not ingloriously. Lord Cornwallis, in his official account of the siege, observes, "The detachment of the 23d Regiment and Marines in the redoubt of the right, commanded by Captain Althorpe (23d), and the subsequent detachments, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone, deserve particular commendation." Sir Thomas Saumarez adds, "For the gallant defence made by the troops which defended the right redoubt, they received the particular thanks of Earl Cornwallis, and also the most flattering testimonies of approbation from the general officers of the army, for their persevering and intrepid conduct during the siege, and on all former occasions." Even the French general officers, after the termination of the siege, gave the Welsh Fusiliers their unqualified approbation, and praise for their intrepidity and firmness in repulsing the three attacks made by such vastly superior numbers on the redoubt, and could not easily believe that so few men had defended it.

The combined army, including militia, amounted to 20,000 men, while the garrison, on the day previous to the surrender, mustered 5950 rank and file, of whom, however, only 4017 were reported fit for duty. Lieutenants Mair and Guyon, of the Welsh Fusiliers, were killed during the siege.

the terms of the capitulation, the garrison surrendered prisoners of war, but were permitted to return to Europe on parole, and to retain their pri-

\* Continue from p. 571.

† Lord Cornwallis's despatch.

‡ Sir Thomas Saumarez.

vate property; the colours of the regiment were thus saved, by Captain Peter\* and another officer wrapping them round their bodies†.

On the 20th of October Captain Saumarez, who was appointed to attend the regiment during its captivity, marched from York Town with half the garrison, and on the 15th of November arrived at Winchester in the back settlements of Virginia, where the soldiers were confined in barracks, surrounded by a stockade.

On the 12th of January 1782, the regiment marched from Winchester, through the state of Maryland to Lancaster in Pennsylvania, a long and severe march, during which several of the soldiers were frost-bitten. Here, on the 2d of June, 1782, Captain Saumarez was one of the thirteen British captains who were compelled to draw lots for their lives.

In May, 1783, the regiment quitted Lancaster, and joined the British army in Staten Island; and in January, 1784, embarked for England. From that period till 1794, they were stationed in the United Kingdom, and in the latter year embarked for St. Domingo, where they assisted at the taking of Port au Prince, but suffered so severely from the climate, that they returned to England a perfect skeleton in 1796.

In 1798 the regiment formed part of a force sent under the command of Major-General Coote, to destroy sluices and works in the canal of Ostend. Two companies only landed on this service; they were made prisoners of war, in common with the rest of the troops, and marched to Lille; they were soon after, however, exchanged, and joined the head-quarters of the regiment in Guernsey.

In August, 1799, the regiment embarked for Holland, with the army under Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, sailed from the Downs on the 13th of that month, and after a tedious and tempestuous voyage arrived in Texel Roads on the 22d. Immediate preparations for a landing were commenced, but it coming on to blow so hard on shore, the fleet was forced to put to sea again; and the gale continuing unabated for the two following days, it was not till the 26th that it finally came to anchor. On the morning of the 27th the troops got into the boats and launches of the fleet to disembark. The reserve, composed of the Welsh Fusiliers and 55th, commanded by Colonel M'Donald of the latter regiment, were the first to reach the shore. They had scarcely formed, and began to move forward, when they got into action with a considerable body of Dutch infantry, cavalry, and artillery, commanded by General Daendels. "The ardour and glorious intrepidity displayed by the troops soon drove the enemy from the nearest sand-hills;" but the contest continued from five o'clock in the morning till three in the afternoon, when the enemy, completely worn out, were compelled to retire. The loss of the British fell chiefly on the reserve, which were the corps principally engaged. The Welsh Fusiliers had 18 rank and file killed, and Captains Bury, Ellis, and the Honourable Godfrey M'Donald, five serjeants, and 69 rank and file wounded.

For some days the troops remained in the position they had won on the sand-hills, suffering severely from the weather, having no other shelter than trenches, which they dug for themselves in the sand. On the 1st of September they advanced from this uncomfortable situation, and established themselves on the Zype Dyke, extending across the peninsula of the Helder, from the Atlantic to the Zuyder Zee. Early in the morning of the 10th of September, the enemy advanced in three columns to attack the position, but were repulsed at every point; the reserve quickened the retreat.

In a few days His Royal Highness the Duke of York arrived and assumed the command of the army, and as considerable reinforcements of English and Russians arrived about the same time, offensive operations commenced. On the 19th of September the Allied army marched in four columns to attack the posts of the enemy. All conducted themselves with great bravery, and the efforts of three of the columns were crowned with complete success. The right column, however, composed of Russians, was unfortunately surrounded in the village of Bergen, and ultimately repulsed with considerable loss. In consequence of this misfortune, the whole of the troops were recalled to the position from which they had marched in the morning. The reserve had marched on the evening preceding the battle to turn the extreme right of the enemy. There was no opposition in that quarter, but the column also resumed its former position.

The state of the weather prevented further active operations during the remainder of the month of September; but the interval was usefully employed in prepa-

\* The late Lieut.-Gen. Peter.

† Captain Julian's Journal,  
x 2

rations for a renewal of the attack on the enemy: this was made on the 2d of October, on which was gained the hard-fought battle, generally known as that of Alkmaar. The action commenced by the reserve, which formed the advanced guard of the right column of the army, under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, attacking and carrying a redoubt in front of the village of Campe, and driving the enemy from that village and the heights above it. They then advanced along the sand-hills inclining to their left, took the Slaper Dyke in reverse, and cleared the road to Groete, and the heights above it, for the Russian column which marched by the Slaper Dyke. Having cleared the ground in front of the Russians, the reserve inclined considerably to the right, to connect itself with the right column (which had marched by the sea-shore), still warmly engaged with the enemy, who were in considerable force on the sand-hills. Meanwhile Sir Ralph Abercrombie had been for several hours warmly engaged with a superior body of the French, which occupied Egmont of the Zee, and the hills in front of it. The arrival of the reserve enabled him to advance and take post on the sand-hills, on which the troops lay on their arms that night, and on the following morning occupied Egmont of Zee. In this battle the Welsh Fusileers had seven rank and file killed, and Lieutenants McLean and Keith, one serjeant, three drummers, and forty-nine rank and file wounded.

After the action the enemy took up a strong position between Boever Wyck and Wyck of Zee, from which His Royal Highness determined to drive him before he should have time to strengthen it, or to receive reinforcements. In pursuance of this determination, and preparatory to a general movement, the advanced posts were ordered to be pushed forward on the 6th of October. This was effected in general with little opposition; but the Russians, while attempting to take possession of a height in their front, were attacked by a strong party of the enemy. Sir Ralph Abercrombie moved up with the reserve to support them, and the enemy advancing with his whole force, the action soon became general along a great part of the line, and was maintained with great obstinacy till a late hour in the night, when the enemy withdrew from the field. The Welsh Fusileers had six rank and file killed, and one serjeant and 33 rank and file wounded.

Winter was now setting in with such rigour, that it was evident nothing further could be effected during that season; a retrograde movement was therefore resolved on. About 7 o'clock on the evening of the 7th of October, the troops were suddenly ordered to fall in, and by ten the retreat had commenced; the night being extremely dark and stormy, and the greatest precautions having been taken to elude the vigilance of the enemy, there was no pursuit, and the army on the 9th resumed its former position on the Zype Dyke unmolested.

On the 14th, His Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief made proposals to the French General Brune for withdrawing the British and Russian troops from Holland, and on the 18th, articles to that effect were agreed on.

In pursuance of the convention, the Welsh Fusileers marched to the Helder, and on the 29th of October embarked on some Dutch schuytz, to be conveyed to some line-of-battle ships about fifteen miles off. The wind dying away they were unable to proceed, and were ordered on board some Dutch frigates, when it was the fate of Lieutenants Hill, Hanson, Viscer, Maclean, and Hoggard, with the grenadiers and two other companies, amounting to 262 men, and 25 women and children, to embark in the Valk. This ship was prevented from sailing at the same time with those which conveyed the rest of the regiment, but she got out with the next tide. On the following evening they were, by reckoning, within thirty miles of Yarmouth, but would not come nearer the shore during the night. Next morning the wind was contrary, and soon increasing to a storm, drove the Valk towards the coast of Norway. She now beat about for several days, till all idea of her position was lost. On the morning of the 10th of November the ship struck on a sand-bank, as was afterwards ascertained, within six miles of the Dutch coast, from which the captain had conceived he was many leagues distant, supposing himself to be at least equally near to that of England; the crew, of whom, indeed, scarce twenty had ever been at sea before, abandoned themselves to despair, and trusted more to their prayers than to their exertions.

The spirit of the Englishmen was not, however, dismayed by their appalling situation. Lieutenant Hoggard, who had some little knowledge of nautical affairs, took some of the soldiers down to the pumps, and Lieutenant Hill having failed in an attempt to break open the powder-magazine, fired several rounds from a soldier's musket; the ship guns had all been drawn, and the gunner could not be found. The ship now beat over the bank and drifted among some breakers, the main-mast

went overboard, severing the long-boat in two in its fall; the mizen and fore-mast soon followed, carrying with them numbers of people who had crowded into the rigging. Lieutenant Hill now hearing the ship going to pieces, took his station on the fore-castle, where he lay down, and from whence he witnessed the unhappy fate of most of his companions, the after-part of the ship having soon broken away. The fore-castle seemed to be fast bedded in the sand, but it soon fell over, when Lieutenant Hill quitted it, and after many fruitless and fatiguing efforts, succeeded in fastening himself with his braces to a fragment of the wreck, on which he at length reached the shore, where he found, that of 446 souls who had sailed in the *Valk*, only 25 survived, himself, 19 men of the Welsh Fusileers, and five Dutch sailors.

The land on which they were cast proved to be the island of Ameland on the coast of Holland. The inhabitants had hoisted the colours of the House of Orange, and cut off all communication with the main land; they received the survivors in the kindest manner, and performed the last offices to those who were washed ashore, with as much decency as their poverty would permit.

Having fulfilled these melancholy duties, Lieutenant Hill hired a fishing-boat, in which he and his companions were conveyed to the Helder, from whence they returned to England in the *Success* frigate.

The regiment was now reduced by shipwreck and the casualties of the campaign, from 1000 to about 400 men; drafts were received from the Irish militia, and a few recruits were raised in England, but the supplies were far from placing the regiment on its former establishment.

In June, 1800, the regiment embarked at Plymouth, in three frigates, and joined the Channel fleet under Lord St. Vincent, disembarked on the Isle de Houat on the coast of France, re-embarked and joined the army under Lieutenant-General Sir James Pulteney, in the unsuccessful attempts on Ferroll and Vigo in August; they thence proceeded to Cadiz Bay, and joined the army assembled there under the command of Sir Ralph Abercrombie. The troops being prevented from landing in consequence of an epidemic fever raging in the city, it was resolved to employ them in an expedition to Egypt. The Welsh Fusileers sailed for Malta, where they landed early in December, for the purpose of refreshing the men, and cleaning the ships; from Malta they proceeded to the general rendezvous, Marmorici Bay, in Asia Minor, where they again landed and encamped. The expedition finally sailed from Marmorici Bay on the 23d of February, 1801, and on the 2d of March, anchored in Aboukir Bay. The Welsh Fusileers again formed part of the reserve, with the flank companies of the 40th regiment, the 28th, 42d, and 58th regiments, the Corsican Rangers, and detachments of the 11th dragoons, and of Hompesch's regiment, commanded by Major-General Moore.

The state of the weather, and the surf on the shore, prevented any attempt to land till the 8th. At two o'clock on that morning, the reserve, the Guards, and the 1st brigade, amounting in all to about 5500 men, commenced getting into the boats, but owing to the great extent of the anchorage, the assembling and arranging of these at the place of rendezvous was not completed till nine. When the signal was made to advance, all sprang forward at the same instant: the French, to the number of two thousand, drawn up at the summit of the sand-hills, in part sixty feet high, and apparently inaccessible, looking down in amazement at the hardihood of the attempt. When they could no longer doubt of the seriousness of the intention to land, they opened such a tremendous fire from their artillery, and as the troops approached, from their small arms, that the surface of the water was broken into foam, and it seemed as if nothing could live in it. This only increased the ardour of the rowers, who pressed on and forced the boats to the beach. "The reserve jumped on shore, and formed as they advanced; the 23d and 40th rushed up the heights with almost preternatural energy, never firing a shot, but charging with the bayonet the two battalions which crowned them, breaking and pursuing them till they carried the two Mole Hills in the rear, which commanded the plain to the left, taking at the same time three pieces of cannon\*. The Guards and the 1st brigade were no less successful, and the British were left in full possession of the heights, and eight pieces of cannon.

The loss of the regiment was six rank and file killed, and Captains Ellis, Lloyd, and Pearson, one serjeant, and 37 rank and file wounded.

The rest of the army disembarked during the day, and the whole occupied a

\* Sir Robert Wilson's History of the expedition.



position about three miles in advance, till the 12th, when it again moved forward and came in sight of the enemy, who was strongly posted with his right to the canal of Alexandria, and his left to the sea. On the morning of the 13th, the army marched in two columns against the right of the enemy's position, but had not proceeded far, when the French, descending from the heights, attacked the leading brigades of both columns. These quickly formed line, repulsed the enemy, and continuing to advance in the same formation for three miles, finally compelled him to take refuge under the fortified heights of Alexandria.

The reserve, which had covered the right flank during these operations, was now brought forward; while the second line marched to the left to turn the enemy on both flanks. The Commander-in-Chief, however, on reconnoitering the position, judged it prudent to withdraw the troops rather than expose them to the certainty of considerable loss, when the extent of the advantage to be gained could not be ascertained, they had already, indeed, suffered severely during the reconnoissance.

The army remained unmolested in the position to which it had retired till the morning of the 21st. The reserve was posted on an eminence on the extreme right, within a few yards of the sea, and among the ruins of an ancient palace, the work of the Romans. About an hour before daybreak on the morning of the 21st of March, the French, to the number of 12,000, issued from their works and advanced to the attack. The action commenced by a feint on our left, but it soon became evident that the greatest efforts were directed against the right. The attack on this point was begun by the infantry, sustained by a strong body of cavalry; the contest was unusually obstinate: the enemy was twice repulsed, and their cavalry were repeatedly mixed with our infantry. They at length retired, leaving a prodigious number of dead and wounded on the field. "The reserve, against whom the principal attack of the enemy was directed, conducted themselves with unexampled spirit: they resisted the impetuosity of the French infantry, and repulsed several charges of cavalry.\*" "To Major-General More, Brigadier-General Oakes, and the reserve, no acknowledgments are sufficient†."

After the victory of the 21st, Major-General Hutchinson, on whom the command devolved, by the lamented death of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, marched against Cairo with the main body of the army. The Welsh Fusiliers remained with Major-General Coote before Alexandria, and assisted in the operations which terminated in the capitulation of that place on the 2d of September. In November they embarked for Gibraltar. "The conduct of the troops of every description," says General Hutchinson in his despatch of the 5th of September, "has been exemplary in the highest degree; there has been much to applaud and nothing to reprehend. Their order and regularity in the camp have been as conspicuous as their courage in the field."

For their conduct on this service the troops received the thanks of both houses of Parliament, and His Majesty was graciously pleased to permit each regiment to bear on its colours and appointments, the Sphinx, with the word "Egypt." Each officer was presented with a gold medal by the Grand Signior.

The regiment returned to England from Gibraltar in August, 1803, and was quartered in the Southern counties till October, 1805, when it embarked at Ramsgate on an expedition under the command of Lieutenant-General Don. The regiment disembarked at Cuxhaven early in November, and after a severe and fatiguing march was cantoned on the banks of the Weser, about a day's march from Bremen. About two months afterwards, the army now commanded by Lord Cathcart, occupied Bremen, where they remained in anxious expectation of being called upon to partake in more active scenes, till the battle of Austerlitz so completely changed the aspect of affairs in Europe, that the British troops were recalled to England in February, 1806.

The next service in which the regiment was employed was the expedition to Copenhagen, under Lieut.-General Lord Cathcart. The Welsh Fusiliers, who, with the 4th regiment, formed Major-General Grosvenor's brigade, embarked at Harwich on the 25th of July, 1807, sailed on the 30th, and on the 16th of August landed, without opposition, on the island of Zealand, about twelve miles from Copenhagen. On their advance toward the capital on the following day, some skirmishing took place with the advance-guard, commanded by Major Pearson, in which the regiment lost five or six men.

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\* Major-General Hutchinson's despatch.

† General Order.

On the 18th, the stores and artillery were disembarked, and the troops soon commenced erecting batteries, and making other necessary preparations for a bombardment. During the progress of these, the piquets had frequent encounters with the enemy, in which the regiment had a few men killed and wounded; but the greatest annoyance was from the fire of the Danish gun-boats. The bombardment commenced on the evening of the 2d of Sept., with such effect, that the town was soon observed to be on fire in several places. The firing continued on both sides till the morning of the 6th, when negotiations were opened, and on the 7th, articles of capitulation were signed. Lieutenant Jennings and two men were killed on the 4th, by a six-pound shot, which wounded two other men of the regiment, and killed two of the King's Own.

From the signing of the capitulation, the regiment was quartered in the suburbs of Copenhagen till the 18th of October, when they embarked for England in the Brunswick, Surveillante, and Heir Apparent Frederick, one of the Danish prizes. On the 6th of November the regiment landed at Deal, after a stormy voyage, during which the Heir Apparent was more than once in considerable danger. From Deal they marched to Colchester, from whence they soon moved to Portsmouth, where, in February, 1808, they embarked in transports, and proceeded to Halifax, Nova Scotia. From Halifax one company was detached to Windsor, the remainder were ordered up the Bay of Fundy, the head-quarters, with three companies, to Auxapolis Royal, and the rest to St. John, New Brunswick.

In these quarters they remained only till December in the same year, when they again embarked, and sailed with the Royal Fusiliers, under the command of Sir George Prevost to Barbadoes, where they joined a force under the command of Sir George Beckwith, destined to make an attack upon the island of Martinique.

The expedition sailed from Barbadoes on the 28th of January, 1809, and, on the following day, having separated into two divisions, in order to attack on different points, the Welsh Fusiliers landed in the Cul de Sac Robert, on the north-east side of Martinique, a small body of the French disappearing as they approached. As soon as it was dark they commenced their march, the men dragging two pieces of artillery, as the horses were quite unserviceable, from the length of time they had been on board ship. The roads were in such a wretched condition from the rains, that it was one o'clock in the morning ere they accomplished a distance of five miles, when they halted. In this manner they continued their march across the island towards Fort Bourbon.

On the 1st of February, the Royal Fusiliers, and the light companies of the brigade who were in advance, drove a body of the enemy from Mome Bruno to the heights of Sourier. Lieut.-Colonel Ellis, who was advancing in support with the grenadiers of the Royal Welsh, now ascended the heights, and drove the enemy across them, and down a narrow road between two sugar plantations, at the mouth of which the grenadiers took post. Here they were soon assailed by a superior force, which they ultimately repulsed. The contest, however, was most obstinate; the French repeatedly returning to the attack, with drums beating. The grenadiers, however, maintained their ground, though with the loss of twenty-six of their number killed and wounded.

The remainder of the regiment now came up, and a sharp action took place, which terminated in the retreat of the French, and in which the Welsh Fusiliers had upwards of an hundred men killed and wounded. A most important position was now gained, from which all the subsequent operations against Fort Bourbon were directed. On the following morning two redoubts were discovered in front, and in advance of them a body of the enemy's infantry. The redoubts opened their fire, and a few men of the brigade were killed and wounded. Parties from each regiment were now ordered forward; they attacked and drove the enemy into their forts, but were ultimately obliged to retire, covered by the grenadiers, and Captain Keith's company of the Welsh Fusiliers. In this affair Lieutenant Roshelly was wounded. Sir George Beckwith now came up, and asked Lieut.-Colonel Ellis whether he thought he could trust his grenadiers to storm the Forts.—'Sir,' replied Colonel Ellis, 'I will take the flints out of their firelocks and they shall take them.' Sir George would not, however, permit the attempt to be made. The enemy evacuated them during the night, spiking and dismounting the guns, and retired to a third fort near their principal works. The second division of the army having now come up, and the way being opened for the fleet by the capture of Pigeon Island, preparations were commenced for bombarding Fort Bourbon.

Four mortar batteries opened on the evening of the 19th of February, and

continued firing all night. This was repeated till the 23d, when the French proposed terms of capitulation; which were deemed inadmissible, and the firing was resumed. On the following day three white flags were hoisted, and negotiations were opened, which terminated in the garrison, amounting to 2000 men fit for duty, besides 700 sick, laying down their arms and eagles, and becoming prisoners of war.

"The casualties of the regiment during this service were two serjeants, and eighteen rank and file killed, and two officers, surgeon Power and Lieut. Roshelly, three serjeants, and ninety-seven rank and file wounded. Of 850*l.* voted to the wounded at Martinique from the Patriotic Fund at Lloyd's, 250*l.* fell to the share of the grenadier company of the Welsh Fusileers, out of which sum the company erected a monument in the Dutch church at Halifax, to the memory of their comrades who fell in the expedition \*."

For their distinguished conduct on this service, the regiment received the gracious permission of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on behalf of His Majesty, to bear the word "Martinique" on their colours and appointments. After the reduction of Fort Bourbon, the regiment returned to Halifax with Sir George Prevost.

In the year 1804, a second battalion was added to the regiment: it was embodied at Chester, where it remained till it was completed, and rendered in every respect fit for service. In November, 1807, it embarked for Ireland, and in the summer of 1808 was encamped on the Curragh of Kildare, where a considerable body of troops was assembled to be exercised by Lieut.-General Sir David Baird.

In the autumn of the same year the second battalion formed part of the force which proceeded with Sir David Baird to join Sir John Moore's army in Spain. It subsequently accompanied the former general in his march to Sahagun, and shared in all the hardships of the disastrous retreat which followed, being one of the regiments of General Frazer's division, which unfortunately advanced a few days' march on the road, from Liego to Vigo, in consequence of the misconduct of the orderly dragoon who carried the despatch directing the retreat to be made on Corunna.

In the action at Corunna on the 16th of January, 1809, the battalion was in Major-General Beresford's brigade, which was in reserve, and which formed the rear-guard when the army embarked on the 17th, the Welsh Fusileers being the last battalion to quit the Spanish shore.

For their services in this campaign the regiment was permitted to bear the word "Corunna" on their colours and appointments, and Lieut.-Colonel Wyatt the honorary distinction of a medal.

The battalion returned with the army to England, and in the summer of the same year again embarked to join the expedition to the island of Walcheren under General the Earl of Chatham. On this service the battalion suffered so severely, from the pestilential climate of the island, that it returned to England almost a skeleton. It was never afterwards employed on foreign service, and, indeed, never attained to such a degree of efficiency as to be equal to repairing the casualties of the first battalion during the Peninsular war.

The first battalion embarked at Halifax on the 10th of November, 1810, arrived in the Tagus on the 11th of December, and having disembarked on the following day, marched on the 16th to join the army under Lord Wellington, which was then advancing from the lines of Torres Vedras in pursuit of Marshal Massena; on the 18th the Welsh Fusileers arrived at Sobral, where they joined the 4th division, commanded by Major-General the Honourable G. L. Cole, under whose orders they continued till the termination of the war; they were brigaded with the two battalions of the Royal Fusileers under the Honourable Colonel Pakenham.

The hostile armies soon went into cantonments; the Welsh Fusileers in Azembuja, where they remained till the 24th of January, 1811, when they moved to Aveira de Cima; in the meantime Major-General Houston had been appointed to the command of the brigade.

• (To be continued.)

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\* Letters and Journal of Lieut. now Lieut.-Col. Harrison.

## STATIONS OF THE ARMY ON THE 1st OF JANUARY, 1833.

AND REFERENCE TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF REGIMENTS.

Regiments and Corps.	Stations of Troops or Service Companies.	Stations of Reserve Companies.	Year of going on Foreign Service.	Year of returning from Foreign Service.	Whence returned.	Agents. British & Irish Establishment.	
1st Life-gds.	Regent's Park	.. . .	..	1816	France	Collyer	
2d do. . .	Hyde Park	.. . .	..	1816	France	Greenwood	
Rl. Horse-gds.	Windsor	.. . .	..	1816	France	Greenwood	
1st Drag-gds	Nottingham	.. . .	..	1816	France	Greenwood	
2nd do. . .	Edinburgh	.. . .	..	1818	France	Greenwood	
3rd do. . .	Brighton	.. . .	..	1814	Spain	Collyer	
4th do. . .	Dundalk	.. . .	..	1813	Portugal	Col. & Cane	
5th do. . .	Newbridge	.. . .	..	1814	Spain	Gr. & Cane	
6th do. . .	Dublin	.. . .	..	1808	Buen. Ayres	Col. & Cane	
7th do. . .	Dorchester	.. . .	..	1799	Holland	Collyer	
1st Dragoons	Canterbury	.. . .	..	1816	France	Hopkinson	
2nd do. . .	Birmingham	.. . .	..	1816	France	Greenwood	
3rd do. . .	Glasgow	.. . .	..	1818	France	Hopkinson	
4th do. . .	Bombay	.. . .	1822			Hopkinson	
6th do. . .	Cahir	.. . .	..	1816	France	Gr. & Ar.	
7th Hussars	Aylesham	.. . .	..	1818	France	Greenwood	
8th do. . .	Newcastle.	.. . .	..	1823	Bengal	Gr. & Ar.	
9th Lancers	Dublin	.. . .	..	1813	Portugal	Gr. & Ar.	
10th Hussars	Longford	.. . .	..	1828	Portugal	Gr. & Cane	
11th Lt. Drag.	Bengal	.. . .	1819			Collyer	
12th Lancers	Cork	.. . .	..	1828	Portugal	Gr. & Ar.	
13th Lt. Drag.	Madras	.. . .	1819			Greenwood	
14th do. . .	Hounslow	.. . .	..	1814	Spain	Greenwood	
15th Hussars	Manchester	.. . .	..	1816	France	Greenwood	
16th Lancers	Bengal	.. . .	1822			Greenwood	
17th do. . .	Gloucester	.. . .	..	1823	Bombay	Hopkinson	
Rl. Wag. Train	Hythe	.. . .	Detachments various periods.				Greenwood
Gr.Gds. 1st bat.	Portsmouth	.. . .	..	1828	Portugal	Greenwood	
.. 2d bat.	King's Mews	.. . .	..	1818	France		
.. 3d bat.	The Tower	.. . .	..	1818	France		
Coldst 1st bat.	Knightsbridge	.. . .	..	1814	France		
Gds. 2d bat.	Dublin	.. . .	..	1818	France		
Sc.Fu. 1st bat	Westminster	.. . .	..	1814	France		
Gds. 2d bat.	Windsor	.. . .	..	1828	Portugal	Greenwood	
1st Ft 1st bat.	St. Lucia	Paisley	1826				
.. 2d bat.	Glasgow	.. . .	..	1831	Madras	Ashley Greenwood Greenwood Gr. & Atk. Greenwood Greenwood Greenwood Greenwood Gr. & Ar. Gr. & Ar. Hopkinson Greenwood Greenwood Gr. & Ar. Greenwood Kirkland Greenwood	
2nd do. . .	Bombay	Chatham	1825				
3rd do. . .	Bengal	Chatham	1828				
4th do. . .	N. S. Wales	Chatham	1832				
5th do. . .	Gibraltar	Bruff	1831				
6th do. . .	Bombay	Chatham	1821				
7th do. . .	Malta	Portsmouth	1825				
8th do. . .	Halifax, N. S.	Hull	1830				
9th do. . .	Mauritius	Fermoy	1832				
10th do. . .	Vido	Clonmel	1826				
11th do. . .	Zante	Brecon	1826				
12th do. . .	Gibraltar	Portsmouth	1823				
13th do. . .	Bengal	Chatham	1822				
14th do. . .	Buttevant	.. . .	..	1831	Bengal		
15th do. . .	Montreal	Newcas. on T.	1827				
16th do. . .	Bengal	Chatham	1819				
17th do. . .	N. S. Wales	Chatham	1830				

Regiments and Corps.	Stations of Troops or Service Companies.	Stations of Reserve Companies.	Year of going on Foreign Service.	Year of return- ing from Foreign Service.	Whence returned.	Agents. British & Irish Establishment.
18th Foot . .	Haydock Lodge			1832	Corfu	Greenwood
19th do. . .	Trinidad . .	Sunderland . .	1826			Greenwood
20th do. . .	Bombay . .	Chatham . .	1819			Greenwood
21st do. . .	Chatham* . .			1827	St. Vincent	Greenwood
22nd do. . .	Jamaica . .	Plymouth . .	1826			Greenwood
23rd do. . .	Gibraltar . .	Naas . .	1823			Gr. & Ar.
24th do. . .	Quebec . .	Carlisle . .	1829			Collyer
25th do. . .	Demerara . .	Greenlaw . .	1826			Greenwood
26th do. . .	Bengal . .	Chatham . .	1828			Lawrie
27th do. . .	Castlebar . .			1831	Barbadoes	Gr. & Ar.
28th do. . .	Cork . .			1830	Corfu	Wat. & Ar.
29th do. . .	Mauritius . .	Cork . .	1826			Gr. & Cane
30th do. . .	Londonderry . .			1829	Madras	Gr. & Ar.
31st do. . .	Bengal . .	Chatham . .	1825			Greenwood
32nd do. . .	Quebec . .	Tralee . .	1830			Hop. & Cane
33rd do. . .	Weedon . .			1832	Jamaica	Greenwood
34th do. . .	Halifax, N.S. .	Boyle . .	1829			Gr. & Cane
35th do. . .	Blackburn . .			1832	Barbadoes	Greenwood
36th do. . .	Barbadoes . .	Kinsale . .	1833			Price & Ar.
37th do. . .	Jamaica . .	Limerick . .	1830			Law. & Cane
38th do. . .	Bengal . .	Chatham . .	1818			Gr. & Cane
39th do. . .	Madras . .	Chatham . .	1827			Greenwood
40th do. . .	Bombay . .	Chatham . .	1824			Lawrie
41st do. . .	Madras . .	Chatham . .	1822			Greenwood
42nd do. . .	Malta . .	Berwick . .	1823			Greenwood
43rd do. . .	Dublin . .			1830	Gibraltar	Gr. & Ar.
44th do. . .	Bengal . .	Chatham . .	1822			Greenwood
45th do. . .	Madras . .	Chatham . .	1819			Greenwood
46th do. . .	Madras . .	Chatham . .	1813			Greenwood
47th do. . .	Newry . .			1829	Bengal	Gr. & Ar.
48th do. . .	Madras . .	Chatham . .	1817			Greenwood
49th do. . .	Bengal . .	Chatham . .	1822			Greenwood
50th do. . .	Birr . .			1827	Jamaica	Gr. & Ar.
51st do. . .	Corfu† . .	Portsmouth . .	1821			Kirkland
52nd do. . .	Dublin . .			1831	Halifax N.S.	Gr. & Cane
53rd do. . .	Gibraltar . .	Stockport . .	1829			Greenwood
54th do. . .	Madras . .	Chatham . .	1819			Greenwood
55th do. . .	Madras . .	Chatham . .	1821			Greenwood
56th do. . .	Jamaica . .	Kinsale . .	1831			Gr. & Ca.
57th do. . .	Madras . .	Chatham . .	1825			Greenwood
58th do. . .	Ceylon . .	Buttevant . .	1828			Gr. & Ar.
59th do. . .	Enni-killen . .			1829	Bengal	Gr. & Ar.
60th do. 1st bat.	Gibraltar . .	Maryborough . .	1830			Gr. & Ar.
2d bat.	Templemore . .			1829	Berbice	Gr. & Ar.
61st do. . .	Ceylon . .	Cork . .	1828			Gr. & Ar.
62nd do. . .	Madras . .	Chatham . .	1830			Greenwood
63rd do. . .	N. S. Wales . .	Chatham . .	1829			Collyer
64th do. . .	Clare Castle . .			1828	Gibraltar	Gr. & Ar.
65th do. . .	Berbice . .	Kinsale . .	1829			Gr. & Ar.
66th do. . .	Kingston, U.C . .	Maryborough . .	1827			Gr. & Atk.
67th do. . .	Gibraltar . .	Galway . .	1831			Gr. & Ar.
68th do. . .	Dublin . .			1829	U. Canada	Hopk. & Ca.
69th do. . .	Barbadoes . .	Bandon . .	1831			Kirk. & Ca.
70th do. . .	Waterford . .			1827	Canada	Gr. & Ca.
71st do. . .	Bermuda . .	Dundee . .	1824			Price
72nd do. . .	Cape of G.H. . .	Aberdeen . .	1828			Greenwood
73rd do. . .	Malta . .	Jersey . .	1827			Lawrie

\* Ordered by Detachments to New South Wales.

† Ordered home.

Regiments and Corps.	Stations of Troops or Service Companies.	Stations of Reserve Companies.	Year of going on Foreign Service.	Year of returning from Foreign Service.	Whence returned.	Agents. British & Irish Establishment.
74th Foot . .	Kilkenny . .	. . . .	..	1830	Bermuda	Hop. & Ar.
75th do. . .	Cape of G. H.	Bristol . .	1830			Greenwood
76th do. . .	Athlone . .	. . . .	..	1827	Canada	Gr. & Ar.
77th do. . .	Jamaica . .	Limerick . .	1824			Gr. & Ar.
78th do. . .	Ceylon . .	Stirling Castle	1826			Brent
79th do. . .	York, U. C.	Perth . .	1825			Lawrie
80th do. . .	Belfast . .	. . . .	..	1831	Cephalonia	Gr. & Ca.
81st do. . .	Templemore.	. . . .	..	1831	Bermuda	Gr. & Ar.
82nd do. . .	Edinburgh .	. . . .	..	1832	Mauritius	Lawrie
83rd do. . .	Limerick . .	. . . .	..	1829	Ceylon	Gr. & Ar.
84th do. . .	Jamaica . .	Portsmouth .	1827			Greenwood
85th do. . .	Manchester .	. . . .	..	1831	Malta	Greenwood
86th do. . .	Antigua . .	Gosport . .	1826			Greenwood
87th do. . .	Mauritius .	Devonport .	1831			Greenwood
88th do. . .	Corfu . .	Chatham . .	1825			Greenwood
89th do. . .	Devonport .	. . . .	..	1831	Madras	Greenwood
90th do. . .	Dublin . .	. . . .	..	1831	Corfu	Gr. & Ar.
91st do. . .	Mullingar .	. . . .	..	1831	Jamaica	Hop. & Ca.
92nd do. . .	Fermoy . .	. . . .	..	1827	Jamaica	Gr. & Ar.
93rd do. . .	Barbadoes .	Fort George .	1823			Greenwood
94th do. . .	Malta . .	Portsmouth .	1824			Kirkland
95th do. . .	Corfu . .	Guernsey . .	1824			Lawrie
96th do. . .	Halifax, N. S.	Sheerness . .	1824			Greenwood
97th do. . .	Ceylon . .	Fermoy . .	1825			Gr. & Ar.
98th do. . .	Cape of G. H.	Cardiff . .	1825			Greenwood
99th do. . .	Mauritius .	Drogheda . .	1825			Gr. & Ca.
Rifle B. { 1st bt.	Halifax, N. S.	Dover . .	1825			Greenwood
{ 2d bt.	Corfu . .	Dover . .	1826			Greenwood
Rl. Staff Corps.	Hythe . .	. . . .				Greenwood
Detachments various periods.						
1st West Ind. Regiment . .	Tinidad . .	Agents. Greenwood	REGIMENTAL AGENTS.			
2nd do. . .	Bahamas . .	Greenwood	Armit, Borough, & Co. Leinster-st. Dublin.			
Ceylon Rifle Regiment . .	Ceylon . .	Kirkland	Ashley, James, 135, Regent-street.			
Cape Mounted Riflemen . .	Cape of G. H.	Kirkland	Atkinson, John, Ely-place, Dublin.			
Royal African Colon. Corps .	Sierra Leone.	Kirkland	Brent, Timothy, 10, St. James's-place.			
R. Newfoundland Veteran Companies .	Newfoundland	Kirkland	Cane, Richard, & Co. Dawson-st. Dublin.			
Royal Malta Fencibles . .	Malta . .	Kirkland	Collyer, G. S., Park-place, St. James's.			
			Greenwood, Cox, Hammersley, and Cox, Craig's-court.			
			Hopkinson, Barton, & Knyvett, Regent-st.			
			Kirkland, J. (Gen. Agent,) 80, Pall Mall.			
			Lawrie, John, Robert-street, Adelphi.			
			Price, W. F., 34, Craven-st., Strand.			
			Watson, W. 63, Charlotte-st., Portland-pl.			

## GENERAL AGENTS FOR THE RECRUITING SERVICE.

*Great Britain*—John Kirkland, Esq. 80, Pall Mall.*Ireland*—Sir Bagenall W. Burdett, Bart., Dublin.

## AGENTS FOR THE DECCAN PRIZE MONEY.

Lieut.-Col. Arbuthnot and John Kirkland, Esq.—Office, 80, Pall Mall.

N. B.—A reference to the List of Agents will explain the Abbreviations.

## PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

## NAVY.

## PROMOTIONS.

## CAPTAIN.

Thos. Dickinson, (B)

## COMMANDERS.

Hon. A. W. Monckton.  
John Woolward, (Retired).  
Alexander Fairbairn, (ditto).

## PURSEER.

J. H. Collings.

## APPOINTMENTS.

Vice-Admiral the Right Hon. Sir George Cockburn, G.C.B. to be Commander-in-Chief on the West India and North American Stations.

Capt M. H. Dixon, to be Secretary to Admiral Sir M. Dixon, vice Thomas Woodman, Esq. appointed Secretary to Sir Geo. Cockburn.

## CAPTAINS.

Sam. Roberts, C.B. . . . Duird  
Sir Geo. Westphal . . . Vernon

## COMMANDERS.

H. T. Austin . . . Salamander  
James Brasier . . . Vernon  
Robt. Hagan . . . Coast Guard

## LIEUTENANTS.

H. L. Maw . . . Vernon  
J. S. Foreman . . . Do.  
W. A. Willis . . . Do.  
Hon. W. H. Devereux . . . Do.  
S. G. Fremantle . . . Do.  
Sir Peter Parker, Bart. . . Do.  
W. H. Brady . . . Numa, Transport  
H. G. Hamilton . . . Flag-Lieut. to Sir  
Geo. Cockburn  
R. A. Bradshaw . . . Winchester  
Andr. Kennedy . . . Alban  
M. F. Brownrigg . . . Castor  
Chas. E. Powys . . . Duird  
Wallace Houston . . . Childers  
Henry Packenham . . . Salamander  
A. Millwood . . . Do.  
Joseph Pyke . . . Isis  
C. J. F. Campbell . . . Comus  
James Kemp . . . Coast Guard  
Henry Amsinck . . . Do.  
John Sleigh . . . Do.  
E. B. Nott . . . Do.

## MASTERS.

J. R. Mayne . . . Vernon

## SURGEONS.

A. Nisbet, M.D. . . . Vernon  
G. I. Fox . . . Salamander  
Thos. Galloway (B) . . . Asia, Convict Ship  
Archd. Ferguson . . . Jupiter, ditto  
Robt. Dunn (B) . . . Jane, Convict Ship  
John Drew . . . Agent at Milford

## ASSISTANT SURGEONS.

T. H. Jones . . . Pircey  
F. Mansell . . . Victory  
W. D. Wilkes . . . Renard  
A. Tucker . . . Vernon  
C. H. Fuller . . . Do.  
P. Toms . . . Do.  
W. F. Carter . . . Britannia  
John Ferrier . . . Royalist  
P. Niddrie . . . Malabar  
Geo. F. Rowe . . . Maggie

## PURSEERS.

J. H. Collings . . . Hyacinth  
I. T. Duffell . . . Salamander

## CHAPELAIN.

Rev. John Baker . . . Vernon

## ARMY.

## WAR-OFFICE, Nov. 23.

2d Royal Surrey Regt. of Militia.—William Lodsald, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Jemson resigned.

West Somerset Regt. of Yeomanry Cavalry.—John Cridland, Esq. to be Capt.; Augustus Pulaford Browne, Gent. to be Lieut.; James Chamon, Gent. to be Vet. Surgeon.

## Nov. 27.

1st Regt. West York Militia.—James Mitchell, Gent. to be Ensign.

2d Regt. West York Militia.—Brunnath Wm. Stourton, to be Capt.

## WHITEHALL, Nov. 30.

The King has been pleased to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal, granting to Lieut. Colonel William Leader Maberly, the office of Clerk of the Ordnance of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

The King has also been pleased to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal, granting to Lieut. Colonel Charles Richard Fox, one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp, the office of Master-Surveyor and Surveyor-General of the Ordnance of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

## WAR-OFFICE, Dec. 4.

Royal Regt. of Horse Guards.—Brevet-Major Everald William Bouverie, to be Major and Lt.-Colonel, by p. vice Hammer, who ret.; Lieut. John Lord Elphinstone, to be Capt. by p. vice Bouverie; Cornet Richard Silver Oliver, to be Lieut. by p. vice Lord Elphinstone; George Stuckley Buck, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Oliver.

7th Foot.—Capt. Lord Sussex Lennox, from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice Hon. Samuel Hay, who exch.; Ensign Thomas Wright, from 15th Foot, to be Lieut. without p. vice Lord Torrington, who retires.

11th Foot.—Alexander Cockburn, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Peake, who retires.

14th Foot.—Brevet Major Henry Marquis of Worcester, from h. p. 37th Foot, to be Capt. vice Edward L'Estrange, who exch.

15th Foot.—Capt. Edward Gyles Howard, from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice Lionel Tollemache, who exch.; John Richard Nash, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Wright, prom. in the 7th Foot.

36th Foot.—Capt. George Cairnes, to be Major, by p. vice Lord George Hervey, who ret.; Lieut. Edward R. King, to be Capt. by p. vice Cairnes; Ensign George Sockett, to be Lieut. by p. vice King; John Bunce Pilgrim, Gent. to be Ensign by p. vice Sockett.

42d Foot.—Henry Maurice Drummond, Gent. to be Ensign by p. vice Stirling, prom.

52d Foot.—Lieut. Walter Butler, to be Adjut. vice Swan, who resigns the Adjut. only.

55th Foot.—Lieut. Thomas Ancrum Heriot, to be Adjut. vice Wilson, who resigns the Adjut. only.

61st Foot.—Ens. William Ward, to be Lieut. by p. vice McKinnon, prom.; George Harkness, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Ward.

64th Foot.—Capt. Mitchell Henry Fagan, from h. p. 2d Ceylon Regt. to be Capt. vice Hayes, dec.  
74th Foot.—Capt. Edward St. John Midmay,

from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice William Graham, who exch. rec. the diff.

76th Foot.—Capt. William Nelson Hutchinson, to be Major, by p. vice Faincombe, who ret.; Lieut. Ralph Allen Gossett, to be Capt. by p. vice Hutchinson; Ensign Robert La Poer Trench, to be Lieut. by p. vice Gossett.

77th Foot.—Ensign John Powell, to be Lieut. without p. vice Bevan, dec.; Ensign Thomas Buckland, from h. p. 35th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Powell.

89th Foot.—Brevet-Major George E. Jones, to be Major, by p. vice Forbes, who ret.; Lieut. Edward Kenny, to be Capt. by p. vice Jones; Ensign William Henry Bayntun, to be Lieut. by p. vice Kenny; Frederick Charles Aylmer, Gent. to be Ensign by p. vice Bayntun.

96th Foot.—Capt. Oswald Pilling, from the 2d West India Regt. to be Capt. vice Hendrick, who retires.

2d West India Regt.—Capt. John James Peck, from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice Pilling, app. to the 96th Foot; Ensign William Jones, from h. p. 88th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Wilson, dec.

Unattached.—Lieut. Donald Henry Aylmer McKinnon, from the 61st Foot, to be Capt. of Infantry, by p.; Lieut. H. Bary Barnham, from the 15th Foot, to be Capt. of Infantry, without p.

Hospital Staff.—Nelson Dartnell, Gent. to be Staff-Assist.-Surgeon, vice Hoeller, placed upon half-pay.

Chaplain.—Rev. Brook Bridges Stevens, from h. p. to be Chaplain to the Forces, vice Wincock, dec.

Memoranda.—The Christian names of Ensign Lord Algernon Chichester, of the 90th Foot, are Stephen Algernon.

The half-pay of the under-mentioned officers has been cancelled from the 4th inst. inclusive, they having accepted commuted allowances for their commissions:—

Lieut. William Henry Bucke, h. p. 43d Foot; Lieut. William Jones, h. p. 60th Foot; Lieut. Thomas Alcock, h. p. 24th Light Drags.; Lieut. John McCartly, h. p. 68th Foot; Second-Lieut. George Townley, h. p. Rifle Brigade; Staff-Assist. Surgeon George Gregory, h. p. Hospital Staff.

#### ST. JAMES'S PALACE, Dec. 1.

The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood upon Rear-Admiral the Hon. Courtenay Boyle, Military Knight Commander of the Royal Manoverian Guelphic Order.

80th Foot.—Major-General William George Lord Harris, to be Colonel, vice General the Earl of Kilmorey, dec.

#### WAR-OFFICE, Dec. 14.

5th Regt. Drag. Guards.—Lieut. Henry Edward Beville, to be Capt. by p. vice Brymer, who ret.; Cornet Robert Meade, to be Lieut. by p. vice Beville; Edward Thomas Harley Chambers, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Meade.

6th Drag. Guards.—Cornet John Campbell Ralston, from h. p. 25th Light Drag. to be Vet.-Surgeon, vice Hayward, dec.

6th Regt. Drag.—John Kingston James, Gent. to be Cornet by p. vice Irving, who ret.

10th Light Drag.—Lieut. Francis Scrymgeour Wedderburn, to be Capt. by p. vice Osborne, who ret.; Cornet Matthew McDonough, to be Lieut. by p. vice Wedderburn; Dudley Heneage, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice McDonough.

17th Light Drag.—Cornet William Lindsay Shedden, to be Lieut. by p. vice Tonge, who ret.;

Second-Lieut. Roginal Wilton Macdonald, from the 60th Foot, to be Cornet, by p. vice Shedden.

Coldstream Regt. of Foot Guards.—Lieut. and Capt. Henry Gooch, to be Capt. and Lieut.-Col. without p. vice Russell, dec.; Ensign and Lieut. Robert Vansittart, to be Lieut. and Capt. vice Gooch.

1st Regt. of Foot.—Lord Charles Beauchamp, to be Ensign by p. vice Wetherall, prom. in the 44th Foot.

3d Foot.—Ensign Harry Williams, from h. p. 2d Garr. Batt. to be Quartermaster, vice George Edwards, who retires upon h. p. 2d Garr. Batt.

4th Foot.—Ensign George Frazer Tytler, to be Lieut. by p. vice Craufurd, who ret.; Richard Thomas Sherlock, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Tytler.

11th Foot.—Lieut. James Watson, to be Capt. by p. vice the Marquis of Worcester, who ret.; Ensign John Kyffin Lloyd, to be Lieut. by p. vice Watson; George Main Fullerton, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Lloyd.

38th Foot.—To be Lieuts.—Lieut. Henry Ogle Lewis, from h. p. 87th Foot, vice Jenkins, app. to the 56th Foot; Lieut. John James Fenton, from h. p. unatt. vice Webster, app. to the 99th Foot.

44th Foot.—Ensign Frederick Augustus Wetherall, from the 1st Foot, to be Lieut. by p. vice Pennington, who retires.

56th Foot.—Lieut. Theophilus Jenkins, from the 38th Foot, to be Lieut. vice Woodgate, app. to the 60th Foot.

58th Foot.—Ensign John Rowan, to be Lieut. without p. vice Robertson, dec.; Ensign Robert Millar, from h. p. Royal Wag Train, to be Ensign vice Rowan.

60th Foot.—Lieut. William Knox, to be Capt. by p. vice Young, who ret.; Lieut. William Hardinge Woodgate, from the 56th Foot, to be First Lieut. vice George Armstrong, who retires on h. p. 89th Foot; Second Lieut. Francis Jessop to be First Lieut. by p. vice Knox; Miles Branthwayt Weston, Gent. to be Second Lieut. by p. vice Jessop; Ross Mahon, Gent. to be Second Lieut. by p. vice Macdonald, app. to the 47th Light Drag.

67th Foot.—John Elton Mervyn Prower, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Evans, app. to the 76th Foot.

68th Foot.—Capt. Donald Henry Aylmer McKinnon, from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice Brevet-Major Simson Kennedy, who exch. rec. the diff.

70th Foot.—To be Majors.—Capt. Joseph Kelsall, without p. vice Mackay, dec.; Capt. Edward James White, by p. vice Sweeney, who retires.

To be Captains.—Lieut. James Gaston, without p. vice Kelsall; Lieut. Philip Wootton Braham by p. vice White.

To be Lieutenants.—Ensign Joseph Richard Lamert, from the 97th Foot, without p. vice Gaston; Ensign Henry Gerrard, by p. vice Braham.

To be Ensign.—Samuel Burgess Lamb, Gent. by p. vice Gerrard.

74th Foot.—Lieut. Augustus Francis Ansell, to be Capt. by p. vice Ansell, who ret.; Ens. Henry Hewitt Thompson, to be Lieut. by p. vice Ansell; George W. Raikes, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Thompson.

76th Foot.—Ensign Charles S. S. Evans, from the 67th Foot, to be Ens. vice Trench, prom.

86th Foot.—Capt. Thomas Decimus Franklyn, from h. p. 24th Foot, to be Capt. vice John Grant, who exch.

88th Foot.—Capt. Thomas Parr, from h. p. 4th Foot, to be Capt. vice John Chipchase, who exch.

95th Foot.—Lieut. William Mayes, to be Capt. without p. vice Stainton, dec.; Ensign Samuel G. Dalgety, to be Lieut. vice Mayes; Gent. Cadet Henry W. Paget, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, vice Dalgety.

97th Foot.—Lieut. Charles Kelson, to be Capt. without p. vice Snow, dec.; Ens. William Morris,



to be Lieut. vice Kelson; Ens. Wallace Crowe; from h.p. 39th Ft. to be Ens. vice Morris; John Kinderley, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Lamert, prom. in the 70th Ft.

98th Foot.—Maj. Edward Vaughan, to be Lieut.-Col. by p. vice Fitzgerald, who ret.; Capt. John Gaspard Le Marchant, to be Major, by p. vice Vaughan; Lieut. Thomas Maitland Edwards, to be Capt. by p. vice Le Marchant; Ens. Henry Douglas Cowper, to be Lieut. by p. vice Edwards; Crofton Hamilton Fitzgerald, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Cowper.

99th Foot.—Capt. Edmund Martindale, from h.p. Royal Staff Corps, to be Capt. vice Constantine Yeoman, who exch.; Lieut. Robert Webster, from the 38th Ft. to be Lieut. vice Richard Collis, who ret. upon h.p. unat.

Royal Newfoundland Veteran Companies.—Lieut. John Grant, from h.p. 21st Ft. to be Lieut. vice Arnold Nesbitt Purefoy, who exch.

Unattached.—To be Lieut.—Colonels of Infantry, the following Majors and Permanent Assistant-Quartermasters-General:—Brevet-Colonel Robert Waller; Brevet-Col. William Warre; Brevet-Lieut. Col. Nathaniel Thorn; Brevet-Lieut.-Col. William Vincent; Brevet-Col. John Richard Ward; Brevet-Lieut.-Col. William Herosford.

Chaplains.—Rev. Joseph Hudson, from h.p. to be Chaplain to the Forces, vice Mills, dec.

#### DOWNING-STREET, Dec. 19.

The King has been pleased to appoint Col. Sir E. J. Murray Macgregor, Bart., to be Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Islands of Antigua, Montserrat, and Barbuda, St. Christopher, Nevis, Anguilla, and the Virgin Islands, and Dominica.

#### WAR-OFFICE, Dec. 21.

1st Regt. of Drgs.—Lieut. John Yates, to be Capt. by p. vice Goodenough, who ret.; Cornet Edward Littledale, to be Lieut. by p. vice Yates; John Yorke, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Littledale.

3d Regt. of Lt. Drgs.—Regimental Sergeant-Major William Wernham (Riding-Master) to have the rank of Cornet, without pay.

14th Lt. Drgs.—Cornet Charles Thornhill, to be Lieut. by p. vice Hodson, who ret.; Ensign John Henderson, from the 33d Ft. to be Cornet, by p. vice Thornhill.

17th Lt. Drgs.—Lieut. Charles Forbes, to be Capt. by p. vice Clarke, who ret.; Cornet Walter Williams, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Forbes; Cornet Robert Arthur Fitzhardinge Kingscote, from the 1st Life Gds. to be Cornet, by p. vice Williams.

1st Regt. of Foot.—Richard Cruise, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Kirkwood, appointed to the 64th Foot.

2d Foot.—Ensign David Cahill, from the 91st Foot, to be Lieut. without p. vice Grier, reversed by the sentence of a general court-martial.

8th Foot.—Ensign Henry Welladvice Roper, to be Lieut. by p. vice Egar, who ret.; Anstis John Bewes, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Roper.

15th Foot.—Ensign and Adj. James Hay, to have the rank of Lieut.

27th Foot.—Andrew Vincent Watson, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Wilson, promoted to the 39th Foot.

29th Foot.—Ensign Edmund George Nicolay, from the 93d Foot, to be Ens. vice Adams, who ret.

39th Foot.—Ensign George A. Wilson, from the 27th Foot, to be Lieut. by p. vice Glynne, who ret. 58th Foot.—Staff-Assist.-Surg. George Kincaid Pitcairn, M.D. to be Assist.-Surg. vice Toulmin, deceased.

63d Foot.—Augustus Frederick Cold, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Jervis, appointed to the 80th Ft.

64th Foot.—Lieut. Freeman Murray, to be Capt. by p. vice Fagan, who ret.; Ens. Francis Sealy, to be Lieut. by p. vice Murray; Ens. John T. Kirkwood, from the 1st Ft. to be Ens. vice Sealy.

77th Foot.—Ens. Duncan Cameron, to be Lieut. without p. vice Persse, deceased; Gentleman Cadet James A. Wheeler, from the Royal Military College, to be Ens. vice Cameron.

80th Foot.—Ensign William Godfrey Jervis, from the 63d Ft. to be Ens. vice Robinson, who ret.

86th Foot.—Lieut. William Thomas Tinné, to be Capt. by p. vice Franklyn, who ret.; Ensign John Dowman, to be Lieut. by p. vice Tinné; Henry Moriarty, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Dowman.

88th Foot.—Lieut. Sir William Payne Galloway, Bart. to be Capt. by p. vice Parr, who ret.; Ens. Edward Fawkes, to be Lieut. by p. vice Galloway; Owen Lloyd Ormsby, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Fawkes.

91st Foot.—Gent. Cadet Edward W. C. Wright, from the Royal Military College, to be Ens. without p. vice Cahill, promoted in the 2d Foot.

93d Foot.—Neil Snodgrass Buchanan, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Nicolay, appointed to the 29th Foot.

Hospital-Staff.—To be Assist.-Surg. to the Forces, Richard Ledsham Hastings, Gent. vice Robertson, appointed to the 78th Foot; Edward William Burton, Gent. vice Pitcairn, appointed to the 58th Ft.

Memorandum—His Majesty has been pleased to permit the 99th Regt. of Foot to be styled the 99th or Lanarkshire Regiment, in consideration of its having been raised and formed at Glasgow, in the year 1824.

## BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

### BIRTHS.

At Marseilles, the Lady of Ensign Atkinson, 73d Regt. of a son.

At Cambridge, the Lady of Major Jones, 12th Regt. of a daughter.

Nov. 20th, the Lady of Capt. Haslewood, 14th Regt. of a son.

Nov. 23d, at Rathkeale, County of Limerick, the Lady of Lieut. Bradshaw, 77th Regt. of a daughter.

Dec. 4th, at Ryde, the Lady of Capt. C. Lock, R.N. of a son.

Dec. 5th, at Lupton, Dalkeith, the Lady of Capt. Robert Tait, 11 M.S. Spartiate, of a son.

Dec. 9th, on board H.M.S. Prince, in Portsmouth Harbour, the Lady of Capt. Lillicrap, R.N. of her twelfth child.

At Sallowglin, County of Kerry, the Lady of Lieut.-Colonel Crosbie, of a son and heir.

At Titchbourn Park, near Alresford, the Lady of Lieut.-Colonel Charles Talbot, Scots Fusileer Guards, of a son.

Dec. 14th, at Brighton, the Lady of Captain Townshend, R.N. of a son.

Dec. 15th, at Bath, the Lady of Major Justinian Nutt, of a son.

Dec. 16th, at Fitcham, the Lady of Lieut.-Col. Charles Short, Coldstream Guards, of a daughter.

Dec. 18th, at Southampton, the Lady of Capt. Inglefield, R.N. of a son.

Dec. 23d, at Chatham, the Lady of Captain T. Galloway, R.N. commanding the Ordinary at that port, of a daughter.

MARRIAGES.

Nov. 28th, by special license, at the house of Lord Decies, in Curzon Street, General the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Beresford, G.C.B. and G.C.H. to Hon. Mrs. Hope, of Deepdene, widow of the late T. Hope, Esq.

In Dublin, Capt. Moffatt, 66th Regt. to Mrs. Spinner, of Birr, King's County.

Major Verity, late 92d Highlanders, to Maria, daughter of the Rev. Robert Steele, of Norfolk.

At Lyndhuist, Capt. R. A. MacNaghten, of the Bengal Army, to Susanna Anne, eldest daughter of George Halford, Esq. of Lyndhurst, Hants.

At Titchfield, John Greenish, Esq. Surgeon, R. N. and of the Royal George Yard, to Anna, daughter of Morris, Esq. of Stubbington, Devonshire.

Dec. 18th, at Birmingham, Lieut. Charles Hopkins, R. N. to Sarah, only daughter of Daniel Led-  
sam, Esq. of Summer Hill.

At Langham Place, Captain F. Warde, R. A. to Annabella, daughter of the late R. Adeane, Esq. of Babraham, Cambridge.

DEATHS.

General the Earl of Kilmoray, 86th Foot. A  
minor of service in our next.

Col. Lord Clinton, Aide-de-Camp to the King.  
Lieut.-Colonel Russell, Coldstream Guards.  
Oct. 6th, Major Longden, Unattached.

CAPTAINS.

Jan. 31st, Brewster, h. p. 8th Foot, Isle au Noix.  
Oct. 13th, Thomson, late 3d Vet. Bat.

LIEUTENANTS.

Jan. 15th, Hayton, h. p. 58th Foot.  
Aug. 8th, Kilkelly, h. p. 37th Foot.  
Sept. 27th, Craven, h. p. 134th Foot.  
Oct. 6th, Bevan, 77th Foot, Jamaica.  
Oct. 7th, Fitzgerald, h. p. 29th Foot.  
Oct. 15th, Gallaher, h. p. 11th Foot.  
Oct. 22d, D'Avenant, h. p. 30th Dr.  
Oct. 30th, Clarke, h. p. Gleng. Fen.

ENSIGNS AND SECOND-LIEUTENANTS.

Oct. 27th, Wemyss, 21st Foot, Portsmouth.  
Scott, 83d Foot.  
Nov. 5th, Graham, late 1st Vet. Bat.  
Nov. 6th, McKown, late 8th Vet. Bat.

QUARTER-MASTERS.

Sept. 16th, Brierly, h. p. Ayrshire Fen. Cav.  
Sept. 25th, Crouchley, h. p. 23d Drg.  
Oct. 28th, Brooks, h. p. 2d Drg. Guards.

June 2d, Mallack, 46th Foot, Madras.  
Aug. 1st, M'Lachlan, h. p. 93d Foot.  
Aug. 30th, Conolly, h. p. 3d W. I. R.

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.

Sept. 14th, Dep. Ass. Com. General E. C. Monk,  
Dominica.

July 8th, at Trichenopoly, East Indies, Capt.  
Richard Barton, 54th Regt.

Oct. 8th, at sea, on board H. M. Packet Emu-  
lous, in which he had embarked at Rio, on his re-  
turn to England, Capt. George Francis Lyon, R. N.  
We shall give a sketch of this popular Officer's  
career next month.

Oct. 12th, at Napoli, aged 31, Mr. Alex. M'Ar-  
thur, Assistant-Surgeon of H. M. S. St. Vincent.

Nov. 11th, at the Island of Bermuda, Vice-Ad-  
miral Sir Edward Griffith Colpoys, K.C.B. Com-  
mander-in-Chief of the West India and North  
American Station. A memoir of services will be  
given in our next.

At Cardigan, South Wales, in the 41st year of  
his age, Lieut. Charles Davis, R. N.

At Fratton, Lieut. Abraham Hughes, R. N.

Capt. Henry Whitmarsh Pearse, C. B., R. N.

Nov. 22d, at New Ross, of cholera, Major Donald  
MacKay, 70th Regt.

On board H. M. S. Hyacinth, in the Gulf of  
Mexico, Mr. W. J. Atrill, Purser of that ship.

Nov. 27th, at Greenwich, in the 60th year of his  
age, Matthew Salmon Kent, Esq. late Surgeon of  
H. M. Dock Yard at Deptford.

Nov. 29th, at Abbey View, County of Clare,  
Lieut. Thomas Ievers, h. p. 3d Foot Guards.

At Dover, Capt. John Hatley, R. N. aged 70. He  
circumnavigated the globe with the celebrated  
Cook.

At King's Town, Dublin, Commander Terence  
O'Neil, R. N.

At Deal, Lieut. Wm. Syfret, R. N. aged 48.

At Castletown, Isle of Man, Col. Smith, Lieut.  
Governor of that Island.

Dec. 7th, at St. Peter's, Thanet, Lieut. Rossin, R. N.

Dec. 9th, H. G. Rogan, Esq. Surgeon R. N.

In George's Square, Edinburgh, Viscountess  
Duncan, in her 84th year. Her Ladyship was  
daughter of the Lord President Dundas, and wi-  
dow of Admiral Lord Viscount Duncan, whose  
name is engraven on the tablets of his country's  
history as the hero of Camperdown. Her Lady-  
ship's eldest son now bears that title. Her Lady-  
ship was also mother of the Hon. Capt. Henry  
Duncan, C. B., R. N., upon whom has fallen unim-  
paired the mantle of his father.

Dec. 14th, at Ballyhedy House, the seat of his  
brother, Lord Dufferin and Clanboye, in the  
County of Down, Ireland, the Hon. Sir Henry  
Blackwood, Bart., K.C.B., Vice-Admiral of the  
White. A memoir of service in an early number.

At Woodstock, suddenly, John Joberna, Esq.  
Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals on half-  
pay.

Ensign Henry J. Dewes, 89th Regt. quartered  
at Plymouth. It appears that he was in company  
with an officer of the 22d Regiment, who is on a  
detachment at St. Nicholas's Island, and was  
heard to say that he would swim over from Ply-  
mouth to his quarters, at the same time alluding  
to Lord Byron's crossing the Hellespont. The  
morning was very stormy and cold, with a strong  
ebb tide flowing at the time, and he was seen  
swimming about fifty yards from the shore, since  
which nothing has been heard of him. His clothes  
were found on the rocks near the water's edge;  
and it is supposed, from the extreme coldness of  
the water, he must have been suddenly seized with  
the cramp, and, from there being no assistance at  
hand, was unfortunately drowned. The deceased  
was the eldest son of the late Capt. John Dewes,  
of the 28th Regiment, and nephew of Major Ridge,  
C. B.

Dec. 17th, the infant son of John Taaffe, Esq.

In Dublin, Lieut. Matthew Phibbs, R. N., lately  
commanding the Coast Guard at Kilrush.

Dec. 19th, Lieut. Frederick Lloyd, R. N.

Dec. 23d, at Connaught Terrace, in his 64th  
year, Sir John Cox, Bart. late of the 2d Life  
Guards, second son of the late Col. Michael Cox,  
of the 1st Foot Guards. He is succeeded in the  
title by his only surviving brother, Col. Geo. M.  
Cox, of the East India Company's Service.

## METEOROLOGICAL REGISTER,

KEPT AT THE OBSERVATORY OF CAPT. W. H. SMYTH, AT BEDFORD.

NOV. 1832.	Six's Thermometer.		At 3 P. M.			Plu- viom- eter Inches.	Evapora- tor Inches.	Winds at 3 P. M.
	Maxim. Degrees.	Minim. Degrees.	Barom. Inches.	Thermo. Degrees.	Hygrom. Parts.			
1	57.5	46.0	29.75	57.4	756	.258	.140	N.N.W. fresh breezes & fine
2	57.3	46.2	29.58	54.0	900	.010	.030	S.W. a gale, cloudy
3	56.3	51.2	29.78	53.5	625	.100	.075	N.W. blowing hard
4	55.8	47.0	29.77	47.0	525	.470	.084	S.W. fresh br. heavy showers
5	52.3	41.4	29.96	41.9	504	.190	.080	N.N.E. fresh winds, showery
6	50.8	42.3	30.33	47.6	658	.156	.055	N. fresh gales
7	45.6	42.4	30.32	44.5	667	—	.030	N.N.E. fresh br. & cloudy
8	48.3	41.8	29.83	46.7	685	.046	.036	N. by E. lt. br. heavy showers
9	51.6	41.3	29.88	48.5	703	.140	.040	N.W. by W. light airs, cloudy
10	44.5	40.0	29.46	44.5	876	.360	.015	S.W. a gale, with light rain
11	46.9	43.1	29.60	45.8	715	.200	.020	E. by N. gentle br. fine day
12	43.8	42.3	29.72	43.5	812	—	.010	S.W. calm, dense fog
13	43.4	40.0	29.76	43.0	818	—	.012	S.W. calm, foggy
14	45.6	40.5	29.97	45.6	833	.053	.015	N.E. light airs and showery
15	51.9	40.4	30.32	42.8	758	.018	.020	N.N.E. light breezes & fine
16	51.9	39.4	30.28	41.9	810	.014	.015	N.N.E. gentle breezes & clear
17	45.6	39.2	30.20	40.7	805	—	.036	E. by S. beautiful day
18	42.6	39.3	30.08	41.3	794	—	.017	E. by N. light br. & cloudy
19	43.3	40.2	29.88	43.3	803	—	.018	E. light airs, dull day
20	45.0	40.4	29.70	44.6	807	.020	.020	E. by N. light br. & cloudy
21	46.2	40.7	29.58	45.7	812	—	.030	E. by S. fresh br. & cloudy
22	49.3	40.6	29.82	47.0	770	—	.035	N.E. lt. br. beautiful day
23	53.0	40.6	29.93	49.2	687	—	.040	E.S.E. light breezes & fine
24	52.6	40.2	29.93	51.6	807	—	.025	S.E. by E. light airs & cloudy
25	50.3	40.3	29.83	50.6	794	.408	.026	S.W. mod. wds. & fine weath.
26	49.2	44.1	29.59	48.5	759	.300	.030	S.W. fresh breezes & cloudy
27	48.0	41.8	29.52	47.6	794	.050	.034	S. by E. blowing fr. equally
28	44.8	40.8	29.70	43.4	679	—	.060	S.W. by W. fr. breezes, fine day
29	46.4	41.2	29.54	43.5	660	—	.055	S.W. by W. blo. hard, fine wr.
30	51.0	39.3	29.83	49.4	700	.210	.046	S.W. blowing fr. with rain.

## TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS.

We have attentively considered the Plan of H. I. P. P., which, though undoubtedly ingenious, and applicable under fixed and favourable circumstances, would not, we fear, be equally efficient under the changeful contingencies constantly recurring at sea. We shall furnish H. I. P. P., with a fuller explanation, if desired.

The Signature of "Miles" is not confined to our St. Helena Correspondent. The passage the latter alludes to was addressed to another. We suspect the letter in question did not come to hand—but shall be happy to comply with the general wish of "Miles" and the Garrison, if communicated within due bounds.

We wait for another number of the "Letters from the West Indies," to complete a paper,—the third being of itself scarcely of sufficient length and interest. We request our obliging Correspondent to assume in future the signature of S, instead of Z, to prevent confusion with another contributor under the latter designation.

We had prepared the first letter signed "One of the Neglected," for insertion—but discovered that it had in the interim been published in a newspaper. The second, though dated the 17th instant, has only reached our hands as we are going to press.

We shall always be ready to give effect to the purpose of "Verus," according to the manner and the matter of his communications.

We shall write to W. G.—Numbers 12 and 13 safely received.

"Q in the Corner" is, doubtless, the "Original." We thank him.

We regret that the "Memoranda of the Services" of an Officer deceased some years, furnished by C. A., cannot with consistency be introduced into our current obituary. The merits of the subject are fully recognized.

Want of space compels us to postpone the Berlin Reviews—the Memoirs of Admiral Boys and others; to be given as early as possible; also a large mass of Correspondence, which we have not space to particularize.

## MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF BELGIUM.

IN a former article we brought down the situation of the military administration of that country to the present period, and rapidly developed some of the causes that had impeded an earlier and more efficient organization. We shall now enter into various details of internal arrangement and economy, and accompany them with authentic returns and states, which will at once give the reader an insight into the system, and enable him to comprehend the magnitude of the Belgian war preparations, and calculate the general expenditure, as compared with our own, for a similar number of men. We shall take each department and branch of the service separately, and after describing its organization, numbers, and attributes, give the amount of the sums allotted for the maintenance of each. The whole is calculated on the extraordinary or war footing, and we may preface our account by observing, that the total war budget, including ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, amounts to about seventy-two million francs, or nearly two millions eight hundred and eighty thousand pounds sterling.

### MINISTRY OF WAR.

Lieut.-General Baron Evain, with the title of "Ministre Directeur de la Guerre."—The functions of the Minister are purely administrative. He has not a seat in the cabinet, as is usual in all continental ministries, having at his own particular desire renounced this privilege; as much with a view of affording him leisure to devote his undivided time to the duties of his office, as to steer clear of parliamentary discussions, and to avoid stirring up those jealousies that might arise from his possessing a leading voice in the political councils of a nation, of which he was a mere member by adoption. He is nevertheless responsible for the acts of his ministry to the Chambers, although not a member of the House; has a right to a seat on the ministerial bench, and is under the necessity of appearing to answer any questions touching his administration, when called upon by the Chambers. All general orders, ordonnances, or contracts relating to the army are signed and published in the name of the minister, who, under sanction of the King, is the source of all organization, promotion, and primary distributions. The salary of the minister does not exceed 21,000 francs (840*l.*) per annum, with a small allowance for office expenses, firing, &c. and forage for six horses. The war-office is divided into five departments or divisions, to each of which is attached a Chief, viz.: 1. The Secretariat; 2. Personnel; 3. Artillery and Engineers; 4. Administration; 5. War Dépôt. The duties of the director of the "personnel" combine the solution of all questions touching promotion. He merely refers to the minister such points as entail responsibility or such "arretés" as require the king's approval.

The army of reserve is under the immediate control of the minister; in this army are included all dépôts, reserves, and garrisons not forming part of the active or army of observation. The commanders of the former report direct to the minister. The distribution, formation, and cantoning of the latter rest entirely with the king, who is the nominal commander-in-chief; the effective command is entrusted to General

Desprez. All details, states, and reports concerning the active army are made direct to the king by the chief of the staff. The latter receives his orders from the sovereign, who is far from taking an inactive share in the duties of command. The whole of this department, indeed everything relating to the different military establishments, are organized on the French model. The number of officers of various grades employed at the war-office amounts to about twenty, who receive no additional pay or allowance than that attributed to their regimental or staff rank. A few civilians are also employed as copying clerks, &c. at very moderate salaries. The total expenditure of the administration of the war-office does not exceed 50,000 francs, or about 2,000*l*.

#### GENERAL STAFF.

Chef de l'état major, General Desprez. One sous chef and about eighteen officers of different grades.—It is perhaps superfluous to remind our readers that in the French and Belgian service, the two departments of Quartermaster and Adjutant-General are amalgamated and consolidated under one head. We shall not discuss the merits of this mode of organization, which, if we mistake not, was once attempted with our army in Spain, but was found not to answer. Whatever it may have done with us, it appears that it works well on the continent, and is an evident saving of time and expense. The officers who are fit for one department are fully qualified to perform that of the other. The office of the chief of the staff is subdivided into two or three divisions, including the various functions of Adjutant and Quartermasters-General, and including the topographical department, to which special officers are attached. The staff form a corps apart. They are not selected through interest and connexion, as is too often the case in the English service. Candidates for these appointments must commence as "aspirants," and undergo a regular and severe examination in languages, the general principles of strategy, the elements of geography, mathematics, and fortification, the laying down plans and maps, and various other acquirements highly essential to staff officers; essentials too much neglected, indeed rarely required in the British service. In order to give young officers a better insight into the duties and details of the different branches of the army, they are required to serve a certain time with some regiment of cavalry and infantry before they are admitted into active staff employment, and thus, as they have for the most part already served as cadets or privates, and have been brought up at the Ecole Polytechnique, they enter upon their functions with a well-grounded knowledge of their duty. The advantage of this system, as far as the mode of selecting officers is concerned, speaks for itself. For, with every possible respect for the bravery, zeal, and intelligence of our staff officers, how few are there who, on being appointed to the junior grades, have any distinct notion of the duties that ought to be required of them? Few in former times were able to speak a word of any foreign language, and scarcely one could draw the sketch of a position, reduce or extend a map, or comprehend the motives or probable results of any military manœuvres. In short beyond the mere operation of copying a general order, and carrying that order from one point to another with the rapidity of an arrow, there were few who could have answered the commonest question touching the general details of an army, or had

any knowledge of those principles of strategy so necessary, one must imagine, for staff officers in a well-organized army. We shall be told, perhaps, that our service has gone admirably upon the present system, and that whether ignorant or scientific, our staff has always most ably done its duty, and aided their General in defeating whatever force may have been opposed to him. We grant this in fact, but no one will surely attempt to assert, that great improvements might not be introduced, and that our staff would become a thousand times more efficient, and better able to execute the duties of their station, if the preliminary study and knowledge of certain branches of military science were more strictly attended to. An aide-de-camp is, we know, a mere machine, and is not required to think for himself. But an Assistant or even Deputy Assistant Adjutant or Quartermaster-General has functions of a higher order to perform, and repeated occasions arise on actual service, when more extensive acquirements and theoretical knowledge might be employed with extreme advantage to the service or general to whose division he may be attached.

Independent of the head-quarter staff, each division has its own, consisting of a chef and sous chef d'état major, who stand in the same relation to their division, as the chief of the staff to the whole army; that is, they combine the two departments. Lieutenant-Generals commanding divisions are allowed two aides-de-camp and two officers d'ordnance; Generals of Brigade, one aide-de-camp, and in the cavalry one officer d'ordnance; but the latter have no brigade-majors. This duty is performed by the aide-de-camp, who is responsible for the states and returns, which are forwarded to the General by the colonels of regiments, and are thence transmitted to the chef d'état major of the division, whence they find their way to the état major-general, where the usual recapitulation is made for the commander-in-chief. These returns are not kept with that admirable detail and precision which was a remarkable feature in the Adjutant-General's office of the Duke of Wellington's army in Spain, but they nevertheless fully answer all the purposes of the general commanding. In Appendix A, will be found a state of the number of officers composing the Belgian General Staff, with their pay and allowances. This list does not include those officers in non-activity, who had been placed, or placed themselves in these functions at the moment of the revolution, though utterly incapable of performing the duties, or those who were subsequently employed, and again put on half-pay in consequence of being implicated in political conspiracies, or from utter incapacity. The uniform of the staff is soldierlike, but plain and economical. All have two epaulettes, the grades distinguished by the strap or bullion. Officers d'ordnance wear the uniform of their regiments, and receive no other allowance or increased pay than the forage of their respective ranks as cavalry officers.

#### CAVALRY.

The regiment of Guides (Light Dragoons), two Lancers, two Chasseurs à Cheval, one Cuirassiers, and three squadrons of mobilised Gens d'Armes (the latter composed exclusively of old soldiers), form the total of this force. Previous to the revolution in 1830, the Netherlands' cavalry consisted of ten regiments, viz.—four Cuirassiers, three Light Dragoons, two Hussars, and one Lancers, to which were attached 316

officers of all ranks: of these, not one-sixth were Belgians; so that the difficulty of procuring officers for this army was felt almost as much in the cavalry as in other corps, when, as we shall afterwards show, the number of Dutch was out of all measure greater than Belgians; but as the four or five colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and majors of regiments were immediately promoted to the rank of general, the command of the newly-organized corps, formed at first of deserters from old regiments, and subsequently filled up by conscription, devolved on men, some of whom, it is true, had seen much service in command of squadrons and troops, but possessed neither the firmness, experience, nor knowledge of human nature necessary for so arduous a task as the organization of new regiments, and the maintenance of discipline under all the combined difficulties of political convulsion and national anarchy. The process of organization was therefore extremely slow, and is still far from approaching to anything like perfection. The men, generally speaking, are remarkably fine,—indeed, for the most part better adapted for heavy than light cavalry,—and, on an average, admirably mounted. Their superiority over the French in the latter respect is remarkable; but, from the want of good squadron officers, and, above all, non-commissioned, combined with the effects of the revolutionary leaven, both the drill, subordination, and whole economy are still defective. Seen in a body, and at rest, they have a highly martial appearance; but they are slow and unsteady in their evolutions. They want solidity and precision as much as they do rapidity; and there is a palpable absence of that neatness and symmetry in the arrangements of their kits and saddlery, which is as essential to the general uniformity as well as individual appearance of the troopers. Foot-drill appears little attended to; and the riding department is extremely faulty. When dismounted, they move about with a lumbering, slouching gait, and without the smartness or erectness of soldiers. When mounted, they roll in their saddles, and have an awkward and loose seat. In short, whether on foot or horseback, they are ill set up.

As regards the seat on horseback, there appears to be a defect, not only in the formation of the saddle, which throws the man forward, but in the rolling the cloaks and position of the holsters. The latter, when covered with the shabraque, or sheepskin, is raised so high, as nearly to reach the level of the chest. The bridle-hand is thus thrown up, the horse's mouth constantly irritated, and the animal made unsteady; and, both in lance and sword exercise, the movement of the weapon and free use of the arm is impeded; whereas, in the Polish and Prussian regiments, especially the Hûlans, this part of the equipment is arranged as low as possible, so as not only to allow the left-hand to rest almost on the mane, and thus ease the horse's mouth, but to leave the front of the saddle free for the use of the lance or sword.

The Belgian regiments are organized by squadrons, and not by troops. These are divided into divisions and platoons. In Appendix, Nos. 2 and 3, will be found the establishment of regiments and squadrons: the total number will be seen in the general recapitulation.

It was a decided error in an army composed of only five regiments to have organized so large a portion of Lancers. The general inutility of this weapon, save in the hands of Poles, has not only been acknowledged by the most experienced officers in France, but the necessity of

having a preponderating force of Dragoons admitted without contestation; indeed, this system seems to have been acted upon so far in the French Army du Nord that entered Belgium, that of 56 squadrons, four only were Lancers, and these probably accompanied the army on account of their colonel, the Duc de Nemours. The plan in future to be adopted will be to attach a squadron of Lancers to each regiment of cavalry, to act as occasion may require.

The formation of this superfluous quantity of Lancers was partly the result of the revolution and the inexperience of the officers charged with the organization of the cavalry. It was moreover a favourite service with the people and disbanded soldiers, who readily volunteered to the Lancer dépôts; whereas the greatest difficulty was encountered in procuring men for the Cuirassiers; indeed, so adverse were they to this service, that although a premium was offered to those old soldiers who volunteered from other regiments, it was no easy matter to find sufficient numbers to form the nucleus of the additional squadrons; consequently, the Cuirassiers, from being composed almost entirely of recruits, mounted on raw horses, and officered by young men, are far inferior to other regiments in every point of view.

The difficulty of maintaining an efficient cavalry, and, above all, that of augmenting to any great extent old regiments, unless the skeletons of troops are composed of veteran officers and non-commissioned, is too well known; therefore, when it is remembered that two-thirds of the Belgian officers were young in their profession, or had never served; that more than three-fourths of the men have not been recruited above twelve months; that the whole have not been embodied more than two years; that the non-commissioned are extremely defective, and the horses all young,—it cannot be a matter of surprise if the cavalry should leave much to be desired.

The dearth of native officers of sufficient experience to command regiments or squadrons was deeply felt by Government, and proved by the inefficiency of corps, both of cavalry, infantry, and artillery; some French and Poles were therefore enrolled. This created much dissatisfaction amongst the nationals, who, although they were constrained to admit the inefficiency of their regiments, could not be brought to acknowledge the cause or the urgency of the measure adopted by the Government; indeed, so far did they carry their jealousy in some instances, that, on a French major being posted to a regiment of Lancers, all the officers determined to challenge him, and he very prudently thought it better to retire than expose himself and the corps to perpetual dissensions. Again, when a Polish colonel was placed in command of a Chasseur regiment, the officers received him with marked uncordiality, obeyed with reluctance, and left no means untried to render his situation untenable. Had the Government, however, been deterred from its purpose by the clamours and dissatisfaction of the complainants, who, it must be remembered, had for the most part already obtained two steps since the revolution, it is highly probable that it could not have organized half the number of men, or, had they equipped and mounted them, their services in the line of battle could not have been relied on.

In speaking of the admission of foreign officers into the Belgian army, some explanations may not be irrelevant. The system pursued by the Netherlands Government, to judge by the list of the army, inde-



pendent of all other political considerations, went almost to exclude Belgians from the staff and command of regiments. We shall not enter into any discussion as to the motives, but merely adhere to the result, showing, that whilst the population of the Belgian provinces was as nearly two to one larger than that of Holland, and her contingent of men consequently in the same proportion, the number of superior officers was out of all proportion in an inverse ratio. We shall merely give a few examples in support of this assertion, taken from the "Jaarboeke voor het Koninkrijke Leger der Nederlanden," or official Army List for 1830.

Of eight field-m Marshals and generals, no Belgian; of 21 lieutenant-generals, three Belgians; of 50 major-generals, five Belgians; of 21 colonels commanding infantry regiments, seven Belgians; of 36 field-officers of cavalry, 12 Belgians; of 45 officers of general staff, six Belgians; of 26 field-officers of engineers, no Belgian; of 50 field-officers of artillery, three Belgians, majors. Therefore, in a total of 254 generals, staff and field-officers, only 35; or, allowing unintentional errors, say 40 Belgians, or  $\frac{40}{254}$ , or  $\frac{1}{6}$ ; whilst the proportion of Belgian soldiers over Dutch was as two to one. The number of captains, subalterns, and non-commissioned bore nearly the same proportion. Thus, though Holland lost the services of the Belgian soldiers, she retained the valuable aid of her staff, engineers, and field-officers nearly intact, and was thus enabled rapidly to re-organize and re-model her army; whilst her adversaries, torn by internal dissensions, and having so limited a number of superior officers, was unable to make any progress, until the arrival of the King united the mass of people in one focus, and the employment of experienced foreigners gave an impulse to the system.

Amongst the evils produced by the death of superior officers, was the necessity of giving rapid promotion to men, who, in ordinary times, could not have attained these grades under many years. Thus generals were placed in command of brigades of 7,000 to 8,000 men, and colonels appointed to regiments 4,500 strong, who had no other experience than the mechanical routine of battalion or company duty. We have spoken of Generals Evain and Desprez, and commented on the admirable discretion shown in the choice of these distinguished officers. The same observation holds good of the rest of the army, who were selected not alone for their military experience and tried valour on the field of battle, but for the moderation of their political sentiments, an object of immense importance under existing circumstances. The number of these officers has been much exaggerated, and, in fact, is not equal to the necessities of the army. They are divided into two classes: 1st. Those who are serving *pro tempore*, and still continue to wear the French uniform; 2nd. Those who have taken permanent service, and have received promotion in the Belgian army. Amongst the first are Generals Desprez, Colonel Chatry de la Fosse, Lieut.-Colonel Beujiaux, and about 18 others. Amongst the latter are Generals Evain and Hurel, with about 220 officers of different grades, amongst which are about 35 Poles and a few Germans.

The uniform and appointments of the cavalry are soldierlike, neat, and of excellent materials; that of the officers is not without beauty, but simple and economical. A young man, raised from non-commissioned, or entering by extraordinary favour, can purchase his outfit, including

two horses, for about 160*l*. The arms and accoutrements are of an excellent description; the long straight sword of the French dragoon has been adopted, and has an immense advantage over the short, crooked sabre, so long in use with us. The mode of clothing the soldier is peculiar; we shall give an account of it in speaking of the infantry. Appendix B. contains a state of establishments of regiments and squadrons, with pay and rations, and cost per regiment.

#### INFANTRY.

The Belgian infantry consists of fifteen regiments, twelve of the line, and three of light infantry. The former of five, the latter of four battalions. Each battalion is composed of six companies, viz. four fusiliers or battalion, one grenadiers and one voltigeurs. The four first battalions of line, and three of light infantry, are always united and act together, the remaining battalion forms the reserve dépôt. Each regiment is commanded by a colonel, each battalion by a major, with one standard for the whole. By this system, regiments, as will be seen by the annexed state, Appendix C. No. 3, are equal to brigades in our service, brigades to divisions, and divisions to *corps d'armée*; the first amounting in the field to nearly 3,500, the second to 7,000 or 8,000, and the latter to 16,000 or 18,000 men. In most cases, especially of regiments and brigades, the responsibility is beyond the powers of the officers intrusted with such extensive commands,—who, for the most part, have risen three, or at least two steps since the revolution; for, on examining the “Jaarbocke” for 1830, above quoted, we find very few officers now holding the rank of major-general then higher than major, and not more colonels higher than captain.

Two corps of partisans, of nearly 1000 men each, have been organized, and do the duty of guerillas: one of them is stationed in Flanders, the other on the frontier of Brabant. They are composed of men of all countries, and, as may be imagined, do not present a picture of very severe discipline; but they are extremely useful in patrolling and clearing the fronts and flanks, and are apparently daring and adventurous. Their dress is wild and martial: it consists of a round hat, looped up at the side, with cockade and yellow feather; a dark green great coat and yellow facings, black waistbelt and crossbelt for cartouche-box and sabre, black oil-cloth knapsack, a light musket, and a yellow worsted cord and tassel coiled round the neck, and hanging over the left shoulder, with green and yellow epaulettes, and an unlimited quantity of beard and mustachio.

Twenty thousand civic guards are mobilised and divided into 34 battalions of four companies each; half light infantry, and the remainder grenadiers. These troops are nearly equal, in most essential points, to the line regiments, and from being exclusively composed of men between the ages of 21 and 30, are, on an average, much stronger, taller, and healthier-looking than the former. All unmarried men, between the age of 21 and 30, not eligible for militia conscription, are available for this class. They remain under arms so long only as the country is supposed to be in danger. The dress and appointments of all line regiments are precisely similar, with the trifling exception of the number on the button and cap-plate,—a great economy and convenience to officers who may be removed from one regiment to another, and a decided advantage and saving to government, which is thus enabled to make

its contracts in greater masses, and consequently at a cheaper rate. The pattern and price of each article are fixed by the War-office, and calculated on the most economical footing, and must be adhered to in the most minute articles: thus the fanciful caprices of colonels are guarded against, and young officers protected from those unavoidable expenses which are the bane of our service. It would be uninteresting to enter into minute details of the uniform further than to remark, that whilst every attention has been paid to the comfort and convenience of the soldier, he is not overcharged with a quantity of superfluous, and obligatory extras, that drain his pay, increase the weight of his kit, and consequently too often impede his movements. The whole weight carried by a Belgian grenadier, including musket and sabre, does not exceed 60lbs.

The French system of marching order in great-coats has been adopted; indeed many of the regiments, on advancing to the frontier, requested permission to leave their jackets in dépôt. In wet weather, and over heavy roads, this must be disadvantageous and unhealthy. The men, on reaching their bivouacs, or quarters, have no alternative but to remain in their coats, saturated with perspiration, rain, and mud, or to put on their jackets to perform fatigue or cooking duties, by which they lose one of the greatest apparent comforts of the English soldier, who, when not immediately before the enemy, is enabled to throw off his light jacket, and put on his dry and loose great-coat; thus giving freedom to his limbs by day, and obtaining additional warmth by night. The short linen and cloth gaiter, with the low shoe, are also preserved. Its inconvenience for marching requires no comment; indeed, this seems to be felt by the French soldiers themselves, for, on examining the feet of several thousand on the line of march, we observed that most of the non-commissioned, and such soldiers as could afford it, preferred the half or laced boot. As the French and Belgian soldiers rarely, if ever, wear stockings on the march, the wet linen gaiter, with the mud oozing between it and the leg, must be prejudicial to the health of the men.

The civic guards are distinguished from the line by one black cross belt and dark oiled-cloth knapsack, a round jacket without facings or skirts, silver lace and epaulettes for officers, plated ornaments for the men, and the whole of them wearing red or green epaulettes; these latter distinctions in the line being confined to the grenadier and light companies, whose crossbelts are white, and packs of goat or calves'-skin.

In barracks the mode of cooking is nearly similar to our own. In the field, or on the march, when not quartered on the inhabitants, the companies are divided into messes of ten, to each of which is distributed a large tin bidon or camp-kettle, carried alternately by the men of the mess. Each soldier has also his small mess-tin, and when they have not wooden canteens, they are supplied with tin flasks. They have no haversacks, but either carry their bread strapped behind, or in their packs. The mode of furnishing the clothing is uniform throughout the army; government furnishes gratis, arms, and crossbelts, for the annual repair of which the soldier pays a certain fixed sum, whether required or not. Everything in the shape of clothes and necessaries is paid for by the men by a drawback on their pay amounting to nearly 2½d. English per day: this is called his "mass," and amounts yearly to about 46.45 francs. On squaring accounts, if anything remains over it is put to the soldier's credit. Colonels of regiments receive their supplies

from the central dépôt, and the captain quarter-master issues them to the regiment at the war-office prices; but it is said they contrive means of putting small sums in their pocket by an arrangement with the army contractors. Government also withholds 21 centimes, or  $2\frac{1}{4}d.$  per day, for rations; which, supposing the pay of a battalion man to be 52 centimes per day, leaves nine centimes over. Then, deducting the expense of blacking, soap, washing, pipe-clay, it rarely happens that the infantry soldier receives more than 14 centimes net every four days: still they are better paid than the French. The reader is referred to the Appendix for an exact statement of pay, where he will likewise find the gross amount of cost of regiments and battalions.

The daily ration consists of  $1\frac{1}{2}lb.$  of bread,  $\frac{1}{2}lb.$  of meat, and in barracks a portion of salt and potatoes, with a half litre of wine, or one-sixth litre of spirits in the field. When quartered on the inhabitants, which is generally the case, the latter are allowed 35 cents (Flemish), or about  $8\frac{1}{2}d.$  for the maintenance of the soldier.

It would be impossible for any army to show finer men than the general run of the Belgian regiments, especially the grenadier companies, who, it must be observed, are not selected altogether for their height. The pay of the flank companies being a trifle higher than the rest, the men are called "d'élite," and are generally admitted as a recompense for good conduct. Such a stimulus would not be thrown away in our army; where, it must be avowed, there is little done in the way of encouragement or recompense to excite the pride or nerve the morals of the men. With us men are picked out merely because they are taller than their comrades, and placed in the grenadiers, though they may perchance be of bad character and rank cowards; and light infantry are selected for their face or shape, though they may be as utterly devoid of address and intelligence as of morality. In line and in column the Belgian troops have a remarkably soldier-like appearance, but on closer inspection, they are as far from the activity and lightness of the French as they are from the solidity and steadiness of the English. The men of the front and rear ranks are generally strong, muscular, but thick-made, inclined to corpulency, rather round-shouldered, and bending the knee (defects of drill), and not good marchers. It is a rare occurrence when off duty to see them erect or well set up, and whilst under arms there is a perpetual wavering and vacillation of the heads and bayonets. Their movements in battalion are also extremely slow and uncertain; there is none of that smart springing up of non-commissioned and flank men seen with us; and it is very evident that the whole are far from that point of perfection which enables officers and men to execute the most complicated evolutions with steadiness and precision, even under the hottest fire. But we must also remember the raw materials of which they are composed, and the short time they have been under arms. This taken into consideration, their progress has been highly creditable to all ranks. The officers have no regular mess. In quarters they subsist as they please, and generally make an arrangement at some table d'hôte for their dinner, which they thus obtain at a very moderate price, rarely exceeding 30 francs per month for lieutenants and captains, and 40 for field-officers, who dine somewhat better. The colonels, field-officers, and chefs d'escadron do not dine at the same table with these inferior grades,—a system copied from the French.

One standard only is allowed to each regiment. A plan that might

be adopted with advantage with us, especially when regiments proceed on active service, where one colour per battalion would surely answer all the purposes of dressing by centre and rallying. Here four battalions, or a brigade of eight battalions, has but two standards; with us there would be sixteen. Thus the chances of loss or accident in the field are as eight to one, and no proportionate advantage gained. When we seldom hear of eagles being captured from the French army, it is in some measure accounted for. Take an army of fifty battalions, that, for instance, du Nord, at present in Belgium, consisting of 17 regiments, or 51 battalions, we find only 17 standards. With us the number of colours would be 102. Surely the half of this number might be left in dépôt. In the Belgian, as in the French service, commissions cannot be purchased. Every young man must enter as private or cadet, and then gradually ascend until he obtains his epaulettes,—a process, without great favour, of two or three years. Of course we mention this as the system now adopted, but which was not pursued prior to the King's arrival. The officers of Civic Guards, to the rank of captain inclusive, according to the constitution, are elected by their companies, subject to the sanction of the colonel. This plan works well enough for the sedentary bans; but for those called into active service it presents great disadvantages, and is, of course, inimical to discipline; the choice of the men not being likely to fall on those of their comrades the most noted for their strictness or severe attention to subordination. The vice of this organization is felt, and will be remedied by an alteration in the law.

The Civic Guards are divided into three classes:—The 1st ban, subject to be called out for actual service, is composed of all able-bodied unmarried men from 21 to 30, not eligible for the militia, or who have passed the ballot: they are placed upon the footing of line troops, and are accountable to the same laws, and receive the same pay and rations. The 2d ban comprises all able-bodied men, whether married or single, between the ages of 21 to 40; their service is entirely confined to the town where they are domiciled, and are only called for on most extraordinary and pressing occasions. The 3d ban includes all males from 16 to 50. It is, in fact, the *levy en masse*. The calling into active service either of these classes must receive the sanction of the Chambers, who vote the supplies; whilst in nonactivity, they receive their orders from the General-in-Chief of the Civic Guards, whose instructions emanate from the Minister of the Interior.

The Belgians have no invalid establishment, no widow's fund, nor is any permanent provision made for officers' pensions. But everything is yet in its infancy, and will require time to mature. Funds for this purpose will, of course, be allotted by the Chambers; for, when it is considered that the army now amounts to nearly 120,000 men on paper, and that the ordinary budget, about one million sterling, will not admit of even a fourth of that number being retained in time of peace, it will be necessary to disband upwards of 90,000 men, and to place an immense number of officers on half-pay.

The balloting for the militia, or, in other words, the conscription, is the only method of recruiting,—the number of volunteers being trifling. All males from 16 to 30 are eligible, with some exceptions,—as only sons of widows, married men with three or more children, and some others. In time of peace they serve for three years, and then return

home, being liable to be called out on an emergency for three years more. Substitutes are allowed; but the principal is answerable for the desertion of his substitute. The population of Belgium at present is about 4,000,000 in round numbers; deducting the portions of Limbourg and Luxembourg, ceded by the treaty of 15th of November, it reckons 3,000,000. The number of men at this moment under arms is in the proportion of about one-fortieth to the whole; and in calculating able-bodied males between the ages of 16 and 40, it is about one to fifteen.

The French formation of three deep has been maintained. We shall not enter into a discussion upon the advantages or disadvantages of a system so different from our own, further than to observe that the musketry fire of the British troops is admitted by all continental officers to be the most deadly and efficient in Europe, whilst they at the same time pronounce our weapons to be inferior to their own, though they admit the superiority of our powder. This effect of English firing can proceed from nothing but the formation. For instance, take a battalion of 900 men (French), and, from the rear-rank not firing, they are reduced for the volley to 600, and, in fact, lose one-third of their fire, whilst of the same number of English every musket is discharged, and the men are able to keep their independent firing afterwards with as much rapidity as though they were served by the third rank. The formation of regiments in four contiguous battalions in the line of battle places the colonel in the same position in regard to his regiment as a general in regard to his brigade. He issues the word of command, and it is taken up by the majors commanding battalions in succession. The colonel receives the command of course from the general. • By this process much valuable time is lost, as it is impossible for the voice of the general to cover the space occupied by eight battalions, especially on a windy day or under fire. It is no less difficult for the colonel to be heard. The consequence is that the command is necessarily transmitted from one to the other, and there is an absence of that rapid and simultaneous movement so beautiful at a review, and of such vital importance in the line of battle. The number of mounted officers to each battalion is also too limited,—not exceeding two, including the adjutant. This, in some measure, accounts for the want of precision and *ensemble* often detected in their review manœuvres. If under a heavy fire these defects would be increased, and must produce the worst results. The object, we are aware, is economy; but that economy which goes to produce inefficiency is badly calculated.

#### ARTILLERY.

This department is under the direction of an inspector-general, whose orders emanate directly from the minister of war. It is a branch, but not an independent part of the military administration. This arm has made a most extraordinary progress. For when we consider the destitution in which it was plunged, it is a matter of astonishment to see how much has been effected in so short a space of time, and this with the most crude materials. The number of battalions under the ancient government have been enumerated. To these and the staff were attached 7 general officers, 6 colonels, 13 lieutenant-colonels, 25 majors, 66 captains, 13 second captains, 238 lieutenants, giving a total of 371 officers. Of these a small proportion were Belgians, and amongst them not one higher than the rank of major. The extreme difficulty of procuring

experienced officers, or indeed officers of any kind possessing sufficient knowledge of the duty, was great in the first instance; and thus under the revolutionary government many were admitted without other claim than their bravery. This difficulty augmented in proportion as it was found necessary to increase the corps; which has finally been put on a footing of 20 companies or batteries of field artillery of 8 guns each, perfectly horsed and equipped; and this independent of garrison artillery, train, and several companies requisite for the defence of Antwerp.

The dearth of officers was in some measure remedied by the admission of foreigners; but the want of good subalterns, and above all non-commissioned, is still sorely felt—their number being out of all proportion small to the mass of guns, 160, that the army is now able to bring into the field. I., II., III., of Appendix D. will give the exact amount of men, pay, &c., together with the number of officers, men, horses, and carriages forming each battery.

The men of this corps are remarkably strong and powerful, and show considerable aptitude in learning the common routine of gun exercise; but they are universally deficient in experience, and with few exceptions have been utterly neglected in ball practice. To judge of what they might be able to perform in the field from seeing their manœuvres at a review would not be favourable, their movements being slow and devoid of precision. Their drill is evidently very slovenly, and the non-commissioned do not appear to understand their duty much better than the gunners. The drivers are apparently too heavy for the horses; which, though far superior to the French, and well calculated to support fatigue at a slow pace, are too small and short-legged to be able to draw the guns through a heavy country, and incapable of moving with rapidity.

The English model of carriage and limber has been adopted, with the exception of a pole instead of the shaft. The calibre of the guns is that of France, and is measured by centimeters. The formation of the batteries into 8 instead of 6 pieces is much criticised, and not adopted even in France. It is true that, in the latter part of the Moscow campaign, Napoleon had recourse to this plan, but not until the number of his captains and superior officers of artillery was much reduced, and it became necessary to consolidate the batteries, by which there was a saving of 4 officers in 24 pieces. This might work well in an army such as that of Napoleon, where the dear-bought experience of daily combats from the Niemen to the Moskwa had afforded the subalterns and privates the experience of ten ordinary campaigns; but with such inexperienced materials as those that constitute the Belgian, it is highly problematical whether the extension given to the batteries will not prove injurious. It is certainly economical, and brings a greater number of guns into fire with less charge to the country; but as it is considered by experienced artillery officers a sufficient task for a captain to command 6 guns in fire, the addition of 2 more may fairly be calculated as likely to embarrass young commanders.

The grand dépôt of artillery and projectiles is at Tournay; the foundry at Liege. Among the latest productions of the latter it may not be irrelevant to mention an enormous mortar, the idea of which originated, we believe, with Col. Paixhans of the French artillery. It surpasses in weight and calibre any piece of ordnance hitherto invented, save one or two that were cast by Mahomet II. The weight of metal employed exceeded 15,000 kilogrammes, or about 30,000 pounds; the diameter

of the bore is 22 inches 7 lines French; the weight of the empty shell is 950 pounds, and when filled 1050.\* It succeeded perfectly in the casting and proof, and was conveyed to Antwerp in a carriage purposely constructed for it, and arrived there on the 8th December.

The uniform of the artillery is neat, much resembling that of the French. The appointments are all remarkably effective, and the construction of the limbers and carriages, though somewhat more clumsy, not less efficient than those of the English army. The gunners are not drilled to the musket as with us, and are for the most part extremely round-shouldered and heavy. But these minor details have been lost sight of in the more important question of equipping them for the field. Hitherto one brigade of horse artillery only has been organized.

#### ENGINEERS.

In speaking of the engineer department as it existed under the Netherlands' government, we stated that the number of Belgians was extremely limited, and that there was not one Belgian field officer; so that, in fact, Captain Goblet was promoted almost immediately to the rank of general-major and inspector-in-chief of fortifications. The Belgian engineers are divided into two classes—staff and troops, or sappers and miners. The number of the former amounts to 47. Of these 1 general-major, 2 colonels-inspectors of fortifications, 5 lieutenant-colonels, directors or commandants of fortresses, 7 majors-commandant, 7 captains commanding fortresses or on the staff of their superiors, 21 lieutenants, and 2 lieutenants acting as aides-de-camp or attached to different fortresses, and lastly, 4 cadets serving as lieutenants. Many of these field officers are at present posted to divisions of the active army, or are employed on different points of Flanders or Brabant, in order to superintend the erection of the redoubts, têtes du pont, and other field works, which have been thrown up in almost every accessible direction upon the roads leading from Holland to Brussels. To the staff of the engineers are attached 34 "gardes," with the rank of serjeant-majors and serjeants. They act as store-keepers, clerks, and sub-inspectors.

The troops of the engineer department consist of a battalion of 6 companies of sappers and miners, commanded by a lieutenant-colonel and major, included in the staff. One of these two officers is placed at the head of the military academy. The strength of the companies amounts to 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 3 drummers, 6 serjeants, 6 corporals, and one serjeant-major,—in all 157 men. Of these 50 are volunteers, the remainder are militia-men. From the utter state of disorganization into which this corps was thrown by the revolution, and from the qualifications necessary to render it efficient, it has made less progress than any other. Its total force consists in 77 officers and 1054 non-commissioned and rank and file.

The pay and allowances of this department will be found in Appendix E. The uniform is simple, and the equipment of the men in marching differs from the artillery only in the musket.

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\* Since writing the above this vast piece of ordnance has been tried at Antwerp. It has been found to answer perfectly, the shell being charged with 93 pounds of powder. It was placed at the distance of 600 metres from the citadel, and fired with a charge of 16 pounds. We shall reserve a more minute description for another Number.



## INSPECTORS OF CAVALRY AND REMOUNT.

This branch of the service is at present intrusted to a board of three officers under the superintendence of a colonel. The commissioners make an account with contractors, who employ agents in Holstein, Hanover, and other parts of Germany; and hitherto the result has been highly satisfactory; the general run of the horses being of a superior description to those of the French. The prices allowed by government are, for cuirassiers 600 francs; for the guides 550; light cavalry 500; foot artillery 530, horse artillery 600. It may be as well to mention here, that inspectors-general of cavalry and infantry will be appointed as soon as the troops retire into cantonments.

## INTENDANT GENERAL'S OFFICE.

The functions of the intendant are principally confined to auditing and controlling the accounts of regiments: hitherto they have been charged also with the payment of troops and superintendence of issues of provisions. The contractors are, however, responsible to the minister, with whom they negotiate direct.

## SCHOOL OF CADETS.

The military school is not yet formed on any solid basis. A law to this effect is about to be presented to the Chamber. Hitherto a few young men have been admitted as cadets, after a proper examination; and they are instructed with a view of placing them as lieutenants of artillery or engineers.

## PONTON BRIGADE.

A company of pontoons has been formed. The boats are on the improved French model, and were worked at the Liège foundry. The brigade is completely horsed, equipped, and manned, with an effective of 137 men and 200 horses, at an annual expense of 71,000 francs. The pay and appointments are the same as those of the artillery.

## DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY.

The army is at present divided into that of observation and reserve, forming, altogether, seven divisions, exclusive of dépôts and garrisons. The active army consists of five divisions. The first, commanded by Lieutenant-General Hurel, is composed of 2 brigades of infantry, 1 of light cavalry, a regiment of partisans, and 24 field-pieces,—about 17,000 men. The second, by Lieutenant-General Durivie, consists of 2 brigades of infantry, 1 of light cavalry, and 32 field-pieces,—about 16,000 men. The third division, Lieutenant-General Goethels, is formed of 1 brigade of infantry, 1 of mobilised civic guard, a heavy brigade of cavalry, and 24 field-pieces,—about 16,000 men. The fourth division, Lieutenant-General Daine, has 1 brigade of infantry, 1 of civic guards, and 24 field-pieces,—about 16,000 men. The fifth division, intended to be composed of cavalry, is not concentrated; giving a total of about 68,000 effectives and 104 field-pieces. The army of reserve is formed of the sixth division, Major-General Niellon, comprising some of the fifth battalions of line and several battalions of civic guards,—about 12,000 men with 24 field-pieces. The seventh division, in Antwerp, is formed from a brigade of line, some fifth battalions, and several corps of civic guards, with 24 field-pieces,—about 12,000 men: giving, altogether, about 92,000 effective bayonets and sabres and 152 field-pieces, exclusive of

a battery of horse artillery, reserves, depôts, and garrisons. Brigades, of which there are 7, are composed of 2 regiments each, with the exception of the first of the first division, which has 3 regiments.

Belgium is divided into as many military governments as there are provinces. To each of these is appointed a general or colonel-commandant, charged with the police and distribution of the garrisons. All reports are made to him and thence communicated to the minister.

In the foregoing sketch we do not pretend to perfect correctness; nor has the past month been favourable for obtaining accurate documents. But we trust that the reader will, nevertheless, be enabled to form a tolerable judgment of the military organization of a country which has latterly occupied so vast a portion of European attention and interest.

We have to acknowledge our obligations to the highest authority for the annexed official documents.

*Note.*—In a former article, in speaking of the number of guns demanded by Napoleon of General Evau, we committed an important error. We should have said, "sixteen hundred," and not "six hundred;"—and in speaking of the nominal establishment of the Belgium army, for "120,000 men," read "110,000 men, exclusive of mobilised Civic Guard."

## APPENDIX A.

## STAFF.

## No. I.—GENERAL STAFF.

	No.	Horses	Pay per Ann.	Remarks.
Lieut.-Generals . . . .	5	12	16,900	These are all employed, and on full pay, which is calculated in francs. This list does not comprise the Ministers of War, or the few French officers serving for the duration of the war.
Majors . . . . .	11	8	11,600	
Maj.-Gens. } Commanding	3	8	10,100	
Colonels } Provinces . .	6	6	8,400	
Colonels . . . . .	5	6	8,400	
Lieut.-Colonels . . . .	4	4	7,100	
Majors . . . . .	5	4	6,300	
Cpts. 1st Class . . . .	9	3	5,050	
ditto, 2d do. . . . .	2	3	3,800	
Lieutenants . . . . .	3	3	2,950	
Total, General Staff	53			

## No. 2.—STAFF OF GARRISONS.

	No.	Pay per Ann.	Remarks.
Commandts. of Garrisons, 1st class	9	6,300	A small sum is added for lodging-money and rations.
ditto ditto 2d class	16	4,200	
Majors de Place, 1st do.	17	2,600	
ditto ditto 2d do.	7	2,100	
ditto ditto 3d do.	5	1,390	
Total Staff of Garrisons	64		

## MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF BELGIUM.

## No. 3.—ARTILLERY STAFF.

	No.	Horses.	Pay per Ann.	Remarks.
Colonels . . . . .	2	6	9.500	These officers are attached to the head-quarters, minister of war, garrisons, or depôts, and are exclusive of field batteries.
Lieut.-Colonels . . . . .	7	4	7.100	
Majors . . . . .	7	4	5.500	
Captains, 2d class . . . . .	9	3	3.350	
Second Lieutenants . . . . .	4	3	2.100	
<b>Total, Artillery Staff</b>	<b>29</b>			

## No. 4.—ENGINEER STAFF.

	No.	Horses.	Pay per Ann.	Remarks.
Colonels . . . . .	2	6	9.500	A small allowance added for rations and lodging-money.
Lieut.-Colonels . . . . .	4	4	7.100	
Majors . . . . .	8	4	6.300	
Captains, 1st class . . . . .	4	3	5.050	
ditto, 2d class . . . . .	4	3	2.950	
Lieutenants . . . . .	8	3	2.100	
Second Lieutenants . . . . .	12	3	1.690	
Aspirants . . . . .	5		1.480	
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>			

## No. 5 —INTENDANCE.

	No.	Horses	Pay per Ann	Remarks.
Intendant in chief . . . . .			11.600	
ditto 1st class . . . . .			8.400	
ditto 2d class . . . . .			6.300	
Sub-Intendant, 1st class . . . . .			5.500	
ditto 2d do. . . . .			3.800	
Adjoints . . . . .			2.500	
Aspirants . . . . .			1.480	
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>			

## RECAPITULATION OF STAFF.

	No.	Remarks.
General Staff . . . . .	53	These do not include aides-de-camp, or officers of ordnance who are borne on the strength of regts.
Garrisons . . . . .	64	
Artillery . . . . .	29	
Engineers . . . . .	47	
Intendance . . . . .	32	
<b>Total, Staff</b>	<b>245</b>	

## APPENDIX B.

## No. 1.—STAFF OF REGIMENT OF CAVALRY.

	No.	Horses.	Pay per Ann.	Remarks.
Colonel . . .	6		8.400	
Lieut.-Colonel . .	4		6.300	
Majors . . .	3		5.500	
Captain-Instructor .	2		3.800	
Capt.-Adj.-Major .	3		3.800	
Lieut.-Adjutant . .	3		3.550	
Sub Lieut. ditto .	2		3.450	
Paymaster . . .	1		1.900	Pay in Francs.
Capt.-Quartermaster	1		2.950	These Officers not borne
Lieut.-Clothier . .	2		1.690	on strength of Squadron
Standard-bearer . .	3		2.950	Establishment. See No. 2.
Surgeon-major . .	2		3.350	
Surgeon . . .	2		2.100	
Adjourn . . .	2		1.480	
Veterinary, 1st class	2		2.100	
ditto 2d class	1		1.480	
Total	19			

## No. 2.—ESTABLISHMENT OF SQUADRON OF CAVALRY.

	No	Officers Horses	Troop Horses	Officers' Pay per Ann.	Troops' Pay per Day	Remarks.
Capt.-Commandant	1	3		2.200		
ditto Second .	1	3		1.800		
Lieut. 1st . .	2	6		1.400		
ditto 2d . .	4	12		1.200		
Serjt.-Major . .	1		1		1.05	The pay is calcu-
Serjeants . . .	8		8		85	lated in guilders.
Serjt.-Quartermaster	1		1		85	
2d Quartermaster	1		1		80	Strength of squad-
Corporals . . .	16		16		45	ron mounted, at full
Troopers mounted	120		120		35	establishment—
ditto dismounted	16				35	
Farriers . . .	3		3		35	Officers, N.C., Trum-
Trumpets . . .	3		3		65	peters, &c. 161.
Total	177	24	153			

## No. 3.—EXPENSE PER REGIMENT OF CAVALRY.

	Francs.
Guides . . . . .	810.400
Chasseurs . . . . .	1.703.500
Lancers . . . . .	1.724.200
Cuirassiers . . . . .	1.850.000

## APPENDIX C.

## No. 1.—STAFF OF A REGIMENT OF INFANTRY NOT APPEARING IN BATTALION STATE.

	No.	Pay per Ann.	Pay per Day.	Horses.	Remarks.
Colonel . . . . .	1	7,400		4	Pay calculated in francs.
Lieut.-Colonel . . . . .	1	5,900		3	
Capt.-Adj.-Major . . . . .	1	2,950		1	
Capt.-Quartermaster . . . . .	1	2,950			
Lt.-Inspector of Clothing . . . . .	1	1,690			
Lt.-Armourer . . . . .	1	1,900			
Lt.-Standard-Bearer . . . . .	1	1,900			
Surgeon-Major . . . . .	1	3,350		1	
Drum-Major . . . . .	1		1.37		
Serjt.-Master-Tailors . . . . .	3		74		
Serjt.-Baggage-Master . . . . .	1		1.37		
Barrack-Serjt. . . . .	1		1.37		
Musicians . . . . .	14				
Total	28			9	

## No. 2.—FULL ESTABLISHMENT OF A BATTALION OF SIX COMPANIES.

	No.	Pay of Staff per Ann.	Horses	Remarks.
Major . . . . .	1	5,900	3	The pay calculated in French francs.
Lieut.-Adj.-Major . . . . .	1	2,500	1	
Paymaster . . . . .	1	1,900	1	
Surgeon . . . . .	1	2,100	1	
Captains . . . . .	6			
Lieutenants . . . . .	18			
Adj. N. C. . . . .	1			
Serjt.-Major . . . . .	6			
Serjeants . . . . .	24			
Quartermaster Serjt. . . . .	1			
Drum-Corporal . . . . .	1			
Corporal . . . . .	48			
R. & F. . . . .	768			
Total per Batt.	877			

## No. 3.—TOTAL EFFECTIVE OR FULL ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGIMENT OF FIVE COMPANIES.

Colonel.	Lieut.-Col.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Surgeons.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Privates.	Drummers.	Musicians.	Total Establishment of Regiment...4700
1	1	5	34	105	6	204	267	3987	76	14	

## No. 4.—ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPANY OF INFANTRY.

	No.	Officer's Pay per Ann.	Soldier's Pay per Day	Remarks.
Captain . . .	1	1,400		The pay is calculated in guilders of 12½ to the pound sterling. Grenadiers and Light Infantry receive an addition of about ½d per. day.
Lieut. 1st . . .	1	900		
ditto, 2d . . .	2	700		
Serjeant-Major . . .	1		85	
Serjeant . . .	4		65	
Quartermaster . . .	1		65	
Corporals . . .	8		35	
Soldiers . . .	128		25	
Drummers . . .	2		30	
Total	148			

## No. 5.—TOTAL ANNUAL EXPENDITURE FOR ONE REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

	Francs	Remarks.
Pay . . .	1,299,146.10	Government deducts from each man per day—
Clothing . . .	376,335.35	
Repairing cross-belts, &c. . .	5,276.84	Cents. For Clothing, &c. 21½ } Total.. 42½ Rations . . . 21 }
Premium for 150 Volunt. . .	6,300	
Orderly-Room expenses . . .	18,380	leaving the private 10 centimes, or about 1½d. per day.
Barracks . . .	18,980	
Rations . . .	441,124.66	The sum deducted for clothing is called " <i>the mass</i> ," and on settling accounts, should any remain over, it is returned to the soldier.
Route money . . .	1,457.05	
Total, 2,167,000.00		

or 82,700*l.* sterling.

*Note.*—Deducting 608,000 francs as the sum held back from the soldier by Government, it leaves the gross outgoing at 1,500,000, or 60,000*l.* in round numbers.—Taking 71 as the number of battalions, including partisans, we have the total expense of infantry, 852,000*l.*, exclusive of arms and ammunition, or about 12,000*l.* per battalion of 877 men.

## APPENDIX D.

## No. 1.—ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

Consisting of 13 Batteries and 1 Dépôt Company.

	No.	Horses each.	Pay each per Ann. francs.		No.	Horses each.	Pay per Day. francs.
Colonel . . .	1	6	8,400	Adj. Non. Com. . .	2	1	2.32
Lieut.-Colonel . . .	1	4	6,300	Trumpet-Maj. . .	1	1	1.79
Majors . . .	5	4	5,500	Master Workmen . . .	4		74
Capt.-Adj.-Major . . .	1	3	3,350	Serj.-Majors . . .	14	1	2.11
Lieut. ditto . . .	1	3	2,750	Adj. of Battery . . .	13	1	2.11
Capt.-Quartermaster . . .	1	1	2,950	Serjeants . . .	123	1	1.69
Capt.-Instructor . . .	1	2	3,350	Quartermasters . . .	14	1	1.69
Paymasters . . .	2	1	1,900	Corporals . . .	110		95
Lieut.-Clothier . . .	1	1	1,690	Trumpeters . . .	41	1	1.26
Surgeon-Major . . .	1	1	3,350	Wheelwrights . . .	13		84
Surgeon . . .	1	1	2,100	Saddlers . . .	14		74
2d Surgeons . . .	13	1	1,480	Smiths . . .	13		84
1st Veterinary . . .	1	1	2,100	Carpenters . . .	13		84
2d ditto . . .	13	1	1,480	Farriers . . .	27		74
Captains, 1st class . . .	14	3	4,200	Gunners, 1st class . . .	343		74
Captains, 2d do. . .	13	3	3,350	ditto, 2d class . . .	715		63
1st Lieutenants . . .	27	3	2,500	Drivers . . .	1313		74
2d Lieutenants . . .	28	3	2,100				
Lieut.-Instructor . . .	1	2	2,500				

## No. 2.—ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMPANY OF FOOT ARTILLERY ON WAR FOOTING.

			6-pounds.		12-pounds.	
No.	Horses.	Pay per Day per Man. francs.	Horses.		Horses.	
Captain . . .	2		Guns . . . . .	36	48	
1st Lieut. . .	4		Howitzers . . .	12	12	
2d ditto . . .	4		Ammunit.Wag.	48	60	
Surgeon . . .	1		Forge Cart . . .	6	6	
Vet. Surgeon .	1		Spare Limbers	12	12	
Adjutant, N. C.	1	2.32	Spare Tumbrils	12	12	
Serjt.-Major .	1	2.11				
Serjeants . . .	8	1.69		21   134	21   162	
Quartermaster .	1	1.69				
Corpora's . . .	8	95	In Reserve, 8 Horses, 4 of		In Reserve,	
Trumpets . . .	2	1.26	which harnessed to spare		12 Horses,	
Saddler . . . .		74	limbers.		&c.	
Wheelwright . .		84				
Smith . . . . .		84	<i>Note</i> —An increase of 12 gunners, 15			
Carpenter . . .		84	drivers, and 26 horses, added to Twelve-			
Farrier . . . . .		74	Pounder Brigade.			
Gunners . . . .		74				
Drivers . . . . .	134	74				
Total 181	150		Total of each Battery.			
			Twelve-Pounder	Guns	Men.	Horse
			Six-Pounder . . .	8	208	176
				8	181	150

## No. 3.—EFFECTIVE OF REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

Men, . 2899 . . .	Expense of pay, 1.137.729.60 francs
Horses, 2913 . . .	Total Expense, 3.796.000.00 . .

*Note.*—There also exist three battalions called "De Siege," of six companies each, making an effective of 1,347 men, and 59 horses; the expense of which amounts to 2,014,500 francs.

## APPENDIX E.

## ENGINEERS.

The Staff are paid the same as Artillery.

## ESTABLISHMENT OF BATTALION OF SAPPERS AND MINERS.

	No.	Horses. each.	Pay per Ann.		No.	Pay per Day.
Lieut.-Colonel .	1	2	6.300	Adj. N. C. . .	1	2.32
Major . . . . .	1	2	5.500	Standard-Bearer	1	2.32
Capt.-Adj.-Major	1	1	3.350	Drum-Corporal	1	1.16
Lieut.-Quarterm.	1	0	1.900	Master-Workmen	3	.95
Lieut. Clothier .	1	1	1.690	Serjt.-Majors . .	6	1.90
Surgeon . . . .	1	1	2.100	Serjeants . . . .	36	1.69
Assist.-Surgeon .	1	1	1.480	Quartermasters .	6	1.69
Captains, 1st class	6	3	4.200	Corporals . . . .	48	0.95
ditto, 2d do.	6	3	2.950	Vice-Corporals . .	36	0.74
Lieutenants . . .	12	2	2.100	Drummers . . . .	18	0.74
Sub-Lieutenants	6	2	1.680	Sappers, 1st class	150	74
				ditto 2d ditto	150	63
Total, Officers	37			ditto 3d ditto	600	63
				Total, R. & F.	1054	

## RECAPITULATION OF ESTABLISHMENT.

## CAVALRY.

## INFANTRY.

	Squadrons	Men.	Horses.		Regiments	Battalions	Men.
Guides . . . . .	4	720	650	1 Line . . . . .	12	60	56,400
1st and 2d Lancers . .	14	2480	2280	Chasseurs . . . . .	3	12	10,680
1st and 2d Lt. Dragoons	14	2480	2280	Partisans . . . . .	2	2	1,800
Cuirassiers . . . . .	9	1600	1460	Civic Guards . . . . .		34	20,400
Gens d'Armes . . . . .	3	540	490				
Total	44	7820	7160	Total		108	89,280

## ARTILLERY.

Field Batteries . . . . . men, 2899  
 Garrison Battalions . . . . . ditto, 1347

4246

*Note.*—Exclusive of Ambulance, Transport-train, &c., giving about 1200 men more.

## PONTON BRIGADE.

One Company . . . . . men, 137

## ENGINEERS.

One Battalion,—Total Staff, &c. &c. . 1131

## GENERAL RECAPITULATION.

	Remarks.
Staff . . . . . 245	
Infantry . . . . . 89,280	
Cavalry . . . . . 7,820	
Artillery . . . . . 5,446	
Pontoon Brigade . . . . . 137	
Engineers . . . . . 1,091	
•	
104,019	To this may be added invalid companies, depôts, hospital-staff and agents, workmen and artillery of Civic Guards, making about 110,000.

Since writing the above, a law (or *arrêté royal*) has been promulgated, fixing the pay and allowances of the army on a permanent footing. It coincides in almost all essentials with the tables we have given, and shows our statement to be nearly correct. This law has force from the 1st of Jan. of the present year, and we are bound to say it furnishes a most striking proof of the prudent administration of the War Minister, and of the liberality and paternal care of the government. Having stated that there was no "Widows' Fund," we eagerly seize this opportunity of correcting our error, as the law in question amply provides for widows and children under age, at the following rate;—

	Francs. per Annum.	Funeral Expenses.
Widows of Lieut.-Generals . . . . .	1690	430
„ Major-Generals . . . . .	1480	430
„ Colonels . . . . .	1270	320
„ Lieut.-Colonels and Majors . . . . .	1060	320
„ Captains . . . . .	650	220
„ Lieut. 1st and 2d . . . . .	640	220
Children under age . . . . .	0	



## SPAIN,

HER NATIONAL DECLINE COINCIDENT WITH THE DECAY OF HER  
MILITARY POWER.

IN the whole range of either ancient or modern civilization, there is no country richer in the historical associations, which engage attention and excite sympathy, than the "renowned, romantic land" of Spain. In the eventful volume of military story no one page more abounds in matter of deep and anxious interest, than that which records the varied fate and chequered fortunes of the Peninsula, during a period of more than two thousand years. It is not altogether that the imagination is excited at the contemplation of the extent and splendour of the dominion Spain had once attained to, and that we delight in tracing through all its stages the energy which could spread itself wide over the western world, and far into the regions of the east, at one and the same time. It was indeed the boast of Philip II. that on his dominions the sun never set: yet cannot the Spanish empire, even of his day, whether we regard the character of the different parts, or the magnificence of the whole fabric, bear comparison with that which a few years of rapid and brilliant conquest reared for the king of Macedon: or with the more matured and solid structure, the slow but sure growth of Roman courage and determination in the course of seven centuries: or even with the political edifice which has risen, broad and high, on the foundations of British wisdom and valour.

But if it be not the great extent of territory or amount of population, once subjected to the Spanish sceptre, that attracts deep notice from the historical student, still less can it be the length of period during which the monarchy retained its power and its lustre. The Spanish crown acquired no very pre-eminent splendour till near the commencement of the sixteenth century; and before its close, already had it suffered partial eclipse, and an obscuration from which it never afterwards completely recovered. The year 1492, which was distinguished by the expulsion of the Moors from their last stronghold in the kingdom of Grenada, and saw likewise a new world discovered and impressed with the token of Ferdinand's sovereignty, did certainly give promise of a long as well as illustrious era of glory; and yet in less than a century were seen ominous indications of the decline of Spanish power. The destruction of the Armada was a death-blow to the naval strength of Spain, and her armies in the Netherlands had only reaped failure and defeat from every effort to crush the rebellion, which the tyrannical bigotry of the Duke of Alva had created. But, if we except the sixteenth century, the period of meridian glory, and the reigns of the first three kings of the Bourbon family, when Spain was visited with some beams of returning prosperity, the record of her fortunes might lead us to consider her, from the time she first occupies a place in authentic history, to the present moment, as under some adverse influence, rendering the possession of the highest natural advantages useless or mischievous.

It is, however, this very circumstance, of the great disproportion between the fortune she has almost uniformly experienced, and that to which Nature and Providence would seem to have entitled her—it is, we say, the very infelicity of her lot which communicates an interest so

intense to the details of Spanish history. The elements of prosperity and greatness, which have been measured out to Spain with so liberal a hand—the extent of her available territory—the fertility of her soil—her inexhaustible mineral wealth—her favourable position for carrying on intercourse with the new world or the choicest parts of the old, should, we might expect, have placed her at the head of most other nations, in commerce, manufactures, and all the sources and accompaniments of wealth, power, and civilization. Every age, too, has evinced chivalrous honour and dauntless heroism to be an essential part of the Spanish character. At all times has the Spaniard shown himself possessed of a spirit which no adversities could subdue—of an energy of purpose and firmness of determination which could hold out under every disadvantage of circumstances, and every accumulation of misfortune. That a people, so highly favoured, both in point of external condition, and of mental and moral qualification, should yet have enjoyed so small a share of national prosperity, and possessed for so short a period political importance, may well assure us that “the race is not always to the swift, nor yet the battle to the strong.”

Spain has successively borne the yoke of the Carthaginian, the Roman, the Goth, and the Moor: but we know, notwithstanding, that this repetition of conquest can be ascribed to no want of a brave and determined spirit in her inhabitants. To secure a firm footing in the Peninsula, it cost Carthage, even in the zenith of her power, twenty years of continued warfare, supported with her undivided resources, and conducted by her three great military commanders, Hamilcar, Asdrubal and Hannibal, in succession. Carthaginian ascendancy was of short continuance: all traces of it were obliterated before the conclusion of the second Punic war. But though Rome so soon succeeded in supplanting her rival, it was only after the lapse of two centuries, and when Augustus had directed the whole force of the empire to the task, that the complete subjection of Spain was effected. In the interval, we meet with many an effort, long and well sustained, on the part of the natives, to vindicate their rights, and establish their independence. Year after year were the veterans of the Republic driven back over the Ebro with dreadful loss and complete discomfiture. We need not remind the reader of the total defeat of a Roman force of 30,000 men, with the slaughter of two-thirds of the whole, by a mere handful of Numantines, nor what determination signalized the defence of their city against 60,000 troops, commanded by Scipio, the overthrower of Carthage. But, perhaps, the clearest perception of what ancient Spain might have accomplished, with the energies of the population and the resources of the country concentrated, is obtained from the fact that Sertorius maintained his ground there for ten years, in defiance of the whole power of the Roman empire. The ablest and most successful generals of the mistress of the world, one after another retired from the contest, baffled and defeated, and Metellus, and even Pompey himself, were among those who sought for safety in the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees.

For the first four centuries of the Christian era, Spain enjoyed the repose naturally resulting from complete incorporation with the Roman empire; but, in turn, she also shared in the disadvantages of the connexion. She participated in the general degeneracy of character which paved the way for the successful irruption of the northern nations, and

thus became an easier conquest to the Goths, who in the end established themselves firmly in the Peninsula. These conquerors soon coalesced with the natives, the distinctive peculiarities vanished, and, by mutual intermarriages, as well as by the use of similar customs and institutions, the two races had altogether become one people, before the invasion of the Moors, near the commencement of the eighth century.

It was internal dissension and the treachery of a faction that first introduced the Saracens into Spain. That these champions of religion, who, within a century from their first assumption of the sword, were able to communicate a lasting impress of their valour and of their faith to the whole extent of Asiatic civilization—that these fanatical and experienced warriors, availing themselves of the mutual hostility of parties among the Spanish people, should have gained the superiority, and have long held it, once acquired, is surely not a circumstance to give rise to any feeling derogatory to the manly character of the subjugated nation. Such a feeling, indeed, we are forbidden to entertain, by the heroic tone which distinguishes the voice of Spanish history for the seven following centuries. No struggle for liberty was ever conducted throughout with the same unbending determination and unflinching perseverance that characterized the continuous and uninterrupted efforts of Spain for so lengthened a period, to expel the African intruder from her shores. No contest ever called forth minds of more powerful intellect, and of nobler purpose—none could lead to displays of purer patriotism, or acts of more devoted bravery. The Spaniard of to-day reverts with pride and exultation to the deeds of his fathers, and the national ballads still celebrate the triumphs of the Cross over the waning crescent:

“Teems not each ditty with the glorious tale?”

On a first view, it might reasonably appear a remarkable exception to the moral laws which regulate the course of human affairs, that a country, abounding in the means of prosperity and greatness, possessed by a brave and high-spirited population, should, for so many successive ages, have been pressed down by foreign dominion; and that even on occasions when an old master could no longer retain his hold, it should not have succeeded in loosing its neck from the yoke, and preventing the reins from falling into other hands. But the fact ceases to involve a mystery when we consider that, with the exception of the period, nearly a century, during which the Gothic monarch had sway over the whole peninsula, we have hardly another instance of the consolidation of Spain's resources, at least for her own benefit, previous to the reign of Ferdinand V. Division and disunion were, therefore, the sources of her weakness, and her efforts to assume her rightful place among the nations had failed, because there had been no simultaneous and continued exertion of her whole strength—nothing but the occasional outbreak of isolated and unsupported acts of heroism. The memorable occasion to which we have already alluded, when the undivided power of the peninsula was employed in its own defence, furnishes eminent proof that the concentration of its means was alone wanting to confer independence, glory, and empire. While Sertorius lived, to apply with effect the capabilities of Spain, and to keep up in the public mind a unanimous feeling of resistance to Roman domination, how often was the eagle—that had risen on the wings of victory over every other field—seen to ~~escape~~ <sup>escape</sup> from the Spanish conflict with drooping pinion and broken spirit!

In like manner, in the interval from the time when the whole peninsula was first brought under subjection to the Gothic throne, to the invasion of the Moors, Spain is allowed to have made rapid strides towards civilization as well as power. Her progress would undoubtedly have been greater had it not been for the complete disorganization, immediately preceding, which barbarian invasion had produced in every part of the Roman empire; but even so, there is no ground for believing that the Moors could have secured a position in Spain, but for the base treachery of the party that, rather than see the rival faction triumphant, preferred throwing their country into infidel and hostile hands. Neither is there any room for imputation on the warlike qualities of the national character in the circumstances connected with the commencement of foreign usurpation in Spain at any antecedent period. It was the division of the Spanish people into a number of distinct and independent petty states, that permitted Carthage to subjugate them, one after another, till, by a course of successive acquisition, she had become mistress of the finest provinces. The conquests made by this power passed directly over to the Romans, who proceeded in a similar manner to reduce the remainder of the peninsula by attacking the separate states in detail, an object, by the way, which was not entirely accomplished till the age of Augustus. When the northern nations made their first inroads into Spain, the country, it is true, was no longer split into a multiplicity of detached political communities, but a change had taken place still more fatal to its interests, and more favourable to the views of an invading enemy. The natives had been sunk, as it were, in a lethargy, for the four centuries previous; they had felt the effects of a long stagnancy—the tranquillity which they had enjoyed was not the consequence of precautionary measures of defence, by which they were prepared for danger, wherever or whenever it might appear, but it was the mere result of their connexion with that vast empire whose very name afforded protection even when it could no longer give real assistance. At no period of their history, therefore, do the people of Spain stand lower in the scale of military merit than at the overthrow of Roman power.

When we inquire, then, into the causes why the emancipation of the Spanish nation from the tyranny of foreign usurpation was effected little more than three centuries ago, we find the tardiness in achieving their independence to be attributable to no deficiency in the qualities of a noble and manly spirit, but to the want of a united application of the great capabilities both of the country and the population. Spain required, in a word, a firmly-established government, whose supremacy should have been acknowledged through the length and breadth of her territory, and whose summons might have called into operation, and directed to the accomplishment of one and the same object, the total aggregate of her resources. Had she uniformly enjoyed the advantage of a single sovereign power, consulting for her interests, instead of being broken into many distinct, self-governed states, or forming an appendage to an overgrown empire, the history of Spain might have presented a very different aspect from what it now does. She might, in that case, have defied the naval pre-eminence of Carthage; she might, we are even ready to say, recollecting what Sertorius did with Spain—have kept her ground firm, and finally successful against the imperial regions; she might have converted the Pyrenees into an insuperable barrier against

the savage hordes of the north—she might have fought all her battles with her African antagonist on his own shore, and beaten him on his own ground.

In fact, no sooner did the one sceptre possess sway from the Pyrenees to the Mediterranean, than Spain quickly proceeded to give proof of the great accession made to her ability and energy, by the political change she had undergone. She stretched her lengthened arms across the Atlantic, and added a mighty continent to her dominions. In less than a century after she was the only European nation mistress of an eastern empire. In Sicily, and Sardinia also, still floated her standard, while allegiance was at the same time paid to the Spanish crown both by the kingdom of Naples, which had first submitted to the conquering arms of Ferdinand V., and by the Milanese, who had been subjected by Charles V. The authority of Spain over the Netherlands we do not mention, because her title to them arose merely from an accidental matrimonial connexion with the House of Austria, and the acquisition of them, therefore, cannot fairly be considered as additional evidence of the strength and vigour that at one period characterised the movements of Spanish power.

But, in a comparatively short time, these characteristics of ability and force were no longer visible in the policy of Spain. Symptoms of decline had become manifest even prior to the death of Philip II.; but from this event to the accession of the Bourbon dynasty, there was only given to the world repeated, and still accumulating proof, that her arm was daily becoming more nerveless and less able to wield the sceptre lately swayed with such conspicuous energy. During this interval she lost half her possessions in the Netherlands, and to the subsequent assistance, afforded more than once by these very provinces, which had wrested from her an acknowledgment of their independence, she was materially indebted for the preservation of the remainder. About the same time, England inflicted a terrible blow on her supremacy in the Western world, by several important acquisitions, especially the capture of Jamaica; and previous to this the Dutch republic had deprived her of her chief settlements in the East. Before the close of the Austrian dynasty, Portugal also had ceased to be an adjunct to the Spanish crown; and finally, to complete the measure of Spain's humiliation, the latter part of Charles II.'s reign saw three foreign powers, without the least right of interference, agree upon a project for parcelling out the whole of her dominions, in accordance merely with the views of their mutual policy, and without any reference to the wishes of the monarch or the nation, whose prerogative was thus deliberately attacked.

When we look for the causes of so rapid a descent from grandeur and power, the Inquisition strikes our view, as the prominent and chief one. It was this that gave uncontrollable ascendancy to a church, which, at all times noted for the depth and consistency of its policy, has invariably treated every other consideration as of minor importance, in comparison with its own elevation, and has too often succeeded in subjecting the temporal to the spiritual power. This secret tribunal soon attained a jurisdiction and influence the most unlimited, and in proportion to the extent of its power was the terror created by its very name. No caution or vigilance, not innocence itself, was a security against its invisible attacks. Its concealed agents were everywhere on the watch to discover

the remotest tendency to that heresy, which, though the ostensible ground of impeachment, was, in truth, the convenient device through which inquisitorial vengeance reached its object. The Inquisition, therefore, was not only a point of union to the ecclesiastical power, but a mighty engine wherewith to undermine all rival interests. Through its operation the civil government of Spain was, to a certain extent, deprived of the supremacy, and, at times, might be justly considered as the organ for executing the plans and realizing the policy of the Church. There was thus behind the throne a power greater than the throne—there existed an irresistible, though unseen influence, not unfrequently assuming the control of the royal councils, and working for the adoption of measures, in which, if the national benefit was an object at all, it was only a subordinate one, while the chief aim was the advancement of ecclesiastical interests.

From the first establishment of the Inquisition we can distinctly trace in the course of Spanish policy a deeper colouring of religious bigotry, and a more determined purpose to make the most important national considerations subservient to the aggrandizement of an artful and ambitious hierarchy. In the expulsion of the Jews, who were the life and soul of Spanish commerce, we have proof that even the talent and sagacity of Ferdinand V. could not secure him against the artifices of ecclesiastical intrigue. The politic Charles V. himself, too, hardly escaped being made the dupe of his zeal for the spread of the Catholic faith. Had he not yielded in time to the necessity of adopting, with regard to the Netherlands, a more liberal policy than he had at first acted upon, even in his own reign might have burst forth the flame of rebellion, which, after all the efforts of the three succeeding monarchs to extinguish it, burned on, till it was converted into the more equable and steady light of independence. Into this contest was Spain precipitated by her religious intolerance—a contest which continued for fifty years to drain her of her wealth and population—which cost Philip II. the enormous sum, for those days, of 20,000,000*l.* sterling, and the loss of successive armies, the *élite* of Spanish chivalry; and which, in the two following reigns, still demanded exertions so far beyond the strength, and contributions so far beyond the means, of the nation, that the result was the complete exhaustion of Spain herself, as well as the loss of what she had so long contended for. When we add, that this revolt of the Netherlands was the immediate cause of the fall of Spanish dominion in the East,—that it established the necessity for the over-taxation, which led to the rebellion and ultimate independence of Portugal,—and that another consequence of the excessive pecuniary burdens imposed on Spain for the support of the war in the Netherlands, was an insurrection in Catalonia, and a disastrous contest with France; the reader will, we presume, agree with us, that the wretched state in which Charles II. left Spain, ought to be chiefly ascribed to the fatal ascendancy of an intolerant and intriguing church in her councils. It would be easy to swell the catalogue of national calamities flowing from the same source. Under Philip II. a rebellion in Spain, caused by religious persecution, cost the lives of 100,000 Moors, the most industrious and valuable of his subjects, and of 20,000 soldiers, the flower of his army. We will only mention further, that, by the last effort of ecclesiastical tyranny against the African population of Spain, 600,000 individuals were ex-

pelled ; who may be said almost literally to have carried with them the agricultural and manufacturing industry of the country.

As the late period at which Spain acquired independence and political importance arose from the want of a single sovereign authority to give harmony and unity to the national exertions ; so have we just seen that the shortness of the day of grandeur which did follow her subjection to one monarchy, the rapidity of her decline from meridian glory, is to be ascribed to the existence of an *imperium in imperio*,—a power stronger than the government itself, and permitting the adoption of such measures only as met the views of the politico-religious establishment, which branched out and spread its influence into every corner of the Spanish dominions.

But the events connected with the elevation of the Bourbons to the throne of Spain led to results productive of a favourable change in the position of the sovereign, and which had the effect of restoring him to a portion, at least, of his due supremacy. The long and arduous struggle in which Philip V. had to maintain his claims to the crown against the united strength of England, Austria, and Holland, roused the military spirit of the Spaniards, and placed a formidable army at the disposal of the government. The royal power, thus supported, was once more re-established in the ascendancy ; and the immediate consequence was, a new vigour infused into the political system of Spain. The contrast is, indeed, most striking between the energy of this and the imbecility of the last reign. The same nation which, under Charles II., had more than once owed its preservation from the rapacious ambition of Louis XIV. to the armed interposition of other powers, was beheld with amazement despatching fleets and armies in every direction, oftentimes to victory and conquest, during the whole length almost of the very next reign. The War of the Succession, which ended by seating Philip V. firmly on the throne, was but a few years passed when, even in the face of an alliance between England, Holland, France, and Austria, he boldly threw down the gauntlet to the emperor. Sardinia, the object of attack, was, within two months, in complete possession of the Spanish troops. Sicily was only saved from the same fate by Admiral Byng's defeat of the Spanish fleet in the bay of Naples. Philip, it is true, soon evacuated these islands, but not without obtaining an equivalent. The subsequent events of his reign, the lustre shed on the Spanish arms in the contest with the Barbary states ; the wresting of Naples and Sicily from Austria, and their occupation by Don Carlos, Philip's son, who was afterwards, by the treaty of Vienna, permitted to retain them as a separate kingdom ; the able and successful defence of the South American colonies against the power of Great Britain ; and the prodigious exertions of Spain, naval and military, in the war for the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, all these abundantly prove the new spirit which re-animated her dormant powers from the time that the arm of the executive was strengthened by the support of an effective army.

But at no period since the accession of the Bourbons, did Spain hold so distinguished a place among European powers as in the time of Charles III. How greatly she had increased in strength, appears conspicuously in the enlarged scale of her warlike operations in this reign. Europe was astonished at the powerful armaments which issued from the ports of Spain to defend her cause,—especially at those

directed against British power during the North American war. The successes, also, which obtained a treaty from Portugal, advantageous to commerce, and conducive to the security of the possessions in South America: and the favourable peace concluded with England, who, at the conclusion of the war, which made her American colonies independent, ceded the Floridas with Minorca to Spain, have justly contributed to gain admiration and give celebrity to the administration of Florida Blanca, the able adviser of Charles III. But the commercial, not less than the warlike policy of this statesman gives evidence of an enlightened and comprehensive mind. He put an end to the monopoly of the American trade, whereby a few leading merchants of Cadiz had been enriched so long at the expense of the nation, and threw open this wide field of mercantile enterprise to the principal sea-ports of Spain. The treaties concluded with the Porte, the Barbary states, and with Portugal, were likewise important steps towards the development of Spain's commercial resources; and, for the attainment of this object, which he was so anxious to arrive at, the last of these treaties in particular furnished great facilities.

There is, however, another name, seldom heard of in connexion with the rapid advance of Spain to prosperity and influence under Charles III., but which, nevertheless, has just claims to a considerable share of the fame which surrounds the memory of Florida Blanca. The individual to whom we allude is Count d'Aranda. He was a member of the military profession, and had chief command of the Spanish army that invaded Portugal at an early period of the reign of Charles III. He first acquired the confidence of his sovereign by the ability he displayed in suppressing the insurrections of the year 1776, which were attributed to the secret instigation of the Jesuits. He occupied a prominent place in the government for the six following years, and was author of many great and valuable reforms, whereby a foundation was laid for Florida Blanca's success as minister. The exertions of d'Aranda restored Spain to some degree of financial prosperity. The energy which pervaded the naval and military departments under his administration, even excited the apprehensions of Lord Rochford, at that time our ambassador at Madrid. His Lordship mentions, with concern, the increased efficiency of the army, as well as the great activity that prevailed in every dock and arsenal of Spain. The nation was also indebted to d'Aranda for measures of a different character, but hardly inferior in point of public utility. He colonized the Sierra Morena with foreigners, mostly Protestants;—he established schools for public instruction, the expulsion of the Jesuits having left Spain unprovided in this respect;—he was, besides, the first who gave the world an authorized return of the Spanish population. But to his successful efforts for making the ecclesiastical subordinate to the civil power, and for diminishing the authority and influence of the Inquisition, do we wish to point especial attention. The court, which could alone take cognizance of the conduct of the clergy, was freed from Papal dictation, whereby its decisions had been hitherto controlled, and placed in closer connexion with the crown. Other regulations, also, were introduced, to give the sovereign a firmer hold over his clerical subjects, and to make his authority really paramount throughout the whole nation. The Inquisition, especially, was submitted to the pruning-knife, and stripped of many of its usurped powers; and



though the pestilential tree was not completely rooted out, yet no longer did its branches send forth the same noxious influence, fatal alike to the energy of the government and the prosperity of the people. It was by these reforms, crushing the usurpations of the church and raising the crown to its proper supremacy, that d'Aranda prepared the ground for that re-establishment of Spain's greatness, to which the subsequent exertions of himself and of Florida Blanca were so successfully applied.

Our readers are aware how quickly the picture was reversed when once Godoy obtained power. His profligate and imbecile administration soon banished all appearances of the prosperity which the able advisers of Charles III. had created; and a thick gloom again hung over the destinies of Spain. Above all, the state of neglect, into which the army was permitted to fall, threw her, an almost unresisting prey, into the clutches of the French republic. The marine, the work of the preceding reign, received a severe blow in the decisive action off Cape St. Vincent, and a final and fatal one in the great battle of Trafalgar. Since then, Spain has continued to fall in political influence and retrograde in internal condition; and, were it not for the persevering and glorious struggle, which, with the paramount support of England, she maintained against the unprincipled usurpation of Napoleon, and in which she strove to sustain her claim to the heroism and chivalry associated with her name in antecedent history, we would be inclined to say, that with Charles III. had died everything elevated and excellent in Spain.

A connected view of the few leading points we have fixed on, leads us to distinguish two grand periods in Spanish history, the one separated from the other by the date of the final subversion of Moorish power in the Peninsula. The misfortunes of Spain in the former era arose from the numerous petty governments, each of which had appropriated a distinct and independent portion of her territory and population. A necessary result of this arrangement was, want of union and co-operation in the employment of her resources. In the latter period, though all Spain owed allegiance to one sovereign, the benefits, naturally following from concentration of the elements of wealth and power, were impeded and counteracted by the ascendancy of the ecclesiastical power, which overtopped and frequently controlled the throne itself. This predominant influence of the church we have distinctly traced as the grand cause of the rapid fall of the greatness of Spain. We have also seen, that the seasons when she was visited with the brightest glimpses of returning splendour, were likewise the times when the civil power was strongest and most independent of the ecclesiastical. An efficient army, the offspring of the hard struggle which placed the crown on the head of Philip V., became the instrument whereby his government was emancipated from a state of vassalage to the Catholic Church, and enabled to adopt that bold and decisive line of policy which did so much towards reinstating Spain in her former rank among nations. It was by a large military force, as well as by a more direct reduction of the overgrown dimensions of the spiritual power, that the government of Charles III. also acquired sufficient confidence in its own strength, to introduce and carry through so many important reforms in the internal administration. From the same source came that decision and energy which marked the foreign policy of this reign, and procured Spain greater advantages and a higher degree of respect and influence

than she had received at the hands of other states since the time of Philip II.

- If, then, it be permitted us to apply to *present circumstances* a little of that instruction, which we have derived from a careful and unbiassed perusal of Spain's history—if, thus qualified, we may suggest to the Spanish government, *at this critical period*,—not any particular course of policy, but a preliminary step, without which no administration can proceed with effect and success to provide for the tranquillity and improvement and happiness of the nation—we would say, in the very first place, and prior to all other considerations, let measures be taken to make the royal authority *de facto* paramount. Persons who have been used to hear of the present King of Spain as the most absolute of despots may think we are now recommending “to gild refined gold.” But, in reality, of all the European sovereigns, there is scarcely one, who has not enjoyed a larger share of independence of action in his public conduct, and a greater liberty to shape the policy of his government according to the dictates of his own judgment, or the counsels of a freely-selected ministry, than has fallen to the lot of Ferdinand VII. The Apostolicals, or Papists, have had the administration of the country in their hands, or at least under their control, for the greater part of the present reign; and the despotic measures, which have been carried into effect in Ferdinand's name, have, in truth, proceeded from the powerful party, to whose dictation he has been mostly obliged to submit. Occasionally he has, indeed, hesitated to go the extreme lengths which the violence of the Apostolicals would recommend, but it affords one some idea of their virtual supremacy, to observe, that the punishment assigned by them for these symptoms of independence was his own deposition, which they actually attempted in 1825, and the exclusion of his issue from the throne. Their desire to enforce the latter part of the penalty was very recently exhibited, and they appear prepared to sacrifice even the peace of the country to the accomplishment of their wishes.

While the government remains thus, overborne and beaten down, it were folly to expect any other result than has invariably followed from such a state of things in all former periods of Spanish history. Let then this grand obstacle to national regeneration, first of all, be removed—let papistical tyranny be overthrown, and let the same instrument be used, which has often before been successfully employed for a similar purpose. Let there be organized and maintained *now*, as under Philip V. and Charles III., an army powerful enough to establish the throne in undisputed supremacy, and adequate to the support of the government, in its efforts to secure universal and uniform obedience to the laws, and to promote the interests of the nation at large, without regard to the views of any confederacy, however firmly united or ably directed.

But Spain, it may be said, does not possess the means of keeping up a large military establishment; the government is even now quite unable to discharge its pecuniary obligations; and its financial embarrassments must soon end in national bankruptcy, if the expenditure be still further increased by any great addition to the standing army. Now, we reply, in the first place, that a sufficiently numerous and effective force could in all probability be maintained with the sum actually levied on the nation at the present time. Secondly, even though it should be necessary, for this purpose, to increase the amount of taxation, the people would be

more able to contribute a larger revenue after the augmentation of the army, than a smaller one before. Though not more than 6,000,000*l.* sterling are annually paid into the Spanish treasury, it has been calculated that double the sum is extracted from the pockets of the people in the name of government. The difference is appropriated by the collectors, of whom there are not fewer than 16,650, and who take this method of procuring for their services an adequate remuneration, that afforded by the state being indeed a miserable pittance. As government employs this host of public servants, from a desire to extend its influence and increase the number of its supporters, it is, for this reason, obliged to pass over those illegal exactions unnoticed. With a powerful army to uphold its authority, however, it would be no longer under the necessity of strengthening its cause by such indirect and pernicious means; but might discard at once such interested royalists, and apply to the public service the six millions a year, which they levy on their own account; and which would far exceed the additional expenditure incurred by the necessary increase of the military establishment.

But, in the next place, the very existence of a numerous and well-organized national force would enable the country to support a heavier taxation; and for this simple reason, that the arm of the law would then be strong-enough to afford industry that necessary protection, which at present can hardly be said to be known in Spain. In the year 1826, in Spain, there were 1223 individuals convicted of murder, 1773 of attempts at murder, and the convictions for robbery amounted to 1620. Now, when we consider that the difficulties in the way of bringing criminals to justice in Spain enable the one-half perhaps to escape, it may give us some idea of the present state of society there, to compare these authentic returns of crimes, actually punished in one year, with the total number (74) of convictions for murder and attempts at murder in England and Wales during the two years 1826 and 1827. Are we then too sanguine in supposing, that the mere presence of a national army, strong enough to enforce the execution of the laws, to give sufficient protection to life and property, and to render mutual intercourse and communication between the different parts of the country more secure, would be so far advantageous to industry and commerce, as in a short time to add considerably to the wealth of the nation?

It may be imagined by some that our remedy does not go to the root of the disease, under which Spain has so long suffered. They possibly think that all her misfortunes have arisen from the little political power possessed by the great body of the people; and they would suggest once more a trial of the Constitution of 1812. With us, however, the experiments already made are decisive. Twice within the last eighteen years has the voice of the Spanish nation declared this form of government, however beautiful in theory, to be totally unsuited to the existing circumstances of the country, and foreign even from the feelings and wishes of the people. Let it moreover be remembered, that, the second time judgment was given, the experience of three years had qualified the nation to pronounce the opinion.

## DOVER HARBOUR FROM THE EARLIEST TO THE PRESENT TIME.

DOVER, one of the chief of the Cinque Ports, has been a place of considerable national importance, from the earliest times of recorded history; but although this period carries us back no farther than the time of Julius Cæsar, when the town became a Roman station, still its capacious bay, its finely wooded hills, and its streams of fresh water, were advantages which pointed out this spot as eligible for a settlement to our British ancestors, a powerful array of whom was drawn up on these hills to oppose the landing of the Roman invader. From whence, or at what period of the world, came these aborigines of the land, is a question connected with the earliest epochs of history,—an event so shadowed and enveloped by the dense clouds which time has thrown around the origin of nations, as to be wholly impenetrable by man, who has nought to guide his researches save the fables of monkish historians, and the unsupported testimony of ancient chroniclers.

Under the Roman government this station acquired a high degree of eminence, on account of its situation on the Rhutapian shore, and its short distance from the coast of Gaul; from which local circumstances it was adopted, and has ever since continued, the chief port of intercourse between this kingdom and the continent of Europe. In the Saxon times it enjoyed many important privileges; among others—a most valuable one at that period—that whoever resided constantly in the town, and paid custom to the king, should be free of toll throughout England. Edward the Confessor granted the Barons of Dover a court for hearing and determining causes criminal and civil. In the ancient Domesday Survey, this town stands at the head of the county of Chenth (Kent); and the same ancient record provides that king's messengers, on their way to the continent, shall pay three pence for the passage of a horse in the winter, and two pence in the summer, the burghesses to find a steersman and one assistant, and if more were required, these were to be furnished at the charge of the king. This may be considered as the most ancient regulation of the price for a passage from England to France extant, and from this period Dover became the general port used by the government, and by the merchants and pilgrims, for embarkation and debarkation. In the reign of Henry III. the passage fare was two shillings for a horseman, and sixpence for a footman; and Richard II. confined the embarkation and landing of all strangers, pilgrims, and travellers on business, to this port by statute. The passage-boats were numerous, and are frequently mentioned in the records, under the various appellations of farecoats, crayers, passagers, and baylings; they paid two shillings each voyage, to what was termed the fareship box, the proceeds of which, under the direction of four warders, was appropriated to the maintenance of the wyke, or ancient harbour.

In the early periods of our history, Dover frequently presented a scene of splendour, activity, and magnificence, in the assembled fleets and armies of England, proceeding to the opposite coast for the chastisement of their country's foes. In 1189, that chivalrous prince, Richard I., embarked at this port for the Holy Land, with a hundred sail of ships and eighty galleys, and landed at Gravelines the same

night. In the year 1213, Dover presented a memorable scene of grandeur and weakness, of power and pusillanimity. Here that weak and vacillating monarch King John, who was then residing in the *Maison Dieu*, issued his precepts to the earls, barons, knights, and military tenants of the realm to assemble, and await a most unprincipled attack meditated upon the kingdom by Philip of France, at the instigation of that paragon of Christian meekness and humility, Pope Innocent III. The call produced one of those imposingly magnificent exhibitions of the power of England, for which she has ever been, and it is hoped ever will be celebrated. It brought together the whole naval and military force of the kingdom, in number so great that provisions could not be obtained for them; and after the dismissal of all such as were not completely appointed and equipped, there remained an army of sixty thousand men. Notwithstanding this fine and overwhelming force, John, whose kingdom was then under an interdict from Rome, and who knew that his enemy the Frenchman, besides a large army, had collected a fleet of seventeen hundred ships, of various sizes, for the purpose of invasion, was so harassed by fear and irresolution, that he chose the mean, disgraceful course of doing homage for his kingdom, before Pandulphus, the Pope's legate, to the more brave and honourable one of trusting to the fidelity of his troops, to the justice of his cause, and to the result of a contest for the kingdom foot by foot with the invader. John, having made his peace with the Church, the base services of the Frenchman were no longer required; however, as the latter had incurred great expense in equipping his military and naval force, and as his good friend the Pope merely laughed his complaint on this head to scorn, he persisted, notwithstanding the thunders of the Church, in prosecuting his attack on England; but our hearts of oak soon settled the affair; for the fleet, under the Earl of Salisbury, though vastly inferior in number, sailed from Dover, and attacked the French so vigorously in their harbours, that they took three hundred of the Frenchmen's ships, destroyed a hundred more, and would have given most accurate account of the rest, had not Philip saved them the trouble by setting them on fire himself.

The *Maison Dieu* was a celebrated religious house for the accommodation of the numerous pilgrims who passed through Dover on their way to Canterbury. It was built in the reign of King John, by Hubert de Burgh, Earl of Kent, Lord Chief Justice of England, and Constable of Dover Castle, a faithful subject and an honest minister, whose services and merits were very ill appreciated by his capricious sovereign.

As the ports and harbours of the kingdom are objects of the greatest importance to a maritime nation, so every particular concerning their ancient and present state,—their rise, their perfection, their decay, and the means for their restoration, must be subjects of the deepest reflection and interest to every man who has at heart the safety of the maritime population and the general prosperity of the kingdom. A good harbour is always desirable, whenever and wherever it can be obtained; but in a situation like Dover, no pains nor expense should be spared to gain one suited to the national wants. The present harbour, as is well known, is subject to a shingle bar across its entrance, and during heavy gales from the south-westward, is often rendered little better than use-

less. To remove this obstruction, many attempts have been made at various periods, and all without success, as will be shown in the sequel. In the reign of Edward the Confessor the harbour of Dover was on the eastern or opposite side of the bay to that on which the present one is constructed. It is supposed to have been merely a sheltered spot, without any erection for breaking the force of the winds and waves; and in the succeeding reign of William I. it was situated at the foot of the castle hill. The Domesday Survey records, that at "the entrance of the harbour was a mill which injures most of the vessels by the great agitation of the water—(*magnam turbationem maris*)—and occasions considerable damage to the king and his subjects—(*regi et hominibus*)—and it was not there in the Confessor's time." This fact is curious, because it proves the use of water-mills at that period in England, though I apprehend that it was not worked by the tide, as some have supposed, but probably by the stream which now forms the back-water for cleansing the present harbour, and which at that time discharged itself into the sea in a more easterly direction than it does at present.

The earliest attempt at constructing an artificial harbour on record, is in the reign of Henry VII., when John Clark, the Master of the *Maison Dieu*, knowing the great losses which mariners sustained in tempestuous weather, constructed, with the help of the king and the sailors, a pier or bank of chalk and earth, for the purpose of breaking the force of the sea, on the south-west side of the bay, which is the origin of the present harbour. So great was the comfort of this asylum to the seamen, that they called it *Paradise*. To break the force of the south-west winds, a round tower was erected on the end of it; and it was probably lengthened soon after it was finished, for a painting in Windsor Castle, of the embarkation of Henry VIII. in 1520, exhibits two round towers upon the mole or pier.

As these men worked on false principles, so their *Paradise* was of short duration, for in ten years the sea carried away nearly the whole of the pier and destroyed the harbour. Not only to be driven out of *Paradise*, but to see their *Paradise* destroyed, was certainly most unfortunate; but it is still more unfortunate that what to them proved a *Paradise* should have turned out a Pandemonium to after times. The free course of the water being stopped by this work, the shingle soon began to accumulate behind it; and to the obstruction so caused may be traced the origin of that bed of pebbles which now lies in the open bay, the dispersion of which has hitherto baffled all human ingenuity.

Having enjoyed security for ten years, a return to their former vexations and troubles was most acutely felt by the seamen, whose situation excited the compassion and roused the philanthropy of Sir John Thompson, another Master of the *Maison Dieu*, who advised the sufferers to lay their case before the King. Sir John drew up a memorial, and went to London with it; he also sketched the form of a more extended head to be run out into the sea, which he likewise laid before his majesty. Henry VIII., seeing the importance and value of a good harbour at Dover, received Sir John Thompson very graciously; and so well did the worthy knight plead the cause of his fellow-townsmen, that Henry advanced him 500*l.* to begin the work, which he undertook to complete, and appointed Sir John his chief engineer. A plan of this work is still in being: it consists of a head, 130 rods in length, with two parallel rows of piles, 26 feet in height, driven into holes cut in the

solid rock, and fastened together by bolts and straps of iron. Between the piles were placed large stones, brought from Folkstone; upon these were laid blocks of chalk, and over all, earth and shingle. Two groins were also constructed on the south-west side, between which were deposited large blocks of chalk, intended as break-waters to the force of the current; but these increased the facility of accumulation to a great extent: the groins filled with shingle to overflowing, and the superabundant quantity was driven round the end of their new works, and laid across the entrance of the harbour. To obviate this disadvantage, Sir John Thompson thought that by carrying the head out into deep water, the shingle would be obstructed from reaching the extremity of his works, or if any portion did reach so far, it would be washed onward across the bay. He submitted his plan to the King, who was very interested in the success of the work, and by whom the plan was approved. But the evil increased with the efforts for its remedy; and Henry, after spending fifty thousand pounds, died, leaving the works unfinished, and the harbour anything but a good one.

A remarkable instance of natural strength of mind and of untutored genius occurs as connected with this undertaking. The conveyance of the stone from Folkstone was found to be very expensive, for in those non-march-of-intellect days, it was thought that land-carriage was the only means of conveyance for a heavy material like stone. A poor fisherman, named Young, who was perfectly innocent of all the axioms of natural philosophy and the specific gravity of bodies, conceived, however, that water might be rendered serviceable to their views, in being made to convey even these large and heavy substances. His first experiment would have delighted the heart of Dr. Wollaston, it was on a scale so small and dapper. He tried whether a heavy body, like stone, could be borne up by water; and if it could, what quantity would float in half a walnut-shell. Finding his idea correct, he next tried the experiment in an egg-shell, and then in a small boat. The truth of his supposition being now proved, he communicated his success to Thompson, who saw the vast benefit he should derive from it, both in a saving of labour and expense. He, therefore, ordered a large vessel, which they called a gabboth, to be built immediately; and so pleased was the King with the ingenuity of Young, that he ordered him to receive a pension of fourpence a day for life.

However, all the efforts made at this period to obtain a good harbour, were worse than useless, because they not only failed in their object, but they tended greatly to increase the evil they were intended to remedy. The head of this pier was in the form of an irregular hexagon, and had a platform for guns to defend the entrance of the harbour;—this was called the Black Bulwark. Other works were also begun at this period, of which the one called the King's Foundation, which was sixty rods in length, was left unfinished, after it had been raised three fathoms in the water. It is now called the Mole Rock, and is a great nuisance in stopping the course of the shingle as carried along by the water.

Henry left no provision for the completion of the works; and although the necessity of a good harbour at this place was allowed, and such large sums had been expended on the works, they remained neglected through the ensuing reign of Edward VI.; the sea, therefore, made sad inroads upon them in so many places, that they were ren-

dered useless, and the town felt great distress for the want of a safe and convenient harbour. Under these circumstances, Queen Mary, of no very grateful memory, granted the town letters-patent to raise money throughout England for the space of two years; but the money so raised was insufficient to repair the breaches made by the sea and to clear away the shingle, which had collected in such a quantity across the entrance of the harbour, that a boat drawing four feet water could not enter it. This was the largest accumulation ever remembered, and appears to have excited much speculation and surprise as to the cause of it, although there was nothing extraordinary in the circumstance; for as they had increased the number and magnitude of their sea-works, which were built on wrong principles, so they had increased the means for a more extensive accumulation of the banks of shingle.

At the commencement of Elizabeth's reign the town, which had been very flourishing, was reduced to great distress, so that a representation was made to the lords of the council stating that unless the pier was repaired, and (still running their heads against error) two new groins added after the Dutch method, many of her highness's houses would be washed into the sea. Among those who thought that a good harbour could be made at this place was Sir Walter Raleigh, and the memorial was well received by the Queen and the council generally. This splendid princess granted the town the free exportation of three thousand quarters of wheat, ten thousand quarters of barley or malt, and ten thousand tons of beer; which privilege yielded 8666*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*, a large sum of money at that time; and it was wisely provided that, in order to prevent misapplication of the Queen's bounty, the Constable of Dover Castle, his lieutenant, and several gentlemen of the county of Kent should be appointed to superintend the works. On examining the inhabitants, the commissioners found that they had no plan worthy of notice either for the removal of the shingle collected or for preventing its future accumulation, and they very wisely determined to seek for some person who was acquainted with works similar to that placed under their direction and control. A person named John True was recommended to them, as being skilled in the Dutch and Flemish methods of erecting sea-works; and he appears to have understood his business very well, although he served the commissioners only for a short time. He recommended them to build a wall of stone across a part of the bay, for the purpose of penning a head of water, and by means of sluices to wash away the bar of shingle from the harbour's mouth. True expended 1300*l.* in squaring the stone necessary; and the commissioners, not being acquainted with the nature and cost of such works, thought he had not done sufficient, and that he was protracting the work; but True was really true to his employers, although they supposed him true to himself alone. The result was that he was superseded by a Fleming named Ferdinando Poins, who approved of all the plans of John True, and also proposed some additional works to the commissioners; but in the midst of their consultations a new engineer stepped forward, in the person of Mr. Diggs, of Wotton, who had presented a discourse to the Queen on the state of Dover harbour, and laid before her majesty several plans which he had drawn for its improvement. One of these was of a magnificent description, as it proposed to enclose the whole bay between two stone heads; it was, however, discarded, as being too expensive, and one on a smaller scale



taken into consideration. Another scheme, also, recommended the cutting a passage through the town, and the formation of a harbour in the meadows near Stembrook. This would have been as expensive as it was ridiculous. A plan by Mr. Diggs was finally adopted, which retained the old error of continuing the works originally begun by Thompson and Henry VIII.; but it provided a sluice, flood-gates, a lock, and a head of water for clearing the obstructions that might arise at the entrance of the harbour. The works were carried on with great spirit under the immediate superintendence of several gentlemen; and it is said that more work was performed in three months than would have been done in several years, if the ordinary routine had been followed. To defray the expenses, the Queen granted three pence a ton on every vessel loading or unloading in any port of the realm for seven years, three halfpence on every chaldron of coals, and the same sum on every grindstone landed for sale. With this revenue the harbour was enlarged, and made more commodious; but the great evil of all, the accumulation of shingle, remained unaltered.

At various times through the succeeding reigns the improvement of this harbour has engaged the attention of many noblemen, who have filled the distinguished office of Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. Among these Lord Cobham, the Earl of Northampton, in the time of James I., and the late Earl of Holderness, were very conspicuous. The former superintended the workmen, while laying down a sluice, and kept an open table for their encouragement. To enumerate all the attempts which have been made down to the present time to improve this harbour would be tedious and useless, as all have failed in the object desired. Mr. Rickalls surveyed it in 1782, and gave it as his opinion that a harbour could not be maintained without a much larger quantity of backwater than was at that time penned for the purpose; and he also thought that if the head was carried out farther it was probable the formation of a bar would be in a great measure prevented. The last experimentalist was an amateur engineer, of the name of Moon, who had been harbour-master for many years, at the time he thought it his duty to lay his plans and views before the commissioners, and to set all those right who had gone before him. His plans were approved; but on commencing operations he soon found that it was one thing to fancy himself an engineer, and another to be able to perform the requisite operations of one. He excavated with such heedlessness and want of judgment, and the water flowed in upon the men so much faster than he apprehended, or could control, that it was found requisite to call in Mr. Walker to remedy the error. Having rescued the Moon from the perilous influence of the water, he presented a plan for the completion of the works; but that of Mr. Moon, no doubt, from the vast superiority which he had already shown, was preferred; and so he continued to improve the harbour, and left it in the great state of perfection in which it now exists.

It has been stated that the accumulation of shingle which deteriorates the harbour at Dover, was caused by extending works into the sea, across the current, of which there is recorded proof. In 1581 an examination took place at Dover, by the Lord High Admiral of England, into the changes that had arisen in the bay since the erection of the works begun by Henry VIII.; and on that occasion the oldest seamen declared, "that, within their memories, the bay was open, and free

from banks of sand and shingle, and that the whole space was sea until the projections were made across the setting of the current." Such then was proved to be the cause of the evil. Now remove the cause, and the effect will probably cease. Replace the present projection into the sea by a head, as short as possible to be of real utility, and give it a form that will allow the shingle to pass onward with as little obstruction as possible; which might be done by giving to the new head the form of the line of curvature taken by the water in its progress round the bay. This form would be that of a small segment of a large circle, against which the shingle could never collect in any large quantity; and the small quantity that would occasionally lay would be readily washed away by the current. The other method of keeping an open harbour is by means of sluices placed in the heads, a system of which was detailed in a plan by the writer of this article, and presented to the Lord Warden in 1829, but cannot be made intelligible here unless accompanied with drawings.

In planning sea-works the necessity of following rather than opposing the natural course of the water is apparent; and it has been found that whenever this principle has been disregarded, evils of the worst description have always followed. A proof of this fact may be seen in a former paper on the Cinque Ports\*, where it is shown that the erection of the works by which Romney Marsh was gained from the sea, cost the kingdom the two harbours of Rye and Winchelsea, and materially damaged others.

T. W.

## SIEGE OF BADAJOZ IN 1812.

FROM THE REMINISCENCES OF A SUBALTERN.

THE soldiers were full of ardour, they anxiously counted the hours as they passed; and when at length, on the 8th of March, the order arrived for the march of the army to the Alemtejo, their joy was indescribable. Badajoz had ever been looked upon by them as unfriendly to our troops, and they contemplated with delight the prospect of having it in their power to retaliate upon the inhabitants their treatment of our men.

On the 9th, the army was in movement; the light division opened the march, followed by the third and fourth; they crossed the Tagus by a bridge of boats, thrown over that river at Villa Velha and pressed rapidly forward towards Elvas. One division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry remained on the Agueda.

On the 14th, the light and third divisions were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Elvas; they were joined by the fourth division on the following day, while the remainder of the army, under Hill and Graham, were pushed forward to Llerena, Merida, and Almendralejo, to observe the motions of the duke of Dalmatia, who by this time was informed of the preparations—though not to their full extent—that had been formed against Badajoz.

The city of Badajoz, which had already been the theatre of two sieges, arising out of the first of which one of the most sanguinary

battles of modern times, considering the numbers engaged, was fought—subsequently, the scene of a great reverse to our troops—and *now* about to be the grave of several thousands of the flower of the British army, is a considerable town in Spanish Estremadura. The great efforts that were made on the part of the English general to possess himself of it, as likewise the obstinate pertinacity with which it was defended by the enemy,—which, taking into account the losses on both sides, including the battle of Albuera, cost the armies of the two nations a loss of men of between twenty-five and thirty thousand veteran soldiers, sufficiently mark it to the reader as a place worthy of his notice. It stands on a point of land at the union of the rivulet of the Rivellas with the Guadiana, the former a tributary stream, meandering round the south-east of the fortress, and passing close to the ravelin called San Roque, which forms a sort of *tête-du-pont* to a bridge that protects the entrance to the gate named *El puerto del Talavera*, and covering a reservoir and sluice on the Rivellas which finally empties itself into the Guadiana. A bold and rocky height, one hundred feet above the level of the river, at this point upwards of two hundred and fifty toises in breadth, is out-topped by an old Moorish castle which stands above the other works, and overlooks the junction of the Rivellas with the Guadiana, lording it, in a manner, over the entire. The fortifications of the castle consist of a wall without ditch or counterscarp; but the curtains and bastions are regular, and their height upwards of thirty-five feet—in many parts the wall is nearer forty than thirty-five feet high, owing in some measure to the inequality of the ground, but principally in consequence of a trench having been sunk (where the soil, which is very rocky, would admit of it) since the former siege. Besides this, there were two outworks on the left of the Guadiana, one called La Picurina, within 250 toises of the body of the place and standing on the right bank of the Rivellas; the other, a fort named Pardaleras, distant only half that space from the walls of the town, and situated between the lower Guadiana and the fort of Picurina. On the right bank of the river is the hill and fort of San Christoval—so memorable, and so disastrous to our arms in the siege of the former year\*—to which outwork had been added another, built on the site where our batteries stood when that fort was so gallantly, yet so fatally attacked by the seventh division: this new work was called Moncœur; and there was another fort at the head of the Roman bridge, standing a gun shot below San Christoval, but feeble, being commanded on every side. Those works formed the exterior defence of Badajoz, and were, as well as the town itself, in the most efficient state.

On the 16th of March, everything being in readiness, a pontoon bridge was thrown across the Guadiana; fifteen thousand men broke up from their *bivouack* at Elvas, and advanced towards the river; the enemy disputed the ground, and here—even here, with only a handful of cavalry opposed to us—the French horsemen had actually the best of it, and kept us at bay during a march of three hours!—At length we gained the river's edge—passed the bridge—drove back the enemy's outposts and completed the investment. The following day, the ponton, accompanied by his engineers, carefully re-

\* See United Service Journal, July, 1831. Page 335-6.

the place. He found its aspect materially changed—the parapets of the castle had been considerably raised—the outworks of Pardaleras and Picurina much strengthened, and a great portion of the ditch filled by the inundation of the Rivellas, which was easy of accomplishment by means of the sluice at San Roque.

The point of attack which his Lordship decided upon, notwithstanding the advantages which were on the side of the enemy, was quite at variance with that of the preceding year, so it must be naturally presumed that the former was found to be faulty. Then, the outworks were by no means so formidable as now on the side about to be assailed, while, on the other side, the scene of the former attack, little progress had been made towards its amelioration. At the time the siege was undertaken in 1811, it was urged by the Engineers that the fortifications on the side of the castle were confined to a simple wall; that the interior of the castle was commanded by the fort of San Christoval on the right bank of the river; and that, once in possession of the fort, we could as completely command the castle as it did the remainder of the works of the fortress, or,—in other words,—that all resistance on the part of the enemy must be futile. The attack against San Christoval the preceding year failed, it is true, but why did it fail? Any person who is curious to know, has only to read the United Service Journal for July, 1831, pages 335-6; if they do so, they will learn the cause of the failure.

From what I have written, it will be seen that the town of Badajoz was deemed a prize worthy of contention; that Lord Wellington had left nothing undone, as far as in him lay, to ensure success, and that the enemy, on his part, had been far from inactive. Our battering train, as compared with the former siege, was formidable indeed, but nevertheless the entire number of guns did not exceed forty—of the best description, no doubt, being metal guns of the largest calibre—while the batteries, on the enemy's side, counted more than three times that number, without taking into account the cannon he had at his disposal to succour his batteries, as they might require such aid, by placing his guns *en barbette*, or in any other way that might best suit his purpose. To reduce a town so circumstanced, supposing every requisite means existed, would have occupied more time than could, under existing circumstances, be spared; because the Duke of Dalmatia might readily assemble 40,000 men, while the Duke of Ragusa, with an equal force, could co-operate with him; and if, by a protracted affair, Badajoz was not carried before the junction of those two armies, it was clear that we must give it up altogether, or encounter an army more than double our own numbers, and in a country, too, decidedly favourable for cavalry, in which arm the French had a vast superiority. Lord Wellington, therefore, resolved to hazard the trial—which, all things considered, offered a fair chance of success—and decided, after a minute examination of its defences, to attack Badajoz on the side of the fort of Picurina, from which point the part of the wall that embraced the bastions of Santa Maria and La Trinidad could be seen across the inundation.

The evening of the 17th of March had scarcely closed, when three thousand men broke ground before La Picurina, at the distance of one hundred and fifty yards. The night was unusually dark, the wind was high, and the rain fell in torrents—all of which favoured the enterprise. The soldiers, accustomed to fatigues, and knowing by experience, if for

nothing but their own safety, the necessity of getting on rapidly with their work, exerted themselves to their utmost, and when the grey dawn of morning made its appearance, the enemy beheld, with surprise, through the mist that surrounded them, the first parallel of our works completed, without their having anticipated it, or having thrown one shot in the direction of our workmen; but as the fog cleared away, it was too palpable to be misunderstood, that, despite of the sagacity of General Count Phillipon and his devoted garrison, a line of circumvallation had been cut close to one of the best of his outworks, without his having the remotest idea of the attempt. The different alarm-bells in the town rang a loud, if not a *merry*, peal, and in less than half an hour a tremendous cannonade was opened upon us, from the guns of the fort, as well as the town itself. Some men were killed, and several wounded, but, excepting this, no loss was sustained; the works were uninjured, their progress unimpeded, and this, our *first* attempt, for the *third* time, was crowned with that unlooked-for success which was a good omen for the future.

The entire of the 18th, the rain continued to fall, and the trenches were already nearly knee-deep with water, but by the great exertions of the engineers, and the persevering resolution of the soldiers, the works were pushed on with extraordinary vigour, the earth not being as yet sufficiently saturated to lose its consistency. On the night of the 18th, it rained still more heavily; nevertheless some guns were dragged through the slough by the soldiers into the batteries marked out to act against La Picurina, and the following morning the works were in that forward state as to cause the French governor much alarm for the fate of this outwork. Towards mid-day on the 19th, a dense vapour, issuing from the Guadiana and Rivellas, caused by the heavy rains that had fallen, made Count Phillipon consider the moment a favourable one to make a rush into our works; he accordingly placed two thousand chosen troops at the different gates and sally-ports with fixed bayonets, ready to storm the batteries at a given signal. At this time our soldiers were working in the trenches, nearly up to their hips in water; the covering party were too distant to afford immediate relief if required to do so, because they were kept out of the wet ground as far as was consistent with the safety of our lines; and the soldiers that composed the working party were in a helpless and defenceless state, their arms and appointments being thrown aside. I happened to be in the works on this day, and having a little more experience than the officer who commanded the party, I observed with distrust the bustle which was apparent, not only in the fort of Picurina, but also along the ramparts of the town. Without waiting the formality of telling the commanding officer what I *thought*, I, on the instant, ordered the men to throw by their spades and shovels, put on their appointments, and load their firelocks. This did not occupy more than three minutes, and in a few seconds afterwards the entire trenches to our right were filled with Frenchmen, the workmen massacred, and the works materially damaged; while at the same moment, upwards of five hundred men attempted to throw themselves into the battery we occupied: but the workmen were armed and ready to receive them; they had just been placed—I must say it, for it is the truth—by me, in a posture not only to save their own lives, but the battery also. The Frenchmen advanced with that impetuous burst so

well known to those who have witnessed it, and so difficult to stand before by any. They had a double motive to urge them on on this occasion, honor had a forible auxiliary in the shape of a dollar, which they were to receive for every pick-axe or shovel they carried out of our trenches, and well as I know the French character, it is difficult for me to say which of the two, honour or avarice, most predominated upon the present occasion; I shall only say that it is my firm conviction—and I judge from the spirit of the attack, that *both* had their share in stimulating those heroic and veteran plunderers to seek for a footing within our trenches, for I never saw a set of fellows that sought with greater avidity than they did, the spades and shovels that were thrown aside by our men. Lieutenant Drury of the 88th and Lieutenant White of the 45th pursued them almost to the glacis of the town; and had the movement been foreseen, there can be little hazard in saying, that, with a sufficient supply of ladders at the moment, the fort of Picurina could have been carried by the workmen alone, so great was their enthusiasm, with a less loss of lives than it cost us (after six days' labour) on the 25th!

The sortie had been well repulsed at this point, but higher up, on the right, we were not so fortunate: the workmen were surprised, and, in addition to the injury inflicted upon the works, a great loss of men and officers was sustained before the covering party reached the spot. General Picton soon after arrived in the battery where I was stationed, and seemed to be much alarmed for its safety, not knowing, in the confusion of the moment, which was great, that the enemy had attacked it, and had been driven back; but when he learned from me, that the workmen alone had achieved this act, he was lavish in his praises of them, and spoke to myself—for him—in very flattering terms; but there was an austerity of demeanour, which, even while he gave praise,—a thing he seldom did to the Connaught Rangers at least!—kept a fast hold of him, and the caustic sententiousness with which he spoke rather chilled than animated. He was on foot, but his *aide-de-camp*, Captain Cuthbert of the Fusileers, was mounted, and while in the act of giving directions to some of the troops, (for by this time the whole of the besieging force, attracted by the cannonade, was in motion towards the works,) he was struck in the hip by a round shot, which killed his horse on the spot, leaving him dreadfully mangled and bleeding to death. This officer was a serious loss to General Picton, and was much regretted by the division; he possessed all the requisites for a staff-officer, without that silly arrogance—the sure sign of an empty mind, as well as head—which we sometimes meet with amongst the gentlemen who compose the *état major* of our army. We lost in this affair about two hundred men, many of whom were cut down in the works, and several in the dépôts far in the rear, by a body of the enemy's light cavalry that galloped out of the town at the moment the sortie commenced. Absurd as this may read, it is nevertheless true: the garrison of Badajoz, cooped up within its walls, without a foot of ground that they could call their own beyond the glacis, and, in a manner, begirt by an army of fifty thousand men, were—by their admirable arrangement of their forces, or—by the superlative neglect of our people, enabled to ride through our lines—unopposed by a single dragoon!—from right to left! Brilliant, however, as was this exploit, it was of no such service to the garrison: their loss exceeded four hundred men, and the capture of a few dozen of

spades and shovels but ill repaid them for so great a sacrifice of lives, at any time valuable, but in their present position, doubly so.

The sortie being at length repulsed, and order once more restored, the works in the trenches were continued under a torrent of rain and fire of artillery. Lieutenant White, of the 45th, who had been much distinguished in the batteries, was struck by a shell, (without a fuse,) on the head, which killed him on the spot; he was reading a book at the moment, and Lieutenant Cottom, of the 88th, who was sitting beside him, was so covered with his blood, that it was thought at first he had been frightfully wounded.

Up to this time the fall of rain had been so violent as to threaten the total failure of the operation; it had never ceased since the 17th, and the trenches were a perfect river; the soldiers were working up to their waists in water, and the fatigue and hardships they endured were great indeed—but there was no complaint—not even a murmur to be heard! and Lord Wellington might be seen in the midst of his soldiers, sometimes with his beard unshaven. Those,—ignorant people I admit, and quite unworthy of any rational persons taking the trouble to reply to their fooleries—who have the presumption to call Lord Wellington “a general of fortune,” had *they* seen him, as thousands of his companions have, at this same siege, worn down with fatigue of body and mind, giving himself up wholly to an operation of such momentous consequence, not to his own country alone, but to Europe generally,—had those persons, I say, seen him *then*, it is to be hoped, for their own sakes at least—for such creatures can have no national feeling—that they would not give their tongues the license they do. • Poor ignorant idiots! The fame of this great man—this first of generals—is too firmly established to be blighted by their slanders, and will, despite of factious renegades, be handed down to posterity, so long as an Englishman—*worthy of the name*—shall be found on the face of the earth.

The next day, the 22nd, the pontoon bridge over the Guadiana was carried away by the floods which the late rains had caused in the river, and the stream became so rapid that the flying bridges could not be made use of, and, in short, all supplies from the other side were cut off. In the trenches, matters were in as bad a state, for the earth no longer retained its consistency, and it was impossible to get it into any shape. On the 24th, however, the weather happily settled fine, and much progress was made towards forwarding the works; but this, and the following day, were perhaps two of the most dreadful recorded in the annals of sieges. The soldiers laboured with a degree of hardihood, bordering on desperation, while the engineers braved every danger with as much composure as if they either set no value upon their lives, or thought their bodies impregnable to shot or shell. In proportion as our works advanced, the enemy redoubled his fire, and the attempt made by us to drag the heavy guns through the mud, or to form magazines for the gunpowder, was almost certain death; but not content with the destruction which his fire carried throughout our ranks, Count Phillipon brought to his aid a battery from San Christoval, which he placed close to the edge of the river; the fire of this battery completely enfiladed our works, and rendered it difficult and hazardous for the workmen to keep their ground. Half a battalion was ordered down to the water's edge, and the effect of their

fire against those guns was soon appreciated by the soldiers in the batteries; the cannonade of the enemy lost its effect, their fire became irregular, their shot passed over our heads, and finally they were compelled to limber up their park of artillery, and retrace their steps, at a gallop, up the Christoval height. Nevertheless, this battery did an incalculable hurt to us; many men were struck down by its fire, but, above all, our engineers suffered the most. This was a loss that could be but ill spared, for we were so scantily supplied with this description of force, that it was found necessary to substitute officers of the infantry to act as such during the siege. Those officers were very zealous in the performance of the dangerous duties they had to fulfil: some had a tolerable knowledge of the theory, but none, if I except Major Thomson of the 74th, and one or two others that had served at Rodrigo, knew anything of the practical part, and those strove, by great intrepidity, to make up for their other defects; they exposed themselves to every danger, with a bravery bordering on fool-hardihood, and consequently, under such a fire as we were exposed to, scarcely one escaped death. Lieutenant Fairtlough of the 5th, and Ramage of the 74th, both acting engineers, were cut asunder by a round shot from the San Christoval battery; others, whose names I forget, shared the same fate, and several were wounded.

Towards three o'clock in the afternoon our works had been materially advanced, several small magazines were in progress, the batteries destined to act against La Picurina were armed, and the losses which we sustained amongst our engineers repaired by the arrival of others to replace their fallen companions. It was at this time, while I was seriously occupied with thirty men, in covering with boards and sand-bags a magazine which had been, with great labour, formed during the forenoon, that a shell of huge dimensions exploded at the entrance of it. There were, at the moment, above a dozen or so of the Staff Corps and engineers, with some of the line, placing a quantity of gunpowder in the vault which had been prepared to receive it. The roof of the magazine was, in defiance of the dreadful fire which was incessant upon this point, crowned by a few soldiers of the party under my command; some kegs of gunpowder, which were at the entrance of the cave, unfortunately blew up, destroying all at that side of the magazine, and, hurling the planks which were but in part secured upon its top, together with the men that were upon them, into the air, caused us a great loss of lives and labour, but fortunately the great store of powder which was inside, escaped. The planks were shivered to pieces, and the brave fellows that occupied them, either blown into atoms, or so dreadfully wounded as to cause their immediate death; some had their uniforms burned to a cinder, while others were coiled up in a heap, without the vestige of anything left to denote that they were human beings. An 88th soldier, of the name of Cooney, barber to the company he belonged to, escaped the effects of the explosion, unhurt, except a slight scratch in the face, caused by a splinter from a rock that had been rent in pieces by the blowing up of the magazine; he was an old and ugly man, but yet so vain of his personal appearance, as to be nearly in despair at the idea, as he said, "of his good looks being spoiled." While he was in the midst of his lamentation, a round shot struck his head and carried it off his shoulders, when one of his companions ex-



claimed, with that humour which none but an Irishman could possess at such a time.—“Well! upon my sowl, he was always an ugly-looking cratur, but *now* he’s the very devil!” all the men laughed, and said, “It was *thrus* for him he was.” Those—ill-timed, some will say—jokes may appear, to many, out of place, but they are not so nevertheless; it is much better that soldiers while enduring fatigues, and braving dangers such as those I am describing, should have a light and cheerful bearing, and it is plain that he who passes his joke in this manner against his fallen comrade stands a fair chance of being similarly placed himself, without any risk of his taking *offence at it*! It is this gaiety of demeanor—this steel-hardiness in moments of peril—that makes soldiers, in the true acceptance of the word, what they ought to be. No matter what a man’s feelings may really be, he should, and must stifle them, because it is well known—at least to those who have seen service—how readily the opinions of a few act upon the great mass of the multitude; and if soldiers were to indulge themselves in mourning over the dead bodies of their fallen companions, it would act like a contagion, and it would be difficult to say how the great body might be infected by it. The Duke of Wellington was never known to pay attention to the reports carried to him of the fall of any of his officers: no more was Nelson. At Trafalgar, when his ship, the *Victory*, was along side of the Spanish *Santissima Trinidad*, one of the first discharges from this mountain of floating timber killed eight men on the quarter-deck. Nelson quietly turned round to his captain, and said, “This is too good to last long.” Yet Nelson was a man of such humanity, and tenderness of feeling, that he was never known to remain on board of his ship when a sailor was to be punished; and at Waterloo, it is affirmed by French officers, and more than hinted at in the bulletin detailing that battle, that the cry of “*Sauve qui peut!*” raised by a few obscure individuals, was the cause of its loss to the French army. However, averse as I am to such conduct, I will not—although not a “Waterloo man”—go the length that my French acquaintances have done, because I verily believe that, at the time the cry of “*Sauve qui peut!*” was raised at Waterloo, it was just about the same service to the Imperial army as the warning given by a Lisbon *femme de chambre* when she has discharged the contents of a certain machine, that shall be nameless, upon the head of some ill-fated passenger—or, to speak more plainly, *when the advice came too late!* The French cannoneers were loud in cheering when they discovered the effects of their fire upon Cooney’s sconce; our men cheered in turn, and continued to crown the top of the already half-dismantled magazine, but as fast as they mounted it, they were swept off its face by the overwhelming fire from the town: yet, notwithstanding the great loss of lives that had already taken place, and the almost certain death which awaited all who attempted to remain on the magazine, it was never for five minutes unoccupied, and by four o’clock in the afternoon it might be said to be perfectly finished. Baffled in his endeavours to stop our progress, Phillipon was determined to make it cost us as dear as he could. Twelve additional guns were brought from the unemployed batteries and placed along the curtain *en barbette*. These, at half-range distance, without the means on our side to reply to them, were fired with a fearful precision; it was next to impossible to stand under it, but the soldiers, on this day, surpassed all their former efforts. The fire of one hundred

pieces of artillery was employed in vain against them; the works were repaired so soon as injured, and everything warranted the opinion, that, should the night prove fine, our batteries would open the following day.

Captain Mulcaster, of the Engineers, by his heroic conduct, stimulated the soldiers wonderfully; no danger could unnerve him, or prevent his exposing himself to the hottest of the French fire, and for a time he escaped unhurt, but at length, while standing on a rising ground, in front of the battery No. 1, a twenty-four pound shot struck him in the neck, and carried away his head and part of his back and shoulders. The headless trunk was knocked several yards from the spot, but was speedily carried to the engineer camp by some of the brave men who, but a few short moments before, looked upon what was now an inanimate lump of clay, with that admiration naturally inspired by one of the finest, as well as the most intrepid young men in the army; for he had endeared himself to the soldiers as much by his kind manner to them, as by his total disregard of danger to himself. It is well known that infantry soldiers had a great dislike to being placed under the control of the engineer officers, who exacted, or at least they thought so, too much from them, but Captain Mulcaster had a manner, peculiar to himself, that gained him the good-will of all.

Major Thomson of the 88th, soon after fell. He was observing a party of the enemy who were rowing a *bateau* across the inundation of the Rivellas with a reinforcement of men intended to succour the troops that occupied the ravelin of San Roque. This operation, although embracing but a small portion of the garrison, was one of a very delicate nature, inasmuch as the distance between our works, and the inundation, was so short as to enable us to command with musketry its entire span; but the governor, ever ready in strategy, provided against even this chance of his plans for defence being marred. He caused to be constructed a large *bateau*, or, perhaps, more properly speaking, a raft. The side of it which faced our lines was raised by light poles to the height of four feet, through which were intertwined wattles of osier; by this means, a support sufficiently strong, without being too cumbrous to impede the movement of the raft, was completed, and the inside was carefully padded with hay, or such light matter, as was a sufficient defence against musketry without any danger of the machine's losing its centre of gravity. To impede as much as possible this operation, several hundred riflemen were placed in advance, and so soon as the machine was discovered in motion on the water, a heavy fire was opened: a corresponding demonstration was made by the enemy, sustained by several batteries, and those mutual efforts were always productive of a heavy loss of lives on both sides, but particularly on ours, because the enemy's line of musketry commanded us at a distance of three hundred and fifty yards, and up to this time we had not one gun to answer their powerful salvos. Major Thomson, who was in command of the riflemen, was in conversation with an *aide-du-camp* belonging to the staff of Marshal Beresford at the moment he fell; a musket ball struck him in the right temple, and passing through the brain, killed him on the spot. He had been but just gazetted to his majority, by purchase; and had served with the army from the campaign in Holland in 1794, to the moment of his death, without ever having been absent from his regiment in any of the battles in which it had been engaged, a few of

which have been recorded in my *Reminiscences*. Captain Seton, an officer of precisely the same standing and services, succeeded him in the command of the 88th, and led his regiment up the ladders on the night of the storming of Badajoz, but he gained no promotion, except in his regular tour! and he has told me that he was the *only* commanding officer of a battalion in the third division that did not get a brevet step!

Near the spot where Thomson fell, an officer of his regiment named North met his death, and, as it was one of great singularity, I shall notice it out of the many that occurred on this fatal day. He was struck in the cheek by a round shot; the under part of his face and a portion of his throat were carried away, leaving the upper part perfect, which hung down in a hideous flap like a deformed mask. He was carried to the hospital, where I saw him two days afterwards, not only alive but sitting upright against a wall; he was perfectly sane, and recognised my voice; he endeavoured to speak to me, but the effort he made inexpressibly shocked me. The voice, in place of issuing from its natural channel, the mouth, but mouth there was none, came spectre-like from the chest, and more resembled the howling of some wild animal than the voice of man. He did not survive the night, and died after a violent effort of nature to sustain life, which he had done for more than fifty hours, giving a proof of the awful capability of suffering that exists in our frame, and faithfully bearing out the writer who says that "many are the shapes of death, and many are the ways that lead to his grim cave—all dreadful."

The evening of a day—never to be forgotten by those who witnessed it—at length began to close; the shades of night soon rendered our lines invisible to the enemy, and under its cover, the men who had been at work for so many hours were withdrawn to the camp; two thousand fresh soldiers replaced them and carried on the duty in the trenches until the dawn of morning, at which time they presented a formidable appearance. Two batteries of thirty-two pounders were unmasked at the distance of one hundred and fifty yards from La Picurina, and ere the sun was clearly distinguishable on the horizon, a violent cannonade commenced against that outwork. It was replied to with vigour, not only from the fort itself, but the batteries of the town also. On this day I was attached to the engineers; but the fatigues I had undergone the preceding one, caused me to sleep soundly, and in truth I had great need of repose, so it was late ere I proceeded to the engineer camp to report myself to Colonel Fletcher, the commanding officer. On my way thither I was much amused by a dialogue which took place between a soldier of the light division, one of the 43rd I think, an Englishman, and a young man who afterwards turned out to be a commissary's clerk—for almost all those fellows who afterwards made such sums of money, and some of them who became so intolerably presuming as to cut their old acquaintances, came out to the Peninsula in this character. The young clerk was attached to the light division, and wished to know from the soldier (whom he recognised by his uniform as belonging to it) whither he was to bend his steps in order to find it. I shall give the conversation word for word, as nearly as I can now recollect after so great a lapse of time.

*Commissary.* Pray, my good fellow, don't you belong to the light division?

*Soldier.* No, Sir, I belong to *the* division.

*Commissary.* Why what division is that? I never heard of it before.

*Soldier.* Have you been long with the army, Sir?

*Commissary.* I have only this morning joined it.

*Soldier.* I thought so!

*Commissary.* Why what has that to do with my question?

*Soldier.* As you seem to be but a young hand—or as we call it in this here army—a green horn—I'll just tell you all about it. This here army is composed of seven divisions, and I'll tell you all about 'em and their names—at least the names that *we*, soldiers, have given them. Ours is called *the* division, because as how we think ourselves the *crack* one. Then there's the first division; those we call the *gentlemen*, because they are made up of Guardsmen and Germans, and His Majesty (God bless him!) is fond of his body-guard, and likes to have good care taken of them; and the Germans he likes as well as the guards, because they say his own mother was a German bred and born. *These chaps* have the snuggest berth in the army. The second division is a corps of observation like, we never see 'em, though we sometimes hear about 'em. The third is the *fighting* division—and the fourth 'ed fight if they were axed! The fifth come up to a town *after* we have taken it, and all useful enough. The sixth are scattered over the country, here and there,—and the seventh are trying to get them together, and this is the way the army is in this here *Island*! "Why truly, my friend," replied the commissary, "your description is amusing enough; but as I have nothing to do with the *fighting* merits of the army, it does not concern me. In a word, I am a commissary, and wish to know where I am to find your division, to which I am attached." "A *Commissary* are you? why then bless your stars that you did not join the division when the brave Bob Crawford—black Bob we used to call him—commanded it; it was he as knowed how to whop a thriving commissary! Why look ye, Sir, I knowed him once myself to throw one of them 'ere chaps neck and shoulders out of a vinder, and it is said, though I don't know it for sartin, that he whopped another in such prime style, the poor cratur ever after looked so *promiscuously*\*, I may say, when he met Bob, that he quitted *the* division, and went—if all as was said of him be true—to the Devil, and when he went to *him*, it must have been a great release to the poor soul, for black Bob was the Devil himself for sarving out a commissary." The young man took his departure in the direction of the light division camp, and if his looks were a criterion to go by, *he*, most unquestionably, was not of the number that mourned Crawford's death.

Towards evening, the fire against La Picurina was so effective, that Lord Wellington resolved to storm it after dark.

(To be continued.)

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\* I suppose the soldier meant "confused."

## ON PLAGUE AND QUARANTINE \*.

HAVING shown the importance of a problem on which depends the necessity or inutility of guards, cordons, lazarettoes, and the whole train of irregular restrictions by which trade and intercourse are clogged, we will now submit some ideas about plague, derived from an intercourse of some years with the various countries in which such regulations have become necessary; as well as others in which the disease has been allowed uncontrolled license.

The plague which ravaged Malta in 1813, although not so destructive as on a former visit, was certainly to the full as severely felt: it swept off thousands of her inhabitants, reduced many to beggary, destroyed for the time her commerce, and paralyzed the whole population. It afforded, however, a fair opportunity to the Medical Staff for studying the most frightful of all diseases; and to the legislation of the island, for showing promptitude and energy. Unfortunately, the opportunity so afforded was not used to the utmost advantage. As this instance was under the British sway, we will mention the measures pursued, because they form so strong a contrast in effect, as to prove many of the reasonings of the anti-contagionists to be chimerical.

The trade and intercourse of Malta with all parts of the Levant had greatly increased with the security afforded by the power and protection of the British flag; but at the same time, the preservation of the public health was confidently committed to a very inefficient system of quarantine. It was thus that in March, 1813, the master of a brig called the *San Niccolo*, though declared in foul health, was able somehow or other, to communicate with one *Borg*, a smuggling shoemaker of *Valetta*, who, with his children, his wife, his father, the *doctress* who attended his wife, his associates in a wine-house, and some of the venal guardians of the Health Office, with whom he had dealings, all fell victims to the disease, and were palpable evidences of the intercourse that had taken place. Yet the anti-contagionists wanted further *proof* of the act of communication! Was it likely that a crew, under penal quarantine, and a fraudulent smuggler, should conduct their nefarious practices so as to be easily traced?

When the malady was first announced, most of the inhabitants were thrown into the utmost consternation, and the streets were crowded with carts, conveying the baggage of numerous families into the interior. But in the midst of this alarm and confusion, an indolent apathy prevailed among the leading men, and no immediate steps were taken by the local government; the suggestions of the Board of Health were disrespectfully neglected, nor were even the city gates closed, although it was a measure of the most vital importance to the country. The master of the *San Niccolo* died in the lazaretto on the 2d of April, and the shoemaker's daughter, who was the first victim in the town, on the 16th of the same month; yet it was not till the 5th of May that the government informed the inhabitants, by public edict, of the nature of the disease. The courts of justice, the libraries, the theatre, and every other place of resort, were now shut up, and *Valetta*, with its suburbs, placed under medical observation; but the insidious disease was then

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\* Concluded from page 449, of Part III. 1832.

insinuating itself into every quarter,—and it is no less strange than true, that some of the country barriers were not closed until the middle of October. How this dreadful malady advanced, is still painfully fresh in the memory of thousands, and therefore need not be dwelt upon; we will merely say, that in *every* instance where a person was attacked, intercourse and communication were traced to have taken place between the individual and some one labouring under the infection.

Such was the precarious character of the precautions adopted by a government that was not deficient in either strength or activity in general cases; but exhibited the usual weak-minded reluctance to acknowledge the identity of so fatal a disease; and when at last roused to the conviction of its presence, was no longer capable to check its progress. It were, however, unjust, while pointing out the defects of the ruling men in the first instance, not to notice their anxiety and exertions in the later stages of the visitation; the humane and efficient measures adopted by the government, the staff, and the richer inhabitants of the island, for the maintenance of the poor during that distressing period, form a most praiseworthy feature in the melancholy story.

On the 5th of October, Sir Thomas Maitland assumed the office of governor of the island. He was a man of foresight and decision; and finding that the disease was spread and maintained by neglect of ordinances, by contraband transfers of goods from thieves to receivers, and by nefarious acts of a shade deeper than we need here harrow the feelings with,—he was determined to enforce means for its suppression. By his energy, the plague was everywhere arrested, with but one sad exception, that of the populous Casal Kurmi, whose misguided inhabitants obstinately resisted every measure enacted for the public safety. This compelled the general, on the 4th of December, to an extraordinary and highly responsible act: having publicly stated the true cause of the continuance of disease in that Casal to be the shamefully stealing and secreting of infected goods, he declared it to be out of the king's peace, and established a military commission over it. He then built double walls of circumvallation around it, guarded so effectually by cordons, that retreat was rendered impossible; and the town was thereby converted into a huge lazaretto, wherein the disease was confined and treated with a rigid watchfulness; but at the same time, with the most humane attention that the case would admit.

This extreme, but wise rigour, proved effectual; the pestilential infection thus closely confined, confidence was completely restored in every other part of Malta, and a general purification took place on the 13th of December; clean quarantine was proclaimed, and all the irksome restrictions were removed. This gratifying announcement was followed on the 29th of January, 1814, by the establishment of pratique throughout all the towns and villages,—the ill-fated Kurmi excepted; and, be it remembered, all anxiety had ceased, though the plague was then actually inclosed in the heart of the country; for, so convincingly did experience teach the nature of contagion, that no observance or precaution was deemed necessary outside the military cordon. Thus we have seen, that if the disease had been timely met with all the rigour of foul quarantine, and decisive measures of segregation adopted, it would probably never have penetrated beyond the city walls, and the greater part of the terror, suffering, and expense have been avoided.

This position appears still plainer by a singular and glaring fact: the port of Malta divides no less than four cities, of which Valetta is the seat of government, though the population of the other three, Vittoriosa, Sanglia, and Cospicua, is of greater amount. In an early stage of the calamity, while the capital was wrapped in fatal security, and in communication with the interior, the inhabitants of the trans-harbour cities, impressed with the conviction that contagion was abroad, boldly cut off all communication with Valetta, and thus saved themselves from the general danger. Such was the measure adopted by three out of the four cities; and the reason for such a different line of conduct is, that the latter are inhabited principally by ship-owners, skippers, and seafaring men, who have had great intercourse with the Levant—people who were well aware that contagion extends exactly in the ratio of the degree of communication with the source of infection.

Scarcely had the happy termination occurred, when the public alarm was again excited by the disease appearing in Gozo, which island, by restrictive regulations, had hitherto escaped with impunity; but when Malta was declared in free pratique, their neighbours, of course, relinquished their preservative measures. The cause was clearly traced to a man of Kurmi, who, before the circumvallation, had concealed a chest of wearing apparel in the vicinity. When the plague had ceased, and the military cordon was withdrawn, he took Pandora's box from its hiding place, carried it to Gozo,—and died two or three days after his opening it there. As this event was followed by the death of the man's daughter, the priest who attended her, and the persons who assisted at his burial, the true disease was discovered, and the vigour and promptitude with which Sir Thomas Maitland attacked it, confined the enemy within circumscribed limits, where it soon yielded to judicious vigilance. Among those who died, was the regretted Dr. McAdam, who fell a victim to his disbelief of *contagion*; and though his exertions were otherwise unremitting, had he survived the attack, it was Sir Thomas's intention to have tried him by a court-martial, for disobedience of orders, in *touching* plague patients. "I sent him," observed this general to us, "to assist in the precautionary measures: any one wishing to tamper must go into foul quarantine; or still better, if they wish to try experiments, I will give them a passage and introduction to Smyrna; but my business is to get rid of it here."

At the close of 1815, a disorder appeared at Corfu, which, from its pathognomonics, was thought to be only a fever, and was thus reported to Sir Thomas Maitland, who was then at Malta. His suspicions, however, were awakened; and repairing in person to that island, he immediately resorted to the important measures of separation and seclusion: a strong cordon of troops was posted round the infected places, and men of responsible character were appointed to direct every effort in preventing communication. Neither expense nor exertions were spared, and the malady was consequently quickly subdued.

Such are the steps which we have personally known to be effective in plague cases. As far as we can learn, the atmosphere underwent no change, either physical or chemical, during the existence of the disease, in which assertion we are grounded more by the health of the soldiers in cordons, or who breathed amongst the infected, without contact, than by the difficult and delicate analyses of Bertholet, Diemberbroeck, and Didier.

The marshy sites of the Greek villages, and the limestone of Malta, offered striking differences of locality; but the only means found efficient were segregation, immersion, and fumigation; and these were equally effectual in both. All the charms and specifics used in the Levant, by tibibs, dervishes, marabouts, and mountebanks, have proved abortive; while the benefit of separation has everywhere been acknowledged, even where it is not practised. A striking proof of the security which it affords, is given by our friend the late Dr. Greaves, since all the patients in the military hospital in Strada-Vescove, near his residence, from being strictly shut in, remained quite free from infection, although they occupied only the upper part of a building, the ground-floor of which was inhabited by seven different families, of whom all perished, excepting four individuals; and the disease was very destructive all around. We therefore come to the conclusion, that the dogma which pronounces plague to be "an epidemic disease totally divested of contagion," is a doctrine fraught with error and peril.

As the generation of plague cannot be spontaneous, or autochthonal, — so is the question of the suspension of its progress involved in difficulty. The idea is not incongruous with the animal economy, that the virus of a disease, not at first infectious, may be exasperated by a variety of causes into such malignity, as to generate an effluvium, which would carry with it the germs of the disease into another system; and if these germs continue to be nourished, and their malignity be increased by the presence of similar causes, whether in the individual or in the atmosphere he breathes, a mass of communicable miasmata is created, sufficient to constitute a contagion. But whether the principle exist in man or in matter, the propagation is mostly traced to latent fomites contained in woollen or cotton cloths, and other susceptible articles, equally on arid or humid localities. Many Turks scruple not to wear the apparel of those who have died of the malady, — not that they are altogether anti-contagionists, but because, as predestinarians, they hold the *avoiding* of disease to be counter to the Divine pleasure. In this spirit, a very considerable traffic is conducted by the Hadjis, or Mecca pilgrims, and others, in secondhand dresses, by which infection is disseminated throughout the Mahometan countries of the Levant. Yet be it observed, in those very places, that the European ambassadors and their suites, the consuls, authorities, and merchants, enjoy so great an immunity, that cases of the plague amongst them may be said to be unknown.

In some of the Barbary states, common sense is beginning to triumph over obstinacy and bigotry; and Tunis has latterly had good reason to rejoice in her sanitary laws. It was by these, and their lazzaretto, that the Tunisians weakened the disease which they contracted from Algiers, while the latter city became a very charnel-house during the years 1819 and 1820 — the miserable result of the purchase of some wearing-apparel from a vessel convoyed by His Majesty's ship *Tagus*, and some of which had actually been put on board the frigate, but luckily remaining untouched, were innocuous. As a proof that rational principles are gaining ground in those parts, we may mention, that on arriving at Tripoli in October, 1816, we found the plague had been carried there by a Smyrniate vessel, upon which we immediately weighed and returned to Malta, knowing that we should otherwise incur a foul bill of health, and a long attendant quarantine, which would interfere with the service con-



templated. But the Bashâ, Usef Karamanli, who is no fatalist, took such prompt measures in preventing communication, that the disease was bounded within the limits of a cordon, and subdued,—so that we were able to return in less than three months. Again in 1821, when the plague raged in Dernah, so cautious was the same Bashâ, that it was prevented from spreading beyond the district; and any person attempting to pass beyond the frontier was shot without hesitation. Dernah was then governed by Bey Mohammed, his eldest son, and when we called there the disease was making frightful ravages,—yet, feeling perfectly sure in *non-contact*, we held communication within a few paces of the inhabitants. Here all the clothes of the infected were burnt,—a remarkable innovation in Oriental usage. In Egypt, Mohammed Ali, a man of known talent, wished long since to adopt the European sanitary laws, but a Teskerah arrived from the Grand Signior, ordering him “not to wrestle with the will of God.” He was not, however, to be discouraged, as he was well aware that his chief opposers at the Porte were interested in the annual kaffela of pilgrims. The melancholy and immediate death of his gallant son, the conqueror of the Wahabees, from visiting a female suspected of having the plague, has fully confirmed him in the danger of contagion. He had seen, that though this disease appeared both in the French and English armies in the campaign of 1801, it gradually diminished under the care and regulations of our board of health, till it totally ceased in 1803, and did not reappear until 1813, when it was brought from Constantinople,—between which place and Alexandria there have been frequent recriminations, as to which has most frequently scourged the other by this fatal importation.

Some theorists have thought plague to be connected with earthquakes, but surely they never recollected that its location is in countries where such visitations are rare: others attribute it to volcanic agency, to which a similar remark applies. It usually breaks out about the latter end of March, is exhausted towards the end of June, and expires by the beginning of November. Here it will be seen by the advocates of marsh effluvia as the cause of pest, that it is effete when malaria is most active. But although, in the pathological features of this disease, there is nothing more remarkable than the regularity of its periods, striking exceptions occasionally happen: it raged violently in Malta throughout the autumn, and in one part, Casal Kurmi, during the whole winter. It has also done the same at Smyrna, Algiers, and Alexandria; and a few years ago, Constantinople was ravaged while the snow was a foot deep. Yet, it appears probable that, under the usual circumstances, the extremes of heat and cold have very considerable effect in at least diminishing the virulence of the disease, and perhaps in weakening the cause itself.

In our own personal intercourse with infected places, we were prepared to maintain segregation, even under pain of instant death to him who should pass a barricade. Our method of curing boats' crews from straggling, and at the same time of ensuring the general safety, was to order the boat under the bows, there make their shipmates give them a drenching, and then a change of clothes, immersing those they had on before in water. On their coming on board the skin was spunged with strong vinegar to excite perspiration, and they were cautioned to be careful in future;—one example proved sufficient. The free use of oil is strongly recommended as a prophylactic; but that it is a sovereign anti-

dote, is an assertion liable to many doubts. In Malta numbers of those who carried off the infected and the dead to the hospitals and the burial-grounds died, though regularly anointed with oil, and clad in oil-cloth from top to toe. It is a remarkable fact, that a young French surgeon, a prisoner of war, who attended the plague hospitals to procure his liberation, frequently felt the pulses of his patients, being the only medical man who actually did so; and he survived the ordeal, attributing his escape to having kept himself under the partial mercurial effect called the "walking salivation." He was an advocate of the principle of contagion, but thought that one party assigned it power beyond due bounds, while the other restricted it within limits far too narrow.

It being a received opinion in the Levant, among the experienced, that the plague is not epidemic, but purely contagious, we must coincide with those who legislate on the latter principle. Were it otherwise, why should those who are cleanly in their habits, and cautious in avoiding contact with the infected, uniformly escape the disease? Witness the consular establishments at Constantinople, Salonica, Smyrna, Aleppo, and other stations, in which most of the Christian families shut themselves up during six or seven months in the year, in domestic quarantine. The ground-floor of the consulate at Alexandria is thickly inhabited by Frank servants and tradespeople, who frequently neglect the proper precautions. The plague has been more than once introduced among them; and in 1821, upwards of eighty Maltese died in that part of the house; yet such is the efficacy of segregation, that the families of Messrs. Lee, Thurnburn, and others, who resided on the floor immediately above the scene of misery, enjoyed uninterrupted health.

From these details, the result of considerable practical acquaintance with the subject, we strongly incline to the contagious nature of plague: an inference, indeed, that has emboldened us to visit infected countries with but little apprehension. The argument whether the disease be originally indigenous or endemic, matters little; it is enough for us to know, that the stage wherein we meet it is infective and transportable, notwithstanding there are many remarkable exemptions which countenance some of the anti-contagion evidences as to absolute and abstract miasm. That the effects of the morbid poison are mitigated by the increased comfort and cleanliness of later ages, is unquestionable; but until the true cause of its origin and spread is less inscrutable than it now appears to be, it would be folly to remove the effectual restrictions placed over it, merely because we do not understand *how* it is that they preserve us. But while we recommend the severe enforcement of precautionary measures, we do not advocate the law of quarantine, as at present written and practised; nor can we say much for the efficiency of our lazzaretti, or the officers and guardians who attend them. This partly arises from our fortunate ignorance in England on matters of plague; so that we will only state, on this point, that a well-digested code of regulations, recognized by all the European powers, would remove many of the arbitrary vexations of commerce, and also establish a surer safeguard where danger is really to be apprehended; while in its operation, the expurgation of susceptible goods would be more efficacious, and personal confinement less capricious.

To be more particular: from dread of so horrible a visitor as the pest, a custom has arisen of giving or denying permission to mix or

negotiate with those states under such apprehension, but upon certain conditions and qualifications. These conditions are generally severe, but are most rigorous at maritime towns, where, though a source of great profit to the employed, they are often an intolerable detriment to merchants, and militate no less against the public than against individuals. The principal ground of vindication is, that the preservation of health is every way paramount. We grant this; but although it is difficult to enact exact rules, or make an invariable standard, that would not cause recrimination among nations, yet various abuses may be corrected, and many of the commercial fetters removed without diminishing our safety. As it is in proof that there is scarcely an instance on record, wherein the plague has not been clandestinely introduced, we think that no remission of quarantine regulations should take place upon any theory which wars with sense and experience; but it appears certain that in most cases there is an unnecessary extension of them. Moreover there is often much knavery afloat in depreciating one merchant's goods to the preferment of another's, a practice which—*salvo sanitatis*—there are very favourable opportunities of effecting. The charges for airing goods are, in most parts, very high, and afford, at the same time, the means of ascertaining their quantity, quality, and condition, to the prejudice of the proprietor. Ships sometimes run into ports from stress of weather, from unsuspected places, and with clean bills; yet the masters are obliged to dance attendance three or four days at the Sanità for pratique, and compelled to pay dearly for needful provisions during the time. Dispatches and correspondence are interrupted very needlessly, and sometimes capriciously; nor are there wanting abundant proofs that political, and even nefarious objects have been forwarded on such occasions. As for the complaints of the mere wanderers called travellers,—in seven cases out of ten, it were well if the privations were even augmented; wholesome confinement, shaved heads, and leisure for reflection would be of wonderful service to most of them.

Sufficient experience has been gained in Malta and the Ionian islands to shew that susceptible effects, however impregnated with infectious virus, can be purified by air and water in six or seven days;—and as it is also admitted by those most acquainted with the subject, that the pest cannot lie dormant any considerable time in the human system, it seems that quarantine need not be extended to the periods established: our own belief is, that seven days for a quarantine of observation, fourteen for a clean one, and twenty-one for a foul one, rigidly enforced, would answer every purpose—save that of Health-office emolument. Under the first class, we would include all those countries which may lately have been visited by disease, but are again in free pratique,—as well as those places contiguous to infection, on whose regulations strict reliance cannot be placed: in the second class we would place those countries subject to pest, but actually clean of it at the time; and to the third class we would confine all ships from countries where the plague is known to be in action; and where foul bills are issued. Of these, the last is perhaps the least dangerous of the three; since it is the most dreaded and the best attended to. The quarantine of observation requires to be most looked after, having been regarded too much as a mere ceremony; so that, though we would shorten its period, we would increase its rigour. Men-of-war may be favoured, according to discre-

tion, upon the captain's report; for what with cleanliness, caution in communication, constant medical aid, and their carrying no cargo, there is not a single instance of the plague having been introduced by them. Still, all carpets, shawls, and other susceptible articles purchased by officers of king's ships, when in the Levant, should be carefully packed *in wood*, previous to being embarked, and given over, at the first lazaretto they arrive at, for expurgation. All cases of overhauling vessels at sea ought to be scrupulously reported on coming into port.

As to passengers, there are two modes of performing quarantine, which, if properly conducted, may be continued. The first, or common mode, is for a person to remain the prescribed time in the lazaretto with all his effects, apparel, and papers, which receive pratique with him: the second is the "Spoglio," or that wherein the person, under certain precautions, is undressed, smoked, attired in fresh clothes, and passed through the barriers, leaving his effects behind him for expurgation. In the last instance he is carefully examined by the medical officers and others, to see that he has no external marks of infection on his body,—none of those eruptions,

"The token'd pestilence  
Where death is sure."

Our friends of Venice, Marseilles, and Leghorn, who plume themselves as the most perfect corps of health legislators existing, would be startled at this proposal: but we can whisper many points of neglect, even under their "best" of regulations. We ask whether, in either of their lazaretti, *all* the letters and papers are opened and put into the stove? Whether *all* the wearing apparel of passengers, and the *whole* contents of their baggage are subjected to that strict examination and exposure so necessary to carry off the lurking seeds of any infection? If not,—then is there as much peril to be apprehended from the effects of a person who has performed quarantine, as from one who has not. But luckily, it is not in lazaretti that we are to look for danger; because, when really foul cases do occur, there are few persons of such venal depravity as not to exert their whole power of discipline, were it only from motives of self-preservation; nor do we know of any instance on record of contamination being propagated in a country by either passengers, or goods, which have performed the prescribed quarantine. This goes far to prove that it is not such an easy matter, to carry the infection, as alarm would lead us to believe; but it also brings the conviction that the process may be better executed than it has been, and in less time; strengthening our assertion, that it is the prevention of *clandestine* communication with ships that calls for the utmost vigilance.

To make our "reform" work well, three primary conditions are absolutely necessary: 1. A well-digested code of laws,—vigorous, just, and impartial, equally binding on the prince and the peasant; and which ought to be made universal, by all the powers of Europe taking a part in its formation, and becoming pledged for its enactment, observance, and fulfilment\*. 2. Spacious, airy, and well-appointed lazaretti, so near a port of sufficient capacity for vessels to lie at their own moorings, that the merchandize to be expurgated may be easily discharged into them, by the crews of the ships which bring them; and

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\* Might not Mohammed Ali be elected into the Synod?—He is a capital fellow, and has recently been elected a member of the Royal Asiatic Society of London!

the necessity of punts or shore-boats, as much as possible avoided,—by the use of which a most dangerous source of communication is opened, and opportunities for smuggling afforded. 3. Efficient and well-disciplined officers and guards,—a desideratum only to be obtained by establishing a health-police corps, into which only men of known good character should be admitted either for life or limited service, and they should be entitled to half-pay or superannuation, on certificates of general attention, secrecy, and fidelity. From this corps should be taken all the branches of the quarantine department, even to the boatmen, and sentries in the interior precincts of the lazaretti. Should these men also form part of the militia of the country in which they are stationed, the expense would be much reduced, while the trust would be incomparably safer in the hands of an organized body, than in those of the hap-hazard set who now seek the employment.

In most countries the superintendence of the health department is managed by a body selected from the respectable part of the inhabitants, and is generally denominated “a Board.” In England, though so far removed from the scenes of danger, the sacred charge is in the hands of the Privy Council of the King. In Marseilles it is entrusted to the Chamber of Commerce. In Venice, three commissioners, of approved integrity and reputation, are chosen by the Senate for the office. In Leghorn, the Board is composed of the governor, the captain of the port, the chief medical men of the city, and the principal officers of the health department. In Malta, during the time of the Knights, the duty was executed by the whole council of the Order; and it met in the vestry of St. John’s Church, every Sunday morning after mass, to deliberate upon the reports of the two knights who were appointed commissioners of health, by annual election. Boards of this description give confidence, not only to the inhabitants of the country itself, but also to other states; and the higher the character and independence of those who form it, the greater will that confidence be; in proof of this, vessels from ports that can boast a strict health-office, are sooner admitted to pratique than others; and the advantage thence accruing to commerce, is more extensive than can be easily calculated.

But it is not the character of the primary boards that in general create dissatisfaction; the chief ground of complaint lies in the details of the office, and in none more than the fumigation of correspondence. This is an important portion of the officers’ duty, and one very repugnant to the feelings of those who are to receive the letters. If the practice of inclosing samples of susceptible matter in packets could be abolished, there is no actual necessity for opening them, there being no instance in which a smoked paper has conveyed infection; and the being cut through with a chisel, and held over burning straw and sulphur, is as effectual an ordeal as the case requires. Those who have the charge of fumigating letters, ought to be men of great discretion; and where the papers are unfolded, should be sworn to secrecy, and kept in strict quarantine during the performance of the duty.

In conclusion,—should any of his Majesty’s Ministers stumble over these our lucubrations, and wish to place the quarantine establishments of this mighty empire on a better footing than they are,—they may, by addressing a letter to ourselves, hear of something to their advantage.

## THE JAMAICA STATION \*.

FROM THE JOURNAL OF A NAVAL OFFICER.

FROM Port Royal there is a *Sound* extending to Rock Fort, a distance of eight or nine miles; the channel for ships lies on the larboard or in-shore side, the entrance to which is close to an extensive fortification called Fort Augusta, but more commonly Musquito Fort. Kingston is situated in a curve of the Sound, to the north-east, and is an extensive city, with considerable trade: the inhabitants are said to amount to 20,000 of all descriptions; among whom are many of the unfortunate fugitives from St. Domingo, and a considerable number of other foreigners, and Jews. There are many very good and extensive dwelling-houses, and large well-built and established hotels and taverns; among these "Bennett's" took the lead, and deservedly so, the host having been a very worthy member of society.

The markets of Kingston are well supplied with articles of consumption, but almost everything bears a higher price here than in other places; living, indeed, in this city, is very expensive, the most trifling repast falling little short of a dollar †. Perhaps there are no people, not even excepting the Anglo-Indian nabobs, who live more sumptuously, or enjoy all the luxuries of life in greater profusion than the mass of the mercantile gentlemen of this tropical metropolis, notwithstanding the vast expense attending such a course of life. It may, however, be doubted, whether many of the individuals constituting the class of merchants, after a lapse of years, retire with ample fortunes, like their countrymen of the East. The honest old English hospitality, so much in vogue in the "golden days of good Queen Bess," after languishing at home, has been transported to the West Indies, and here, in the strictest sense, it reigns unalloyed;—may it continue unimpaired,—and long, very long, may the good people enjoy the means of ensuring much of their own happiness, by endeavouring to render others happy!

A military barrack is situated in the northern suburb, and in that quarter there are a number of very pretty villas which attract notice. The Admiral's Pen ‡, a very agreeable country residence, lies at a little distance on the road to Spanish Town; the house is spacious and well-built, in the West India style, and provided by the local government for the convenience of the naval commander-in-chief; and it appears it was its intention to have been equally liberal with the East India Company in the supply of a certain sum of money to naval officers for their tables, but the then Commander-in-chief, (either Sir Peter, or Sir Hyde Parker, as I have understood,) from some motive not now clearly known, declined the generous offer; which, as may be supposed, has not since been renewed. Not knowing the circumstances which passed at the time of the offer, I shall make no further remarks, than that the

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\* Continued from p. 62.

† The Spanish dollar is 6s. 8d. currency; the exchange is 40 per cent.

‡ The Jamaica papers latterly have complained bitterly of the neglect of their island, by withdrawing the presence of the naval Commander-in-chief. It appears that the Admiral's house, from not receiving necessary repairs, was said to be untenable, but the House of Assembly, considering the interests of their island neglected by the mother-country, are said to be indifferent about the matter. The circumstances are to be regretted.

naval officers, subsequently serving on the station, have had reason to regret it—especially the captains and commanders, who having, from the practice of the service, to keep a table, find the outlay considerably exceed their pay; and I have no doubt many have been obliged to encroach upon their own private fortunes. Of course I speak of those who have not large incomes: to the officer of wealth it could be of no moment. The military, with more wisdom accepted, and continued to enjoy the gratuity until very lately; which must have afforded partial relief in a country where everything is so extravagant in price, which the following charges will substantiate:—

	£	s.	d.
For washing linen, three months . . . .	10	18	4
A Lieutenant's undress coat . . . .	13	0	0
One pair of boots, one pair of shoes . . . .	4	0	0
One pair of blue trowsers . . . .	4	0	0
One dinner, bed for three nights . . . .	2	5	7
Second breakfast of cold meat . . . .	0	8	4
Breakfast . . . .	0	6	8

There is a Botanical Garden near Kingston, where a great variety of tropical plants are cultivated, but which I had not an opportunity of seeing; a circumstance I very much regret. Some new varieties of Eastern fruits have been successfully introduced into the island, and are already multiplied in an astonishing degree. The bread-fruit, the jack, the mango, and others have found their way into every part, and very much increase the comforts of the inhabitants; the former, which in point of utility seems to demand the first title to attention, is not, however, held in such high estimation by the negroes as it is by the natives of the Polynesia of the Great Ocean; which may perhaps proceed from its use being of less absolute necessity to the former, as it is assuredly to the other people. In times of scarcity, however, when plantains and ground provisions fail, it is probable it will rank higher in the estimation of the negroes than it does at present. I acknowledge not to trace any resemblance between this fruit and bread, and think the name was applied to it rather as being likely to prove a substitute for that “staple of life.”

I could not learn whether that delicious fruit the mangosteen, so highly praised by Oriental travellers, has found its way into the isles of the West; if not yet introduced, it would seem a great omission, as the fruit is said to be the finest in the world.

The distance from Kingston to Spanish Town, or as it is officially termed, *St. Jago de la Vega* (St. James of the Plain), the seat of government, is thirteen miles; the road, the greater part of the way on a level, is the finest in the island. The houses are not numerous, and the town has more the appearance of a neat country village than the capital of an important island. The country around is in many parts romantic and picturesque, and the air much cooler than at Kingston. The public offices form three sides of a square, ornamented at the upper side with a temple and a statue erected to the memory of Admiral Lord Rodney, whose victory over the Comte de Grasse prevented a meditated attack on this island. The natives have ever since held this victory as an event which saved their country from spoliation; and at this day the memory of the gallant Admiral is still venerated: indeed, even the negroes seemed to have imbibed the same feeling, for we find several

of them adopting the name of that late veteran officer. The vehicles which traverse the fine line of road between the two places are principally one-horse chairs or gigs, locally called *kittereens*. In these unsteady carriages the young naval officers often take a land-cruise, and seldom return without a capsize, or shaking the chair nearly to pieces against the trees on the road-side.

The passage-vessels between Kingston and Port Royal are wherries and canoes; the former are very fine roomy boats, but rather heavily built, carrying two *shoulder-of-mutton* sails, and from their construction are well calculated to sail up and down the *Sound* under the pressure of strong, or as they are usually termed, "fiery" sea-breezes;—lying very close to the wind, they make the passage to and fro on opposite tacks, seldom having to go about more than twice, and generally without tacking at all. The canoes are not so safe during the continuance of the sea-breeze; but as the negroes are careful, and understand the management of their frail vessels, fatal accidents are of rare occurrence. These long and narrow hollowed logs are provided with one, and sometimes two, spritsails; and if the breeze happens to be fresh, the canoe generally gets half filled with water, and the passengers in constant apprehension of its turning over with them. In the absence of the sea-breeze, or during the periods of its least strength, the canoe is preferable to the wherry; which indeed cannot make the passage during a calm. At such times an awning is spread over it, and additional men are provided to the oars, such as they are, for they do not use paddles except to steer by; and if the passenger happen to drop asleep, which generally is the case, the voyage will appear to him, on awaking, to have been performed in a wonderfully short space of time. The construction of the wherry passage-boat prevents the possibility of her upsetting from the pressure of the wind; and as the sea in the *Sound* is smooth, she presses through it with astonishing swiftness, under the weight of canvas used. To persons unaccustomed to make the passage, the danger appears great, although in reality there is none: only one instance of a wherry's swamping came to my knowledge whilst on the Station; and in this instance the boat was deeply laden with boxes of doubloons and dollars, for a packet-ship ready to sail for England. It appeared that on that day, the sea-breeze was very strong, and the water unusually agitated; the vessel, for greater speed, carried her sails unreefed, and when near the broadest part, which was most exposed to the violence of the wind, she plunged her bows under the swell, and sunk to the bottom. One or two of the crew were drowned, but the greater part of the treasure was afterwards recovered. Had two or three wherries been employed upon the occasion, no accident would have happened.

According to Sir William Young's account, in the year 1807, there was imported into Great Britain from Jamaica, 1,780,757 cwt. of sugar, and from all the other islands, &c. collectively, 1,707,739 cwt.;—the quantity in favour of Jamaica being 73,018 cwt. Hence, we may be enabled to judge clearly the relative value of that fine island, when compared with our other West India possessions.

The following list shows the precedence of these possessions as to the quantity of sugar imported into Great Britain from them:—



1. Jamaica	5. Barbados	9. Antigua	13. St. Lucia
2. Grenada	6. Tobago	10. Trinidad	14. Montserrat
3. St. Vincent	7. Surinam	11. Nevis	15. Tortola
4. St. Kitt's	8. Dominique	12. Demarara	16. Bahamas.

The climate of Jamaica, as may be supposed from its geographical position, is very warm; but the sea-breeze by day, and the land-wind at night, mitigate the heat that would be, without their friendly aid, almost intolerable, and render it more salubrious than the generality of Europeans seem disposed to believe; yet it must be acknowledged that, at certain seasons of the year, and from causes which probably are disseminated through the atmosphere, dangerous diseases are produced, which have proved destructive to European constitutions. In ordinary cases, however, intemperance and neglect of timely precautions, aided by a dread which frequently pervades the minds of strangers on their arrival in the climate, bring on fevers and other disorders that often terminate fatally. Much, however, depends on the temperament of the individual, and in some cases, where there is a predisposition to disease, the aid of physic almost becomes useless: the unhappy sufferer sickens, and dies in a few hours; in fact, there are some constitutions that cannot exist in so warm a climate.

The diet of seamen is, I think, an exciting cause, and no doubt hastens many of those valuable men to that "bourne from whence no traveller returns." Much of the food of which they partake has a tendency to impoverish, if not to inflame, the blood, and to render the frame liable to disease; but this is a circumstance that has hitherto been unavoidable; everything that was considered of use to correct the impurities of such food has been supplied. If, however, the pyroligneous acid should turn out to be of use in the preservation of fresh meat, as has been confidently hoped, we may expect that a change will occasionally be made in the particular articles of salted beef and pork, by which the condition of the seamen will be greatly ameliorated. I do not know what truth there may have been in the circumstance, very generally current in the navy, that the worn-out hack-horses of Cork, Dublin, &c., were bought up by the contractors for salted beef for the supply of his Majesty's ships, *cured*, and put up with the ox, bull, and cow meat; but much of that article which has come under my observation and mastication, seemed to justify such an opinion; and the well-known villainous adulterations in different articles of food and drink are sufficient to show that there are but too many men to be found, in England at least, ready to gain profit at the risk of their fellow-beings' health, and in some cases even of their lives!

The medium temperature of the air in Jamaica has been stated by some of the doctors who paid attention to the subject, to be about 75° of Fahrenheit; but there is a great range between the maximum and minimum, and, as may be supposed, the heat varies according to local situations: at Port Royal dock-yard, the master-attendant informed me that he has known the thermometer, when suspended in the shade of a tank-house, rise as high as 120°; and Capt. R. B. James, of the Forest, in Hanover, on the north side of the island, assured me that he had seen it as low as 43° in his piazza. It must be observed, however, that the former place is, perhaps, the hottest spot in the

island, whilst the latter, being situated in the mountains and surrounded with forests, is one of the coolest.

• The northern and eastern sides of the island generally enjoy a cooler temperature than the corresponding opposite parts, and are consequently much healthier; the appearance of the inhabitants evidently confirms this by the difference in their persons; for it is not unusual to observe many of those of the northern parts, with ruddy complexions, and full habits, whilst on the south side swarthy and pallid countenances generally prevail.

The *norths* which blow occasionally in the months of December, January, February and March, although they may, and do frequently occasion devastation among the plantations, and endanger the shipping, tend in a great measure to dissipate disease, and to render the climate more agreeable. During my time, and preceding it, *norths* and westerly winds were not so frequent as of later years. From 1811 to the present time, westerly winds have been so common between Jamaica and Cuba, as to be felt during some part of the day for weeks together; a circumstance that in the olden time would scarcely have been believed. With these exceptions, however, there is little variation in the general climate; the year is divided into the rainy and dry seasons, the alternations being periodical, but subject to some slight irregularities.

The hurricane months are August, September, and October, when violent gales are looked for, and often felt: these dreadful tempests are generally local, and their fury soon spent; since 1812 they have been more frequent than before that period, happening every two or three years. It has been my lot to have experienced five hurricanes, and to see eight lower masts go over the side from the fury of the winds and seas, besides encountering many severe gales. Off Port Royal and the south side of the island a south-west wind often blows, but it is very gentle, and retires immediately at the approach of the blustering sea-breeze,—retracing its course to the caverns and recesses of the snow-capped cordillera of Santa Martha, whence no doubt it originates.

The great terror of this climate, the yellow fever, has been very destructive to our officers and men: out of the ship's company of a frigate I belonged to, that arrived in her from England, in little more than twelve months there were scarcely a dozen men remaining. It has long been a question whether this disease be contagious or not; for my own part, (but with no pretension) as far as I am enabled to judge from the observations I have made,—having had the melancholy and distressing sight of witnessing eighteen unfortunate men dying in a day,—I must agree with those who think it is not; and I am inclined to believe that it has its origin in the first instance from *miasma*, which deranges the *biliary* organs; and, corrupting the blood, produces inanition and other symptoms of the yellow disease. The fact, that old *stagers* and natives whose constitutions are inured to the changes which take place in the climate, and are therefore less liable to infection, are seldom attacked by it, and the negroes rarely, if ever, appears to support the inference drawn; for if it were contagious, or communicated by contact, all alike would be liable, when in community, to suffer; whereas it is certain that those persons who have been the shortest time in the country are most subject to its influence.

Perhaps nothing tends to augment the general disease in tropical climates, among our seamen, more than the confined air which they breathe between decks, and damp clothing,—which at times, indeed, is unavoidable. As a convincing proof of the former, it has been observed on this station that the crews of corvette-built vessels have been considerably more healthy than those of other ships. The fine set of men belonging to the *Echo* sloop-of-war, who had been a series of years on this station, may be given as a particular instance. On the contrary, the crews of the frigates suffered to a frightful extent; and I think we may venture to affirm that ships arriving from Europe during the wet seasons will be more liable to have their crews affected with disease, than those which may come to the station during any of the other months of the year. I most sincerely hope our men-of-war will be supplied, if they are not so already, with that invaluable article known by the name of chloride of lime (*oxymuriate of lime*), for correcting the impurities of foul air, &c. I have had the pleasure of seeing it tried in the torrid zone, in one of the most unhealthy ports in the world, on board of a vessel, whose crew remained in health, although surrounded by other ships wherein death was making dreadful ravages. Indeed, so convinced am I of its efficacy in preventing the diseases incidental to warm climates, that, possessing, as I do, an ardent attachment towards the old service in which I have been nurtured, and a sincere regard for its valuable members, no one circumstance would afford my mind more real satisfaction than to hear of its general use in our ships\*.

Our seamen, too, in this climate, are subject to ulcers in their limbs, generally in the feet and legs, frightful to behold,—probably proceeding from impurity of blood, originating in the diet of salted meats. I have witnessed lamentable instances of the height and obstinacy of this dreadful disease. Peruvian bark, in powder, has been used with much success externally; but fresh diet with vegetables and fruit seem alone capable of stopping its progress, and its entire cure probably would seldom yield to anything except a change of climate. The citric acid may be a very good antiscorbutic; but in this instance it appears to have little or no power even in checking the rapid strides of this cancerous disease of the limbs; and I am of opinion that it loses its efficacy, and is rather detrimental by constant use. With me, it had always the effect of creating bile, and producing an unpleasant acidity in the stomach, which the fresh juice of the lime or the lemon made into lemonade never caused. I do not know by what name the surgeons have distinguished the abovementioned formidable disease (which cannot belong to the cutaneous class, as it dips to the very bone) but it appears to differ materially from the sea scurvy—that bane to ancient mariners—and may properly be termed the “consuming canker.”

It would be a very proper additional point of duty, to that which the surgeon's assistant has to perform, if he were directed, (on the West India stations,) at the divisional inspection of the ship's company, which takes place every day when at sea after breakfast, to question the men individually, if they have any spot or other indication of ulcer upon their legs; for there is no doubt that they often, when left to themselves,

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\* It might be manufactured in the dockyards, at a much less expense than it can be purchased for.

neglect to inform the surgeon of the first appearance of this disease, and the consequence of which has been often the loss of limb or of life; as the salt-water with which their feet are so constantly wet, acts as a caustic to these ulcers, and without doubt greatly irritates and increases them.

*Noctalopia*, or night blindness, is also a common distemper among the seamen; many instances I have witnessed, and in our frigate the men were affected with it to an alarming degree. The immediate cause of this singular nocturnal defect of the visual organs, which appears to be peculiar to those climates that are not subject to freezing cold, has never, I believe, been satisfactorily pointed out. It was suggested to me that lime-juice diluted with water is a remedy; and I have also heard that tobacco-juice is of service. Upon due reflection, I am inclined to attribute its origin to a nervous affection of the coats of the stomach, rather than to any internal disorganization of the membranes of the eye; and if my position be near the truth, tonics would be of service.

The sailors have a common notion, that sleeping upon deck with their eyes exposed to the light of the moon, is the occasion of the malady; and hence it has been termed by them "moon-blindness." The question naturally arises,—Can there be any foundation for this idea? I have heard it ridiculed as a mere whimsical speculation of this eccentric class of men. I think, however, that Jack's solution of this chirurgical case is a very natural conclusion, and perhaps, at last, may be found consistent with the true cause, whenever the point be determined. Many persons, it is well known, sleep with their eyes open, among sea-faring people especially. It is also true, that our ship's companies are permitted, when there is no occasion for their services, during a night-watch in warm countries, to sleep upon the deck,—the operation then, of the rays of light from the moon, striking upon the naked or exposed eye, and concentrating into one focus on the pupil, and thus acting upon the retina for some time, may occasion, I conceive, a dimness, or even a total deprivation of sight, whenever the organ thus affected becomes again exposed to the exciting cause. Let the eye be exposed to the rays of the sun, even transiently, and a partial, although momentary, deprivation of sight takes place. If the eye, therefore, by casual (such as sleep) or violent means, be kept for some time opposed to the rays of the sun, there would be little doubt of blindness following. As the moon is a medium of light without heat, the effect of her concentrated rays acting upon the nerves of the eye, when steadily fixed, would be considerably milder, and perhaps produce partial blindness only; and the fact, of only a certain number out of some hundreds thus exposed, being affected, seems to strengthen the idea—for only a few out of the many may be supposed to sleep with their eyes open, or to be placed in that precise position necessary for the full effect of the wonderful planet's power. I must, however, leave others more competent than myself to determine the question; mine are speculations made, like Jack's, without any pretensions to stability.

[To be continued.]

## ILLUSTRATIONS OF CAVALRY WARFARE.

CAPTAIN GANSAUGE, of the Prussian Lancer Guard, has lately published, at Berlin, a small volume of military contents, under the title of *Kriegswissenschaftliche Analecten*, wherein, along with other matters, he gives an account of three cavalry actions, fought during the campaign of 1813, between the French troops and a brigade of Cossacks, to which the able and well-informed author was himself attached. These actions prove so clearly the great ignorance of cavalry strength, and proper mode of employing that arm, prevalent even in the last campaigns of the war, that I cannot refrain from presenting them to the reader in illustration of what has already been written on this subject. They are, in fact, as the newspapers say of the annuals, perfect gems of their kind, and gems, therefore, they shall be termed.

## GEM THE FIRST.

It was on the 19th of August, soon after the expiration of the armistice, when the French troops had already begun to press back the allies in the direction of Berlin and Potsdam, that the regiments of Don Cossacks, under the command of Colonel Bichalow, received orders to undertake a *reconnaissance* in the direction of Lükenwalde. These troops, who had bivouacked on the Treboin road, advanced in consequence through Scharfenbrüch and Walterdoff. As the French picquets, stationed in the latter places, retired at our approach, we soon obtained a full view of the meadows that extend to the northward and eastward of Lükenwalde. While we were yet engaged in driving back the enemy's picquets, a mass of cavalry, greatly exceeding us in number, advanced in haste from the town, and drew up in our front; they were formed in column of squadrons, and as the skirmishers fell back, and joined the main body, we had soon nothing but this heavy mass before us. Though the Cossacks could gain little in a contest with so large a force, it was equally evident that still less was to be risked in assailing them; so that urged, partly by their natural instinct, and partly by command, they pushed forward to the attack. The French advanced at a short trot to meet us; under the apprehension, probably, that the Russians would attempt to dash into the intervals between the squadrons these were closed up, almost to quarter distance. Thus formed they bore directly down upon the centre of our line, which instantly opened out; the Cossacks, throwing themselves on the flanks and in the rear of the hostile column; and the French, finding no enemy to contend with in front, soon halted, whilst the warriors of the Don kept firing into the mass, or spearing the flank files of their enemies. The French had by this time got into such complete confusion, that they could undertake no evolution of any kind, and the Cossacks, on their part, totally unable to move in compact order, never thought of dispersing, by a bold onset, the helpless mob they were thus assailing; but perfectly conscious that, as individual horsemen, they had nothing to dread from such unskilful-adversaries, continued to fire at them, and to execute partial charges whenever opportunities offered. The French, whose flank files had faced outward, and whose rear files had gone to the right-about, also sprung their carbines, so that a regular, if not very destructive, *fusillade* ensued, and lasted for upwards of half an hour. At the expiration of this time, the heads of some infantry columns were seen

advancing from Lükenwalde in the direction of the meadows on which we were fighting: they were accompanied by artillery, and the first shots fired at us served as a signal for the release of the column of cavalry so singularly surrounded. Colonel Bichalow, perceiving that nothing could be effected against so superior a force, withdrew his troops by the way of Scharfenbrück, without being pursued by a single Frenchman. It was perfectly evident, that a want of skill in manœuvring, and a total ignorance of the real nature of cavalry action, had induced the French to crowd together into that ominous column. One-third of their number, well and bravely led, would have driven the three regiments of Cossacks from the field with perfect ease; whereas, by the conduct pursued, they owed their liberation only to the speedy advance of their infantry and artillery. This action also gave ample proofs of the utter unfitness of the Cossacks for anything like a home charge, as well as of the little that can be effected by their loose and scattered mode of fighting.

#### GEM THE SECOND.

Soon after the battle of Dennewitz, when the Cossack regiments already named were hovering about Königsbrück, near Dresden, Colonel Bichalow was ordered to observe, and if possible to attack, the French cavalry that had been pushed forward from the latter place towards Grossen-Hayn; we broke up, therefore, on the 18th of September, and proceeded to Esteleverda. Here we learnt that the villages to the south of Muhlberg were occupied by French cavalry, and it was immediately resolved to attack them in their quarters. Before we attained the heath extending between Muhlberg and Spanberg, we fell in with General Ilowaisky, who assumed the command of the whole Cossack force, which, including the regiment he had brought along with him, amounted in all to about 1200 men. Whether this meeting was accidental, or the result of previous arrangement, I pretend not to know. As soon as we had fairly cleared the wood of Muhlberg, we discovered the French cavalry near Borack, some already formed, others advancing at a trot from the villages farther in the rear. I was afterwards told by the prisoners, that they had two thousand men present on the ground.

While the Cossacks were occupied in forming up, the French had also completed their movement; their entire body, except a feeble reserve placed at a considerable distance behind, was formed, *en muraille*, in a single line, without intervals. The Cossacks threw themselves upon the unwieldy mass, and were received with a sharp fire from the enemy's carbines; the French had not even drawn their sabres. The Russians, at first, gave way before this fire; and whilst they were again forming and preparing for another onset, a movement was observed in the enemy's line. I expected that we were to be attacked; but I was mistaken, for the French only wheeled outwardly with a view to gain ground for the necessary intervals between their squadrons; and, having effected this, they again wheeled up. The object of this change of formation was, I suppose, to prevent their flanks from being turned; a mode of attack the Cossacks instinctively adopt on all occasions.

Both parties got ready with their new arrangements about the same time. The Cossacks were pretty sharply told not to shrink from the fire of the carbines; and officers rode behind the line with orders to

cut down the first man who should fall back. Several squadrons were also appointed to turn the enemy during the progress of the front attack. These orders were punctually obeyed; the Cossacks pressed in upon the French, and surrounded their separate squadrons; and I had here an opportunity of seeing several of the enemy's dragoons, who had fired their carbines at us, cut down or speared before they could put sword in hand. At first, the French defended themselves as well as men could do, when contending at a halt against active and constantly-moving enemies; but some of the squadrons having turned, the rest gradually followed the example. The reserve, also, instead of advancing to the support of the front line, only joined the flight; so that in a short time the entire plain, as far as the wood of Jacobsthal, towards which every one hurried, was covered with scattered horsemen. Not a single half squadron was to be seen together,—it was a complete chase; during which most of those who were afterwards taken fell from their horses. Behind the heath which we entered on passing the wood, and which was the last scene of this extraordinary race, a line of French Cuirassiers was unexpectedly discovered, and their calm and imposing attitude at once commanded halt, without any order to that effect having been at all found necessary. Satisfied with our victory, we returned through the wood to Mühlberg.

The defeat of the French on this occasion was entirely owing to their inability to move, and to the want of confidence in their own prowess, naturally resulting from such a deficiency.

#### GEM THE THIRD.

When, on the 11th of October, Colonel Bichalow's brigade of Cossacks, forming the advanced guard of General Bulow's corps, was halting at Debitch, their picquets got entangled in a skirmish with those of the enemy stationed on the road to Eilenburg. As the French came up in some strength, they easily drove back the Russians, so that Colonel Bichalow was forced to send a couple of hundred men to the support of his skirmishers, in order to allow the rest of the brigade to feed their horses at leisure. I accompanied this detachment, and had an opportunity of witnessing the whole of the action that ensued. At a short distance behind the village of Berendorff, through which, in our turn, we drove the French, the ground forms a few wave-like ridges, covered here and there with a little underwood. As we approached these hillocks, and while very carelessly driving the French division before us, a regiment of Chasseurs that had been concealed by the inequality of the ground, suddenly made their appearance. Fortunately for us, they attacked us only on a trot, and in column of squadrons, so that we easily evaded the onset of such superior numbers. The officer who commanded the Cossacks had, at the commencement of the affair, left one-half of his men behind, to act as a reserve,—an arrangement that, in a little time, again brought the action to a stand; for as soon as this second line joined us, the French halted, threw out skirmishers, and, going to the right-about, retired at a trot, followed by the whole swarm of Cossacks, who, every moment, expected to see their enemies get into confusion; every Cossack being firmly convinced that, as an individual horseman, he had then nothing to dread from such unskilful riders. We had thus followed the French column back to the very hill where they first attacked us, when we perceived another body of their cavalry

advancing, at a round trot, against our left flank; they appeared to consist of two squadrons, and proved, as I afterwards learned, to be the Hussars of Elsass. As the commander of the Cossacks had previously sent to acquaint Colonel Bichalow that we were engaged with a superior enemy, and was consequently in momentary expectation of being reinforced, he did not think it too hazardous to detach the division of his left wing in the direction of the advancing Hussars, whilst he remained with the centre and right opposed to the Chasseurs, who had again halted, and fronted. In this we were, however, something out of our reckoning, for the Hussars of Elsass now executed, by regular signal, an admirable attack against us. As soon as they were put to a gallop, two squadrons that had been posted behind the centre, came up from the rear at full speed, and formed one on the right and one on the left of the centre squadrons; the whole regiment then, without firing a single shot, threw themselves right down upon us, and, in two minutes, every Cossack was swept from the ground. (Recollect, reader, *d'autres gens d'autres soins*.) The Chasseurs took no part in this charge, and only followed at a trot. We were driven headlong towards Barendorff, and as it was impossible to ride round the place with exhausted horses incapable of clearing the ditches that divide the adjacent fields, every one hurried towards the entrance of the village, where friends and foes got completely jammed together, so that sharp hand-to-hand combat was the natural consequence. These sort of close encounters are not, as is well known, the result of all cavalry actions; and the Cossacks, who carefully avoid them whenever it is possible, were now only forced into the fight by the absolute necessity of self-defence. At this most critical moment, and at the height of our need, Colonel Bichalow arrived to our assistance with the rest of the brigade. His Cossacks having galloped round the village, rushed with their usual war-cry on the already disordered Hussars: those who were still able, instantly turned and fled, but the bravest and foremost, who fought with us in the streets, were hemmed in, and all either killed, wounded, or taken; the rest threw themselves in confusion on the Chasseurs, who, during the action, had approached too near the village; their formation also gave way before this crowd of fugitives and pursuers, the whole French mass got into disorder, and the complete rout and chase, so frequently consequent on cavalry actions, immediately ensued. We, on our parts, spurred after the flying enemy as fast as we could, till we again reached the height before spoken of, when the whizzing of some howitzer shells that fell amongst us, promptly brought us to a halt; and Colonel Bichalow concluding that he had a superior enemy in front, desisted from further pursuit, leaving only a small picquet to observe the French, who soon disappeared from the field.

This action did not last more than half an hour; as all the movements here described followed each other with the greatest rapidity. We captured about a hundred horses, and sustained a loss that was far from inconsiderable.

Now reader, before going any further, let us first see what is the opinion entertained of the Cossacks by the highest military authority to which we can refer; it will help us to form a correct estimate of the warriors with whom we have just seen them engaged. Frederick II., speaking of them, says—" *Quiconque fait bonne contenance n'a pas*



*grands risques a courir ; car le regiment de Ziethen, bien inferieur en nombre se Soutint seul contre eux sans qu il y eut un Houssard de pris ou de blessé."* Having established this point, let us next recollect that the cavalry who, in column and at a trot, attacked such feeble troops, and afterwards formed a kind of solid mob in order to repel them by a fire of carbines ; who drew up in line to contend, in regular *fusillade*, with the same foes ; who forgot they had sabres by their sides, and thought of their spurs only when retiring ; who, to say nothing more, charged at a trot and fled at a gallop, were the soldiers of Napoleon, the boasted military genius of our time ; the very men of whom we have been speaking formed part of the army under his immediate command ; fought, perhaps, under his own eye ; had certainly been instructed according to his regulations, and, what is still more important, they were led by officers who had of course been trained up in the views and ideas of cavalry warfare prevalent in the imperial army. And what then could those ideas be ? As far back as the time of the ancients it was known that ACTION constituted the principal force of the cavalry. To this Charles XII., Frederick, and Seidlitz, proved, by many a gallant deed, that the impulse derived from the strength of the horse should be added. But of these matters the French troops, of whom we have here been speaking, were evidently in utter darkness ; they would all, except the brave Hussars of Elsass, have been much better on foot, without either spurs, sabres, or horses ; they would then have been only bad infantry, instead of being, as they were, horse-marines incapable of being animated even by the bounding motion of the steeds on which they were mounted.

Perhaps you will say that the best of the French cavalry had been destroyed in Russia during the previous campaign, and that the examples above quoted proved, after all, nothing more than that three out of the four commanding officers engaged in these actions happened to be men ignorant of their duty ; a very reprehensible deficiency certainly, but not one that can be fairly laid to the account of the general system of the army, or to its chief, as there are, no doubt, incapable officers in every service.

Granting, for the present, the whole of this proposition, though the second part does not admit of being maintained, it by no means frees Napoleon and the French army from the charge of having been ignorant of the real strength and nature of cavalry action. I have here laid no stress on the bad horsemanship, and want of skill in manœuvring displayed by the troops, as these glaring deficiencies may, to a certain extent, have resulted from the short time the men had been embodied ; nor am I accusing the commanding officers of misapplying any particular modes of fighting : I distinctly charge the whole system, that allowed such notions of cavalry warfare to exist, with feebleness and with emanating from ignorant men. That there were many able and enterprising cavalry officers in the French army only proves that men may rise at times above the faulty system under which they have been trained : that Napoleon and his marshals, who presided over such a system, gained splendid victories, proves still less,—for it is easy to give the reins to fortune and to hurl masses of brave men to battle : Attila and Alaric did just as much. It is true, no doubt, that hundreds of volumes have been filled with pompous histories of the actions performed by the French commanders of our age, as well as with the praise

bestowed upon them in consequence; equally true it is that stars, dignities, and decorations, always deeply stained with the blood of the brave, have been lavished upon them and their conquerors. But whenever we seek, in the detailed accounts of the scenes of carnage that led to all these questionable honours, for tangible and intelligible proofs of the military skill and genius displayed by the mighty victors, we seek in vain, as we find only declamation, and a sickening profusion of adulation, everywhere substituted for logic and for science.

J. M.

## IRELAND.

IRELAND is at this moment in a state of anarchy and confusion, bordering on rebellion; the laws are openly disobeyed, and the power of the legislature appears insufficient to compel the respect due to them; and in defiance of the warning voice of proclamations, meetings are held for the purpose of intimidating those who are disposed to submit to the present order of things. There must be some vital reason for the lawless proceedings which agitate this unfortunate country to its very centre.

Ireland has been blessed by Providence with a most productive soil, which yields its fruit almost spontaneously; rivers, abounding in fish, flow through its valleys; and canals, the most splendid in the world, afford a ready means of transporting grain and merchandise; mines of various metals are hid in the hearts of the mountains; quarries of marble, stone, and slate exist in various parts of the island; and the climate is mild and salubrious. What then can a people possessing such a country want?

This question has been frequently asked, and a variety of plans proposed for tranquillizing Ireland; and those adopted have merely had the effect of calming for a moment the fearful cries of a starving population. Emancipation, it was fondly believed by the poor, would be the means of providing them with bread, because they were informed so by men, whose interest it was to have the measure carried. In public and private we were told, "give the Catholics equal rights with their Protestant brethren,—dissensions will cease, and Ireland become prosperous and united." It would be well for both countries, had the sequel proved that these assertions were well-founded. The result of granting this boon to the country has been anything but what was anticipated by those who implicitly believed the statements of designing persons. The great mischief attending emancipation was, the manner in which the lower orders were induced to believe that riches would follow close on its steps,—and once the law of the land, the squalid visage of want would depart from their dwellings. The sufferings the Irish endure, from the positive want of food to appease their craving hunger, are dreadful. This extreme poverty is not partial, but universal; and no idea of their misery and starvation can be formed from a comparison with the English pauper; the latter must be supplied with a certain portion of the necessaries of life by the laws of the land; but in Ireland, where no system of poor-laws is established, the indigent man's only hope is in the charity of his fellow-creatures, which, though abundantly distributed, cannot be regularly depended upon: and living under such privations, nobody can be sur-

prised that the Irish listened to the voice of deceit, and followed the counsel of men, who instigated them to insist upon having emancipation, which, in their ignorance, they imagined would perform the prodigies of a magician's wand, in their ill-fated country.

The lower orders of the Irish must be at the mercy of the agitators, till their natural protectors take compassion on them, and visit their neglected estates and tenantry;—not alone for the purpose of extracting reluctantly-paid rents from their pockets, but with a view of improving their condition, listening to their complaints, acquiring their confidence, and rendering them every assistance in the management of their farms; a line of conduct which will tend more to the well-being of Ireland than anything else. The absenteeism of the generality of great landholders and men of property has been the cause of the poorer classes becoming so depraved, and ready to undertake any scheme, with the most remote chance of bettering their condition. Many of them having no landlords to whom they are attached residing amongst them, and from whom, in distress, they could hope for relief, naturally follow the crowd, and are easily led by persons who flatter them, and understand the method of using to advantage that popular instrument,—mob oratory. Instead of the landed proprietors of Ireland being mentioned with respect by their tenants, they are accused (the absentees) of being hard masters, and of taking no interest in the welfare of their dependents. With this feeling corroding the breast of the peasants, it is no wonder they should hearken to men, who they fancy have their interest at heart; and however mistaken they may be, having no resident landlords to set them right, and treat them kindly, they will become progressively more discontented, till their smothered vengeance breaks out, and causes bloodshed and ruin in the country.

The Catholic religion is considered the great bane of Ireland; but give a man (professing any faith) labour, whereby he can obtain sufficient wages to support himself and family, and free permission to worship the Almighty as his conscience dictates, and he will become a deserving and useful subject, whether Catholic or Protestant. Starve a human being, and persecute him, and you render him a dangerous enemy. The priests have at present great influence over their flocks, because the latter have no other persons to look up to for advice and assistance in the time of need.

It is in the power of the aristocracy and gentry of Ireland to put an end to these disturbances; and by them only can the good work be accomplished. Force will, no doubt, for a time awe the disaffected inhabitants into submission, but this will not give wealth and prosperity to the Emerald Isle: concord and repose are the only remedies which can effectually benefit the land; and this is to be brought about by her own sons,—not by a single individual repairing to his home, but by the great body of absentees coming to a determination to reside on their own properties, and attempt to gain by kindness the good will of those whom they have so long neglected. No country can prosper when its riches are drawn from it without an adequate return. If half the revenue derived from the soil of Ireland were expended in that country,—if the nobles and gentry were to open their mansions, in different parts of the country, and promote and reward industry and diligence, by improving their domains and reclaiming waste lands,—the advantages would be incalculable. Once establish a good under-

standing amongst the population, and happiness will spread with rapid strides. Were Ireland to become a safe field for speculators, thousands and thousands of pounds would flow into her coffers; and the perseverance and ingenuity of man would soon raise her head above want and misery, and make her prosperous. The great difficulty is, to bring her to this enviable state,—no laws will ever do it,—it cannot be obtained by confusion: this desirable object is only to be brought about by the voluntary return and co-operation of the absentees. At first it will require a certain sacrifice to be made on the part of the aristocracy and gentry, as far as their personal comforts and amusements are concerned; but few lovers of their country will allow these minor considerations to deter them from saving Ireland from destruction. The necessity of preventing further outrage is so manifest, that no individuals, possessed of property in the country, can refuse to lend their assistance in any way most conducive to its welfare; and if such persons will consider the subject attentively, they will be convinced that the two great wants are, the circulation of money and the presence of men of rank and character in society,—who, by their example, might give a proper direction to the feelings and pursuits of the tenantry. The satisfaction of promoting the interest of one of the finest countries in the world would amply recompense the absentees for the difficulties they would at first encounter; and the determination to exert themselves to the utmost of their power, in ameliorating the condition of the farmers and labourers would, in the end, be crowned with success, and lead to the cessation of outrage.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

\*\*\* Apart from the military speculations in which we may be expected to indulge, the distracted and critical condition of Ireland, and the crimes of its teeming population, so leniently adverted to by our contributor, justify the production of every practical suggestion for the cure of those evils. With this view we seize the present opportunity of bringing to the notice of authority, a plan for counteracting at least one source of popular misery, communicated to us during the agitation of the Catholic Question, and resulting from the extensive experience of one of the most humane and philosophic observers of Irish character. The suggestion is conveyed in the following terms:—

“Nothing appears more alarming in the present aspect of Ireland than her rapidly increasing population,—outstripping beyond all measure her progress in civilization, or her means of employment. It has often occurred to me, that one of the principal preventives of this great evil would be found in a Parochial Provision reserved *exclusively* for the CHILDLESS of both sexes. The details will readily occur to the intelligent persons to whom this suggestion is offered.

“Those who imagine that the lower Irish, in their early marriages, act without reflection or foresight, are quite mistaken. Persons who expostulate with them on this subject are usually silenced by these questions,—‘If I am without children, what is to become of me when I am past my labour? Must I not perish for want?’—The fact is, that marriage is their *only provision for old age*—the only providence within their reach. This is the true explanation of the ridicule which attaches in Ireland to celibacy and barrenness. To be childless is to be poor and destitute; and of course an object of derision and contempt.”

From the above it is easy to understand why marriages are contracted in Ireland so young and so universally,—entailing tenfold wretchedness upon the pauper parties. Yet is even such a state preferable to the ruinous effects of the introduction into Ireland of an unmitigated code of Poor Laws, holding out a premium to pauper propagation,—debasement—tyrannous—fraudulent, and perverted as those still tolerated in England,—where more vice and misery are generated by the abuse of this remedial enactment, than result from the absence of so just a provision, if duly administered, in any other civilized community. Let us hope that not only these laws, but the misnamed system of law in general may undergo an early and thorough revision, in order to adapt it to its legitimate ends. Law, as it is, affords a profession for the lawyer, but no cheap or secure resource for the client. Law, with us, is not a means of justice, being in effect, a scheme of jugglery, per favour of which and the brutal prejudices and ignorance of common juries, more legalized iniquity is perpetrated in this country than in any other on the globe.—Ed.

#### THE LAW.

[The arms of the Temple are surmounted by a *Lamb*—hence the following epigram.]

LAWYER.—The Temple's founder set before our eyes  
The lamb—the type of innocence and peace ;—

CLIENT.—True ; and the skin is o'er the best disguise  
For gentlemen whose object is to *fleece*.

\* \* A little work, entitled “A Cry to Ireland,” has just reached our hands ;—as far as a hasty glance enables us to judge, it contains matter worthy of perusal.—Ed.

#### MEMOIR OF THE SERVICES OF THE LATE GENERAL THE EARL OF KILMOREY.

THIS officer, better known in the army as the Honourable Francis Needham, commenced his career as a cornet in the 18th Dragoons in 1762, nearly three-quarters of a century past. From this regiment he removed to the 1st, in which he became lieutenant, and in 1774 he was promoted to a troop in the 17th Dragoons.

Captain Needham served the whole of the American war : he was present at the blockade of Boston, at New York, the affairs in the Jerseys, the battles of White Plains and Freshfield, in Pennsylvania, Philadelphia and Virginia ; at the affair at Elizabeth Town under General Kuyphausen, and in every action in which his regiment was engaged.

From the 17th Dragoons he exchanged to the 76th Foot, and in that regiment was promoted to a majority. At the siege of York Town he was made prisoner.

On the reduction of the army at the peace of 1783, Major Needham was placed on half-pay ; but soon after became Major in the 80th, and Lieutenant-Colonel in the 104th Foot. In 1788 he was appointed to a company in the 1st Foot Guards ; and in 1793 obtained the rank of Colonel, consequent on his appointment of Aide-de-Camp to the King. He subsequently held the respective commissions of 3d, 2d, and 1st Major and Lieut.-Colonel of the 1st Foot Guards. In 1795 he obtained the rank of Major-General, and in 1802 that of Lieutenant-General.

In 1794 he was appointed Adjutant-General of the expedition to the coast of France under Lord Moira ; and, subsequently, placed on the home staff, from which he was removed to serve as second in command to Major-General Doyle, in the expedition with Count D'Artois to take possession of Isle Dieu ; which place the troops maintained as long as the navy could afford them any protection.

During the Irish rebellion, and for six years, General Needham served on the staff in that country : he was at the battle of Vinegar Hill, and had the sole command at Arklow.

In 1810 he was appointed Colonel of the 86th Foot, of which regiment he continued Colonel till his death in the present year. In 1812 he was promoted to General.

Excepting his cornetcy in the 18th Dragoons, his Lordship purchased all his commissions. Twenty-one years of his services were with his regiments, and many of the subsequent years were passed in active employ and command.

As General Needham he was member of Parliament for Newry. In 1818 he succeeded his brother the late Viscount in his title and estates, and in 1822 he was created Earl of Kilmorey.

MEMOIR OF THE SERVICES OF THE LATE THOMAS BOYS, ESQ.  
VICE-ADMIRAL OF THE BLUE.

THE late Admiral Boys was descended from an ancient family, formerly of Bonnington, in Kent, and described by Philipott, in his *Villare Cantianum*, (page 169\*) as "the numerous and knightly family of Bois." He was grandson of Commodore Boys, Lieut.-Governor of Greenwich Hospital, whose remarkable and providential escape from the *Luxborough* galley, when that vessel was destroyed by fire, A.D. 1727, is recorded in a printed Narrative of the transaction, (folio, London, 1787,) and in a series of well-executed paintings, preserved in the above institution. His father was W. Boys, Esq. of Sandwich, surgeon, author of the *Collections for a History of Sandwich*, in two vols. 4to., a work well-known to antiquaries, and highly prized by them.

In the "Memorandum" of Admiral Boys's services, given in by command to the Admiralty, with that of other naval officers, some years ago, he appears at first serving on board his Majesty's ship *Vigilant*, Captain Kingsmith, early in 1778. But a friend, well-known for his accuracy, writes—"He first served with the late Capt. J. Harvey,\* in the *Speedwell*, either in 1776 or 1777, I believe the

\* The same Captain Harvey who afterwards so nobly distinguished himself as Captain of the *Brunswick*, in the action of the 1st of June, and died of his wounds then received. Lady Harvey, wife of Admiral Sir Henry Harvey, (the brother of Captain Harvey, of the *Brunswick*,) was Admiral Boys's aunt ; and to the friendship and favour of Sir Henry, he always felt himself most highly indebted in the course of his professional services.

When the *Brunswick* was hotly engaged on the 1st of June, with an enemy on each side of her—*L'Achille* and *Le Vengeur*,—Capt. H. Harvey, commanding the *Ramillies*, was able to bear down, and assist his gallant brother, by a single, but effectual broadside, by which incident the brave crew of the *Brunswick* were not a little encouraged and animated.

latter." This apparent discrepancy, however, may be easily reconciled by supposing that he served, in the first instance, in consequence of his youth, without being borne on the ship's books; in which case no return would appear in the Memorandum sent in to the Admiralty. The following is the Document at length; and perhaps no account could more fully exhibit the extent and variety of this officer's services:—

## MEMORANDUM OF THE SERVICES OF CAPTAIN THOMAS BOYS.

Several Bearings or Ranks.	Names of the several Ships.	Names of the several Admirals, Captains, and Commanders.	Stations on which the Ship was chiefly employed.	Date of Entry.	Date of Discharge.
Boy ..... } Midshipman . }	Vigilant .....	{ Capt. R. Kingsmith.. } " Sir Digby Dent. } " Sir Geo. Home . }	Channel and } West Indies.. }	early } in 1778 }	1780
Midshipman . } Master's Mate }	Convert .....	Capt. Henry Harvey...	Leeward Islands	1780	Apr 1782
Midshipman ...	Formidable ....	{ Adm. Sir G. B. Rodney } { Capt. Vashon .....	Jamaica .....	1782	Aug 1782
Midshipman ...	Montague .....	{ Adm. Sir G. B. Rodney } { Capt. George Bowen. }	Jamaica to } England.... }	Aug 1782	Nov 1782
Master's Mate .	Cleopatra.....	Capt. Henry Harvey...	Channel.....	Dec 1782	1783
Midshipman ...	Assistance ....	{ Comm. Sir C. Douglas } { Capt. Bentinck..... }	Halifax.....	Aug 1783	1784
Lieutenant ...	Bonetta .....	Capt. Rich. G. Keates .	{ Halifax, and } { to England. }	Jun 1784	Nov 1784
Lieutenant ...	Rose .....	Capt. Henry Harvey...	Newfoundland	Apr 1786	Dec 1788
Lieutenant ...	Princess Royal.	{ Adm. Hotham .....	Channel.....	1790	Sept 1791
Lieutenant ...	Britannia.....	{ Capt. Holloway .....	Mediterranean	Dec 1792	Mar 1795
Acting Captain	Censeur .....	Self .....	Corsica .....	1795	1795
Commander ...	La Fleche .....	Self .....	Mediterranean	1795	1795
Acting Captain	Fortitude ...	Self .....	Mediterranean	1795	1795
Commander ...	Lacedemonian .	Self .....	Martinique ..	1796	1796
Post Captain..	Tourterelle ...	Self .....	{ Leew. Isl. and } { St. Domingo }	1796	1796
Post Captain..	Severn .....	Self .....	{ St. Domingo } { and Jamaica }	1796	1798
Post Captain..	Aquilon .....	Self .....	{ St. Domingo } { and Jamaica }	1798	1800
Post Captain..	Saturn .....	Self .....	Coast of France	Mar 1808	Jun 1808
Post Captain..	Zealous .....	Self .....	{ Cadix, Lisbon, } { Baltic, North } { Sea, Coast of } { France .....	Oct 1808	Aug 1814
Post Captain..	Malta .....	Self .....	Plymouth.....	Nov 1815	1815
Post Captain..	Ramillies.....	Self .....	{ Plymouth... } { Medway.... }	Nov 1815	{ Ptd. off } { Sept 2. }
			{ Leith .....		1818
Thomas Boys ...		{ Post Captain.....	1796		
		{ Rear Admiral of the Blue ..	12 Aug. 1819		

As Admiral Boys had not the fortune to hold a command in any of the general actions which took place since his promotion to the rank of Post-Captain, it is not material to trace his progress in those naval conflicts of an earlier date, in which, though present, he had less opportunity of distinguishing himself, or in his various services ashore, whether in Corsica, in the West Indies, in Spain, or at Toulon.

In Admiral Hotham's action with the French fleet, 1795, when the *Ca-Ira* and *Censeur* were taken, Lieutenant Boys was first of the *Britannia*, (the admiral's flag-skip,) and he was in consequence promoted to *La Fleche*, with the rank of Commander. Shortly after, in company with the *Cyclops*, Captain H. Hotham, he was so fortunate

as to obtain information respecting the enemy's fleet, which led to a partial engagement; the following account of which is extracted from a letter to his father:—

'You will have heard of our late falling in with and pursuit of the French fleet: had they sought us and attacked us before we had been joined by the long-delayed reinforcement, matters might have turned out differently; but they waited until we had joined, and then, I fancy, not knowing our strength, came over close into Fiorenza Bay, where the whole of our fleet was lying. The sea-breeze, which at this season generally sets in during the day-time, prevented our immediately pursuing them, but in the evening we put to sea. We saw nothing of them the next day, when it was my good fortune to speak a Ragusan vessel, not above sixteen hours from Toulon, which had passed through the enemy's fleet, and gave us exact intelligence of their number and situation. The next morning, after a squally, blowing night, our fleet at day-light found itself to windward of the enemy, and between them and Toulon, with the wind at N.W. After arranging our fleet, the Admiral wore and stood towards them, at first forming the line; but seeing their inferiority, and desire to get off, he made signal for a general chase. About ten there appeared the greatest probability of bringing them to a general action, they lying in disorder, almost becalmed, and our fleet going down on them with a fresh breeze from the N.W. But, on our van getting nearly up with them, we, in our turn, were becalmed; and they, getting a light wind from the eastward, drew out in some order, and crowded sail in-shore. At length, the breeze reaching our ships, our van closed up with their rear. The Victory and Culloden behaved nobly, and one of their seventy-fours, L'Alcide, soon struck. Our van were still gaining on the enemy, and became much separated from the heavy ships in our rear, when unfortunately the captured ship took fire: this occasioned some confusion in our centre and rear, who were close to her; and, several of our ships being obliged to tack to keep clear of her, the separation between our van and the body of the fleet was much increased. At this time the Admiral thought it necessary to make a signal to discontinue the engagement. Our loss was small, considering how warmly our van was engaged; about ten killed and thirty-six wounded in all. The French made a fair run of it, and did not fight so obstinately as on the 14th of March. The Alcide had about forty killed and wounded before she struck. About 300 were burnt or drowned, and about 290 saved.

'This is the first action I ever had an opportunity of seeing *at a distance*. It was a grand sight; the one fleet running, and the other gaining on them, and engaging warmly as they arrived up: the Alcide burning fiercely in the middle of our fleet, and at the same time a violent storm of thunder and lightning to the westward. It will never go out of my eyes, and, when I have time, I shall attempt to draw something like it.'

As Captain of the Zealous, 74, at the time of the battle of Corunna, Admiral Boys was engaged in the embarkation of the British army. The Zealous reached Corunna a day or two before the battle took place: and for three days he was incessantly employed in the business of embarkation, during the last twelve hours as senior officer. For their services on this occasion, the navy received (with the army) the thanks of Parliament.

The highest rank with which Admiral Boys actually served, was that of Commodore, which he held during part of the time of his commanding at Leith. Admiral Boys was distinguished by great coolness and presence of mind, in dangerous and trying circumstances—the highest description of military courage. The soundness of his judgment, also, appeared in various instances; and it may be added, that



he was eminently a peace-maker. The value of this character in the service is well-known, and is especially felt in the details of duty on board ship. By this disposition, he was, on a certain occasion, the means of preventing the most serious consequences, when one of the parties at issue was a person of some consideration; and it also manifested itself continually in healing the divisions, arising from time to time, in a man-of-war. On this subject, a friend whom he knew how to appreciate, writes, "As a peace-maker no one ever equalled him."

He was conspicuous, also, for great kindness and consideration for his officers and ship's crew, accompanied by an anxious desire and a great readiness and promptitude to make all suitable exertions for their promotion and professional success. Nor did this care for the benefit of those who had once served under him, overlook, after their decease, the widow and the orphan.

He made it a fixed rule to support authority. His principle was, that those who are employed ought also to be trusted. It was his plan, therefore, to interfere as little as possible, in the details of service, with officers who commanded under him; always leaving to them, in ordinary cases, the *mode* of conducting duty, provided it was performed to his satisfaction. He took great delight in enlarging on the perseverance with which he acted on this system;—instancing a case where an officer under him chose to order a boat to be painted with "*pippin green*," and *Collingwood blush*,"—an extraordinary combination of embellishment, but one which he did not think proper to disturb.

He was distinguished, also; by his observance and acknowledgment of the finger of Providence, especially in some hair-breadth escapes in the course of his professional adventures. On one occasion, when a vessel had been taken from the enemy, he was commanded, with others, to carry her into port; but, by some mistake in the list, another name was substituted for his; and, not without suspicions of foul play, he was forced to forego his appointment. The vessel, however, having been crippled in action, was lost ere she reached her destination, and all on board perished. He manifested a similar trust in Providence, throughout the whole period of the national difficulties in our struggle with Napoleon; the news of every fresh disaster, in the shape of land victories over our Continental allies, only drew from him the expression, that matters would mend some day: and, when the tide first began to turn in our favour, at the commencement of the struggle in Spain, this was only in accordance with his general impression of what would sooner or later take place.

To other qualities which marked the character of Admiral Boys, we may add that he was quite of a disposition to be contented and satisfied with that degree of promotion and distinction which his king and country had awarded to his services. A friend, who thought he might have expected more, lamenting to him one day, in conversation, that he had never enjoyed an opportunity of distinguishing himself as a commanding officer in any general action,—and that, after all his long and toilsome services, he had not come in for a share of those honours which had been so liberally distributed towards the close of the war,—he made no reply; but, taking a piece of paper, wrote upon it a list of several young persons of his own standing, with whom he had sailed,

as companions, in one of the first ships in which he served; and, against the name of each, a word or two, to show what had become of them. At the bottom of the list he wrote his own name, and opposite to it, sketched a small *flag*. Thus, he knew how to look at the favourable side of the account, as well as the unfavourable; or, in other words, to consider not only how many were better off, but how many were worse off than himself. This paper he handed to the friend aforesaid.

It remains only to say a few words respecting his various attainments, professional and general. With regard to those of a professional kind, he had attentively and practically studied naval tactics, naval mechanics, and naval history. The writer had the honour of being present at an interview at Walmer Castle, when Admiral Boys called to pay his respects to his present Majesty, then Duke of Clarence. His Royal Highness, himself better read than most men in the naval wars of England, was pleased to employ the greater part of a conversation of some length, on nautical topics;—aware, probably, of his visitor's extensive and minute knowledge upon these subjects, and with great address gave the conference such a turn, as made it a very gracious and condescending, but at the same time a very acute and searching, cross-examination of the Admiral, and of his nautical information. The examination referred principally to some of our naval actions in the last century, the names of the ships engaged, the state in which they went into action, with other details equally particular, on all which points the Admiral came off with flying colours. The end was, that his Royal Highness appeared to be well satisfied with the result of the interview: the Admiral, who had been somewhat put upon his metal, withdrew, grasping the hand courteously extended to him, with a hearty "God bless you, Sir," the old naval benediction to a superior, and exclaiming, "It was the stiffest examination he had ever stood, since he had seen service;" and the only other person who was present can testify, that if a candidate for university distinctions had acquitted himself with equal accuracy in Greek metres or in mathematics, he would have come off with honour in the Senate-house.

The tactics of Admiral Boys were tried towards the close of the last war, when he was ordered to join the fleet in the Channel, with the line-of-battle ship which he then commanded as Captain, for the purpose of exercising, previous to going into harbour and being paid off. It is well known, that on these occasions, if a ship loses her place in the line, by making too much or too little sail, &c., it is usual for the Admiral, when the error is noticed, to make her signal; and it of course becomes a matter of competition amongst the different ships, to avoid this distinction, each wishing to have their own signal made as seldom as possible. Admiral Boys related, with great satisfaction, that his ship, on this occasion, had not her signal made once. In one instance he went for a few moments into his cabin, but keeping a good look-out even there, he observed that something was getting wrong in his ship's distance, and instantly went upon deck and gave the necessary orders to make or shorten sail as the case required. The error had been already noticed by the Admiral, glasses were at work, and the ship's signal was seen ascending: but ere it was up, the correction of the error was also noticed, and the signal was hauled down again without having been hoisted. As Captain Boys had then been lying for some

time at Leith, some of his brother officers on the occasion good-naturedly gave his ship the title of the "North Star," both in honour of her sailing, and also by way of intimating the supposed cause, namely, her having her crew consisting in a great measure of Scotch sailors, who are allowed at all hands to be among the best. But whatever merit was due to them upon this particular occasion, must be divided amongst about fifty men; for that was the whole number of Scotchmen which the ship happened at that time to bear upon her books. And afterwards, when she was paid off, her Commander had the satisfaction of observing, that instead of wasting their wages in two or three days of drunkenness and profligacy, they made their bargain with the skipper of a small vessel that they had set eyes upon, at five shillings a head, and all shipped themselves off at once to Leith, taking their money with them in their pockets, for their parents, wives, or sweethearts.

Admiral Boys was distinguished for taste, both in poetry and in the fine arts. He appears to have written verses, French as well as English. Of all descriptive pieces in distinguished writers, he seemed chiefly to admire that awfully sublime passage of Danté, where the poet depicts the Venetian Ugolino, whom his enemies had starved to death, gnawing their bones in the regions below, and "his mouth uplifting from the fierce repast;" and the dream of the Roman general in Tacitus, when, surrounded by dangers, he saw the ghost of Quintilius Varus, ("Ducemque terruit dira quies," &c., *annal. i. lxx.*) He was thoroughly well-acquainted with Shakspeare, and one of the last literary amusements which seemed to afford him interest, was turning over the leaves of Ayscough's Index, apparently with many a pleasing reminiscence. His ear was so accurate, that when he heard an opera, he generally brought away the most striking movements. And his taste in paintings was sufficiently manifested by his collection, which, though small, contained some excellent pieces, especially a portrait of James II. as Duke of York, which is generally allowed by artists to be a first-rate picture; while many of his own sketches manifest great skill and talent, and a remarkable knowledge of light and shade. Towards the close of his life, his judgment continued accurate long after his memory had failed. Yet, even in regard to the recollection of facts, his well-stored mind sometimes gave evidence in his latter days of most retentive powers; and once, when he was referred to for the explanation of something respecting the evacuation of Toulon, in Archenholtz, an able historian of Germany, he rectified some inaccuracies respecting the positions of the ships, with no small precision. His strength, however, and his faculties gradually declined; and at length, almost without a struggle, and to all appearance unconscious of the awful change which was taking place, he solemnly passed from this sublunary state to an unseen and eternal world. The Admiral departed this life at Ramsgate, of an apoplectic attack, on the 3d November last, in the 70th year of his age.

## NOTICE OF THE LATE CAPTAIN ROBERT CAMPBELL, R.N.

WE regret exceedingly to have to report the death of this excellent officer; and, we grieve to add, one of our most interesting contributors. His friends authorise us to mention, that Captain Campbell was the author of the series of papers which have appeared in this journal under the title of "Recollections of a Sea-Life, by a Midshipman of the last century;" and we are satisfied, that no person could have perused the articles in question, without feeling that they were in the hands of an officer of talent and experience, and one possessed of excellent taste, judgment, and right feeling in all matters, private or professional. On public grounds, therefore, as well as the more selfish ones connected with the loss of an able assistant in our task, we sincerely regret the death of this officer, and we have no doubt that in this sentiment we shall be joined by many of our readers.

As we had not opportunities of knowing much of the private life of our late valued contributor, we applied to Captain Basil Hall, who first introduced him to us, and at whose instance he undertook to write the series of papers alluded to; and as Captain Hall is an old shipmate and friend of his, we cannot do better than insert the following letter, which we received in answer to our application:—

"United Service Club, 22nd January, 1833.

"MR. EDITOR,—I should most willingly give you such a sketch of my excellent friend, Captain Campbell's professional career as you ask for, did I not think that he has himself already executed this task much better than any one can do it for him. His memory is very safe in his own hands; for I feel well assured that no one can read the papers published by him in your Journal, under the title of *Recollections of a Sea Life*, without sincerely respecting the author, and becoming insensibly attached to him. In truth, he was one of the best officers I have ever sailed in companionship with, and so thoroughly right-minded and right-hearted in all he thought, said, and did, that he won the confidence of all whose duty it was to act over him, or with him, or under him. I shall merely mention that he served for a considerable time as Sir Samuel Hood's first-lieutenant, and he enjoyed the hearty good opinion of that great judge of an officer's character.

"I feel strongly tempted to give you some anecdotes of my late friend's professional as well as his private life; but I check myself, from the fear that I may mistake my own private regard for the interest which your readers feel on the occasion. When a man has long lived in the eye of the public, and claimed their attention by important services, every one feels interested in knowing even the minutest details of his life. But when an officer's merits, however great they may be, and however valuable they might prove, if they had met with opportunities of distinction, are known only to his private friends, it is not, perhaps, the best way to augment his reputation, to detail such particulars as can find no ready sympathy with general readers. The following anecdote, however, is so striking in itself, and so characteristic of my poor friend, that I venture to send it you.

"In the year 1818, Captain Campbell was appointed to the command of the island of Ascension, which, it will be remembered, had been occupied by us during Buonaparte's detention at St. Helena. I forget what ship he was appointed to; which, however, he was to fit out in the river, for the purpose of carrying out his garrison and stores. Within a day or two after receiving his appointment, and while he was making

preparations to leave home, a horse kicked him and broke his leg severely. Nevertheless, he had no thoughts of relinquishing his command, and the Lords of the Admiralty having kindly allowed his brother Captain Lewis Campbell to fit out the ship, he remained quietly in the country to recover. In five weeks afterwards, although he could not stand, as the bone had not united, he insisted upon having a cot contrived so as to hang up in the stage-coach, and in this way he came to London, and took a lodging close to the Admiralty. The fracture, which was found as bad or worse than before, was put to rights in town, and he was desired to keep quiet. This injunction, however, was beyond his powers; and within a day or two he rose from his bed, and, with his leg actually dangling about, in spite of numerous splints and bandages, he proceeded to the Admiralty, and was admitted to a personal interview. His great anxiety was to know distinctly what was expected of him in his novel command; and as he felt that he could not gain this knowledge except by personal communication, he incurred the risk of protracting his cure rather than leave England uninformed of his duty. Accordingly it was not till several weeks after reaching Ascension that the bones of his leg began to knit, and long afterwards before he gained adequate strength to put in execution the purpose he had long projected of surveying the island. On the death of Buonaparte he was relieved from the command of Ascension. A geographical and geological account of Ascension was printed by Capt. Campbell in 1824, in Professor Jameson's *Philosophical Journal*—and I need not refer again to the papers in your *Journal*—only one of which, however, on manning the Navy (No. 41), bears his name.

"Among the papers of my friend there have been found many incipient articles which would have done credit to the pages of the *United Service Journal*, had he lived to have matured them. I venture to send you one of those which contains several characteristic touches, independently of being not a little interesting in itself.

"I remain, your most obedient servant,

"BASIL HALL."

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"In the service of his country there are many trying situations in which an officer who devotes himself to it is liable to be placed. When these circumstances involve an equal participation of personal danger the die is soon cast, and the decision to be made is relieved from a load of that responsibility which must ever influence the feelings of a conscientious man, when he is called upon to sacrifice the lives of his fellow-creatures, without partaking an equal risk.

"In the case, for instance, of boats being despatched to attack an enemy when the commanding officer does not leave his ship to accompany them,—which, in general, he ought not to do,—all that an officer can do, in such circumstances, is to consider well the practicability of the service, and to exert his judgment in the preliminary arrangements which lie within his power—giving to his men credit for that courage, and to his officers credit for that courage and judgment and foresight, with which much is practicable that might be deemed impossible by the cool calculator.

"Having made his mind up, he must free himself from the trammels of that feeling of responsibility which has a tendency to damp the fire of all spirit of enterprise, and which, I would trust and believe, has been the cause of the instances we have heard of, where commanding officers have been censured for not bringing an enemy to action, rather than from any fear of personal danger.

"But whatever personal bravery a man may have, if he be troubled with this diseased degree of conscientiousness—this fear of responsibility, it must, as far as it goes, unfit him for the duties of an officer, but more particularly for those of a commanding officer.

"Supposing such an officer to be totally regardless of personal safety

when put in competition with his duty, still cases will and do arise to every man who devotes his life to the service, which will put to a severe test that kind of resolution, the want of which I have noticed. There are some puzzling questions for a man who is liable to be influenced by this over-degree of conscientiousness, which he should turn in his mind, so as to be able to act upon when such cases occur to him.

"For instance—you are in chase of an enemy's man-of-war—you are coming up with her, but have no time to lose—her port is a-head—one of your men falls overboard—the life-buoy is cut adrift, as a matter of course, by somebody near it—you see the man swim well and get hold of it—yet if you shorten sail your chase gets off—what will you do?


"There can be no question of what would be the line of duty for an officer placed in such circumstances, yet it would be a severe trial for a brave and humane man."

**A NEW METHOD OF DETERMINING THE LINES AND ANGLES OF  
A REGULAR FORTIFICATION,  
ACCORDING TO AN IMPROVED SYSTEM OF VAUBAN.**

HAVING been sometimes engaged in giving instruction in fortification and engineering, I have often regretted that the different works of a fortified place were not, so far as circumstances would permit, derived from some fundamental basis in a general and uniform manner. In this case, simplicity and efficiency should, as much as possible, be combined, so that the various parts might be readily formed without the aid of complex instruments; while, at the same time, they might be less expensive, though stronger, and, by judicious position, afford greater protection to one another, than those constructed by the common methods. On examining my mode of determining the position of the faces of the ravelin, it will be found that they are obtained with great ease, and the flanks are completely covered by them from the fire of the besiegers. In like manner the counterscarps of the ditches are found with equal facility, while the dimensions of the whole fall between the extremes of those approved of by the best engineers.

WILLIAM GALBRAITH.

The following diagram shows the manner of determining the several parts of a fortification, as proposed in this paper, and exemplified in the case of a regular hexagon, to which the construction and computations refer.



## I.—BY CONSTRUCTION.

By the principles of geometry, inscribe in a circle a regular polygon, of as many sides as the fortification is intended to have fronts.

1. Divide  $360^\circ$  by the number of the sides of the polygon, the quotient will be the angle at the centre. Subtract one half of the angle at the centre from  $90^\circ$ , the remainder will be half the angle of the polygon, which being doubled, the angle of the polygon will be found.

2. With half the angle as the centre, or half the angle of the polygon and the given side, the radius of the circumscribing circle may be determined. For the purpose of drawing the plan on paper, the sector containing the lines called *polygons* will perform the operation most readily.

3. Let  $ab$ , equal to 180 toises\*, in mean fortification, be the side of the given polygon, consisting of six sides, forming a regular hexagon. Then, by Art. 1,  $360^\circ \div 6 = 60^\circ$ , the angle  $acb$  at the centre. But the angle  $acm$  is half of  $acb$ , its measure is therefore  $30^\circ$ , and its complement (or  $90^\circ - 30^\circ =$ )  $60^\circ$  forms the angle  $cab$ , half the angle of the polygon. Hence all the angles of the triangle  $abc$  are equal, and the triangle is equilateral, as is well known to those acquainted with elementary geometry, therefore  $ac$  is also known, being equal to  $ab$ , the side of the given polygon.

In the case of any other polygon, the angle  $acm$  is found in a similar manner, therefore with  $am$ , half the given side  $ab$ , and this angle, the triangle  $amc$  may be formed, and its other sides,  $ac$ ,  $mc$ , found both by construction and trigonometrical calculation. It is obvious that the angle of the polygon  $abv$  is equal to twice  $abc$ , or, in the case of a hexagon, equal to  $120^\circ$ .

4. Bisect  $ab$  in  $m$ , and draw  $nm$  at right angles to  $ab$ . At  $a$  draw the line  $ac$ , making the angle  $mac$  equal to half the angle of the polygon. Produce  $ac$  to meet  $nc$  in  $c$ , then will  $ac$  be the radius of the circumscribing circle, which, in the present case, is equal to  $ab$ , and, without any operation, is known to be 180 toises. From  $m$  lay off  $md$ , the normal or perpendicular, equal to one sixth of  $ab$ , the side of the polygon, or  $(180 \div 6 =)$  30 toises, and through  $d$  draw the indefinite lines  $adi$  and  $b dh$ , in which take  $ae$  and  $fb$ , the faces of the bastions, equal to one third of  $ab$ , or  $(180 \div 3 =)$  60 toises. Hence the points  $e$  and  $f$ , forming the shoulders of the bastions, are determined.

With the points  $a$  and  $b$  as centres, and a radius equal to  $af$  or  $be$ , intersect the lines  $ai$  and  $b h$  in the points  $i$  and  $h$ . Join  $if$ ,  $he$ , and  $hi$ , these will form the flanks of the bastions and the curtain. Hence the broken line  $acehifb$  will form the principal outline of one front, to which all the others are equal and similar.

5. To form the ravelin so as completely to cover the flanks, which is an important consideration in a well-constructed fort, produce the flanking lines  $he$ ,  $if$ , to meet the side  $ab$  of the polygon in  $o$  and  $p$ , the line  $op$  will be the gorge of the ravelin.

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\* The French toise is equal to 1.065825 English fathoms, or the former is only about  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. greater than the latter, and consequently for many ordinary purposes, as in the present case, the fathom may be substituted for the toise without sensible error.

From this construction it is clear that the flanks cannot be seen by the besiegers, since  $keo$ ,  $ifp$ , are straight lines, and to this circumstance, as well as to its general simplicity, a superiority for our method is chiefly claimed. To complete the ravelin, with the centres  $o$  and  $p$ , and a radius equal to one third of the side of the polygon, or equal to the face of the bastion, describe arcs intersecting each other in  $n$ , join  $no$ ,  $np$ : these will form the faces of the ravelin.

Also join  $fo$ ,  $ep$ , intersecting in  $g$ , and produce them to  $t$  and  $u$ : the lines  $gt$ ,  $gu$ , will form the counterscarp of the principal ditch,  $atgubd$ . Again, produce  $oe$  to  $y$ , and make  $oy$  equal to two thirds of  $oe$ , and through  $y$  draw  $qj$  parallel to  $on$ , and in like manner  $ar$  parallel to  $np$ , then will  $qjr$  be the counterscarp of the ditch before the ravelin.

Hence, the whole of the outlines of our fortification are derived from two fundamental elements—the number of the sides of the polygon, and the length of one of them, by precise rules of great simplicity and of ready application, forming results superior to, though not differing greatly from, those of our best engineers.

*Remark.*—In most plans and fortifications actually constructed, the salient angles are all as sharp as the lines forming them will produce. It would be an advantage to round off all these angles slightly, so that the shot striking them might produce less effect in shaking the masonry at these points, which generally form the objects of attack. Care must be taken, however, not to remove too much of the angles, so as to afford room to the besiegers with scaling ladders to be protected from the flanking fire of the garrison.

Of course it is also understood, that tenailles, the covered way, and any other necessary outworks, may be added in the usual manner.

## II.—BY TRIGONOMETRICAL CALCULATION.

In the triangle  $bmd$  are given the side  $bm$ , 90 toises,  $md$ , 30 toises, and  $bmd$ , a right angle, to find the angle  $mbd$ ,  $18^\circ 26' 7''$ :  $mbc - mbd = 60^\circ - 18^\circ 26' 7'' = 41^\circ 33' 53'' = fbl$ . In the triangle  $baf$  are given the sides  $ab$ ,  $bf$ , and the contained angle  $abf$  to find the angle  $afb$   $152^\circ 48' 4''$ , the angle  $fab = 8^\circ 45' 49''$ , and the side  $af = 124.54$  toises, equal to the line of defence  $ai$ . By construction  $afi$  is an isosceles triangle,  $pai - paf = 18^\circ 26' 7'' - 8^\circ 45' 49'' = 9^\circ 40' 18'' = fai$ , and  $90 - \frac{1}{2}fai = 90^\circ - 4^\circ 50' 9'' = 85^\circ 9' 51'' = aif$ ,  $bbf = fhi = eih = 18^\circ 26' 7''$ : therefore,  $eih + eif = hif = 103^\circ 35' 58''$ , the angle contained between the flank and curtain;  $ifb = fih + ifh = 103^\circ 35' 58'' + 18^\circ 26' 7'' = 122^\circ 2' 5''$ , the angle of the shoulder of the bastion. Again  $180^\circ - ifb = 180^\circ - 122^\circ 2' 5'' = 57^\circ 57' 55'' = hfi$ . In the isosceles triangle  $afi$  are given the equal sides  $af$ ,  $ai = 124.54$  toises, and the contained angle  $fai = 9^\circ 40' 18''$  to find the flank  $fi = 21$  toises. Since  $kl$  is parallel to  $ab$ , and  $abl = 60^\circ$ , then  $klb$  is  $120^\circ$ . In the triangle  $hlb$  there are given the angle  $hlb = 120^\circ$ ,  $bhl = 18^\circ 26' 7''$ , and the side  $bh = 124.54$  toises, to find  $bl = 45.47$ , and  $hl = 95.41$  toises. In the triangle  $fhi$  are given the angle  $fhi = 18^\circ 26' 7''$ , the angle  $hfi = 57^\circ 57' 55''$ , and the side  $fi = 21$  toises, to find  $hi = 56.29$  toises, one half of which, or  $28.14$  toises, is  $si$ .

Now  $hl - hs = 95.41 - 28.14 = 67.27$  toises  $= sl$ , whence  $sl - si = 67.27 - 28.14 = 39.13$  toises, the length of  $il$ , the demi-



gorge of the bastion; and  $kl = 2si + 2il = 56.29 + 79.26 = 134.55$  toises, the interior side of the polygon. In the triangle  $sid$  are given the angle  $dis = 18^\circ 26' 7''$ , the angle  $isd = 90^\circ$ , and the side  $si = 28.14$  toises, to find  $ds = 9.38$  toises. Now  $dm + ds = ms = 30 + 9.38 = 39.38$  toises, and  $kl + bl = ct + bl = cb = 134.55 + 45.45 = 180$  toises, the radius of the circumscribing circle,

Again,  $180^\circ - afi = 180^\circ - 85^\circ 9' 51'' = 94^\circ 50' 9'' = afp$ ; since  $op$  is parallel to  $hi$ ,  $180^\circ - hif = 180^\circ - 103^\circ 35' 58'' = 76^\circ 24' 2'' = apf$ . Now, in the triangle  $apf$  there are given the angle  $apf = 76^\circ 24' 2''$ , the angle  $pag = 8^\circ 45' 49''$ , and the side  $af = 124.54$  toises, to find  $pf = 19.52$  toises. But  $\frac{2}{3}$  of  $pf = \frac{2}{3} \times 19.52 = 13.01$  toises =  $px$  or  $oy$  (Article 5), whence the points  $x$  and  $y$ , in the counterscarp of the ditch before the ravelin, are determined. In the triangle  $nom$  there are given  $on = 60$  toises,  $om = \frac{1}{2} op = 37.67$  toises, to find  $nop = 51^\circ 6' 34''$ , and  $onm = 38^\circ 53' 26''$ , whence  $onp = 2onm = 77^\circ 46' 52''$ . In the triangle  $opf$ , there are given the side  $op = 75.34$  toises, the side  $pf = 19.52$  toises, and the contained angle  $opf = 76^\circ 24' 2''$ , to find the angles  $pfo = 88^\circ 35' 16''$ , and  $po f = 15^\circ 0' 42'' = aot$ . In the oblique-angled triangle  $apf$ , there are given the angle  $apf = 76^\circ 24' 2''$ , the angle  $afp = 94^\circ 50' 9''$ , and the side  $af = 124.54$  toises, to find  $ap = 127.67$  toises, and  $ab - ap = 180 - 127.67$  toises =  $52.33$  toises =  $bo$  or  $ao$ . In the right-angled triangle  $aot$ , right-angled at  $t$ , there are given  $aot = 15^\circ 0' 42''$ , and the side  $ao = 52.33$  toises, to find  $at = 13.55$  toises, the breadth of the principal ditch before the place at the salient angle of the bastion.

The angle  $po y = hif = 103^\circ 35' 58''$ , and  $po y - nop = 103^\circ 35' 58'' - 51^\circ 6' 34'' = 52^\circ 29' 24'' = zo y$ . In the right-angled triangle  $ozy$ , right-angled at  $z$ , there are given  $zo y = 52^\circ 29' 24''$ , and the side  $oy = 13.01$  toises, to find  $yz = 10.32$  toises, the breadth of the ditch before the ravelin.

In the right-angled triangle  $ofp$  there are given the angle  $po f = 15^\circ 0' 42''$ , and the side  $om = 37.67$  toises, to find  $mg = 10.10$  toises. Again, in the triangle  $onm$ , right-angled at  $m$ , there are given  $n b m = 51^\circ 6' 34''$ , and the side  $on = 60$  toises, to find  $nm = 46.70$  toises; therefore  $nm + mg = 46.70 + 10.10 = 56.80$  toises =  $ng$ , the capital of the ravelin.

In the right-angled triangle  $omg$  there are given the angle  $gom = po f = 15^\circ 0' 42''$ , and  $om = 37.67$  toises, to find  $og = 39.00$  toises. In the right-angled triangle  $amc$  there are given  $am = 90$  toises, and the angle  $mac = 60^\circ$ , to compute  $mc = 155.88$  toises.

Again,  $ms - mg = 39.38 - 10.10 = 29.28$  toises =  $gs$ , and  $gs - ds = 29.28 - 9.38 = 19.90$  toises =  $dg$ . Also  $ng + dg = 56.80 + 19.90 = 76.70$  toises =  $dn$ , and  $ds + dn = 9.38 + 76.70$  toises =  $80.08$  toises =  $sn$ .

Lastly,  $cm - m = s = 155.88 - 39.38 = 116.50$  toises, equal to  $sc$ , whence all the necessary lines and angles are known.

By proceeding in a similar manner, the dimensions of the lines and angles of any other polygon, such as a pentagon, heptagon, &c., will become known, and the practical construction on the ground will be readily effected.

**A SUMMARY OF THE TROOPS THAT CAME FROM HOLLAND WITH  
KING WILLIAM III.,**

**AND OF THOSE EMPLOYED AT THE BATTLE OF AGHRIM IN IRELAND, 12TH MAY, 1691.**

On the 5th Nov. 1688, the whole fleet came into Torbay, and some of the forces immediately landed at Brixham quay, to secure the landing of the rest, which was done in a very short time after.

The forces in this expedition, according to the account printed in Holland, were as follows, viz. :—

**HORSE (15 Corps.)**

1. The Life Guards ; 1 troop of 197 men.

We find this troop in British pay, on the 9th October, 1690, at the cost of 16,126*l.* 4*s.* per annum.

2. Regiment of Guards commanded by the Sieur Benting ; 480 men ; 6 troops.

Similar remark, but cost 30,051*l.* 8*s.*

3. Montpelian.

7. Oyen, or Vauboyen.

4. Gingle.

8. Vanderlip.

5. Zuylestein.

9. Lapbroeck.

6. Scravemore.

10. Flodorp.

11. Seyde.

These 9 corps had only 3 troops each, and several of them also were in British pay on the 9th October, when their strength was increased to 213 men, and the cost of each regiment per year 13,078*l.* 18*s.* Montpelian's, Gingle's, and Zuylestein's, were afterwards at the battle of Aghrim, on the 12th July, 1691.

12. Waldeck's Regt.

13. Nassau's ditto.

14. The Prince's Dragoons, 860 men.

15. Marrowis's ditto, 440 do.

**Recapitulation of Cavalry—**

Life Guards	.	.	.	.	197 men
Regiment of Guards	.	.	.	.	480
Prince's Dragoons	.	.	.	.	860
Marrewis's ditto	.	.	.	.	440

1977

The other troopers estimated at . 1683

Total 3660

**Foot (16 Regiments.)**

1. Foot Guards, commanded by Count Salmes, 25 comps., 2000 men.

We find this regiment in British pay, 9th Oct. 1690 ; then called 27 comps., 2634 men ; cost, 56,851*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.* per annum.

2. Talmash, 12 companies.—Now the 5th, or Northumberland regiment of foot, which Tollemache had from 9th Oct. 1685, to 1st May, 1688,—consequently the regiment that came over with King William in 1688. In the estimate of 9th Oct. 1690, it is called Lloyd's, who was then Colonel ; 12 comps., 840 men, cost 15,097*l.* annually, and classed with the Dutch troops in British pay.

3. A regiment which was formerly Bellisso's, 12 companies.—Now the

6th regiment of foot, which Sir Henry Bellasis had from 3d April, 1680, to 28th Sept. 1689; then Win. Babington, to 15th April, 1691; and then George Prince of Hesse Darmstead. In the October estimate, as above mentioned, it is called Babington's; 12 comps., 840 men, cost 15,097*l.*; and in the order of battle for Aghrim, 12th July, 1691, it is called the Prince of Hesse's regiment; in both cases it is in the Schedule with the Holland troops.

4. Mackay's, 12 companies.—In the same estimate it is called 1200 men; cost 19,933*l.* Lieut. Cambie and 25 men of this regiment were gallantly engaged at Wincanton, soon after King William landed, in 1688.

5. Nassau's, 12 companies.—In British pay, 1690; 840 men, cost 15,171*l.* 8*s.*

6. Balfort's, 12 companies.

7. A regiment, formerly Wachop's; 12 companies.

8. Coulsen's, 12 companies.

Of these regiments, the 5th and 6th foot, and Nassau's, are in the order of battle for Aghrim, 12th July, 1691.

9. A regiment which was the late Earl of Ossory's, 10 companies.—This was Thomas Earl of Ossory. In 1677 he was made Colonel and Captain of one of the six English regiments in the Dutch service.

10. Breckvelt, 10 comps.

13. Hagenden, 10 comps.

11. Holstein, 10 comps.

14. Fagel, 10 comps.

12. Wirtemberg, 10 comps.

15. Branden, 10 comps.

16. Prince of Breckvel, 10 comps.

#### Recapitulation of Foot—

Salm's Foot Guards	.	.	.	.	2000 men
7 regts of 12 comps.	.	.	.	.	84 comps.
8 ditto of 10 ditto	.	.	.	.	80 do.

Total 164 comps.

164 companies, averaged at 53 . . . 8692

Total 10,692 men.

#### *The Battle of Aghrim in Ireland.*

12th of May, 1691.

(FROM STORY'S HISTORY OF IRELAND.)

English in the field,—47 squadrons of horse, 28 battalions of foot, in all about 17,000 men.

Irish in the field,—5000 horse, 20,000 foot.

#### English Line of Battle.

Lieut.-Gen. Ginckell.—The Duke of Wirtemberg.

First line on the right,—Lieut.-General Scravemore,—Brigadier Villers,

#### CAVALRY.

Squadrons.

2 Lyeson, now 3d Dragoons.

2 Wynn, now 5th Dragoons.

- 2 Oxford, Royal Regt. Horse Guards, Blue.
- 2 Langston, 1st Horse.
- 3 Ruvigny, in British pay.
- 2 Villers, 2d Dragoon Guards.

Major-General Mackay ; Brigadier Bellasis.

INFANTRY.

Battalions.

- 1 Kirk, 2d Foot.
- 2 Gen. Hambleton, 20th Foot.
- 3 Herbert, 23d Foot.
- 4 Lord George Hambleton, } New regiments.
- 5 Foulks, }
- 6 Bellasis, 22d Foot.
- 7 Brewer, 12th Foot.

Major-General Tettau ; Brigadier La Meloniere.

- 8 La Meloniere, French in British pay.
- 9 Du Cambon, ditto, ditto.
- 10 Belcastle, new regiment.
- 11 Grebon, Dutch, in British pay.
- 12 Danish, }
- 13 ditto, } in British pay.
- 14 ditto, }

Major-General La Forest ; Brigadier Eppinger.

CAVALRY.

Squadrons

- 2 La Forest, in British pay.
- 2 Schested, } Danes, in British pay.
- 2 Doneps, }
- 3 Bencerer, } Dutch, in British pay.
- 3 Monpeucillare, }
- 3 Eppinger, Dutch, in British pay.

Second Line on the Right.

CAVALRY.

Major-General Ruvigny ; Brigadier Leveson.

Squadrons

- 3 Cunningham, 6th Dragoons.
- 1 Wynn, 5th Dragoons.
- 3 Lancer, 1st Dragoon Guards.
- 4 Woolsley, in British pay, perhaps French.
- 2 Byerley, 3d Horse.

Major-General Talmash ; Brigadier Stuart.

Battalions.

- 15 Stuart, 9th Foot.
- 16 Earle, new regiment.
- 17 Tiffin, 27th Foot.
- 18 late Hambleton, }
- 19 St. John's, } New regiments.
- 20 Lisburne, }
- 21 Meath, 18th Foot.

Major-General Count Nassau ; Prince of Hesse, Brigadier.

- 22 Nassau, Dutch in British pay.
- 23 Lloyd, 5th Regiment of Foot, }
- 24 Prince of Hesse, 6th ditto, } English.
- 25 Lord Cutts, Dutch, in British pay.

26 Danish,	}	in British pay.
27 ditto,		
28 ditto,		

## CAVALRY.

Major-General Halstaple; Brigadier Schalk.

## Squadrons.

3 { Schalk,	}	Dutch, in British pay.
1 { Nieuhouse,		
1 Zulistien,		
3 { Ruderell,		
3 { Ginckel,		
2 Eppinger,		

47

N.B. In the foregoing arrangement it will be seen, that the present 5th and 6th Regts. of Foot were not brigaded with any other English regiments, though paid by Britain; but are part of the Division which is made up of Dutch and Danish troops, under Count Nassau, and the Prince of Hesse. They came over with King William III. and were borne in the estimates laid before Parliament, as part of the troops in the Dutch establishment, or in the schedule, with the expenses of the Dutch forces, for some time after his Majesty landed before they were placed in the line of the British army, when they occupied the 4th and 5th places in the succession of rank with the infantry regiments,

H. T.

## POMPEY'S PILLAR.

As an improvement to "A Suggestion for conveying to England the Egyptian Obelisk, commonly called Cleopatra's Needle," in the United Service Journal for September, 1832, the following hints are submitted, to prove that a much finer object might be conveyed hither at a trifling additional expense and labour—viz. the celebrated and beautiful Pillar of Pompey. This would outdo the French.

Nearly the same *power* that would be required to put the Obelisk on board ship would answer for Pompey's Pillar.

I cannot say positively, whether the capital and abacus are separate blocks; but if they are, as I think likely, there would be no great *difficulty* in taking them off the shaft. Nor would there be more *difficulty* in lowering the shaft into a horizontal position, than there would be in placing the Obelisk in the same situation.

The *difficulty* of removing the shaft from its present site to where it could be embarked, provided there is still a water communication between the lakes Maadie and Marcotis, would be easily overcome; and should the communication between the two lakes which the English made in 1801 be stopped, an artificial communication from the lake to the western harbour of Alexandria might be made by opening the extant bed of the *ancient* or *original cut*, which united Lake Marcotis with the harbour, where the isthmus does not much exceed 300 yards across; nor would there be much *difficulty* to remove it by land to the beach of the harbour, if the other modes were found to be impracticable.


## Pompey's Pillar.

	ft.	in.
The height of the shaft is . . . . .	64	0
The diameter of the shaft at the bottom . . . . .	8	4
The diameter of the shaft at the top . . . . .	7	0

## Cleopatra's Needle.

The height of the Obelisk is	68	3
The breadth of the Obelisk at the bottom	7 ft. 7 in.	by 7 0
The breadth of the Obelisk at top	5 1	by 4 9

It was stated in the House of Commons, 15th April, 1832, that the Obelisk weighs about 284 tons; therefore, if an inspection of the following figure be made, which represents the *diameter* of the column, and *breadth* of the bottom of the Obelisk, it will easily be perceived, that there cannot be any material difference in the weight of either.



Diameter 8 feet 4 inches.  
Breadth 7 feet.  
Breadth 7 feet 7 inches. • • •  
Scale  $\frac{1}{4}$  of an inch to a foot.

I ascended about half way to the top of the column in the year 1802, by means of a rope ladder, and having seen the object in question often, and knowing well the localities of its situation, and also having an idea how *easily* the column might be taken down, perhaps I can afford the gentleman who made the suggestion, if he has not been himself on the spot, some information respecting either of the objects, and which I shall be most happy to do, if he will address me to that effect.

• Some of the materials that would be required are already upon the spot, and the principal *wants* would be some intrenching tools, and some powerful tackle from the shear hulks at the dockyards, or from the ships of war. But it is not altogether by *the means* of tackle that I should remove it from its vertical to a horizontal position.

There are plenty of pieces of granite of the same species lying about Alexandria, some of which could be brought home for the purpose of repairing any part of the cornice of the pedestal that may be injured, and likewise the foliage and mouldings of the capital that may be injured by time and destroyed in the removal.

A composition of the chiselings, and some pounded granite, with a mixture of some of our best lime (Scotch), could be made to fill up the small defect on the north east side.

Sonnini strongly recommended that this column should be conveyed to France; and a French officer, employed on the expedition, proposed the removal of it; but Sir Robert Wilson says, "*probably the attempt would have proved beyond his or any other man's abilities.*" For my own part, I see no great *difficulty*, having assisted in getting the obelisk, which the French have lately conveyed to France, nearly on board ship in the year 1802.


• W. WARB,

A Commissary, Ordnance Dep., H. P.

## A BOW RUDDER.

THE following plan is proposed for fixing and working a rudder at the bow of a vessel, to act in unison with the rudder at the stern, as calculated to embrace all the advantages proposed by that experienced and highly respectable officer in the East India Company's Service, Captain William Manning, as stated in p. 541 of the United Service Journal for December, 1831; and which, I think, will also be found to meet the objections of W. J. T., of Cambridge, page 260, in the Number for October, 1832.

Additional Stem and Rudder.



The plan consists in fixing an additional stem, made of iron, of sufficient strength, on the present stem of the vessel (already built) and securing the same by strong braces fixed securely on the bow, and hanging the rudder on the additional stem at the bow, precisely in the same way as the rudder at the stern is hung, as shown in the drawing.

The following results may be expected:—1st. The rudder at the stem is intended to act in unison with the rudder at the stern, by which means the same force would be exerted at each end of the vessel, and would unite in effect to bring the vessel round to the wind, and prevent her missing stays.—2nd. When before the wind, or nearly so, the rudder on the stem might be allowed to swing, or be fixed, as thought necessary.—3rd. When the tiller at the stem is put a little to leeward, and the rudder at the stern is made to act in unison with it, their combined influence would very much tend to keep the vessel to windward.—4th. The rudder at the stem would be an additional security in case of accident to the rudder at the stern, to which it is liable from going over a bar, and from other causes.—5th. The additional rudder at the stem appears particularly suitable for steam vessels, by which means the steersman at the bow would have it in his power to discover, and instantly avoid, every impediment in the ship's course; and would be particularly useful at night, and in foggy and boisterous weather, and in rivers crowded with vessels both moving and stationary.

In the drawing, the keel is lengthened to the extremity of the foot of the rudder, to show an easy and safe mode of protecting it from accident, when the ship touches the ground at the stern. In building a new vessel the keel may be carried out in the first instance of sufficient length to have the additional stem built in the frame of the vessel to receive the bow rudder; and the tiller may be made in any form, and applied in any way, most convenient.

W. ALDERSEY.

## FOREIGN MISCELLANY.

## MONTHLY RETROSPECT OF MEMORABILIA.

24th February, 1654.—However fatal the infatuation which instigated the great opponent of Gustavus Adolphus to neglect or condemn his imperial master's orders, the recent discovery of Wallenstein's correspondence with his most intimate friends, has effectually wiped away the stain of treachery which has been to this day synonymous with his very name. His haughty soul could not brook the envy, harshness, and ingratitude, with which the court of Vienna repaid him for twice interposing his gallantry and strategical talent with an effect which averted the overthrow of Ferdinand's throne. An

almost criminal unconcern for the obvious call of duty, was the retaliation which he used; for this, it can never be denied, he merited reprobation and punishment; but to die by the hand of the assassin, and to have his fame for ever blackened with the double charge of treason and corruption, were acts worthy only of the wretches who conspired his murder. It is a mournful task for English pen to retrace its history, and mark the instruments by which it was consummated.

Wallenstein had been stripped of the dignity of Imperial Generalissimo, and placed under ban as a traitor. The affections of his soldiery and his truest followers, even Piccolomini's devotion, which he had "read in the stars," were estranged from him by the secret machinations of his sovereign. In this crisis, the veteran took refuge with three regiments in the fortress of Eger; but he had not long established his quarters in it, when three of his colonels, Leslie, an Irishman, and Butler and Gordon, two Scotchmen, who owed everything to his patronage, confederated to destroy him. Their first act of blood was to rid themselves of four of Wallenstein's staunchest adherents, which they accomplished at a supper to which they invited them on the night of the 24th of February; and here their instruments were principally selected from the ranks of our own fellow-countrymen. The names of Captains Geraldine, Devereux, Macdonald, Birch, and Pestaluz, point, with one exception, at a British origin. On the evening in question, Gordon, Butler, and Leslie were carousing with their intended victims, when the door of the apartment was suddenly burst open, and Geraldine rushed in with six dragoons, armed with halberds at his heels, crying out, "Holla, Sirs! what man amongst you is Imperialist to the bone?" "God save the Emperor Ferdinand!" shouted the three confederates, as they rose from the table. This motion was the signal for the onset upon their ill-fated guests: they fell, mangled and lifeless, under the butchery of their brethren-in-arms. In the meanwhile, four-and-twenty more of Geraldine's dragoons were engaged in slaughtering the domestic servants, whose escape was cut off by the previous raising of the drawbridge. As soon as this prologue to the tragedy in hand had been closed, the confederates let down the bridge and made their way into the town, where all was tranquil, as if no demon in mortal shape were abroad in quest of desolation. The last and blackest deed impended. Leslie undertook to guard the street which led to Wallenstein's dwelling, for the purpose of suppressing any disturbance, whilst Butler, Geraldine, and Devereux, cautiously proceeded towards it, at the head of a party of dragoons. The clocks had struck eleven. Butler posted himself in front, and Geraldine in rear of the house, at either entrance: but Devereux, at the head of his myrmidons, each of them brandishing a halberd, rushed up the staircase. One of Wallenstein's valets, striving to prevent their ingress, was struck to the ground, and another made his escape, crying out, "Rebellion! rebellion!" The veteran awoke at the uproar; as he raised himself in his bed, the door of his chamber was violently thrown open, and Devereux rushed in with his followers. The duke had, in the interim, sprung out of bed and was standing at the window. "*Art thou the scoundrel,*" bellowed Devereux, "*who designest to march over to the enemy with the emperor's men, and wrest the crown from his brow? Thine hour is come!*" Wallenstein did not deign to reply, but cast a lowering, frigid look on the traitor. "Thine hour is come!" Devereux again roared out. And Wallenstein's lip moved; and, as he raised his hands to heaven, the wretched Devereux transfixed him with his halberd through the breast. The reeking corpse was immediately rolled up in a carpet and borne to the citadel, where it was laid by the side of his faithful and martyred adherents.

Such were the last moments of a man,—who, with all his faults, and ambition may not be accounted the least of them,—will ever hold a place among the most illustrious warriors of any age or country. The confederates and their abettors divided a large sum of money, which they found in his possession, amongst them; and they likewise seized upon his papers, but could



not succeed in discovering a single line, which, in the remotest degree, affected his fidelity to his imperial master. It was rumoured at court, that a tear dropped from that master's eye on receiving intelligence of this deed of blood!

### GERMANY.

#### MONSTER-GUNS.

The attempt to introduce one of this species of engines, at the late siege of the citadel of Antwerp, calls to mind the immense pieces formerly used under the name of *Karthauns*. They were of three sizes,—halves, quarters, and wholes. The latter were three yards long, weighed between seventy and eighty hundred-weight, were loaded with from twenty to thirty pounds of gunpowder, and projected a ball of eight-and-forty to sixty pounds in weight. One of these dostructive machines, christened "The Foul Wench," was mounted on the rampart of the water-gate at Dresden, when that city was besieged by Frederic of Prussia in the year 1760. It was the ruin of the houses in the rear, and an object of alarm and terror to all its neighbours; indeed, the commotion and roar which its discharge occasioned, were such, that the officer in command was generally compassionate enough to give previous notice of the exact time when it would begin to thunder. The non-militants might be seen and heard, running up and down the streets, and shouting, 'To-day the Foul Wench will be fired three times: at six, at noon, and at seven in the evening.' At this signal, all the windows were thrown open, and everything that was brittle was hurried away to some safe corner; men, women, and children fell on their knees in prayer, and not a lip would touch food until the "Wench" had done her bidding.

### BAVARIA.

The Greek legion which has been placed under the command of Major-General Von Hertling, and has been embarked at Trieste, is composed of two regiments of infantry, embodied from four battalions of four Bavarian regiments; a battery of foot artillery, consisting of six six-pounders and two obutzes and two squadrons of Lancers, under the command of Prince Edward of Altenburg, a brother of the Queen of Bavaria.

### RUSSIA.

#### RUSSIAN SAILORS.

As they receive higher pay than the soldier, and, when on a cruise, their pay is doubled, whilst their means of spreading sail in chase of pleasure and debauch are close-reefed, our sailors never put foot on shore but with brim full purses,—the butts of every tapster and brewer along shore. In times of peace, the sailor has more leisure and greater resources for earning a subsistence than the man of belt and bayonet; and he does not omit turning his anchorage to good account during the winter months. A very large proportion of them are shoe-makers, tailors, joiners, basket-makers, brush-makers, turners, and the like. There are not a few of them, besides, who follow the craft of picking and stealing in all its branches, whilst many of their fellows make a large offing inland, and live by their ready wit on the simple boor and farm-yard menial, at the rustic market, on the emperor's highway, or within the precincts of the stable or kitchen. Their joviality of humour and special love for a frolic, furnish the community at large with an inexhaustible store of mirth and pastime. I have frequently seen them charge through the streets, mounted on flexible goats of wood, with their favourite national *Balalaika*\* in hand, and when their wallet has been liberally replenished by the bystanders, enact an interlude utterly *sui generis*, in some open space, to the abundant delight of their audience. The grimaces, contortions, and twisting-and-turnings of our merry, reckless tars, who dismount from their goat's backs and disport all sorts of antics with them, would make even a stoic grin, or the most arrant misanthropist in creation split his sides.

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\* A rough instrument with three strings, somewhat of the form of a guitar.

The quarters, appropriated to the seamen, lie upon an elevated rock in the vicinity of the town; they form a range of newly-erected barracks, and, at a distance, have a picturesque appearance; but when you approach them, the charm is completely dissolved, for they are as wretchedly constructed as can well be conceived, and abandoned to such pure and unmitigated neglect, as to impel you to turn instantly away from them in disgust. Their accommodation being inadequate to the ten thousand sailors at present on the station, a portion of them are quartered on the farms and villages in the neighbourhood, the farm-house serving as head quarters for the officer in charge of his company. These barracks and quarters are so many starting-points, from which they disperse over the whole surrounding district, waging depredations on the goods and chattels of friend and foe alike, but rarely with peril to the person; the object of their foray being confined to articles apt for conversion into fermented liquor. In the evening, therefore, you must use no little circumspection not to come short of your great-coat, hat, or watch,—nay, they will courteously give the lady the wall, and then turn sharp round in the rear, and ease her shoulders of cloak or tippet, or her arm of reticule or bracelet. The promptitude and severity with which the offence is visited, have hitherto failed of checking these disgraceful practices. In fact, the great bulk of them are half savages; uncouth and disgusting in appearance, uncleanly and generally filthy in their dress, and coarse, beyond any other mariners I have seen or heard of, in manners, language, and amusements. If tame at all, it is only from the iron curb of hard and relentless discipline.

#### SWEDEN.

##### METALLIC SHEATHING.

On Wetterstedt, the Swedish chemist, has lately introduced an alloy of antimony, and quicksilver, as a substitute for copper sheathings to vessels. The combination of these three metals prevents the alloy from oxidizing, at the same time that it secures that cohesion, tenacity, and elasticity to the composition, which the copper itself possesses but to a very limited extent. This new sheathing is said also to resist effectually the corrosive qualities of sea-water, to retain at all times a clear and polished surface, and to be obnoxious to every animal or vegetable substance. The price at which Wetterstedt supplies his article is very reasonable, and we have been assured that it is extremely durable, and acquires increased powers of resistance the longer it remains in contact with sea-water.

#### FRANCE.

##### AIDE-DU-CAMP.

This post would appear to be of as old a date as the first institution of regular troops; its duties were performed by young men of rank, who entered as volunteers into the army, but received neither fee nor reward for their services. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they were called "*Aides des Maréchaux-de-Camp des Armées du Roi*," because they were more particularly attached to the Maréchal-de-Camp for the purpose of assisting him in distributing the army into quarters. The Duke d'Enghien alone had two-and-twenty such aides, when he laid siege to Thionville in 1643; and, in the times of Lewis XIV., their allowances were five-and-twenty pounds per month. This monarch assigned four of them to every Field-marshal or commander of an army, two to every lieutenant-general, and one to every Maréchal-de-Camp, when engaged in active service. The aides-de-camp of a marshal of France hold superior rank to those of inferior generals; and such as are attached to the sovereign or royal princes, enjoy rather a nominal office than any active post.

##### GENERAL HAXO.

This officer, who commanded the French corps of engineers before the citadel of Antwerp, was born at St. Dizier, in Lorraine, and is now in his fifty-eighth year. His father held a general's commission, in the days of



## CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE PRINCIPAL PORTS AND STATIONS.

Portsmouth, January 19, 1833.

MR. EDITOR.—A few days after my letter of last month had been despatched, this town was a second time put in confusion by a county contested election; the candidates being Lord Palmerston, Sir G. Staunton, and Mr. Fleming. The dissenters here are very numerous, and being inclined to favour the powers that be, threw their weight into the Ministerial scale, and Mr. Fleming was rejected. Each candidate addressed the populace from the hustings: my Lord made a long speech, which ended, as most of those addresses do, by few understanding what he meant, or even said; Sir George Staunton professed himself independent and unfettered, and I firmly believe is so; Mr. Fleming rested his pretensions on his Conservative principles and also his independence. He was deceived by numbers who promised their votes, and afterwards backed out from voting for him; in consequence of which, at the conclusion of the contest, he was 250 below Sir George Staunton. The elections being over, it is to be hoped that the electors will banish all hostile feeling to their opponents, and that the elected will act honestly and uprightly for the good of all classes, when they take their seats in the House of Commons.

Captain Roberts joined the *Druid* on the 17th ultimo; and on the 22nd she sailed for the *Tagus*, to relieve his Majesty's ship *Briton*.

On the 20th ultimo, his Majesty's brig *Serpent*, Commander Symonds, sailed on a cruise for three weeks or a month.

The *Vernon* conveyed detachments of the 84th, 86th, and 1st Royals to Plymouth, to embark in the *Romney* for the West Indies.

A French brig, called the *Menagerie*, on her way to the Mediterranean, put into Spithead, to set up her rigging.

On the 26th of December a melancholy event occurred on the south-west part of the Isle of Wight, near Black Gang Chine. A small Swedish brig, with fruit from Alicant to Dunkirk, ran on shore about one o'clock in the morning; it blowing very hard, she was soon knocked to pieces, and the Master (A. Wull), his son, and mate, were drowned: four persons were saved.

The *Adder* cutter, on the 28th of December, brought in the Dutch ship *Indiaan*, from Batavia to Rotterdam, having met with her at the back of the Isle of Wight.

The *Sulphur* was paid off the last day of the year. She brought home from Swan River, Australia, and the different places she touched at and surveyed, numerous specimens of botany, conchology, mineralogy, and zoology, not particularly well preserved. The cases were landed at the Royal Hospital at Haslar, and will be arranged and distributed in that Museum, to which all King's vessels returning from surveys send their Collections by Admiralty order\*.

The Admiralty have adopted a plan, and ordered it to be announced by public advertisement, that the widows of all carpenters, boatswains, gunners, and second masters, shall in future attend at the Vestry of the Dock-yard Chapel, to be identified by the chaplain, and produce his certificate before they are paid the pensions due to them.

On the 4th of January his Majesty's ships *Spartiate* and *Volage* returned from the Downs: the first to be got ready for the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir M. Seymour, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in South America; the latter to be paid off: she came into harbour the same day.

The *Malabar* rejoined Sir P. Malcolm on the 5th; and the *Childers* went into harbour to be paid off. The *Forrester*, a vessel of upwards of 200 tons,

\* Quære—Would they not be better bestowed in the Great Central Museum of the Services in London?—Ed.

and mounting three guns, intended to be employed on the coast of Africa, put into Spithead on her way out. She is fitted expressly for slave-trade suppression. Lieutenant W. H. Quin commands her; and her armament is one long 18-pounder on a swivel, and two carronades. Lieutenants Pike and Windham, of the navy, appointed to the *Isis*, went passengers in her.

The *Sylvia* transport, Lieutenant Westley agent, brought home a small detachment of the 71st Regiment. She had a passage of twenty-seven days from Bermuda. The head-quarters of the 37th Regiment had been conveyed to Jamaica in his Majesty's ship *Winchester*. Two companies of that Regiment had gone thither in his Majesty's sloop *Fly*. The late Commander-in-Chief, Sir E. G. Colpoys, was buried at Bermuda, on the 11th of November.

At the usual half-yearly meeting of the Royal Humane Society in London, the following naval people had silver medals awarded them; and as your Journal is read in foreign parts by many who do not see the local papers, it is needless to apologize for extracting the names, and the reason the medals were granted:—

**Mr. P. Dumaresq.**—His Majesty's sloop *Onyx*, for saving the life of a drummer, named Fisher, off Sheerness, in February last.

**Mr. F. Higginson**, his Majesty's revenue cutter *Lion*, for saving the life of a boy in Salcomb Harbour, in December last.

**Mr. G. Johnson**, his Majesty's ship *Mastiff*, for saving the lives of two seamen; one had fallen overboard at Napoli, in June, 1831; the other in May last, at ten o'clock at night, in this harbour.

**Lieutenant Finlayson, R.N.**, *City of Bristol* steam-packet, for preserving from a watery grave six persons at different times.

**Lieutenant Barnes, R.N.**, for saving the life of George Nelthorp, off Lumps Fort, in this neighbourhood.

**Lieutenant Davis, R.N.**, for rescuing one of the crew of the sloop *Dartmouth*, near Rye, in November last.

**And to Captain Lillierap, R.N.**, the Captain of the Ordinary of Portsmouth, for his new invention, which consists of a longitudinal iron bar, with ropes, being affixed to the common sea-buoy, adopted by the Admiralty on Captain Lillierap's suggestion, and which has already preserved several persons from being drowned. The watermen who ply the ferry between Portsea, Gosport, and Portsmouth (and are good judges in this case), speak in the highest terms of this simple contrivance, and of the confidence they experience now, should their boats be accidentally upset near the buoys, from the rapidity and force of the spring-tides in this harbour.

On the night of the 9th of January, the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Port, Admiral Sir Thomas Foley, G.C.B., and Rear-Admiral of the United Kingdom, died at the Admiralty-house in High-street.

This venerable and distinguished officer superseded Admiral Sir Robert Stopford in May, 1830, and consequently would have been relieved in May next, if the hand of death had spared him so long.

Few officers have seen more service than Sir T. Foley. He was a lieutenant in one of the ships in Lord Rodney's action, and was promoted to the rank of commander in 1782. In 1793 he commanded his Majesty's ship the *St. George*, successively carrying the flags of Rear-Admiral Celi and Sir Hyde Parker. In Lord St. Vincent's action of the 14th of February, 1797, Sir Thomas Foley commanded his Majesty's ship *Britannia*, bearing the flag of Sir Charles Thompson. He was shortly afterwards in command of his Majesty's ship *Goliath*, and, in the battle of the Nile, had the honour to lead the British fleet into action, in that ship. In 1799, Sir Thomas Foley joined his Majesty's ship the *Elephant*; and at the battle of Copenhagen, in April, 1801, carried the flag of Lord Nelson. In 1807, Sir Thomas Foley

was appointed to a colonelcy of marines, which he retained until he was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral. In 1811, he succeeded the late Sir George Campbell, as Commander-in-Chief in the Downs, and remained there until the termination of the war. Sir Thomas Foley was nominated a K.C.B. on the origin of that honorary distinction; and, in 1820, was invested a G.C.B.

In this short account of the services of this meritorious officer, it will appear that Sir Thomas Foley was so fortunate as to command line-of-battle ships in three celebrated general actions, for which he was presented with gold medals.

The late Sir George Campbell and Sir Thomas Foley are the only Port-Admirals that have died at Portsmouth with their flags flying.

Sir Thomas Foley has left a widow, but no children, having married, in 1802, Lady Lucy Ann Fitzgerald, an aunt of the present Duke of Leinster.

His state of health, for some time past, precluded him from entering much into the gaieties of life; but he was esteemed for the most unbounded generosity and hospitality by numerous old officers and companions in arms, and was considered a most entertaining and delightful companion by all who were admitted to his society. His remains were publicly interred in the Garrison Chapel, on the 16th instant, with great pomp, the naval and military authorities, &c. attending\*.

The ceremony was over by about two o'clock, and the flag on board the Victory was immediately struck, and a pendant hoisted, thus making her a private ship. The last public naval funeral at Portsmouth was Admiral Sir George Campbell's.

George Grant, Esq., banker, of this borough, who was made a purser in his Majesty's navy in 1783, also died within this month.

The flag of Rear-Admiral Sir M. Seymour, Bart., K.C.B., was hoisted on board the Spartiate on the 12th, and that officer will carry on the port duties until the Commander-in-Chief joins.

The situation of resident agent for transports, at Portsmouth, has been dispensed with, and such duties as are required relative to that department of the naval service, are in future to be performed by the flag-lieutenant of the Admiral-Superintendent, whose employment is now defined. As every transport taken up has a lieutenant of the navy placed in charge of her, the avocations of a resident agent at each port will most probably be found unnecessary; and the Admiralty have, in all cases of reduction of office, made very proper and fair remuneration to the parties.

Nothing has transpired as to the release of the Dutch merchant-ships which have been detained by the combined squadron, and sent in here. They are still in the harbour; of course at great expense to their owners; and, from all accounts, not likely to be of any advantage to their detainers. Whether the blockade is less strict, the Dutch trade less, or they slip in past our cruisers, certain it is that very few have been seized this month; and as the question between the Dutch and Belgians is as far from being settled as it was before Antwerp was captured, the unfortunate Dutch mariners in this harbour, I fear, will have a long sojourn, and perhaps, after all, take up their residence in a floating prison.

The question as to embarking field officers of Marines in the different foreign station flag-ships must be determined very shortly; the Spartiate will probably depart from hence in a month. I apprehend the intention of sending an officer of that rank in the Vernon is for the present abandoned, there being no accommodation for him in that ship; however, it is very easy to send him out in a transport. The appointment is now generally considered beneficial to the corps; and when finally settled, will, without doubt, be hailed with satisfaction by both officers and men. Moreover, it is em-

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\* We retain our Correspondent's brief notice of this distinguished officer, whose services, however, shall be given in detail.—Ed.

ploying a number of field-officers, who cannot help feeling that when they have attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel, continuing them at the division for life, is rather placing them on the shelf.

A small addition to the subscription towards defraying the expense of the expedition, to ascertain the fate of Captain Ross and his companions, has been made within the last month in this immediate neighbourhood.

The Isle of Wight and the coast of Dorset have this winter had a repetition of the old tragedy of the *Smuggler versus* the Exciseman. An affray occurred on the 23rd of December, on the beach at Lodmore, in which two men lost their lives. The cargo was landed; men came down to take it away; preventive men interfered; fire-arms were resorted to; and ultimately two people were killed. Last winter, a lieutenant of the navy, in attempting to seize some smugglers, was pushed off the cliff near Lulworth, and killed on the spot. The crown solicitors used their utmost endeavours to bring some of the suspected parties to justice, and two or three were actually tried at the last county assizes; but the jury acquitted them, either for want of evidence, or that the smugglers' employers had contrived to keep the important witnesses out of the way. At the Newport sessions for December, a man and three women were separately convicted on distinct charges of smuggling, and fined in penalties varying from 25*l.* to 100*l.* It is a farce to suppose these people can pay the fines; they must be imprisoned, and their families maintained by the parish. The utmost vigilance is, I firmly believe, used by the officers employed on the coast-guard; but still the crime exists to a fearful extent, with frequent loss of life and property, to which it is hoped the Legislature will turn their attention.

The 3d Dragoon Guards, on their route from Brighton to Dorchester, halted at Fareham on the 15th; and it was reported in the town, that an express had arrived from London, suddenly changing their destination to Ireland. They are a very fine body of men and horses.

The squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir P. Malcolm, has been in the Downs since I last wrote, except the small vessels, some of which have been in the eastern ports to relit, and the others to cruise. It consists of the *Donegal*, *Revenge*, *Talavera*, and *Malabar*, of the line; *Castor*, *Stag*, and *Conway*, frigates; *Larne*, *Snake*, *Scout*, and *Satellite* sloops; and the *Dee* and *Carron* steamers. The *Spartiate* and *Vernon* have been withdrawn to be flag-ships to South and North America; the *Southampton*, *Volage*, and *Childers* to be paid off, and the *Rover* is ordered to Plymouth to fit for the Mediterranean, expecting to relieve the *Pelican*, whose three years will expire in April next.

It is not yet known who is to be Port-Admiral. Sir H. Neale was mentioned, but an objection has been started from his being in Parliament, and his politics not exactly according with the present Administration: if he comes here he must resign Lymington, and it is not very probable that he will desert his friends there, without once going into the House. Two other officers are named—Sir P. Durham, and Sir W. Hargood; the latter is a friend of his Majesty. Sir D. Gould is to have the Grand Cross.

The troops in the garrison and at Gosport consist of the dépôts of the 7th, 12th, 51st, 84th, 86th, and 94th regiments of foot; some slight variation has taken place this month in their movements, by exchanging one dépôt from Portsmouth to Gosport.

P.

“ Portsmouth, January 21, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—Having read in your last month's Journal the following passage respecting the Royal Naval College:—“There are two employments of importance, in which the senior class of students are daily exercised, for or eight months previous to leaving, not generally known in the service,

—viz., actual gun-practice, and rigging, knotting, splicing, &c.,"—I am induced to remark upon it, feeling that unless it be more fully explained, the captains receiving the students into their ships, and your naval readers generally, may be led into error in supposing the instruction of "rigging, knotting, splicing, &c.," was given there as part of the established system of education, and consequently look for more from them than it is fair to expect. The object of the Lieutenant-Governor is to introduce, as much as possible, professional amusements; and for this purpose he has taken great pains in getting a small rigging-house fitted up, where any boys who may prefer employing their play hour (between school and dinner time) in learning to knot and splice are *encouraged* to do so, but by no means forced; it is wholly voluntary on their parts, and considering they had been the three preceding hours closely confined to mathematical instruction, it would only cramp their minds to make it otherwise.

In the rigging-house are placed two block vessels—a ship and a brig; the latter upon so large a scale, that two boys can stand in each top: she has running rigging rove, and a suit of sails bent, which the boys who attend knotting and splicing occasionally pull and haul about, and so, as a professional amusement, gain a tolerable acquaintance with (at the very least) the names and application of all the ropes and other parts of a ship's furniture. Towards the close of the half year, ten boys who have gained some knowledge in knotting and splicing, and who happen to be nearest to going away, have been allowed to unrig, and rig her again with a new gang of rigging, having previously fitted it with their own hands, under proper instruction, and thus gain such further knowledge as will prove of real service to them on their first embarkation.

The twenty seniors attend the gun practice as a duty; they soon handle their arms well, and few artillerymen fire with greater precision.

By taking such notice of the above in your next month's Journal as will afford (to your naval readers in particular) a true explanation, you will oblige

A CONSTANT READER.

Devonport, 20th January, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—We have had so little doing here in the naval way since my last, that I fear the extracts from my Journal will be scarcely worth your acceptance; we live in hopes, however, that through the determination of our Dutch friends, we shall, ere long, have more employment for our now neglected navy.

The *Druid*, 46, came in here on the 24th ultimo, but sailed again next day for Lisbon. The *Jupiter* troop-ship sailed a second time on the 30th for the Mauritius, but returned on the 3rd instant with loss of her main-yard. On the 5th the *Prince Regent* transport arrived, and having embarked a company of sappers and miners, sailed the same day for Corfu. The *Jupiter* sailed a third time on the 7th; and the *Royalist*, *Pantaloön*, and *Comus* on the same day. The *Briton*, 46, arrived on the 12th from Oporto. The *Romney* troop-ship sailed on the 15th for the West Indies, and the *Rhadamanthus* steamer for Falmouth. On the 17th the *Briton* sailed for Portsmouth. The *Vernon* is expected to be ready in a very few days for Sir George Cockburn's flag. Fifty shipwrights are ordered from this yard to Sheerness, and twenty to Milford; and instead of working four whole days and two halves, the artisans here are now to be employed on five whole days in the week, which is certainly a better arrangement both for them and the service.

Having observed in your Journal, some time since, a hint about the expediency of affording some compensation for the numerous and heavy losses sustained by naval officers in cases of shipwreck, capture, fire, and



other casualties, and for which, unlike their compeers in the army, they have no allowance from Government; and as it is highly desirable to form a Fund, for the purpose of indemnifying officers for such unavoidable losses, it is proposed, that the following Scale of Subscriptions for each rank, and the maximum of remuneration, be submitted to the service, viz. :—

Rank of Officers.	Annual Subscriptions when employed.	Commutation payment in lieu of Annual Subscriptions.	Maximum of Remuneration.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£.
Flag Officers . . . .	3 3 0	15 15 0	300
Captains . . . . .	2 2 0	12 12 0	200
Commanders . . . .	1 10 0	9 0 0	150
Ward-room Officers .	1 0 0	6 0 0	100
Inferior Officers, including all those who walk the quarter-deck . . . . .	0 10 0	4 0 0	50

It appears, by the Navy List for this month, that there are now 3522 officers employed who would be eligible to join this association, including those upon the Coast Guard Service; and as their subscriptions would amount to 2535*l.* 18*s.* per annum, it is presumed that if only half the said number became members, there would be ample funds for the purpose.

It might not be necessary to confine the compensation only to cases of loss by shipwreck, capture or fire, as there are frequent instances of heavy loss by the upsetting of boats, falling overboard of clothes and bedding, burning for the plague, as lately in the *Seylla* at Smyrna, and unavoidably left behind by being suddenly ordered to sea; all which might safely be submitted to the judgment of the Committee of Claims and Management.

It would be proper that the money subscribed for this purpose should be invested in Government or other good security, in the names of three trustees, who, together with four others chosen annually (two of the latter being ward-room officers) should be a Committee, which should manage the affairs of the association, assisted by a Secretary, with a small stipend for his trouble in keeping the accounts, collecting the subscriptions, and conducting the correspondence.

All claims for remuneration should be supported by such proof of the actual value and unavoidable nature of the loss as the Committee may require; and subscribers should not be allowed remuneration beyond the maximum stated, unless they had paid more than ten annual subscriptions, and then only according to the judgment of the Committee, and the sums subscribed. It might also be desirable to accept such legacies or donations as may be offered in aid of this object, but without giving the donors any voice or share in the management.

That naval officers are not indemnified by Government for their losses by shipwreck, fire, or capture, as well as those of the army, is an unjust and invidious distinction; and it was most painfully manifested in the case of the loss of his Majesty's ship *Comus*, in 1816, when the officers and crew of that ship lost all their effects, except the common dresses they had on at the time, without getting any compensation; while the army officers, who were shipwrecked near the same spot within a week afterwards, in the *Harpooner* transport, were immediately furnished with money from the military chest to replace their losses, and, consequently, soon appeared in gay attire; while the unhappy tars were left to their own resources, and the assistance of their brother officers.

It is further suggested, that the Secretary of one of the Clubs, or of the Naval and Military Library and Museum, might conduct the business of this Association with much facility, and at a very small expense.

I remain, yours, &c.,

ALPHA.

\* \* In consequence of a passage respecting the Devonport election, contained in Alpha's Letter of last month, purporting that the resolution proposed at a meeting convened by Sir Edward Codrington, on the 3d Dec., declaratory of Sir Edward's conduct during his canvas of that borough, and embodying a pledge that the meeting would use the most strenuous efforts to ensure his return to Parliament, was passed by a *large majority*, we have received an authenticated communication, by which it appears that on the occasion referred to the friends of Sir Edward and the opposing candidate, Mr. Leach, were nearly balanced.

Other particulars upon the subject have also been stated to us, through the same medium, to which, however, the pending trial upon the question renders it unnecessary, as well as objectionable, for us to allude. Our Correspondent ALPHA, being naturally anxious for the success of a distinguished brother officer, was excusable for adopting the opinion, which, it appears, was the prevailing one in the borough; but it is our duty and desire to be just.—ED.

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## GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL.

### *Military Fund.*

MR. EDITOR.—An appeal has at last been made to the feelings of the Army, on behalf of its widows and orphans. This appeal breathes the pure spirit of sympathy and benevolence,—it is divested of all sordidness,—it is to diminish the sum of human woe, and to raise up and elevate virtue. This sacred and heart-stirring call will be responded to in a manner worthy of the British Army. You will, at once, understand that I allude to the establishment of a Military Fund.

I ought to feel—and I hope I do feel—a just diffidence in myself, while I presume to address you on a subject of such deep importance to the Army; but I reflect, that no one is too humble to interest himself in the sacred cause of humanity. This is my apology, if, in the attempt, there appear presumption.

Perhaps, then, you will allow me to state, that, having reflected on the wants of the Army in this respect, and on the incalculable happiness which a Military Fund would be the means of diffusing throughout the service, I was induced, in 1830, to submit to the consideration of a distinguished General Officer, then at the head of an important military department, the suggestion of establishing a permanent Military Fund for the benefit of the Army in general, but more immediately for the benefit of the *widows and orphans* of Military Officers. I felt, also, that, in the able Editor of the United Service Journal, so good a cause would find a zealous advocate and friend; and, therefore, in November of the same year, I took the liberty of communicating the plan to you. The communication was acknowledged in the usual manner. I now place the correspondence in your hands, and you will perceive that the principle and advantages of a Military Fund received the unqualified approbation of the General Officer to whom I have alluded; and I have reason to know that his opinion, up to this moment, remains unchanged.

The Army, I trust, does not require to be told at this time of day, of the real value of such an institution. The effects it is capable of producing, and

the happiness which, in the course of a few years, we may expect it to spread and *perpetuate* throughout the army, must make it an object of deep and anxious solicitude with all who feel for the honour and credit of His Majesty's service. The luxuries of the world, which gild the exterior, produce, at best, only an unsatisfying radiance, and are not the sunshine of real happiness; on the other hand, the exercise of pure and *active* benevolence, in alleviating the sufferings of humanity, gives that sweet impress to the feelings almost to be envied, and which time itself would in vain attempt to efface.

It will be seen by my letter marked No. 1, that, in the very outset, I ventured humbly to recommend, that, in the formation of a Fund for our Army, care should be taken to make it approximate, as near as possible, in its data and machinery, to the Military Funds of the Indian Army. I retain this opinion. The institutions of the Indian Army, for itself, its widows and orphans, have stood the test of time, and have produced a happiness amongst those connected with it, which—if such feelings were permitted—the King's Army might well envy. The Army's will, of course, decide for itself; but I cannot help expressing a hope that the idea, contemplated by some, of establishing a Fund upon the principle of a Joint Stock Company, with its attendant profit or loss, will not be entertained. If the British Army is to have a Fund at all of its own, let it be enshrined within the mantle of benevolence, and let it not sink down to the cold and selfish medium of mercantile speculation.

A Military Fund is within the means and compass of the Army. When we look to its aggregate income, and behold the splendid establishments it has procured for itself,—and I by no means underrate these,—it is not possible to doubt that the Army possesses resources within itself, more than sufficient to found and support a munificent Military Fund. The Navy has no greater resources than the Army; and yet, to its praise and honour, the Navy has its Charitable Fund, its Annuitant Fund, and, more recently, its Naval School. The Army, then, has resources. But there are two features bearing strongly upon this vital part of the question, which I here beg respectfully to suggest. These are, 1st, I would admit, its subscribers to the Widows' and Orphans' Fund, all civilians belonging to those Government Departments immediately connected with the Army. This would bring a great accession of capital to the Fund; and, as the civilians do not come within the range of war and of climate, the chances of their families falling heavily upon the Fund would be distant and remote. The second suggestion is with respect to *unclaimed* prize-money belonging to the Army. I would not, to establish the best Fund in the world, take one farthing justly belonging to the veteran soldier. I would leave this sacred and untouched; but I do think that all unclaimed prize-money belonging to the *officer* might, with great justice, be applied in aid of the Widows' and Orphans' Fund, and in supporting a Military School for the Sons of Officers. This is the view I take, and which I submit, with great deference, to the superior judgment of others.

I am not unaware that, in some quarters, opinions are entertained unfavourable to the army having a Military Fund of its own. I respect these opinions; but it may be permitted, without offence, to answer, that his present Majesty—the highest authority in the State—is the Patron of the Naval Fund. This must carry conviction. Can it be said, that what is a blessing to the Navy, and to all other classes of civil society, must be an evil to the Army? or is it rationally feared, that an institution, based in humanity, to shield its widows and orphans from an un pitying world, can only establish itself on the ruins of the British Army? The idea cannot, for a moment, be entertained.

A Military School, for the education of the sons of officers—the want of which is so deeply felt, cannot be separated from the cause of benevolence, and ought to form an integral part of any general measure to advance the interests of the army. It is an institution second in importance to none,

because it is calculated, more than any other, to determine and influence the future fate of thousands.

It is believed—at least it is anxiously hoped—that the army recognizes the establishment of a Military Fund, as just in principle, as well as in substantial policy; and thus it is ventured—although with unfeigned diffidence—to suggest the following steps, as mere preliminaries to the general measure being perfected and accomplished.

1st. It is earnestly recommended, as decisive of its future success, that an application be made, through the proper quarter, most humbly entreating his Majesty to condescend to become the Patron of the Military Fund. His Majesty, whose heart overflows with kindness, will not be unwilling to extend to the army the same gracious favour and protection, which he has been pleased to give to the navy.

2ndly. To appoint, under the sanction and authority of the General Commanding-in-Chief, a Board of Officers, whose duty would be, to examine, frame, and propose such regulations, as might be deemed necessary to the establishment of a Military Fund; to decide upon the funds and resources, the mode of management, and to adopt the most efficient means conducive to the general welfare, and to the solid and permanent duration of the establishment.

3rdly. The Board to submit the foundation and details of the Institution to the army, in a form to carry with it conviction of the advantage and complete practical security of the Fund.

4thly. To call upon the army, individually and collectively, to give donations and subscriptions to establish the Fund.

5thly. To give full confidence to the army, all donations and subscriptions, received on account of the Fund, to be invested in Government securities, and in the name of three official trustees, namely, the General Commanding-in-Chief, the Secretary-at-War, and the Paymaster-General to the Forces.

These, of course, are only initiatory steps, leading us up to the higher undertaking. Actions, not sentiments, are the thing to be dealt with. Let the army unite in one common bond,—in one common and righteous cause,—and the triumph of benevolence will be complete. I would say to the army, in the language of our present Secretary-at-War, Sir John Hobhouse,—“That a just posterity will render its gratitude, while its own approving conscience will amply repay it for the anxiety of so noble an enterprise.”

Your most obedient and humble servant,

F. HAMILTON.

(Late) Captain Ceylon Regiment.

N.B. The plan I contemplate, provides not only a pension to the widow, but also enables the officer to secure to his children the sum of 400*l.*, payable at his death. These leading features have been considered and approved by Mr. Finlaison, the Government Actuary, who has undertaken to prepare the necessary calculations and tables.

London, 26th Dec., 1832.

### *Captain Hayes on Naval Construction.*

Elm Grove, Southsea.

MR. EDITOR,—Some of the numerous statements which have lately been made in the public prints relative to the construction and qualities of ships of war, appearing to me incorrect and vague, I am induced to offer a few observations and remarks upon this most important subject, in the hope that, if you consider them worth insertion, you may be able, without excluding more valuable matter, to find a corner for them in your excellent Journal.

It has been stated by some writers that a large vessel should necessarily sail faster than one of smaller dimensions, while others say, the superior sailing of the latter is no proof of inferior construction in the former; but these disputants appear to me to overlook a very material point, namely, the *rig* of the contending vessels. I have, in the last twelve years, formed a system of Naval Architecture on fixed principles; and the experiments neces-

sary to the formation of this system, with the observations made thereon prove to me, that if a ship, a brig, and a cutter, be sent to sea on trial of their sailing qualities, and it be granted that all of them are equally well constructed,—that the placing of the masts, the stowage, and the trim, are as perfect in one as the other, and that the whole are managed with equal skill,—the brig will prove superior to the ship, and the cutter to the brig, notwithstanding the difference in size; but suppose these vessels to be in pairs, and all equally well appointed, as, above, the large ship would prove superior to the smaller,—and so with the brigs and cutters; and, therefore, when I see a small vessel beat a larger of the same rig, I conclude something to be defective in the latter. Often have I heard the remark, when a large ship has laboured much in a sea, “She is over-built,—she is too large for her class;” than which nothing can be more erroneous. Some of the American large frigates, I am told, labour prodigiously; but this is caused by incorrect construction, and not by increased dimensions. A ship may be too large for her armament, and the purposes she may be intended for, and this will cause unnecessary expense; but never can, if properly constructed, cause her to labour more than a smaller vessel. A vessel of the most perfect form may, however, be rendered extremely destructive in spars, rigging, &c., by injudicious masting, stowage, and trim; and such errors will cause a fast-sailing ship to become dull and heavy in all her movements; and this is the case with the President class of frigates, of which the *Madagascar* is one; their masts are more than six feet from their proper situations, and the stowage has hitherto been equally incorrect. A fixed principle of construction points out all these defects, and offers a remedy for them; and without which no two ships can be constructed and built alike, unless one be copied from the other; even should the length of the water-line, the stem, the stern-port, and the mid-ship section, with the point where the latter is to be placed, be given to two architects, they could not produce two ships alike, without communicating with each other on the subject. A fixed principle removes all difficulties. But in speaking of such a system, let it not be understood that I am recommending all vessels to be built of one unvaried form,—I have no such wish; nor do I see it could answer any good purpose. The system I am speaking of will enable the architect to vary the form of his ships as often as he may wish to do so, and at a certainty of not producing a bad one.

As it appears to be the fashion to pass judgment on the construction of the *Vernon* and *Castor*, I suppose I must, as I witnessed two or three of their trials, say something on this point; and therefore I confess, that not having seen the drafts from which these vessels were built, I feel myself inadequate to give any decided opinion respecting them. And I can only observe, that I consider the latter ship too small, and the former unnecessarily large, for a first-class frigate; and as in their performance I saw nothing remarkable, and neither of them having been constructed on any fixed principle, I do not think anything of certainty can have been elicited during the time I was with the squadron.

JOHN HAYES, Capt. R.N.

*Captain Peake in reply to the Editor of the Metropolitan Magazine.*

Navy Club, Bond Street, January 21st, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—The extensive circulation of your Journal amongst that class of society with whom I am naturally most anxious that my father's memory should stand well, induces me to request that you will give insertion, in the forthcoming Number of the United Service Journal, to the following copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Editor of the Metropolitan. The motive expressed above will, I trust, lead you to deviate from your rule of giving admission in your valuable work to nothing but original matter.

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,

J. L. PEAKE, Captain, R.N.

To the Editor of the United Service Journal.

"Navy Club, Bond Street, January 19th, 1833.

"SIR,—In the Metropolitan Magazine for November last, the following paragraph appeared:—

"When Mr. Peake was Surveyor of the Navy during the York Administration, it was thought advisable to increase our Naval force with forty sail-of-the-line; and it is to *his eternal disgrace*, that, instead of copying from the fine models in his possession, he actually built in merchant yards forty vessels of so inferior a scantling and quality, that they have been generally designated in the Navy as the Forty Thieves."

"It is not without a painful struggle that I suppress the feelings excited in my mind by the very harsh terms in which the writer of that paragraph has thought proper to express himself in reference to the professional conduct of my father, the late Sir Henry Peake. Admitting that the characters of public servants are fit subjects for criticism, I must be permitted to say, that the writer has made a very intemperate use of his privilege.

"Instead, however, of following his example by retaliating abusive language, in justice to the memory of my father, I beg to submit to you the following statement, which I trust, as an act of justice to the memory of my late father, will be inserted in your next Number.

"In June, 1806, Sir Henry Peake, then Mr. Peake, was appointed Surveyor of the Navy,—the Right Hon. Charles Grey, now Earl Grey, being the First Lord of the Admiralty,—in the room of Sir John Henslow, and jointly with Sir William Rule.

"In August, 1806, the Lords-Commissioners of the Admiralty directed drawings to be prepared for building a class of 74-gun ships; and, in consequence, each surveyor prepared and submitted drawings separately for their Lordships' approval, of the following dimensions:—

Sir William Rule.				Mr. Peake.			
		Ft.	Ins.			Ft.	Ins.
Length of Deck . . .		174	0	Length of Deck . . .		176	0
Breadth, extreme . . .		47	6	Breadth, extreme . . .		48	0
Depth in Hold . . .		20	8	Depth in Hold . . .		21	3
Burden, in Tons . . .	1717			Burden, in Tons . . .	1766		
Height of Midship Port, as per draft	5	8		Height of Midship Port, as per draft	6	0	

"In submitting the above, Mr. Peake expressly stated to their Lordships, that from the known good character of the French Courageant (as given by Naval Officers), he had prepared his drawing; and disclaiming credit for whatever merit they might be found to possess.

"I have further to observe, that these drawings were returned to the Surveyors by their Lordships, with directions for them to construct another jointly, with instructions as to the dimensions; which directions were of course complied with, and a drawing was prepared, submitted to, and approved of by the Board of Admiralty, of the following dimensions; from which the class of ships, known officially as the Surveyor's class, were built. This was in September, 1806:—

#### Surveyor's Joint Draft.

	Ft.	Ins.
Length of Deck . . .	176	0
Breadth, extreme . . .	47	6
Depth in Hold . . .	21	0
Burden in Tons . . .	1741	
Height of Midship Port, as per draft . . .	6	0

"I would remark, that had the Admiralty permitted each Surveyor to have built the ship proposed without obliging them to compromise certain points in the construction,—and which must have been done mutually;—there is little doubt but better ships would have been produced than those of the joint draft.

"Anxious to suppress the feelings of a son in vindicating the memory of the late Surveyor, Sir Henry Peake, I prefer adopting the language of the

Editor of the Hampshire Telegraph to my own. In his paper of the 5th of November last, he writes,—

“ ‘The Metropolitan.—We observe the gallant Captain Marryat, of the Navy, announces himself as the Editor of this monthly periodical. It is rising into high repute, and contains a variety of very amusing matter; the article *Naval Architecture* is very interesting, but we must object to a passage in it, at page 245, reflecting, in most *unmeasured terms*, on the late Sir Henry Peake, for the construction of the line-of-battle ships known as the *Forty Thieves*. True it is, that finer and larger ships might have been built; but would they have been so generally serviceable? Could they, if they had drawn more water, have safely been sent to the Baltic, the Belt, and the Dutch coast? Certainly not. Besides, *Thieves* as they were, we should be glad to learn of any other *forty* ships, built within a similar period, that have done half their work.’

“ I take upon me to say, without the fear of contradiction, that this is not the opinion of the Editor of the Hampshire Telegraph only, but also that of a large majority of our best and most experienced Naval Officers; and I leave the public to decide, after the above statement, how far it was either courteous or just on the part of the writer on Naval Architecture in your Journal, to apply the epithets he has done to the late Sir Henry Peake.

I remain, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

“ To the Editor  
of the Metropolitan Magazine.”

J. L. PEAKE, *Captain, R.N.*”

### *The Light Division.*

MR. EDITOR,—On reading the letter of C. J. T. S. in your January number of this year, it does not clearly appear to me that the writer has sufficiently established that he never intended to depreciate the character of the Light Division by his observations respecting them in his first letter; and, as he is anxious that strict justice should be done them, a third party may probably be excused the intrusion of a few words on the quotation from his first letter, which quotation I shall again *quote*, that your numerous readers may decide on the nature of that feeling which could dictate such remarks on the Light Division, not that one solitary opinion ought to be taken as the voice of the Gallant Third Division, who, satisfied with their own large share of glory, have never dreamt of lowering the character of their brother soldiers of the Peninsula Army.

I shall now let the words of C. J. T. S. speak for themselves:—

“ I am myself aware that the merit must be divided (and in no equal portions) with the Third Division. I remember that at Badajoz, when they failed, the Third Division by taking the Castle gained the town; that at Sabugal, when in a most awkward scrape, *we (the Third Division)* rescued them; and where, in their whole career, can they produce an instance to equal in splendour the conduct of the 5th and 77th at El Bodon?”

In most actions where considerable bodies of troops are employed, the actual fighting part falls on one portion, whilst the rest are employed in marching to turn a flank, threaten communications, &c., and those who have been employed in the combat, have generally been rewarded by the greater portion of fame, should their conduct in the fight have been distinguished by courageous and persevering opposition against a brave enemy; otherwise, the Waterloo Medals should have been presented by the Prince Regent to the Prussian troops, instead of to the English, whom they rescued from the AWKWARD SCRAPES of fighting, at the battle of Waterloo.

The Army are by no means ignorant of the nature and severity of the resistance encountered by the Third Division in scaling the walls and taking the Castle of Badajoz; and, although the troops at the breach claimed but slight credit for their exertions, still we think that C. J. T. S. could have

spared a small portion of his glory for the capture of Badajoz to the *Fifth Division*, as that division, we believe, *gained* the centre of the town about the period of the Third Division taking possession of the Castle; and, although the Fifth Division had not the advantage of any strong hold in Badajoz, yet it must have contributed finally to cause the retreat of those gallant Frenchmen, who so long defended the breach with obstinate valour, against those who had yet to learn, that the troops employed in turning the flanks merited far brighter laurels than those who encountered the severer shock of battle.

How greatly is it to be regretted that the corps of Frenchmen, who were appointed for the defence of the breach of Badajoz, had not on that night been placed in the Castle and on the walls adjacent to it, in order that the divisions who were sent to the breach might have learnt how easily *those* Frenchmen could have been beaten; the Fourth and Light Divisions would have willingly been shown an easier way into Badajoz, for, like Archimedes, they had not discovered the royal road.

"An awkward scrape" certainly implies that the Light Division were in a situation not very creditable to themselves on the arrival of the Third Division to the "*rescue*," at Sabugal; they must either, at that period, have been nearly surrounded by the enemy, or were retreating in a disorderly manner. But at the period of the arrival of the Third and also the *Fifth Division* (whom C. J. T. S. has again forgotten), the French had already commenced their retreat; during the combat the Light Division never lost an inch of ground; on the contrary, they had gained upon the enemy and captured a gun on his position, which all the efforts of Infantry and Cavalry could never regain; on the enemy's strength being discovered at the commencement of the action, it appeared discouraging, but retreat was never thought of; the Light Division felt assured that Lord Wellington would take charge of their flanks, if they only performed their own part properly when such an enviable opportunity was offered them in their front.

When the 3rd and the 5th *Division* appeared in sight, the French had been repulsed in every part of the field; it was then expected by the troops engaged, that those two divisions being first, would have been ordered to pursue and destroy the enemy then retiring in a straggling manner across marshy ground, and along roads broken up by the rains; but the "*rescue*" of the Light Division from a disgraceful capitulation or a dastardly flight was more due to the ten minutes firing of a part of a brigade of the Third Division, than to their own musket-shots and bayonets.

The Light Division can never be so arrogant as to contradict C. J. T. S., where he asserts that nothing performed by them during the war could equal in splendour the combat of El Bodon; indeed, they have never spoken of that affair but with admiration and pride, as shedding a brilliant lustre on the British arms.

The letters of C. J. T. S. appear to have been written in consequence of a doubt having arisen as to which of the two breaches at Rodrigo were first carried. Happening, Mr. Editor, to have been a party concerned on that night, I can state that the head of the column of the Light Division carried the small breach after a sharp but short struggle, and as the rear of the column were moving up across the ditch, an officer from the 3rd Division advanced in great haste along the bottom of the ditch from the *large breach*, requesting that a reinforcement might be immediately sent there, as the troops at *that breach* were likely to be beaten; a party of the Light Division instantly returned with that officer, joined in the efforts at the large breach, and finally entered the town with the 3rd Division.

The above details have been entered into from the probability of their proving more satisfactory to C. J. T. S., than a reference to the despatches; should any others be desired, they can be furnished most readily by

5th Jan., 1838.

RESCATADO.



*Deccan Prize Money.*

MR. EDITOR,—As one individually concerned, permit me, through the medium of your widely-circulated pages, to revive the attention of those liberal Members of the House of Commons who formerly so strenuously interested themselves about *the distribution of the Deccan Prize Money*, towards the great hardship of the still unsettled state of that question, in the hope that they will be able to bring the matter to an early issue in the approaching session of Parliament.

Allow me, at the same time, to express a humble opinion that Sir Thomas Hislop made out, at best, but a feeble case, in claiming the lion's share, to the prejudice of the Commander-in-Chief of all India; when it is considered that the latter not only planned the whole system of military operations which led to the success of the campaign, but by placing himself at the head of a formidable force, in a commanding central position, effectually watched, overawed, and paralyzed the councils, as well as hostile movements of more than one doubtful or adverse power, at the same time that, during the progress of the co-operative movements of the different branches of the combined army, he not only influenced most, but directed many of them; and in some instances, even interfered with distant *details*. And I would only put the simple question to Sir Thomas Hislop,—despite of all selfish prejudice,—what could have been done, or what might not have been the consequence in several instances, but for the opportune presence of the Marquis of Hastings, and the force under his immediate control, generally known by the name of the Centre Division of the Grand Army?

Let it not be supposed, from my thus arguing, that I belonged to that Army,—such not being the case. I happened, however, to serve with a detached portion of the *Bengal* Army, which accidentally formed an illustration of the real state of the question at issue, in having, by the express orders of the Marquis of Hastings, moved forward, and partially participated in the warfare with one of the powers of the *Deccan*.

It is true, I believe, that the high spirit and truly elevated, yet perhaps too sensitive mind of the Marquis of Hastings, led that nobleman, in the first instance, to *waive* his *right* to the Commander-in-Chief's share of prize money, rather than that it should be possibly insinuated that he had made his high office of Governor-General subservient to any sordid scheme for recruiting his deranged finances, through the medium of his subordinate station of Commander-in-Chief; and it is, perhaps, equally true, that it was only on his being urgently reminded that by so doing, he would be inflicting a very great injustice and injury upon his creditors as well as his family, that he was induced to relinquish his chivalric intention. But, even had he acted otherwise, such an *abdication* proceeding could surely neither have affected his *inherent right* and title to prize money as Commander-in-Chief of the combined Army, nor formed a precedent for any future military Governor-General that might be similarly situated\*.

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\* As the express terms in which the Governor-General in Council vested Sir Thomas Hislop with a particular *special* control and responsibility in the Deccan, seems to have been somehow overlooked, permit me to subjoin the following extract from the Supreme Government's instructions on the occasion, dated 17th May, 1817, forming, one would think, rather a formal extinguisher to that officer's claim to the prize money of a distinct Commander-in-Chief.

Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop, Baronet, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Fort St. George, &c. &c., "to assume the personal command of all the troops in the Deccan, and the general control (subject to the authority of the Governor-General in Council only), of the military operations and political negotiations and arrangements, connected with the proposed service in that quarter of India,"—"subject, eventually, in the conduct of operations in the field, to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief in India."

But, independent of all these circumstances, one might suppose that the dispute between Sir Thomas Hislop and the Marquis of Hastings, for *the* Commander-in-Chiefship, (for two suns cannot well shine in the same firmament,) would have really afforded no just ground for the suspension of the rights and claims of a whole army,—after an already long-protracted delay of fifteen years,—considering that these two shares might have very easily been retained by the Prize Trustees, until the knotty point at issue should be more satisfactorily settled by competent authority.

The claim of Sir Lionel Smith rests upon altogether different grounds; but considering that the treasure claimed for his division as *actual captors*, was not known of, far less taken possession of by them at the time of the capture of Poonah, but quietly discovered eight months afterwards,—that the law-officers of the Crown had come to an impartial decision on the merits of the case, as far as existing evidence permitted,—and that the warrant of distribution had *passed* the Royal Sign Manual,—it might surely have been reasonably expected that there would have been no good or sufficient grounds for again suspending the already cruelly protracted claims of the whole combined army on that account; particularly as even Mr. Warburton's motion was confined to the suspension of the Prize Distribution Warrant, *as far as related to the claims of Sir Thomas Hislop and Sir Lionel Smith, alone.*

As matters, however, unfortunately turned out otherwise, let us trust that more than sufficient time has already elapsed for reconsidering the question, and that the claims of a whole army will not be much longer compromised in favour of the disputes of any two or three individuals, however exalted; but that all concerned will speedily obtain their just rights, and among the rest,

Your humble Servant,  
CINCINNATUS.

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### Badges.

MR. EDITOR, —Adverting to the subject of Badges, I beg to suggest that a petition, in the form given in the United Service Journal for February, 1831, page 288, may be presented to his Majesty through the proper channel, by two Navy and Army Officers of distinction; and I would submit, for the consideration of the officers of the United Service, that the following, or any other more approved plan, may be transmitted at the same time for his Majesty's sanction.

If the event of his Majesty being graciously pleased to permit such officers of the Navy and Army, as have distinguished themselves in action, to wear an appropriate badge at their own expense, when notice thereof has been given in the Gazette, it would be desirable that it should also appear in the United Service Journal, with directions to all officers, who have been actually engaged with the enemy, to forward a statement of their services (To ——— here state the public office), according to the form pointed out in the United Service Journal for August, 1831, page 350.

I knew an officer who served the guns in a breaching battery, and was the first volunteer for a forlorn hope in the storming party; the same officer performed similar services at a second siege, where he was the first man to enter the breach at the head of 250 men. I knew this same officer at a third siege to serve in the howitzer battery; and when the storming party had been repulsed after a heavy loss, with extraordinary exertions, assisted by the Artillerymen, he planted a howitzer within ten yards of the gateway at midday, which, in a few rounds, he blew open and entered the fort; and, although the storming party had rallied and ascended the breach, the hottest fire of the enemy was directed against the party at the gateway, and in less than an hour the British troops were in possession of the fort: no doubt there are many brave men unrewarded, who have performed more signal

feats of valour; but even these acts are not unworthy of the most gratifying reward an officer can receive; viz., a small token of his Majesty's approval of his conduct.

When the badge has been approved, it is to be hoped that the dies will be forthwith prepared, and a certain number struck without waiting for the officer's claims, as a few surplus medals (should there be any) can be no great expense to the country.

The badges might be arranged as follows, in four Classes:—

#### FIRST CLASS.

St. George's Cross in gold, such as is described in the United Service Journal for January, 1831, page 102, with the Crown and Anchor in the centre for Naval, and a Lion for Military Services.

#### SECOND CLASS.

A Gold Star, having a Crown and Anchor in the centre, for Naval, and a Lion for Military Services.

#### THIRD CLASS.

A Gold Medal, having on one side the King's Head and Naval Trophies, for Naval Services, and the King's Head and Army Trophies for Military Services; and the officer's name and services engraved on the other side.

#### FOURTH CLASS.

A Silver Medal, of the same size and description as described in the Third Class.

An officer, of whatever rank he may be, who may have *Commanded* a vessel of war when engaged as a single ship in a brilliant action, or *Commanded* armed-boats in some signal engagement with the enemy, or who may have *Commanded* a storming party or forlorn hope to wear a badge of the First Class.

All officers of the Navy and Army, of the rank of a field officer, who may have been actually engaged in any general action with fleets, squadrons, or troops; and also all officers of the rank of captain in the Army, who may have distinguished themselves in any brilliant action between two ships of war or cutting out, or on a storming party or forlorn hope, to wear a badge of the Second Class.

All *Commissariat* officers of whatever rank, who may produce satisfactory testimonials of distinguished services in a fight with the enemy, or of having been engaged in a general action of fleets, squadrons, or troops; also, any officer entitled to a badge of the Second Class, who may have performed any of the services therein, or herein described, more than once, to wear a badge of the Third Class.

Quarter-deck officers not holding commissions, who may produce satisfactory testimonials of having performed any such services as are described in either of the classes, to wear a badge of the Fourth Class.

There may be many defects in this arrangement; my only object is to forward the details more than they hitherto have been, with the hope that some more able correspondent will improve upon the plan, and put the thing in such a shape that the public officers to whom this matter may be referred by his Majesty, may have less difficulty in suggesting a plan for carrying it into effect in these times of rigid economy.

Yours, &c.,

AN OFFICER.

December 25, 1832.

P.S. The badges should be distributed as received from the Mint, and the officers have them mounted and engraved themselves according to the circulars, which, no doubt, will be issued for their guidance, otherwise they may expect some years to elapse before they receive them complete.

*P for Peninsular Service.*

MR. EDITOR,—Though the subject of a Peninsula Medal has long been ineffectually agitated, the Army still looks to a satisfactory result of their appeal. Meantime the officers who would be entitled thereto are gradually becoming less numerous, as indeed is the case even with those of Waterloo, whose exploits are so much more recent. A comparison of a late Army List with one of some years back will make this sufficiently obvious. The “*W*’s” now are comparatively few, even in regiments who shared most fully in the honour. The distinction, however, is of an enviable and gratifying nature, and forms a bond of connexion between all those entitled to it. The anniversary does not pass wherever the military are stationed, or do most congregate, without a Waterloo dinner, calculated in an eminent degree to promote good fellowship, and attended with many interesting reminiscences.

My object in making these observations, is to suggest the appendage of a similar distinction in the Army List to the names of the officers who served in the Peninsula. Their number is not now so considerable, that the addition of *P* to each name so entitled, would give much trouble to the printer; and I am sure it would afford satisfaction to many deserving officers, at present undistinguished from others who never saw any service. Besides, it would serve as a link between brothers in arms, who encountered the foe in the same fields, but were not fortunate enough to obtain any other distinction.

The advantages of nourishing a proper “*esprit du corps*” have long been acknowledged. Can a fitter opportunity than the present offer? I trust, Mr. Editor, that you, who have so often and successfully advocated the interests of the Army, will not allow this hint to be lost—and that the trifling boon solicited will not be denied.

Yours ever,

Dec, 1832.

L. P.

*“A Lubber” on Letters of Service.*

MR. EDITOR,—It has struck me as very singular that, in the Army List, such a fuss should be made about Waterloo by the authorities at the Horse Guards as to induce them to cause a German text *W*. to be placed before Wellington’s name and those of his fellow-labourers on that eventful day, as if the English nation had no other warriors than *Lobsters* to defend her; and that in a certain periodical, called the Navy List, the most contemptuous silence should have been shown to the *Dolphins*, as if they were not equally warriors as well as the *Lobsters*, and as if there never were such places as Copenhagen, the Nile, Trafalgar, Algiers, or Navarino: therefore, I call upon the authorities of the Navy, through your valuable and interesting Journal, to cause the following *symbols* to be placed *before* those officers’ names who have been at those respective actions in the *next* Navy List,—namely:—

C. for Copenhagen.

N. for Nile.

T. for Trafalgar.

A. for Algiers.

N. for Navarino.

For instance,—

C. N. T. NELSON, K. C. B.

A. EXMOUTH, K. C. B.

N. CODRINGTON, K. C. B.

It can be *easily* done, as where there is a *will* there is a *way*; and before every officer's name who has a claim to those letters, from the Admiral to the Lieutenants, Masters, and Pursers; and in the *very next* Navy List, too, and in the Army List, if the letter *P.* for Peninsular War, and *B.* for Burmese War, were *similarly* placed, it would be but a mark of *due* and *reasonable* respect to the brave officers connected.

Do not suppose, Mr. Editor, that I am ungrateful to the *Lobsters*, for my best friend is a *Lobster* with one arm, a brave and chivalrous personage; but I wish to see fair play towards the *Dolphins*.

Hoping, with great respect, to see this letter in your *next* Number (as the case is *urgent*), I remain, truly, an admirer of your Journal, and

Jan. 8th, 1833.

A LUBBER.

### *Uniform of the Half-Pay—Military Decorations.*

MR. EDITOR,—Your last Number contains a letter from a Correspondent, inquiring whether or not "half-pay officers are *entitled* to wear any uniform, and if they are, what it is?" and I have observed with astonishment, that several letters have occasionally appeared, of a similar nature, suggesting that a specific uniform should be forthwith ordered for that purpose. Is it possible that any "Old Soldier" can be ignorant that every officer in his Majesty's service is equally entitled (whether on full or half-pay) to appear in uniform "at Court, on public days, or abroad?" Unemployed officers may wear either the regimentals of the corps of which they are on the half-pay, or the dress appointed to be worn by the "unattached," at their option. Few, indeed (having any choice), will select the *latter*, in which, whatever their rank may be, they are constantly liable to be mistaken, at a very little distance, for a staff-serjeant of the Guards in *undress*! It is rather mortifying that a branch of the service, containing some of our most distinguished officers, should be condemned to such a costume (rendered still more conspicuous by the splendour, &c. &c., by which they are surrounded, on the only occasions when it is worn), especially as foreigners attach great importance to such particulars, and, in *their* eyes, every ensign of militia, or even "deputy-lieutenant," must appear to be of much greater consequence than men who have perhaps commanded a battalion in half a dozen campaigns. It is true that, in order to prevent themselves from being considered as belonging to an *inferior* branch of the service\*, most officers make up "a fancy uniform" on going abroad, in consequence of which, it is rare to meet with any two who are dressed alike; but this is bad, and should be discountenanced. Nobody can be a more sincere advocate for *proper* economy than I am; but it is ridiculous to suppose that the few extra shillings which it would cost to make the appearance of the "unattached" equal to that of their brethren in arms who may happen to be on the half-pay of a regiment, could be an object worthy of a moment's consideration, when it is remembered, that making up an uniform, or not, is entirely optional, and that they are never worn in *this* country except at Court, reviews, grand public days, or fancy balls.

Permit me also to add a few words on the subject of the "military decoration," so much wished for. That an equitable distribution of such a favour would be attended by many difficulties I am perfectly aware. If granted for "services in the field," *exclusively*, those officers who have exposed their lives to the perils of unhealthy climates, would have reasonable cause for complaint. If it depended solely on length of service, not only would many meritorious officers be excluded, but (such is the vanity of human nature)

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\* The writer heard the following observation made by a Frenchman to his countryman:—"There are three different classes in the British service; the regular army who wear gold lace, the militia silver, the unattached none."

many would dislike to exhibit such a *tell-tale*; and I have frequently observed of late, that even "Waterloo men" were rather shy of producing evidence that they must be "close aboard of *forty*, at least!" I would, therefore, humbly suggest that the decoration should be given to every officer who had served twenty years on full-pay, or thirty years altogether, reckoning *two* years of tropical service for *three* (as was formerly the case for pensions), and every general action for one (or two) years of service.

Many much better plans may doubtless be struck out; but if these suggestions should draw the attention of abler heads to the subject, so that, *at last*, the long-expected boon may be granted, they will answer the purpose for which they have been hastily penned by,

Sir, your obedient servant,

London, Nov. 5th, 1832.

MILES EMERITUS.

### *Naval Uniform.*

MR. EDITOR.—I some time ago wrote a "Commander's Petition" for change of uniform; some of the changes therein requested have taken place; this emboldens me to offer, most respectfully, some hints to the higher powers, hoping they may meet their approval, as well as be agreeable to our brethren of the navy.

1st. Let us be blue, and all blue; substitute blue for the scarlet cuffs and collars, the collars to have gold lace round the bottom, as now worn by flag officers. The lieutenants to wear an epaulette only on the right shoulder.

2ndly. Do away with the undress great-coat; instead of which have a coat similar to the full dress, excepting the slashed sleeve to have no lace. The epaulets to be finished with a gilt plate, one inch deep, instead of bullion. Flag-officers and captains to wear their distinguishing badges as on the strap of their full dress bullion epaulets; officers on half-pay to be allowed to wear this coat as a dress coat, but without the epaulets, or buttons on the cuffs, collars, or pocket-flaps.

3rdly. The foraging cap to be with a cloth top, unstiffened, and to be worn at all times with the undress; cocked hats with full dress. They certainly are unseemly and uncomfortable appendages on watering, wooding, sanding, dock-yard, and other services. I am not saddling the profession with much additional expense, the undress epaulets will last a man's service life.

I am yours,

A constant Reader, and a

Jan. 14, 1833.

COMMANDER.

### *Remarks by a Militiaman.*

MR. EDITOR.—May I solicit a page in your Journal for the following remarks:—Amongst the many changes that have lately taken place in the appointments and dress of the army, one alone has struck me with astonishment and regret—it is the determined line drawn between the Militia and the regular service, by confining one to gold lace, and the other to silver.

I have been a short time in the regular service, and am now an officer in an old and well-known regiment of Militia.—Reader, I can see you smile, as the truth begins to dawn upon you, and, perhaps, giving a nod to your neighbour, say, "Ah! I see *how* it is, *this* good old regiment has in olden times figured in gold lace."—A most sagacious remark, worthy sir, and perfectly correct—we did wear gold lace, like some others in the same service. Yet think not, courteous reader, that we are like children who take the pet, when they have set their hearts upon a pretty gilded toy, and cannot get possession of it. No, no, Sir, we are men of metal, and have as fair a *distribution* of good sense amongst us as most fellows. I own candidly, we are a little vexed, on finding a change made, the utility of which we cannot

divine ;—only shew us, that it is an improvement on the old plan, and that it is a SATISFACTORY change to the regular army, and not a word more will your poor militiaman utter, but will do his duty, and hold his head as high in silver lace, as ever he did in gold.

What is the feeling of regiments who have hitherto worn silver lace, fought in it, and borne their parts gallantly, in all the noted actions in the Peninsula, and elsewhere,—do they feel gratified by the change,—is it any pride or pleasure to them?—I much doubt it. On the contrary, any one who has felt a pride in his regiment must lament such a change—all are now alike—the advantage of which I cannot comprehend. Regiments have lately been ordered to wear scarlet, cavalry as well as infantry—and why?—because it was a *national* colour, and worn in *old times*!—we wish to be *English* in one thing—why not in *another*? But mark the inconsistency of the thing!—instead of confining the militia service strictly to silver, what is done?—why, three Lancashire regiments, I believe, are to continue their gold,—because they are called the Duke of Lancaster's own. Surely, their blue facings, and *Royal* attached to their name, is a sufficient mark ;—I willingly allow, that none of our militia regiments deserve the compliment more than they do; yet not more than many others. Why not, then, let the others resume their former lace—their facings are different, which is a sufficient mark also. But without further comment,—why make this change at all? The militia have ever been allowed to wear the same uniform as the line, with the difference of their county badges, and the militia button.

Moreover, this change may cause many to think they are no longer considered as soldiers, and thus cast a damp upon their exertions, which have ever been most exemplary; for where (I ask any old officer) could you see finer drilled regiments. Did they not, during the war, volunteer by companies at a time both men and officers, leaving the poor colonel to start afresh. How many of these gallant fellows have nobly distinguished themselves, and left their bodies on the field of battle—a true mark of British gallantry! I think I am not wrong in saying, that a third of the British army commenced as militiamen; and if our fellows are proud of being considered as soldiers, is it not, to say the least, a harmless, and most excusable pride?—and if it adds to the *esprit de corps*, and causes our hardy country lads, our tradesmen, or last, but not least, our pale-faced weavers, to consider themselves as soldiers, is it not well bestowed!—does he not shoulder his musket more briskly, and look to his officer with more reverence and respect, when placed on the same level,—and if I may use so homely a simile,—(one of the same family) as the regular service. Perhaps some old campaigner who reads this, may call us a parcel of coxcombs, numbering the humble individual who now addresses you as the most egregious of that class. But I think I know an old stager better than that,—he is too kind-hearted, too light-minded a fellow to abuse a poor militiaman for looking back to good old times. As affairs now stand, our services may soon be required; perhaps we may be sent to the sister island, and a more disagreeable, irksome service no man could be put to. We shall then want new clothing and appointments: take, then, this opportunity of placing on the former footing as fine a set of fellows as England can produce. And now let me conclude, and request your pardon, kind reader, for this sudden outburst of feelings; and hoping that these humble remarks may attract attention, I subscribe myself

Your obedient humble servant and well-wisher,

PETER FIRELOCK.

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### *Arrow for The Life-Boat.*

MR. EDITOR,—Your constant courtesy induces me to hope that you will do me the favour to give a place in your Journal to a description of the dimensions of the Arrow and its auxiliaries, which may eventually become a

most useful adjunct to the *Life-Boat*, &c., when prevented from a near approach to the wreck or ship in distress, by the surge and breakers (on an intervening bar, sand-bank, or ridge of shelving rocks), in forming a line of communication with the shore.

The principle having been already explained to the public, repetition becomes unnecessary, and would be superfluous. The extreme practicability of the present arrangement must claim for it a lively interest, and its application to the *Life-Boat* completes the efficacy of the latter, to which, therefore, I trust it will henceforth become an indispensable auxiliary.\*

In the present case, a blunderbuss is alone necessary: that manufactured for the town of Whitby, by Mr. Pritchard, 14, Bull-ring, Birmingham, is thirteen inches and a-half long in the barrel, and its calibre one inch. The length of the arrow, which is of solid iron, is fifteen inches, and its entire weight six ounces and a quarter. A cask, threaded on its spindle behind the sliding-ring, may be used as a substitute for the recoil-spring. A bridle of twisted iron wire, connected with the sliding-ring, is attached to a leather thong thirty-eight inches long. To the double, or bend of this thong, a mackarel (or log) line is fastened. The quantity of gunpowder used is three and three-quarter drachms, the gauge for which accompanies the apparatus.

The Arrow, with the above quantity of gunpowder, will carry the line nearly 230 feet in a storm; and in the numerous experiments made in the presence of a considerable concourse of spectators, the line invariably maintained its integrity. In the *Life* (no other) Boat the line is carefully coiled up in a tinned iron case, which remains at the bottom of the boat. The diameter of this case at top is eight inches and a half, at the base six inches, and its depth seven inches and a half. Such a line will be found of sufficient strength to pull the rope necessary to establish a line of communication between the wreck and the shore. The gunpowder, as well as the line, may be preserved *entirely free from wet*, whether from rain or the sea-spray, by means of *Lycopodium powder*, the inflammable seed of the *Lycopodium Clavatum*, or club-moss.

This invention, moreover, presents an easy mode of conveying a message from one ship to another during a storm: and, in the case of a fleet dispersed by the tempest, might prove invaluable as a ready method of communication. By a proportionate increase of the Arrow and its appendages, the principle becomes applicable to the largest piece of ordnance, therefore the distance of transport may be immensely extended.

Your obliged and very humble servant,

Jan. 12, 1833.

J. MURRAY.

### *Naval and Military Lunatic Asylum.*

MR. EDITOR,—It was with feelings of gratification that I perused the last Letter of Sir Andrew Halliday (the former I had no opportunity of seeing), accompanied with a View of his proposed Naval and Military Lunatic Asylum, in your November Number;—a building which, if erected, would not only be an ornament to the metropolitan county, but at the same time reflect an almost immortal honour upon its philanthropic projector and no less benevolent supporters. It is a wonder that none has been, ere this, established; for who, Mr. Editor, are so truly deserving of scientific professional assistance, when suffering under this the worst of all diseases, "*than the brave protectors of our native land?*" and who, when it has pleased Almighty God, for some wise purpose, to remove the grand mental character that distinguishes the man from the lower animals, than those who have suffered winter's cold and summer's parching heat, or have braved the dangers of the tempestuous ocean, and death at the cannon's mouth;—are these brave men, let me ask, to be neglected during a bereavement of the greatest



blessing which man can enjoy? No; it must not be said that Great Britain will thus neglect her defenders, when they *require every species of beneficent assistance—the most scientific skill that could be procured*, and a verification of Bannister's excellent song (which in this case more particularly applies), "*That Man should act as the Brother of Man.*" I am not at all surprised that such a proposal should have been started by Sir Andrew Halliday, when I reflect that, during the last thirty years, that eminent physician has devoted his sole attention to procuring sound practical knowledge on the nature and treatment of mental diseases, as well as information on the mode of conducting public and private lunatic asylums in Great Britain, as well as on the Continent, regardless of time, trouble, or expense, but solely with a view, if possible, of benefiting mankind; as Sir Andrew's numerous works amply testify.

I therefore indulge in the hope, that the time is not far distant when, through the benevolence of the wealthy officers in the army, navy, and East India Company's service, as also of the nobility and gentry, that a Naval and Military Lunatic Asylum will adorn this metropolis, and shed comfort on its afflicted inmates. As a means of furthering this object, permit me to suggest, that if one or two days' pay were given from the highest naval and military officer, down to the humblest man in the respective services, a great sum would directly be obtained. Again, as on a recent occasion, a large sum was procured by a penny subscription, to purchase popular tributes of regard for his Majesty's Ministers,—I think this plan might be adopted; for I do not believe that there exists a man, woman, or child, who would refuse to contribute their mites for such a noble and benevolent an object; but, on the contrary, would cheerfully give them; and respectable persons be found as willing to undertake the task of collecting them, in order to save trouble and expense to the Committee. I throw out these suggestions for the consideration of Sir Andrew Halliday and his philanthropic coadjutors.

Trusting to your kindness in giving this letter a place in an early Number, I have the honour to remain,

Your obedient servant,

HENRY WILLIAM DEWHURST, F.W.S.,  
Surgeon, Professor of Zoology, Anatomy, &c.

Lambeth,  
Dec. 21, 1832.

### Old Subalterns.

MR. EDITOR,—As economy appears to be the order of the day with the powers in office, and taking your valuable Journal for a channel through which ideas may be conveyed, may I request you (as the object is feasible), to insert the following:—

There are several old lieutenants on the retired list with no prospect but that of remaining *Subs.* all their lives, veterans who can produce testimonials of meritorious service, and who have, doubtless, some of them *lost their rank* in consequence of being wounded in action; and others from infirmities contracted during the campaigns on the Peninsula. I would suggest that all such should be offered the option of being promoted to the rank of Captain unattached, as it would be placing them on a more respectable footing in society, and at the same time be a saving to the public of 6*d.* per diem from each who availed himself of it, their retired pay being 7*s.* 6*d.*, and the half-pay of Captain but 7*s.* This suggestion, though brief, conveys much, and I hope will not altogether pass unnoticed at head quarters.

I am, Sir, your constant Reader,

Leeds, 20th Dec., 1832.

JUSTICIA.

P.S. Old Lieutenants of the Navy who have been upon the shelf for years are promoted to superannuated Commanders, why should Lieutenants of the Army, disabled in the service, not have equal honours conferred upon them?

*On the use of Paddles in Vessels of War.*

MR. EDITOR,—Having noticed the remarks under the signature of the “Original Q in a corner,” in the late Number of the *United Service Journal*, upon my observations upon the inutility of paddles for the purpose of meeting the more rapid movements of steam-vessels of war, I beg to acknowledge that the writer has exhibited the subject in a very satisfactory view, since it is apparent that the steamer must remain in all positions out of the reach of the small arms of the sailing-vessel; and it is also clear, that the further the distance between the vessels, the greater the distance to be traversed by the steamer in its rotatory movement. The sailing-vessel will be the centre of a circle, and the steamer will describe the circumference in the manner which may be familiarly illustrated by the revolution of a common coach wheel, in which the nave as the centre is seen to move, at not a tenth part of the velocity of the exterior iron of the rim. This view of the subject contains, indeed, the very gravamen of the question as to the future utility of sailing-vessels of war; and as it proves the practicability of defence by the use of paddles, I am most happy to acknowledge that “Q in a corner” has established the doctrine of Captain Napier, and overthrown that of

Your very humble Servant,  
H. F.

*Query by a Commander.*

MR. EDITOR,—Allow me to ask, through the medium of your valuable *Journal*, why no officer of the rank of Commander has been appointed to his Majesty's ship *Spartiate*, about to receive the flag of the Commander-in-Chief proceeding to South America?

Public report states, I know not with what truth, that the officer named to that command asked for the appointment of various members of his own family to the different situations of captain, commander, flag-lieutenant, &c., &c.; and that their Lordships at the Admiralty having denied him these requests, he, in return, declines receiving a Commander. Yet, by the rule of the service (and that rule made by his present Majesty when Lord High Admiral), the *Spartiate* ought to bear an officer of that rank, just as well as her surgeon, or purser, or any other part of the establishment. Nor can I well conceive why any officer, be his rank what it may, is allowed thus openly to violate established rule. Of this I am persuaded, and it is the general feeling of the service, that had a captain (not of the patrician order) declined receiving a first-lieutenant in his ship, that officer would have been forced upon him, or he would himself have been superseded by return of post.

Perhaps, Sir, some of your Correspondents may throw a light upon this subject, which I am unable to discover.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your admirer and humble servant,

Portsmouth, Nov. 30, 1832.

A COMMANDER.

*A Problem.*

MR. EDITOR,—I am something of a mathematician, and was the first who solved the Prize Question: given, the length of a ship, the extreme breadth, and the number of the crew, to find the Captain's name, and the date of his commission?

But I have been puzzled over a problem, in which I must request your assistance. On the 29th of November, tenders were to be received by Sir John Hill, at Deptford, for the purchase of His Majesty's ship, *Grampus*, of 30 guns. The purchaser was to return all the marked copper and mixed metal that might be found in taking the ship to pieces; for which he is to be allowed the following prices: viz., copper 8½d. per lb., mixed metal 6d.

Now as the *highest* tender sent in was 620*l.*, what will the said good 50-gun ship cost the purchaser, after he has been paid for the metal?

Pray let some of your scävans help me out, and oblige,

Your well-wisher,

NAT. NUT-CRACK.

Gravel Lane, Dec. 20th, 1832.

### *Marine Artillery.*

MR. EDITOR,—In the Letter of P. P. on "Recruiting," he says (p. 552), "I should think there could be but little objection to each regiment recruiting for itself, as the Artillery, Marine Artillery, and Guards, do at this moment. Any officer who has served with these corps will acknowledge that their superior conduct is a proof of that system," &c. P. P. is wrong as respects the Marine Artillery, inasmuch as the men are enlisted by the parent corps as Marines, from which they are selected; the Marine Artillery *never* having recruited for themselves.

Yours ever,

M. A.

### *Colonel Jordan.*

A LETTER, of which the following is a copy, has been addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Jordan, inspecting field-officer at Liverpool, by the mayor of that city, in testimony of the noble exertions of that respected officer, and the excellent conduct of the troops under his direction, during the recent conflagration at the above-mentioned port. It will be in the recollection of our readers, that Colonel Jordan, while in the act of providing for the safety of others, with a devoted earnestness which made him blind to the means of securing his own, was overtaken by a falling wall, and so crushed in one of his legs, as to render its immediate amputation necessary. We are gratified in being enabled to state that he is doing well.—ED.

Town Hall, 19th January.

My dear Sir,—It is alone owing to the very distressing accident which befel you on Tuesday morning, whilst actively and humanely engaged in preserving the lives and property of others from the ravages of a destructive fire, that I have delayed doing what my duty and feelings have equally prompted me to do, fearful of producing any excitement, which, by possibility, might be unfavourable to your speedy recovery. I am now happily relieved from that apprehension, and rejoice that it has pleased Almighty God to spare your valuable life, and that I am afforded the opportunity of making known to you the high sense I entertain of the important services rendered by yourself, and the troops under your command, on this awful and distressing occasion. I reached the scene of devastation a little before three o'clock, and, from Launcelot's Key, I saw the fall of the wall that occasioned your accident, but was not informed of it until you had been removed; as, however, I remained on the spot for several hours after that time, I am glad to bear testimony to the usefulness and excellent conduct of the troops whilst their services were necessary.

I have the honour to remain,

My dear Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

CHARLES HORSFALL, Mayor,

# EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO; OR, NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

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## AFFAIRS AT HOME AND ABROAD.

THE New Parliament, summoned for the 29th of January, will have met ere the publication of our present Number.

The most important feature of our domestic concerns at the present moment is the state of IRELAND. The wild annals of that singular country exhibit her for centuries as more or less convulsed;—still she has hitherto possessed an active and recognized government—ruling in the name and behalf of the Sovereign of these realms. The “sister kingdom” is now in a condition little short of anarchy—unless the usurping conclave of agitators, acting under the influence of the priesthood, be taken as the *de facto* government of the island. In the most disturbed districts the ordinary laws cannot be administered—because juries cannot be found to return unbiassed verdicts. There appears no remedy but martial law.

Ireland is at present held only by the sword. The conduct of the troops, as admitted by all parties, has been admirable: their merits have been specially attested by an Order of the Day, which we have this month the pleasure of recording. Should there be occasion for still more active exertions on the part of the forces employed in Ireland, it is imperatively due both to the public service and to the individual officers and soldiers, that they should be publicly supported in the execution of functions which they have no power to evade—nor be abandoned, like the Police, to the perverse verdicts of intimidated juries and the costly delays of the law, for the unavoidable discharge of the arduous and ungrateful duties they are officially required to execute. *Salus publica suprema lex*—and surely those who maintain the public safety are entitled to a dispensation from the vindictiveness of Party, as well as to the countenance and gratitude of the State.

Should it be in contemplation to embody any portion of the Militia for employment in Ireland, we would suggest, without prejudice to the members of that excellent branch of the United Service, that officers on the half-pay of the line should be selected to fill the vacancies; by which means economy might be combined with a public and individual benefit, and the aid of experienced officers be made available for a service requiring more than ordinary steadiness and discretion.

Did our space permit, there are many other points connected with a subject so momentous and absorbing, both in a national and social view, upon which we could dilate. In the body of this Number will be found a brief Paper, suggesting an obvious remedy, which, however, is chiefly applicable to a state of comparative tranquillity and obedience to the laws. Let us hope that the restoration of Ireland to a condition so essential to her own interests is not remote.

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The progress of Ibrahim Pacha through Asia Minor continues unchecked, though not unopposed. On debouching from the defiles of the Taurus, he was attacked near Konieh, the capital of Karamania, by the

Grand Vizier, who, after an obstinate conflict, rendered still more disastrous by the defection of his best troops, was defeated, wounded, and taken prisoner. The Egyptian army, which before the battle amounted to 30,000 men, appears to have suffered much, and, whether from this cause or motives of policy, Ibrahim had not immediately followed up his success. The distance from Konieh to Constantinople is about 200 miles. The remaining Pachas were endeavouring to collect the scattered forces of the Sultan, who was pressing forward reinforcements to their aid. Further extremities may possibly be averted by mediation. Hitherto the results of this war attest the usual triumph of discipline and tactics over irregular numbers, however physically brave.

We abstain from comment on the military occurrences in Belgium, as we shall offer our readers a full account of the Pacific War of Antwerp in our next Number.

**MORTALITY AMONGST GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS.**—The last promotion of General Officers took place in June, 1830, on the accession of his present Majesty to the throne. In the Army Lists for the following years, the numbers stand as below:—

1st January, 1831.	1st January, 1832.	1st January, 1833.
7 Field Marshals.	7 Field Marshals.	6 Field Marshals.
105 Generals.	97 Generals.	91 Generals.
214 Lieutenant-Generals.	204 Lieutenant-Generals.	197 Lieutenant-Generals.
230 Major-Generals.	225 Major-Generals.	219 Major-Generals.

It thus appears there has been a decrease of 1 field-marshal, 14 generals, 17 lieutenant-generals, and 11 major-generals, between 1st January, 1831, and 1st January, 1833.

The following have disappeared during the last year. The mortality, in round numbers, is greater than among the Admirals:—

*Field-Marshal.*—Sir A. Clarke, G.C.B.

*Generals.*—Alexander Campbell, Earl of Kilmorey, Earl of Donoughmore, Sir George Don, George V. Hart, Samuel Dalrymple.

*Lieutenant-Generals.*—Charles Darby, James Dunlop, William Cuppage, the Baron Rottenburg, John Hughes, John Hunnfrej, Lord Macdonald.

*Major-Generals.*—Samuel Swinton, J. Murray, Sir A. Bryco, Sir W. Williams, Sir C. Ashworth, Sir Charles Bruce.

Subjoined is an account of the Flag Officers of the Fleet, for the same period:

1st January, 1831.	1st January, 1832.	1st January, 1833.
2 Admirals of the Fleet.	2 Admirals of the Fleet.	1 Admiral of the Fleet.
57 Admirals.	52 Admirals.	48 Admirals.
66 Vice-Admirals.	63 Vice-Admirals.	58 Vice-Admirals.
70 Rear-Admirals.	65 Rear-Admirals.	64 Rear-Admirals.*

The Flag Officers who have died in 1832 are here under named:—

*Admiral of the Fleet.*—W. P. W. Freeman.

*Admirals.*—Sir R. Bickerton, T. Drury, Hon. Sir A. J. Cochrane, Sir I. Pellew.

*Vice-Admirals.*—Lord H. Paulet, Sir E. Colpoys, Hon. Sir H. Blackwood, T. Boys, R. Winthorpe, J. Peard.

*Rear-Admirals.*—J. Sutton, G. Fowke, W. Cumberland, V. V. Ballard.

On comparing the official Navy Lists for January, 1832, and January, 1833, there is a decrease of 6 captains, 10 commanders, 59 lieutenants, 23 masters, 10 purasers, 4 surgeons, and 7 assistant-surgeons. P.

\* Three officers of this rank have been added this year out of the usual routine; viz, Sir M. Seymour, Rear-Admiral Briggs, and the Earl of Dundonald.

**NAVAL AND MILITARY LIBRARY AND MUSEUM.**—We take the opportunity of thus early appraising our readers that the Anniversary Meeting of this institution will take place at the Thatched House, St. James's Street, on Saturday the 2d of March, at 2 o'clock. The occasion will be likewise commemorated by a Dinner on that day, at the same house.

Contributions received since the last publication.

#### LIBRARY.

Major-General Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.—*Naval Evolutions*; A Memoir by Major-General Sir Howard Douglas, Bart. K.S.C. C.B. F.R.S. &c. containing a Review and Refutation of the principal Essays and Arguments advocating Mr. Clerk's Claims in relation to the Manœuvre of the 12th of April, 1782, and vindicating by Tacttical Demonstration and numerous authentic Documents, the professional skill of the British Officers chiefly concerned on that memorable occasion, 1 vol. 8vo. 1839; An Essay on Military Bridges, by Major-General Sir Howard Douglas, Bart. &c. &c. Second Edition, 1 vol. 8vo. 1832.

Colonel J. B. Savage, C.B. R.M.—A Poetical Sketch of the Campaigns in Holland in the Years 1793 & 1794, with a Narrative of the Retreat of 1795 By an Officer of the Guards, 2 vols. in one.

Capt. Hamilton, late 1st Ceylon Regt.—A Specimen of Elaborate Penmanship, executed by John Vandevelde of Amsterdam, Anno Domini 1605.

Edw'd. Beaumont Smith, Esq.—*Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier.* By Lieut.-Colonel Leach, C.B. 1 vol. 8vo.

Henry Marshall, Esq. Deputy-Inspector-Gen. of Hospitals.—Contributions to a Natural and Economical History of the Cocoa-Nut Tree. By himself. Pamphlet, 1832.

Lieut.-General Sir H. E. Bunbury, Bart. K.C.B.—*Mémoires de l'Artillerie* (St. Remy), 2 vols. 4to. Paris, 1707; *Imprese Militari*, &c. (Bocca), 2 vols. 4to.; *Vigenia*, 1668; *Traite des Ponts*, 1 vol. 8vo. Paris, 1716; *Traite de la Construction des Chemins*, 1 vol. 8vo. Paris, 1721; *Plans des Villes*, &c. *Tasie*, 1 vol. folio. Paris, 1631.

Capt. J. Norman Campbell, C.B., R.N.—Official Medical Reports upon the Epidemic called Cholera, in Dantzick, 1831. By John Hammett, M.D. R.N. 1 vol. 8vo. 1832.

Lieut. W. H. Brady, R.N.—*Observations on Negro Slavery in the Island of Santa Cruz*, with Miscellaneous Remarks, 1 vol. 8vo. 1829; *Memoir of the English Naval Affairs from 1660 to 1673*, by H. R. H. James Duke of York, 1 vol. 8vo. 1729.

W. J. Huggins, Esq.—A Coloured Engraving of the Belzoni entering the Harbour of Port Louis, Mauritius, Nov. 1827. Painted by W. J. Huggins, Marine Painter to His Majesty. Engraved by E. Duncan.

Master Warrington W. Smyth.—*Walton, on the Dimensions of Spanish America*, 1 vol. 8vo. 1814.

*Natural History of England*, by Benj. Martin, 2 vols. 8vo. London, 1763; *Histoire de Charles XII.* by M. De V——, 1 vol. 12mo. Basle, 1732.

*Military Maxims of Napoleon.* Translation by Col. D'Aguilar, 1 vol. 18mo. Dublin, 1831.

Lieut. Percy Neville, 26th Regt., K.L.H.—*Kennett's Roman Antiquities*, 1 vol. 8vo., *scams*; *Historical Memoirs of the Irish Bards*, &c., by Joseph C. Walker, 2 vols. 8vo., Dublin, 1818.

Lieut.-Colonel Oldfield.—*Memoirs of Major Oldfield*, extracted from his own Papers, 1 vol. 8vo.

#### MUSEUM.

C. R. Higgins, Esq.—A case of British Lepidoptera, containing eighty-two Specimens, classed and named.

Lady Owen.—The Birds' Skins from Ascension; a Neptunian Vase, from the coast near Singapore, 2½ Gin. high, and 5½. 10½. in circumference.

Miss Alexander.—An African Pouch, manufactured at Kano, an inconsiderable city in Soudan; it was formerly the property of a war chief of the Sultan Damfodio, who was father to the Sultan Bello.

Lieut.-General Sir H. E. Bunbury, Bart. K.C.B.—Two Provisional Standards, borne by Battalions which had not earned their Eagles, and taken at the battle of Salamanka. The Hunting Bow and Quiver of Tippoo Sahib, sent after the capture of Seringapatam, to the Secretary of State.

J. R. Bakewell, Esq.—A specimen of the Anthrosite Coal, from South Wales.

Capt. W. F. W. Owen.—Specimens of the Calcasamis Lime-stone, on which the New Victualling-Office, at Plymouth, is built. A collection of Cornish and Brazilian Stones, &c.

Master Warrington W. Smyth.—A Quadrant 50 years old; a Dial, made to fire by means of a magnifying-glass; a Stuffed Grebe, English; Skull of a Hare.

Capt. Robert Allen, h. p. 5th Regt.—French Medal, struck to commemorate the battle of Marengo.

Rev. F. W. Hope—Five cases of British and Foreign Insects, chiefly coleopterous.

Lieut.-Colonel Oldfield—Piece of Labrador Stone, discovered on the Labrador coast, by the Moravians, about 1708.

Lieut. Spence, R.N.—Some Garnets found in the burn at Monlinean, Perthshire, N. B.

#### CHANGES IN THE STATIONS OF CORPS SINCE OUR LAST:—

3d Dragoon Guards from Brighton to Dorchester.

7th Dragoon Guards from Dorchester to Newbridge.

7th Hussars are at Norwich.

1st Battalion Grenadier Guards is at Portman-street Barracks (erroneously printed Portsmouth in our last).

5th Foot Reserve Companies from Bruff to Nenagh.

32d Foot Reserve Companies from Tralee to Limerick.

36th Foot Reserve Companies from Kinsale to Ballincollig.

42d Foot from Malta to Gibraltar.

66th Foot Reserve Companies from Maryborough to Wexford.

69th Foot from Barbadoes to St. Vincent's.

77th Foot Reserve Companies from Limerick to Tralee.

84th Foot Reserve Companies from Portsmouth to Gosport.

86th Foot Reserve Companies from Gosport to Portsmouth.

94th Foot Reserve Companies from Portsmouth to Gosport.

## ANNALS OF THE BRITISH FLEET.

	Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.	Principal Commanders-in-Chief.
	<p>1807.</p> <p>War with France, Russia, Holland, Spain, Denmark, Tuscany, Naples, &amp;c. &amp;c.</p> <p>First Lord—Right Hon. Thomas Grenville.          ——— Lord Mulgrave, from April.          John Markham.          Sir H. B. Neale, Bart.          Lord William Russell.          Lord Kensington.          Thomas Freemantle.          William Frankland.          Lord Gambier, from April.          Sir Richard Bickerton, from April.          William Johnston Hope, from April.          Robert Ward, from April.          Viscount Palmerston, from April.          James Buller, from April.</p>	<p>Channel.—{ Admiral Earl St. Vincent.          ——— Admiral Lord Gardner.</p> <p>Portsmouth.—Admiral Montagu.          Plymouth.—Admiral Young.</p> <p>Cork.—{ Vice Admiral Whitshed.          ——— Admiral Lord Gardner.</p> <p>North Sea.—{ Adm. Lord Keith,          ——— till May.</p> <p>Downs.—{ Vice Admiral Rowley.          ——— Admiral Lord Keith.</p> <p>Cape of Good Hope.—{ Rear-Admiral Sir          ——— Thos. Troubridge.</p> <p>Halifax.—Vice Admiral Hon.          ——— George Berkeley.</p> <p>East Indies.—{ Rear-Admiral Sir          ——— E. Pellew.</p> <p>Jamaica.—Vice-Admiral Dacres.</p> <p>Mediterranean.—{ Vice-Admiral          ——— Lord Collingwood.</p>

## DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH NAVAL FORCE IN EACH MONTH OF 1807.\*

Stations.	Number of Ships.											
	January.	February.	March.	April.	May.	June.	July.	August.	September.	October.	November.	December.
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
In the Downs and North Sea . . . .	152	158	141	127	116	103	134	193	197	190	184	119
In the English and Irish Channels . .	150	153	132	127	141	131	133	115	127	147	123	105
Spain, Portugal, and Gibraltar . . .	30	30	32	21	31	30	34	33	20	31	36	22
In the Mediterranean . . . . .	33	46	46	66	45	43	53	50	51	57	55	53
Coast of Africa . . . . .	3	4	5	4	4	3	3	2	3	2	2	4
West Indies and on the passage . . .	51	40	51	57	61	66	66	63	60	64	63	65
At Jamaica, ditto . . . . .	36	35	34	37	34	37	32	30	28	32	31	31
In America and at Newfoundland . .	27	25	24	24	25	21	28	33	31	36	36	34
South America . . . . .	—	—	—	—	17	10	30	26	25	20	19	—
Cape of Good Hope and Southern stations	14	14	15	22	—	—	—	—	—	8	9	21
East Indies, and on the passage . . .	37	37	37	36	37	40	39	37	41	44	44	41
On an Expedition, Foreign Service, &c.	25	28	25	21	21	27	—	—	—	—	—	22
Total Ships at Sea . . . . .	556	579	542	535	532	523	542	582	592	631	602	517
In Port and fitting . . . . .	170	148	150	196	209	217	176	143	135	120	142	212
Guard Ships . . . . .	10	50	10	10	10	11	14	12	12	13	11	11
Hospital Ships, Prison Ships, &c. . .	* 27	27	27	30	27	30	32	30	31	35	35	37
Total Ships in Commission . . . .	763	746	740	771	778	781	761	767	770	799	790	777
In Ordinary . . . . .	183	182	183	163	148	159	172	167	168	183	178	100
Building . . . . .	115	115	111	95	94	80	92	94	88	85	89	181
Grand Total . . . . .	1063	1061	1034	1029	1020	1020	1025	1026	1026	1067	1057	1067

Naval Estimates, 1807.—130,000 † men, including 31,400 men—Total Expenditure £17,400,337 9s. 3d.

\* For the year 1806, see p. 572 of Part II. for 1831. \*

† The first estimate was 120,000, but on the 26th January it was augmented 10,000.

## STATE OF THE ROYAL NAVY IN JANUARY 1807.

Rates or Classes.	Number of guns in each ship, viz.	Establishment of 1792, see p. 32 of Admiralty Orders of Nov. 10th, 1794, including carronades on the quarter deck, poop, and fore-castle.	Number of Ships in			Grand Total, viz.			Burthen of the ships in					
			Commission.	Ordinary.	Building or ordered to be built.	British and Foreign built ships.	Foreign built ships.*	Brigs built ships.	Commission.	Ordinary.	Building or ordered to be built.	Total burthen.		
Three Deckers.	1st	120	†	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	
		112	118	12 & 18 pound.	1	—	4	5	—	5	2,508	—	10,464	12,072
		100	108	ditto	2	1	—	3	2	1	4,855	2,351	—	7,206
	2nd	98	106	ditto	2	2	4	8	—	8	4,461	4,253	8,997	17,711
		80	88	—	13	2	1	16	—	16	25,809	4,240	2,278	32,387
		74	82	24 pounders	6	6	—	12	10	2	12,864	13,120	—	25,984
	3rd	74	82	18 pound. large	11	—	3	14	3	11	29,901	—	5,749	26,740
		74	82	middle	13	9	2	24	11	13	24,325	16,017	3,611	44,883
		74	82	small	16	4	21	41	5	36	27,898	6,879	36,031	71,398
	4th	64	72	—	27	16	1	44	3	41	41,074	25,832	1,674	71,580
		60	—	—	32	5	—	37	12	25	41,213	6,856	—	51,071
		56	—	flush	—	2	—	2	1	1	—	2,511	—	2,511
	5th	50	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	2	2,082	—	—	2,082
		50	62	{ common or quarter-decked.	8	8	—	16	3	13	8,648	8,163	—	17,111
		44	52	—	3	—	—	3	—	3	2,661	—	—	2,661
	6th	41	—	Gun-frigate.	5	1	—	6	2	4	6,047	1,357	—	8,304
		40	—	18 & 24 pound.	4	—	—	4	—	4	4,751	—	—	4,751
		38	46	large	19	14	6	39	24	15	20,721	15,473	6,555	42,752
Two Deckers.	1st	38	46	small	17	2	—	19	4	15	16,931	1,078	—	18,009
		36	44	18 pound. large	7	3	—	10	7	3	7,275	3,039	—	18,314
		36	44	small	17	2	15	34	1	33	15,753	1,908	14,083	31,554
	2nd	36	41	12 pounders	11	—	—	20	19	1	10,047	8,412	—	18,459
		32	38	18 pound. large	5	—	3	8	—	8	4,542	—	2,749	7,291
		32	38	small	5	—	—	5	—	5	3,907	—	—	3,907
	3rd	32	38	12 pound. large	6	3	—	9	6	3	4,914	2,340	—	7,254
		32	38	small	24	9	—	33	1	32	16,377	6,255	—	25,632
		28	—	—	11	3	—	14	3	11	6,856	1,778	—	8,634
	4th	21	32	Gun-post ship	6	—	—	6	2	4	3,248	—	—	3,248
		22	—	ditto	7	—	5	12	—	12	3,744	—	2,068	6,412
		20	28	Quarter-decked	4	3	—	7	3	4	1,792	1,360	—	3,172
	5th	20	28	flush	3	4	—	7	7	—	1,637	2,005	—	3,732
		16	24	—	25	41	234	41	193	59,514	8,310	16,776	81,000	
		12	0	—	12	6	—	18	18	4,223	2,065	—	6,288	
	6th	12	0	—	2	—	—	2	—	2	—	668	—	668
		10	2	—	10	2	1	103	11	92	18,063	304	177	18,546
		72	2	—	72	2	—	74	23	51	7,743	273	—	8,015
7th	58	26	—	58	26	1	82	19	63	36,716	20,940	199	63,885	
	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
One Deckers.	1st	120	118	12 & 18 pound.	1	—	4	5	—	5	2,508	—	10,464	12,072
		100	108	ditto	2	1	—	3	2	1	4,855	2,351	—	7,206
		98	106	ditto	2	2	4	8	—	8	4,461	4,253	8,997	17,711
2nd	80	88	—	13	2	1	16	—	16	25,809	4,240	2,278	32,387	
	74	82	24 pounders	6	6	—	12	10	2	12,864	13,120	—	25,984	
	74	82	18 pound. large	11	—	3	14	3	11	29,901	—	5,749	26,740	
3rd	74	82	middle	13	9	2	24	11	13	24,325	16,017	3,611	44,883	
	74	82	small	16	4	21	41	5	36	27,898	6,879	36,031	71,398	
	64	72	—	27	16	1	44	3	41	41,074	25,832	1,674	71,580	
4th	60	—	—	32	5	—	37	12	25	41,213	6,856	—	51,071	
	56	—	flush	—	2	—	2	1	1	—	2,511	—	2,511	
	50	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	2	2,082	—	—	2,082	
5th	50	62	{ common or quarter-decked.	8	8	—	16	3	13	8,648	8,163	—	17,111	
	44	52	—	3	—	—	3	—	3	2,661	—	—	2,661	
	41	—	Gun-frigate.	5	1	—	6	2	4	6,047	1,357	—	8,304	
6th	40	—	18 & 24 pound.	4	—	—	4	—	4	4,751	—	—	4,751	
	38	46	large	19	14	6	39	24	15	20,721	15,473	6,555	42,752	
	38	46	small	17	2	—	19	4	15	16,931	1,078	—	18,009	
7th	36	44	18 pound. large	7	3	—	10	7	3	7,275	3,039	—	18,314	
	36	44	small	17	2	15	34	1	33	15,753	1,908	14,083	31,554	
	36	41	12 pounders	11	—	—	20	19	1	10,047	8,412	—	18,459	
8th	32	38	18 pound. large	5	—	3	8	—	8	4,542	—	2,749	7,291	
	32	38	small	5	—	—	5	—	5	3,907	—	—	3,907	
	32	38	12 pound. large	6	3	—	9	6	3	4,914	2,340	—	7,254	
9th	32	38	small	24	9	—	33	1	32	16,377	6,255	—	25,632	
	28	—	—	11	3	—	14	3	11	6,856	1,778	—	8,634	
	21	32	Gun-post ship	6	—	—	6	2	4	3,248	—	—	3,248	
10th	22	—	ditto	7	—	5	12	—	12	3,744	—	2,068	6,412	
	20	28	Quarter-decked	4	3	—	7	3	4	1,792	1,360	—	3,172	
	20	28	flush	3	4	—	7	7	—	1,637	2,005	—	3,732	
Sloops from 14 to 18 guns.	16	24	—	25	41	234	41	193	59,514	8,310	16,776	81,000		
	12	0	—	12	6	—	18	18	4,223	2,065	—	6,288		
	12	0	—	2	—	—	2	—	2	—	668	—	668	
Bombs of 8 guns and 2 mortars.	10	2	—	10	2	1	103	11	92	18,063	304	177	18,546	
	72	2	—	72	2	—	74	23	51	7,743	273	—	8,015	
	58	26	—	58	26	1	82	19	63	36,716	20,940	199	63,885	
Fire ships of 14 guns.	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
Gun brigs from 10 to 14 guns.	74	82	24 pounders	6	6	—	12	10	2	12,864	13,120	—	25,984	
	74	82	18 pound. large	11	—	3	14	3	11	29,901	—	5,749	26,740	
	74	82	middle	13	9	2	24	11	13	24,325	16,017	3,611	44,883	
Cutters from 4 to 14 guns.	64	72	—	27	16	1	44	3	41	41,074	25,832	1,674	71,580	
	60	—	—	32	5	—	37	12	25	41,213	6,856	—	51,071	
	56	—	—	—	2	—	2	1	1	—	2,511	—	2,511	
Troop-ships, store-ships, &c.	50	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	2	2,082	—	—	2,082	
	44	52	—	8	8	—	16	3	13	8,648	8,163	—	17,111	
	41	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	3	2,661	—	—	2,661	
Grand total, viz.	41	—	Gun-frigate.	5	1	—	6	2	4	6,047	1,357	—	8,304	
	40	—	18 & 24 pound.	4	—	—	4	—	4	4,751	—	—	4,751	
	38	46	large	19	14	6	39	24	15	20,721	15,473	6,555	42,752	
Ships of the line from 60 to 120 guns.	38	46	small	17	2	—	19	4	15	16,931	1,078	—	18,009	
	36	44	18 pound. large	7	3	—	10	7	3	7,275	3,039	—	18,314	
	36	44	small	17	2	15	34	1	33	15,733	1,908	14,083	31,554	
Ships of 56 guns and under.	36	41	12 pounders	11	—	—	20	19	1	10,047	8,412	—	18,459	
	32	38	18 pound. large	5	—	3	8	—	8	4,542	—	2,749	7,291	
	32	38	small	5	—	—	5	—	5	3,907	—	—	3,907	
Sloops from 14 to 18 guns.	32	38	12 pound. large	6	3	—	9	6	3	4,914	2,340	—	7,254	
	32	38	small	24	9	—	33	1	32	16,377	6,255	—	25,632	
	28	—	—	11	3	—	14	3	11	6,856	1,778	—	8,634	
Bombs of 8 guns and 2 mortars.	21	32	Gun-post ship	6	—	—	6	2	4	3,248	—	—	3,248	
	22	—	ditto	7	—	5	12	—	12	3,744	—	2,068	6,412	
	20	28	Quarter-decked	4	3	—	7	3	4	1,792	1,360	—	3,172	
Fire ships of 14 guns.	20	28	flush	3	4	—	7	7	—	1,637	2,005	—	3,732	
	16	24	—	25	41	234	41	193	59,514	8,310	16,776	81,000		
	12	0	—	12	6	—	18	18	4,223	2,065	—	6,288		
Gun brigs from 10 to 14 guns.	12	0	—	2	—	—	2	—	2	—	668	—	668	
	10	2	—	10	2	1	103	11	92	18,063	304	177	18,546	
	72	2	—	72	2	—	74	23	51	7,743	273	—	8,015	
Cutters from 4 to 14 guns.	58	26	—	58	26	1	82	19	63	36,716	20,940	199	63,885	
	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
Troop-ships, store-ships, &c.	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
	50	—	—	694	171	108	273	223	750	481,075	175,904	112,641	770,220	
Grand total, viz.	74	82	24 pounders	6	6	—	12	10	2					



anchored in a style far surpassing his expectations \*. The harbour was defended by regular fortifications of 3 tier of guns, Fort Amsterdam mounting alone 66 pieces of cannon; the entrance of the port only 50 yards wide, athwart which was the Dutch frigate *Halstaar*, of 36 guns, and *Surinam*, of 22, with two large schooners of war, one commanded by a Dutch commander; a chain of forts was on Miesburg's commanding height, and that almost impregnable fortress, Fort Republique, within the distance of grape shot, enfilading the whole harbour. At a quarter past six o'clock the port was entered; a severe and destructive cannonade ensued, the vessels were carried by boarding, the lower forts, the citadel and town of Amsterdam, by storm, all of which by seven o'clock were taken possession of. A capitulation was signed by the governor, Changulon, and at ten o'clock the British flag was hoisted in Fort Republique. The British had 3 seamen killed, and 14 wounded; the Dutch had 7 killed, and 6 wounded; amongst the former was the Com. Everts, who was killed early in the action.—2. Capt. Selby of the *Cerberus*, 32 (Leeward Island station), chased and obliged three French privateers to take shelter under a battery near the Pearl Rock, Martinique. It appearing practicable to cut them out during the night, Lieuts. Coote and Bligh volunteered the attack; when about eight o'clock, they boarded two of the vessels under a most tremendous fire of cannon and musketry from the shore, and brought them out, notwithstanding the enemy had taken the precaution to unbend their sails. The loss sustained by the *Cerberus* was very considerable; Lieut. Coote received a most desperate wound in the head, which deprived him of his sight; 2 men were killed, and 9 wounded. The third privateer made her escape with her sweeps, under cover of the night. *Le Creole*, 1 (French), taken on the Leeward Island station, by a boat of the *Cree*, 32, H. Pigot, manned by 6 individuals, and commanded by Lieut. Thomas, who gallantly carried her without any assistance. *L'Entreprenante*, French privateer, 1 gun, 17 men, taken by the *St. Christopher* sloop. *A. Hodge* (Leeward Island station).—3. *La Favorite*, French cutter, 14 guns, 70 men, taken by the *Pickle* schooner, 10, Lieut. Callaway (Channel station).—4. *Nautilus* (sloop), E. Palmer, 18, B. 1804, wrecked on Cerigotto, a barren rock in the Levant; part of the crew survived, but 62 were destroyed by famine, and among them the commander.—5. As Capt. Lord Cochrane, of the *Imperieuse*, 40, was passing the basin of Arcasson, Lieut. Mapleton volunteered his services to bring out with the boats whatever vessels might be found there, and, as a preliminary step, attacked *Fort Roguette*, the defence of the entrance. A large quantity of military stores was destroyed, 6 great guns and a mortar spiked, the platoons and carriages burnt, and the fort laid in ruins. Capt. J. Brisbane, of the *Alcmene*, 34, in Lat. 50 deg. N. and Long. 11 deg. W., captured *Le Courier*, French cutter privateer, (formerly the hired cutter *Alert*), pierced for 14 but mounting only 7 guns, with 70 men. *United Brothers* (tender), Lieut. W. M'Kenzie, 6 guns (hired) taken off the *Lizard*, by a privateer of 12 guns, after a spirited resistance.—7. In consequence of the French government having declared all his Majesty's dominions to be in a state of blockade, measures were adopted to obviate the tendency of this declaration. It was ordered that no neutral vessel should be permitted to trade from one port to another, both which ports belonging to, or in possession of, France or her allies, or so far under their control, as that British vessels could not trade thereto; and the commanders of ships of war, &c., were instructed to act accordingly. *Le Trente et Luanant*, French privateer, 16 guns, 65 men, taken by the *Arindne*, 20, A. Furquhar, (Home station).—8. Capt. P. Stordard, of the *Cruizer* (sloop), 18, being about eight leagues to the southward of the Galloper, after a four hours' chase, brought to and captured *Le Jena*, French lugger privateer, of 16 guns.—18. *The Venus*, 32, H. Matine (Leeward Island station), after sixteen hours' chase, captured the French privateer brig, *Determinee*, of 14 guns and 108 men.—21. Capt. Sayer, of the *Galathea*, 32, (Leeward Island station) discovered a sail in the S. E. steering for *La Guira*, and soon compelled her to another course for Barcelona; she attempted to get away. At two o'clock her top-gallant sails were scarcely above the horizon, but in a situation between the ship and the coast that still afforded hopes of her, by co-operation of the boats: they pushed off under the direction of Lieut. Coombe, manned with 5 officers, 50 seamen, and 20 marines, who, after rowing about twelve leagues in three hours, (part of the time under a burning sun) came up with her. Having first hailed her, they instantly attempted to board on both quarters, but by the fire of her guns, which had been all trained aft in readiness, and having to combat under every disadvantage, with more than double their numbers, were twice repulsed. The boats now dropped, and poured through her stern and quarter ports a destructive fire of musketballs and small arms, which cleared the deck of many of the crew, who were all crowded aft; when, after an arduous struggle (a third time) for a footing, the gallant little band rushed on board, and in a few minutes drove all before them. The captain and most of his officers were lying wounded on the decks. The vessel proved to be the French Imperial corvette *Le Lynx*, 16 guns, pierced for 18, with 160 men.—22. *Felix* (schooner), R. Clarke, 10, P. R. 1804; driven on shore, and wrecked in the Bay of St. Andero, where she had been sent with a flag of truce. Crew lost except three.—23. *Orpheus*, T. Briggs, 32, B. 1799, lost on a coral reef (Jamaica station).

\* Desirous of sparing the effusion of blood, he wrote the following laconic note on the capstan of the *Aréthusa*, during the action, to the governor of Curaçoa, which was not regarded, as the enemy seemed bent upon destroying him. "Sir,—The British squadron are here to protect, and not to conquer you,—to preserve to you your lives, liberty, and property. If a shot is fired at any one of my squadron after this summons I shall immediately storm your batteries—you have five minutes to accede to this determination."

† In the death of Lieut. Walker the service lost a most promising officer. Although Lieut. Coombe had before lost a leg, his activity in the execution of his duty was unabated; in this action he received a severe and dangerous wound in the thigh above the former amputation. Of the officers commanding the five boats, only Lieut. Gibson was unhurt. The boats had 9 killed and 22 wounded. *Le Lynx* had 14 killed and 20 wounded.

crew saved.—24. *Les Deux Seurs* (French privateer), 16 guns, 130 men, taken by the *Rattlesnake*, (sloop) 16, Lieut. H. Warden (East India station).—25. *Isabella* (Spanish privateer), 3 guns, 64 men, taken by the *Hunter* (sloop), 18, F. H. Inglesfield, (Jamaica station).—26. *Le Braye* (French privateer), 16, taken by the *Cruiser* (sloop) 18, P. Stoddart (Home station.) *L'Adolphe*, (French privateer), 14 guns, 39 men, taken by the Norfolk armed defence ship, W. Richau (Home station).—27. *Jena* (French privateer), 4 guns, 30 men, captured by the *Princess Augusta* (H.A.C.) Lieut. J. Tracey (Home Station.) The *Caroline*, 36, Capt. Rainier, after a smart action, captured the *St. Raphael* (alias *Pallas*), Spanish register ship, belonging to the Royal Company of the Philippines, mounting 16 guns, with 97 men, having on board 500,000 Spanish dollars in specie, and 1,700 quintals of copper, besides a valuable cargo. She had 27 killed, and wounded. The *Caroline* had 7 wounded. *El Postillon*, 3, and *El Carmen*, 5 (Spanish), taken, after fourteen hours' chase, by the *Lark* (sloop), 18, R. Nicholas (West India station.) They were afterwards destroyed during an attack within *Zispatá Bay*, where three vessels of the enemy took refuge. The *Lark* also cut out a Spanish schooner from a creek of *Zispatá Bay*, which was protected by a 4-gun battery.—28. The *Jason*, 32, F. Cochrane (Leeward Island station), at daylight discovered a ship and brig to windward, to which he gave chase; at ten he succeeded in bringing the ship to action within pistol-shot, which shortly after struck, and proved to be the French national ship, *La Favorite* (formerly in his Majesty's service) of 16 long sixes, and 13 twelve-pound carronades, with 150 men, 10 of whom were killed, and 1 wounded. The *Jason* had one wounded. The brig kept above gun-shot to windward, and while the prisoners were exchanging, effected her escape. *Jackdaw* (schooner), Lieut. N. Brice, 10, B. 1806, taken, near the Cape de Verde Islands, by a Spanish corvette, (recaptured by the *Minerva*, 17th February.) *Santa Lucia* (F.) (brig), Hon. M. de Courcy, 16, T. 1803, captured on the Leeward Island station.

February 3. The town and citadel of Monte Video were taken by assault, after a most determined resistance, from the Spaniards, by the troops under the command of Brig.-General Auchmuty, and a squadron of ships under the command of Rear-Admiral Stirling, in the *Río de la Plata*. The prizes\* taken were 57 ships of war and merchantmen, 15 sloop-rigged gun-boats, and 6 row-boats with guns. The names of the ships composing the British squadron were, the *Diadem*, 64, Rear-Admiral Stirling; Capt. S. Warren; *Raisonable*, 64, J. Rowley; *Ardent*, 64, R. Donnelly; *Lancaster*, 64, W. Fothergill; *Unicorn*, 32, L. F. Hardyman; *Medusa*, 32, Hon. D. P. Bouverie; *Daphne*, 22, F. Mason; *Howe*, 38, E. Killwick; *Charwell*, 18, E. H. Chamberlayne; *Phœnix*, 18, J. Palmer; *Encounter* gun-brig, Lieut. J. H. Talbot; *Staunch* gun-brig, Lieut. B. Street. (See also Military Annals).—6. *La Chasseur* French lugger, 2 guns, 42 men, taken by the *Kite* sloop, 18, J. James (Home station).—13. *Woodcock* schooner, 10, Lieut. J. Collett, B. 1806, and *Wagland* schooner, 8, Lieut. W. Cullis, B. 1806, wrecked at St. Michael's, one of the Western Islands (crew saved).—14. *Ajax*, 74, Hon. H. Blackwood, B. 1788, caught fire accidentally (Mediterranean station) and burned. The commander escaped, and part of the crew. Capt. Dacres, of the *Bacchante*, 20, captured off Cape Raphael, the Dauphin French national schooner, after a chase of ten hours. She mounted 3 guns, and had on board 75 men; she had done much mischief to the trade, and was well known in Samana, that nest for privateers.—16. *Le Beugainville* French brig, 16 guns, 91 men, taken by the *Scorpion* sloop 18, P. Carteret (Home station).—18. Capt. T. J. Maling, of the *Diana*, 36, after a five hours' chase, off Cork Harbour, succeeded in bringing to and capturing, the French privateer *La Charlotte*, pierced for 20 guns, but mounting only 14, with complement of 113 men. *Prospero* (bomb), W. King, 8, B. 1803, lost off Dieppe; crew saved, except 7; the rest captured. *Inveterate* (gun-brig), Lieut. C. Norton, 14, B. 1801, lost near St. Valéry en Caux; four of the crew perished, and the remainder were captured. *Griper* gun-brig, Lieut. E. Morris, 14, T. 1804, foundered off Ostend, during a violent gale; all hands perished. *Speedwell* brig, Lieut. W. Robertson, 14, P. 1796, foundered off Dieppe.—19. Differences having arisen between the Porte and the British Government, a squadron was despatched to the Dardanelles, consisting of the *Royal George*, 110, Vice-Admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth, commander-in-chief, Capt. R. O. Dunu; *Canopus*, 80, Rear-Admiral Sir T. Louis, Bart., Capt. T. G. Shortland; *Pompee*, 80, Rear-Admiral Sir W. S. Smith, Capt. R. Dacres; *Windsor Castle*, 74, Capt. C. Boyles; *Repulse*, 74, Hon. A. K. Legge; *Thunderer*, 74, John Talbot; *Standard*, 64, Thomas Harvey; *Endymion*, 40, Hon. T. B. Capel; *Active*, 40, R. H. Mowbray; and *Meteor*.—The Admiral passed the Dardanelles at a quarter to nine o'clock on the morning of February 19, 1807. A small Turkish squadron had been for some time at anchor within the inner castle. Admiral Sir S. Smith had orders with his division to destroy them, should they interrupt the passage. At half-past nine o'clock, the *Canopus* entered the narrow passage of *Vestos* and *Abydos*, and sustained a very heavy cannonade from both castles, within point blank shot of each other. They fired upon the ships as they passed in succession, but it was returned in such a spirited manner as so considerably diminished its force, that the effect on the sternmost ships could not have been severe. Immediately to the N. E. of the castles, and between them and Point Pesquies, in which a formidable new battery had been erected, the small squadron already alluded to were at anchor, the whole of which Sir Sidney Smith caused to explode in four hours, except a small corvette and a gun-boat, which were preserved. One frigate was driven on shore on

\* The following ships of war were taken in the harbour of the island of Rattones:—*La Pania*, 22, *La Fuerte*, 22; *La Hero* brig, 20; *Los Dolores* schooner, 10; *La Paz* schooner, 10; *La Reyna Louisa*, 24; frigate, (name unknown) 28; and three gun-boats (names unknown) blown up at same time, to prevent capture.

† The thanks of both Houses of Parliament were voted to Rear-Admiral Stirling, and Brigadier General Sir Samuel Auchmuty and Lumley.

the European side, and destroyed by Capt. H. Mowbray; and the 64 having run on shore on Pesquies Point, was destroyed by the *Repulse*, Hon. A. K. Legge, in conjunction with the boats of *La Pompée*. The battery of 30 guns on Point Pesquies was taken possession of by the royal marines; the guns were spiked, and the squadron anchored on the evening of the 20th off Constantinople. Negotiations were immediately entered into between Mr. Arbuthnot, the British minister, and a minister of the Porte, which continued till the 27th with a prospect of success. Notwithstanding the progress of negotiation, the Turks were observed, on the 27th, to be erecting a battery on the island of Prota, to which a party of marines from the *Canopus* were despatched, and were brought off, on making signals of distress, by the boats and marines of the *Royal George*, *Windsor Castle*, and *Standard*. The discomfiture was occasioned by about 100 of the Turks having retired to an old convent, where they defended themselves by firing through the loop-holes. In the course of the night they effected their escape, though every expedient of vigilance was exerted. (See 3d of March.) Ignition, (F. V.) Lieut. Philip Griffin, 4, P. 1804, lost off Dieppe; four of the crew were drowned, and 14 saved. *Magpie* schooner, Lieut. E. Johnson, 14, B. 1806, driven by stress of weather into Perros, and there taken possession of by the enemy. *Le Chasseur* French cutter privateer, 2 guns, 36 men, taken by the *Ariadne*, 20, A. Farquhar (Home station).—20. *The Venus*, 32, H. Matine, (Leeward Island station,) captured the French privateer schooner *L'Etoile*, of 6 guns, two of which were thrown overboard, and 54 men. *Le Ragoten* French schooner, 8 guns, 29 men, taken by the *Carrier* cutter, 10, Lieut. R. Ramsey (Home station).—25. Capt. Dacres fell in with the *Mediator*, 36, Capt. Wise, with whom he consulted, and having taken him under his orders, determined to send the captured vessel into Samana, under her former colours, to disguise the *Bacchante* as a prize, and the *Mediator* as a neutral, which stratagem so completely deceived them, that they got through the intricate navigation of the harbour, and anchored within half a mile of the fort, before the enemy discovered the mistake, who opened a fire upon them from the fort, which, after a cannonade of four hours from the ships, was carried by storm, by the seamen and marines of both ships, landed under the command of Capt. Wise, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry from the whole range of batteries. Seven of these brave men were wounded. *Busy* cutter, Richard Kelly, 12, B. 1797, upset on the Halifax station, and lost, with all her crew. *Atalanta* sloop, Lieut. John Bowker, (acting,) 16, T. 1797, lost off Rochefort; crew saved, but part made prisoners.

March 1. Blenheim, Rear-Admiral Sir T. Troubridge, Bart., Capt. Austen Bessell, 74, B. 1761. Red. 1801. Missing since February, after experiencing some tremendous gales off Table Bay. (See Obituary.) The boats of the *Glutton*, 60, T. Secombe, (Mediterranean station,) under the orders of Lieut. E. Watson, covered by the *Herondelle* brig, 16, surprised and captured in the port of Sigri, a Turkish ship of 10 guns, formerly a French corvette of 16 guns. Lieut. Watson and 4 marines were killed, and 4 seamen and 5 marines wounded.—2. *Pigmy* cutter, Lieut. Higginson, 12, B. 1806; lost off Rochefort; officers and crew saved, but taken.—3. Sir J. T. Duckworth's squadron passed Point Pesquies and the castles in safety. The Turks had been incessantly occupied in adding to the number of their forts. The fire of the two inner castles had, in going up, been severe; but the effects in returning were doubly formidable; in short, had they been allowed another week to complete their defences throughout the channel, it would have been a very doubtful point whether the squadron could have returned at all. *Blanche*, Sir T. Lavin, 38, T. 1801; lost off Ushant in the night; 45 of the crew perished; the rest were captured.—6. Court Martial on board the *Gladiator*, lying in Portsmouth Harbour, for the trial of Captain Sir Home Popham †, for having withdrawn, without orders, the naval force from the Cape of Good Hope; and undertaken the expedition to the Rio de la Plata. Adjudged to be severely reprimanded.—9. *Crafty* F. schooner, Lieut. R. Spencer, 12, T. 1804; taken by three privateers of far superior force in the Straits of Gibraltar.—20. Alexandria, (Egypt,) surrendered to the British arms. The military force was under the command of Major-General Fraser, (see *Military Annals*); and the naval under that of Capt. Hallowell, of the *Tigre*, 80. Little opposition being made, the British sustained a loss of only 16 killed and wounded. One Turkish frigate of 40 brass guns, another of 34; and a corvette of 16 brass guns, were captured in the harbour.—27. *The Scout* (sloop,) 18, W. Raitt, (Mediterranean station,) drove on shore near Cape Plata, in the Strait of Gibraltar, the Spanish felucca privateer *Admiral*, of Tariffa, of 10 guns and 100 men. *Cæsar*, (F. brig,) 10, T. 1806; driven on shore on the coast of La Gironde; crew lost except 45.—31. *Ferreter*, (gun-brig,) Lieut. H. Weir, 14, B. 1801, taken by seven Dutch gun-boats, in the night, after many of the crew had been killed.

\* The shot which they fired were granite, and of a prodigious weight. The main-mast of the *Windsor Castle* was more than three-quarters cut through by one of 800lbs. weight. The result of the action off Point Pesquies was, the burning of 1 ship of the line of 64 guns, 4 frigates, 3 corvettes, 1 brig, 2 gun-boats; captured, 1 corvette and 1 gun-boat. The total loss sustained by the squadron was, 48 killed, 236 wounded; and 4 missing.

† See *Annals of the Navy*, 29th June, 1806, published in this Journal for August, 1831.

‡ On the 23d September following, the British evacuated Egypt, and returned to Sicily. The expedition to Alexandria was generally censured, as it tended to throw the Turks into the hands of the French. The situation of Alexandria would have given a pretext to Bonaparte to send an army to Egypt, in conjunction with the Turks, for our expulsion; and it would have been madness to attempt any permanent conquest and advantageous establishment in Egypt in spite of both French and Turks.

RECORD OF THE SERVICES OF THE TWENTY-THIRD REGIMENT,  
OR ROYAL WELSH FUSILEERS \*.

On the 5th of March Marshal Massena broke up from his cantonments at Santarem, and put his army in motion for the frontiers of Portugal. The allied army was immediately ordered in pursuit. The 4th division formed part of a force which was sent in the direction of Thomar, under the orders of Marshal Beresford, who, on the 12th, came up with a strong rear-guard of the enemy at Redinka. It was immediately attacked, and after a sharp contest driven in on the main body of the army.

Lord Wellington now determined to detach a considerable portion of his army to lay siege to Badajoz, which about this time fell into the hands of the French, and the 4th division was ordered on this service, the execution of which was entrusted to Marshal Beresford.

The Welsh Fusileers having quitted the main army marched by Thomar, and on the 18th of March crossed the Tagus at Taacos. A bridge having been constructed with some difficulty, the division crossed the Guadiana, and on the 9th of April arrived before Olivença, which they were directed to besiege. General Cole sat down before the place on the 11th, and on the 15th, when the breaching battery was completed, sent a flag of truce into the town, offering favourable terms in case of an immediate surrender. No answer was returned, and the batteries opened their fire. A breach was soon effected, when the governor, apprehensive of an assault, made an unconditional surrender of the town, and the garrison, consisting of 370 men, marched out prisoners of war.

Soon after this event Lord Wellington arrived in the neighbourhood of Badajoz and having reconnoitred the place, gave orders for the immediate commencement of the siege. The fortress was completely invested on the 8th of May, and the operations of the siege carried on with little effect till the 14th, when Marshal Beresford having received intelligence of the march of Marshal Soult from Seville with a strong force to raise the siege, broke up from before the place, and advanced to Valverde. The 4th division was left to cover the removal of the stores to Elvas, a service which was so completely effected, that not a single article fell into the hands of the enemy.

As the position of Valverde left Badajoz completely open, Marshal Beresford, on the 15th, moved his army to the heights of Albuera, where he resolved to give battle. The fourth division joined on the morning of the 16th, only about half an hour before the commencement of the action, and formed, with a brigade of Portuguese, the second line of the British and Portuguese army; the Spanish troops under Generals Blake and Castanos forming in two lines the right of the allied army. About eight o'clock in the morning the enemy was observed to be in motion: a strong body of cavalry, and two heavy columns of infantry issued from the woods in front of the position, and moved on the bridge and village of Albuera. Meanwhile, Soult, with the main body of his army, crossed the river considerably above the position, and having taken possession of the heights on the right, attacked and drove the Spaniards from their ground, and formed his line so as to rake that of the allies nearly at right angles. In order to dislodge the enemy from this commanding position which he had thus gained, General Cole was ordered to form his division in an oblique line in rear of the right, with his now right thrown back, and an ineffectual attempt was made to induce the Spanish troops to advance. Major-General Stewart's division now arrived from the centre of the line, passed through the Spaniards and attacked the heights. At this period of the action a heavy storm of rain, added to the smoke of the guns, obscured the atmosphere so much, that the leading brigade of this division, while in the act of deploying, was attacked by a body of Polish Lancers, when two regiments were unfortunately broken and cut to pieces. Major-General Houghton's brigade next arrived, and sustained the contest for some time with the greatest gallantry, but the enemy's artillery and musquetry spread havoc through their ranks, while a deep gully in their front prevented the British from using their bayonets. At this crisis the 4th division was ordered to advance, and General Cole in person led the Fusileer brigade up the heights.

"Such a gallant line issuing from the midst of smoke, and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy's heavy masses,

\* Concluded from p. 136.

which were increasing and pressing forward as to an assured victory; they wavered, hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape, from all their artillery, whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed; Cole, and the three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkeshaw, fell wounded; and the Fusilier battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult, by voice and gesture animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately on friends and foes, while the horsemen, hovering on the flanks, threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their order,—their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in front; their measured tread shook the ground; their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation; their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot, and with a horrid carnage, it was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack, to the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the struggling multitude, endeavour to sustain the fight; their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion; and the mighty mass gliding way, like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and fifteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill.\*

The loss of the Welsh Fusiliers in this desperate conflict was severe. Captain Montague, and Lieut. Revis Hall†, one serjeant, and seventy-three rank and file killed; Lieut.-Colonel Ellis, Captains Hurford, M'Donald, and Stainforth, Lieutenants Harrison, Treeve, Booker, Thorpe, Castles, Harris, Ledwith, and M'Lellan, 12 serjeants, one drummer, 232 rank and file wounded, and one serjeant and five rank and file missing: Capt. M'Donald, and Lieut. Castles died of their wounds. So numerous were the casualties among the officers and serjeants, that Capt. Stainforth's company was at the conclusion of the action commanded by a corporal‡.

About three o'clock in the afternoon both armies resumed the positions they had respectively occupied in the morning, and remained in them during the 17th. On the morning of the 18th Soult retired towards Seville, pursued for some distance by the allied cavalry, though far inferior in numbers.

On the retreat of the French the siege of Badajoz was resumed, and the place again completely invested on the 25th of May, under the immediate superintendence of Lord Wellington. Two additional divisions arrived from the northern army to assist, and the 4th division was stationed at Almandralejo to cover the operations. These were continued till the 10th of June, when Lord Wellington determined on converting the siege into a blockade, and removed the stores to Elvas, himself taking post at Albuera. As the forces, however, which were moving upon Badajoz proved to be greatly superior in number to the allies, his lordship retired across the Guadiana, and placed the army in position on the Caza, with the right protected by the fortress of Elvas.

The army continued in this position till the middle of July, when the French corps, which were opposed to it, having separated, the 4th division marched to the north, and joined the main army, which was occupied in blockading Ciudad Rodrigo. Towards the end of September, Marshal Marbont having been joined by the corps of General Doreene, advanced to raise the blockade, and Lord Wellington withdrew on the 25th to the heights of Fuente Guinaldo. The 4th division having been as a rear-guard at Aldea de Ponte, this village was attacked on the 27th by the French advanced guard, which twice succeeded in gaining possession of it, and was as often repulsed by the gallant division, who remained masters of the disputed

\* Col. Napier's History of the Peninsular War.

† This young officer had not yet completed his seventeenth year, when he was thus prematurely cut off from his country and connexions. He had borne the King's colour of his regiment throughout the engagement, and it was not until its termination—even when the roar of battle had given place to the shouts of victory—that a stray shot struck him on the forehead, the effects of which proved mortal. This slight tribute will, it is hoped, be excused to a brother's memory.—ASST.-ED,

‡ Thomas Robinson.

post, which they maintained till night, when they fell back to Soito. Lord Wellington having asked Major-General Pakenham for a "stop-gap regiment" to cover the retreat of the division, the latter replied, "That he had already placed the Welsh Fusiliers there." "Ah!" said his lordship, "that is the very thing."

In these affairs Captain Van Coutland was killed, and Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel Pearson, commanding the light companies of the brigade, and Captain Cane severely wounded.

Lord Wellington awaited the enemy in the position of Soito; but Marmont, satisfied with the sample he already had of the prowess of his opponents, declined an engagement, and retired to Ciudad Rodrigo. The allies went into cantonments on the frontiers of Portugal.

While in quarters, the troops were employed under the direction of the engineers, in preparing large quantities of fascines and gabions, which they were soon summoned to employ in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

As the 4th division contributed to this brilliant affair only by taking its turn of duty in the trenches,—in which the Royal Welsh suffered a loss of 17 rank and file killed and wounded,—it may be sufficient to state, that the ground was broken on the night of the 8th of January, 1812, and that on the 19th of the same month the place was taken by storm; a rapidity of operation which Marmont, (who was approaching somewhat hastily to its relief,) declared to be quite incomprehensible.

Having repaired the works of Ciudad Rodrigo, and placed a Spanish garrison in it, Lord Wellington next turned his attention to Badajoz. The preparations for the siege of this fortress had been carried on with extraordinary secrecy, and were completed about the beginning of March. The army broke up from its cantonments in the neighbourhood of Almeida, and marching with the greatest rapidity, arrived before Badajoz on the 16th of that month, when the place was invested by the 3d, 4th, and light divisions. On the 6th of April, three breaches were considered practicable, and orders were issued for the assault. The storming of the breaches in the face of the bastion of "La Trinidad," and in the curtain between that bastion and that of Sta. Maria, was assigned to the 4th division, led by Major-General the Honourable Charles Colville.

The troops destined for this service issued from the works at 9 o'clock at night; when on the glacis they were discovered by the enemy, who poured a heavy fire upon them; they, nevertheless, advanced in good order to the covered way, which they entered at various points where the palisades had been broken by the fire of the besiegers. Bags of hay were now thrown into the ditch to lessen its depth; and on these the men jumped down, or descended by the ladders. The ditch was now filled with men, and the enemy exploded an incredible number of fougasses, shells, and other combustibles, which they had arranged along the foot of the breach, and in the ditch: their effect was in the highest degree appalling, as well as destructive, and naturally created some confusion among the assailants. In the midst of this fire, smoke, and noise, three flank companies of the 4th division, that were intended for the attack of the breach, in the curtain, mounted an unfinished ravelin in front of it, conceiving it to be the breach itself. They soon discovered their mistake; but being now exposed to a musketry fire from the whole of the front attacked, and seeing a difficult descent, before they could reach the foot of the breach, they halted, and returned the fire of the garrison. At this crisis the light division, which was to have stormed the breach in the bastion of Sta. Maria, being led too much to the right, joined these flank companies of the 4th division on the summit of the ravelin, and considerably increased the confusion. Order was at length restored, and these troops were conducted to the real points of attack. In the meantime the columns of the 4th division moved on to the attack of the breach, "La Trinidad," without firing a shot; but from want of sufficient ladders, there was no formation of the troops to make them advance as a machine. Only the bravest, prompted by their individual gallantry, or those nearest the spot, followed their officers; and the enemy was found to be so well prepared, that notwithstanding the most heroic and persevering efforts of the assailants, no lodgement could be effected on the breach. As the men ascended, the besieged rolled down upon them an astonishing quantity of loaded shells, and exploded a variety of other combustibles which had been previously arranged on the face of the breach. Several officers and men reached the summit, and grappled with the *chevaux-de-frise* with which it was guarded; but being unable to force over them, they were much cut and bayoneted in their attempts to remove them; and finally, driven down the breach with great slaughter. Though thus repulsed in repeated assaults by the

seemingly inexhaustible combustibles of the enemy, not an individual attempted to withdraw from the scene of carnage; but all remained patiently to be slaughtered in the ditch. Lord Wellington, however, hearing of the state of affairs, ordered the divisions to be withdrawn, and to be formed again for a renewal of the assault a little before daylight. The success of the 3d and 5th divisions in escalading the castle and the bastion of San Vicente, however, obviated the necessity of any ulterior measures,—the British were already masters of Badajoz.

The loss of the Welsh Fusileers during the siege and in the assault was,—Captain Maw and Lieutenant Collins, 3 sergeants, and 19 rank and file killed. Lieut.-Colonel Ellis, Captains Potter, Leahy, Stainforth, and Hawtyn—Lieutenants Farmer, Johnson, Harrison, George Brown, Walley, Brownson, Walker, Tucker Fielding, Holmes, Llewellyn, and Wyngate—7 sergeants, 1 drummer, and 84 rank and file wounded; of whom, Captain Potter and Lieutenant Llewellyn died of their wounds; 1 sergeant and 19 rank and file missing. With the exception of Lieut.-Colonel Ellis and Potter, all the officers were killed and wounded on the night of the assault, when in consequence of Colonel Ellis's wound, the battalion was commanded by Captain Leahy.

Major-General Colville was severely wounded, and carried from the breach by Serjeant James Ingram, of the Welsh Fusileers, who is still in the regiment.

After the fall of Badajoz, the army marched to the North; and on the 16th of June, arrived at Salamanca. Marmont retired on their approach, leaving garrisons in some forts which commanded the Tormes at that place. The allies crossed the river by the fords above and below the town; and while the 6th division besieged the forts, the remainder were held in readiness to oppose the main body of the enemy, who still attempted to keep up a communication with them. On the 20th, Marmont appeared in front of the position of San Christoval, and made a strong demonstration with his cavalry on the plain; but after a pretty warm skirmish, retired again. Lieutenant Leonard, of the Welsh Fusileers, while looking at the affair was killed by a chance shot from a great distance. The forts being taken on the 27th, the French retired to the Douro; but being soon reinforced, resumed the offensive, and obliged our army to retire in turn. These movements continued several weeks, each General narrowly watching his adversary, and holding himself in readiness to attack, on the commission of any important fault. Such an opportunity presented itself on the 22d of July, on the plains of Salamanca, and Lord Wellington hastened to avail himself of it. The attack was made against the centre and left of the enemy. On the former point the resistance was obstinate. The 4th division advanced to the attack in line, exposed to a very accurate fire of grape, round, &c: they carried two positions in the most gallant style,—but the most determined valour must yield to numbers. They were opposed to Bonnet's division, about 10,000 strong,—got intermixed with the lines of the enemy, who involved them,—deployed on the left flank of the Portuguese brigade of the division, and finally, compelled them to retrograde about four hundred yards: here they re-formed, and being joined by their supports, the 6th division renewed the attack with complete success.

The victory of Salamanca cost the regiment, Major Offley, and 9 rank and file killed; Lieut.-Colonel Ellis, Major Dalmer, Lieutenants Enoch, M'Donald, Fryer, and Clyde, and 84 rank and file wounded.

The enemy being now driven across the Douro, Lord Wellington marched upon Madrid, where the army arrived on the 12th of August. Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm with which they were received by the inhabitants of the capital; thousands came forth to meet them, bearing branches of laurel and other emblems of triumph. All business was suspended in the city,—the streets were strewn with flowers,—and the houses decorated as on occasions of the greatest festivity. Bull-fights and other public amusements were exhibited for their entertainment.

From this scene of gaiety and dissipation, the regiment removed to the Escorial, where it remained till the retreat of the army to the frontiers of Portugal, in consequence of the failure of an attack on the castle of Burgos, and the approach of Soult, with his army, from Andalusia, and of Clausel, with the troops that had been beaten at Salamanca.

The Welsh Fusileers reached Soutilla, on the banks of the Douro, on the 5th of December, so reduced by eleven months of incessant service, that they were about this time formed into six divisions of twelve files each. In the course of the winter a few men joined from the second battalion; but the regiment commenced the campaign of 1813, with only three hundred effective men; most of these, how-

ever, were hardy and experienced veterans, and all were newly clothed, and in the highest state of equipment.

The army did not take the field this year till the middle of May, when it advanced and drove the enemy from his position on the Douro; following him up without intermission, as far as Vittoria, where, on the 21st of June, a general action was fought, which terminated in the total defeat of the French, commanded by King Joseph; the intruder himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner. On this occasion the Welsh Fusileers did not come in immediate collision with the enemy. Lieutenant Sidley was wounded, and 4 men killed, in driving the French across the Zadorra, on the 19th.

In consequence of this decisive victory, the whole of the French, with the exception of the garrisons of San Sebastian and Pampluna, evacuated the Spanish territory, and retired across the Pyrenees. The blockade of Pampluna was entrusted to the Spaniards; the 4th division covering them in front of the pass of Roncesvalles. On the 25th of July, Marshal Soult, who now commanded the French army, made his appearance in the pass, with a very superior force; and the division, after an obstinate resistance, was compelled to retire to a strong position in the rear, which the enemy did not venture to attack. On the two following days, the enemy continued to advance in great force; and the allied army, which was now concentrated to protect the blockade of Pampluna, fell back on that fortress, near which, on the 28th, both armies appeared in order of battle.

The chief efforts of the enemy during this day, were directed against the position occupied by the 4th division, which was engaged in a contest second only to that of Albuera, in severity. "The battle of the 28th, was a beautiful display of military manœuvres; the enemy formed his columns in the most perfect order, and advanced to the attack with a rapidity and impetus, apparently irresistible. I was in immediate support of the 7th cacadores (Portuguese), who were the advanced piquet, and consequently received the first shock of the enemy's column. My people only thought of fighting, and at once checked their progress. Our supports on both sides were brought up, and the contest continued with varying success till four o'clock, when the enemy withdrew, only leaving his voltigeurs in our front. We had three divisions upon us,—the 4th, 5th, and 7th; the two former were chiefly opposed to the 40th, who made two unheard of charges; indeed, the whole day was a succession of charges.\*" "In the course of this contest," says Lord Wellington, "the gallant 4th division, which had been so frequently distinguished in this army, surpassed their former good conduct†. Every regiment charged with the bayonet; and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23d, four different times." Their officers set them the example; and Major-General Ross, commanding the brigade, had a horse killed under him.

On the 28th, Captains Stainforth and Walker were killed; and Lieut.-Colonel Ellis, Lieutenants the Honourable John Neville, Harris, Brice, and Adjutant McLellan, wounded. "The battalion," says Colonel Ellis, "has only the semblance of one. I commenced the action of the 25th, with only 254; so with the loss of 105 in action, sick, and attendants on the wounded, I am reduced to 160 bayonets. On the morning of the 30th, when formed for the pursuit of Soult, I only stood 121; and by the 2d of August, I was reduced to 108."

On the 29th, both armies remained inactive; but on the 30th, the enemy was observed to be in motion. He was instantly attacked, and compelled totally to abandon a position which Lord Wellington declared to be one of the strongest and most difficult of access ever occupied by troops. On the 2d of August, the French were once more driven through the passes of the Pyrenees, into their own territory.

The siege of San Sebastian, which had been suspended on the advance of Soult to the relief of Pampluna, was now resumed. On the 31st of August, the breach was carried by assault; the storming party consisting of volunteers from the different divisions of the army,—those of the Welsh Fusileers were commanded by Lieutenant Griffiths, who was among the wounded.

After the fall of San Sebastian, the hostile armies remained for some time inactive, or occupied only in strengthening their respective positions, and preparing for the further prosecution of the campaign. The troops, however, suffered severely from the inclemency of the weather. Exposed on the bleak summits of the

\* Letter of Lieut.-Col. Ellis to Capt. now Lieut.-Col. Harrison.

† Col. Ellis, in the letter above-quoted, feelingly laments that his Lordship had not witnessed the conduct of the regiment in the battle of Albuera, which he declares is "still without a parallel."



Pyrenees, they gazed with intense longing on the beautiful plains of France, which lay stretched out beneath their feet. The close neighbourhood of a watchful enemy, rendered the greatest vigilance necessary, and the duties were severe.

The moment so ardently desired at length arrived. Early on the morning of the 7th of October, the army, under favour of a dark and stormy sky, descended from the heights, crossed the Bidassoa, and established itself on the French territory, with little opposition from the enemy. The continued inclemency of the weather, and the badness of the roads, retarded the further advance of the army till the 10th of November, when all preparations being completed, the columns moved down the passes of the Pyrenees in the most perfect silence, and lay down, each at its appointed station, to await the dawn of day to make their attack. This was commenced by the 4th division, which carried a strong redoubt in front of the village of Sarre, drove the enemy from that village, and continued its advance against the heights in its rear, exposed to the fire of intrenchments by which the position was secured. These, however, were successively abandoned as the division advanced, the enemy flying in great disorder, towards the bridges on the Nivelle; the garrison of one redoubt, which alone offered any resistance, were made prisoners. The other attacks were all equally successful, and terminated in Soult withdrawing the whole of his army, and resigning his position to the allies; who now went into cantonments in advance of the Nivelle, where they were permitted another interval of repose.

On the 9th of December, the army was again in motion, and attacked the enemy's position on the Nive; on that and the four following days, a severe contest was maintained by the hostile forces, in which each was in turn the assailant. The flanks of the position were the contested points; and the 4th division, which was in the centre, was not immediately engaged; but it had much severe duty in marching to the support of either flank, as they were successively engaged.

On the 11th, two battalions of Nassau troops, having heard of the liberation of their country from the yoke of Napoleon, deserted from the French, and were received by Lieut.-Colonel Ellis, who then commanded the brigade.

After the passage of the Nive, the army again went into cantonments; the Welsh Fusiliers, at Ustaritz, where they remained till the middle of February, 1814, when they again took the field, and drove the enemy through a most difficult and intersected country; till on the 27th of February he took up a strong position at Orthes, where he determined to await the issue of a battle. The attack was commenced by General Cole, with the 4th division, carrying the village of St. Boe's, after an obstinate struggle. Marshal Beresford, who directed the movements of this part of the line, next turned his attention to two lines of the enemy posted on the heights above; the only approach to these, lay along a narrow tongue of ground, flanked on either side by a deep ravine, and completely exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery. In this confined situation it was impossible to deploy; and so destructive was the action of the enemy's guns on the columns, that notwithstanding the most gallant and persevering efforts of the 4th division, it was impossible to gain the heights. By a powerful attack in flank, however, the enemy was at length driven from the position, and forced to retreat with precipitation, pursued by the cavalry, who made many prisoners.

Captains Wynore and Jolliffe, and Lieutenant Harris, were severely wounded; and 50 men killed and wounded.

By the 10th of April the whole army had crossed the Garonne; and an immediate attack on the enemy's position, under the walls of Toulouse, being resolved on, it was begun by the 4th division, which, having driven the enemy from the village of Mont Blanc, proceeded in open columns along the front of the position, till they gained the extreme right, when they wheeled up, and advanced in line, overcoming all resistance, and forcing the enemy from the heights, and beyond their entrenchments. Here they waited for the artillery, which, owing to the badness of the roads and the rapidity of the advance, had been left behind. As soon as the artillery came up, they continued their advance along the ridge, following up their success, till the enemy, repulsed on all points, was compelled to take refuge within the walls of Toulouse.

The regiment was not much exposed to musketry in this action, but was under a heavy cannonade the whole day. The casualties did not exceed eight men killed and wounded.

After this battle the regiment marched to Langon, near Bourdeaux, where it was stationed during the whole of the month of May. On the 1st of June, they marched for Blancfort, where they arrived on the 6th, and embarked on board the

Egmont, 74, disembarked on the 26th at Plymouth, from whence they soon after marched to Gosport.

For their services during the Peninsular war, the Royal Welsh were permitted to bear on their colours and appointments, the words "Albuera," "Badajoz," "Salamanca," "Vittoria," "Pyrenees," "Nivelle," "Orthes," "Toulouse," "Peninsula."

Lieut.-Colonel Ellis, who had been promoted (4th June, 1814) to the rank of Colonel by Brevet, was appointed a Knight Commander of the Bath, and received the honorary distinctions of a Cross, and one Clasp. Lieut.-Colonel Sutton, also Colonel by Brevet, and Knight Commander of the Bath, a Cross and three Clasps, for his services in the Portuguese army. Lieut.-Colonel Pearson, a Medal. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Dalmer, a Medal, and one Clasp. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Hill, attached to the Portuguese army, a Cross. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Hurford, a Medal, and one Clasp. Captain Leahy, who commanded the regiment at the storming of Badajoz, a Medal.

On the 25th of October, this year, the second battalion was reduced, when 26 sergeants, 21 corporals, 23 drummers, and 377 privates, were transferred to the first battalion, which now mustered upwards of 1000 rank and file. Of these, however, many of the veterans of Holland, Egypt, Martinique, and the Peninsula, and some limited service men, were soon after discharged.

On the return of Napoleon from Elba, the regiment was again ordered on service, and embarked on the 23d of March, 1815. On the 30th they disembarked at Ostend, and immediately proceeded in canal-boats to Bruges, from whence they marched to Ghent, and subsequently to Lessines, where they were attached to the 4th division, commanded by Lieut.-General the Honourable Sir Charles Colville.

On the 24th of April the battalion marched to Grammont, where it remained, with the intermission of a few days, till the 15th of June, when the troops were hastily summoned from their cantonments in consequence of the advance of the French army, commanded by the Emperor in person. The Welsh Fusiliers marched with the greatest expedition during the whole of the 16th and 17th, and arrived late in the evening of the latter day, at Braine la Leude, in the neighbourhood of which they bivouacked in a wheat-field, under torrents of rain.

The station of the 4th division, on the memorable 18th of June, was the reserve; and during the early part of the day, the regiment was merely exposed to a distant cannonade, from which it suffered no loss. The light companies of the brigade were, however, engaged, and lost some men.

As the day advanced, Sir Henry Ellis perceiving an opening where his regiment might be employed with advantage, moved it up into the line; where, formed in square, it sustained several charges of the French cuirassiers. The greater number of the men were now, for the first time, in presence of an enemy; but these emulated the steadiness of their veteran comrades, and all nobly maintained the character of their regiment.

The glories of the day were, however, dearly purchased by the Welsh Fusiliers with the life of their beloved commander, Sir Henry Ellis, who, continuing on horseback in the centre of the square, was struck with a musket ball in the right breast. Feeling himself faint from loss of blood, he calmly desired an opening might be made in the square, and rode to the rear. At a short distance from the field he was thrown from his horse while in the act of leaping a ditch; here he was found soon afterwards, much exhausted, and conveyed to a neighbouring out-house, where his wound was dressed. In the course of the night of the 19th, the hovel in which he was lodged unfortunately caught fire, and he was with difficulty rescued from the flames by Assistant-Surgeon Munro, of the regiment; but exhausted by so many shocks, he soon after expired\*.

The other casualties were, Brevet-Major Hawtyn, Captains Jolliffe and Farmer, Lieutenant Fenshaw, 2 sergeants, and 9 rank and file killed. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, Captain Johnson, Lieutenants Fielding, Griffiths, Clyde, and Sidley, 7 sergeants, and 71 rank and file wounded. Lieutenant Clyde died of his wounds.

After this brilliant and decisive victory, the allied army advanced rapidly on the French capital. On the 24th, the 4th division arrived before Cambray, which they took possession of on the same day: the Welsh Fusiliers entering by an old breach near the Port du Paris, with the loss of Lieut. Leebody, and one private killed. The citadel having surrendered on the following day, the division resumed its march on Paris on the 26th, and on the 1st of July encamped on the plain of St. Denis.

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\* The officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the regiment, have commemorated their affection and esteem for their distinguished leader, by erecting

Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir Lowry Cole, having now joined the army, the Welsh Fusileers were, at his request, transferred to the 6th division, in which they were again brigaded with the Royal Fusileers, their associates in so many victories.

The regiment remained under the command of the Lieutenant-General, in Major-General Kempt's brigade, till October, 1818, when the British troops were withdrawn from France.

On their return from France, the Welsh Fusileers served in Ireland till December, 1823, when they embarked for Gibraltar \*. In January, 1827, they joined the expedition to Portugal, under Lieutenant-General Sir William Clinton; and in March, 1828, returned to Gibraltar, where they are now serving.

a monument to his memory, in the Cathedral of Worcester, his native city. The following is the inscription :—

In Memory of  
Colonel Sir Henry Walton Ellis, K.C.B.,  
A native of this city,  
Who, at an early age, entered the 23d Regiment,  
Or, Royal Welsh Fusileers,  
Then commanded by his father, Major-General John Joyner Ellis,  
And afterwards led on to honourable distinction by himself, during seven years of  
unexampled military renown;  
Having received eight wounds, and rendered services as important as they were  
brilliant,  
In Holland, Egypt, the West Indies, America, Spain, Portugal, and France,  
He fell by a musket-shot at the head of his Regiment,  
Almost in the glorious moment which announced victory to Great Britain, and  
Peace to Europe, on the memorable Plains of  
Waterloo.  
He died of his wounds on the 20th of June, 1815, aged 32 years.  
His loss was lamented, and his worth recorded, by his illustrious Commander,  
Wellington,  
In words that will perish only with history itself.  
This Monument was erected  
By the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the Royal Welsh Fusileers,  
As a Tribute of their respect and affection to the Memory of a Leader,  
Not more distinguished for Valour and conduct in the Field,  
Than beloved for every Generous and Social Virtue.

Extract from His Grace the Duke of Wellington's despatch, dated Orville, 29th June, 1815:—

"Your lordship will see in the inclosed lists, the names of some valuable officers lost to his Majesty's service. Among these I cannot avoid to mention Col. Cameron, of the 92d, and Colonel Sir Henry Ellis, of the 23d regiments, to whose conduct I have frequently drawn your lordship's attention, and who at last fell, distinguishing themselves at the head of the brave troops which they commanded.

"Notwithstanding the glory of the occasion, it is impossible not to lament such men, both on account of the public and as friends."

\* Adjutant-General's Office, Dublin, 24th November, 1823.

G. O.

The 23d Royal Welsh Fusileers being on the point of embarkation for a foreign station, Lieutenant-General Lord Combermere feels he cannot, in too strong terms, express his approval of the general good conduct and discipline of this superb regiment, during the time it has been under his orders.

The 23d, so eminently distinguished for its services in the field, has been uniformly conspicuous in this command for its soldierlike appearance and behaviour; and from the ample opportunity the Lieutenant-General has had of personal observation, he is enabled to bear testimony to the merits of the system—evincing throughout the corps the greatest zeal, energy, and talent on the part of Colonel Pearson, as well as unremitting attention on the part of all under his command.

By command of the Lieutenant-General,

(Signed) J. GARDINER, D.-A.-General.

W. HARRISON, Lieut.-Col., 23d Fusileers.

## PRIZE MONEY.

PRIZES ADVERTISED FOR PAYMENT IN THE LONDON GAZETTES, AS REPORTED TO THE TREASURER OF THE NAVY, DOWN TO THE 18TH DECEMBER, 1832.

## WAR OF 1793.

Fox, Hd. Ad. Cr.; King George, Hd. Ad. Cr.; Nautilus, and Sea Gull, for Kleyne Syervier, capt. 2 July, 97.—Pay 19 Dec. 32.—Agts. W. and E. Chard, 3, Clifford's Inn, Fleet-street.

## WAR OF 1803.

Aurora, for St. Domingo, capt. 6 July, 09.—Pay 30 Oct. 32.—Agt. J. P. Muspratt, 9, New Broad-street.

Ballahou, for La Rhone, capt. 4 Aug. 07.—Pay 19 Dec. 32.—Agts. W. and E. Chard, 3, Clifford's Inn.

Castor, for Le Minuit, capt. 22 Jan. 14.—Pay 10 Oct. 32.—Agts. ditto.

Desirée, for L'Espérance, capt. 17 July, 13.—Pay 9 Oct. 32.—Agts. Cooke and Halford, 41, Norfolk-street, Strand.

Dryad and her Tender, Black Joke, for Frasnquita, capt. 15 Feb. 32.—Pay 8 Dec. 32.—Agts. F. M. Onmanney and Son, 22, Norfolk-street, Strand.

Fleur de la Mer, for St. Domingo, capt. 6 July, 09.—Pay 20 Oct. 32.—Agt. J. P. Muspratt, 9, New Broad-Street.

Griffin, for ditto, capt. ditto.—Pay ditto.—Agt. ditto.

Laura, for La Rhone, capt. 4 Aug. 07.—Pay 19 Dec. 32.—Agts. W. and E. Chard, 3, Clifford's Inn.

Lark, for St. Domingo, capt. 6th July, 09.—Pay 30 Oct. 32.—Agt. J. P. Muspratt, 9, Broad-street.

Moselle, for ditto, capt. ditto.—Pay ditto.—Agt. ditto.

Monkey, for Charles of Boston, capt. 1 May, 32.—Pay 22 Oct. 32.—Agts. Maude and Co. Great George-street, Westminster.

Maidstone, for Heroína, capt. 17 Oct. 26.—Pay 11 Dec. 32.—Agts. Evans and Eyton, 7, Northumberland-street.

Prospero, for name unknown, capt. 17 Feb. 11.—Pay 9 Oct. 32.—Agts. Cooke and Halford, 41, Norfolk-street, Strand.

Polyphemus, for St. Domingo capt. 6 July, 09.—Pay 30 Oct. 32.—Agt. J. P. Muspratt, 9, New Broad-street.

Pike, for ditto, capt. ditto.—Pay ditto.—Agt. ditto.

Sparrow, for ditto, capt. ditto.—Pay ditto.—Agt. ditto.

Tweed, for ditto, capt. ditto.—Pay ditto.—Agt. ditto.

Thrush, for ditto, capt. ditto.—Pay ditto.—Agt. ditto.

Tuscan, for Elba, capt. 3 July, 15.—Pay 9 Oct. 32.—Agts. Cooke and Halford, 41, Norfolk-street, Strand.

## GENERAL ORDERS, CIRCULARS, &amp;c. &amp;c.

## ARMY.

War Office, 24th Dec. 1832.

SIR,—The King having been pleased, by his royal warrant of the 18th inst., to fix certain rates of allowances, as specified in the annexed schedule, for the provision of fuel, candles, straw, and wood for his troops in Ireland, in places where those articles cannot be supplied in kind, under the directions of the Board of Ordnance, in lieu of the rates mentioned in the schedule No. 3, attached to his Majesty's Warrant of 31st Dec. 1830, I have to acquaint you therewith, and to request that all charges for these allowances, liable to be made in the public accounts of the regiment under your command, from and after the first day of the ensuing month, may be governed accordingly.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

JOHN HOBHOUSE.

Officer commanding — Regt. of —.

Schedule referred to in the Secretary at War's Circular Letter of the 24th Dec. 1832.

Rates of Allowances for the provision of Fuel, Candles, Straw, and Wood, in Ireland, at places where those Articles cannot be supplied in kind by the Ordnance Department.

		Daily Rate.			
		Summer.		Winter.	
		From 1st April to 30th Sept.	From 1st Oct. to 31st Mar.	From 1st April to 30th Sept.	From 1st Oct. to 31st Mar.
Allowances to Officers and Men.	Field Officers; each . . .	s. d. s. d.			
	Other Commissioned Officers, each . . .	0 4 0 10			
	Sergeants of Cavalry, and Sergeant-Major, and Quarter-Master	0 2 0 5			
	Sergeant of Infantry, each . . . . .	0 1 0 2 1/2			
	Other ranks { Cavalry of . . . . . Infantry	0 0 1/2 0 1 0 1/2			
Allowances for Officers' Mess, or separate Cooking ..	For more than three Officers . . . . .	0 4 0 10			
	For three or two do. . . .	0 3 0 5			
	For one do. . . . .	0 2 0 0			
	For an Officer's Guard . .	0 2 1 0			
	For a Non-commissioned Officer's Guard . .	0 1 0 6			

War-Office, 26th Dec. 1832.

SIR,—I am directed by the Secretary at War to annex for your information and

guidance, a statement of the daily rates of allowances to General and other Staff-Officers, and to Field and Staff-Officers of infantry regiments, in lieu of forage for the horses required to be kept by them for the public service, for the half year from the 1st July, to the 31st December, 1832, agreeably to which the charges for forage will be allowed.

I am directed to add, that if a charge at a different rate has been already made in your accounts, the same should be corrected according to the said statement.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

L. SULLIVAN.

Paymaster of the —

Statement of the Daily Rates of Allowance in lieu of Forage, for the period from the 1st of July to the 31st of December, 1832.

GREAT BRITAIN.			IRELAND.		
Rate of Allowance.			Rate of Allowance.		
COUNTIES.	s.	d.	COUNTIES.	s.	d.
Berks.....	1	9	Antrim.....	1	
Corwall.....	1	11	Armagh.....	1	
Devon.....	1	8	Cavan.....	1	
Dorset.....	1	8	Donegal.....	1	
Essex.....	2	0	Down.....	1	
Hants.....	1	10	Fermanagh.....	1	
Kent.....	1	10	Londonderry.....	1	
Lancaster.....	1	10	Monaghan.....	1	
Middlesex.....	1	10	Tyrone.....	1	
Norfolk.....	1	10	Carlow.....	1	
Northampton.....	2	0	Dublin.....	1	8
Northumberland.....	1	11	Kildare.....	1	8
Nottingham.....	1	9	Kilkenny.....	1	8
Somerset.....	1	8	Louth.....	1	8
Suffolk.....	1	10	Meath.....	1	8
Surrey.....	1	11	Queen's County.....	1	8
Sussex.....	1	10	Wicklow.....	1	8
Warwick.....	1	11	Wexford.....	1	8
York.....	1	9	Galway.....	1	7
North Britain.....	1	10	King's County.....	1	7
The Counties in			Leitrim.....	1	7
which there are	1	10	Longford.....	1	
no Contracts..			Mayo.....	1	
			Roscommon.....	1	
			Sligo.....	1	
			Westmeath.....	1	
Jersey.....	2	6	Cork.....		
Guernsey.....	2	5	Kerry.....	1	8
			Waterford.....	1	8
			Clare.....	1	7
			Limerick.....	1	8
			Tipperary.....	1	8

War-Office, 26th Dec. 1832.

Sir,—With reference to Article 475 of the Explanatory Direction dated War-Office, 20th November, 1830, I have the honour to acquaint you, that whenever a recruit joins the head-quarters of the regiment, who has been approved by a District Staff-Surgeon, but whose fitness the regimental Medical Officer does not feel himself justified in confirming, the Regimental Medical Officer is to transmit, through his Commanding Officer, to the

Director-General of the Army Medical Department a report of the case, showing in what the unfitness of the recruit consists, and whether, in the Regimental Medical Officer's opinion, it has originated since the recruit was approved by the District Staff Surgeon.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,  
JOHN HOBBHOUSE.

Officer commanding  
— Regiment of —.

Adjt.-General's Office,  
1st Jan. 1833.

The exemplary conduct of the troops demands from the Lieut.-General commanding the strongest expression of his approbation.

Called upon during the late elections, and for a considerable time before, to perform the most harassing duties, and necessarily dispersed in small bodies throughout the country, scarcely any irregularity has occurred, nor has the smallest complaint been preferred; whilst on all occasions, when required to support the civil power, and often exposed to insult, sometimes even to outrage, they have united temper with firmness, and discipline with forbearance. In the exercise of these qualities, the troops have reflected honour on themselves, and acquired the respect and admiration of the people of Ireland.

The Lieutenant-General commanding desires to express to the Major-Generals, commanding districts, his acknowledgments of the judicious arrangements they have everywhere made to meet the exigencies of the service.

His best thanks are due also to the officers and men under their orders for the zeal and activity with which these arrangements have been carried into effect, and for their exemplary behaviour in the arduous and difficult situations in which they have been placed.

To Major-General Sir Edward Blakeney, on whom the distribution of the troops, during the elections, has exclusively fallen, in the absence of Lieutenant-General Sir Hussey Vivian, he begs most especially to express his entire satisfaction,

By command of the Lieutenant-General commanding,

GEORGE D'AGUILAR,  
Dep.-Adjt.-Gen.

## PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

### NAVY.

#### PROMOTIONS.

##### CAPTAIN.

J. M. Laws.

##### COMMANDERS.

Charles Burnett.	F. Franklin (retired.)
Thomas Gregory.	B. Leigh (do.)

##### LIEUTENANTS.

J. L. R. Stoll.	Edward Grey.
T. M. C. Symonds.	L. S. Tindal.
Hon. J. R. Drummond.	C. G. E. Napier.
Hon. G. F. Hastings.	

##### PURSERS.

Edmund Brown.	W. O. Cox.
Thomas Thompson.	J. Evans.
William Anderson.	W. L. Freeman.
Edward Rowe.	F. Fox.
Wm. Clatworthy.	

#### APPOINTMENTS.

Rear-Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, Bart. and K.C.B., to be Commander-in-Chief on the South American Station; and Admiral Sir Thomas Williams, G.C.B., to succeed the late Sir Thos. Foley, at Portsmouth.

##### COMMANDERS.

Wm. Mudge (Sup.),.....San Josef.  
E. T. Crouch, to be Secretary to Sir M. Seymour.

##### LIEUTENANTS.

J. H. Windham.....	Isis.
John Harding.....	San Josef.
G. A. Frazer.....	Do. " "
Edward Seymour.....	Flag-Lieut. to Sir M. Seymour.
Thomas B. Brown.....	Talavera.
H. W. Johnston.....	Donegal.
John Kemp.....	Coast Guard.
Henry Lawrence.....	Do.
W. M. Hearle.....	Do.
N. C. France.....	Do.
T. L. Massie.....	Satellite.
Edward Grey.....	Spartiate.
W. Houston.....	Do.

##### MASTERS.

Benj. Hunter.....Prince Regent Y.  
J. H. Davy.....Comus.

##### ASSISTANT-SURGEON.

R. L. Hartowr.....African.

##### PURSERS.

T. Williams, to be Secretary to Sir T. Williams.  
Samuel Wadland.....Spartiate.

### ARMY.

#### WAR-OFFICE, Dec. 28.

5th Regt. of Drag. Guards.—Lieut. John Wallace King, to be Capt. by p. vice Seton, who ret.; Cornet Lawrence Robert Shaw, to be Lieut. by p. vice King; Tonman Mosley, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Shawe.

14th Regt. of Light Drags.—Cornet James Phelps, to be Lieut. by p. vice Curwen, who ret.; William Henry Archer, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Phelps.

1st Foot.—Ensign Alexander Imlach, from the 6th Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice Mair, app. to the 96th Foot.

8th Foot.—Capt. Edward Drury, h. p. from 8th Foot, to be Capt. vice Frederick Richardson, who exch.; Ensign Charles Drummond Bailey, from h. p. 21st Light Drag. to be Ensign, vice Imlach, app. Quartermaster in the 1st Foot.

7th Foot.—Lieut. Lord Hamilton Francis Chichester, to be Capt. by p. vice Lord Sussex Lennox, who ret.; Ensign Frederick Sydney Hutchinson, from the 71st Foot, to be Lieut. by p. vice Lord Hamilton Francis Chichester.

13th Foot.—Ensign Thomas Sewell, to be Lieut. by p. vice Darlot, who ret.; Hon. Emilius J. W. Forester, to be Ensign, by p. vice Sewell.

15th Foot.—To be Captains.—Capt. John Pasley, from h. p. 78th Foot, vice Richard Long Battersby, who exch.; Capt. H. Barry Barnham, from h. p. unatt. vice Howard, who ret.

20th Foot.—Edward Hill, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Prendergast, who ret.

33d Foot.—James Knight, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Henderson, app. to the 14th Light Drag.

57th Foot.—Lieut. John MacMahon Kidd, to be Capt. by p. vice Lane, who ret.; Ensign A. T. Allen, to be Lieut. by p. vice Kidd; John Head Shadforth, Gent. to be Ensign, p. vice Allen.

60th Foot.—Capt. Walter Evelyn, to be Major, by p. vice Leslie, prom.; Lieut. John William Cross, to be Capt. by p. vice Trevelyan; Second Lieut. Thomas Bunbury, to be First Lieut. by p. vice Cross; William Frederick Hill Rooke, Gent. to be Second Lieut. by p. vice Bunbury.

71st Foot.—Major Joseph Thomas Pidgeon, to be Lieut.-Col. by p. vice Jones, who ret.; Captain Richard Wharton Myddleton, to be Major, by p. vice Pidgeon; Lieut. William Denny, to be Capt. by p. vice Myddleton; Ensign Henry Edmund Austen, to be Lieut. by p. vice Denny.

To be Ensigns by purchase.—Serjeant-Major Bernard Grant, vice Hutchinson, prom. in the 7th Foot; Augustus Levinge, Gent. vice Austen.

73d Foot.—Capt. Alexander Duke Hamilton, to be Major, by p. vice Fancourt, who ret.; Lieut. Henry B. Harvey, to be Capt. by p. vice Hamilton; Ensign Francis Baring Atkinson, to be Lieut. by p. vice Harvey; Augustus William Murray, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Atkinson.

74th Foot.—Lieut. Luke Allen, to be Capt. by p. vice Mildmay, who ret.; Ensign Robert Horton, to be Lieut. by p. vice Allen; George Wm. Fordyce, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Horton.

76th Foot.—Capt. Lionel Tollemache, from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice Augustus Hotham, who exch. rec. the diff.

77th Foot.—Major James Wemyss, from h. p. unatt. to be Major, vice Edward Jones, who exch. rec. the diff.

89th Foot.—Ensign Montague Vernon Abbott, from h. p. unatt. to be Ensign, without p. vice Dewes, dec.

96th Foot.—Quartermaster Hugh Mair, from the 1st Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice Murchison, commuted.

97th Foot.—William O'Malley, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Crowe, who ret.

Unattached.—Major Charles Leslie, from the 60th Foot, to be Lieut.-Colonel of Infantry, by p.; Lieut. Wilbraham Spencer Tollemache, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Captain of Infantry, by p.; Lieut. John Usher, from the 66th Foot, to be Captain of Infantry, without p.

Hospital Staff.—Assist.-Surgeon Thomas Rhys, from h. p. Second West India Regt. to be Assist.-Surgeon, vice Dawson, placed upon h. p.

Brevet.—The undermentioned Cadets of the Hon. East India Company's Service to have temporary rank as Ensigns during the period of their being placed under the command of Col. Pasley, of the Royal Engineers, at Chatham, for field instructions in the art of sapping and mining:—

Gentleman Cadet Alexander Nash, Gentleman Cadet Stephen Pott, Gentleman Cadet John W. Tombs, Gentleman Cadet Philip Hart, Gentleman Cadet James G. Johnson, Gentleman Cadet Rivers F. G. East.

Memorandum.—Lieut.-Colonel Philip Delatre, h. p. unatt. has been allowed to retire from the service by the sale of an unatt. commission.

#### OFFICE OF ORDINANCE, Dec. 31.

Royal Regiment of Artillery.—Second Captain James Humphreys Wood, to be Captain, vice Knox, dec.; First Lieut. Henry Nixon Daniel, to be Second Captain, vice Wood; Second Lieut. Robert French Handcock, to be First Lieutenant, vice Daniel; Second Captain William Ernst Jackson, to be Captain, vice Grant, dec.; First Lieut. Archibald Macbean, to be Second Captain, vice Jackson; Second Lieut. Powrie Ellis, to be First Lieut. vice Macbean.

To be Second Lieutenants.—Gentleman Cadet Fielding Marriott, vice Beresford, promoted; Gentleman Cadet Huntley George Hooper, vice Crawford, promoted; Gentleman Cadet Thomas Elwyn, vice Cleve, promoted; Gentleman Cadet Charles James Wright, vice St. George, promoted; Gentleman Cadet George Augustus Frederick Derenzy, vice Nodham, promoted; Gentleman Cadet William Hamilton Elliott, vice Bignell, retired on half-pay; Gentleman Cadet Peter Macbean, vice Campbell, promoted; Gentleman Cadet Charles Robert Wynne, vice Frazee, promoted; Gentleman Cadet Lowry William Montgomery Wynne, vice Marlay, promoted; Gentleman Cadet Francis Ramsay, vice Warde, promoted; Gentleman Cadet William Wynne Jones, vice Tytler, promoted; Gentleman Cadet Anthony Benn, vice Tireman, promoted.

Surrey Regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry.—Wm. Hart, Gent. to be Surgeon, vice James, deceased; George Curtis, Gent. to be Assist.-Surgeon, vice Hart, promoted.

#### WAR OFFICE, Jan. 4.

1st Regt. of Foot.—Capt. Humphry Babington, from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice Barton Teunison, who exch. rec. the diff.

5th Foot.—Lieut. Theophilus Jenkins, from the 56th Foot, to be Lieut. vice John Jones, app. to the 60th Foot.

6th Foot.—Lieut. John Johnson, from the h. p. of the 6th West India Regt. to be Lieut. vice Henry Augustus Dalton, who exch.

7th Foot.—Staff-Assist.-Surgeon James Munro, M.D., to be Assist.-Surgeon, vice Davey, who resigns.

15th Foot.—Lieut. Charles Cooke Yarborough, to be Capt. by p. vice Passley, who ret.; Lieut. George Sockett, from the 36th Foot, to be Lieut. without p. vice Burnham, promoted; Ensign William Henry Mounsey, to be Lieut. by p. vice Yarborough; Charles Horrocks, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Mounsey.

18th Foot.—Ensign Charles John Russell Collinson, to be Lieut. by p. vice Temple, who ret.; Arthur Wilson, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Collinson.

24th Foot.—Lieut. John Rogers Griffiths, from the h. p. 52d Foot, to be Lieut. vice Joseph Francis Peacocke, who exch.

36th Foot.—Lieut. William Curtis, from the h. p. Royal African Corps, to be Lieut. without p. vice Sockett, app. to the 15th Foot.

45th Foot.—Lieut. George Henry Moore, from the h. p. of the 66th Foot, to be Lieut. vice Andrew Clendinning, who exch.

56th Foot.—Lieut. John Russell, from the h. p. of the 27th Foot, to be Lieut. vice Jenkins, app. to the 5th Foot.

69th Foot.—Lieut. John Jones, from the 5th Foot, to be First Lieut. vice William Anderson, who retires upon the h. p. of the 27th Foot.

66th Foot.—Lieut. Francis Taylor, from the h. p.

of the 54th Foot, to be Lieut. without p. vice Ussher, prom.

93d Foot.—Ensign George Home Dunbar, to be Lieut. by p. vice Burgoyne, who ret.; William Pitt Trevelyan, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Dunbar.

99th Foot.—Lieut. Lambert Cowell, from the h. p. of the 19th Foot, to be Lieut. vice William Spencer Norbun, who exch.

Hospital Staff.—Staff-Surgeon George John, from the h. p. to be Surgeon to the Forces, vice Samuel Barwick Bruce, whose appointment has not taken place; Duncan McGregor, Gent. to be Staff-Assist.-Surgeon, vice Munro, app. to the 7th Foot.

#### OFFICE OF ORDINANCE, Jan. 3.

Corps of Royal Engineers.—First Lieut. Arthur Kay, to be Second Captain, in the vacancy occasioned by the decrease of Capt. Stanway; Second Lieut. George A. Bennett, to be First Lieut. vice Kay.

Fife Militia.—William Wemyss, Esq. to be Major, vice Dalyell, prom.

Ensign James Dalton Fyfe, to be Lieut. vice Mitchell, dec.

Worcestershire Yeomanry Cavalry.—Thomas Taylor Vernon, Esq. to be Capt. vice Bearcroft, dec.; Edmund Thomas Perrott, Gent. to be Cornet, vice Ashwin, resigned.

1st Regt. of Royal Surrey Militia.—Thomas Bailey Potts, Gent. to be Lieut.

#### WAR OFFICE, Jan. 8.

The half-pay of the undermentioned officers has been cancelled from the 8th instant inclusive, they having accepted the commuted allowances for their commissions, viz.:

Ensign Edward Austin, h. p. 47th Foot; Ensign Charles Frederick Colyear, h. p. unatt.; Lieut. John Villiers Shelley, h. p. 60th Foot; Ensign Adam Johnston, h. p. 57th Foot; Lieut. Richard Butley, h. p. Rifle Brigade; Lieut. Robert Weldon Tarlton, h. p. 18th Foot; Lieut. John Lacon Akers, h. p. unatt.; Lieut. John Ekins Waring, h. p. 49th Foot; Lieut. Richard Ashe, h. p. 71st Foot; Cornet Lewis Count Kielmassege, h. p. 1st Hussars King's German Legion; Lieutenant Christopher Bernard Martin, h. p. 60th Foot.

#### WAR OFFICE, Jan. 11.

3d Regt. Dragoon Gds.—Capt. Ellis Hodgson, from h. p. 10th Light Drags. to be Capt. without p. vice Wethered, dec.

7th Dragoon Gds.—Capt. George Nugent, to be Major, by p. vice Chalmel, who ret.; Lieut. Thomas Edmund Thewles, to be Capt. by p. vice Nugent; Cornet Henry Corbet Singleton, to be Lieut. by p. vice Thewles.

11th Regt. of Light Dragoons.—Lieut. William Handley, to be Capt. by p. vice Creighton, who ret.; Cornet John Rose Holden Rose, to be Lieut. by p. vice Handley; Ensign Alexander Walker, from the 91st Foot, to be Cornet, by punch. vice Rose.

12th Light Dragoons.—Thomas Brannan Bunbury, Gent. to be Veterinary-Surgeon, vice Castley, deceased.

15th Light Dragoons.—Assist.-Surg. John Maitland, from the 1st Foot, to be Assist.-Surg. vice Dealy, promoted in the 77th Foot.

3d or Scots Fusilier Regiment of Foot Gds.—Arthur Edward Onslow, Gent. to be Ensign and Lieut. by p. vice Byng, appointed to the 7th Foot.

1st Regt. of Foot.—Lieut. Edward A. G. Muller, to be Capt. by p. vice Babington, who ret.; Ens. Edmund Blackford, to be Lieut. by p. vice Muller; Henry Richard Marindin, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Blackford; Staff-Assist.-Surg. George Cleirhew, M.D. to be Assist.-Surg. vice Maitland, appointed to the 15th Lt. Drags.

3d Foot.—Ens. and Adj. William White, to have the rank of Lieut.; Ensign Allan Menzies, from

the 46th Foot, to be Ensign, vice White, appointed Adjutant.

7th Foot.—Ensign and Lieut. William Frederick Byng, from the 3d Foot Guards, to be Lieut. by p. vice Lindsay, who ret.

16th Foot.—Lieut. Robert Carr, to be Capt. without p. vice Walton dec.

To be Lieutenants, without purchase—Ensign Charles C. Adams, vice Carr, dec.; Ens. Charles Jeffries Carter, vice Crumpe, dec.

To be Ensigns.—Ensign James Brooke Irwin, from the 67th Foot, vice Adams; Ensign Crofton Hamilton Fitzgerald, from the 98th Foot, vice Carter.

20th Foot.—Major Alexander Fraser, from the 40th Foot, to be Major, vice Simcocks, who exchanges; Ensign Philip Le Couteur, from h. p. unattached, to be Ensign, without purch. vice Stanford, dec.

40th Foot.—Major John S. Simcocks, from the 20th Foot, to be Major, vice Fraser, who exch.

To be Lieutenants—41st Foot—Ensign Robert Harnett, without p. vice Dainty, dec.; Ens. Geo Sheaffe Montizambert, by p. vice Harnett, whose promotion, by p. has been cancelled.

To be Ensign—Ensign Carroll O'Meara, from h. p. 1st Foot, vice Montizambert

45th Foot.—Lieut. George Minter, to be Capt. without p. vice Perham, dec.; Ensign Henry Boswell Bennett, to be Lieut. without p. vice Minter; Ensign and Adj. John Hine, to have the rank of Lieut.; Ensign James Campbell, from h. p. 73rd Foot, to be Ensign, vice Bennett

46th Foot.—Ensign George Heneage Lawrence Wharton, from the 72d Foot, to be Ensign, vice Menzies, appointed to the 3d Foot.

49th Foot.—Charles Alexander Sinclair, Gent. to be Ensign, without p. vice Campbell, dec.

67th Foot.—Gent. Cadet Arthur B. Cane, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Irwin, appointed to the 16th Foot.

70th Foot.—Ensign John Stanley, to be Lieut. by p. vice Connor, who ret.; William Sinclair May, Gent. to be Ensign by p. vice Stanley.

72d Foot.—Gent. Cadet Thomas E. Pollard, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, without p. vice Wharton, appointed to the 46th Foot.

75th Foot.—Sergt.-Major William Brookes, to be Adj. with the rank of Ensign, vice Sutton, who resigns the Adjutancy only.

91st Foot.—Edward Lovett Robertson, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Walker, appointed to the 11th Light Drags.

96th Foot.—Lieutenant Edwin Griffiths, from h. p. 48th Foot, to be Paymaster, vice Scott dec.

98th Foot.—Ensign Walter Balfour, from h. p. 57th Foot, to be Ensign without p. vice Fitz Gerald, appointed to the 16th Foot.

Rifle Brigade.—Major-General Sir James Stevenson Baines, K.C.B. to be Colonel-Commandant of a battalion, vice Major-General Sir G. R. Bingham, dec.; Second Lieut. Richard Henry Fitz Heibert, to be First Lieut. by p. vice Tollemache, prom.

Hospital-Staff.—John M'Coy McDonald, Gent. to be Staff-Assist-Surg. vice Hastings, whose appointment has not taken place.

Memorandum.—The undermentioned appointments, as stated in the Gazette of the 2d of November last, have not taken place:—

Assist-Surg. Connell, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Assist-Surg. in the 15th Light Dragoons; Staff-Assist-Surgeon Grant, to be Assist-Surgeon in the Rifle Brigade.

#### OFFICE OF ORDNANCE, Jan. 9.

1st h.p.:  
to be 1st Lieut. vice Page.

First Regt. of the Duke of Lancaster's own Militia.—Robert James Shuttleworth, Esq. to be Capt. vice Latham, dec.

#### WAR-OFFICE, Jan. 18.

1st Regt. of Life-Guards.—George Rushout, Gent. to be Cornet and Sub-Lieut. by p. vice Kingscote, appointed to the 17th Lt. Drags.

Royal Regt. of Horse-Guards.—Lieut. Hon. Augustus John Child Villiers, to be Capt. by p. vice Cosby, who ret.; Cornet Walter Robert Tyrrell, to be Lieut. by p. vice Villiers.

6th Regt. of Dragoons.—Lieut. Col. Henry Madox, from the h. p. unat. to be Lieut.-Col. without p. vice Greswolde, dec.

21st Regt. of Foot.—Capt. Angus William Mackay, from the 33d Regt. to be Capt. vice Beet, appointed to the 94th Regt.

33d Foot.—Capt. Frederick Rodolph Blake, from the 94th Regt. to be Capt. vice Mackay, appointed to the 21st Regt.

41st Foot.—Staff-Assist-Surg. Nelson Dartnell, to be Assist-Surg. vice George Russell Dartnell, who exch.

50th Foot.—Ensign Henry Gunton, to be Lieut. without p. vice Tudor, appointed Adj.; Gent. Cadet William H. Wright, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, vice Gunton; Lieut. William Langley Tudor, to be Adj. vice White, dec.

61st Foot.—Ensign John Thomas Bligh, from the 94th Regt. to be Ensign, vice Seton, who exchanges.

66th Foot.—Lieut. Francis Carr, from the h. p. unattached, to be Lieut. vice John Montgomery Russell, who exchanges, receiving the difference.

68th Foot.—Major Lord William Paulet, from h. p. unat. to be Major, vice James Menzies, who exch. receiving the difference.

77th Foot.—Capt. George Antoine Ramsay, to be Major, by p. vice Wemyss, who ret.; Lieut. William Jonathan Clarke, to be Capt. by p. vice Ramsay; Ensign Robert J. Stratton, to be Lieut. by p. vice Clarke.

94th Foot.—Capt. John Goodday Beet, from the 21st Regt. to be Capt. vice Blake, appointed to the 33d Regt.; Ensign William Carden Seton, from the 61st Regt. to be Ensign, vice Bligh, who exchanges.

Hospital-Staff.—Assist-Surgeon George Russell Dartnell, from the 41st Regt. to be Staff-Assist-Surgeon, vice Nelson Dartnell, who exch.

Memoranda.—The names of the Captain, on the h. p. of the 67th Regt. are William Gordon Cumming Skene, and not William Gordon, as hitherto stated.

The promotion of Ensign Adams, to be Lieut. of the 16th Foot, was vice Carr, prom. and not vice Carr, dec. as stated in the Gazette of the 11th of January inst.

#### JAN. 22.

Memorandum.—The half-pay of the undermentioned Officers has been cancelled from the 22d instant, inclusive, they having accepted a commuted allowance for their commissions, viz:—

Lieut. Henry John Sperling, h. p. 9th Foot; Cornet Michael Pack, h. p. Royal Waggon Train; Lieut. Thomas Labey, h. p. 6th Foot; Ensign Frederick Dumaresq, h. p. unatt.; Lieut. George Campbell, h. p. 49th Foot; Lieut. Sir John Powell Glyn, Bart. h. p. unatt.; Lieut. Sir William Henry St. Lawrence Clarke, Bart. h. p. unatt.; Lieut. John Williams Martin, h. p. 9th Foot; Ensign William Unett, h. p. 43d Foot; Staff-Surgeon Samuel Barwick Bruce, h. p. Hospital Staff.

The undermentioned Officers on full-pay have also been allowed to retire from the service, receiving commuted allowances for their commissions from the 22d instant, inclusive:—

Lieut. Andrew Richard Evans, of the 16th Foot; Staff-Assist-Surgeon Edward Josias Bulteel, of the Hospital Staff.

West Suffolk Regt. of Militia.—William Newton, Esq. to be Lieut.-Colonel.

Warwickshire Regt. of Yeomanry Cavalry.—Samuel Pole Shawe, Esq. to be Captain.



## WHITEHALL, Jan. 12.

The King has been pleased to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, granting to George Earl of Munster, Colonel in the Army, the office and place of Governor and Captain of His Majesty's Castle of Windsor, in the room of Henry Marquis of Conyngham, deceased.

The King has also been pleased to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal of the said United Kingdom, granting to the said George Earl of Munster, the office of Constable of His Majesty's Castle of Windsor, as also the office of Lieutenant of the said Castle, in the room of Henry Marquis of Conyngham, deceased.

The King has also been please to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal of the said United Kingdom, granting to Lord Frederick Fitz-Clarence, Colonel in the Army, the office or place of Lieutenant of His Majesty's Tower of London, in the room of George Earl of Munster.

[To be substituted for the notice in the Gazette of Tuesday Jan. 15].

## St. JAMES'S PALACE, Nov. 6. 1832.

The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood upon Rear-Admiral Charles Conyngham, Military Knight Commander of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order.

## BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

## BIRTHS.

Dec. 22, at Clare Castle, the Lady of Surgeon D. Macpherson, 64th Regt. of a daughter.

At St. Ann's, Newtown Forbes, the Lady of Lieut. and Adj. H. Fenwick, 86th Regt. of a son.

At Devonport, the Lady of Asst.-Surgeon Hugh Orr, 89th Regt. of a son.

Dec. 27th, the Lady of Capt. A. S. H. Aplin, 89th Regt. of a son.

Dec. 28th, at Hambleton, Hants, the Lady of Lieut. Wm. Cooley, R.N. of a son.

Dec. 29th, at Keyham Point, the Lady of Capt. Palliser, R.A. of a daughter.

Dec. 30, at Lord's-lane, near Hoddleston, the Lady of Capt. D. H. O'Brien, R.N. of a daughter.

At Southampton, the Lady of Lieut.-Colonel Hely, late of the 11th Foot, of a daughter.

The Hon. Miss Martin, Lady of Capt. Fanshawe Martin, R.N. of a son.

Jan. 1, 1833, at Dunmore East, county of Waterford, the Lady of Capt. Samuel Roberts, C.B. of H.M.S. Druid, of a son.

Jan. 12, at Gosport, the Lady of Henry Tucker, Esq. Purser, of H.M.S. Beacon, of a son.

At Pickle Lodge, near Barnham, Norfolk, the Lady of Com. Mc. Hardy, R.N. of a daughter.

Jan. 14th, at Emsworth, the Lady of Com. W. H. Pierson, R.N. of a son.

At Edinburgh, the Lady of Capt. Smith, 2d Dr. Guards, of a daughter.

At York, the Lady of Lieut. Sir W. L. Young, Bart. 8th Royal Irish Fusars, of a son and heir.

Jan. 16th, at Canterbury, the Lady of Capt. Geo. Gipps, R.E. of a daughter.

Jan. 18th, the Lady of Lieut. G. T. Purvis, R.N. of a son.

## MARRIAGES.

Nov. 29th, at Walcot Church, Bath, Lieut.-Colonel Thorn, K.H. Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the Northern District, to Amelia Eleanor, the youngest daughter and co-heiress of the late Charles Worthington, Esq. of Lansdown Crescent, in that city.

Dec. 19th, at Lifford Church, county Donegal, George Russell Dartnell, Esq. 41st Regt. to Anna Maria, only daughter of G. W. Bennett, Esq. of Bennett's-town, county Limerick.

Dec. 27th, at Backford, Major Townshend, 49th Regt. to Emma, daughter of Lieut.-General Glegg, of Backford Hall, Cheshire.

At Lamerton, Capt. Charles Morgan, R.M. to Elizabeth, eldest daughter of Walter Weeks, Esq. of Hurdleditch, near Tavistock.

At Manchester, Lieut. Edmund Peel, R.N. son of Edmund Peel, Esq. of Church Bank, Lancashire, to Lucy, daughter of Richard Meek, of Tetlow Fold.

Jan. 1st, at Edinburgh, Lieut. J. J. Kerr, R.N. to Helen, eldest daughter of the late Adam Smith, Esq. of Stockbridge.

At St. George's, Hanover-square, the Hon. Capt. Hope, to Charlotte, daughter of Admiral and Lady Tollemache.

Jan. 3d, at Pontefract, in the county of York, Capt. Broughton, R.N. nephew of General Sir John Broughton, Bart. to Eliza, eldest daughter of John Perfect, Esq.

Jan. 8th, at Islington, Rear-Admiral Barker, of Cold Harbour, Gosport, to Mary Ann, daughter of J. Hunter, Esq. of Compton Terrace.

Jan. 9th, Lieut. S. Lettsom, 80th Regt. to Mercy, youngest daughter of the late James Ormerod, Esq. of Camber Hull, Lancashire.

Jan. 12th, at New Ross, Capt. S. Walker, 65th Regt. to Miss Arabella Bradley.

At Ballinacollig, county Cork, Lieut. Joseph Nugent Blood, 35th Regt. to Elizabeth, second daughter of the late Capt. Fitzmaurice, of Lagaturn, county of Mayo.

Jan. 17th, Lieut. R. K. Barnes, R.M. to Catherine Letitia, eldest daughter of the late William Falwasser, Esq. of the Haymarket, London.

Jan. 19th, at Limerick, Lieut. J. B. Robinson, 19th Regt. to Dora Chancellor, second daughter of John Tucker, Esq.

At Hampton, Lieut. E. S. Curwen, 14th Light Drs. to Frances, daughter of the late William Falwasser, Esq. of Hampton Court, Middlesex.

Jan. 22d, at St. Mary's Church, Bryanstone-square, Lieut. T. Bulkeley, 1st Life Guards, to Frances Amelia Rivers, daughter of Sir Francis Freeling, Bart.

Jan. 24th, at All Soul's Church, Strand, Lieut. T. C. C. Moore, R.M. to Miss Seelinger, daughter of the late Major Seelinger, 66th Regt.

## DEATHS.

## LIEUTENANT-COLONELS.

Sept. 11th, Phillips, h. p. R. Marines.  
Gossip, h. p. 11 Garr. Batt.  
July 29th, Forrest, E. I. Comp. Service.  
Dunne, ditto.

## MAJOR.

March 4th, 1830, Wajorn, h. p. Royal Mar.

## CAPTAINS.

Boyes, 64th Foot.  
March 18th, Hicks, late 4th Vet. Bat.  
June 9th, Snow, 97th Foot, Kandy, Ceylon.  
Aug. 20th, Mathews, late of R. Art.  
Sept. 16th, T. Donald, Barr. Master, Berbice.  
Oct. 28th, Stainton, 95th Foot, Corfu.  
Nov. 26th, Barrow, h. p. Newfoundland Fenc.  
30th do. Lundin, h. p. 21st Foot.  
Dec. 9th, Stanway, Royal Eng. Ireland.  
Hall, h. p. Royal Mar.

## LIEUTENANTS.

Wade, 13th Foot.  
July 28th, 1832, Phibbs, 40th Foot, Poona, Bombay.

June 2d, Macdonald, 55th Foot, Bellary, Madras.

—Morison, ditto.

Persse, 77th Foot.

Dec. 14th, Liddle, h.p. 11th Drags.

Nov. 5th, Black, h.p. 48th Foot, Donegal.

Oct. 29th, Dixon, h.p. 80th Foot, Jersey.

Dec. 12th, Cotter, h.p. 7th W. I. R. do.

Sept. 30th, Schwartz, h.p. Nova Scb. Fen. Town Adj. of Cape Breton.

Nov. 16th, Foy, h.p. 94th Foot.

Feb. 22d, Nixon, late 2d Vet. Bat.

May 17th, Cameron, 9th do.

March 31st, Irwin, 11th do.

Harpur, h.p. unat.

Oct. 14th, Mason, do.

Nov. 24th, Kay, h.p. 62d Foot.

Laue Brown, h.p. 83d Foot.

Nov. 30th, Carthew, late Art. Drivers, Truro, Cornwall.

Appleton, h.p. Royal Mar.

Carington, do.

Dec. 9th, Sely, h.p. 5th Foot.

#### SECOND LIEUTENANTS AND ENSIGNS.

Martin, 38th Foot.

Aug. 27th, Nicoll, Fort Ailj. in Canada, Coteau du Lac.

Gwinnell, h.p. Royal Mar.

Nov. 5th, Graham, late 1st Vet. Bat.

May 30th, Hall, 6th do.

July 10th, Harrison, 8th do.

Nov. 6th, McKown, do.

April 8th, Campbell, h.p. 65th Foot.

#### PAYMASTERS.

Feb. 13th, Griffiths, h.p. 23d Foot.

#### QUARTER-MASTERS.

Nov. 19th, Wainwright, h.p. 27th Foot.

April 13th, Phillips, late of 58th Foot.

Sept. 29th, Banks, h.p. 4th Dragoon Gds. Templemore.

#### ASSISTANT-SURGEONS.

July 5th, Toulmin, 58th Foot, Ceylon.

Taylor, h.p. Staff.

Dec. 4th, 1831, Gibbons, late of Royal Art.

Dec. 20th, 1830, Bloxham, do.

#### VETERINARY-SURGEONS.

Nov. 3d, Hayward, 6th Dr. Gds.

#### COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.

Oct. 5th, Dep.-Assist.-Com.-General Curll, h.p. Barbadoes.

June 2d, at Bellary, Madras, Lieut. W. McDonald, 55th Regt.

Commander P. Tomlinson, R.N.

At Tregony, Capt. Wm. Hennah, C.B. R.N.

At Titchfield, Commander Covey, R.N.

At Dartmouth, Lieut. Peter Creed, R.N. (1783.)

Dec. 21st, at Haddington, Major-General, Sir Robt. Scott, K.C.B. of the Madras army.

Dec. 23d, at Dunkirk, Dr. Adam Neale, Physician to the Forces.

Dec. 22d, at Edinburgh, Major Francis A.S. Knox, R.A.

At his residence in Hamilton Place, General the Most Honourable the Marquis of Conyngham, K.St.P. and G.C.H. Governor of Windsor. A memoir of service will be given.

Dec. 24th, at Brighton, Capt. E. Wethered, 3d Dr. Gds.

At Gunley, near Welch Pool, Montgomeryshire, Commander Robert Campbell, R.N. (See a notice of this officer from the pen of Capt. Basil Hall our present Number.)

Dec. 27th, at his residence, Barton Place, near Exeter, Shulldham Peard, Esq. Vice-Admiral of the White.

Dec. 31st, at Cork Barracks, James Castley, Esq. Veterinary Surgeon of the 12th Royal Lancers, in which regiment he served upwards of twenty-three years.

Jan. 2d, Lieut.-Gen. J. Gordon, of the E.I.C. Service.

Jan. 3d, at his residence, 5, Cumberland Terrace, Regent's Park, Major-General Sir George Ridout Bingham, K.C.B. Colonel of the 2d Bat. Rifle Brigade. A memoir of service will be given.

At Deptford, John R. Spencer, Esq. Master R.N. and of the Prince Regent Yacht.

Jan. 3d, at Doncaster, Col. Holmes, O.B. late 3d Dragoon Gds.

Jan. 6th, at Slamshaw, Portsea, George Grant, Esq. Purser, R.N.

At the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, Capt. Chadwick, Riding-Master at that Establishment.

Jan. 8th, at Folkestone, Commander Smith Cobb, R.N.

Jan. 9th, at the Admiralty House, Portsmouth, aged 76, Admiral Sir Thomas Foley, G.C.B. Rear-Admiral of Great Britain, and Commander-in-Chief at that Port. A memoir of service will be given in a future Number.

Jan. 9th, at St. Omer's, Major-Gen. Pye, late Deputy Quarter-Master-General at Jamaica.

Lieut.-Col. Greswolde of the 6th or Inniskillen Dragoons.

At his seat, Filbrig Hall, Norfolk, William Windham, Esq. Vice-Admiral of the White.

Jan. 14th, at Parkgate, Cheshire, Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton Dod of the Honourable E.I.C. Service.

At Chatham, Major-General Theophilus Lewis, from the Royal Marines.

At Thames Ditton, Capt. John J. Mitchell, R.N.

At Gosport, Geo. Harries, Esq. Purser, R.N.

Lieut. Arthur Short, R.N.

Jan. 23d, at his house at Teignmouth, Devon, Admiral the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Exmouth, G.C.B. Vice-Admiral of the United Kingdom. A memoir of service next month.

The late Capt. Hatley, R.N., whose death is recorded in our last monthly obituary, entered the service as Midshipman, on board the Resolution, Capt. James Cook, whom he accompanied on his last voyage of discovery in 1776, and returned home in the same ship in 1781. He next sailed in the Magnanime, Capt. Walseley, for Madras, and there joined the Superbe, under the patronage of his father's friend, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K.B., and in 1782 received his commission as Lieutenant, and was appointed to the Active, frigate, Capt. Mackenzie. As Lieutenant, Capt. Hatley served with credit in different ships during the war with France, and was made a Commander for his spirited conduct on board the St. George, during the mutiny in 1797; after which he commanded the Winchelsea, of 32 guns, in the Egyptian expedition, and received a gold medal for his services. On his return from Egypt, in 1802, he obtained his Post-Rank, and the command of the fine frigate Boadicea, of 40 guns, at the Cape of Good Hope, where he afterwards commanded the Reasonable, of 64. At the time of his decease, he was the 25th on the list of Post-Captains. Capt. Hatley was a man of very firm and undaunted mind; of deep religious principles, though averse to much outward display of them; of steady loyalty, and inflexible integrity; constant in friendship, liberal and kind to all around him, and particularly gentlemanlike in his deportment; so that throughout his life he was universally respected and beloved.

## TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS.

THE unjustifiable practice of appropriating whole articles, as well as passages, from works which are at pains and expense to produce original matter, without the slightest acknowledgment of the source from whence they have been borrowed, has grown to a very serious abuse, and should be reformed. We observed, for instance, that an important and laboured document, *exclusively* given by this Journal, namely "The Distribution, &c of the Army," was copied entire, but *not quoted*, from our Number of last month, by The Limerick Chronicle, a newspaper too respectable to warrant its recourse to such unfair expedients; we therefore believe it to have been an oversight in the case of our friends of the Chronicle. The Albion, however, copied it also, inadvertently we have no doubt, "from The Limerick Chronicle;"—and thus our "Thunder" goes the round of the realm under false colours,—a requital for our exertions which we are perpetually doomed to experience. The mere mention of this abuse will, we are convinced, be sufficient to induce its correction, as far as we are concerned.

We beg to inform "A Friend to the Naval Service," that our object in giving insertion to the document upon which he comments was to enable the service to judge for themselves, but without any preference upon our part. While, therefore, we beg to decline any controversy on the subject, we shall readily admit any general remarks on the plan, if incorporated in our Post Correspondence of next month.

Our next Number shall contain a Narrative of the Siege of Antwerp.

The letter of "A Yachtsman afloat," has been incorporated in our review of the work to which it relates—deferred unavoidably till next month.

We thank T., whose offer is acceptable; and are obliged to Mr. H. W., whose Letter shall be inserted in our next.

T. P. R. is hypercritical—we are sensible of his kind intentions.

Mr Holdsworth's Reply to Captain Nixon on the subject of his "Revolving Rudder," has reached us too late for our present Number, but shall appear in our next.

Many Memoirs of deceased Admirals and General Officers, including those of Lord Exmouth; Sir Thomas Foley; Sir Edward Colpoys (A. B.'s notice of whom we have received); Sir George Bingham, (the Memoranda respecting whom by "A Constant Reader," have reached us); Sir Banastre Tarleton, &c, are prepared or early insertion. We repeat our request for authenticated communications from the friends of deceased officers.

H. I.'s communications are always acceptable.

"Mules," and "A Master of a British Merchant Ship," in our next.

We retain the MS. of H. S. K., which we have not yet had an opportunity of using, but hope to have.

The subject referred to by Mr. C. B. being concluded in our present Number, we shall insert his letter in our next.

G. M., "Justitia," "A Post Captain of 1805," &c. &c. &c., have been received.

We request that all letters and communications for THE EDITOR may be addressed, post or carriage paid, to the care of Mr. Colburn, 13, Great Marlborough-street.

## SIEGE OF ANTWERP IN 1832.

## HISTORICAL NOTICE AND PREVIOUS SIEGES.

THE siege of the citadel of Antwerp is destined to hold a prominent rank in the annals of military warfare, not only from the activity and skill displayed by the besiegers, the noble endurance and fortitude shown by the besieged, but from various operations having been performed by the French engineers, the practical development of which is of rare occurrence in the history of attack and defence. We shall not attempt to discuss any of the political causes that led to this interesting and important enterprise, but confine ourselves, as far as possible, to the narration of events as they occurred during the struggle, interspersing our narrative with such anecdotes and observations as bear directly on the subject, and accompanying it with documents essentially connected with the history of the siege.

We have adopted as our guide, and founded our description on, the official Reports of Marshal Gerard, Lieutenant-Generals Haxo and Neigre, to the French government,—on those of General Chassé to the Netherlands' Minister at War,—and on notes either taken by ourselves on the spot, or furnished by eye-witnesses who bore a prominent share in the operations. We have attempted to maintain the most strict impartiality, and to mete out equal justice to both parties, at the same time freely emitting our opinions, which, however open to objection or criticism, are put forth with the sole view of showing the light in which certain transactions were looked upon by the generality of those who were actors in or spectators of the attack.

It has, unfortunately, not been in our power to receive any precise details or explanations from the Dutch officers, as to particular apparent omissions, and we might add, errors committed by the garrison in their system of defence: indeed, delicacy forbade us to discuss the subject with them. If, therefore, there are some points that we have ventured to criticise, and where we have dwelled with less praise than we could have desired, we trust, should this sketch meet the eye of any of those gallant men, that they will attribute our remarks, not to any intention or desire to depreciate their merits, but from our having based our opinions on *effects*, as well as military antecedents. Any technical omissions, arising from the causes above-mentioned, may, and no doubt will, be supplied in the pages of this journal.

The limited space permitted to an article of this nature does not admit of the introduction of voluminous or elaborate details, or of our annexing any very copious documents. We have, nevertheless, given such official pieces as pertinently influenced the operations, and have inserted them in the order they occurred. Amongst these will be found copies of the summons, capitulation, and correspondence between the two belligerent commanders, with extracts from Marshal Gerard's general orders, various authentic returns, and states of troops, train, and stores.

Before commencing a description of the operations of the siege, a few words respecting the city and citadel may not be irrelevant. The

name of Antwerp, according to an ancient legend, emanated from a fable of a Giant who abode in these parts, and erected a strong-hold on the spot where the city gate (*Porte de l'Escaut*) opposite the *Tête de Flandre* now stands. Here the pirate commanded the navigation of the river, and exacted tribute from all vessels passing to and fro, punishing such as were unable or unwilling to submit to his demands, by death or mutilation. At length a valiant knight, named Brabon, (*unde derivatur Brabant*;) set out with the noble resolution of ridding the country of this scourge. Having arrived at the gate of the castle, he defied the Giant to mortal combat,—felled him to the ground,—sprang on his body,—and cutting off his hands, cast them into the river; then taking possession of the castle, he immediately founded a town in its vicinity, which he named "*Handwerpen*" or "*Handcast*," whence, according to tradition, springs the word Antwerp; the arms of which at this day are, a castle or turret surmounted with two hands. The city, which is supposed to have been the capital of the "*Ambivarites*," a colony of Seythians, is of great antiquity, and was an ancient marquisate of the Holy See. It formed a district apart from the seventeen United Provinces, and was composed of the town and certain contiguous castles or bourgs on the Scheldt. The emperor of Germany, Otho II., first raised it to the rank of a city in 950. It was afterwards made over to Henry II., and from him passed into the Houses of Brabant and Lorraine, and subsequently became the property of Spain. Its population in 1500, exceeded 200,000 souls.

The citadel was first constructed (1568) in the reign of Philip II., during the government of the Duke of Alba, who employed for this purpose the celebrated engineer, Paciotto, a native of Italy, contemporary of Rafaele. The principal object of its erection was to overawe the inhabitants. The fortress itself is a regular pentagon, with three ravelins, two detached lunettes (*St. Laurent* and *Kiel*), and a wet-ditch from twenty to twenty-two feet deep. The waters are supplied from the Scheldt, by means of two small sluices opposite the river, and are divided from those of the city ditches by a *batardeau*, in front of the curtain-connecting bastions *Fernando* and *Toledo*, close to the right flank of the irregular bastion covering the esplanade. The scarps of the bastions and curtains have a half-revetment in brickwork, strengthened by massive counterforts, which are prolonged to the *terre-plein*. The counterscarps are fully revetted close up to the edge of the covered-way. The ravelins are without revetments in masonry, having merely a talus of earth strongly palisaded near the berm, and supported by a submerged wattle-work, such as is commonly employed on the banks of the Flemish canals. The citadel was primitively constructed according to the ancient Spanish or Italian system, that is, with extremely elongated curtains and contracted bastions. These defects were rectified by *Ehrard de Bar le Duc*, when the science of fortification was approaching towards that perfection subsequently given to it by the great masters of the art. The length of the curtains was then diminished by augmenting the proportions, or rather by converting the ancient small bastions into "*reduits*," (susceptible of being cut off by a deep palisaded ditch,) maintaining their revetments, and covering them with others, having, according to the system of *Coehorn*, retired flanks. Greater depth and width were given to the ditches, the whole of the revetments were pulled down and repaired, the ravelins and *batardeau*

were added, and casemates constructed; but recent events have proved that these latter were neither sufficiently strong nor numerous, and above all, that they were most insalubrious and inconvenient. The wells, also, were highly defective.

No alteration or improvement was made from that period until the place fell into the hands of the French in 1792. The governor, General Carnot, then directed the construction of the counterguard in front of the esplanade, the forts Montebello, Carnot, and other out-works to their left, as well as the two lunettes St. Laurent and Kiel. The scarps of these two works are of masonry, peculiar for strength and consistency; the counterscarps are not revetted. Scientific men find fault with the construction of St. Laurent, since, although the ditch on its right flank and face is enfiladed from the ravelins behind Kiel, as well as the bastion and curtain in its rear, the left face is not properly flanked by the citadel. Thus, for instance, on placing oneself in the ditch, a few yards from the capital and looking towards the bastion Toledo, he finds that bastion almost entirely shut out by the angle of the flank; nor does any portion of its fire open on the ditch, unless within a few feet of the counterscarp. The operation of attacking the mines, and establishing and effecting the passage of the ditch, was thus greatly facilitated, and accounts, in a great measure, for the trifling loss sustained by the French during this operation. It was observed in discussing the assault of St. Laurent, that a bold and scientific engineer, determined to defend this post to the uttermost, would, *proprio motu*, have blown in the angle in question; having previously formed an excavation and entrenchment in its rear, as soon as he discovered the preparations for the passage. By this means a much greater portion of the fire of the Toledo battery would have been opened upon the assailants.

The lunette St. Laurent, the gorge of which is defended by a loop-holed wall and trous de loup, was entirely separated from the works in its rear, nor was it even occupied by General Chassé until March, 1831. He then ordered it to be connected with the salient angle of the covered-way of the ravelin, by a strongly palisaded double caponnière, whilst the Belgians were actively employed in constructing batteries on the river face, and throwing up barricades near the esplanade. Chassé having menaced to bombard the city unless the Belgians discontinued their works, these operations were the subject of diplomatic intervention. The governor of the citadel, in reply to the reclamations of the Commissaries of the Conference, declared that he acted thus in consequence of the Belgians having violated the convention by which it was mutually agreed to maintain the *status quo*. The Belgians, on the other hand, recriminated by quoting sundry infractions committed by the Dutch, and although both parties yielded for the moment to the pressing instances of the diplomatists, and abandoned, or feigned to abandon, any further works, the covered communication between St. Laurent and the ravelin was gradually completed, and the defences of the town were progressively brought to that state of menacing efficiency, to which Antwerp may possibly owe its salvation from bombardment: for in General Chassé's report to his government, we find the following remarkable passage:—"I esteem myself fortunate in having been able to arrange the neutrality of the city in this instance, for otherwise our flotilla and the Tête de Flandre must have

long since been destroyed by the superior fire of the enemy's (Belgian) artillery."

The works erected by the Belgians consisted of two or three lines of strong palisaded barricades, intersecting all the streets and avenues leading to the citadel. In these, as well as in various bastions and out-works, cannon and mortars were thickly planted. A line of powerful parapets, epaulements, and batteries, extended from the burned arsenal to the great sluice opening into the basins, and warehouses, which were converted into an intrenched camp, bounded on the south by the canals *des Brasseurs*, *Vieux Lion*, and *L'Ancre*, on the west by the river, and on the north and east by the ramparts of the city. From thence to the Fort du Nord, a chain of batteries was also constructed, mounting from the extreme left to the right, that is including Fort Carnot and Fort du Nord, a formidable armament of mortars and cannon of different calibre, amongst which were several 12-inch mortars on Colonel Paixhan's improved model.\* The whole of these, especially the mortars, bore directly on the citadel, at an extreme distance of one thousand yards, or completely commanded and enfiladed the river, the Tête de Flandre, and Fort St. Hilaire on the left bank.

Antwerp and its citadel are celebrated for having sustained sundry blockades and sieges, and for having changed masters on numerous occasions. These events took place in the years 1576, 1583, 1585, 1706, 1748, 1789, 1792, 1793, and 1814. Amongst the most renowned sieges of former times was that of 1585, when Antwerp was attacked by the Prince of Parma, with 20,000 infantry and 17,000 cavalry. It surrendered on the 17th of August of that year. The most remarkable event of this siege was the construction and destruction of the famous bridge of boats, thrown by the Spaniards across the Scheldt from near Liefkenhock to Lillo. This was effected by an infernal machine invented by the engineer Gennibelli, a native of Mantua. The account given by Strada of this terrible machine is highly curious. The only two sieges undertaken against the citadel since the science of fortification has been reduced to fixed principles are those of 1746 and 1792.

On the 19th of May, 1746, a deputation of the magistrates of Antwerp arrived at the head-quarters of Prince Maurice, of Saxe, announcing that the combined forces had evacuated the city, leaving a garrison of 1600 men in the citadel, under the command of the Marquis de Piza. A corps of troops, under the orders of the Marquis de Brièze were instantly detached from the grand army to take possession of the city. The forts Austrawiel, St. Philippe, and others on the left bank, surrendered at the first summons. The rest of the army destined to besiege the citadel, consisting of 28 battalions and 18 squadrons, having arrived, the trenches were opened on the night of the 25th and 26th, and the first parallel, with its right leaning on the covered-way opposite St. George's gate, now Porte de Malines, and its left extending towards the Kiel road, was traced and completed. The night of the 26th and 27th was occupied in forming the second parallel, the left of which terminated near the centre of the post, with which it was connected by two zig-zags. One ricochet and two mortar batteries were established on the left of the first parallel; and a fourth was constructed on the right of the second, near the ramparts of the town, nearly on the spot where

the left of the counterguard now stands. On the 27th and 28th, the approaches were pushed on to the glacis, in the direction of the capitals of bastions Toledo, Fernando, and the ravelins to their right; and a fifth battery was established in front of the left of the second parallel. The enemy maintained a heavy fire, but no sorties were made. On the 28th and 29th, the sap was prolonged on the right, and the batteries having opened with vigour, the fire of the place began to slacken. On the 29th to 30th, the four saps were carried up to the palisades of the covered-way; and the besieged having abandoned this, on the 30th to 31st, a lodgment was effected, and operations for crowning the glacis were immediately commenced. Preparations having been made for establishing the breaching batteries, the governor hoisted a white flag, and on the following morning, the 1st of June, the garrison surrendered by capitulation, after six days open trenches. The city and citadel were evacuated by the French in 1748, in virtue of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, concluded on the 18th of October of that year.

The operations of the second siege, both as to the neutrality of the city, and breaking ground, bear considerable analogy to those of the present day. After the victory gained by Dumourier, at Jemappe, in November, 1792, the French army divided into two corps. The right pushed on to the Rhine; the left, under General Labourdonaye, advanced upon Antwerp, which opened its gates, on the 18th of November, to General Larmarière, commanding the advanced guard. The French immediately summoned the citadel, where the Marquis of Clermont Tonnerre, with a garrison of 2000 men, had retired, and stoutly refused to surrender. The remaining divisions of the army, amounting altogether to 12,000 men, now arrived; they encamped a little beyond Berchem, at the distance of about 1800 toises from the citadel. A council of war was held on the 22d; the plan of attack was drawn up, and it was determined that, "although the weakest part of the fortress is evidently that fronting the esplanade, yet, in order to spare the inhabitants, the attack shall be directed externally on the front, leaning on the left communication between the citadel and town." It is to this paragraph that Marshal Gerard alludes in his letter to General Chassé. Every preparation being completed, and the neutrality of the town secured, the trenches were opened on the night of the 26th, by 1800 workmen. By a remarkable coincidence with the late siege, a heavy fog hung over the ground and masked the operations, so that the besieged were taken by surprise, and did not open their fire until near eleven on the following day. This was the more remarkable, as a hard frost having hardened the ground to the depth of nearly two inches, the noise of the picks and intrenching-tools might be heard to a great distance. This was considered by the besiegers a most fortunate circumstance, as they were thus enabled nearly to complete the first parallel, with its communications and entrenchments, without the loss of a man. The nature of the soil being such as to render it impossible to dig above twenty inches without encountering water, it was necessary to make up for the deficiency in depth by adding to the breadth of the parallel and approaches. On the 27th, the besieged opened their fire, and General Miranda superseded Labourdonaye in the command of the besiegers. The day was occupied in rendering more perfect the work of the previous twelve hours. On the night of the 27th and 28th, the



first parallel was completed, and the construction of the batteries actively pursued, though the water rendered them scarcely tenable. On the morning of the 28th some of the guns and ammunition were brought up, under a heavy fire from the place. At one P.M., one battery of ten guns opened on the citadel; this was succeeded in the course of the day by a second. Towards four P.M., a flag of truce was sent out by the governor, offering to capitulate; and in the course of an hour, the fire was put a stop to on both sides. After considerable discussion, the capitulation was signed on the morning of the 29th, and the garrison surrendered itself prisoners of war, after little more than forty-eight hours' open trenches. It must be borne in mind that the lunettes Kiel and St. Laurent were not then in existence,—that the garrison were unprovided with ammunition or provisions necessary for a prolonged defence,—and that the left bank and river were occupied by the French.

The precise position of the garrison and defences of the citadel on the 29th November, 1832, may be summed up in a few words. At the moment operations commenced, the Dutch held the citadel, including the lunettes Kiel and St. Laurent, with a garrison of about 4500 men. They had an ample supply of provisions, ammunition, and 130 pieces of artillery of different calibre. The Tête de Flandre, the forts Burcht, Zuyndrecht, and St. Hilaire, were armed and garrisoned by about 500 men, whilst 11 gun-boats and a steamer were anchored in the river. The whole of the Polders, included within the bend of the Scheldt from near the village of Burcht to the Pipe de Tabac, were laid under water to the depth of seven to nine feet, and thus completely secured the forts, flotilla, and citadel from all molestation from the left bank. These inundations were fed by a rupture in the dykes of the Scheldt, nearly opposite the citadel, and another in the vicinity of the Pipe de Tabac. By this means it was intended to have secured a free communication and passage for the gun-boats between the Upper and Lower Scheldt, without the necessity of their passing under the fire of the Belgian batteries; but the operations of the division Sebastiani neutralized the effect of this measure.

Having placed the reader in possession of the above details, which connect the present with the earlier history of this celebrated fortress, and show its state at the moment of attack, we will proceed to narrate the operations of the late siege.

#### PREPARATORY MOVEMENTS AND BREAKING GROUND.

The Dutch cabinet having declined to accede to the terms dictated by a portion of the Conference, a combined fleet proceeded to blockade, or rather cruise off the Dutch coast; and according to the convention signed between the French and British governments on the 22d of October, 1831, orders were given to the French army of the north, to hold itself in readiness to advance at a moment's notice. The term allowed to the Dutch to evacuate the citadel having expired on the 15th of November, instructions were forwarded to the French head-quarters, and by daybreak on that day, the army, consisting of 51 battalions, 56 squadrons, and 56 field-pieces, with a number of batteries, a pontoon brigade, corps of sappers and miners, and a reserve train, forming altogether a force of nearly 55,000 effect-

tives, were in motion towards Antwerp. This force was divided into four divisions of infantry, under Lieut.-Generals Sebastiani, Achard, Jamin, and Fabre; an advanced guard under his royal highness the Duke of Orleans; one division of cuirassiers; one of dragoons; and two detached brigades of light cavalry; comprising altogether eight brigades of infantry, six of cavalry, and eleven of artillery, exclusive of three battalions and eight squadrons, forming the advanced guard. The fifth division, Lieut.-General Schramm, remained in reserve: it was principally formed of provisional battalions of grenadiers and voltigeurs, taken from the fourth battalions of all regiments of the army of the north; which fourth battalions had remained at their depôts.

On the mornings of the 15th, 16th, and 17th, the second, third, and fourth divisions, with 36 field-pieces, preceded by an advanced guard and a brigade of light cavalry, with 6 guns, debouched by Tournay, Mons, and Binch, keeping the right bank of the Scheldt, and, traversing Brussels and the neighbouring towns, reached the vicinity of Antwerp on the 19th, 20th, and 21st. They were followed by a second brigade of light cavalry and the reserve train, which reached Malines and Contich between the 22d and 28th. In the mean time, the first division, with 12 field-pieces, advancing simultaneously by Courtrai, Deynse, and Ghent, to St. Nicholas, established its head-quarters at the latter place; threw forward its advanced posts to Zuynrecht, made preparations to occupy forts St. Marie, St. Philippe, and the dykes near Caloo and Doel, and patrolled those in the direction of the inundations round Liefkenshoek and St. Hilaire. The advanced guard of the Duke of Orleans was sent forward on the 20th on the high roads to Wustwesel and Hoogstraaten, with the head-quarters of the princes at Braeschaet—its left leaning on the light brigade of cavalry (de la Woesteen) thrown out by Capelle on the chaussée to Bergen-op-Zoom, and their right in communication with the Belgian outposts of Turnhout. These troops maintained their positions with little variation during the whole siege.

On the 21st, the division (Achard) moved forward to support the advance, its centre and head-quarters at Schooten, its left reclining on the villages near the Scheldt, with detachments at Fort la Croix, and its right leaning towards the other side of the Turnhout chaussée. The third division (Jamin) was cantoned to the right and left of the high road from Malines to Antwerp, with head-quarters at Contich. The fourth division (Fabre), which had crossed the Ruppel by a pontoon bridge near Boom, was echeloned from thence to the vicinity of Kiel, with its head-quarters at Hemixen; one brigade of this division was bivouacked to the right and left of the chaussée in the rear of Berchem, serving as a guard to the grand parks and artillery depôts. The division of dragoons (Dejean) had its head-quarters at Alost, with detachments at Loikeren and Beveren. The division of cuirassiers (Gentil St. Alphonse) remained in reserve at Grammont. On the 20th, Marshal Gerard removed his head-quarters to Borgerhout, whilst the Directors-General of Engineers and Artillery, Lieutenant-Generals Haxo and Neigre, established theirs at Berchem. Field hospitals were organised at Hoboken and Berchem, with reserves at Malines, Louvain, and Brussels. The grand parks were ordered to be formed at Berchem and Wilryk, where the artificers, aided by the Belgian sappers and miners, immediately prepared an abundant supply of gabions, fascines, saucissons, sand bags, and planks for platforms.

Colonel Caradoc having received orders from the British Government to act as commissioner at the French head-quarters, reached Brussels, and joined the Marshal, placing himself in correspondence with the English envoy, Sir Robert Adair.

In the meanwhile, the Belgian army, compelled by diplomatic arrangements to remain passive spectators of the operations, made a flank movement of concentration to its right, with the head-quarters at Lierre, and the fronts of its columns pressing the Dutch frontier—its left resting on Turnhout, and its right communicating with Venloo, by the moors of Peel, whilst a strong corps observed Maestricht. From the 20th to the 25th the Marshal's attention was occupied in giving more commodious and efficient distribution to the cantonments of the troops, who from being concentrated in great numbers round the immediate vicinity of Antwerp, were extremely crowded, and thus not only caused great inconvenience to the inhabitants, but themselves suffered much from the confined nature of their quarters. Their numbers also exceeding the returns for which preparations had been originally made by the Belgian commissariat, a want of provisions and forage ensued in the first instance, but these evils were speedily remedied. Some damage to property likewise took place. In consequence of the want of fuel, some fine timber and ornamental plantations were felled by the troops; but the severe discipline established by the Marshal, and the vigilance of the military police, quickly put an end to excesses, which, however much to be condemned, were the almost inevitable result of the absence of proper provision for the calls of the soldier, the want of which was more severely felt from the inauspicious nature of the season.

By the 26th, the whole of the troops were distributed in the cantonments they were destined to hold during the siege, some of which were, however, at a considerable distance. This, combined with the frightful state of the weather, and impracticable condition of the cross-roads, added much to the fatigues of the detachments on marching to and from the trenches. Some of these came from and returned to Malines after taking their turn of duty. The battering train, entrenching tools, and ammunition, which had been embarked at Douai, and thence, descending the Scarpe and Scheldt, conveyed to Boom on the Ruppel, did not reach the latter until the 23d and subsequent days, and it was not until the 27th and 28th that a sufficient quantity was landed, so as to enable Generals Haxo and Neigre to report the effective establishment of their respective parks, when, as we observed before, a vast supply of fascines and gabions was already collected. It was observed, that these gabions, which weighed about 45 lbs. each, were peculiarly strong and well formed, and the small twigs and dried leaves being left on, and wattled inwardly, gave additional strength and solidity to the whole; they were principally made from the small branches of the pollard oak. All previous preparations and details being completed, the Marshal moved his head-quarters to the village of Berchem on the 29th, and issued orders for commencing operations at night-fall.

At eight P.M. the troops destined for this service, consisting of three brigades, 18 battalions of infantry, 900 artillery, and 400 sappers, the whole under the command of his royal highness the Duke of Orleans, assembled by detachments at the three depôts of entrenching tools that had been formed for the purpose; the right near the church of Ber-

chem, the centre near the garden called the *Parc aux choux*, and the left a little to the right of the Boom road, near the country-house of a Mr. Verbeck. The covering parties, composed of the flank companies of these brigades, supported by twelve 8-pounders and a strong picquet of cavalry, debouched under cover of the walls and hedges, and were thrown out under the direction of General Haxo, by whom, and the officers of his department, the first parallel and its approaches were traced out, whilst General Neigre and the officers of artillery simultaneously occupied themselves in marking the projected batteries. The first parallel leaned on the covered way of the right face of Montebello, and its left extended towards Kiel, terminating in two embranchments on the banks of a small stream and road of that name. Its nearest point was about 325 and its farthest about 435 yards distant from the most advanced works of the citadel. The distance covered by the first parallel from right to left was 1870 yards, and by the approaches in its rear about 3750. The communications for the right and centre debouched from the Malines Chaussée, in the village of Berchem, parallel to the road from thence to the Harmony and St. Laurent; that for the left commenced near the garden called Hemrichs; whilst a fourth, on the extreme right, sprung from the covered way of the left flank of Montebello, opposite the first traverse.

Owing to the tempestuous state of the weather, and other causes, it was not until near midnight that the working parties were definitively posted and enabled to commence breaking ground; but as the nature of the soil rendered the employment of the pickaxe almost unnecessary, the works advanced rapidly, and the whole of the troops were under cover by daylight. The ground between the Malines Chaussée and that conducting to Boom, is of a soft and spongy nature, and is, in fact, a mere series of gardens and pleasure grounds, where the insertion of the spade beyond the depth of eighteen or twenty inches, infallibly produces water; this was of course attended with many serious evils, and in some parts rendered the trenches untenable, and utterly prevented the possibility of conveying the artillery through the ordinary channels; at the same time this was attended with one or two marked advantages: as the absence of all stones and hard substances not only afforded greater facility for rapid excavation, but had the important merit of diminishing the danger from splinters, whilst, in many instances, the heavy shells embedded themselves to such a depth as to render their explosion perfectly innocuous. Thus, out of twenty-eight of these projectiles thrown by the besieged, during one day, into battery No. 7, three only cast their splinters above ground.

In this instance, as in 1792, the garrison appears to have been ignorant of the operations of attack, for it was not until near nine A.M. on the subsequent morning, that the Dutch engineers discovered that ground had been broken. It must, however, be observed, as some excuse for this apparent want of vigilance, that the night was rainy and tempestuous; that a dense fog completely veiled the atmosphere; that the ground from the Malines road, round Berchem and St. Laurent, to the foot of the glacis of the citadel and outworks, is intersected in every direction by trees, hedges, plantations, gardens, and buildings, and that it presents the utmost possible advantage for masking and concealing the advance of troops or working parties. It is, in fact, difficult to dis-

cern objects at the distance of 400 yards, even in the day-time, whilst at night it is almost impossible, unless forewarned or alarmed by the sound of voices and tools, to discover anything that may be going on at half that distance. On the other hand, General Chassé must have been well aware of the intended attack, which had been delayed by fortuitous circumstances. He had complete command of the ground to the distance of 325 yards from the foot of his glacis, according to the convention with Belgium; and although he had withdrawn his picquets within his covered ways, surely it was the duty of a vigilant commander to have patrolled his front, or to have employed confidential and enterprising officers to reconnoitre at night-fall, and thus procure him instant information of the enemy's operations. It may be argued, in consequence of the anomalous nature of the whole proceedings, and the declaration that the contending parties were not to be considered at war with each other, an opinion not participated in by the Germanic Confederation, as appeared by their 46th protocol, that General Chassé had some excuse for his apparent supineness, from the supposition that the formality of a summons would have preceded any positive attack. His letter in reply to that of Marshal Gerard bears this construction. Be this as it may, an operation that is usually attended by considerable loss to the besiegers, was effected without the slightest obstruction, and this unlooked for advantage was enhanced by the artillery having simultaneously traced out and commenced the construction of the batteries, twelve in number, at the same moment that the engineers were employed in defining the parallel, an occurrence almost unprecedented in former sieges. We have dwelt upon this point, not only because we consider it to have been a serious error, however occasioned, on the part of the besieged, but because it seemed to form one of a series of instances wherein the besieged appeared deficient in vigilance and activity. The system of reserving or husbanding the means of defence until the near approach of the enemy shall render every shot more effective, cannot hold good when the attacks are commenced at a distance which may be considered as less than half of that usually determined upon for the opening of the first parallel.

At daybreak on the morning of the 30th, the covering parties were withdrawn into the parallel, or places under cover, behind some of the numerous adjacent buildings, and Colonel Auvray, sous chef de l'état major, was despatched with a flag of truce, which produced the following correspondence between the Marshal and General Chassé:—

“ Berchem, near Antwerp, 30th Nov. 1832.

“ Monsieur le General,

“ I have arrived before the citadel of Antwerp at the head of the French army, with a mission from my government to reclaim the execution of the treaty of the 15th Nov. 1831, which guarantees to his Majesty the King of the Belgians possession of this fortress, as well as the forts thereon depending on both sides of the Scheldt.

“ I hope to find you disposed to admit the justice of this demand. If, contrary to my expectation, it should be otherwise, I am charged to inform you that I mean to employ the means at my disposal to obtain possession of the citadel of Antwerp.

“ The operations of the siege will be directed against the external faces of the citadel, and although the weakness of the fortifications on the side near the river, and the cover of the houses, offer me advantages for attacking, I take advantage of them. I have then to expect, in conformity with

the laws of war, and the usages constantly observed, that you will abstain from any species of hostility against the city. I shall occupy a portion of it, with the sole view of preventing anything that might expose it to the fire of your artillery. A bombardment would be an act of useless barbarity, and a calamity for the commerce of all nations.

"If, notwithstanding these considerations, you should fire on the town, France and England will exact indemnities equivalent to the damage done by the fire of the citadel, forts, and ships of war. It is impossible that you yourself cannot foresee that, in such case, you would be responsible for the violation of a usage respected by all civilized nations, as well as for the evils that must result. I await your reply, and trust it will suit you to enter forthwith into negotiation with me for surrendering the citadel of Antwerp and forts depending upon it. —Receive, &c.

"To General Chassé,  
&c. &c. &c."

(Signed) COMTE GERARD, &c."

"Citadel of Antwerp, 30th Nov. 1832.

"Monsieur le Marechal,

"In reply to your summons, which I have this instant received, I apprise you, Monsieur le Marechal, that I will not surrender the citadel of Antwerp until I shall have exhausted all the means of defence placed at my disposal.

"I will consider the town of Antwerp neuter so long as no use is made of the fortifications of the town, or exterior works depending on it, whose fire might be directed against the citadel or Tête de Flandre, including the forts Burght, Zuyndrecht, and Austruwiel (St. Hilaire), as well as the flotilla stationed in the Scheldt before Antwerp. It must be understood, as a matter of course, that the free communication, by the Scheldt, with Holland, as it has hitherto taken place, must not be interrupted.

"I learn, with surprise, that whilst your Excellency is engaged in negotiations, hostilities have been commenced, by opening offensive works under the very fire of our cannon; consequently, I have the honour to apprise you, that if, by mid-day these works are not discontinued, I shall find myself under the necessity of preventing them by force.—Receive, &c.

(Signed) CHASSÉ."

"To Marshal Gerard,  
&c. &c. &c."

At mid-day precisely the garrison opened its fire, but with trifling effect, the range of the shells was uncertain, and it was observed that the greater portion either fell short or buried themselves without exploding. At three p.m. Marshal Gerard despatched a flag of truce, with the following letter, to which General Chassé replied in the evening :—

"Berchem, near Antwerp, 30th Nov. 1832.

"Monsieur le General,

"The first hostilities are in the cannon-shot that you have fired on my troops\*, at the very moment I received your letter of this day's date. The

\* We confess ourselves much inclined to agree with General Chassé in his argument, as regards the first act of hostilities, and construction to be put on Montebello and the other works alluded to. According to all the received usages of war, the first, and, indeed, one of the most important, acts of hostility, is the action of breaking ground, which the Marshal designates as "*dispositions*." Marshal Gerard says that "he reposes his proceedings on the examples of 1746 and 1792." Now, if we are not much mistaken, neither Montebello, the counter-guard, or any of the exterior works were then in existence; besides, if they had been, we cannot conceive how it is possible to consider them as not belonging to the body of the place, more especially, since they are contained within the glacis and covered way. Montebello may be termed an advanced, but not a detached, work; but this cannot be said of

cutting the dykes near Liefkenshoek on the 21st and 25th instant, and the shot fired at the Belgian officer, might be considered as a rupture of the armistice, much more than the dispositions commenced on the ground occupied by me before the citadel. Before opening my fire, I wished to offer you the means of preserving the city of Antwerp and its population from the evils of war; and, for this desirable purpose, I offered to renounce the advantages presented to me by an attack from the side of the houses, by restricting myself to the external faces. The lunette Montebello is necessarily comprised in the latter, as well as the counter-guards and works not forming a part of the body of the place, properly speaking.

"In acting thus, I have reposed on the examples of the sieges of 1746 and 1792, during which the town, by mutual consent, was considered neuter, without, however, the besiegers losing the faculty of extending their works to the extreme defences. If, whilst I avail myself of this faculty, you seize this opportunity to fire on the city, I shall be entitled to attack your citadel from the side that best suits me, and you know the disadvantage that must then result to your defence.

"If, for the preservation of the town, I may consent not to employ the internal batteries against the Tete de Flandre, I cannot on this account admit that you shall preserve the right of freely navigating the Scheldt. This, on my part, would be equivalent to besieging without blockading you. It is my duty, then, Monsieur le General, in the interest of your honour and your humanity, to urge you to conclude arrangements by which the city may be placed as neuter between you and me, reminding you that the whole responsibility of a refusal must fall on yourself.

(Signed) MARSHAL GERARD."

"To General Chassé,  
&c. &c. &c."

"Citadel of Antwerp, 30th Nov. 1832.

"Monsieur le Maréchal,

"In reply to your Excellency's second letter of this day, I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that at the moment you made propositions not to attack the citadel from the town side, your troops were occupied without in erecting offensive works against me, which I found myself compelled to oppose. It is on your part, therefore, Monsieur le Marechal, that hostilities have commenced. However, neither the fortifications of the town of Antwerp, nor the detached works and forts can ever be permitted to be made use of to besiege the citadel, and I apprise you, Monsieur le Marechal, that at the first gun-shot fired from any of these points, I shall consider the town as having assumed an hostile attitude, that may expose it to total ruin, of which the fiercest results must fall personally on your Excellency. It is most incontestable, Monsieur le Marechal, that the abovementioned works were constructed for the defence of the place, and not to attack the citadel. It is thus that they always have been considered and acknowledged by the military authorities of Antwerp.

"The free communication with Holland by the Scheldt, which has always existed, is a point so just, that it cannot be conceded by me, nor am I able to comprehend how this communication can be detrimental to your operations of attack.

"You see by these propositions, Monsieur le Marechal, that I am well-disposed to spare the town, as, indeed, my conduct has too well proved during two years, notwithstanding the reiterated provocation of the inhabitants and military authorities.

"To Marshal Gerard,  
&c. &c. &c."

(Signed) CHASSÉ."

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the counter-guard, which, to all intents and purposes, must be held as forming an integral part of the defences. It might as well be argued that a ravelin or tenaille before a curtain is not comprised within the immediate works of any given fortress.

The frequent menaces of bombardment made by General Chassé, combined with the recollection of what had occurred in 1830, had led the greater portion of the inhabitants, indeed, all Europe, to look upon the destruction of the city as nearly inevitable; thus, the arrival of the French army, and the commencement of operations, was the signal for general emigration, or for the removal or concealment of all such property as could be transported. Every precaution was, however, taken by the authorities to anticipate misfortune and preserve tranquillity, whilst detachments of firemen and engines were sent from all the principal towns in Belgium, in readiness to act in case of conflagration. In order, however, to prevent all collision between the Dutch and Belgians, and thus to deprive General Chassé of any legitimate pretext for firing on the town, the Belgian troops were withdrawn from the parts bordering on the citadel, and their places occupied by a detachment of French troops, according to a convention, of which the following is an extract, signed between the Marshal and Governor on the 29th:—

“The lunette Montebello shall be given up to the French troops. Five hundred men shall have permission to pass through the town every day, by the Malines gate, to occupy the first line of posts. The gates of the city shall remain occupied by Belgians, who will also maintain the second line of defences.”

The natural fears of a timid and mercantile population, combined with their terrified remembrance of the past, and their ignorance of what might be termed the “*stale-mate*” given to Chassé by the overpowering strength of the city batteries, still maintained considerable alarm, and this was augmented to a general panic, when, upon the opening of the French batteries, and an accidental falling into the streets of the city, nearest the burned arsenal, of three or four shells, some officious persons in authority recommended all such inhabitants as still remained, either to fly, or prepare for the worst emergency. Confidence and courage, however, promptly revived, and at the end of twenty-four hours all apprehension of a bombardment subsided. Many persons who had abandoned the city returned to their houses, whilst several foreign officers and strangers flocked from different countries to witness the operations: amongst these were a few British. But it was remarked with surprise that, with the exception of Colonel Webber Smyth, of the Horse Artillery, and Captain Biand्रेth, of the Engineers, no other officers of their departments were present. The reverse had been expected, both from the vicinity of Antwerp; and from the rare opportunities afforded in modern times for obtaining practical information in the art of sieges; and we may safely affirm that such an occasion of witnessing some of the interesting operations executed by the French engineers, is not likely to be a matter of early occurrence. The above-mentioned two officers assiduously followed the works, and were constantly seen in the most advanced approaches and batteries. In consequence of many suspicious persons having hovered about the head-quarters, and penetrated into the trenches, strict orders were issued by Marshal Gerard to exclude every one, unless provided with a written pass. These permissions, signed by Lieutenant-General St. Cyr Nugues, Chief of the Staff, were accorded, without difficulty, on application through the regular channels, and we feel ourselves bound to acknow-



ledge the civility and good-humour of generals, officers, and soldiers, in showing the trenches and batteries, and giving every information in their power.

During the day of the 30th, an attempt was made by the engineers to drain off some of the water that particularly incommoded the centre and left of the trenches, by opening the sluices of Kiel, and others in its vicinity; but although a fall of fifteen inches was thus obtained, it had little permanent effect, from the continuance of the heavy rains, the mud and water in many parts being above two feet deep. The working parties were occupied as usual in widening and strengthening the parallel and approaches, and in establishing banquettes in different directions. The artillery were actively engaged in completing the batteries, of which ten, including Montebello, for guns and howitzers, and two for mortars, were already in an advanced state, and it was supposed, that thirty-six hours would suffice to bring up the guns, so as to open the fire on the third morning. During the day, the garrison maintained a steady fire, but the intervals between the shots were longer than is ordinary in such cases. At three P.M. the trenches were relieved by one brigade of infantry, and detachments of flankers, and during the remainder of the siege this operation was always performed about that hour.

Whilst these events were passing, the division Achard was occupied in watching the right bank of the Scheldt, and in attempting to place Forts la Croix and St. Philippe in a state of defence; but the deplorable condition of the roads rendered it impossible for them to bring up more than one gun and two howitzers. On the left bank General Sebastiani took possession of Fort St. Marie, the fire of which crosses with that of St. Philippe exactly opposite. Detachments were thrown out upon the dykes of Doel and Liefkenshoek, which fort, as well as those in front of Antwerp, were summoned, but their commander returned an energetic and negative reply. The Dutch vessels moored opposite Doel, and as high up as Fort St. Hilaire, exchanged fire with the French detachments, and endeavoured to incommode them in their operations, they were briskly replied to from some field-pieces and musketry, but with little effect on either side. The gun-boats in the Scheldt, under the command of Colonel Koopman, maintained their position opposite the citadel, and, as the Dutch at Tete de Flandre were observed to have unmasked two or three embrasures on the town, the Belgians constructed a new battery for six guns on the quay.

Second night, 30th Nov. to 1st Dec.—Five approaches were pushed on in front of the first parallel, two in the direction of the capital of the Toledo bastion, two upon that of the lunette St. Laurent, and a fifth, terminating in a place of arms, on the extreme left. The superabundant strength of the garrison,—which exceeded, by more than 2000 men, the number required according to fixed principles, and which, in the late instance, must have been a source of inconvenience, rather than an advantage,—combined with the determined character of the governor, had led the besiegers to expect that the night would not have been permitted to pass without a vigorous sortie. Vigilant preparations were therefore made, to repulse any attempt of this nature, but nothing occurred, and by daylight the trenches as well as batteries were nearly completed. The fire of the garrison, languid during the night, increased

in vigour after sun-rise. It was remarked, that this fire was generally hottest from seven until nine in the forenoon, and from mid-day to three P.M. At all times, however, they kept up a sharp discharge of musketry and rampart guns, which was replied to from the parallel and place of arms, the crests of which were surmounted with sand-bags, whence the covering parties, mounted on the banquettes, replied with constancy. The day was occupied in improving the work of the night, and in cutting drains to carry off water, wherever the nature of the level permitted. It was found necessary also to cover the bottom with single or double rows of fascines, but in some parts even these precautions were insufficient to produce a foundation sufficiently solid to resist the pressure of heavy guns. The artillery were actively engaged in preparing the service magazines, and in laying down the platforms and bringing up the pieces to the tails of the different communications through which they were to be conveyed to their respective batteries. On the right this was a matter of less difficulty; but on the left, the marshy and impracticable nature of the ground presented the most serious obstacles; and, as it was the Marshal's intention to open the whole of his fire simultaneously, considerable delay was anticipated, and, indeed, a question arose, whether it would eventually be possible to drag up the pieces to the batteries on the extreme left. This was effected, as will afterwards appear, by a bold and unprecedented manœuvre.

During the afternoon an attempt was made by some soldiers of the garrison, disguised as peasants, to set fire to some of the numerous buildings bordering on the covered way of St. Laurent. After partially effecting their purpose with great courage, they were discovered and driven back. It is a matter of surprise, considering the number of these buildings, independent of the hedge-rows, railings, and low walls, that mask the ground in front of the defences, that General Chassé had not earlier taken precautions to destroy them. One can well comprehend the motives of humanity that dictated such forbearance, but self-defence in war is a paramount consideration, to which the finer feelings of humanity must, unfortunately, give way. It is true that, upon first declaring the city "in a state of siege," in Sept. 1830, General Chassé gave a noble example by destroying a house of his own within a short distance of the covered way, but the destruction was confined to this single building. We shall quote an extract from an original letter, dated on the 27th May, 1831, and addressed by the General to the Commissaries of the Conference, on the subject of the offensive works then carried on in this spot by the Belgians. The passage does the highest honour to the disinterested sentiments of the gallant veteran. After remonstrating against the works alluded to, he says,—

"This morning they have been seen actively working at a manufacture of fascines (*atelier de fascinage*) at musket-shot distance from the capital of the lunette St. Laurent, within the enclosure of a small property belonging to myself, and of which I was the first to destroy the dwelling-house, on the occasion of our being declared in a state of siege. This new devastation is a matter of indifference to me, and I should rejoice if all those that may result from this state of affairs, could be concentrated in it alone."

From 1st to 21 Dec.—Two zig-zags were added to the approaches

thrown up the previous night. One from the centre in the direction of the gorge of St. Laurent, the other on the right diverging towards the curtain between the Toledo and Hernando bastions. The heavy and incessant rains sorely incommoded the workmen, and impeded the arming of the batteries; the attention of the engineers was directed to diminishing these evils, which, in despite of facines and frames, rendered some part of the trenches almost impracticable. Numerous banquettes were established in front, and steps cut in the rear of the trenches, the crests of which were generally furnished with sand-bag loop-holes. Soon after daybreak a sally was made by the garrison, in the direction of the left of the parallel. About 600 men, under the command of a field-officer, and covered by a heavy fire of shot, shells, and rampart guns from the bastions and St. Laurent, debouched by the sally-bridge on the right flank of the ravelin, and gallantly advanced up to the crest of the trench; but the covering parties being prepared, they were instantly repulsed, with trifling loss on both sides. On the other hand, the French post at the Melk-huys was dislodged by the raking fire of the gun-boats, and the Dutch maintained an advanced picquet in this direction, showing a disposition to cut the dyke; an operation, which, had it been effectually practised, might have inundated the ground from the banks of the river up to the Kiel road. But this road being elevated on an embankment, forms a dyke to the country between it and the Malines Chaussée. This is worthy of observation, as various erroneous opinions were put forth as to the power of General Chassé to inundate the left and centre batteries at spring-tides. It appears, however, that such a measure is impracticable, the chaussée being elevated about thirty inches above the highest water-mark. Measures were taken to ascertain this fact by the French engineers, and thus no alarm was felt by the marshal. The fire from the fortress was by no means vigorous, but it was remarked that the practice of the Dutch gunners was highly praiseworthy,—one piece in the salient of St. Laurent, the range of which enfiladed the road from Weyerick, considerably annoyed the advance of the pieces and ammunition from the park. On the left bank, the little garrison of fort Burcht made a sally, and succeeded in effecting a cut in the dyke, which completely insulated this fort. In the mean time, General Sebastiani's detachments had to sustain a heavy cannonade from the vessels of war moored opposite the dykes. The casualties during the day and previous night were comparatively trifling. The surgeons established their field-hospital in the rear of the first parallel. The slightly wounded were conveyed to the church of St. Laurent, where they received the first dressing, and were then removed to the temporary hospital at Hoboken, and from thence to Malines and Louvain. All severe cases were transported on bearers to the hospital in Antwerp, where they were attended by French and Belgian surgeons. The advantage of such a disposition requires no comment; and as the wounded were thus spared the pain of removal after amputation, the number of deaths was incredibly small.

The light cavalry of the advanced guard was employed in patrolling the frontier, where there was not the slightest symptom of any intention on the part of the Prince of Orange to move to the succour of the place. Indeed, when we consider that his royal highness (exclusive

of probable motives of policy) had little more than 45,000 effectives, with about 80 pieces of cannon, to oppose against 60,000 Belgians and 30,000 disposable French, with nearly 200 guns,—it can be no matter of surprise that he remained a passive spectator of the operations. To have ventured an attack would have been an experiment too hazardous to be undertaken without the promise or certainty of support from Russia; and although a Prussian corps of 28,000 men had its head-quarters at Crefeld, its advanced posts near the Meuse, and its reserves at Cologne and Dusseldorf, still there was no certainty of its making any hostile movement, or supporting any offensive operations on the part of the Dutch. Even admitting that the numbers of the two armies had been more equal, the measure would have been dangerous. To have advanced by the Breda and Turnhout roads on Antwerp, would have exposed his left flank and rear to have been turned by the Belgian first and third divisions, and thus left the road to Bois le Duc and Tilbourg completely open, and endangered his retreat. Whilst had he thrown forward his right, and refused his left, and endeavoured to have made a dash on Brussels by the routes of Diest and Louvain, the combined forces would have placed their main body on the advantageous position of the two rivers Nette; and whilst their right masked Mäestricht, their left would have been in readiness to operate on the right flank and rear of the advancing army, and thus endangered its communications, and cut off its retreat from Holland.

It has been omitted to mention that a Dutch lieutenant of artillery deserted from the citadel prior to the commencement of operations. This miserable man communicated some valuable information as to the amount of guns and interior defences. His picture of the casemates and state of the garrison was borne out by subsequent facts. For the honour of Holland we ought to remark, that during the progress of the war, few native soldiers have abandoned their colours, and only this one officer, who, in reply to questions put to him, could adduce no motive for his disgraceful conduct.

2d to 3d Dec.—Four zig-zags were made in front of the approaches on the right and centre, and a half parallel to complete the place of arms was constructed on the night of the 30th, on the left. Several boyaus were also thrown up in its rear, with the hope of meeting dry ground for communications, but no solid bottom could be obtained. The heads of the zig-zags were now pushed within 135 yards of the foot of the glacis. The progress made by the artillery this night was of immense importance. The batteries Nos. 1 (commencing with Montebello on the right) 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9, with two for mortars in the rear of the centre and left of the first parallel, were completely armed and ready to be unmasked at a moment's notice. The compact and handsome construction of these batteries, the solidity of their parapets and service magazines, were much admired. The operation of arming Nos. 7, 8, and 10 on the extreme left, was impeded by the difficulties of the ground; and in the latter, more especially, by one of the 24-pounders having upset at the mouth of the communication, thus precluding the possibility of bringing up the others. Several hours' labour was required to extricate the fallen piece, which had become imbedded in the mud, and it was only by immense exertions that this could be effected, and the passage cleared. The working parties were principally occu-

pied during the day in widening and completing the excavations of the night, particularly the left advanced half parallel, where considerable height was given to the parapets by banquettes and half cavaliers, established through its whole length. A steady fire of musketry was kept up from this point on the ramparts and embrasures, which was effectively replied to by the besieged with their rampart guns and biscayans. Every effort was made to render the communications leading to the batteries more practicable for artillery, but in despite of an immense quantity of fascines and other materials employed, it was found impossible, in some parts, to form any firm foundation; an obstacle increased by the continued rains and the filtrations from the small springs, rills, and ditches that intersected the ground in front of the prolonged faces of St. Laurent. Notwithstanding the professed neutrality of the Belgians, three companies of artillery of that nation were employed in aiding to construct the batteries; the number of French artillery, six companies, being insufficient to man and work them. Marshal Gerard was desirous to have employed Belgians; but the diplomatists very judiciously interfered, and the Belgians confined their assistance to the mere spade-work, until a reinforcement of seven companies of French artillery arrived by forced marches. Three Belgian officers of engineers, and three of artillery, were however attached to Generals Haxo and Neigre, for the sake of reporting proceedings to the chiefs of their respective departments at the head-quarters, which were established at Antwerp. A Dutch soldier having attempted to desert by the burned arsenal, was fired on by his comrades. The French sentinel, mistaking this for an attempted sortie, discharged his piece; the picket turned out, and it was not until two or three volleys were fired, that the mistake was discovered. A trifling sortie was attempted from the right flank of the covered-way of the ravelin, but was repulsed without the covering party quitting the half parallel. There was neither vigour nor force sufficient employed on these occasions. They were, moreover, executed in the day-time, when they could be immediately detected and galled as they filed out of the covered-way, and thus exposed to loss ere they were enabled to form on the glacis, or return the fire from the place of arms.

3d to 4th Dec.—The second parallel was traced and commenced; its right leaping on the foot of the glacis of the counterguard; its centre and right 130 yards distant from the place of arms in the covered-way of bastion Toledo; and its left terminating to the right of the covered-way of St. Laurent, at the distance of 90 yards from its crest, and 15 yards from the foot of its glacis. The extreme half parallel on the left was projected beyond the boom chaussée in the direction of the salient of the covered-way of the lunette Kiel. Banquettes in front, and steps in the rear, were established throughout; these were the more necessary in this quarter, as the water nearly filled the trench to a level with the terre plein. The length of the second parallel was 1250 yards, occupying altogether with its approaches from the first parallel, 3025 yards of ground. By extraordinary exertion the batteries Nos. 7, 8, and 10 were armed this night. The unsound nature of the ground bade defiance to all the exertions of the men and horses, and the resources of art. A bold plan was therefore projected, and successfully executed. A passage was cut in the parapet and reverse of the left communica-

tion near the Kiel road, the trench was filled up with fascines, the ground sounded in front, and found substantial. A few additional horses were then harnessed to each piece; they were dragged out in front of the parallel, completely exposed to the fire of the besiegers, at the distance of 220 yards, and brought round to batteries Nos. 7 and 8, without accident to the guns, and with very trifling casualties amongst the artillerymen. Marshal Gerard thus speaks of this operation, in his letter to the Duke of Dalmatia, dated 4th December:—

"I ought to state, Monsieur le Ministre, that I was astounded to the utmost excess, at their obtaining a result so satisfactory. It is impossible, without seeing it, to imagine that human efforts could accomplish such an enterprise."

Had a bold and vigorous sortie been made during the moment of this perilous and daring enterprise, well supported by the fire of the place, the confusion and loss to the besiegers must infallibly have been great; but on this, as on sundry other occasions, favourable opportunities were unfortunately thrown away by the garrison, which justified the opinion generally entertained, that they were more inclined to confine themselves to a passive defence, and to trust rather to the skill and courage of their artillery than to the science of their engineers, and the valour of their infantry. It may, indeed, be affirmed that the whole merit of the defence rested with the gunners, whose conduct cannot be too highly appreciated.

#### OPENING AND PROGRESS OF THE BESIEGING BATTERIES.

The whole of the batteries being completely armed, at eleven A.M. the embrasures were unmasked, and the signal being given by a shot from No. 5, they opened their fire from centre to flanks, and maintained it steadily during the day. The disposition of the batteries was as follows:—

No.	Twenty-four Pounders.	Sixteen Pounders.	8-Inch Howitzers.	
1	4	2	2	{ battering gorge of St. Laurent, and left face of Toledo.
2	2	2	2	{ enfilading right face of Toledo.
3	4	2	2	{ battering retired flank of Paciotto, and reverse of ravelin.
4	0	2	2	{ battering left face of ravelin.
5	4	3	0	{ battering curtain between Paciotto and Toledo.
6	0	2	2	{ enfilading right face of St. Laurent.
7	4	2	0	{ enfilading left face of Toledo.
8	0	3	2	{ enfilading left face of St. Laurent.
9	0	0	8	{ battering left face of lunette Kiel.
10	8	0	0	{ battering salient and left face of Paciotto.
A } B }	mortars 10 and 8 inch {		12 9	
	26	18	41	
Total, 85.				

The garrison, which had hitherto shown itself on the parapets, now retired behind the ramparts, and the men not on duty were confined to the casemates. Their artillery replied with animation, unmasking several new embrasures against the batteries erected upon the prolongations of the faces, and maintaining a vigorous discharge from the guns and mortars under the blinds in the retired flank of Paciotto. Generally speaking, the blinds raised over the embrasures on the faces and salients, from being exposed to a raking fire, especially from the long howitzers, were seen to give way, and may be said to have produced embarrassment rather than security. The advantage of these works, in all points protected from flank fire, is unquestionable; but we are not prepared to admit their utility when exposed to the action of ricochet on their flanks. It is necessary to observe, that General Chassé, in his official report, lays great stress on the destructive and "irresistible" effect of what he terms the "Paixhans" howitzers. This is an error: the only howitzers employed were those of the new model,—improvements on the Russian licorne. It is true, the first idea of this improvement was suggested by the scientific officer in question, but the long howitzer used by the French is totally dissimilar from the cannon bomb that owes its name to Colonel Paixhans. Several mortars and guns on Colonel Paixhans' plan were mounted in the city batteries, but from motives which are best known to the Committee of Artillery and General Neigre, none of this model were employed. The importance attached by General Chassé to the power of howitzer fire is worthy of attention; it affords a striking proof of the advantage of using hollow projectiles either en ricochet or point blank.

Whilst on the subject of the battering guns, it must be observed that the whole were of brass, of peculiar beauty, with improved limbers and trains; the prejudice existing in the French artillery against the employment of iron guns is too well known to require observation, nor is it within our limits to enter into any discussion on the subject. Certain it is, however, that the fire of brass guns cannot be so quick or constant as that of iron pieces, and, on the present occasion, the discharge of the French batteries was by no means rapid. For, taking the whole number of round shot fired in nineteen days, between eleven A.M. on the 4th to nine A.M. on the 23d, at 33,000, it will give about 1736 per day, and the average number of 24 and 16 pounders, exclusive of howitzers and mortars, being about 40, it will only allow  $72\frac{1}{2}$  per hour, or somewhere about 43 shot per gun during 24 hours. The quantity of 8-inch howitzer shells expended was nearly 16,000, the number of the howitzers 20; this gives a lesser proportion. The mortar batteries, comprising nearly 40, fired about 14,000 rounds, by which it will be seen that there was no excessive expenditure of ammunition compared with the mass of guns.

Although the casualties in the batteries and trenches had increased since the commencement of the fire, the loss in killed and wounded was extremely trifling; this must be attributed to the remarkable solidity of the epaulements, and not to any want of skill on the part of the Dutch gunners. The precision of their aim, especially with their long guns, was generally praised.

In the mean while, the besiegers watched, with anxiety, the effect of their fire, which was seen to tell with force, especially on the faces of the

Toledo bastion, where two guns were silenced, and before nightfall the embrasures, merlins, and some of the blinds, were found to have given way, whilst videttes, placed on the tower of the church of Notre Dame, reported that the howitzer and mortar shells had ignited several portions of the interior; but the besieged succeeded in subduing the flames before they effected serious injury. The fire from Montebello appeared to be extremely galling to the enemy, and, as the legitimate use of this fort by the French was a matter of great doubt, apprehensions were entertained that General Chassé would at length open his guns on the town, but it was not observed that he had remounted any of his pieces on the curtain or faces opposite the city, whence they had been removed to be employed elsewhere. The evening, however, passed without any molestation, and the city was looked upon as secure. The loss of the besiegers, up to this evening, amounted to 15 killed, and 20 wounded; that of the besieged, to 1 killed, and 7 wounded, with 3 missing, and 15 killed and wounded in the sorties.

The working parties were employed in rendering more perfect the communications between the first and second parallel, and in cutting steps on the reverses of the boyaus, in order to admit of easier egress in the event of attack. The second parallel was furnished with banquettes, and the crest of the parapets topped with sand-bags. The remarkable strength and security of all these works, part of which were executed by flying sap, were highly advantageous, and acted powerfully on the *morale* of the young troops. In fact, it is but justice to the French engineer officers and sappers to state, that from the first opening of the trenches up to the last preparation for the passage of the ditch, the whole of their operations were admirable for their beauty and efficiency; having the air of practice-works thrown up for the instruction of cadets, rather than offensive operations constructed under a galling fire, and carried on under great difficulties of ground and weather.

The batteries having thus opened their fires on the 5th morning, at a distance not exceeding 450 yards from the bastions, and within 300 of the covered-way of St. Laurent, the sap having been pushed on to the foot of the glacis of the latter, and the wall at the gorge having been breached, preparations were made for attempting to carry it by escalade; but the time being no object, in comparison with the desire of the Marshal to spare the blood of his people, and the engineers being, moreover, anxious to obtain as much practice as possible, and to execute some of those operations that are of rare occurrence in sieges, the project of attacking St. Laurent by a *coup de main* was abandoned for the more certain method of a descent into the ditch and mine.

From 4th to 5th.—An approach was pushed on from the second parallel, almost in a direct line, upon the salient of St. Laurent, and an entry was made in the covered-way by a return to the left. This operation at first proceeded without obstruction; but about two A.M. the garrison discovered what was passing, and opened a sharp fire of musketry from the lunette, and of grape and biscayans from the ram-parts. A lodgement was, however, effected without loss near the spot usually occupied by the first traverse. It was remarked with surprise, that the besieged, having a superabundant garrison, should have abandoned the covered-way of the lunette, whence they might have sorely galled the workmen, and impeded the progress of the sap. The same obser-



vation may be applied to the other covered-ways and places of arms, during the remainder of the siege, they being for the most part slackly defended or totally abandoned.

On the right a boyau was run forward by flying sap from the second parallel, in the direction of the Toledo bastion, and ending on the boom chaussée, which quits the city at the Beguine's gate, passes behind the gorge of Montebello, and thence running at the foot of the glacis, passes between St. Laurent and the ravelin. The tenaille in the rear of Montebello was connected by a ramped communication with the left flank of the counterguard covering the esplanade. The whole of the lower part of its left face being skreened from the direct fire of the citadel by the covered way in front, a path was made along the berm, and a boyau opened through the parapet, near the salient, intended to be carried on to the profile of the right flank.

The day was employed, as usual, in giving strength and perfection to the labours of the night. Two new mortar batteries (C and D) opened their fire at dawn; thus augmenting the number of these pieces to 40, and the total number of guns to 105. It must not be omitted to mention that battery A never opened its fire, and was not in fact completely armed. The garrison replied to this heavy cannonade with becoming ardour, and succeeded in silencing three guns on different points. Battery No. 10 was particularly exposed to the fire from Kiel, the two ravelins, and bastion Paciotto. In Montebello, the pieces being mounted on old and unsound wheels, four out of eight yielded to the recoil of their own explosion, and were obliged to suspend their fire, until fitted with new carriages. It must be remarked that these guns were iron, and formed part of the original armament of that fort.

In the course of the forenoon, the citadel was observed to be ignited in several quarters, and the whole was enveloped in a thick smoke. The flames were, however, subdued by the gallant exertions of the garrison; but the great barracks, church, magazines, and other prominent buildings suffered considerably, and already showed that their protection, although strongly blinded, could not long be relied on. Some of the stores were therefore removed, and the men sheltered in the casemates, where they suffered much from the crowding and unwholesome atmosphere. The insecurity of the blindages and temporary bomb-proofs was a source of great annoyance and peril; even at this early stage, they presented little opposition to the weight or violence of hollow projectiles. About noon, a bomb fell into a casemate of this kind, occupied by the 9th régiment of infantry, wounding two officers and several men.

The steady fire of the besiegers began also to tell upon the defences. Some heavy guns on the faces of Toledo were silenced, and the garrison somewhat slackened its fire, being occupied in attempting to repair the damaged merlins and embrasures, and bringing up reserve carriages. The want of long howitzers, or indeed of other guns mounted on elevated wheels, in the manner so strongly recommended by Colonel Paixhans, was much felt, and is a striking proof in favour of the doctrines of that scientific officer\*. It is justly observed by him, that

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\* *Nouvelle Force Maritime et Application de cette Force à quelques Parties du Service de l'Armée de Terre.* Par H. T. Paixhans.

during a long period the same artillery was employed throughout Europe for field and battering-trains, as well as for the defence of fortresses or coasts. It is only within half a century that an especial *matériel* was adopted for the field, another for sieges, and a third for coasts; but up to this present hour, there is no artillery exclusively destined or employed for the defence of fortresses; and yet the quantity of cannon required for fortified towns on the Continent amounts to nearly two-thirds of the whole mass of artillery required by each state. For, taking a given number, say 100, it results that, in France, 10 are required for field-service, 4 for battering-train, 20 for coast defence, and 66 for fortified towns.

General Gribeauval, somewhere about 1770, was the first person who proposed an amelioration in these respects, by introducing elevated rampart carriages, and by reducing the average defensive guns to sixteen; arguing, that it was not extreme range that was required in a defence, but multiplied fire; justly observing also that the same calibre was not required to batter gabions or open temporary works of fresh earth as was requisite for battering revetments in masonry, or destroying bomb-proofs and strong blindages. But with this exception, and the partial adoption of vertical fire, the system of artillery defence remains much as it was in the days of Vauban, whilst that of attack has made a rapid and striking progress.

The objections to the *matériel* now in use for fortresses may be summed up in a few words, more especially that employed on the Continent, where, with the exception of Sweden, the use of iron guns is sparingly adopted:—1st. Brass ordnance is heavier and more expensive, it requires a greater number of gunners and a larger quantity of powder, it cannot be so repeatedly fired, and is more liable to accident than iron of the same calibre. Thus, for instance, in the late operations, seven out of thirty-six brass 24-pounders employed, were rendered unserviceable by their own fire, although this did not exceed 100 rounds per day for 48 hours in the counter and breaching battery, and about 31 in those for ricochet. 2d. Its weight renders it almost motionless; and this defect can only be obviated by embrasure carriages, or if to avoid the inconvenience and weakness of embrasures, by employing the heavy barbets, which again destroy all powers of motion, and leave the pieces exposed not only to the effects of the weather, but to the fixed and determined fire of the enemy, without a possibility of moving or sheltering them by a change of position. 3d. Battering cannon are of higher calibre than is required for defence. Field artillery is too light; and, until the introduction of the new model long howitzer, this species of gun was far from answering the required purpose; yet even these were advantageously employed by the Dutch artillery. 4th. The garrison carriages commonly in use are infinitely too heavy to permit rapid transport from one point to another, and the battering carriages are not sufficiently lofty; and all practical men unite in acknowledging the embarrassments and inconveniences attending barbets.

We shall not attempt to point out, nor do we pretend to know, what would be the most efficacious remedy to apply to these defects; but it must strike every one who has paid any attention to the subject, that both the guns and carriages now employed for garrison service are incompatible with the objects for which they are destined, and that

amongst the earliest improvements ought to be the introduction of an intermediate calibre, and a more abundant supply of elevated carriages, of light yet solid construction, susceptible of being removed with facility from one point to another, or rapidly run up to the parapets and withdrawn to the terre-plein to load.

The besieged endeavoured to remedy some of these defects by employing a few 12-pounders and 5½-inch howitzers in the manner alluded to. With these they maintained a galling fire of grape and round shot, more injurious and harassing than the discharges of their heavy guns; the range of which being determined by their position in blinded embrasures, could be avoided or guarded against.

The besieging guns in Montebello having been repaired and their fire renewed, its shot was found extremely galling to the ravelin and St. Laurent. A flag of truce was therefore sent into the Marshal, by General Chassé, and the following correspondence passed between them:—

“Citadel of Antwerp, 5th Dec. 1832.

“Monsieur le Maréchal,

“The calamities which your aggression calls upon the city of Antwerp, whilst negotiations are still pending for the maintenance of peace, appear likely to be realized in all their severity, in consequence of what, I trust, may be attributed to the mere imprudence of your troops, not dictated by your orders. Notwithstanding my reply (B) of the 30th Nov. 1832, to the letter you did me the honour of addressing to me, I have been frequently fired upon from Montebello, as well as from the ramparts of the body of the place, near the gate des Beguines.

“These are deviations from the basis of arrangement proposed by your Excellency, as well as those announced in my answer. It is my duty, therefore, with a view of doing everything in my power to avert a disastrous conflict, to warn your Excellency of this. The consequences cannot but fall on the authors of an aggression which, being undertaken at the moment that efforts are being made to bring the negotiations for peace to a conclusion, and when they no longer depended but on a few trifles, must compromise these important interests; and which, although undertaken with such powerful means against the point I occupy, appear not to hesitate placing at stake (*mettre sur le jeu*) a city whose preservation is reclaimed both by its importance and humanity.

“I am under the necessity of calling on your Excellency to give some explanation on the subject of the transgression which I have the honour to point out. Fort Montebello is so much a dependence on the fortress, that I cannot abstain from replying to any further fire directed against me from that fort or the ramparts of the body of the place. The inhabitants know me too well, as likewise the conduct I have adopted since I occupied this position; a conduct sufficiently appreciated by their Excellencies, the French and English Commissaries of the conference, not to discern to whom they must attribute the calamity that menaces them, should similar provocations compel me (to act).

(Signed) “CHASSE.”

“To Marshal Count Gerard,  
&c. &c. &c.”

“Head-quarters before Antwerp, 5th Dec. 1832.

“Monsieur le General,

“In the letter that I had the honour to address to you on the evening of the 30th Nov., in reply to yours of the same date, I clearly pointed out the march traced out for me by my instructions, relative to the siege of the

citadel, I only reclaim in the name of my government, the execution of the treaty of the 15th Nov. 1831, signed and guaranteed.

"In attacking the citadel of Antwerp, which you ought to surrender to me, I only employ the means placed without the body of the town of Antwerp; I cited the examples and the proper law that justified my conduct in this respect. In taking care that you shall not be molested from the interior of the place, I give you the greatest proof of my desire to spare the city and its population, because it offers means and positions for attack which would speedily entail your ruin, it being my intention to cut you off from all outward communication.

"If, notwithstanding this, you inhumanly sacrifice the city of Antwerp, I am prepared to make you feel that such conduct would be as contrary to your own interest as it is to humanity, and that you would deplore the consequences.

(Signed) "GERARD."

"To General Chassé,  
&c. &c. &c."

Those communications call for one or two observations. To commence a discussion on the justice or policy of an attack on the citadel, after six days' open trenches, seems superfluous; and although General Chassé's conjecture, of the fire of Montebello being the result of an oversight, was a courteous way of giving Marshal Gerard an opportunity of "backing out," it was not to be supposed that a formidable battery should have fired during twenty-four hours without positive orders. The right of employing this lunette or the counter-guard as offensive works against the citadel, must be considered as highly questionable. General Chassé looked on it as a "transgression," and infraction of the neutrality of the place. He was by no means singular in his opinion; for the events of 1746 and 1792 cannot be taken as precedents. If he was in a situation to retaliate, he might, as a matter of courtesy and humanity, have written a warning letter, but he ought to have acted on the reply. To menace, and not execute a threat, is a mere encouragement to further impunities, and a proof of weakness. The Governor's report to his government plainly declares that he was well pleased not to fire on the town. This letter to Marshal Gerard impressed every one with a similar feeling, and gave reason to believe that he was already sorely harassed, and determined to confine himself to a passive defence.

General Chassé complains of having been fired upon from the body of the place, or rather from the ramparts. Up to the date of his letter, not a shot had been discharged from the counter-guard, and at no period of the siege was a gun or musket fired from the ramparts. The most severe and unremitting precautions were adopted by General Desprez, chief of the Belgian staff, and Colonel Buzen, commandant of the city, to prevent all possibility of such an occurrence. Officers commanding batteries had strict orders not to fire, unless positively directed so to do by written or personal directions from the commandant; and the utmost vigilance was exercised to restrain the sentinels from committing the slightest act that might be construed into an aggression,—a matter not likely to occur, seeing that the Belgian troops occupied the second line of defence.

General Chassé's previous bombardment of Antwerp has been judged with some severity. On the other hand, it would be the height

of injustice not to declare that he is fully justified in calling to mind the forbearance shown by him on sundry occasions since that period, when various infractions of the convention agreed upon between him and the delegates from the provisional government of Belgium would have borne him out in rigorously employing against the city of Antwerp all the means of destruction placed at his disposal. The following extract of a letter addressed to General Chassé, on the 19th May, 1831, by the Commissioners of the Conference, is a sufficient corroboration of this observation:—

“ Having learned yesterday morning that the Belgians had commenced works against the citadel which you command, in contravention of the rights of nations and all military laws, we lost no time in waiting on the Regent, and urged him to order the cessation of these operations. Orders were instantly issued to that effect; but the delay in the execution had nearly compromised every thing. We have admired your prudence, and we will make known your noble conduct under these trying circumstances.”\*

The opinion of so experienced a soldier and upright a man as General Belliard is conclusive, more especially as no one can accuse him of undue partiality or bias; for Belgium had not a more true or disinterested friend, nor the peace of Europe a more warm advocate, than this lamented and excellent man†. His colleague, Lord Ponsonby, well knowing and appreciating his worth, acted with him on a generous principle of confidence and reciprocity, equally honourable to both and eminently advantageous to the interests of their respective nations.

From 5th to 6th.—The lodgment effected on the previous night in the covered-way of the salient place of arms of the St. Laurent was prolonged as far as the first traverse. The besieged, who were now more on the alert, kept up so vigorous a fire, that the engineers were obliged to renounce the flying and to adopt the full sap. The loss in this quarter was more serious than on the former night; and, as time was no object, it was resolved to hazard the men's lives as little as possible. Thus the works advanced with proportionate slowness. A lieutenant-colonel of engineers (Morlay) had his thigh fractured by a biscayan, and four sappers were wounded. The lieutenant-colonel had met with a similar misfortune in Spain, and had successfully resisted amputation; on being brought to the hospital at Antwerp, he again showed the same resolution, in spite of the advice of the surgeons; and hopes were entertained of his recovery.

The boyau debouching from the right of the second parallel, was continued across the Boom chaussée towards the extreme right of the

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\* (Signed) Auguste Belliard, Lieutenant-General Comte et Pair de France. • Charles White.

† Auguste Belliard, Lieutenant-General, Count and Peer of France, Commissioner with Lord Ponsonby from the Conference to the Belgian government, subsequently Ambassador to the court of King Leopold. His merits as a soldier are recorded in the history of a thousand battle-fields, and his virtues as a man, whether in public or private life, were appreciated by all who had the honour of his acquaintance. He was seized with a fit of apoplexy, whilst walking from the King's palace at Brussels across the park, and died two hours after, at his own hotel, on the 28th January, 1831. Belliard, who had a thousand opportunities of enriching himself in Italy, Germany, Russia, and Spain, died leaving behind him little but his sword.

covered-way of the counterguard. A passage was then cut through the covered-way, terminating with a return on the terre-plein. Great difficulties and some loss were encountered in this operation, especially on traversing the chaussée, where the pavement and hard foundation offered considerable obstruction. Gabion after gabion was knocked over by the well-pointed fire of the besieged, and it was necessary, on more than one occasion, to pause in the work. A lieutenant of engineers and ten men were wounded, and two killed.

A moment of panic was also created amongst the working and covering parties, which tended to impede the operations. The young soldiers, who had never before been under fire or employed at night, were utterly unprepared for the various devices and inflammable projectiles usually employed on such occasions. They were astounded by the novelty and brilliancy of the fire-balls and rockets thrown out by the besieged. Some of these falling into the trenches and saps, caused much alarm. The men, as is the common practice, had been told to shelter themselves from shells and bombs so long as the fuses burned, or until a proper time had elapsed for explosion. Mistaking these innocent projectiles for shells, they either lay down or moved away, and it required some persuasion on the part of the officers to convince them of the object and innocuous nature of the flame, the brilliancy of which lighted up the ground for many yards around, giving a livid and ghastly colour to all surrounding objects.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that nearly the whole of the French army, excepting the Engineers, artillery, and 65th regiment, which latter was formed from the disbanded men of the Royal Guard, after the July revolution, was composed of young soldiers. For inexperienced troops there can be no lesson so bad as a siege; none more likely to produce a pernicious effect on their minds, and to lead them to mistake their duties on other occasions. In the trenches it is incumbent on the officers to keep their people snug, and to repress, rather than stimulate courage and personal exposure. The soldier is taught to watch for projectiles, to shelter himself, and either to run from or crouch at their explosion. That which in the open field is looked upon as an act of cowardice, in the trenches becomes a matter of duty. Nothing can be more opposite. Place a man in a parallel, and when shells alight you bid him lie close and not expose himself. Let a sortie be made, and you require him to rush forward under the hottest fire, and then the mere blinking of the eye is regarded as a lack of heart. The officer and veteran can reason and comprehend the necessity and difference, but recruits having been told that it is folly to expose themselves on one occasion, cannot understand why it should be dishonourable to screen themselves on another, and that, perhaps, on the same spot, and at an interval of only five minutes.

The zig-zag in the counterguard having about three feet width and four in depth, exclusive of its parapet, was conducted along the parapet, nearly to the extremity of the right flank, within 180 yards of the counterscarp of bastions Toledo and Fernando. Two lodgments, blinded and sheltered with fascines, were then established in the parapet, each for six rampart guns, intended to rake the covered-way of Toledo, and to plunge into the interior of the lunette. Other lodgments or excavations were made for one, two, or more men to fire on the parapets

and curtain of the bastions, which the besieged had surmounted with sand bags, from behind which they maintained a smart discharge of biscayans, that were found extremely galling to the sap.

It is almost unnecessary to observe that the rampart guns are heavy muskets, carrying a two-ounce ball, loaded at the breach, and having percussion locks. The stock is poised on a wooden picket, and the barrel remains supported by the parapet, which is masked with sand bags, forming loop-holes, only sufficiently large to admit clear sight for the marksman.

One or two companies of volunteers, all picked shots, were selected for this service, and it was highly interesting to observe the intelligence and ingenuity of these men, both in forming lodgments and in selecting the points best adapted for their fire.

Some British officers who had gone through the Peninsular campaigns, and assisted at the sieges undertaken by our people, were struck, not only by the admirable workmanship of the French sappers, but by the general intelligence of the soldiers. They remarked, also, the gigantic provision of men and *matériel* placed at the disposition of the engineers and artillery, and contrasted them with the limited resources which were furnished to our army,—where the valour, constancy, and undaunted heroism of the soldier were too often made a substitute for many deficiencies that were loudly reclaimed by the two grand offensive departments.

This is not a place for criticising the operations of our own army, but there is no impartial person who served at any of our sieges, or who has even read the invaluable work of Sir John Jones on that subject, who does not feel convinced that the commander-in-chief, his officers, and soldiers, had difficulties to encounter that could scarcely have been accomplished by any other troops (in the same space of time) in the world; more especially when the bravery and science of the enemy opposed to them is taken into consideration. With how great a sacrifice of human life these operations were effected, the returns of the period serve to show.

The trenches on the left flank of the second parallel having been carried as far as the nature of the ground and the plan of attack admitted, the working parties on that side were merely employed in strengthening the parapets, and endeavouring to drain off some of the water which rendered these points nearly untenable, though the weather had much improved and the rain ceased. The whole attention of the besiegers was now directed towards pushing on the sap in the direction of Toledo, and the occupation of the lunette, without which latter the ultimate operations could not be effected. In short, the whole process of attack was now confined between the covered-way of the counterguard and the capital of St. Laurent, and the plan of the engineer to batter the left face of the Toledo bastion began to develop itself.

In the mean while a steady fire was maintained against the lunette Kiel, the ravelin in its rear, and the bastion Pacciotto, whence some heavy guns, under cover of the retired flank and strong blindages, greatly incommoded the trenches in the direction of battery No. 2, and ricocheing into the Malines road, between Berchem and the city, rendered the passage somewhat dangerous.

About midnight, a body of about 100 men issued from the right of

the covered-way of the ravelin, turned that of St. Laurent on the same side, and attempted a rush on the lodgment of the capital; but although they came on with great gallantry, they were discovered before they had time to form, and were instantly repulsed by a company of light infantry stationed in the place of arms on the left of the second parallel.

These weak and ineffective sallies, which had more the air of reconnoitring parties than bold sorties, were difficult to comprehend. They were not sufficiently numerous, they were apparently unsupported, and appeared to have no definite object. They scarcely impeded the work for an instant, and produced no other effect than exciting and keeping the covering parties more earnestly on the *qui vive*.

The day was employed in widening the sap in the covered-way of St. Laurent, and the approach directed on the left face of Toledo. The lodgments in the counterguard were completed, and the branches surmounted with sand-bag loop-holes for musketry. The besieged still kept up an animated fire from Toledo, harassing the sap near St. Laurent. They were replied to with extreme vigour by all the besieging batteries. The new model howitzers proved extremely effective. Their shells, ricocheing from the parapets and terre-pleins, or plunging into the buildings and blindages, were found most destructive. General Chassé, in his report dated the 10th of December, 1832, thus speaks of them:—"The enemy employed against us pieces of new invention, called Paixhans. Nothing can resist their force, which causes great ravages in the buildings and blindages\*."

This passage is well worth the attention of our Ordnance. The great stress laid by General Chassé, in various parts of his report, on the destructive effects of these 8-inch shells, fully corroborates all that has been said and written upon the advantages likely to result from a more general employment of hollow projectiles, whether by sea or land.

During the day the buildings of the citadel were observed to be on fire in various quarters, whence large columns of smoke and bursts of flame were seen to ascend. Towards dusk, the grand magazine of provisions, which had been carefully blinded, was ignited, and burned with such fury as to baffle all efforts to arrest its progress. It was, therefore, left to its fate, and, before midnight, was reduced to cinders. The temporary bomb-proof hospital, also rendered as secure as the nature of such works admit, was traversed by a shell, and three men were killed.

The insecurity of this latter building was a source of great anxiety to the garrison; and it was therefore determined to convey as many of the wounded as could be removed to the Tête de Flandre. The boats of the flotilla were employed for this purpose; and being brought up into the cut leading to the sluice of the citadel, the men were conveyed round the covered-way to the water-side, and thence carried, at night, across the river, into the inundated polders, and then disembarked at the hospital established at the back of the village.

Towards eleven P.M., a shell fell into the service magazine on the

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\* This error has already been pointed out. One is also inclined to express some surprise at the Dutch artillery being unacquainted with the new-model howitzer, which is no secret to our artillery or that of Prussia.



Toledo bastion, which blew up with a tremendous explosion, without, however, causing other damage than the destruction of an 18-pounder. A similar accident occurred to a small quantity of powder in one of the French batteries.

The besieged, who had this day thrown a body of men, with one or two cohorts, into the left covered-way of the ravelin, where they had established a small redoubt or blockhouse in the salient place of arms, as well as another in the re-entering angle, kept up a sharp fire on the sap. This important point ought to have been strongly occupied from the first moment, and might have been armed with two or three light field-pieces or howitzers; but by some unaccountable omission, these important points were not even palisaded, as will be seen by referring to the plan of attack. Some of the French batteries being directed to point their fire on this quarter, a lieutenant of the 9th infantry and a few men were wounded.

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On the frontier no movements took place, nor were any demonstrations made by the Dutch against the covering division on the right bank. On the left, General Sebastiani was busily engaged in placing forts Perle and St. Marie in a state of defence. The curtain of the latter, facing the river, had been destroyed during the previous year,—the parapets had been levelled, and the platforms removed. Their places were, therefore, supplied by a temporary breast-work of gabions and fascines; new platforms were laid down, a powder-magazine was constructed, and an efficient cover formed for the troops and guns.

In despite of the almost impracticable state of the roads and communications, which were for the most part axle deep, the artillery succeeded in dragging some heavy pieces through the mud, and established a battery of mortars, 24 and 18 pounders. A few field-pieces and howitzers were likewise mounted near the Pipe de Tabac above, and at La Perle below St. Marie. Epaulements were also made on the dykes, with banquettes for musketry.

On the night of the 5th, the Dutch squadron, consisting of the Eurydice frigate (flag-ship), Comète and Proserpine corvettes, Medusa bomb, two steamers, and 20 gun-boats, under Vice-Admiral de Leeuw, bore up, and came to an anchor, with springs on their cables, within long gun range of La Perle. General Sebastiani immediately despatched an officer to inform the Admiral that no vessels could be permitted to mount or descend the stream.

During the night the ships made no alteration in their position, but cleared for action, and at daybreak the Admiral announced, that unless the French evacuated the forts and banks of the river, he should open his fire in a quarter of an hour. Shortly after a heavy cannonade commenced, which was replied to by La Perle, whence several howitzer shells fell amongst the gun-boats, and caused them to haul further off. The ships, however, being beyond the range of the field-pieces, the latter, after a few ineffectual rounds, ceased their fire; but St. Marie opened her's from two mortars and four 24-pounders, whilst some companies of infantry, posted behind the dykes near Liefkenshoek, maintained an incessant and harassing discharge.

The cannonade and musketry fire was vigorously kept up on both sides, until nightfall, when the fleet, finding it could make no impression, weighed anchor, and dropped down towards Lillo, not, however, without causing some casualties, and destroying two farms in the vicinity of Doel. The loss on both sides was trifling, but a shell having fallen on board the *Eurydice*, mortally wounded the Admiral. Upwards of 500 musket-shots were found to have struck his vessel.

The result of this engagement is a strong proof of the disadvantages under which vessels of war labour when navigating narrow channels, with a rapid tide-way, exposed not only to the fire of land batteries, but musketry, more especially when the artillery on shore is enabled to make an abundant use of hollow projectiles, the ravages of which, on a crowded deck, must be such as to require no explanation.

It is recorded, that in 1814, nearly on the same spot, a small field battery (*à fleur d'eau*), of two guns and one howitzer, checked the descent of some French ships of war from Antwerp, and after maintaining a cannonade of several hours, without sustaining the smallest injury, forced them back with considerable damage and loss. This must invariably be the case, when the contest takes place in rivers between wooden floating constructions and solid land batteries; and, therefore, those who speak of a British fleet forcing its way up the Scheldt, and, above all, of its being able to maintain its position in that river against the flat land batteries, cannot have devoted much time to investigate the difficulties or dangers of the enterprise.

We have in this affair a striking illustration. For one finds a Dutch fleet of nearly thirty sail, ably commanded, gallantly manned, formed in line of battle, and presenting a battery of nearly two hundred pieces, not only checked, but obliged to retire before a few guns, hastily established in a temporary battery. No one can venture to suspect the Dutch navy of want of skill or courage, for braver or better seamen do not exist. But the commander felt that to attempt forcing a passage would have risked the safety of half his vessels, and thus prudently hauled out of fire. This is merely mentioned as a matter of consideration for those who, in treating the question of forcing the Scheldt, imagine that a British or French fleet, has nothing to do but to run in, and that the forts and batteries that flank the river, from Flushing to Breskens, up to Batz, would instantly be demolished. It has been shown what *St. Marie* and *La Perle* were able to do, though most inefficiently armed; had there been time to provide them with heavy guns and mortars, more especially with the cannon bomb and new mortars, according to *Paixhans'* system,—such as are employed on board some of the war steamers, and are now mounted by the Belgian government in several of their forts,—it is highly problematical whether the Dutch squadron could have maintained its ground for half an hour.

In the meantime, the King of the Belgians arrived at Antwerp, and took up his residence at the palace in the *Place de Meir*, where the grand head-quarters of the Belgian army, under General Desprez, were established. His Majesty, who had left his equipage at Berchem, mounted his horse, and rode into Antwerp, attended by Marshal Gerard, the Dukes of Orleans and Nemours, and a brilliant cortège of general and staff officers. The Duke of Orleans being for French duty this day, quitted the King and returned to Berchem. Amongst the suite of

the Princes and Marshal were several young men, whose names struck upon the soldier's ear, and awakened recollections of many victories. Of these, the most prominent were, the Prince de la Moskwa, and his brother, sons of the brave Ney; the Prince d'Eckmuhl, son of Davoust, the Duke of Istria, son of Bessières; and the younger Montebello, son of Lannes.

King Leopold, after minutely inspecting the fortifications and batteries of the town, rode to the tail of the trenches, near Berchem, and then proceeded to examine every part of the offensive works, up to the heads of the sap. The manner in which the King exposed himself was a source of anxiety to the people in the city, who eagerly watched and gladly hailed his safe return. An anecdote is recounted, and corroborated by an order of the day from the Marshal, that gave much interest to this visit. On approaching a dangerous portion of the sap, his Majesty met a party conveying a badly wounded sapper to the hospital. The man had a leg fractured, and had received other wounds. The King, as it is stated, stopped the party an instant, to inquire how and where he was wounded. Raising himself up, but not recognizing the rank of his interlocutor, the soldier replied, with a firm voice, "General, I've lost a leg, at the head of the sap; I was at my post." "If my cross and a pension can console you for having lost a limb in my service, you shall be satisfied," replied the King; and, on returning to the palace, instantly fulfilled his promise.

This was the first overt occasion which Leopold had of according this favour; and it was impossible to have met with an opportunity so favourable. The place, the time, the manner, and the cause—all contributed to add interest to the scene. It is of rare occurrence that sovereigns are enabled to see with their eyes, and reward military merit with their own hands, on the very spot where the meritorious action has taken place. The Leopold order could not have sprung forth under more favourable or striking auspices; and up to the present hour, not a soldier or officer has received this mark of distinction who has not paid for it with his blood, or merited it by his courage.

Differing from most decorations of a similar kind, it has been alone conferred on men who were distinguished where all were brave. A common soldier was the first to receive it; the warm blood flowing from his veins, and his fractured limb his only recommendation. In our army a universal medal is distributed—not to record the valour of the man, but to commemorate the notoriety of the event. Honours of a similar nature are distributed; but when do they reach the breast of the subaltern, non-commissioned, or soldier? God be praised! with us we do not require such stimulants to urge us to our duty; or, if we did, no man would have done his duty—for the stimulant never was applied. This event, with the name of the sapper, was announced to the army by an Order of the Day. This again was exciting, and produced a happy effect. The French well know how to avail themselves of such opportunities.

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From 6th to 7th.—A battery of 24-pounders, established near the village of Burcht, on the left bank, and another in front of Hoboken, on the right, opened a ricochet fire upon the gun-boats, that flanked the

French post at the Melk Huys\*. The distance was too great to produce any decided effect; but the fire incommoded the vessels, and compelled them to change their position. Seven, with the steamer, retired through the rupture in the dyke into the inundated polders, and the other four dropped down and anchored in line abreast of the Tête de Flandre, which position they maintained, with little variation, up to the last moment of the siege.

At nightfall, the fire of the besieged, which had previously slackened, was resumed with increased ardour, especially from the blinded mortar battery of Paciotto, from the retired left flank of this bastion, as well as from the curtains to the right and left of Toledo. The workmen in the sap of the covered way of the counter-guard suffered considerably. Five sappers were killed or wounded, and the gabions were perpetually displaced. It was on this point that the besieged appeared principally to direct their fire. A lieutenant of engineers was wounded by the splinter of a shell at the moment the Duke of Orleans was passing; one grenadier was killed, and a lieutenant of infantry and ten soldiers were wounded.

In the mean time, the sap was actively advanced on the covered way of St. Laurent. The first traverse was pierced, and the work continued so as to form a cover to the branch in its rear. Two traverses were formed by double sap on the right of the trench, running nearly opposite to the glacis of the left face, and a return was made from this towards the covered way, and from thence another branch was pushed on almost parallel to the former; the near approach to the covered way of the ravelin rendering it necessary to give greater acuteness to the angles of the approaches.

The extreme brilliancy of the moon was highly unfavourable to the rapid progress of the works. Objects were rendered as distinct upon the horizon as during the brightest sunshine. This was not altogether without its advantages to the besiegers; it prevented much confusion in the communications, enabled the officers and men to walk from distant points under cover of the hedges and intersected ground, and to make their observations as well by night as day; as not a head could appear above the dark outline of the elevated ramparts or covered ways without being distinctly seen, the tirailleurs and rampart gun-men were also enabled to take deliberate and certain aim, screened by the shadow of the low parapets and approaches. The marksmen placed in the lodgments of the counter-guard were likewise enabled to distinguish the gunners or soldiers in the lunette St. Laurent, and, by a galling fire in their rear, obliged them to use much caution in standing to the parapets.

On the left, the trench running parallel to the left face of St. Laurent, was furnished with banquettes and loop-holes for infantry. On the right, the approach in the covered way of the counter-guard was widened, and the lodgments in the counter-guard strengthened.

The artillery of the besieged was not idle. In despite of the mass of fire brought upon it, and the destruction of its merlons, embrasures, and blindages, the Toledo bastion maintained a spirited fire from its right face

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\* This is a building on the banks of the Scheldt, about a quarter of a mile from the glacis of the citadel. It was formerly a cabaret or small tavern, and is near the sluice of Kiel.

on the sap near St. Laurent; whilst a howitzer and 18 cohorns, established behind the curtain to its left, caused considerable havoc, and impeded the approaches on the right.

The Dutch artillery, which, during the whole siege, allied the most daring courage and ceaseless activity to a precision of practice not to be surpassed, began to employ the vertical fire,—which, from the advancing approximation of the offensive works, told efficaciously on the approaches, the heads of which were now drawn within 130 yards of the left face of Toledo, and 35 from that of St. Laurent.

The fire from Montebello having breached the top of the wall at the gorge of St. Laurent, and injured the palisades of the caponnière, orders were given by General Chassé to establish an inward palisaded retrenchment behind the former, and to repair the other; but on subsequent examination, it did not appear that any effective work had been executed to counteract the operation of which this fire was the necessary forerunner.

It was intended to have assaulted St. Laurent this evening; already its probable capture was announced by Marshal Gerard to the Duke of Dalmatia, under date of the 5th:—"To-morrow, I think," says the Marshal, "we shall occupy the lunette." But the ground having been felt, the reverse was found protected by numerous *trous de loup*, the wall of the gorge was still little injured, and the rest of the defences were in a more efficient state than was expected. The project of storm was therefore abandoned, and the regular process of descent, passage, and mine, determined upon.

Where time was no object, it was deemed useless and inhuman to sacrifice valuable lives in obtaining a little earlier by force that which a little later must infallibly be obtained by art. Moreover, the French engineers were not sorry thus to have an opportunity of executing the descent and passage of a wet ditch; which is a matter of rare occurrence in the annals of sieges. Under existing circumstances this prudent forbearance was highly praiseworthy; but, speaking in a military point of view, one is bound to observe that there was no great daring shown in the attack of this insignificant outwork, which thus held out sixteen days. With the loss of 100 or 150 men, St. Laurent might have been carried by escalade, as soon as the place of arms opposite its salient and the trench on its left were established; and the more easily, since the covered-way of the ravelin was at that time neither defended nor palisaded, and the wood work of the caponnière itself was so feeble as to present little obstacle. Fort Picurina, forming part of the advanced works of Badajoz, defended by seven guns and 300 men, the gorge extremely strong, was carried by the British troops on the ninth night, without a breach, with the loss of 19 officers and 300 men killed and wounded.

The range of the besieging batteries opposite the city, in the direction of Wylrick and St. Bernard, was not remarkable for its precision: many hollow projectiles and some round-shot fell into the Scheldt, or dropped upon the esplanade and contiguous buildings. Some accidents resulted in the streets adjacent to the burned arsenal, attended with loss of life, and causing considerable panic in the city. These mischances were much magnified; still they were of such frequent recurrence as to call forth criticisms on the inaccuracy of the French

fire, extremely unjust in most instances, as the round shots were all ricochets from the parapets. This error was not altogether rectified up to the latest moment of the siege, though repeated directions to that effect were given to commanders of batteries; indeed, it was in some measure unavoidable, especially as regarded batteries 11 and 6. From the tower of the cathedral, or that of St. Andrew, immediately adjacent to the burned arsenal, it was easy to watch the effect of every hollow projectile, and much surprise was created by observing the numbers that exceeded their just range.

It is true that all shells from the batteries on the right of the centre, that missed the citadel and plunged upon the glacis, or the ditch near the sluices opposite the Scheldt, were not altogether useless, since they endangered the communications between the flotilla and garrison; but the number of these as well as others that alighted on the esplanade and ditch of the ravelin fronting the city, bore a large proportion to the general mass. It was stated by persons who took notes, that out of 31,000 hollow projectiles hurled upon the citadel, nearly one-eighth exceeded their range. Enough, however, fell within the ramparts to render the bombardment unparalleled for its duration and effects. No language can describe the desolation and havoc produced; which proves that if the garrison showed no extraordinary activity or science in their defence, they indisputably evinced a degree of patience, resignation, and fortitude not to be surpassed by the best disciplined and oldest troops.

In proportion as the offensive works approached nearer to the fortress, the nature of the attack assumed increased interest, and that of the defence displayed greater activity and vigour. Much was still wanting to lend it a character of energy and anticipatory vigilance, consistent with the reputation of the Governor, the strength of his garrison, and the abundant resources placed at his disposal. There appeared throughout a tardiness, a languor, an absence of that daring, harassing alertness, that alliance of science with force, which is the criterion of a well-planned and vigorous resistance. During the whole siege there is not one action of *colât* on record. Passing over the slackness of the fire during the first four days, when the position of the unfinished batteries was well known, no vigorous sorties or false alerts were made; the covered-ways were neither palisaded nor occupied in force; no counter-defences were raised by the engineers to meet those attacks that they must have foretold to be the inevitable consequence of the advance of the approaches on certain given points; no attempts were made to countermine St. Laurent, or the covered-ways or glacis of the ravelin or bastion of Toledo, though the attacks on these faces were plainly indicated, and the precise situation of the counter and breaching batteries as clearly defined as though they had been already traced out. A numerous—too numerous—garrison was allowed to remain comparatively idle in its casemates, when they might have been employed in various ways, tending to harass the besiegers and to retard the progress of the siege.

On the other hand, it is but just to observe that the attack participated much in the character of the defence; for, admitting the unrivalled skill of the engineers, the beauty and strength of whose approaches were of the first order, and excepting the brilliant exploit of arming the

batteries Nos. 7 and 8, and the capture of St. Laurent, where no defence was made, there does not appear to have been a single operation that reminded one of those valiant enterprises so familiar to French troops in their former wars, and which were matters of trite occurrence in the sieges executed by the British troops.

In narrating events of this description it is incumbent to treat the subject as soldiers, not as politicians: we have nothing to do with the causes or diplomatic motives; we must look to facts and effects; and in giving the details, speak of the operations, not as they shall be narrated to suit political purposes, but as they will stand recorded in the pages of military history.

An experiment was tried during the day upon the dykes of the citadel, which, as before stated, are fed by means of a sluice opposite the Scheldt, and separated from those of the city by a batardeau.\* The waters of the latter were therefore let off by opening the flood-gates near the talus; and as a reduction of several feet was thus procured, it was hoped that this operation might act by filtration upon those of the citadel, independent of its exposing the revetment of the batardeau nearly to its foundation. No material difference was, however, observed in the water-mark of the citadel ditches; and it was therefore projected to establish a battery on the left flank of the counter-guard to breach the batardeau itself. This plan was not, however, accomplished until a later period. On recurring to General Chassé's report of the 12th, it appears that the operation above-mentioned was fully successful, and that from a crevice in the batardeau, the water in the ditches at low tide was reduced to a few inches. General Chassé thus terminates his despatch of that day:—"The state of the ditches, which are daily drained dry, renders the defence much more difficult, and demands increased precautions, seeing that if we were not constantly on our guard, the low flanks might be escalated during the night."

These facts did not come to light until after the firing ceased on the 23d: an idea having apparently existed up to the last moment that several feet water still remained in the ditches at low tide, whereas in fact they were scarcely knee-deep; so much so, that at the moment the batteries were silenced, several artillerymen and sappers ran down the descent, and, wading across, climbed the breach, exchanging tokens of good will with the Dutch soldiers of their own arm.

Whilst on the subject of the effect produced on the ditches, it must be observed that the filtration acted powerfully on the wells of the citadel. These were long notorious for their imperfection; plans had already been drawn up for their reconstruction or reparation, prior to the revolution. Their contents were brackish and unwholesome, and

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\* The ditch of the ravelin, opposite the Scheldt, it must be observed, is dry. Its gorges are divided from the wet ditch by two batardeaux, furnished with flood-gates; these serve as channels for the water, which is admitted into them from the Scheldt by a subterraneous passage. Either one or both of these sluices can be used, and made to produce a current of water, but of no great strength. A batardeau divides the centre of the wet ditch at right angles with the curtain; and thus, supposing a passage to be effected by an enemy opposite Toledo, and a dyke to be formed by shutting down one sluice and opening the other, a current or pressure of water could be obtained that would render such passage extremely insecure.

in fact scarcely potable, without an admixture of vinegar or some other purifier. There were evidently fissures or crevices that admitted the impure waters of the marshy substrata and rivers, whilst they allowed that procured from rain and other sources to filter away. This misfortune added sorely to the many inconveniences suffered by the garrison, and is an additional proof of the endurance of the soldiers.

The following extract from a general order of the Marshal must not be omitted, as it shows the practice adopted by the French army on similar occasions:—

“ Head-quarters, Berchem, 7th Dec. 1832.

“ An order of the day of the 2d inst. announced that the workmen furnished to the artillery and engineers from regiments of the line, would be paid in the proportion of 75 centimes ( $7\frac{1}{2}d.$ ) per man, for twelve hours by night, and 50 centimes ( $5d.$ ) per man, for twelve hours by day. This payment must be made from the funds at the disposal of the artillery and engineers, according as the workmen have been employed by one or other of these services.\*

“ A great number of projectiles thrown from the citadel, having fallen and remained in the trenches, the Marshal has decided that an indemnity shall be granted to the soldiers who may bring them to the artillery. This indemnity is fixed at the following rate:—Round-shot of all calibres, 25 centimes ( $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ ); howitzer-shells, 35 centimes ( $3\frac{1}{2}d.$ ), mortar ditto, 60 centimes ( $6d.$ )

(Signed) “ ST. CYR NUGUES.”

When this order was promulgated, it was curious to observe, not only many soldiers, of all arms, but the peasantry and boys from the city, eagerly watching the fall of the projectiles that dropped behind the first parallel. No sooner did a shell alight, than they rushed forward, and scarcely waited to see whether it exploded, ere they began to dig, either for the whole or its fragments. The boys showed an extraordinary daring on these occasions, and thus more than one accident occurred.

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From 7th to 8th.—A howitzer shell, from battery No. 4, having penetrated the blindage of the laboratory, set fire to the loaded bombs and other combustibles deposited there, and caused considerable havoc. A serjeant-major of artificers and two artillerymen were killed, and one mortally wounded. The utter insufficiency of these temporary case-mates against the plunging fire of the new model howitzers, or, indeed, against that of the mortars projected at the usual elevation, began to awaken serious apprehensions in the mind of the Governor, and was a source of deep anxiety to himself and his officers, who saw the most important points of shelter thus hourly menaced with ruin, without the possibility of applying any remedy.

Many passages of General Chassé's report, not only dwell on the sufferings, but plainly indicate the fatal moral effect wrought on his people by the scene of devastation that surrounded them, and thus shows the

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\* Of course this did not apply to the general working parties, but merely to such men as were employed as sappers, aid-gunners, or artificers, in the various branches required for the service of the two departments, such as fascine-makers, sawyers, smiths, &c.



paramount importance of airy, extensive, and secure bomb-proofs. It requires no great skill to discover, from the General's letters, that the mental energies of the garrison were enfeebled by the insecurity of their position; and, certainly, no one can marvel, that men who could obtain no repose,—who had no efficient means of cooking, who had lost all confidence in the protection of their shelter, who were harassed day and night by the fall of buildings, were herded beneath posterns, insecure blindages, cellars, damp casemates, and infected communications, and who were, for the most part, kept in a state of inaction,—should be somewhat disheartened, and not in a condition to undertake vigorous sorties, or other daring enterprises. These observations cannot be applied to the artillery, who, from first to last, were constantly exposed without cover, and as constantly employed, and this without their activity or mental energy being in the slightest degree impaired.

The condition to which the citadel was reduced, even at this early stage of the siege, might have shaken the nerves of the oldest soldiers; and there is no man of any military experience who is not aware, that when once discouragement finds its way into the hearts of the men, its contagion is so rapid, and its effects so baneful, as to baffle all argument and example on the part of the officers. The latter are stimulated by education, honour, hope of recompense, and promotion; the former has none or little of these stimulants to sustain his spirits: he feels in the flesh, and reasons in the body—not morally but physically.

There is no situation so trying to the courage of the soldier, as that wherein he is placed in a state of inaction, under a heavy cannonade, or made to continue for a lengthened period a passive spectator of the demolition of walls or parapets raised for his defence, and under whose crumbling ruins he is required to exhibit, not the force of his arm and weapon, but that of his mind.

Had the bomb-proofs and casemates of the citadel been more secure—had the wells and tanks been better constructed—the men's blood warmed and their passions excited by more active employment, this might not have been the case. For, in despite of the incessant fire of the besiegers, it is certain that the defences of the citadel were less injured than might have been anticipated from the immense number of guns playing upon them; and with only one narrow breach, raked by the fire of the retired flank of Fernando, and a redut or inner bastion behind them, which might have been armed and cut off, so as to command the breach, the result of an assault would have been highly problematical. Had it been repulsed, then indeed the glory of the defence would have been equal to what has been said of it.

Badajoz, Burgos, and Tariffa, are proofs that breaches are not easily won, when valiant garrisons manfully stand their ground, however desperate the energy, or dauntless the valour of the assailants.

There is no secret in the whole art of war more precious, than that of inspiring assailing troops with confidence in themselves and commanders—or defensive bodies with thorough faith in the strength of their position, whether this be behind walls or in the open plain. It was thus the republican and imperial armies obtained a series of unrivalled successes over superior forces. It was by this means the British troops performed those memorable achievements that have raised the English soldier to so high a station in the estimation of all Europe.

The paramount importance of roomy and impenetrable casemates becomes every day more important; for it is not too much to assume, from the progress already made and still making in the science of gunnery, and the increased use and direful effects of hollow projectiles, that the time is not far distant when the art of attack and defence will be reduced to a struggle between bombs and bomb-proofs.

The experiment made by the huge 22½ inch mortar, invented by Colonel Paixhans, and cast in the Liege foundry, is a prodigious stride already made in the science or application of projectiles. At one start it has doubled the diameter of the largest of these weapons hitherto employed in sieges. But we shall have occasion to recur to this subject again in its proper place.

The well-directed and animated fire of the besieged, combined with the bright moonlight, impeded the progress of the sap in the salient place of arms and the covered way of St. Laurent. Gabion after gabion was overturned or demolished, and a portion of the work damaged; indeed, the fire was so heavy, that the workmen were obliged to sink the excavation beyond the usual depth, and, on more than one occasion, were forced to suspend their labours. The night was employed in replacing the gabions, and strengthening the parapets. At the same time preparations were made for commencing a blinded descent into the ditch, nearly opposite the left of the salient. The blinds and timbers were already prepared by the artificers of the park, and placed in readiness in the adjacent lodgment; a large stock of fascines and saucissons were also brought up and deposited in the approaches.

The branch, commenced the previous night in the direction of the re-entering place of arms of the lunette, was continued; whilst another boyau was also commenced, intended to unite with the lodgment made near the second traverse. Considerable difficulties were, however, encountered, not alone from the fire of the place, but from the nature of the ground, which here rose in a mound of rubbish and stiff earth to the height of six or seven feet. These works, which ought to have been completed on the foregoing night, advanced slowly. It is observed in General Haxo's journal, "that this was the first time, since breaking ground, that operations commanded to be executed by him were not terminated within the prescribed time." He attributes it partly to the clearness of the night, and partly to the fire of the besieged; the latter is highly honourable to the Dutch artillery.

The parapets of the Toledo bastion, against which the besiegers directed the principal efforts of their batteries, were considerably cut up, but it still maintained its fire with almost undiminished vigour, and, on several occasions, the Dutch soldiers were seen to spring on the crest of the rampart, and take deliberate and steady aim at the heads of the sap. About eight P.M. a small detachment sallied from the covered way of the ravelin, and boldly advanced upon the lodgment, but they were repulsed by a sharp fire of musketry from the place of arms and second parallel. At eleven P.M. a second sally was attempted in the same direction, but the clearness of the night betrayed them before their small column had time to form; and although some of them advanced with dauntless courage to the parapet of the boyau on the right, they were speedily driven back with the loss of four or five men. These sallies, though too limited to be effective, served to retard the

work, and prevented the sappers from proceeding with confidence. From these examples it is easy to conceive what might have been done had they been stronger, and more frequently repeated.

On the right, at the extremity of the covered way of the counter-guard, the working parties terminated a return branch, that covered the whole width of the ditch of the counter-guard; the profile of which is nearly parallel to the centre of the left face of the bastion Toledo.—The excavations and lodgments formed in the parapet of the counter-guard were increased in number, and sheltered with blinds, intended to cover the marksmen ordered to fire into the interior of the lunette and covered-way of Toledo; whilst a boyau was also cut in the terre-plein parallel to the profile of the right flank, and screened from the bastion Fernando by that of the esplanade. Here a lodgment was also made for sharp-shooters to enfilade the covered-way of Toledo, and the re-entering place of arms close to the batardeau.

The projected descent and attack on St. Laurent seems to have escaped the vigilance of the garrison, as appears by General Chassé's report of the 8th day's operations. For at the moment the assailants were busily employed in piercing the descent to the ditch, he says,—

"Our vertical fire from the lunette, and that direct from Kiel and the citadel, as well as the frequent small sorties, appear to have induced the enemy to renounce this enterprise (the attack on the lunette), so that, at present, his operations seem exclusively limited against bastion No. 2—(Toledo.)"

It must also be observed, that the mouth of the descent and sap on the left face of St. Laurent were necessarily sheltered from the direct fire of Kiel. This supposition on the part of the Dutch engineers in some measure accounts for the absence of many useful, and almost necessary, counter precautions that might have been employed to retard the completion of the descent and passage of the miner.

An error also is to be observed in the report of the same day relative to the works on the left flank of the counter-guard. It is stated, that embrasures were opened on this flank in a battery intended to breach the gorge and to support the attack on St. Laurent; but that they were destroyed by a reverse fire from the citadel. Now, at the period alluded to by General Chassé, a battery *was* projected, but not commenced. Remonstrances were said to have been made by the Belgian authorities, and by the diplomacy, against this measure, as they feared it might draw misfortunes on the city. The work was therefore renounced, and not a single embrasure opened; nor was it until some days later that the battery No. 12 was commenced, and its embrasures unmasked on the batardeau. This error, perhaps, arose from the embrasures of the lodgments being supposed to be made for cannon.

The loss of the besiegers up to this day, on relieving trenches, amounted to 12 killed and 94 wounded; amongst the latter were 6 officers. That of the besieged was 25 killed, 67 wounded, and 3 missing, amongst these 5 officers.

Confidence was now completely restored in the city. All fear of molestation was given up. The exchange was attended, the shops were re-opened, and the markets abundantly supplied. Crowds of strangers filled the hotels, where it was difficult to procure lodging; and had not the thunders of the cannon, amplified by the echoes of the cathedral,

reminded one of what was passing, it would have been impossible to suppose oneself within a thousand yards of a fierce bombardment.

Amateurs of all countries, and officers of all nations, were seen eagerly seeking permission to visit the trenches, or to mount the towers or buildings, whence a sight could be obtained of the operations. Some ascended the noble tower of Notre Dame, whence the eye commanded a view of the country for many leagues around, and enabled one to judge of the havoc committed by the inundations, which had converted the broad expanse of fertile polders into a broad waste of unwholesome waters. There flowed the broad river, tenanted only by four or five gun-boats, whilst lower down, towards Lillo, the lofty masts of the Dutch vessels of war were visible through the haze. On the left bank, the banner of Holland, floating above the inundations, marked the position of the three forts occupied by them on that side. Beneath, lay the noble city, filled with the hum of voice, the rattling of wheels and clatter of horses' hoofs,—its inhabitants busied with their usual avocations, and its streets thronged with passengers, apparently as little affected by what was going on, as though the citadel had been leagues distant. To the south, was the fortress itself, partly enveloped in the shadow, or marked by the haze of smoke, but a portion of the profile of its bastions plainly traced out by the reflection of the sun gleaming on its ditches. Its interior seemed tenantless, had not sundry columns of light and curling smoke, followed by the loud echo of its guns, and the sharper rattle of its musketry, told the spectator that the garrison were staunchly standing to their posts. From the smoke and fog that generally hovered over the ground, it was difficult, even with the best telescope, to descry the outline of the offensive works, and the eye eagerly sought for the angular projections of earth, behind which one was aware that thousands of active assailants were busily employed. During some intervals it occurred that there was a deep silence, and one was inclined to doubt the reality of hostilities; but suddenly curling eddies of smoke, rising here and there in a semicircle, at some distance, and followed by loud explosions, indicated the positions of the French batteries; whilst here a shell bursting, with tremendous noise, in the air; there another, creating lesser destruction when falling into the buildings; or there again a round shot, whistling and splashing into the Scheldt,—convinced one that the business of war was being vigorously carried on.

The tower of the church of St. Andrew, though less lofty than that of the cathedral, was, from its vicinity to the esplanade, a favourite observatory. Its turret was crowded every day with the curious; and it was here that King Leopold, attended by an aide-de-camp, took his station, and watched, with natural and intense anxiety, those operations destined to restore to his dominion the possession of this emporium of Belgian commerce.

It was from this point that the effect of the besieging fire could best be observed; and it was curious to remark the anxiety with which each discharge was watched, and the criticisms that were uttered when shot or shells soared over the citadel and fell harmless into the river or upon the esplanade.

One of the most singular anomalies attending this siege was the conversion of the theatre into a place for observing the operations.

This building, contiguous to the Malines gate, was favourably situated for obtaining a sight of part of the bastions, trenches, and batteries. A portion of the roof was therefore removed, platforms raised, and the managers, profiting by the eager curiosity of strangers, published the following hand-bill:—

“ Notice.—The public is informed, that places are to be procured at the Théâtre des Variétés, at Antwerp, for seeing the siege.”

From 8th to 9th.—The blinded descent, commenced during the previous night, was actively carried on, and met with little molestation. It was carried down to within two or three feet of the counterscarp; but the latter was not cut through, in order to conceal its exact position from the garrison, until everything was completed. The strength and neatness of this work was much admired, although not to be compared, in beauty or delicacy of construction, to that of a *ciel couvert*, subsequently opened under the covered-way of Toledo.

A new branch by full sap was opened between the first and second traverse, and that directed on the re-entering place of arms, continued\*. Some portion of this work, and the lodgment behind, was destroyed several times by the fire of the besiegers. The small Coehorn mortars, and howitzers, fired vertically, were found to gall the workmen, whilst the round-shot and mortar-shells knocked over the gabions and demolished the parapets. About 10 o'clock, a few Dutch volunteers rushed out of the redoubt of the ravelin near its junction with the caponnière, and with daring, but prodigal gallantry, threw themselves on the heads of the sap. The sappers, who were somewhat taken, by surprise, and unsupported, seized their muskets, sprung on the parapet, and repulsed this handful of brave men, of whom five out of nine remained on the ground.

During the night, a new battery G, for six mortars, was completed in front of the first parallel, nearly opposite, about 220 yards from the capital of St. Laurent. It was armed with pieces taken from battery C in its rear. Another battery, No. 11, for four 24-pounders, was likewise constructed immediately contiguous and within the same coffer, and armed from No. 10. These were intended to harass the Toledo bastion and adjacent curtains, and to batter point-blank the right face of the former.

On the right, the trench was carried on in the direction of the re-entering place of arms of the left face of the Toledo bastion. An attempt was made to advance a boyau by flying sap from the latter towards the salient of Toledo; but the vigorous discharge of shot and shell, and the harassing effect of the vertical fire of the besieged, incommoded the sappers, and continually tore away the gabions, many of which were compelled to be replaced ten or twelve times.

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\* In speaking of the traverses of the lunette, it must be remembered, that no first traverse actually existed; therefore it must be understood, that the first traverse means the first encountered: strictly speaking it should be the second, and so on. But as General Haxo adopts this term, it has been thought proper to follow him. On the right face there were the usual number, four traverses; on the left, only three.

The sappers were armed with helmets and cuirasses, according to the old system ; these were found to resist musketry, but were inefficient against grape and splinters.

In other parts of the trenches the working parties were busily engaged in repairing the damage done to the parapets, and in endeavouring to drain off the water or throw out the mud which choked the communications, many parts of which, though floored with fascines, were nearly impassable. It must, however, be remarked, that with the exception of those points intersected by the Boom chaussée, the whole of the ground in advance was highly favourable for the operations of the trenches. A soft loam or compact sandy bottom, without the slightest admixture of stones or hard substances, rendered it easy for the sappers to excavate quickly and secure them from the dangerous effects of splinters, which in a flinty soil are as dangerous, and often produce as many casualties as the fragments of the shells themselves, and are therefore a powerful auxiliary to the fire of the place.

A third lodgment for rampart guns was cut opposite the profile of the right flank of the counterguard, and the others strengthened. The annoyance caused by the marksmen in this quarter was excessive. Their fire, directed with great precision, plunged into the covered-way and reverse of the lunette, causing many casualties. The branches being extremely narrow and deep, and the lodgments in the same proportions, the men could only be got at by vertical fire ; and on examining the lodgments and branches at various periods, it was remarkable how few shells or projectiles had alighted in them. The confidence inspired by this sense of security increased the accuracy of their aim ; not thrown away at random, but directed with care on prominent objects. The intelligence of these men in judging the proper moment for firing was as remarkable as the general gaiety and good-humour of the soldiers during the whole operation.

The latter may appear very unimportant ; for, with us, provided the men do their duty, it is generally a matter of little consideration, whether they be cheerful or not. Indeed, how often does one not remark the officer chiding the soldier for a laugh or a jest at a moment when the spirits of the men may require some excitement ? and there are few officers of experience who do not acknowledge the value of a cheerful disposition in the ranks, and the effect that a gibe or quaint saying produces in moments of danger. For example, every one knows, that the Guards, in Spain, were nick-named the "Gentlemen's Sons," a joke in which the illustrious Commander-in-chief good humouredly joined, and not unfrequently repeated. At Burgos, a detachment of this corps was advancing to the assault,—the fire was tremendous,—many gallant men had fallen, and the rest paused. The officer commanding, seeing this, sprung forward, cheered them on, and then said, "Forward, lads ! Do you think they'd be so cruel as to send the Gentlemen's Sons on such duty if the French guns were loaded ?" This produced its effect,—there was a laugh,—and on they dashed.

Of the characteristic gaiety of the French many examples can be cited. One or two will suffice. On passing the angle of the boyau leading into the second parallel opposite St. Laurent, which was partially enfiladed from Kiel, an infantry soldier was met floundering through the mud under the weight of a heavy gabion. A shot struck

the parapet, and either from this or a false step, down fell the man and his burden into the mire. One of our countrymen would have risen, and his first impulse would have been to have wished the besieged and the service at a much hotter place than the head of the sap. But the conscript sprung up, shook himself, and exclaimed, with a smile,—“Who says it is not a fine thing to be a soldier? I'll enlist for ten years more from this day,”—and then, hoisting up his load, on he went. On another occasion, near the descent made in the ditch of the ravelin, the adjutant of the trenches was writing a memorandum: a shell pitched on the reverse of the trench, exploded, and covered him and his paper with a shower of sand. The officer flipped it off quietly with his hand, and said,—“They are more polite than you, Messieurs; they sent me the sand-box.” A round-shot, struck a gabion close to the Duke of Orleans, and buried itself in the ground, within a few inches of his person. The Prince took off his hat, and bowing, said,—“One ought to be polite to new acquaintances.”

As the works advanced, the number of casualties in the besieging army augmented, especially amongst the sappers, whose loss was more severely felt than twice the number of men in other corps. The attention paid to the instruction of the soldiers of this army is great, and it is but justice to say, that they appeared to display intelligence and self-possession of the first order; being, for the most part, not only able to execute the most important and hazardous operations, but to plan the lesser details. The system pursued by the engineers was, for General Haxo to sketch out the order of each day's operations; copies of these were given to the officers commanding on different points, who traced them on the ground, and they were then executed by the men, little further superintendence being necessary. When it is considered that the British army had no regular corps of sappers and miners in Spain, it is a matter of astonishment that the officers of engineers were enabled to perform the important task imposed upon them at the various sieges. The number of those distinguished and gallant men who were killed and wounded is a proof how severely they paid in their persons, for a deficiency so remarkable and so injurious to the service.

A battery for six mortars (E) on the right, and in front of the first parallel between Nos. 3 and 4, opened its fire. Another (F), also for six mortars, was traced behind the centre of the second parallel. They were armed with the pieces from A and B. Platforms were also laid down for four mortars, in Montebello. Their fire was directed upon the Toledo bastion and buildings in its rear.

On the previous day, heavy jets of smoke and flame were seen to rise from the great barracks, the upper-story of which had been filled with earth, manure, and other precautions against fire. A howitzer-shell having lodged in one of the beams, the flames soon burst forth, and raged with irresistible fury. These continued to burn all day, and at night the whole range of buildings presented a mass of fire, lighting up the atmosphere to a great distance, and presenting a brilliant and most imposing spectacle. Seen at some distance, with the flames raging in its interior, and darting their rays through the long ranges of windows, it had the appearance of some vast scenic representation, the grandeur of which was heightened by the thunders of the cannon, and loud detonations of the bursting shells. Towards midnight, the rafters

and timbers gave way, the roof fell in with a loud crash, and smothering the flames, produced a sudden transition from the most brilliant light to the blackest darkness. By the afternoon of the 8th, the whole was reduced to a heap of ashes.

The loss and inconvenience inflicted on the besieged by this misfortune was an aggravation of their suffering. For now, the laboratory, kitchens, church, hospital, and magazines of stores and forage, in short, almost every building within the place, was destroyed, or so riddled with shot, as to render it unsafe to approach their crumbling walls; and thus forced the soldiers not on duty to confine themselves to the posterns and casemates.

The sap having been much galled by the coehorns in the lunette and ravelin, four of these portable mortars were placed in the second parallel, opposite the capital of St. Laurent, and after a few trials, were found to produce a diminution of the discharges against them.

The casualties within the last forty-eight hours had somewhat augmented; but had not exceeded a daily average of 18 men *hors de combat*, from the opening of the trenches. It was observed by an intelligent officer, that the mode of defence in some measure tended to increase the loss. The fire of the besieged, though admirably directed, and, on certain points, extremely vigorous, was partial and not sustained. Sometimes during half an hour or more, scarcely a shot was fired. Men and officers thus became impatient; and often, where prudence should have commanded the employment of the full sap, the work was done for some yards merely by excavation or simple sap. Of a sudden, the garrison would then rouse themselves; a heavy discharge took place, and the working parties were thus overtaken, whilst fully exposed. This may also have been the effect of calculation.

The wounded on these occasions were well taken care of; and the facilities offered by the immediate vicinity of the Antwerp hospital were of immense advantage. All serious cases were immediately transported within the walls, where conveniences and even luxury awaited them; and they were attended with unremitting skill and attention, not only by their own, but by the Belgian surgeons, under the direction of Dr. Seutin, an able and active operator.

Whilst on this subject, it is impossible to pass over the conduct of the Dukes of Orleans and Nemours. These young princes, who evinced a zealous devotion to their duties as officers, and a steadiness and gallantry under fire, not to be surpassed by the oldest soldiers, usefully and humanely employed a portion of their leisure in visiting the hospitals at Antwerp, Berchem, and Hoboken. They examined, and spoke with each man; flattering them with kind and gracious compliments on their courage, consoling them with immediate pecuniary assistance, or promises of future recompense, and impressing the sufferers, as well as all persons present, with a deep respect for their generous and unaffected sentiments and behaviour.

A hundred little anecdotes are reported of the mutual sayings that passed on these occasions, as honourable to the princes as to the wounded. It would be irrelevant to repeat them; but it is certain that the happiest effect was produced throughout the army by the report of what passed on these occasions. The soldiers were not only gratified on seeing their princes partaking of the same dangers, and running the



same hazards as themselves ; but they were stimulated to a forgetfulness of danger when in the presence of those who had the power of rewarding valour, and less thoughtful of the consequences, since they knew their princes would not allow them either to linger unattended, or to rise from their beds to drag out an unrequited existence.

The King of the Belgians also availed himself of his journey to Antwerp to visit the hospitals, where he left substantial proofs of his bounty ; and having examined almost all the men, and directed notes to be taken of such as were the most deserving, either commanded money to be distributed, or reserved to himself the future pleasure of conferring his cross upon them.

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From 9th to 10th.—The operations against St. Laurent were resumed at night with multiplied activity, and the sap advanced to the crochet of the second traverse, whilst that intended to debouch upon it from its right was likewise pushed on. The sappers having been considerably inconvenienced, it was determined to form a company of chosen marksmen, destined to be posted in the branches, and to keep up an unremitting fire on the lunette and ravelin. Three detachments of these volunteers were placed at night-fall in front of St. Laurent—two of them in the boyau, parallel to its left face, which was furnished with sand-bag loop-holes, and a third in blinded lodgments, cut in the body of the parapet of the covered-way. The moment they opened their fire, it attracted the whole attention of the garrison, who immediately redoubled theirs in this direction, and thus, their attention was diverted from the heads of the sap, both here and in front of Toledo.

The besieged commenced employing their pierriers, whence they discharged vast quantities of stones, fragments of iron, small grenades, shell-splinters, and other missiles. The charge of projectiles was placed in a wicker-basket, and this again rested on a circular wooden sabot or wad, over the chamber. Many hundreds of these wooden platters fell into the trenches, and could be seen distinctly whirling and twisting in the air. The artillery fire of the place was less animated than usual ; that of the besiegers, from having mounted their new batteries, was more violent than on the preceding day.

• The principal operation of the night was the commencement of the third parallel, about 130 yards in advance of the second—its right debouching beyond the Boom chaussée, from the branch running into the covered-way of the counterguard ; and its left uniting with the boyau parallel to the foot of the glacis of St. Laurent. A dense fog favoured the execution of this work ; whilst the unexpected fire of the picked marksmen near St. Laurent drew off the attention of the garrison. Thus, the line was traced by the captain of engineers on duty, the workmen laid on, and the parallel advanced by flying sap, with such rapidity, that the men were covered, and the gabions and parapets firmly fixed before the besieged were aware of what was going on. At length, however, they discovered the parapet, and a multitude of fire-balls were thrown out, and a sharp vertical fire directed upon it, but the range was less perfect than on the preceding night, and the casualties proportionately trifling. Seven men only were wounded.

The fearful havoc committed amidst the buildings of the citadel occupied much of the attention of the besieged, who had already ten guns and fifteen carriages completely disabled; and with the exception of their mortars, coehorns, and light pieces, were unable this night to employ any other guns than those protected and sheltered behind the retired flanks and blindages of bastions Paciotto and Hernando. Of these, however, and their field-pieces, which, as before stated, they ran up to the ruined parapet, fired and withdrew to the terre-plein to reload, they made a gallant use.

The bomb-proof kitchens, previously much injured, were now gradually crumbling to pieces, and thus added to the inconvenience of the troops, who were obliged to cook their provisions in the best manner they could, under the posterns or within the dark and unwholesome casemates. General Chassé states in his report of this day's operations, that "no blinded work could resist such a fire;" and he principally attributes the destruction to the effect of the new model 8-inch howitzers.

Up to the year 1822, the 8-inch howitzer in common use in France, measured exactly 3 feet 6 inches (French), weighing 1096 pounds, or 23 times that of the loaded projectile. Its calibre was equal to a solid shot of 80, and it contained about 65 ounces of powder. The new model howitzer, we have already observed, is partly an improvement on the Russian licorne and the Spanish heavy howitzer, perfected from the suggestions of Colonel Paixhans, by the French committee of artillery.

On examining General Chassé's report to his government,—a report evidently written with the frank and undisguised feelings of a brave and honest man,—one cannot fail to be struck at the frequent recurrence to the effect of the French howitzer fire; but one is still more surprised at finding the following observation, and to see the obnoxious term repeated on more than one occasion. "The buildings," says the general, "every where yield to the violent fire of the enemy, who, by a *brutal abuse* of their gigantic means of destroying the citadel, seek to obtain an object that otherwise would have cost them too much time, labour, and bloodshed." That the French fire was severe and efficacious, and yet not more destructive or rapid than might have been expected from the great quantity of pieces in battery, and the number of days they were employed, there can be no doubt. Forty mortars, twenty howitzers, and an average of forty long guns, were directed to maintain a steady discharge, and, of course, to inflict all the damage of which these engines were capable. It has been shown, that the whole number of rounds of all descriptions fired from eleven A.M. on the 4th, to nine A.M. on the 23d, amounted to about 63,000. Taking the number of pieces in battery to have been 105, and the number of days 19, this will give about 3300 for the whole, per day; 600 rounds for each piece for 19 days, and 31 rounds for 24 hours, or not 1 shot in 40 minutes for each gun.

It is hardly necessary, therefore, to observe, that it was the duration, and not the rapidity of the fire, that was most harassing; for, supposing the besieging army to have been pressed for time, and abundantly supplied with ammunition, it would not have been difficult to have augmented the average fire to four rounds per hour, which would have given 10,080 rounds per day, and the enormous number of 191,720 in

19 days. Without recurring to the number of rounds fired by the British battering guns, on various occasions, which was rarely less than 100 or 90 rounds per day, we have an instance of a brass 12-pounder in the citadel firing 68 rounds between sunset and sunrise, or nearly 6 rounds per hour.

The vigour of the besieging fire consisted, then, not in the number of rounds fired by each gun, but in the profusion of the *matériel*. Speaking by precedent or fact, it cannot be admitted to have been a rapid fire; but even supposing that each gun had fired three times as many shot, what would this prove?—that the besiegers had made vigorous use, but no abuse of the means at their disposal. Had General Chassé defended a populous city, thronged with inhabitants or filled with rich magazines of private property,—had his blinded works been stored with the goods of laborious merchants,—or his barracks been an asylum for inoffensive women and children,—then, indeed, a bombardment would have been a brutal abuse of force; but surely so old and experienced a soldier as General Chassé could not seriously find fault with the besiegers for exerting their utmost efforts to weaken his defences, and to put him and his garrison to the utmost possible straits, by an active employment of every legitimate projectile.

It can easily be understood, that General Chassé was grieved, and that he suffered deeply,—not for himself,—for a more gallant soldier never drew sword,—but at the sight of the hopeless condition to which his people were being reduced, without a prospect of relief or succour. One can imagine, also, the anguish of mind of a generous soldier, on witnessing the distress of his men, driven to shelter themselves in crowded posterns, his wounded in danger in the hospitals, and his officers in continued peril, not alone from the fire of the enemy, but from the crumbling ruins, which no longer afforded them shelter. But he could not blame the besiegers for doing that duty, which, had he been in command of their army, or had his brave artillerymen manned the offensive guns, would probably have been executed with still greater energy.

The raft for the blinded descent was prepared and brought up to the lodgment, but the descent itself was not terminated. A second descent, *à ciel couvert*, was commenced to the left of the first, nearer the capital of St. Laurent. The ground selected for this was found more suited for launching the raft for the miner, who was in readiness to cross over to commence operations against the scarp. The third parallel was improved and widened, and banquettes for musketry established; the right of this parallel, near its junction with the boyau of the covered-way of the counterguard, was considerably incommoded by the fire from the retired flank of Paciotto. The sap debouching from this point towards the salient place of arms of the covered-way of Toledo was so galled with the showers of shells, coehorns, grape, and stones, that the men were withdrawn, and the work was abandoned for the moment.

In order to protect this point, and to check the fire of the besieged, four coehorn-mortars were established in the branch in its rear close to the ditch of the counterguard. Two sappers and two soldiers of infantry were killed, and two of the former wounded. One of these was completely buried by a bomb, which exploded at his feet; but he fortunately escaped with a mere contusion. The Dutch vessels near Lillo

made no renewed attempt to molest General Sebastiani. On the right bank and frontier all remained tranquil.

The loss of the besiegers up to mid-day amounted to 182 men killed and wounded.

From 10th to 11th.—A little after dusk a detachment of 60 infantry and 20 sappers, favoured by the darkness and fog, issued from the palisaded reduit in the re-entering place of arms of the ravelin, and, following the covered way of the Toledo bastion, gallantly dashed forward on the sap on the extreme right of the counterguard. This enterprise fully succeeded, and was conducted with great spirit and address. Some of the infantry rushed forward on the sappers, who were taken by surprise, and compelled to fly, whilst the rest of the party overturned about twenty gabions, destroyed the sap, and finding the four coehorn mortars, cast them into the ditch. But two companies of the trench-guard arriving to the assistance of the sappers, the sortie was driven in, with the loss of two officers killed, eight or ten men wounded, and one prisoner. Had this sally been supported by a diversion on the left, as well as another from the centre by St. Laurent, much more benefit might have resulted; but on this, as every other occasion, the numbers were too weak to be effective, and the approach of a few men sufficed to repulse them. However, enough had been done to employ the besiegers the whole night in repairing the mischief. One flanker was killed, and three sappers wounded.

The descent *à ciel ouvert* into the ditch of St. Laurent was terminated without being discovered by the besieged, whose attention was occupied by a heavy fire of musketry purposely maintained from the places of arms and lodgments. Under cover of this, the raft was brought down and launched, and an experienced serjeant of miners and four sappers were sent across. After some hours' labour, they reported that they had been able to make little progress, in consequence of the extreme strength and compactness of the masonry of the revetment; by dawn, however, they succeeded in making a considerable impression, and were then withdrawn for the day. It must be again observed, that no part of the foot of the scarp, from the salient to the angle of the left flank, can be enfiladed from the citadel.

In the mean time, the saps on the glacis and covered-way of St. Laurent were united in front of the second traverse; the first by working to the right, the other to the left. It was then carried on nearly parallel to the re-entering place of arms, and prolonged beyond the Boom chaussée, in the direction of the salient of the covered-way of Toledo.

On the right, nearly from the centre of the third parallel, an approach was pushed forward, intended to be carried on to the extremity of the covered-way of the counterguard, so as to unite with the return branch embracing the right profile of its ditch. The fire of the besieged was heavy, but on this, as on all occasions of breaking new ground, they were either unprepared, or unable to discover what was passing.

We should have mentioned, that the difficulties encountered by the besiegers in arming the batteries G and No. 53, on the previous

night, were extreme. The ground being intersected with ditches, and being throughout rotten and unsound, it was necessary to cut through the first parallel, to drag the guns by a narrow road, bordered on either side by deep ditches, and then to convey them across the open ground into the battery, by turning sharp to the left over a small bridge, nearly at right angles. This manœuvre could only be accomplished with extraordinary labour and exertion; nor was it effected without two mortars being overturned, one of which became so fast embedded in the mud, that several hours elapsed before it could be extricated.

The danger and embarrassments of such operations, especially in the face of an enterprising and vigilant garrison, render them too hazardous to become precedents; but on this occasion, the nature of the ground rendered it impracticable to employ the usual communications, through which it was not only impossible to draw the guns, but even to transport the daily supplies of ammunition.

The fire of the batteries of cannon had considerably slackened during the day and evening; the extreme density of the fog, which concealed objects at 150 yards' distance, and completely masked the citadel, rendered their employment dangerous, lest they should injure the men on the saps, which had now reached the foot of the glacis. But at dawn, the new batteries and the mortars in Montebello resumed their activity, and for a while completely silenced that of Toledo. The besieged had five pieces either dismounted or rendered utterly unserviceable during these twenty-four hours; making all together 15 guns and 20 carriages disabled since the commencement of operations. Amongst other accidents, a shell having alighted on one of the 12-pounders, broke it in two, as though it had been sawn across.

A singular occurrence also took place in the besieging battery No. 10. The Dutch fire from Kiel, Paciotto, and the ravelin, had been extremely active, and so admirably directed, that shot after shot entered the embrasures, and in some measure forced the gunners to slacken their fire. A shot having displaced a gabion, it fell in the embrasure, so as to mask the piece; the captain commanding, seeing the men somewhat discouraged, sprung on the parapet, pushed aside the obstructing gabion, returned to his own station, and was in the act of pointing a gun, when it made a sharp recoil; on inquiring the cause, it was found that a 12-pound shot had entered at the muzzle; and had gone clean home to the bottom of the cylinder, where it split on the 24-pounder within, without injuring the gun, or even scratching it; its fragments were preserved, and presented to General Neigre as a curiosity.

During the day, the boyau, debouching from the re-entering place of arms of St. Laurent, directed on the salient of the covered-way of Toledo, was actively carried on by full sap. The third parallel was strengthened. Banquettes and loop-holes for musketry, as well as steps in front and rear, were made, to enable the men to repulse an attack or retreat if necessary. The heavy fire of mortars brought by the besieged on the sap, starting from the right of the covered-way of the counterguard, inclining towards the salient of Toledo, again obliged the workmen to desist: a lieutenant and five infantry soldiers were killed; three and a sapper were wounded. The garrison also renewed its fire with increased activity on the left, where a sapper was killed, and three of the working party wounded.

The new battery H, for four 10-inch mortars, commenced during the night on the extreme right of the second parallel, almost touching the Boom chaussée, at the distance of 360 yards from the left face of Toledo, was completed and armed from battery C. Platforms were also laid down for four mortars in Montebello, in addition to four others previously placed there. Half of these were in front, and a little to the left of the low casemated guard-house on its capital, and the other half in the rear, and a little to the right; thus augmenting the number of pieces in this fort to sixteen. It must be remarked that the thirty mortars which had been mounted in batteries A, B, and C, in rear of the first parallel, were now advanced close to the second, and divided amongst E, F, G, H, and Montebello. D, armed with ten mortars on the left, maintained its fire nearly up to the last moment, when half its pieces were taken to furnish battery I. The range of these batteries was directed not only against the front of attack and interior, but against that part of bastion Fernando, which could not be got at by direct or ricochet fire.

General Neigre observes, in his report, that "the disarming of the batteries in the first, and arming of those in the second parallel, was performed gradually, so as not to render sensible the diminution of fire during this operation; and that, since the opening of the trenches on the night of the 29th November, nineteen batteries, with platforms for 138 pieces, had been constructed." It must not be understood from this, that 138 pieces opened their fire; for, as it has been shown, No. 18 was armed with four twenty-fours from No. 10, still leaving four in the latter; and the advanced mortar-batteries, E, F, G, H, were supplied from those in their rear; thus the cypher of 105 remained the same; but by adding 34 to 105, it gives 139; therefore the number of platforms laid down must have been to the latter amount; but it must be recollected A was not armed, and consequently only 138 platforms were completed.

Hitherto the artillery had been extremely fortunate; the casualties were few; and although a shower of shells fell around Montebello and many within, it was singular to observe the good fortune of the gunners in escaping. Up to this day not above forty men of this corps had been put *hors de combat*. This was in some measure to be attributed to the remarkable solidity of the batteries, and partly, as before observed, to the soft ground, which threw up no splinters, and frequently smothered the projectiles; this was particularly the case on the centre and left. It should be stated, that in all the batteries not exposed to direct fire of cannon, the embrasures were furnished with thick musket-proof wooden shutters, opening vertically in their centre, and mounted on frames, with iron hinges and handles. These were opened to point and fire, and immediately closed on the recoil of the piece.

It appears, from General Chassé's report, that the ditches of the citadel were nearly dry at low water, and that a fissure was observed on this day in the batardeau. The General attributes this to the fire of a low battery near Montebello. No such battery existed. It was the effect of shells, as appeared from subsequent examination. It would not be possible to establish any low battery, except on the left flank of the counterguard, that could breach the batardeau, and this

was not done until the 19th. The besiegers were, however, not aware of the state of the ditches until some days later, or the necessity for establishing battery 12 would have been obviated.

The garrison now began to suffer for the want of pure water; an irremediable misfortune, which greatly enhances the merit of their patience and endurance. A Dutch gunner distinguished himself on this day by a noble act of devotion: a shell having alighted within the passage, and at the open door of the powder-magazine, in the bastion Fernando, this intrepid soldier darted forward, pushed it aside, and closing the door, thus prevented the misfortune that must otherwise inevitably have occurred. In a conversation subsequently held with the British Commissioner, Colonel Caradoc, and Sir George Hamilton, Secretary to the British embassy, General Chassé mentioned this anecdote in terms worthy of himself and the brave artilleryman. These are actions that merit recompense, and should be commemorated.

Independent of the want of water, the sufferings of the garrison hourly increased from the destruction of every place of shelter except the posterns and subterraneous communications. Here, half the men were compelled to stand pressed one against another, whilst the other half snatched a few minutes' repose either seated or lying down. Even the vaulted cellars, under the great barracks and other buildings, began to give way, and not a single blindage was intact.

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From 11th to 12th.—In addition to the raft already prepared, three others were got ready and placed in the open descents of the ditch of St. Laurent. These rafts were about 12 feet by 8. They were made of strong planks, nailed transversely upon three rafters. Poles were furnished to the men to guide them across.

At dusk the miners returned to the scarp of the lunette, and under cover of a heavy roll of musketry, fired two petards placed in the excavation made on the previous night. By this means a large fissure was obtained; and the serjeant having entered the hole, commenced a gallery under the centre of one of the arches supporting the second stage of the revetment. An aperture sufficient to admit one man having been made, the other miners followed in succession; but the work advanced slowly, and the raft had nearly been sunk three or four times by shells, by which two men were wounded.

The boyaus directed on the salient of Toledo debouching the one from opposite the re-entering place of arms of St. Laurent, and the other from the return on the right of the covered-way of the counter-guard, were united nearly opposite the capital of Toledo, and thus formed the fourth parallel. Two approaches were commenced on the right; the one, intended to connect the centre of the trench running from the third parallel to the right of the covered-way of the counter-guard, with the fourth parallel, and the other, starting from the extreme right, close to the ditch of the esplanade bastion, directed on the glacis of the left face of Toledo.

This night the working parties were extremely fortunate. No casualties occurred; there was a heavy fire, but the range of the shells was too wide, and the vertical fire of the place not sufficiently elevated.

The saps advanced rapidly, shrouded by a dense fog; and although the besieged threw out a number of light balls, the thickness of the atmosphere rendered them ineffective.

The highest praise is due to General Chassé for the loyalty and humanity he evinced up to the latest moment,—not so much in sparing the city,—but for so directing his fire as not to injure the villages immediately in the rear of the line of attack. Berchem, for instance, the centre of which is not above 2500 yards from the ramparts, was within easy range of his shells. This village was the head-quarters of the Marshal, of the artillery, and engineers. It was crowded with officers and troops of all arms, and filled with inhabitants. One park of artillery was formed near its entrance, on the Malines side, and a park of engineers was established at the church. General Chassé must have known this, and might have created the utmost inconvenience, and, perhaps, loss, by directing his fire upon it:—but he abstained. The same thing may be said of the village of St. Laurent; the church of which was employed as a hospital. One or two projectiles may have fallen in this quarter; but, if they did, they were accidental. In general, the fire of the besieged was entirely confined to the attacks and batteries before them; and it is a matter of astonishment, considering the accuracy of their range, that so few casualties occurred. The multiplicity of the boyaus and trenches, the strength of the parapets, and softness of the ground, can alone account for this; for it is not too much to say, that it would have been difficult to have found two square yards of ground between the different parallels and trenches that were not either ploughed with shot or torn with projectiles.

At eleven a.m. the battery of mortars, H, on the extreme right of the second parallel, opened its fire, which, combined with that of the other mortar batteries, evidently told severely on bastion Toledo, and the curtain to its left, as the mortar fire of the besieged, which had hitherto been extremely well sustained from this point, evidently slackened; occasioned, as it appeared, by some of the pieces being disabled, and by one or two small service magazines of powder and live shells having exploded. One of the buildings of the citadel was observed to be in flames, but the ravages of the shells had left little to be devoured by fire. Scarcely anything remained standing but bare walls, and these were rapidly crumbling to dust, leaving nothing but a blackened and scorched chaos of ruins, that were enough to have discouraged the stoutest hearts.

In the mean time, the miners continued their work under St. Laurent, and, having completed their galleries, commenced chambers for three mines. The blinded descent, which had been terminated to within a few inches of the unrevetted counterscarp, was not opened. It was wide enough to admit six men abreast, and sufficiently strong to resist a sharp fire of bombs. A quantity of fascines and long saucissons, loaded with stones, were brought up to the lodgment, and placed in readiness for the passage of the ditch.

The fourth parallel was widened during the day. Banquettes and loop-holes were established on the left, to enable the tirailleurs to fire into the reverse of St. Laurent, and banquettes with steps were made opposite the covered way of Toledo, in order to facilitate the repulse of any sortie that might be made from this quarter. Preparations were begun to debouche, by double sap, from the fourth



parallel, on the nearest point of the covered-way, in order to effect the crowning of the glacis. On the right, a communication was established by a passage of fascines, between the right flank of the counter-guard and the approaches on the glacis of Toledo, near the re-entering place of arms. The principal object of this communication was to render it more easy to apprise the rampart gun-men, stationed in the lodgments of the counter-guard, when and how to direct their aim.

The fire of the place was resumed, and gallantly maintained. Some casualties occurred. One of the volunteer sharp-shooters, posted in a blinded lodgment, was buried, and badly wounded, by a shell which alighted on the top of the small excavation where he was concealed. Several others shared the same fate.

The Dutch fleet again moved up the Scheldt, and exchanged fire with the troops on the right bank, but without any extraordinary result to either party. The forts St. Philippe and La Croix having been partially armed, the latter, with only two 8-inch howitzers, were in a position to resist all efforts of the squadron to ascend the river; and, as the utmost vigilance was exercised by the detachments of General Achard's and Sebastiani's divisions, it was only at great risk and peril that Colonel Koopman, commanding the flotilla of gun-boats opposite the citadel, was enabled to convey the Governor's despatches, or communications to his government. This, however, was effected by confidential and intrepid seamen, who, in small boats, with muffled oars, crossed the inundations, dropped down with the tide, and took advantage of the shadow of the banks to pass unobserved by the forts and vedettes; or, if challenged, held to the middle of the stream, and pushed on in despite of the fire. In order, if possible, to intercept these communications, guard-boats, manned by the men of the marine company attached to the army, constantly rowed up and down between the citadel and Fort du Nord.

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From 12th to 13th.—The chambers in St. Laurent were not yet completed. Masses of stone and various obstacles were encountered by the miners, that delayed the work. From the water of the ditch having been let off by the garrison, who began to suspect that something wrong was going on, and had discovered the rafts near the descent, without, however, seeing that of the miners, the latter was stranded in the mud, and could only be set afloat by the men springing into the ditch, and hauling it off by main force.

On the right, the covered-way of the left face of the Toledo bastion was crowned to the distance of 65 yards, and a loop-holed place of arms for musketry was established on that part of it which enfiladed the covered-way on the right face. This operation was completed by day-break.

The besieged made good use of their vertical fire: the small portable coehorns and pierriers were found to annoy the workmen; but the range of shells was less perfect. The besieging batteries were extremely active. Marshal Gerard, in his report of the 13th, says, "I have given orders that our fire shall be arranged so that there shall be continually a shot and shell in the air: the execution of this measure allows

no respite to the enemy, and prevents his quitting the casemates where he has taken refuge." In fact, taking the number of projectiles hurled on the citadel at 63,000 during the nineteen days,—that is, 33,000 round shot, 14,000 mortar, and 16,000 howitzer shells,—it will be found that the Marshal's orders were strictly performed; and that, on allowing the time necessary for the shells to perform their parabola, few seconds could have elapsed without a shot or shell being in motion.

The various besieging batteries having been advanced to the points they were intended to occupy, until the progress of the approaches permitted the establishment of those intended to batter and counter-batter the ramparts, no new works were undertaken by this arm. Some of the embrasures were, however, changed, according as the besieged directed their own pieces. Officers were stationed on the tower of the cathedral, to observe the range, and make reports on its accuracy. This was an advantage of great importance to the besiegers, and rendered the slightest inaccuracy inexcusable. A shell from the place fell close to the powder-magazine of battery No. 8, and set fire to some loaded shells, by which three gunners were wounded.

The miners in St. Laurent were advancing rapidly with their work, when the detonation of a 24-pounder in No. 11 battery, acting on the mouth of the gallery, caused so strong a concussion of air that the earth in one of the chambers fell in, and nearly buried the miner. This produced additional delay, and retarded the operation of charging the fourneau. Before dusk, however, the damaged chamber was again cleared, the three fourneaus loaded, each with about 420 lbs. of powder; and the saucissons laid ready to receive the match. From various causes these operations had occupied the greater part of five days. The delay was principally caused by the extreme solidity and consistency of the revetment, and from the lightness of the sandy soil within, interspersed with fragments of rubbish or bricks, which obstructed the advance of the galleries, and when removed, caused the sand to crumble, as to require great caution on the part of the miners, as well as the employment of planks and other supports. Everything having been reported ready by the engineers, and three long rafts being brought down to the mouths of the descents, that on the right was cut through the counter-scarp, and orders given for the assault to take place at night.

In the mean time, the besiegers kept up a galling fire. A 16-pounder, mounted under a blindage in the retired flank of Fernando, was brought to bear on the head of the sap on the right, so as to enfilade the boyau crowning the glacis on the left face of Toledo. The besieged made such good use of this piece, that the head of the sap, and the stuffed gabions employed to cover the sappers, were nearly demolished, and the work interrupted for some time. The Dutch artillery on this occasion showed a precision of practice not to be exceeded by any gunners in Europe. The calibre of the piece employed was precisely that to which allusion already has been made in speaking of the *matériel* best adapted for defences. The deluge of bombs, shells, biscayans, stones, grenades, and grape, showered on the sap on the extreme right, near the ditch of the esplanade bastion, rendered it prudent to withdraw the workmen, of whom 1 officer and 6 men were wounded, as well as 16 of the French guard.

The damage done to the citadel this day greatly annoyed the garrison.

The terre-pleins of the bastions, and the ground in every direction, were torn up with shells, rendering it extremely difficult for the troops to move; whilst the ruins of the buildings, dropping across the communications, in many instances precluded the possibility of changing the positions of the guns, or bringing up ammunition. The casemates in the masonry, that served as a last refuge, no longer afforded security from the fire, the fragments and splinters falling into the entrances, and wounding some of the men. The vaulted roof of the powder-magazine had also suffered, and, on the side of the church, was completely battered down. The besiegers' ricochet fire also made great havoc on the bastions. The bomb-proof hospital was injured; a beam had given way, and a deep crevice was remarked in its front. "One expected with horror," says General Chassé, "to see this building fall down; it is dreadful to anticipate such a misfortune, and to be unable to apply the slightest remedy." Four officers were this day killed or wounded, and several men put *hors de combat*.

Notwithstanding this distressing state of affairs, the garrison in general behaved with remarkable fortitude and patience, and the officers of infantry gave a noble example to their men; whilst Lieut.-Colonel Selig, commanding the artillery, was indefatigable in his exertions night and day, and proved the courage and activity of the gallant men under his orders, by the rapidity and violence of their fire.

It has been omitted to mention, that a deserter from the citadel, who was on duty in the burnt arsenal, contrived to make his escape. This man, who was a native of Lillo, gave a deplorable account of the situation of the fortress; but was unable to communicate any further information. To prevent a recurrence of these desertions, General Chassé only employed native Dutchmen, or men on whom he could rely, on this duty. It must be mentioned, to the honour of the garrison, that desertions were at all times extremely rare, and these, principally of Swiss, Germans, or Belgians.

The French princes and the Marshal again visited the hospitals. A donation of 8000 francs was placed by King Leopold at the disposition of the Burgomestre (Legrelle), for the use of the poorer classes who most suffered by the operations. Many of these, who were market gardeners, and small farmers of the Pepinière, or ground in front of Berchem, not only had their gardens and trees damaged, but their habitations completely demolished, as every building within the radius of the first parallel was either totally destroyed, or riddled with shot. A sum of money was also transmitted by the Queen of the Belgians to purchase comforts and convenience for the wounded.

#### ASSAULT OF THE LUNETTE ST. LAURENT.

From 13th to 14th.—After nearly sixteen nights' open trenches, the preparations for the assault of St. Laurent were completed, and orders issued to the general commanding the trenches, to prepare for the storm. Much, too much in a military point of view, was said of this outwork; defended by little more than a hundred men, with only one 5½ inch howitzer, two coehorn mortars, and one 6-pounder, mounted behind a long embrasure on its right face, that enfiladed the road or path leading

to St. Laurent. The lunette, as before observed, was connected with the reduit in the salient place of arms of the ravelin, by a double palisaded caponière, the left of which was somewhat strengthened by the remnants of some old ruined arches in masonry. On inspection, this turned out to be a work of no great solidity or importance, especially as regarded the palisades, which were made of weak and unsound materials, but, with the exception of their tops, sheltered from the fire of Montebello and other batteries, by the ramp in their front. The gorge was closed by a loop-holed wall of no extraordinary thickness, and not above 16 feet in height. A narrow ditch had been recently cut at the reverse foot, and beyond this again, were a number of trous de loup, converging from the flanks of the ditch to the edge of the caponière, blocks of stone were also scattered about in several directions; but these were of little use. A strong iron gate closed the entrance. The interior presented nothing formidable; and, apparently, the Dutch engineers had not taken any precautions to anticipate attack, or to meet it when attempted. No counter-galleries were made; there were no inward palisades, no chevaux de frise; and the blinded magazine under the capital near the salient, which might have been primed for explosion, was left to the mercy of the assailants. No part of the covered-way was palisaded. In short, it is not too much to assume, that, had it been a matter of importance to the besiegers to carry this outwork by escalade, this operation might have been effected, with trifling loss, on the fourth or fifth night. It has been objected, that the loss of life from a *coup de main* would not have exceeded that of the casualties caused by the fifteen days' work. This might have been the case; but it must be recollected, that the fire from the place rendered the lunette untenable, and that it could be of no importance to the besiegers until their parallels were sufficiently advanced to require it as a point of support to their left.

The plan adopted by the Marshal cannot but be approved of in the present instance of *quasi* hostilities, when he was without fear of interruption, and when an incessant bombardment was paving the way to the surrender of the body of the place, if, indeed, the term body can be applied to a fortress, the interior of which already presented one black and distorted chaos of smouldering ruins. The process of descent and breach also offered an admirable lesson to the engineers, of which they wisely availed themselves. Indeed, the whole siege may be considered as bearing the character of a practical model, rather than an example of vigorous attack and obstinate defence. For the distinction between passive and obstinate resistance is as great as that between a scientific and enterprising attack.

But, to return to the operations. The mine being reported ready, the blinded descent was pierced at dark, the fascines and saucissons were brought up close to the edge of the ditch, and the three rafts, joined one to the other, were prepared for launching. Three storming parties were formed of flank companies of the 65th line, and posted with reserves in the lodgment on the capital and boyau leading from the second parallel, nearest the points of attack. A fourth column, composed of one company of light infantry, supported by a detachment of grenadiers, were directed to debouche from the trench opposite the left

of the caponière, to rush on that and the gorge, and to cut off the retreat of the garrison. Nos. 2 and 3, of 50 grenadiers each, were placed close to the descents, and were intended to pass the ditch and mount the breach, whilst No. 1, consisting of 25 grenadiers, with 6 ladders, and 6 pioneers, armed with axes, were to turn the right face, and scale the wall of the gorge. No. 4, as before said, were to dash on the left, and to cut off the passage by the caponière; and, being likewise furnished with axes and ladders, were to attack the gorge in case of resistance. The whole were to be supported by reserves of 100, and further reserves of 200 each, and to be covered by a vigorous fire of musketry from the places of arms in the second parallel, directed against the ravelin, and by a more than ordinary discharge from the batteries against Toledo, Hernando, and the curtains to the right and left of the former. Owing to various unexpected delays, and the length of time required to construct the passage of fascines, it was not until nearly five A.M. on the 14th, that the details were completed, and the match applied to the saucisson of the mine. After a few moments' anxious suspense it produced the desired effect. Three successive shocks and explosions took place, and when the smoke and dust had cleared away, the scarp presented a wide and practicable breach; the whole mass of the salient, the masonry of which was peculiarly firm and consistent, having been driven bodily forward, was separated from the work, and projected out of its true line at least three feet, still, however, retaining its perpendicular.

The men, who had been kept in a state of feverish excitement during some hours, were eager to rush on, but the violence of the explosion had injured part of the fascine passage, sunk one of the rafts, and demolished part of the lodgment on the covered-way of the capital. This again occasioned some delay, and it was not until Lieutenant-Colonel Vaillant, of the Engineers, ventured across the bridge, and reconnoitred the breach to its summit,—an enterprise he twice performed,—that orders were given by signal for the storming parties to advance. More than half an hour had been required, after the explosion, for the necessary repairs. Had the garrison rallied, and stood with courage to the breach, the loss of the storming party must have been great. But, although they had detected the operation of forming the passage, and had directed so sharp a fire on it as to stagger the workmen, and cause much hesitation, they were either unprepared for an attack, or so stunned with the sudden effect of the explosion, that they offered no resistance to the assailants, who, advancing in the order prescribed, rushed forward without firing a shot, and in a few seconds were masters of the lunette—the second and thirty party mounting the breach, the first escalading the right flank of the gorge, and the fourth throwing themselves into the caponière, and closing the gate. One lieutenant, one serjeant, and 48 rank and file, were made prisoners, 7 were found dead; the remainder, about 56 in number, on the first or weakest explosion, threw down their arms, and made their escape by the caponière into the reduit of the salient place of arms of the ravelin. The captain commanding them, having been wounded on the previous day, had not been replaced. The fourth column of attack having been exposed to a heavy flank fire from the covered-way of the ravelin and ramparts, suf-

fered severely, losing 8 killed and 30 wounded. The others, more fortunate, had not a man touched.

The moment the operation was effected, the prisoners were marched off, and the captured howitzer turned against the ravelin. A lodgment was then made across the summit of the breach, under cover of the ruins, and a communication was run along the top of the revetment of the left face, as far as the flank angle, the talus of the rampart forming a parapet. The fascine bridge was strengthened, and a parapet made on its right flank to screen it from the fire of Toledo, from which it was, however, almost entirely sheltered by the angle of the flank. This bridge being liable to accidents, it was determined, in order to secure certain access to the lunette, to connect the gorge, by a branch of communication, with the approach debouching from the re-entering place of arms, joining the fourth parallel. It was nearly six A.M. before this operation was commenced; but in despite of the heavy fire of shells and grape, which for some time caused considerable hesitation amongst the workmen, the sap was rapidly pushed on, and before broad daylight, the men were completely under cover.

On the 4th column arriving at the caponière, it was found that the palisades had been little injured, and the wall of the gorge almost intact, in despite of ten days' heavy fire from Montebello. The scaling ladders furnished to the party, being only twelve or fourteen feet long, were likewise insufficient; but the *trous de loup* and blocks of stone offered little impediment. The men sprang across these, and reached the foot of the wall without difficulty. After the first explosion, no resistance was offered, but prior to that the little garrison mustered a gallant fire. Several Dutch soldiers boldly sprang on the parapet, and shot at the miners as they were returning on the raft.

Whilst these operations were being carried on to the left, a heavy fire of musketry was directed against the ramparts from the fourth parallel and lodgment crowning the glacis on the left face of Toledo. Taking advantage of the moment the attention of the besieged was occupied with the assault on the lunette, the fourth parallel was widened, deepened, strengthened, and connected with the salient of the re-entering place of arms, close to the batardeau, which is common to Toledo and the bastion of the esplanade.

The lodgment on the capital of St. Laurent being effected, and the boyau at its gorge sufficiently advanced to ensure cover, all the troops were withdrawn excepting the number positively required to prosecute the sap, and a small reserve as a guard. The latter were sheltered by the blinded magazine. The day was employed in completing the lodgment skirting the Boom road, and connecting the fourth parallel with the caponière at the gorge of the lunette. Banquettes and loopholes were established in its centre and flanks for musketry, intended to oppose that of the besieged stationed in the palisaded reduit of the salient place of arms of the ravelin as well as behind the *cremaillère* running along the right face. The latter formed a connexion between the reverse of the caponière and the bridge of communication leading from the right re-entering place of arms into the ravelin, and thence by another bridge, through the *gate des Secours* into the citadel. The last-mentioned bridge having been much damaged by shells was

mortars and howitzers kept up an incessant discharge, and carried considerable devastation to the enceinte of the place.

During the night, a shell fell upon the powder-magazine, between bastions Fernando and Alba, apparently secured from danger; it blew up with a loud explosion, but caused no other damage. The passage and entrance of the powder-magazine of the Duke bastion was also completely destroyed by shells; and in short every part of the body of the citadel presented a scene of indescribable ruin. Amongst other things, the flag-staff and colours were repeatedly shot away; and General Chassé mentions that, on this day, the standard having been destroyed, a sailor gallantly climbed the staff, and hoisted another in its place. Some of the guns under the blindages in the flank of Paciotto, having been dismounted, Col. Selig succeeded, by great exertion, in bringing up others, which opened their fire during the morning. The practice of the guns on the right flank of Fernando was so perfect, that the besiegers were unable to prolong the crowning beyond the third traverse on the left face of Toledo. A mortar was also brought into play by the besieged from bastion Toledo, and another from the curtain over the gate des Secours on the other side. The fire of the coehorns in the lodgment opposite the capital of St. Laurent, as well as that of the howitzers in the lunette, galled the besieged so severely in the covered-way of the ravelin, that they were compelled to abandon it, with the loss of thirteen wounded, still maintaining possession of the palisaded reduit or palanque in the right re-entering place of arms, whence their musketry fire severely incommoded the lodgments in St. Laurent and at the gorge.

By the exertions of Colonel Koopman and the sailors of the flotilla, the garrison were enabled this day to remove eighty-three sick and wounded to the Tête de Flandre, an operation not easily performed, as the shells of the besiegers, great numbers of which fell in the direction of the sally-port, rendered the service at once perilous and laborious; but the activity and *sang-froid* of the sailors overcame every obstacle, and the whole was effected without accident. The artillery of the garrison reckoned 8 guns and 12 carriages disabled in the last three days, making altogether 16 guns and 27 carriages *hors de combat*. Their casualty from the commencement of the siege amounted to 60 killed, 191 wounded, and 60 missing, and amongst them several officers.

During the afternoon the lodgments near the gorge of St. Laurent were improved, and the traverse on the middle of the caponnière strengthened. A small blinded lodgment was made here by the sappers to protect the squad not at work from vertical fire. It must be observed, that the sap was conducted according to the system laid down by Vauban by squads of four sappers and a corporal, relieving each other every hour; the cuirass and helmet were invariably employed. The working parties in the different boyaus and trenches most exposed, of their own accord perforated small excavations under the reverses, into which they hastily sprang, on a shell falling close to the edge. It was interesting to observe the intelligence displayed by the men in forming for themselves places of shelter, either by excavations such as have been mentioned, or by placing one or two fascines diagonally against the parapet, so as to form a sort of inclined traverse against splinters.

Many accidents were thus avoided. Personal observation enables us to speak to the efficacy and simplicity of the contrivance.

The covered-way of Toledo was crowned before dusk as far as the point intended for the establishment of the counter-battery No. 15, and the descent into the ditch prepared for placing the first chassis—the shaft was about seven feet in height by six broad. The solidity and beauty of this work was highly creditable to the French miners. A small advanced gallery was run nearly down to the revetment of the counter-scarp, and the ground secured in case of countermining. Nothing having been discovered, the work proceeded with security.

For such of the readers who are not acquainted with the nature of descents, a short description may not be useless. They are of three kinds:—1st, *à ciel ouvert*, or open, which is a mere trench or passage cut through the glacis and covered-way, to the level of the water, if wet, and to the bottom of the ditch, if dry, and is used when the height of the covered-way is too small to admit of a blinded or subterraneous work. 2d. Blinded is a passage of the same nature, but of greater width; its sides are supported by simple blinds placed vertically. Upon the top of these a third blind is laid horizontally, to support hurdles, fascines, and earth, with which the whole is covered, so as to render it bomb-proof. When the ground is extremely loose or sandy, planks are introduced behind the blinds on the sides to prevent the earth falling in. This species of descent is practised when the depth of the ditch does not admit of a subterraneous excavation, as in the descent *à ciel couvert*. This latter is nothing more than a subterranean gallery, such as is to be met with in common mines. In order to render its sides and roof capable of resisting the pressure of earth and weight of shells, the first are maintained with strong chassis or frames, having three uprights and three transversal beams. Behind these, planks are placed horizontally, or rather following the inclination of the plane. These are again secured by short horizontal or diagonal spars. The top is secured by a strong frame resting on the lateral supports, and above this a roof is formed of strong planks. The portion nearest the mouth being the weakest and most liable to accident from shells, is well covered with fascines, gabions, and sand-bags, so as to form a cavalier for musketry. The plane of the descent varies according to the depth of the ditch, as well as the point whence the opening commences, but the general calculation is about 1 in 4 inches. In our sieges in Spain, nothing of this kind was ever executed, nor was there time permitted for such a proceeding. If it had been otherwise, it is difficult to say how it might have succeeded, when one considers the sad deficiency of sappers and miners, and the want of practice of the British soldiers in all the finer and more delicate operations of attack. Not having any immediate data at hand to go by, it is not easy to particularise the number of times within the last fifty years that a descent into a wet ditch has been executed; but it has been of such rare occurrence as to render it an epoch in the late siege, and consequently to give increased interest to the operation itself. One may venture to state that the besieging engineers would have been sadly disappointed, had the place surrendered before they were enabled to perfect their work. Such an opportunity may not speedily recur, and few live to see it; but the details of the event will remain as precious



records in the archives of that department, and will be turned to good account.

The name of a British officer who was present at the siege, and assiduously followed every inch of the different works, has been mentioned. It is probable that zealous officer considers the experience he gained on this occasion as invaluable to a man in his department. Of course the practice of all these details is minutely attended to by the English corps of sappers and miners; but there is a wide difference between the school work in a polygon, and the same operation carried on within forty yards of an enemy, and under a heavy fire of every species of projectile.

The duties of the trenches had hitherto been taken by the four brigades, forming the third and fourth divisions, strengthened by one regiment from the first; but in order to give participation to as many men as possible in the honours of the siege, the brigades of the reserve division also took their turn. This division, commanded by Lieut.-General Schramm, and principally composed of flankers, as will be seen by referring to the returns in the Appendix, had remained in reserve, as much with a view of giving the whole army of the north an opportunity of sharing in the recompenses anticipated by their comrades, as with that of meeting the movement of concentration made by the seventh and eighth Prussian corps in the Rhenane provinces, the head-quarters of which, under General Muffling, were established at Crefeld. Lieut.-General Schramm had his head-quarters at Malines, and a brigade of his division relieved the trenches this day, marching from Malines, and returning to that place on the following day. The besieging army exclusively before the citadel was thus augmented to upwards of 30,000 infantry.

The Dutch prisoners who had passed the night at Berchem were marched off this day in the direction of France. The officer, Lieut. Boer, was treated with marked kindness by the besiegers. It was remarked that the men who belonged to the 10th Dutch regiment were mostly of the Jewish persuasion, and that they were unusually small and weakly looking. But when it is considered what the poor fellows had gone through during the last three or four days, it cannot be a matter of surprise that they appeared dispirited and ill-conditioned. The Dutch wounded, of whom there were seven or eight, were conveyed to the Antwerp hospital, where they met with the utmost care and attention.

The divisions Achard and Sebastiani maintained their positions, and continued to fortify the posts on both banks. The guns in fort La Croix, which had hitherto consisted of only two 8-inch howitzers, were reinforced by two eighteen-pounders. Occasional skirmishes took place between the gun-boats and the French piquets on the dykes, but nothing serious was attempted.

The rain again fell in torrents and inundated the trenches; those on the left of the first parallel, and batteries 6 and 11, were nearly impassable.

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From 15th to 16th.—At dark, a double sap was pushed forward along the left of the caponière, from the traverse made in its centre, and carried on so as to commence crowning the covered way of the left

face of the ravelin, the whole of which had been evacuated by the besieged. This was not discovered until the sappers reached the salient place of arms, and after attaching a bag of powder, as a pétard, blew in the wood-work of the palanque\*, intending to clear the covered-way by the bayonet. The right face of the covered-way of Toledo was likewise crowned to a sufficient distance to admit the foundation of the counter-battery No. 15, intended to batter the right retired flank of Fernando.

The approaches debouching from the fourth parallel were strengthened, and other boyaus were made in its rear to facilitate the passage of the guns reserved for arming batteries 14 and 15, which would thus be brought from the Park between Berchem and Wilryck by the communication leading from the former village to the first parallel to the left of battery No. 5; then following this parallel to the right, through the zig-zag to the left of battery F, then along the second parallel, and the trench in its front across the Boom chaussée, then through the third parallel and boyaus leading direct to the fourth parallel immediately contiguous to the rear of the batteries.

The descent into the ditch was advanced some feet, and the first chassis placed and secured. The workmen were less incommoded than usual this night by the fire of the place. The torrents of rain and the darkness probably prevented the artillery from displaying their accustomed energy. On the side of the besiegers the mortars and howitzers continued their prescribed number of rounds. The artillery also commenced a new battery, No. 13, for four sixteen-pounders, near the re-entering place of arms on the left face of the lunette, at 215 yards from the salient of the ravelin, and nearly parallel to the right face of Toledo, which it was intended to batter direct.

The nature of the ground, which was here extremely swampy, presented great obstacles to the progress of the work; but by daylight the whole of the parapets and coffer were completed, and the ground ready for the reception of the platforms and construction of the magazine. In the meantime the breaching-battery was advancing rapidly; but here again the surface of the ground offered considerable impediments. It was necessary to fill up a deep excavation on the spot proposed for the position of the two right guns, as well as to give more than usual height and thickness to the parapets: but by daylight the sleepers and platforms were laid down for the four left guns, and the frames or blinds placed in the embrasures. This battery covered about eighty feet from right to left within the coffer; this extra length was caused by a traverse placed between the third and fourth gun on the right, and thus forming, as it were, two batteries. The crowning of the glacis was strengthened on the left, and the revetment raised as high as the genouillière.

Reports reached head-quarters of some movements in the Dutch army, indicating an intention of advancing to the succout of the place.

\* A palanque is a species of fortification, so called in Hungary. It is made of stakes driven into the earth, interlaced with twigs, and covered with earth.—In the present instance it was composed of upright timbers, planks, and hurdles, and thatched with straw, forming a block-house or guard-room. The word of course comes from the German *planke*, whence our word plank.

A brigade of cavalry, cantoned to the right of Contich, received orders to move upon Turnhout, and the generals of brigade of the division Achard, as well as his royal highness the Duke of Orleans, commanding the advanced guard, had orders to hold themselves in readiness. Similar commands were issued to the reserve division, and a part of the third and fourth. Had any serious attempt been made by the Prince of Orange, these troops would have been concentrated, as circumstances might require, in the direction of Turnhout, leaving a sufficient number of men to continue the operations of the siege. This, however, proved to be a superfluous measure of precaution. It was well ascertained that the Prussian corps of observation had no intention of co-operating with the Dutch troops, and that its concentration was a mere measure of general policy, sanctioned by a protocol of the Germanic Diet. On the other hand, it could scarcely be contemplated that the Prince of Orange, however eager to measure himself with the Belgian army, would attempt so rash an enterprise as an attack upon this army, much superior in numbers to his own, and supported, or rather flanked by nearly 30,000 French, forming altogether a mass of 86,000 effectives, with 200 pieces of cannon; whilst the whole of the troops that his royal highness could bring forward did not exceed 46,000 men, with about 96 field-pieces.

The idea of an attack on the part of the Dutch army was therefore never seriously entertained at the French or Belgian head-quarters; and, as was anticipated, the reported movement proved to be a mere change of cantonment of two or three battalions of infantry dispatched from the left to strengthen the right of the line, which was appuyed on the Scheldt by Bergen-op-Zoom and Batz. \*

The position held by the Belgian troops continued nearly the same. Maestricht, of which the garrison amounted to about 5500 effectives, was watched by the third division of infantry, cantoned at Tongres, Loo, Hasselt, and the vicinity, which, as circumstances required, could act as a reserve to the first division, echeloned along the frontier by Diest and Beringen, Hechtel and Peer, thus covering the road from Eindhoven and Helmond to St. Trond and Louvain. The second division had its advance at Turnhout, its head-quarters at Herenthals, and was in immediate communication with the first division by Gheel and the villages on the Nette. The fourth division remained in reserve, and was echeloned from Terveuren upon Louvain, so as to support the right or centre, as occasion might require. The French troops took charge of the front included between the Turnhout chaussée and the Scheldt, and covered the different roads debouching from Holland on Antwerp. In the event of an attack, the combined Belgian and French army would have maintained its left and refused its right, by taking up the position of the greater Nette, and by thus drawing the enemy two marches from his frontier, not only have facilitated their own more rapid concentration in a strong position, completely covering all the approaches to the capital, but would have exposed the right flank of their adversaries to be turned and enveloped, and their retreat cut off from Holland in case of defeat.

The Dutch troops were said to be in a high state of efficiency, and their artillery, though less numerous than that of the Belgians, much superior in practice and experience. The latter arm may be considered

the elite of their army. The cause is easily explained: for at the period of the revolution nearly the whole of the field brigades returned complete into Holland; and as an immense proportion of the officers and non-commissioned were Dutchmen, they were enabled to give great extension to this corps, and to supply its ranks with old and experienced men taken from the garrison or militia battalions. Their heavy cavalry was also peculiarly fine, but the light cavalry and infantry were not to be compared in appearance with the Belgian troops; and in point of drill and manœuvre could boast of no superiority. As regarded the general equipment of the Belgian army, little remained to be desired; and with the exception of the English soldiers, to whom they bear a strong physical resemblance, it would not be possible anywhere in Europe to find a finer body of men. The "staff," to use the technical term, is admirable, and although the Flemings, as is the case with all people inhabiting flat or marshy countries, are not good marchers, they possess a number of qualities which are the first requisites for forming good soldiers. Personal courage is not alluded to, for it is an almost admitted fact, that if the officers and non-commissioned are good, and the system of discipline equal, men of all countries would be found equally courageous. For instance, the Italians, Poles, and troops of the Confederation incorporated in the French army, gave constant proofs that they were not behind-hand in gallantry with their French comrades; and in our service, we have seen men of all nations fight side by side with our own people;—more could not be required, nor a greater compliment be paid to them.

This being the birth-day of the king of the Belgians, a grand *Te Deum* was celebrated in the cathedral of Notre Dame. At 11 o'clock the Belgian officers of the garrison assembled at the house of the commandant, and thence proceeded in a body to the palace, to wait on General Desprez. The latter joined them with his staff, and proceeded at the head of the troops, already paraded on the *Place Verte*, into the body of the church, where the service immediately commenced. There was something highly affecting and imposing in the sight of the vast body of this mighty edifice filled with dense masses of soldiers and citizens, listening with devout attention to the deep chaunt of the choristers, and the swelling peals of the organ, whilst between every modulation of the instrument, or pause in the holy songs, the thundering echoes of the cannon, or bursting of projectiles in the air, made the windows of the venerable pile vibrate, and even shook the vaulted floor on which one stood. It was one of those singular moments in men's lives, that lead them to doubt of the real existence of what they hear and see; for so great was the contrast between the pious attitude of the mixed crowd, the melody of the rich voices, the thrilling tones of the swelling organ, and the sight of the servants of God, attired in their rich surplices and scapularies, with the thunder of the guns, the explosion of shells, and the thought of the work of violence going on within a few yards, that one required to be shaken from his reverie ere he could credit that the whole was not some dramatic delusion, or that it was possible, that the same men who were devoutly praying on bended knees for God's blessing and protection, should be eagerly panting to rush without the city gates to gorge their hands in blood. If these expressions be wild or confused, they are but the result of the im-

pression left upon the mind by the imposing scene of that morning. It was necessary to have been present to have felt its effects, and, if present, it was impossible not to have been deeply affected.

From 16th to 17th.—The torrents of rain that continued to fall, greatly incommoded the workmen, and rendered the first and second parallel nearly impracticable. A lodgment was made from that on the salient of the covered-way of Toledo, as far as the second traverse of the ravelin, and an opening was pierced into the covered-way of the latter, preparatory to a descent *à ciel ouvert* into the ditch; neither the counterscarp nor scarp was reveted. The double sap skirting the left of the caponière was prolonged in the direction of the left salient of the ravelin, and a boyau was run out from behind this, uniting with the communication leading from the gorge to the fourth parallel. The miners were busily employed in advancing the descent, and a second chaussée established.

Battery No. 13, on the left flank of St. Laurent, was armed this night with four pieces of 16, brought from the park. This operation presented great difficulties, from the incessant fall of rain, which had rendered the communications impracticable for the guns; and as the surrounding ground was swampy and rotten, it was necessary to construct a fresh track for each piece, and by violent exertions to drag them through the mud. Before this, however, could be completed, the whole vicinity of the battery was so cut up, that the ammunition-cars and tumbrils could not approach, and it was necessary to carry the supplies in baskets, or on slings. On passing from the second parallel into the trench leading to the third, one of the guns also was overturned, and became immovably fixed. It was impossible to find purchase for levers or footing for gins, the legs of which sunk in the mud up to the rollers.

The hollow, stated to have existed on the spot destined for the two right breaching guns, was filled up by the workmen attached to the artillery, and preparations were made for laying down the platforms. The revetments of the coffer of the battery were strengthened. At the same time, the work of the counter-battery was busily prosecuted, but not without sustaining a heavy fire of musketry and hollow projectiles, from the bastion contiguous, and of round shot from the flank of that of Fernando. The spirited and gallant manner in which Lieut.-Colonel Selig kept up his fire from this quarter, and the little damage that was done in return, are deserving of notice.

Some discussion had taken place as to the results likely to be obtained by breaching the batardeau. It would certainly, as was argued, have the effect of draining the ditches at low water; but at the return of the tide, the natural consequence would be a strong current of water, that might carry away the passage across the ditch. To obviate the latter danger, the engineers made experiments in the ditches of the town, by fastening barrels together, secured with timbers, so as to form arches. The ends of these barrels were knocked out, and the circumference strengthened inside and out with iron circles and cross spars. They were found to answer the purpose perfectly, and, therefore, the three guns destined to arm No. 12, were brought up and placed in battery.

The number of guns that had been disabled in the citadel rendered it necessary for the besieged to employ their reserves from the flanks of bastions Paciotto and Fernando, the fire of which, as well as that of their rampart guns, was so galling, as to impede the progress of the sap. The palisades round the reduits or inner bastions of Toledo, having been destroyed, the engineers endeavoured to replace them, and to widen the excavation at its foot; but the tremendous fire of the besiegers rendered it impossible for the workmen to stand their ground, and all further attempts were abandoned. Three guns were likewise dismounted, and the destruction within the body of the place was only arrested by the want of further food for fire or demolition.

With the exception of arming the batteries Nos. 12 and 13, the progress of the assailants during the last twenty-four hours was not rapid; and it was remarked, that the breaching and counter-batteries advanced slowly. The casualties were, however, few, but the extreme inclemency of the night discouraged the working parties, and a more than usual number of light balls, thrown with great precision, invariably caused hesitation. No attempt appeared to be made by the people to smother these projectiles, which thus often burned with a most brilliant light during several minutes.

A class of persons attached to the French army deserve especial mention. These were the *rivandières* or licensed sutler-women, of whom a certain number is attached to every regiment, in the proportion of four per battalion. They receive lodgment in barracks, and rations in the field. They wear, for the most part, a particular costume, have a *plaque*, or tin on the arm, denoting their number and the corps to which they belong, and have the exclusive privilege of selling spirits to the troops or battalion to which they are attached. Their dress was generally a glazed hat, a blue petticoat with a tri-coloured border, and red or *garance* military trousers, boots, a short cloak, and a keg slung round the shoulder, with a small basket containing one or two glasses, and a few loaves. Wherever the fire was hottest, there they were to be seen; and it was singular to see the prevailing passion of gain, not only leading these heroines into the most dangerous positions, but to observe them utterly forgetful of the showers of grape and projectiles that, to use the expression of one of them, "fell like plums" around, alone intent on receiving their small change, or rating some debtor who had neglected to pay up his score. Whilst, however, the matter of business was always kept in sight, they were not without frequently exhibiting instances of nobler sentiments. Their devotion and attention to the wounded, and the readiness with which they exposed themselves in the cause of humanity, was as remarkable as praiseworthy. One amongst them was particularly cited. She was a young woman of rather prepossessing appearance, and peculiar for the neatness of her dress. Her courage and disregard of self were so striking, that she was not only cited by the whole army, and the subject of conversation to strangers, but she was thought worthy of being noticed in general orders. She was thus spoken of by Marshal Gerard, in his order of the day. "Antoinette Moran, cantinière of the 25th line, affords daily proofs of her courage and devotion; she rescued a wounded miner, who had fallen into the ditch, from under the enemy's fire. She had already had her hat perforated by a ball, in as-

sisting a wounded man; and amidst a shower of shells and bullets, she brought a bearer to carry off another. She deserves the gratitude of the army." During the subsequent reviews at Valenciennes, the celebrated cantinière was presented to the king, when she received a gold medal of 1000 francs value, and a pension of 250 francs per annum.

Accustomed as British officers are to the dry and laconic style of our ~~own~~ general orders, where individual traits of courage, especially those performed by men below the rank of field-officers, rarely find place, to notice the conduct of a woman may appear puerile. But the policy of such proceedings cannot be denied, and might safely be adopted with us, who have no decoration for junior officers, and no promotion for such soldiers who may particularly distinguish themselves. It may be replied, that, where all do their duty, where all are brave, there is no necessity or possibility of selection. This cannot hold good, for a skirmish rarely occurs that one or two men do not distinguish themselves in a manner that calls for peculiar notice. Soldiers are pretty good judges, not only of the bravery of their officers, but of those of their comrades; and if, after an action, one takes the trouble of asking the men of a company for the names of those who have performed any striking act, they are generally as just as they are impartial in their replies.

Battery No. 13, having been provisioned, opened its fire, which was first directed against the left face of the ravelin, where it dismounted a gun, and was then turned upon the right face of Toledo. This fire greatly incommoded the besiegers, but it also caused some accidents in the lower part of the city, as the shot that ricoched from the parapets, flew over the citadel and alighted in the streets bordering on the burned arsenal. Some of them struck upon the Scheldt, and were seen to bound on the water far beyond the Tête de Flandre.

It was the turn of the Duke of Orleans for the trenches, but in consequence of the reported movement of the Dutch, His Royal Highness received orders to remain with the advanced guard. On the Dutch frontier, as well as on both banks of the Scheldt, nothing occurred worth mentioning, though an attack on the left by Doel was anticipated, the Dutch having concentrated two or three battalions at Batz.

The celebrated mortar, of which so much had been said, reached Antwerp this day, and was directed to be conveyed to the heath in front of Braeschaet, where the Belgians had established a polygon. A section of this formidable but unwieldy engine is annexed. In his report, General Chassé complains of this mortar having been employed. It was, in the first place, Belgian, so were the 24-pounders in Montebello. We have given our opinion as to the equity of this fort and the counterguard being employed by the besiegers, and we cannot but coincide with General Chassé, at least, in thinking, that there was something almost wanton in bringing against him an engine, which could but add to a wasteful demolition. For, as it has been remarked, little or nothing remained to be destroyed, and the surrender of the place, ruined as it was by the fire of hollow projectiles, was a matter inevitable, and might with honour have been submitted to when the glacis was crowned.

To judge, however, by the immense number of projectiles and stores that were being continually brought up from France, the besiegers calculated upon a resistance of some days more; and from the firm coun-

tenance shown by General Chassé, there were those who expected that he would defend his breach. The highest authorities were divided in opinion as to this point, and it was, at all events, considered prudent to be amply provided for fourteen days more.

The casualties of the last twenty-four hours were comparatively trifling, not exceeding 7 killed, and 24 wounded.

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From 17th to 18th.—The gun-boats being moored out of fire behind the dykes of the polder, a portion of their crews were landed at the citadel to assist the artillery; and, as was the case with our own brave sailors at St. Sebastian's, they were found to render the most essential service. Their daring courage was a fine example to the rest of the garrison, who, for the most part, worn out and harassed by the incessant bombardment, had become much dispirited, and began to look forward with eagerness for the moment of surrender.

Ten coehorn mortars were placed by the besiegers in a battery formed in the centre of the fourth parallel, making the number of these guns 19. Their fire, combined with that of the light infantry marksmen stationed with rampart guns in the counterguard, was found to incommode the garrison of the ravelin, and to keep down its fire. The boyau crowning the covered-way of the left face of the ravelin was pushed forward, and the descent into the covered-way near the salient converted into a lodgment, composed of a double tier of gabions, placed against the palisades on the right flank, intended to enfilade the ditch and bridge at the extremity of this face. The boyau crowning the left was improved and strengthened with banquettes and loop-holes for musketry; the same was done to the fourth parallel, intended to silence the fusilade from the ravelin.

The descent *à ciel ouvert* was brought down to the edge of the ditch, and a large quantity of fascines and gabions were brought up to the diagonal boyau running from battery I to the fourth parallel, in readiness for effecting the passage of the ditch, should this operation be determined on. Workmen were busily engaged in clearing out the mud, and strengthening with fascines and hurdles such parts of the communications through which the breaching guns were required to be brought to the front. It was necessary for this to convert some of the boyaus into trenches, and to prepare openings where the guns could be dragged out in case of the trench being found impracticable. A new boyau, leading from the fourth parallel towards the right face of Toledo, intended to unite this parallel with the counter-battery, was commenced, and a new lodgment was made from the right of the crowning of the covered-way of the left face of Toledo to the left of the re-entering place of arms near the batardeau. The multiplied and apparently confused nature of these works renders description difficult. The reader is, therefore, requested to follow the plan, upon the *minute* correctness of which he may implicitly rely.

The weather continued most inclement; but the number of workmen being even more than was necessary, the ground light, and an abundant supply of gabions and fascines at hand, the different saps were conducted with tolerable rapidity. The fire from the place was, however, ex-



tremely galling; a captain of engineers, and a lieutenant of infantry attached to the picked marksmen, were killed, and several men wounded. A lieutenant of artillery and several gunners were also wounded in the batteries. The work for establishing the breaching batteries did not advance with the desired vigour; the incessant rain drove the men to seek shelter against the banquettes, and under the cover of fascines, whilst a well-directed mortar fire from the place continually knocked down the parapets, and required much time and labour in repairs. The counter-battery had also made little progress; but the traverses of the covered-way, on which it was being constructed, were turned and strengthened so as to form part of the parapet; the revetment was also commenced, but the incessant fire of musketry, stones, and vertical projectiles, frequently caused hesitation and interruption, and by daylight it appeared little had been done.

Battery No. 12 was unmasked early in the morning, and directed on the batardeau. The officer of engineers charged with this work discovered at daylight the crevice already alluded to; and it is singular enough, that whilst General Chassé imagined that this fissure had been caused by the besiegers' guns, as early as the 12th, the latter, upon discovering it, supposed that it had been effected by the garrison themselves, in order to produce a strong current. A breach having been effected after eighteen shots, the guns ceased firing. Some of their shot having struck the curtain behind, the revetment was seen to yield in a manner that gave reason to suppose that the scarp of Toledo would offer no great resistance.

During the day, the artillery officers having sounded the bottom of the communications, found them too rotten to admit the passage of their guns; the whole of those between the first and second parallel, and in rear of the former, were, therefore, floored with double rows of fascines, and over these, strong hurdles. This was found to answer. On the right, the whole of the fourth parallel comprised between the glacis of Toledo and that of the ravelin was improved and furnished with steps on the reverse, a precaution adopted in most of the trenches; thus facilitating the egress of the men in case of shells falling within, or enabling them to form rapidly to repulse a sortie. The want of such steps in our trenches in Spain was the cause of frequent accidents. The working parties were, however, so much incommoded by the fire of the place, that little could be done more than to improve the works already thrown up.

In consequence of the establishment of the breaching and counter-batteries, and the boyaus of communication crowning the two places, it was necessary to stop the fire of several of the besieging batteries in their rear, and to confine the discharge to that of mortars and howitzers. The besieged had, however, two or three guns dismounted; and as they had scarcely any reserve carriages left, they were reduced to great straits. They succeeded, however, in running up some light guns to the parapets, and these, from being moved about from one point to another, and withdrawn to the terre-plein; or behind the traverses to load, did good execution. On sounding the wells, General Chassé found that their water had much decreased, and great anxiety was felt lest they should soon become dry,—an irremediable and appalling misfortune.

No further use had been made of St. Laurent; it was found to be so

much exposed to the fire of the place, and being of no other importance than as an *appui* to the left of the parallel, the mouth of the zig-zag on its left face was stopped up, and the lodgment evacuated. The covered-way of the ravelin having been abandoned, with the exception of the reduit in the right re-entering place of arms, and the caponière being guarded, there was no fear of any attempt being made to retake it, more especially as the garrison appeared to have renounced all intention of making sorties, which, indeed, would now have been nearly impracticable, the bridge of communication between the ravelin and Gate des Secours having been destroyed, and the gate itself blocked up with masonry, merely leaving sufficient room for the passage of one man.

The casualties of the day averaged the usual number.

The King of the Belgians again returned to Antwerp, but did not visit the trenches.

From 18th to 19th.—At dusk, the descent into the ditch of the ravelin was widened, and brought down to the level of the water. It entered into the project of the engineers, to commence a fascine passage, and to carry the ravelin by a *coup de main*, provided this could be effected by surprise. It has been said, that this work was not revetted; its ditch was about twenty-four yards wide, and about eight feet in depth; a strong inclined palisade or fraise ran along its faces, just above the berm, and the talus of its parapet presented an easy slope. It had a 6-pounder mounted in the salient, with one or two coehorns, and a howitzer on its terre-pleine. At the gorge, immediately opposite the wooden bridge leading to the Porte des Secours, was a palisaded tambour, inclosing a *palanque* or small guard-house. It had a blinded service magazine, and one or two traverses, but presented no other serious obstacle to a storm, than the passage of its ditch. This was completely enfiladed by the right face of bastion Toledo, and its retention, it taken, could not but be considered as problematical, from its being commanded by the plunging fire of the curtain in its rear, from which, in spite of the incessant ricochet fire of the numerous besieging batteries, the garrison maintained an incessant discharge of musketry and rampart guns, as well as from two or three field-pieces, which were served with admirable gallantry.

Various reports were in circulation at the moment, as to the operation conducted against the ravelin. The simple state of the case is, that the attack was a species of *hors-d'œuvre*, no way tending to the ultimate success of the operation on the left face of Toledo. It was the desire of the general directing the engineers to have effected this passage and capture, one might almost say, as a lesson, or at best, as a favourable opportunity of making a *coup d'éclat*, of which so few if any examples occurred during the siege; yet, the moment it was discovered that many valuable lives might be lost, the project was abandoned, and the work arrested in its progress. But we are anticipating.

During the early part of the night, the sappers proceeded with rapidity. A violent storm of rain and wind blowing in the faces of the garrison of the ravelin, prevented their discovering what was passing;

and beyond a few accidental projectiles, the sappers employed in laying the fascines in the ditch were little incommoded. Some delay, however, took place in the supply of fascines: a party of workmen charged with bringing them up from the third parallel lost their way amidst the intricacies of the boyaus, and wandered to the right; and before the officers sent in search of them could find where they had gone to, in the mean time, a light-ball, accidentally pitching on the passage itself, betrayed its progress to the garrison. It had been carried as far as two-thirds across, and required but an hour's work to render it practicable. The storming party were already told off, and only waited for the signal of attack. This party consisted of two detachments of grenadiers, led by six sappers, with axes and crow-bars, to break down the fraise. One party was to rush round the berm to the left, and to cut off the men, still holding the reduit opposite the bridge of the re-entering place of arms. The second was to escalate as near as possible to the salient, and, dashing on the tambour, endeavour to gain it before the garrison could take refuge within.

The moment the defenders, consisting of 140 men and a few gunners, discovered what was passing, they opened a most destructive fire of musketry; and having given notice to the body of the place, a 12-pounder, established the previous day on the right face of Toledo, also commenced an unremitting discharge of grape. Sixty-eight rounds were fired from this piece between one A.M. and daylight. A lieutenant-colonel of engineers and nine sappers being wounded, and several other men being put *hors de combat*, General Haxo, after consulting with the chief of the staff, Lieut.-General St. Cyr Nugues, who likewise received a violent contusion from a splinter, withdrew the workmen and abandoned the attack. That it was a failure, there can be no doubt; but, under existing circumstances, and seeing the little importance of the capture, to have persisted in throwing away the men's lives would have been an unpardonable act of folly. The honour of the repulse must, however, entirely rest with the garrison.

It strikes one as remarkable, that, although these men were utterly exposed, and had no shelter, they retained their energy and activity, and showed themselves good soldiers. They were few in number, but constantly employed, and their spirits, up to the last moment, seem to have been better maintained than that of their comrades under the casemates within. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand how they allowed the descent to be perforated through the counterscarp, and the passage to be commenced without interruption; more especially, as General Chassé states in his report of the previous day, that the besiegers "had commenced their approach, near the second traverse of the covered-way, to the ditch of the ravelin." These are faults for which the engineers must be responsible; for it is not to be supposed that officers of infantry, however zealous, brave, and well-instructed, should be enabled to judge of the nature of offensive works, or calculate, with any degree of precision, as to the points liable to attack in consequence of the direction given to any particular boyau or approach. It is different with the engineers, whose duty and profession it is to divine consequences, as well as to anticipate them. The slightest want of vigilance in such cases may lead to irreparable misfortunes; and it appears incontestable, in this instance, that, had the besiegers profited by the advantages

afforded them, and taken the proper precaution to have a full supply of fascines and saucissons, of which there were many thousands ready, the passage might have been effected, and the ravelin carried by surprise. Once across, neither the fraise, parapet, nor inward defences, presented any obstacle; and though twenty or thirty men might have been lost, the opposition of a few, however brave, could not have availed against numbers.

The state of the trenches, deluged in almost every direction with mud and water, rendered the work extremely harassing and irksome to the soldiers. A strong wind, mixed with sleet and rain, blew in their faces and drenched their clothes, and obliged them to rest standing. The trench guards, and men employed in firing from the banquettes, were unable to lean against the parapets, without sinking bodily into the mud; and the sappers, working on their knees, were incommoded in a most painful manner. It is but justice to say, however, that they bore it with a degree of good humour and characteristic gaiety, that was remarked by almost all strangers.

The only new ground broken this night, was a short boyau, by full sap, leading from the re-entering place of arms to the covered-way of the left face of Toledo, and terminating near the right of the breaching battery; this was not effected without the loss of 9 men killed and wounded—the garrison having thrown out a number of light balls, guided by which they judiciously directed a constant discharge of musketry and rampart guns.

Whilst the operations were being carried on against the ravelin; those for completing the breaching battery were vigorously pursued. The whole of the platforms were laid, the magazine completed, and by daylight, everything was ready to receive the guns. The counter-battery was in a less forward state; its left flank was galled from Paciotto, and its front incommoded from the right of Fernando, the fire of which was remarkable for its precision and steadiness, and, being well-sheltered from direct shots, was enabled to manœuvre with greater confidence. By noon, however, the coffer of No. 15 was widened, and the revetment and embrasures terminated. The sleepers were all laid down, and three platforms completed. These platforms, as well as the whole of the stores, were brought from France. The artillery, likewise, commenced two other new batteries; one for ten mortars, I, intended to replace D, situated upon the capital of bastion Toledo, at 250 yards from its salient; the other for six pierriers, No. 16, in front of the re-entering place of arms on the left. These latter, the position of which was not discovered by the besieged, and thus received little interruption, were in a very advanced state by daylight. The magazines for the counter and breaching batteries were established in the boyaus in the rear, and a supply of shot, calculated at one hundred rounds per gun, was brought up and placed in pile, within convenient serving distance.

It has been omitted to mention, that a lieutenant-colonel of engineers, accompanied by two officers, passed undiscovered along the glacis of the right face of the ravelin, in order to discover the exact position of the bridge of communication: had the attack been carried into execution, a party of voltigeurs would have been thrown into the covered-way on the right, and, hastily rushing on the reduit, would have endeavoured

to have surprised the men within, and thus created a diversion. A French soldier of light infantry, belonging to the volunteer marksmen, also distinguished himself by creeping out of his lodgment, and under a heavy fire, removing a forage-cap opposite a particular point of the sap, which served as a mark for the rampart gun-men of the besieged. On the other hand, a Dutch serjeant and two men embarked in the small boat, used for communication between the ravelin and Gate des Secours, pushed round under cover of the counterscarp, and carefully examined every part of the revetments on both sides.

The fire on both sides was resumed with activity in the course of the forenoon. That from the garrison incommoded the sap on the right so severely, that it was thought prudent to draw off the men; many of the gabions were knocked over, and the parapets destroyed by their shells. The guns in the flank of Paciotto also told well on all parts of the parallel and boyaus, in the direction of the battery No. 2, and drove the trench guard from the banquettes and loop-holes; those in the flank of Fernando were not less destructive in the direction of the counter-battery, and No. 13 in its rear; the shot also enfiladed a small portion of the trench near the latter. A 24-pounder on the right face of Toledo was dismounted by the ricochet fire of No. 2. This loss was seriously felt by the garrison; the redoubled fire of the besiegers, and the lack of reserve pieces, rendering it impossible to replace it. A shell also fell on the reserve magazine of the left face of bastion Alba, which blew up; fortunately, without causing any other mischief.

These repeated accidents rendered the situation of the garrison most distressing. Upwards of thirty guns and thirty-nine carriages had been disabled or dismounted. Five powder magazines had blown up. Scarcely a blindage or splinter-proof remained uninjured. The wells were rapidly leaking, and offered no prospect of any fresh supply, as the gutters for conducting the rain-water were destroyed by the ruin of the buildings, and the tanks were choked beneath the mass of scorched ruins. If the defence of the garrison, taken as a body, cannot in justice be praised for its vigour, it must be memorable, as an example of patience and resignation, not to be surpassed in military story. We are not prepared to assert positively, but we believe there is no instance on record, of troops in a confined fortress having withstood a bombardment of a similar nature, without exhibiting marked signs of impatience. Indeed, whether considered in point of duration, incessant continuity, or circumscribed space, there is, perhaps, no example on record of so harassing and overwhelming an attack.

It having been announced that an experiment would be made on the 24-inch (English) mortar on the heath of Braeschaet, a number of generals and officers of all arms proceeded to that village. The previous experiments made at Liege had not succeeded, either from some defect in the shell, or in the mode of firing. It had been tried with the usual wooden sabot, as well as with a wad of twisted straw; but, with one or two exceptions, the projectile burst at the moment of quitting the piece. This was attributed to a want of thickness in the shell, particularly of the culot or part coming in contact with the charge, which, from the great diameter of the cavity, had not sufficient thickness to resist the shock of the powder and concussion of the air. Fresh shells were directed to be cast in the proportion shown in the annexed drawing.

The first eight or ten experiments were made with the dead shell filled with its proper weight in sand, and fired with various charges, from six to twelve pounds, gradually increasing. No accident occurred. The artillery officers being satisfied with these trials, the shell was loaded to a third, and so on to its full charge, upwards of a barrel and a quarter. One shell alone burst out of six, at the mouth of the piece; the remainder fell near the target, and exploded with a fierce detonation, tearing up many cubic feet of earth, and scattering splinters to the distance of 450 yards. The shells were hoisted to a level with the mouth of the cylinder by means of a chevalet supporting a swivel bar, on the one end of which were suspended two chains with hooks to catch the rings of the shell, and on the other a weight nearly equalling that of the projectile; it was easily raised by this means, and then lowered without any jar into the chamber. A straw-twisted wad was employed as a sabot. The operation of loading required an average of 37 minutes to 50. The vent was fitted with a spring detonator, and the man who fired stood behind a traverse, and pulled the spring with a long cord.

The experiment having succeeded, it was resolved to bring the mortar into Antwerp, and preparations were made to place it in battery on the covered-way of the bastion of the city, between the re-entering place of arms of Montebello and the Malines gate. Eight horses were required to draw the carriage on which it was placed, and eight others to draw the carriage containing the bed. The weight of the empty shells being nearly 1000lbs. it is easy to calculate the number of these projectiles that could be moved in any ordinary ammunition waggon. The weight of the bed, which is of timber, is not given in the scale, but it may be taken as at somewhat more than the mortar itself, making altogether about 30,000 lbs.; add to this 110 shells for 100 rounds at 1000lbs. each, and 110 barrels of 90lbs. each, and it gives the enormous dead weight of 70 tons, exclusive of gins, triangle, chevalet, carriage, and sundries. The name of *Monster-mortar* seems to have been well selected, for it is scarcely possible to conceive a more ugly or unwieldy implement. With the exception of the mortar at Moscow, which has thirty-six inches in diameter at the mouth of the cylinder, and was, if ever used, employed for projecting masses of granite, the monster-mortar exceeds any other weapon of the kind hitherto known. The original conception is due to Colonel Paixhans; it was executed under the direction of Baron Evain, and cast at the Belgian royal foundry at Liège.

The casualties during the last twenty-four hours were heavy; 27 serious cases were brought to the hospital of Antwerp, and an equal number to the ambulances of Berchem; 2 officers and 12 men were killed.

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From 19th to 20th.—During the latter part of the day the working-parties were employed in draining the parallels and trenches wherever the slope of the ground admitted. It has been before observed, that in advance of the second parallel, little inconvenience was felt from the water, which ran off by the fall of the glacis, where the softness of the earth presented one striking advantage. Whenever new ground was broken, no clicking or noise was made by the tools, and thus it con-

stantly occurred, that the boyaus were commenced and terminated without being discovered by the besieged; whilst an abundant supply of fascines and gabions enabled the besiegers to give strength and solidity to their saps, without fear of suffering from a dearth of these important articles. When one reads of the trenches before Badajoz having been completed with a total of 700 fascines, one can scarcely understand how the engineers were enabled to execute the duties imposed on them.

The principal attention of the besiegers was this night directed to the completion of the breaching and counter-batteries. The former might have been armed on the previous night and opened this morning, but it was determined to wait for the armament of the latter; though, from the little effect produced by its fire on the flank of Fernando, this does not appear to have been absolutely called for. If this battery was considered essential, why was it not commenced and terminated simultaneously with the other? Soon after dusk the six guns intended for the breaching-battery were brought from the park to the tail of the communications near Berchem: but such was the depth of mud, the rapid inclination of the glacis, and the numerous angles of the boyaus, that it was not until nearly 4 A.M. that the pieces were run into the battery and placed on their respective platforms. It required upwards of eleven hours' incessant labour and the utmost exertions to effect this important duty, notwithstanding an abundant supply of horses, men, and artificial means. Such was the inequality and depth of the ground in some places, that the fascines and hurdles sunk with the weight of the carriages axle-deep, on one side; whilst on the other, the wheels remained with the tires scarcely indenting the bottom. The sharp turns of the boyaus in the rear of the fourth parallel destroyed the start or impetus given to the pieces, when once in movement, and they were consequently obliged to be pushed rather than dragged forward. The lieutenant-general commanding the artillery superintended the operation in person, and his report of this day mentions with high encomiums the exertions of the officers and men of his department, who were assisted by a company of grenadiers.

Though the besieged were not aware of what was going on, they maintained a heavy fire on the vicinity of the covered-way from Toledo, as well as from the flanks of Fernando and Paciotto. The shot from the latter, having to traverse the parapets of the accumulated boyaus on the right, were particularly destructive. Some remarks on the extreme multiplication of these boyaus will be offered hereafter. Great difference of opinion existed as to the advantage of their employment. It was argued, that the risks, casualties, and, we may add, confusion frequently occurring, would have been diminished had they been more simplified.

The time occupied in arming the breaching-battery prevented the artillery from bringing up the pieces to batteries I, and No. 16; two mortars therefore were only placed in the first, and two pierriers in the second. The battery of nineteen coehorns was moved up to the boyau immediately in the rear of 14, and kept a constant discharge upon Toledo and the curtain to its left. We believe that no use was made, nor was there a supply of these pieces with our army in Spain. Had the British been furnished with a small number at Burgos, their loss from *tirailleur* fire would probably have been much less. In the late operation they were found highly effective and equally galling by both

parties. Their portableness, the small quantity of powder they require, and the facility with which they can be conveyed on bat horses or mules, independent of the harassing nature of their fire when within a hundred yards of an enemy, render them a powerful and almost indispensable auxiliary to a battering-train; for it often occurs that two or three marksmen posted behind angles of reduits or palisades are completely screened from musketry fire, and thus able to do fearful execution, as occurred at Burgos. Had the besiegers on that occasion been supplied with half a dozen coehorns, the marksmen would have been easily dislodged, and a great loss of life been spared.

On perusing the siege operation of our armies, one meditates, with profound astonishment,—not at the heroic valour of the men—not at the daring conception of the commander, and the devotion of the engineers and artillery,—but at the singular want of liberality and foresight,—we speak it deliberately—of the Ordnance department and government, in neglecting to furnish the commander-in-chief with a thousand requisites that were essential not alone to the success of any given measure, but to the honour of the army and the country. Whence did this proceed? Was it from misplaced economy; from want of a thorough knowledge of what was urgently necessary; or from too great reliance on the undaunted and persevering bravery of the British soldier? We shall not attempt to decide or point out the cause; but most certainly the effects were most disastrous, and often not to be counterbalanced by the most lavish expenditure of precious blood.—Look to Badajoz; 378 officers killed and wounded,—a battalion, in fact! There, it is true, an unparalleled success was a set-off to the loss. At Burgos again, 92 officers and 1972 men hors de combat, and this with the disgrace of a repulse! And yet it can scarce be called a disgrace, when it is considered, that the army had then neither sappers nor miners, only five officers of engineers, but few intrenching, no mining tools, and but three 18-pounders, and five iron 24-pounder howitzers. The latter ought not to be included in the calculation; for their inefficacy, both for ricochet and breaching at distances exceeding 200 yards, is, we hope, so well established, as never to admit of their being again added to a British battering-train.

We must be forgiven this digression; but when we saw before us the mighty park of French artillery, counting altogether nearly 150 pieces of different calibre, including reserves, a forest of gabions and fascines, and a supply of platforms, sand-bags, mining and working tools, military stores of every description, upwards of 900 sappers,—in short, an arsenal more abundant than that of many small states, with every other essential for the supply of an immense besieging army, on the most liberal and abundant footing;—we could not help mentally travelling back to those days, when the bodies of our gallant comrades were made substitutes for fascines and gabions, and their muskets for absent mortars;—thrice happy, brave fellows, when they could employ their bayonets; and that, too, against an enemy proportionate in numbers, equal in courage, and superior in practical science.

The construction of the counter-battery was pursued; but the vigorous fire of Fernando caused considerable interruption, and the shells, which were thrown with remarkable precision, damaged the parapets and revetments, and frequently rendered it necessary to renew the plat-



forms and sleepers. There was not that activity manifested in completing these batteries that might have been expected from the abundance of materials, the number of men, and the easy nature of the ground. It was not explained why the covered-ways on both faces of Toledo were not crowned simultaneously, nor why these batteries were not commenced, so as to be ready to receive their armament at the same time.

On the left, a fresh boyau by double sap was broken out from the trench, conducting to the descent of the ditch of the ravelin and the salient of the re-entering place of arms; its head being directed on the salient of Toledo. On the right, the boyau, commenced on the previous night from the re-entering place of arms common to Toledo and the esplanade bastion, was prolonged to the covered-way. The shaft of the great descent was bored down to the counterscarp, and a second descent *à ciel ouvert* commenced parallel to it on the right. Some intention still existed of continuing the passage of the ditch of the ravelin, and of executing the project of attack already detailed. The necessary supply of fascines and gabions for the completion of the passage and parapet were brought up, the sappers and workmen told off, and the storming parties and pioneers ordered to be in readiness; but the besieged were vigilantly on the watch. They had brought a 24-pound howitzer and a pierrier into the ravelin, and from the close of the day kept up a constant shower of light balls, shells, stones, and musketry, on the passage; whilst a 12-pounder, sheltered by a traverse on the right face of Toledo, which had been kept masked until dark, opened so brisk a fire of grape and round-shot on the ditch and passage, that it was judged advisable not to pursue the operation, and it was consequently entirely renounced. It must be remembered, that a third of the passage was already completed, and that not more than twenty-one feet remained unfinished; therefore, there is little doubt, had the capture of the ravelin been deemed important to the ultimate success of the siege, that it might have been effected with comparatively trifling loss.

The conduct of the garrison of St. Laurent gave no reason to anticipate a sturdy resistance in the ravelin, and a minute subsequent examination proved that the engineers had done nothing to provide against any attack. There was not the slightest symptom of inward trench, palisade, or in fact of any work tending to impede an assailant.

The feebleness of the defence of St. Laurent has been mentioned. General Chassé, in his report detailing the loss of that work, thus expresses himself:—"The wound of Captain Groeneveld, and the explosion of the mines, affected the spirit of the garrison, and the efforts of Lieut. Boers of the 10th infantry could not prevent the capture of this fort." Indeed, the officers commanding the assailing parties were as much astonished at their good fortune as with the absence of all resistance; for it must be remembered, that the loss sustained by the fourth column of assault arose from the fire of the ramparts and ravelin on their flank, and not from St. Laurent.

We can vouch for the correctness of the following anecdote:—On rushing into the breach, and descending with charged bayonets into the *terre-plein*, the Lieutenant Duverger, commanding the grenadiers of the 65th, sprung on the Dutch officer, and having secured him, expressed his surprise, in no measured terms, at the want of energy of the garrison, adding, "Sir! if I were your general, I would bring you to a court-

martial for not having done your duty." We give this as it was repeated to us by Lieutenant Duverger himself, on the morning subsequent to the affair, in the presence of many other persons. That there was not the shadow of an attempt at defence there is no doubt; indeed, nearly fifty men, as has been stated, threw down their arms and escaped by flying into the caponnière, whilst the remainder were found in a supplicating attitude. It is, however, just to the Lieutenant to say, that he honourably performed his duty. The above remarks equally affect both defenders and assailants, for where there was no struggle, no defence, there could be no great glory in the achievement; and we may take upon ourselves to state, that when one of the officers commanding an assaulting column was promised a recommendation for the Legion of Honour, he replied to the General (Haxo), "It will be the happiest day of my life when I receive such a distinction, but I do not feel that I deserve it; for we did not fire or receive a shot."

The working parties being withdrawn from the descent to the ditch of the ravelin, they were employed in widening and improving the adjacent boyaus, and in establishing loop-holes with sand-bags on every part of the trenches or parallels from which musketry could annoy the besieged, either in the ravelin or Toledo. The defenders of these works adopted a similar precaution, and their wall-guns, which they fired with great precision, were found extremely galling. A fair supply of these guns, which in the account of the sieges in Spain are not mentioned, is of great importance as auxiliaries to a battering-train; though it was observed by the volunteer marksmen of the 19th French light infantry, mostly Corsican hunters, that they should have preferred long rifles; the recoil of the gun and the fixture of its stock not compensating the advantage of loading at the breach.

During the day the artillery on both sides maintained its fire with much animation,—that of the besieged caused many casualties, especially in the batteries. The loss of the twenty-four hours amounted to a captain of artillery and twenty-seven men of different arms *hors de combat*. The Dutch squadron maintained its position in the lower Scheldt, having an advanced guard of gun-boats between Lillo and Liefkenshoek. Its movements were made known to head-quarters at Berchem by a line of night and day signals established on the dykes between St. Philippe and the Imperial Battery to the north of the small basin of the city. The armament of La Porte, St. Marie, La Croix, and St. Philippe was completed. Various field-batteries were established on the dykes; and a detachment of sailors of the marine company attached to the army, having rigged and armed some large row-boats, constantly cruised at ebb-tide between the Fort du Nord and the city, as well as between St. Marie and St. Philippe, in order to interrupt all communication between the garrison and fleet. The zeal and address of the Dutch sailors was, however, such, that they frequently contrived to elude the vigilance of the row-guard; and in one instance Colonel Gumoens, of the Dutch staff, and a captain of artillery made their way into the citadel. The former, an officer of much merit, was subsequently mortally wounded by the explosion of a shell, and died in the hospital at Antwerp.

It would not come within the scope of an article of this nature, already perhaps too long, to introduce anecdotes of the conduct of the French

soldiers when wounded ; but as a psychological illustration of national character, it may not be uninteresting to observe that the wounded almost invariably preserved their gaiety under the greatest bodily torment. Their replies or exclamations on these occasions, though often breathing the noblest sentiments, bore the stamp of almost dramatic excitement. Under similar circumstances the British soldier supports pain with his accustomed national firmness and impassibility ; reserving, if badly wounded, his strength and resources for the moment of operation, generally more painful than the wound itself. The clenched jaw and contracted brow are the only indications of his bodily agony. The Frenchman, on the other hand, laughs, and as it were endeavours to outwit torture : he seems to bid defiance to pain, and try to overcome corporeal suffering by redoubling his wonted loquacity. Deep resignation and patience show themselves in the one ; utter heedlessness and indifference in the other. The courage of the two people in the day of battle has not been inaptly assimilated, the one to the gay bearing of a gallant hastening to a feast ; the other, to the tranquil demeanour of a man entering a church.

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From 20th to 21st.—The fire from the place this afternoon was less vigorous than on the preceding days. It was, however, smartly maintained from the flanks of Paciotto and Fernando, and the curtains to the right and left of the former ; but as several magazines had already exploded, it became important to economise the remainder of the ammunition. The utmost discretion was therefore recommended in its employ ; and the fire was principally concentrated on the works approximating the breaching-battery. General Chassé thus notices the diminution of his resources in his journal of this day :—" The necessity of economising our mortar and howitzer ammunition, which began greatly to decrease, is the sole cause that our fire had not all the success we could desire." Our scientific readers will be able to judge of these resources by the annexed table of supplies found in the citadel after the capitulation.

Preparations were made in the Belgian marine (consisting of six brigantines, armed with eight 12, 18, and 36-pounders, and manned by 30 to 40 men each) to send down two or three of these vessels from their station at Rupelmonde to the anchorage opposite the citadel, with a view of intercepting the communication between the flotilla and the fortress. General Chassé, having been apprised of this project, gave orders to Colonel Koopman to place two gun-boats in the stream, between the cut in the dyke and the shore opposite the Melkhuis. This being observed, the battery at Burcht, mounting six 32-pounders, opened upon the two gun-boats, and, after a few shots, compelled them to resume their station behind the dykes. The Belgian brigantines dropped down abreast of Hoboken, but advanced no further. It was justly considered that their appearance in the waters of the city would have been an infraction of the neutrality ; and, independent of their inability to cope with the experienced crews of the Dutch gun-boats, a partial combat might have produced other acts of collision, and thus have entailed misfortunes on the city.

A second descent, commencing *à ciel ouvert*, was opened a little to the right of the principal shaft. It was intended to run this down to the counterscarp by a blinded covering, and connect it with the great descent by a short gallery parallel to the ditch. The grand descent was commenced at thirty-five yards from the outward revetment of the counterscarp, and had an inclination of about  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Its breadth was six, its height about seven feet. To prevent accidents, the roof was double framed. The mouth of the smaller descent was pierced at twelve yards from the outward revetment and had about three by six feet aperture; the inclination of the latter was about  $\frac{1}{3}$ .

It may be proper here to introduce a few words respecting the state of the ditches. The perpendicular height of the brick revetment of the scarp from the lowest level of the plane of the profile to the cornice, was 31 feet; that of the earthen talus above it, 19—in all 50. The width of the ditch between the revetments was 87 feet. The revetment of the counterscarp, which rose to the level of the *terre-plein* of the covered-way, was 18 feet in height and about 4 in thickness. The utmost quantity of water susceptible of being introduced into the ditches by means of the sluices indicated by the two arrows in the ravelin opposite the Scheldt, and retained by the *batardeau* 6 of the Plan, was, at spring-tides, from 12 to 13 feet, including the sediment or mud, of which there was nearly  $4\frac{1}{2}$  feet. Prior to the 12th, that is before the crevice was effected in the *batardeau*, the total of mud and water averaged about 10 to 11 feet; after the 18th, on which day the crevice was converted into a breach, the depth was reduced about 4 to 5 feet; and as the filtration rapidly augmented, on the day of the capitulation the depth of mud and water did not exceed 7 feet. From the sediment having been of long standing, and from the peculiar qualities of the Scheldt deposit, called “*schorre*” in Flemish, which quickly consolidates, and forms the first substratum of the polders, this mud had obtained so much consistency as scarcely to yield to the weight of the human body. Thus, the depth of water on the morning of the 23d, must be taken as not having exceeded 40 inches. It has been mentioned that several gunners from the nearest batteries dashed into the ditch, and waded across to the breach, the moment the batteries ceased firing, on the morning of the 23d, the water scarcely reaching the middle of their bodies. After this period, the drainage was so great, that little or no water remained at ebb-tide.

Owing to the slackness of the fire of the place on the one side, and in consequence of the improved weather and the exertions of the officers on the other, the counter-battery was made ready by nightfall to receive its armament. It must be observed that all operations connected with tracing, excavating, and constructing the batteries were performed by the officers of artillery, and working parties under their immediate orders, totally distinct from the duties of the engineers, between which two corps, unless we have been much deceived, there existed some jealousy and perhaps some slight dissidence of opinion.

The armament of this battery encountered difficulties similar to those of No. 14. Notwithstanding the labour expended in draining, clearing, flooring, and widening the trenches and communications, it was only by incessant force of bodily exertion, that the artillerymen, aided by the grenadier companies of the 65th, were enabled to drag up the pieces,

and to run them on their platforms. A number of light balls and rockets, and an incessant though random fire of musketry and wall pieces, with a sharp discharge of grape from the place, caused much interruption, and it required nearly seven hours, from six P.M. to one A.M., to complete the operation. Four powder magazines, for the service of Nos. 14 and 15, were established in the boyau in the immediate rear of the former. The necessary provision, at the rate of about 120 rounds per day for each gun, was brought up, and a proportionate pile of shot placed in readiness behind the platform of each piece. The artillery in the distant batteries had employed wads of damp hay; wooden sabots, flat on one side and concave on the other, of which a large store were found in the arsenal of Antwerp, were adapted for the guns in the breaching batteries. The charge was also ordered to be augmented from the usual proportion to the rate of half the calibre.

The remainder of the mortars wanting to arm I, as well as the pierriers for No. 16, were brought up, and the armament and provisioning of these batteries and their magazines fully completed.

Towards two A.M., the besieged having made some fresh dispositions, again renewed their vertical fire; and by the remarkable precision of their mortar practice, showed the fallacy of the assertion, not only that these pieces are more efficacious and certain in their range at a distance exceeding 300, but that their fire is very uncertain when within 150 or 100 yards; for it was incontestably proved that in proportion as the approaches approximated the defences, the effect of these projectiles became more deadly and unerring. We venture to call this point to the consideration of our artillery officers, the more especially as it created great discussion at the time.

The 24-inch mortar, which had been brought into Antwerp, was conveyed to the Malines gate, and a ramp having been made by cutting through the first traverse of the covered-way to the right of the road, it was conveyed to the platform prepared for it, and placed in battery behind the second traverse, and directed on bastion Fernando, at the distance of about 800 yards. General Chassé complains in strong terms of its being employed. It is therefore proper to observe, that Marshal Gerard only yielded an unwilling consent to the entreaties of the artillery officers, who were eager to make an experiment. It being feared that, if any of the shells burst or fell short, they might injure the advanced batteries or boyaus, or kill the men by the immense radius of their splinters, the mouth of the piece was directed, as above stated, on the bastion Fernando, and a trifling addition made to the exact charge necessary for its precise range, in order to guard against short falls. A small magazine was constructed in the traverse, but with merely sufficient powder for each charge. The projectiles and stores were kept at the guard-house near the Malines gate.

During the night the engineers opened a fresh boyau of communication, running from nearly the centre of the 2d parallel to the 3d, in the direction of battery 13, the passage of the guns and accumulation of water having rendered that to its left, running parallel to the glacis of St. Laurent, nearly impracticable. Ramps and short trenches were made in different directions, to facilitate the passage of guns and ammunition into the counter-battery, and from the latter to the magazines. The boyau running from the left re-entering place of arms of Toledo to the

covered-way and the zig-zags on the right were improved, the parapets heightened, banquettes and loop-holes for musketry established, whence, as well as from all the lodgments and places of arms, an incessant tirailleur fire was maintained on the place. The besiegers, still suspecting an attack on the ravelin, continued to pour a heavy fire in that direction, and constantly threw out light balls, but the whole of the men having been withdrawn from that quarter, no casualties occurred.

#### BATTERING IN BREACH.

At eleven A.M. (21st), the breaching and counter-batteries, each armed with six 24-pounders, the mortar-battery I, with ten 10-inch, and No. 16, with six pierriers, were unmasked and opened their fire; a large provision of granite squares, taken from the broken pavement of the Boom chaussée, had been placed near the latter. It is proper to observe that, in order the better to secure No. 14 from the flank fire of Fernando, two strong traverses were constructed in its coffer, dividing the pieces into three divisions, as indicated in the plan. A similar precaution was adopted in No. 15, and its left flank, being exposed to the enfilading fire of the ravelin and Paciotto, was rendered more than usually strong, and the parapet raised four feet above the ordinary height. The whole of the batteries, whose range was not obstructed by the advanced works, re-opened with increased vigour, and from this period up to the last hour of the siege, 40 mortars, 20 howitzers, 6 pierriers, 19 coehorns, 30 24-pounders, and 15 16-pounders,—in all 130 pieces, maintained an almost incessant discharge; and yet not a single casemate in masonry had hitherto received any serious damage.

The order given to the breaching batteries, the muzzle of whose pieces were 52 yards distant from the revetment, was to fire by salvos of two guns to mark out a horizontal line as near the level of the water as possible, and to continue until the revetment was detached from the earth; thence to take a vertical direction on each side, so as to form a breach of about 100 feet; and the whole of this being cut out, to commence an independent fire on the centre. The counter-battery, distant 350 yards from the flank of Fernando, was directed to maintain an incessant discharge upon that flank and the reduit in its rear; but the besieged stood so steadily to their guns, and pointed with such remarkable precision, that two pieces were quickly silenced. The garrison had kept ten pieces of large calibre in reserve for the flanks of Paciotto and Fernando, and were enabled to concentrate a heavy fire on the front and left flank of No. 15. Shot after shot entered the embrasures, ploughed up the soles, demolished the cheeks, and ruined the ramparts. The superiority of the Dutch over the French fire in this quarter was evident; but it must be remembered that the former had the advantage of retired flanks, strong blindages, and solid embrasures, which, on the cessation of the fire, were still little injured in Fernando. Three of Paciotto had already suffered severely before the breaching battery opened; and it required all the energy and activity of the artillery officers to keep open the embrasures and refit the damaged pieces. The breaching-battery being comparatively secured from round shot in front, and its embrasures screened from musketry by thick wooden blinds, it could only be molested by vertical fire and

hollow projectiles. Of these the besieged made good and effective use.

In the mean while the two descents were vigorously pushed forward : that to the right was prepared for blinding, and four frames were established in the principal shaft. Some idea may be formed of the accuracy of the Dutch mortar fire, when it is stated that the work was obliged to be abandoned three times during the night. The miners commenced boring the revetment, but the solidity of the masonry offered great obstacles, and petards were required to move some of the masses of mixed cement, broken granite and brick, that consolidates so firmly as to form a solid body harder than stone itself. An accident occurred at this descent, which, for a while, caused considerable panic. A bomb fell at the very mouth, where it exploded, killing one lieutenant of the 25th, two sappers, one voltigeur, and wounding another. The concussion of air was so great that the lights were extinguished, and the gallery being filled with smoke and left in utter darkness, officers and men at the bottom supposed the roof had given way and that they were buried, and, as the lateral gallery was not yet completely opened, there was no escape on that side. After a few moments' anxious suspense they were re-assured by hearing the voice of a vivandière, who, though a second bomb followed close on the heels of the first, killing two and wounding three men, with the utmost coolness walked down, and calling to one of the miners said, "Here's your dram, but you must drink from your hand, for the cursed shell has broken my glasses." The fire from the place on No. 15 was so accurate and hot, that the two damaged guns could not be re-opened, and it was a service of great danger to repair the embrasures and parapets of the others, but a captain of artillery, with two corporals and a gunner, mounted on the top, and gallantly re-established the gabions.

We have omitted to mention, that a letter to Marshal Gerard, signed by Marshal Soult, was published in general orders, in which notice was given to the army, that all such men as should meet with wounds "equivalent to the loss of the use of a limb, would be immediately admitted at the Invalids, and that the families of those who fell would be pointed out to the munificence of government." This and the encouragement held out of a distribution of crosses of the Legion of Honour was well calculated to produce a happy effect in the mind of a young army, and to cheer the spirits of men in hospital. The donations to the wounded, both from the royal families of France and Belgium, were liberal. The French princes and the Marshal repeatedly visited the hospitals, when they conversed familiarly with the sufferers. We shall venture to give an authenticated specimen of one of these dialogues. "Be of good cheer, my friend," said Marshal Gerard to an amputated man, "I also was wounded as a private." "You'll allow, general, you have had smartish promotion then," replied the soldier: "besides, one can see as well with one eye, but one can't march with one leg." "Console yourself," answered the Marshal, "though you do not get a baton you will a pension that will enable you to plant a wood." "I sha'n't have far to go for a leg, then," retorted the other; "besides I know one can't make omelets without breaking shells."

The good effect of commanders-in-chief or generals visiting the hospitals need not be pointed out. The Duke of Wellington was so

sensible of this that he rarely omitted doing so when circumstances permitted, and this suddenly, so as to give no time for hollow parade or preparation. We remember on one occasion, when head-quarters were at Fuente Guinaldo, and the hospitals at Celorico, that the Duke secretly sent on relays, and, accompanied by two or three of his staff, started early and rode with his usual rapidity to the latter place, where he arrived unexpectedly. Here, either from neglect on the part of the Portuguese authorities, or for want of energy elsewhere, his Grace found the sick and wounded in a most deplorable condition, many of them lying in the streets, on or under the cars, in a state of the utmost destitution, exposed to all the inclemencies of the rainy season. He spoke with his usual laconicism to some of the sufferers—"Wounded?" "Yes." "Badly?" "Smartish." "Been attended to?" "No, my Lord." "How long have you lain here?" "A day or two." "How's this?" "Don't know, but there's more wounded than I am, and besides, now you are come it will be all right." The Commander-in-chief's eye sparkled, his lip contracted, and the sharp expression, "Ah!" was uttered. Then, turning round, he said, "Let these poor fellows be put under cover in the house of the Juiz de Fora and magistrates; I shall see whether they will leave my people to rot in the streets." Then sending for the principal functionary himself, he rated him in such terms as made the man wish the earth would open to hide him, and, turning on his heel, walked towards the hospital. At this juncture, up came the medical superintendent, a smart, tall, and intelligent Irishman, with well-polished boots, snow-white linen, and an umbrella sheltering his best coat. The contrast between the drenched and mud-splashed chief and the spruce physician was striking. The Duke eyed him, but said nothing. He had made up his mind how to deal with the delinquent. As the party advanced, a bullock-cart obstructed the narrow street. The good-humoured and unsuspecting Irishman raised his umbrella, put his right hand on the crupper of one of the oxen, vaulted over with great agility, seized their heads, and turned them so as to admit a passage. This feat was not lost on the general, who, having finished his inspection, and finding every thing in a state rather to augment than allay his anger, administered no very honied admonition to the medical superintendent, mounted his horse, and returned to head-quarters. On his arrival, the inspector-general of hospitals was sent for, to whom he expressed all his displeasure, and ordered the unfortunate Irishman to be sent in disgrace to England. The doctor endeavoured to deprecate his Lordship's choler, and added, "I regret most sincerely to hear this, for I always considered Mr. — to be one of the most active men in the department." "Active enough, by G—," retorted the Duke, "for he jumped over a car and pair of bullocks with an umbrella in his hand." Mr. — was not saved by this joke.

To resume. The breaching battery maintained its fire with success. By four P.M., the line marked out parallel to the level of the water had yielded and exposed the earth behind; the vertical lines were also rapidly giving way, and large masses of the revetment had fallen. The masonry of the scarp appeared of an inferior description to that of the counterscarp. The fire of these guns was by no means rapid, not exceeding an average of six or seven rounds in the hour, or about eighty to ninety per day, from sun-rise to sun-set. Even with this trifling



expenditure, the vents of some pieces already showed symptoms of weakness, and the mouths of two or three commenced to scale and crack. The immense superiority of iron over brass material for battering-train received an additional corroboration from this siege. The casualties of the day were severe, and principally in the nearest batteries; 2 captains of artillery were killed, a third wounded, and about 35 men put *hors de combat*, in different directions.

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From 21st to 22d.—The evening closed in with heavy rain and mist; towards dark, all the gun batteries slackened their fire. Nos. 14 and 15 ceased altogether, but a heavy discharge of hollow projectiles was maintained on the bastion Toledo, to prevent the besieged from repairing the parapets to the right and left of the breach, or from throwing up retrenchments in the rear. A shower of coehorns and musketry was directed on the breach, where, it appears, no effort was made by the garrison, either to slope off the earth or to clear the bottom. The attention of the besieging engineers was now almost entirely directed to the completion of the descents and preparations for the passage. The sections of barrels and prismatic hollow troughs, twelve of each, with the necessary tackle, weights, and tools, intended to form the arches, were brought up to the neighbourhood of the second parallel in rear of battery H, and an abundant supply of fascines, sand-bags, saucissons, and gabions was deposited in a boyau immediately contiguous to the mouths of the shafts. A few sappers were employed in improving the boyaus on the extreme right, and working parties of infantry were constantly engaged in clearing the communications in the rear of the breaching batteries, but the operations of the siege were now so far advanced, that it was unnecessary to break fresh ground, and the sap running from near the descent into the ditch of the ravelin in the direction of the salient of Toledo, being found useless, was discontinued, as will be seen by referring to the Plan.

The besieged, who still continued to expect an attack on the ravelin, maintained a heavy fire of musketry on the ditch, and a spare eighteen-pounder having been run up and placed under cover of a traverse on the right face of Toledo, kept a steady discharge of grape on the unfinished passage. They also made constant use of light balls, large rockets, and *lances à feu*. This apprehension somewhat diverted their attention from the main attack, and in order to strengthen them in this delusion, the tirailleurs established on the banquettes of the nearest communication fired incessantly, whilst now and then half a dozen men were ordered to run down to the passage and to discharge their muskets from the end.

Nothing of any importance occurred during the night. The besiegers were busily employed in refitting the two damaged pieces in No. 15, new wheels having been put on, the embrasures and revetments strengthened, all six guns were ready to open at day-break. This battery and No. 14 were much annoyed during the night by vertical fire and shells, which were directed with admirable precision from the mortars and howitzers behind the adjacent curtains. In the breaching battery a thick screen of fascines was laid during the night across the trunnions and carriages of the pieces, which greatly protected them from accidents,

and the gunners were directed to shelter themselves in the descents or under blindages made in the angles of the traverses. The two descents had now made great progress, that on the left, having been pushed nearly one hundred feet, had reached the counterscarp; that of the right was partly blinded, and the lateral gallery made ready for communication. At midnight, the twenty-four-inch mortar was loaded with twelve and a half pounds of powder, and the first discharge took place. The huge projectile, of which the internal charge was fifty-four pounds of powder and combustibles, was watched with anxiety as it made its parabola, and a look-out person stationed on the tower of St. André reported that it had fallen and exploded near the great powder magazine at the gorge of bastion Fernando. The success of the experiment was thus demonstrated. At the second shot, which took place nearly an hour later, the shell burst on issuing from the mouth of the mortar, not by explosion from the fuze, but from the weakness of the projectile itself. Great care was therefore ordered to be taken in selecting others, of which the culots were thicker. "The enemy," says General Chassé, in speaking of this mortar, in his report of the 21st, "have put the seal to their brutal and barbarous mode of proceeding, by firing from the great monster-mortar, so long announced."

In the mean while, the artillery of the garrison was not idle. Every spare gun was extracted from the faces not attacked, and conveniently stationed in readiness to replace accidents. It was necessary to drag these pieces over ruins, under crumbling walls and prostrate timbers, over ground ploughed with shells, and under the concentrated fire of sixty mortars and howitzers. Immense stress has been laid by the besiegers on the effects of their artillery, and certainly their gallant exertions merit the greatest commendations; but we think General Chassé has scarcely done justice to his own people—he said much, but not enough, at least in his public report: for we venture boldly to assert that there is no praise or recompense that Lieutenant-Colonel Selig and his men do not deserve. They, and nearly they alone, made the defence, and in so saying we are supported by the highest opinions of officers of all countries who witnessed the operations, or subsequently inspected the interior of the fortress. The engineers apparently did little; the infantry not more, and the state of General Chassé's health was such, we believe, as rendered it impossible for him to display that activity of body which was the characteristic of this gallant veteran. This was an unfortunate circumstance for the besieged. For however energetic and resolute the mind of a governor, however judicious his plans, or able the officers charged to carry them into execution, and a more zealous and devoted soldier than General Fauvage does not exist, still every one must be aware of the paramount advantage of the immediate and superintending eye of the commander-in-chief, and the effect produced on troops when deprived of his constant presence.

How often have we seen the British soldier depressed at the temporary absence of the Duke of Wellington, however able or valiant his substitute! How often again has one seen, in the line of battle, the men's spirits raised to a frenzy of confidence when he appeared or placed himself near their ranks. No matter how great the peril, the opposing force, or difficulty of ground,—he being there, all was right; and though death stared the soldier in the face,—open-jawed,—almost

certain to devour him,—still he had faith and hope,—and on he rushed. God knows how he arrived—for in the front it was through a deluge of fire,—if in the rear, through a river of blood;—but, nevertheless, he did arrive. There always exists some superstition as to the fortune of their generals in soldiers' minds, and this confidence in the Duke was carried to an indefinite extent in the British army. However desperate the occasion, he led his people to victory, and victory ensures honour and promises advancement. Honour! for our victories, especially in sieges, were purchased by dint of the most undaunted energy, and by achievements that, in other armies, would have conquered the cross of honour for the meanest soldier. Promotion! for the path lay over the bodies of our mangled comrades!

We crave pardon for this digression, prompted by the memory of old and pertinent events.

At daylight the fire from all the batteries of cannon was renewed with redoubled ardour, and the discharge of mortars, coehorns, howitzers, musketry, and every gun that could be brought to bear without endangering the advanced works, was more violent than on any preceding day. The revetment of the scarp, from the salient to a distance of one hundred feet to the left, had given way, and exposed six of the counter-forts, which rose from the base nearly to the crest of the parapets. This peculiarity of construction, which gives great force to the parapets, was much remarked. The counter-battery plied its shot vigorously on the flank of Fernando, but produced little impression, and was answered with effect by the besieged. Some idea existing that an attempt would be made by General Chassé to embark his people, blow up the bastions, and either to run down the river under cover of the confusion, or, at all events, to land them at the Tête de Flandre, and there make terms, orders were given to the batteries in advance of the villages of Burcht and Hoboken, to keep a sharp look out on the gun-boats. Some move having been made by those in the Polders, these batteries opened their fire, and two vessels were damaged.

The situation of the garrison was now becoming critical. The men were harassed and showed symptoms of great depression. Several powder magazines had blown up,—more than thirty guns had been disabled. Every building not casemated in masonry, with the exception of the hospital, was levelled or burned; and this latter had considerably bulged from its perpendicular. The wells were either drained by filtration or were filled up by crumbling ruins. The dysentery began to show itself amongst the troops, and soft water was getting scarce; and, independent of many sick, the loss amounted to 90 killed, 349 wounded, and 69 missing. The latter, however, was of little importance, generally speaking, for the strength of the garrison still remaining, was much more than sufficient for convenience or defence. A council of defence was assembled, and a correct report made to the governor. The engineers declared that the breach would be practicable in less than thirty-four hours. The commandant of artillery observed, that he had scarcely any disposable reserve pieces remaining, and that in the event of the guns in the flank of Fernando being disabled, there could be little prospect of defending the foot of the breach, or interrupting the passage; but there was still an abundant supply of ammunition. The defences, generally speaking, were stated to be in good condition; and,

if the men could be relied on, it was possible to defend the breach. Nothing was definitively settled, but the governor resolved to continue the defence until the state of the breach should warrant his surrendering with honour \*.

Nothing daunted, Lieutenant-Colonel Selig and his men served their pieces with gallant constancy, and made good use of their light guns, kept loaded in reserve, and immediately run up and discharged, whenever one of the larger pieces received an injury. Their mortar and coehorn fire was very effective on the breaching batteries; and their tirailleurs, under cover of such portions of the left face as remained intact, kept up a constant roll of musketry. By three P.M., the appearance of the breach gave reason to suppose that twenty-four hours would suffice to render it perfectly practicable, and convert it into an easy slope. A deserter from the garrison made his escape by the burned arsenal; the picture this man gave of the sufferings of the garrison was deplorable; he declared the *morale* of his comrades was completely broken down. But little reliance was placed on his assertions.

The 24-inch mortar fired at intervals during the day. The shell was distinctly seen making its curve, and alighting with great precision. In the air it had the appearance of a huge cricket-ball, and had, apparently, little velocity.

The besieged having availed themselves of the cessation of fire during the previous night to repair damages, the breaching and counter-batteries were directed to continue their discharges after dark; but the thickness of the weather prevented their being very effective. Towards sunset, a boat with about thirty men of the garrison coming from the Tête de Flandre, having grounded near the Melkhuyts, they landed, and were attacked by the French post near the dyke: after sustaining a sharp fire, and losing two or three men, they made good their retreat by the glacis to the gorge of Kiel. The casualties of this day in the batteries and adjacent boyaus were severe, especially in the artillery. A lieutenant-colonel, 2 captains of that arm, and 19 men of different corps, were killed or wounded in the two batteries.

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From 22d to 23d.—The night was employed by the artillery in giving additional strength to the counter-battery and No. 14; both of which had suffered severely, the shells pitching on the parapets and embrasures, tearing away many cubic feet of revetment. The traverses were heightened and the flanks strengthened. The engineers continued their labours at the descents. The left gallery was completely framed down to the revetment of the counterscarp, and was pierced so as to afford an arched opening of about four feet wide and three in height. The left descent was also blinded down to the revetment, and the miners commenced opening the latter. The lateral gallery of communication was also blinded, and the whole was in a state to admit the immediate commencement of the passage, for which the materials above-mentioned were in readiness to be employed on the subsequent night.

The breaching and counter-batteries continued their fire slowly, as before-mentioned, during the night, and were replied to by the besieged

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\* We give this statement on the authority of an officer of the garrison.

with more than wonted animation. The remarkable accuracy of the Dutch mortar fire at this close range, not only harassed the gunners and working parties, causing many casualties, but was a strong corroboration of the arguments of those who had urged the expediency of advancing the whole of the batteries much nearer to the place after the establishment of the second parallel. It is with the utmost diffidence that we venture to approach a subject of this grave nature; but, in expressing some surprise that the besieging artillery should have persisted, throughout the whole siege, in maintaining all their cannon-batteries in their first positions, and should only reluctantly have advanced those for mortars, we are borne out by the opinion of many practical men of the highest experience and authority serving with the army. It appears that the lieutenant-general commanding the artillery pertinaciously adhered to the principle, that it is at point blank that cannon fire is most efficacious; and that nothing is gained by that of mortars at close range:—that is, that the impetus of the former does not increase by reducing the distance between the point blank and a given object; and were it not for intervening glacis and counterscarps, revetments could as speedily be breached at full point blank, as at fifty yards; whilst in regard to the latter, their execution is rendered less certain by the necessity of diminishing the charge and fuse. But if the force of the full point blank was equal to that of the same piece at a reduced distance, why increase the charge from one-third to half, or from eight to twelve pounds for 24-pounders, when within fifty yards?—The effect produced by the breaching battery on the revetments of the left face of Toledo was most rapid. Seven hours' fire on the 21st, about thirteen on the 22d, in all thirty-four, at the rate of not more than six shots per hour per gun—one hundred and twenty-four rounds for twenty-four hours, had brought down the whole of its revetments, and seriously injured the counter-forts, which were more than six and a half feet square. On the other hand, the counter-battery, distant about three hundred and fifty yards from the right flank of Fernando, produced little effect; and, calculating from the damage done to it at the moment of surrender, it would, apparently, have required a week to have breached it, had a breach been necessary.

We are aware, that the iron 24-pounders now in use in the English siege-trains have been brought to such perfection of bore and metal, as to be highly effective at the full point blank range, and that their fire has been known to be extremely destructive even at fourteen hundred yards. Practicable breaches were made by our guns in Spain at distances varying from six to eight hundred yards; but in our operations it was of the utmost importance to save time; and thus our sieges were hurried to their *dénouement*, at a great sacrifice of human life, when both engineers and artillery would, most probably, have preferred the more regular routine, and, surely, would not by preference have selected point blank as the distance to be maintained through the whole operation. Besides, there can be little doubt of the superiority not only of our iron (over the French brass) guns, both as for accuracy and capability of maintaining rapid fire; but of our powder being of a finer and more powerful quality. The French brass guns could not, we believe, support more than an average of seven shots an hour, for any length of time, without drooping at the mouth and flying at the vent; whereas our

artillery consider eight rounds per hour as by no means sharp or detrimental to the pieces.

But, even admitting that nothing is obtained by approximating cannon batteries, it has been clearly demonstrated in the late siege, that mortars are, not only equally certain, but more deadly in their range when within one hundred or one hundred and fifty yards; and as battery I was at the eleventh hour moved up to the third parallel, one must suppose that the French artillery began to admit the efficacy of the Dutch fire. It is certain, that the shells of the latter increased in nicety of range, in proportion as the works advanced; that few shells failed to explode; and that, after the covered-way was crowned, their execution became very dangerous to the workmen, and more detrimental to the saps and batteries. Take, for instance, a given number of shells fired on Montebello and on the breaching battery, it will be found that the proportion of those dropping at the proper point, in the latter, were as four to one. In the former, one officer was wounded in nineteen days; in the latter, four were killed and five or six wounded in forty-eight hours. If the object of keeping batteries at the average of point blank distance, which, by referring to the list of batteries or Plan will be found to be the case, was to neutralise the effect of the besiegers' fire, and to preclude him from the advantage of convergency, which ought to belong to the besiegers,—this would be a powerful argument; but if this were the case, it would be an admission of the efficacy of fire at short ranges, and would destroy the argument on which the objections are founded. It is certain, that if this principle were correct, and that shot could tell as well on a solid revetment at six hundred yards as at fifty, and there were no lofty glacis or covered-ways to screen the scarps, it would be an immense advantage; for musketry and cohorn fire, usually so harassing to close batteries, would thus be rendered useless.

#### THE SURRENDER.

At day-break, the whole of the besieging batteries renewed their fire. That of the breach told well on the masonry of the counter-forts. The earth already presented a fair slope, and promised a practicable breach at the end of a few hours. At about eight o'clock, however, a flag of truce appeared at the post stationed in the burned arsenal, and two officers of the garrison, Lieutenant-Colonel Selig, of the artillery, and Major Van der Wyck, of the engineers, having stated that they were bearers of a letter from General Chassé to the Marshal, they were immediately conducted, by the esplanade, to the Malines gate, and thence to Berchem, where, on being presented to Count Gerard, they delivered the following letter:—

“Citadel of Antwerp, 23d Dec. 1832.

“Monsieur le Maréchal,

“Thinking that I have satisfied the honour of a soldier in the defence of the place of which the command has been confided to me, I am desirous to terminate the effusion of blood. Consequently, Monsieur le Maréchal, I have the honour to apprise you that I am disposed to evacuate the citadel with the force under my orders, and to treat with you for the surrender of this place, as well as the position of the Tête de Flandre and forts depending on it. In order to effect this, Monsieur le Maréchal, I propose to you to direct a cessation of the fire on both sides during the progress of the negotiation. I have charged two field-officers to remit this letter to your Excellency; they

are furnished with the necessary instructions for treating for the above-mentioned surrender.

" Marshal Gerard, (Signed) CHASSÉ."  
&c. &c. &c.

" A true Copy. (Signed) GERARD."

A council of war was immediately assembled to discuss the verbal propositions offered by the two Dutch officers, the principal feature of which was, that the garrison was ready to evacuate the fortress and forts on the left bank, on condition of being transported, with arms and baggage, to Holland, either by land or water, as should be determined upon by the Netherlands' government. These propositions being considered inadmissible, a sketch of a capitulation was drawn up by General St. Cyr Nugues, and after considerable discussion on the part of the Dutch commissioners, Colonel Auvray was directed to accompany them to the citadel, and it was not until a late hour of the evening, that General Chassé consented to and signed the following capitulation:—

#### CAPITULATION

*Concluded between the General of Infantry Baron Chassé and Marshal Count Gerard.*

" 1st. The General of Infantry Baron Chassé will deliver up to Marshal Count Gerard the citadel of Antwerp, the position of the Tête de Flandre, the forts Burght, Zwyndrecht, and Austrowiel, in their present condition, with their cannon, warlike stores and provisions, with the reserve of the objects mentioned in No. 3.

" 2. The garrison will march out with the honours of war, will lay down its arms on the glacis, and will be prisoners of war. At the same time, Marshal Gerard engages himself to have them conducted to the frontiers of Holland, where their arms shall be restored to them, as soon as H. M. the King of Holland shall have ordered the evacuation of Forts Lillo and Liefkenshoek. For this purpose, Marshal Gerard will, without delay, despatch an officer to the Hague, and will permit General Chassé to send one on his part, if he deems it expedient.

" 3. Officers will preserve their arms, and all the garrison their baggage, carriages, horses, and effects, either appertaining to corps or individuals forming part of this garrison. Those persons not belonging to the garrison, who have remained in the citadel, will be under the protection of the French army.

" 4. If the King of Holland orders the surrender of Forts Lillo and Liefkenshoek, the garrison shall be conducted to the Dutch frontier, by land or water, according to the option of General Chassé, immediately after possession is taken of these forts.

" 5. If the garrison takes the land route, it will march in one column. General Chassé shall have the faculty of sending forward staff-officers and commissaries to prepare quarters on the Dutch territory.

" 6. In case the horses and waggons of the garrison are not sufficient for the transport of its effects, means of transport shall be furnished at their expense. The same condition shall be applicable for such boats as may be requisite for the transport of the furniture of the officers and functionaries of the garrison.

" 7. For the transport of the sick, and more especially the wounded, the necessary number of boats shall be provided to transport them to Bergen-op-Zoom, at the cost of the Dutch government. The sick not susceptible of being moved shall continue to be treated, in places, analogous to their situation, at the expense of the Dutch government, and by medical officers

of that nation, who, on their retiring, will enjoy the same advantages as the garrison.

" 8. Immediately after the signature of the present capitulation, the besieging army will occupy the ravelin and the gate of the curtain facing the town, by one battalion.

" 9. With the least possible delay the commandants of artillery and engineers (Dutch) will deliver up to the chiefs of these departments in the French army, all arms, ammunition, plans, &c. relative to the service with which they are respectively charged. An inventory of the objects surrendered shall be drawn up by both parties.

" Done at Antwerp, this 23d Dec. 1832.

" The Lieut.-General Chief of the Staff, furnished with full powers, on the part of the Marshal commanding in chief the Army of the North,

(Signed) ST. CYR NUGUES."

#### ADDITIONAL ARTICLE.

" The flotilla \* of twelve gun-boats stationed before Antwerp, under the orders of Colonel Koopman, is not included in the present capitulation.

(Signed) COLONEL AUVRAY."

Immediately after the arrival of the Dutch officers at Berchem orders were issued to stop the fire of the besieging batteries, and an officer with a white flag was directed to hasten to the breaching battery, and thence to communicate with the garrison, in order that General Chassé might issue similar instructions to his gunners, who, not being aware of what was passing, continued to fire a few rounds after the French batteries had entirely ceased. The last shot from the flank of Fernando carried off the arm of a French artillery officer in battery 15. At ten A.M. the fire ceased entirely on both sides, having been maintained by the Dutch from mid-day on the 30th of November, altogether 22 days and 22 hours; and by the French, from 11 A.M. on the 4th of December, making 18 days and 23 hours,—the former having expended 42,000 rounds, and the latter upwards of 63,000, the half of which were hollow projectiles, of which a large proportion passed over the citadel. The moment the batteries ceased firing, the garrison crowded the parapets and ramparts, and some of the besiegers having dashed into the water, waded across the ditch, and, scrambling up the breach, shook hands with the defenders. It was stipulated that both parties should abstain from working during the progress of the negotiations; but some of the garrison, unknown to the governor, having been seen occupied in clearing the breach, and repairing the parapet of Toledo, and the embrasures in Fernando, the General commanding the trenches immediately gave notice, that the fire would be re-opened if this was continued. No further act of hostility took place.

It has been shown by the capitulation, that the flotilla under Colonel Koopman was not included. That gallant seaman meditated an enterprise, which, had it even partially succeeded, would have reflected the highest honour on the Dutch navy. As it was, the attempt was boldly conceived, and merited the greatest praise. Having landed much of his powder, to prevent accidents from hot shot, and issued secret orders to the commanders of the flotilla to prepare to sail upon a preconcerted

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\* By some oversight, the flotilla was not thought of until the capitulation had been signed and exchanged.



signal, the wind being fair, though the tide was flowing, Koopman profited by the darkness, and at 10 P.M. the vessels cut their cables, and hoisting every stitch of canvass, bore down the Scheldt, and might probably have succeeded in running down with little damage, had not accident betrayed their intention before they were fairly under weigh. A Polish colonel in the Belgian service, the gallant Prozynski, was waiting at the post in the arsenal for the return of Colonel Auvery, and happening to walk towards the borders of the river, perceived some movement amongst the vessels, though the night was so dark as almost to shroud objects at a short distance. The idea of an attempt to escape suggesting itself, he immediately sent word to the sentries on the quays to open their fire and to alarm the batteries, so that before the headmost vessel had reached the Fort du Nord, the Belgian gunners manned their pieces and commenced a cannonade. Seeing this, and thinking it imprudent to risk the lives of the crews, Colonel Koopman directed the flotilla to put back, and to run up with the tide to their former stations. One vessel, gun-boat No. 8, however, gallantly maintained its course in despite of the fire of the batteries, and had already reached the neighbourhood of St. Philip. In a few moments it would have been in safety; but signals having been made along the dykes, a heavy fire was opened upon it from the fort, and having taken the ground in rounding one of the points, the lieutenant (Meersman) thought it prudent to surrender. The crew, consisting of about thirty men, were made prisoners by General Achard's division, and brought through Antwerp in two waggons on the following day, when these brave men were insulted and assailed with mud and stones by a portion of the populace of that city. This detestable act excited general indignation in the hearts of all that witnessed or heard of it. The French escort of hussars, of whom there were only ten or twelve, dashed amongst the vile mob, composed of the lowest orders, and laid on with their sabres; whilst some Belgian officers who chanced to be present exerted themselves to the utmost to put a stop to this abomination. Colonel Caradoc, and Sir George Hamilton, the British secretary of embassy to the mission at Brussels, happened to be returning from the citadel at the moment. It is scarcely necessary to say, that they conducted themselves on this occasion, at some personal risk, as became Englishmen and gallant men.

Having mentioned the names of these two gentlemen, we think it will be gratifying to the British army to state, that on their visiting the Governor on business connected with the mission, he expressed himself extremely anxious that they should inspect the citadel, and make such report to the government and the Duke of Wellington, of the condition in which they found the fortress, as would place the nature of his defence in a proper light in the opinions of the Duke and the British army, a sentiment honourable to him, and flattering to English soldiers. The gallant veteran, in his letter to the Dutch minister of war, declared that, had he consulted his own feelings, had he been responsible for his own life alone, he should have gladly sought a glorious termination to his long career upon the breach. We believe this fully, and laud him for having judged more humanely. We have criticised the operations, and do not hesitate to declare, that neither attack nor defence were such as to place the siege upon a level with many

others that could be mentioned; but it must be recollected that the besiegers were not pressed for time, and that their principal object was to spare the effusion of blood; whilst the defenders knew themselves to be without a prospect of relief, were exposed in a very confined space to one of the most constant bombardments ever recorded in history, and were attacked by such an overwhelming force of men and matériel, as never sat down before a fortress; and this force, without a chance of interruption, with every possible advantage of supplies, and with no other external enemy to fear than the rain and mud.

To return to the gun-boats. On finding his bold enterprise frustrated, Colonel Koopman immediately directed his crews to set fire to and destroy their vessels, and to land at the Tête de Flandre. This project was executed immediately; four gun-boats and two steamers were burned and scuttled in the Polders, and the remaining six were destroyed in the river; and by daylight scarcely a vestige of them remained. It was in consequence of this proceeding that Colonel Koopman was subsequently treated with some severity, being deprived of his sword, and placed in close arrest. But General Chassé having strongly remonstrated, and the British commissioner having likewise interceded, the brave sailor, who had but done his duty nobly and honourably, was placed on the same footing with his comrades in misfortune.

Whilst these important events were passing before the citadel, the Dutch secretly collected a small body of troops from Flushing and Batz, amounting to about 2000 men, and embarked them on board the squadron, with the intention of making an attack on the left of General Sebastiani's division, stationed near Doel, of destroying the batteries between that place and Liefkenshoek, and cutting the dyke so as to inundate the whole of the Doel Polder. At daybreak on the 23d, the Eurydice frigate, with two corvettes, three steamers, and twenty gun-boats, worked up within pistol-range of the dykes, and immediately commenced disembarking a considerable number of troops, whilst the garrison of Liefkenshoek were directed to make a sortie, and to fall on the right flank of the French detachment. The landing was partially effected before the French, who occupied this post with 500 infantry, three 8-pounders, and one 5½ inch howitzer, reached the point of attack. A company of grenadiers immediately threw themselves forward, and, supported by two other companies, opened a heavy fire of musketry, whilst the four guns plied the assailants with grape. After a sharp conflict the latter were driven back with some loss. In the meantime the remaining companies advanced to check the sortie from Liefkenshoek, which they succeeded in repulsing after a short struggle. The landing was protected by the fire of the squadron, which was vigorously maintained until a late hour, when the troops having been re-embarked, the vessels hove out of reach of the shot. The loss of the Dutch, many of whom were bayoneted or drowned in endeavouring to regain their boats, amounted to about 100 killed, wounded, and missing; that of the French was nearly equal, having 17 killed, and 69 wounded.

At daybreak on the 24th, two French battalions marched into the citadel and took possession of the ravelin and ramparts; the Dutch flag was hauled down, but no other substituted in its place. The strength of the garrison of the citadel, exclusive of forts, on the morning of the surrender, amounted to 3797 rank and file, and 129 officers,

with 300 wounded, amongst the latter 10 officers. We refer the reader to the Appendix for details. Shortly after, Marshal Gerard and the French princes entered the fortress with the lieutenant-generals commanding engineers and artillery, and immediately proceeded to visit General Chassé, whom they found in a small casemate in the Alba bastion. On their progress from the gate to the governor's quarters, they met with a scene of devastation and ruin, and a thousand painful and disgusting objects, that baffle all powers of description. We shall therefore confine ourselves to stating, that the whole interior presented an unparalleled chaos of black and smouldering destruction; that, with the exception of the principal powder, and two or three service magazines, and the hospital, not a building remained standing. The *terre-pleins* of the bastions were ploughed up with shell-holes, and the gorges encumbered with fallen rubbish; and although the casemates and subterranean communications were not perforated with shells, they emitted an offensive and almost insupportable odour, caused by the quantity of men crowded in them.

Everything was said by the victors to console and flatter the vanquished, and after a meeting at once dignified and affecting, Count Gerard took his leave, having, it is said, stated to General Chassé, "That it was high time to surrender; that he had gallantly and honourably done his duty, and that he ought not to have held out a day longer."

This day having been fixed for the garrison to march out, it was arranged between the marshal and governor, that this ceremony should take place on the glacis, between Lunette Kiel and the river, as much to insure tranquillity as to avoid trouble to the garrison, who were to return to the citadel. At 3 o'clock p.m. the Dutch troops formed in marching order, under the command of Major-General Fauvage, and with colours flying, drums beating, filed out of the fortress, and formed in column on the Kiel glacis. General Chassé's health not permitting him to ride or walk so far, he was spared the pain of being present. Detachments of different corps of the besieging army, with cavalry and artillery, were formed in order of battle fronting the fortress, and after the usual ceremonies, the garrison marched by, the French troops carrying arms, and the drums beating a salute. The vanquished then piled arms, took off their cross-belts, and after a short time returned into the place, where it was settled they should remain until the King of Holland's reply relative to Liefkenshoek and Lillo should be received, an aide-de-camp of Marshal Gerard and an officer from the garrison having been despatched to the Hague for this purpose.

On the 25th, detachments of the besieging army crossed the river and took possession of the Tête de Flandre and forts dependent, where they made prisoners the crews of the gun-boats, amounting to about 352 men, and 30 officers, and 467 officers and men of different infantry regiments, exclusive of about 250 sick—making all together a total of 4845 effectives, and 550 sick and wounded.


On the 27th, a negative answer as to Lillo and Liefkenshoek was received from the Hague. The Dutch government refused to ratify the capitulation, and rejected the offer made on the part of the French commander-in-chief, to send back the garrison on condition that officers and men would take an oath not to serve against France or her allies during the war; that is, until the pending question between Holland

and Belgium should be definitively settled. In consequence of this, arrangements were made for the removal of the garrison to France as prisoners of war. On the morning of the 29th, the first column, under the orders of General Fauvage, consisting of about 2400 men, embarked near the Melkhuys, crossed the Scheldt to Burcht, and took the route of Ghent by Cassel to St. Omer. They were followed on the 31st by the second column, composed of an equal number. General Chassé moved with this detachment, a brigade of the division Sebastian serving as escort to each.

At mid-day on the 1st of January, the citadel was evacuated by the French, and taken possession of by the Belgians, who immediately hoisted their standard. The besieging army had already commenced its retrograde movement by brigades. The battering-train and stores were re-embarked at Boom; and on the 10th the whole of the troops, with the exception of the sick and wounded, had recrossed the French frontier, and thus terminated the operation.

We beg to express our grateful thanks to those officers who have kindly assisted us with details and opinions. The sketch of the attack done by Captain Hallard of the Belgian engineers, is, we are able to state, from minute personal inspection of the ground, correct in all its details, and is a reduced fac-simile of that in the possession of the besieging engineers.

Section of 24 inch Iron Mortar seen in a vertical position




#### EXPLANATION

Diameter of Shell	24 in
Thickness exclusive of culot	2 1/2
Weight of empty shell	916 lb
Powder contained in shell	91 "
Weight of shell full charge	1015 "
Culibre massive	1666 "
Weight of mortar (metal)	14 700 "
" (wood)	16 000 "
Powder in chamber (full)	30 "

The French weight has been preserved purposely for the sake of greater accuracy

Section of Shell, with charge and fuse.



## APPENDIX.

## STATE OF THE ARMY OF THE NORTH

EMPLOYED IN THE SIEGE AND COVERING THE OPERATIONS UNDER  
MARSHAL COUNT GÉRARD.

Chief of Staff... Lieut.-Gen. St. Cyr Nugues.	} Head-Quarters, Berchem. Park, near Wylrick. .. Berchem. Grand Dépôt, Boom.
Sous Chef.... Colonel Auvray.	
Artillery ..... Lieut.-Gen. Neigre.	
Engineers ..... Lieut.-Gen. Haxo.	

## ADVANCED GUARD.

Divisions. *	Brigades.	Regiments.	Squad	Battal.	Guns.
I. Lt.-Gen. Sebastiani (H.-Q. Beveren.)	{ I.I.R.H. D. of Orleans (H.-Q. Braeschaet)	1st Hussars .	4	{	{ 6 6-pounders. II.A.
		1st Lancers .	4		
	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Garlet....	20th Lt. Inf. .		{ 3	{ 12 8 and 12 pounds.
		11th Lt. Inf. .			
	{ 2d Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Rumigny .	15th Line ...		{ 3	{ 3
		8th " " ...			
	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Castellane	19th " " ...		{ 3	{ 12 8 and 12 pounds.
		8th Lt. Inf. .			
	{ 2d Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Voirol....	12th Line ...		{ 3	{ 3
		32d " " ...			
II. Lt.-Gen. Achard . (H.-Q. Merxem.)	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Georges ..	30th " " ...		{ 3	{ 12 8-pounders.
		52d Line ....			
	{ 2d Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Zoepfel. .	58th " " ...		{ 3	{ 3
		18th " " ...			
	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Rapatel ..	19th Lt. Inf. .		{ 3	{ 12 8-pounders.
		7th Line....			
	{ 2d Brigade, Maj.-Gen. d'Hincourt	25th " " ....		{ 3	{ 3
		61st " " ....			
	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Ruhlières.	65th " " ....		{ 3	{ 12 12-pounders
		41st Line....			
III. Lt.-Gen. Tamin .. (H.-Q. Conlich.)	{ 2d Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Durocheret	3d Lt. Inf. .		{ 1	{ 3
		Grenadiers ...			
	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. De Rigny .	50th Line....		{ 3	{ 12 6-pounders.
		Voltigeurs ...			
	{ 2d Brigade, Maj.-Gen. La Tour Maubourg	1st Chasseurs	4	{ 4	{ 4
		2d Hussars .	4		
	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Vilatte ...	5th Dragoons	4	{ 4	{ 4
		10th " " ...	4		
	{ 2d Brigade, Maj. Gen. Giessler ..	1st Dragoons	4	{ 4	{ 4
		4th " " ...	4		
{ 1st Brigade, Maj. Gen. Simoneau.	9th " " ...	4	{ 4	{ 4	
	10th " " ...	4			
IV. Lt.-Gen. Fabre ... (H.-Q. Hemixen.)	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Vilatte ...	7th Chasseurs.	4	{ 4	{ 4
		8th Hussars..	4		
	{ 2d Brigade, Maj. Gen. Giessler ..	4th Chasseurs.	4	{ 4	{ 4
		5th Hussars..	4		
	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. De la Woesteen...	7th Chasseurs.	4	{ 4	{ 4
		8th Hussars..	4		
	{ 2d Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Simoneau.	4th Chasseurs.	4	{ 4	{ 4
		5th Hussars..	4		
	{ 1st Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Simoneau.	7th Chasseurs.	4	{ 4	{ 4
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	8th Hussars..	4			
{ 2d Brigade, Maj.-Gen. Simoneau.	4th Chasseurs.	4	{ 4	{ 4	
	5th Hussars..	4			
{ 1st Brigade, 					

			Horses.	Total Men.	Total Horses.		
Artillery Siege . . . . .	14 Companies of	120	} men each.	—	1680	—	} 3980
Sappers and Miners . . . . .	10       "       "	120		—	1200	—	
Pontoon Brigade. . . . .	1       "       "	200		—	200	300	
Train . . . . .	8 Squadrons	220		460	1760	3680	
* Giving about a Relief and a half for each Gun, supposing the Number in Battery to have averaged 100.							

RECAPITULATION OF GENERAL FORCE.

	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Cavalry . . . . .	6,000	6,000	
Infantry . . . . .	54,000		
Engineers, &c. . . . .	1,200		Siege . 144
Artillery, Field . . . . .	1,600	3,500	Field . 78
" Siege . . . . .	1,600	4,800	
Train and pontoons . . . . .	1,900		
Marine. . . . .	150		
Total * . . . . .	66,450	14,300	222
* In round numbers : there may be some errors, but the whole is tolerably exact. The horses do not include those of officers.			

LIST OF BATTERIES, WITH DIRECTION OF THEIR FIRE.

	No.	24 pounders	16 pounders	8 inch howitzers	10 inch mortar.	Distance in yards.	Direction of Fire.
Opened on 4th and 5th Dec.	1	6	—	2	—	535 & 550	Battering left face of Toledo and gorge of St.
	2	—	2	2	—	500	Ricocheing right face of Toledo. [Laurent.
	3	4	—	2	—	640	Battering left face of ravelin.
	4	—	3	2	—	650	Ricocheing right face of ravelin.
	5	6	2	1	—	680 & 430	Batt. right face of Toledo, ricocheing right face
	6	—	2	2	—	700	Ricoch. left face of Toledo. [of St. Laurent.
	7	6	2	1	—	380 & 700	" left face of St. Laurent, and batt. left face
	8	—	3	2	—	465	" left face of ravelin. [of Paciotto.
	9	—	—	6	—	820	Battering salient of Paciotto.
	10	8	—	—	—	650 & 520	" left face of ravelin and lunette Kiel.
21st. between 8th & 18th	A*	—	—	—	10	850	Not armed.
	B	—	—	—	9	1000	Body of citadel.
	C	—	—	—	11	1050	" "
	D	—	—	—	10	850	" "
		30	14	20	40	• • • • •	{ Total, 104,* of which 10 mortars
							did not fire.
	11	4	—	—	—	500	Battering right face of Toledo.
	12	—	3	—	—	435	" batardeau.
	13	—	4	—	—	220 & 275	" left face of ravelin, right face of Toledo.
	E	—	—	—	6	500	Body of citadel.
	F	—	—	—	6	490	" "
	G	—	—	—	6	650	" "
	H	—	—	—	6	380	" "
	K	—	—	—	8	600	" "
	14	6	—	—	—	50	Breaching battery.
	15	6	—	—	—	350	Counter-battering left flank of Fernando.
	16	—	—	—	—	125	6 pierriers on the ravelin and Toledo.
	—	I	—	—	10	250	Terre-pleine, and rampart of Toledo.

Note.—19 coehorns (3½ inch) not included.

\* Misprinted 105 in the text—*passim*.

## SIEGE OF ANTWERP IN 1832.

## RECAPITULATION.

Guns.	No.	Remarks.
24-pounders . . .	42	The twelve 24-pounders in Nos. 14 and 15, and the 16-pounders in Nos. 12 and 13, were new. No. 11 was armed from No. 10, and E, F, G, H, K, and I, from A, B, C, and D. The other batteries maintained their position and fire up to the last moment.
16 " . . .	17	
8-inch howitzers .	21	
10-inch mortars .	40	
Pierriers . . . .	6	
Coe horns . . . .	19	
Total	145	

Maximum of Gun range . . . 680\* yards.

" Howitzer do. . . . 850 "

" Mortar do. . . . 1000 "

\* Taken from the nearest salient or face.

## RETURN OF ARTILLERY &amp; STORES

FOUND IN THE CITADEL OF ANTWERP AND FORTS,

As per Inventory, 24th December, 1832.

## No. 1.—CITADEL.

Guns.	No.	Ammunition.	No.
24-pounders . . .	11	Shot of different calibre . . .	8,797
18 " . . .	8	" Case and Canister . . .	2,815
12 " . . .	20	Shells—Mortar and Howitzer .	12,171
6 " . . .	24	Muskets . . . . .	5,237
6½ in. howitzers .	8	" Cartridges . . . . .	1,000,000
5 " " . . .	3	Powder in Barrels . . . . .	150,000lb.
12 in. mortars . .	3	It would be superfluous to give the long list of items, such as roche à feu, lances, rockets, platforms, &c. of which there was a proportionate store. These have been given with the return of the Forts, in order to show the proportions. The reader will be able to judge from the foregoing return of material, of the length of time the Commandant could have relied on his ammunition.	
10 " " . . .	5		
8 " " . . .	4		
6½ " " . . .	4		
13 " " . . .	3		
13 in. pierriers . .	2	* Exclusive of 31 pieces of different calibre, damaged and dismounted.	
Coe horns . . . .	19		
Total	114*		

## No. 2.—TETE DE FLANDRE.

Guns.	No.	Limbers, &c.	No.	Ammunition.	No.
12-pounders, iron .	2	Limbers, spare . . .	3	12-lb. cartridges . . .	199
6 " " . . .	2	Platforms . . . . .	5	6-lb. " . . .	323
12 " brass . . .	1			12-lb. shot . . . .	184
Total	5			6-lb. " . . . .	221
On referring to the list of Belgian Batteries, and the overwhelming weight of metal mounted on the Quays, one cannot be surprised at General Chassé having gladly acceded to the neutrality of the city. To have resisted, with 5 guns against 30 or 40, would have been an act of insanity. It must, however, be observed, that whilst General Chassé appears to have been well-acquainted with every gun mounted against him, the Belgians were not equally well-informed of his dispositions; for there was an impression, that several mortars were mounted in this fort.				12-lb. case . . . .	89
				6-lb. " . . . .	76
				Lances à feu . . .	180
				Matches . . . . .	200
				Powder, Barrel of .	1
				Musket Cartridges .	12290
				Grenades . . . . .	50

## No. 3.—FORT BURGH'T.

Guns.	No.	Limbers, &c.	No.	Ammunition.	No.
8-pounders, iron . .	8	Platforms. . . . .	6	6-lb. case . . . . .	71
1 " swivels . .	2	Ditto . . . . .	5	6-lb. shot . . . . .	460
6 " brass . .	1	Limbers . . . . .	2	4-lb. " . . . . .	35
6 " iron . .	4			6-lb. cartridge . . .	300
Cochorn mortars . .	2			Lances à feu . . .	60
6-pounders . . . .	3			Matches . . . . .	600
Total	20			1 lb. shot . . . . .	16
				Grape . . . . .	14
				Powder in Mag. lbs.	1,700

In the event of any serious attack, it will be shown by this table that the fort was not presumed to hold out many hours, not having more than 50 rounds for one day for its 8, and about 100 for its 6-pounders. As regarded the city, it was innocuous, not having a single mortar.

## No. 4.—FORT AUSTRUWIEL.

Guns.	No.	Limbers, &c.	No.	Ammunition.	No.
6-pounders, brass . .	2	Limber . . . . .	1	6-lb. shot . . . . .	82
		Platforms . . . . .	5	6-lb. cartridge . . .	197
				Lances à feu . . . .	70
				Matches . . . . .	150
				6-lb. case shot . . .	70
				Musket cartridge . .	6230

An idea was current in the highest quarter that this fort was armed with a large portion of mortars, and, consequently, a fire of nearly 100 guns, of high calibre, and several mortars, was prepared to be directed upon it.

In Fort Zuyndrecht or Bevern there was no artillery, and merely a Serjeant's Picquet. The Redoubt Caloo or Wellington was dismantled.

## No. 5.—RECAPITULATION.

Citadel . . . . .	114	} Total, 141 pieces, of different calibre.
Tête de Flandre . .	5	
Fort Burght . . . .	20	
Austruwiel . . . . .	2	

## No. 6.—STATE OF THE GARRISON OF ANTWERP AND FORTS DEPENDENT, PRIOR TO THE SIEGE.

Commandant . . . . .	General Chassé.
Second in Command . .	Major-General Fauvage.
Artillery . . . . .	Lieut.-Colonel Selig.
Engineers . . . . .	Major Van der Wyck.
Flotilla . . . . .	Captain Koopman (Colonel.)

## No. 7.—KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING—BESIEGED TROOPS.

Regiment.	Battalion.	Strength.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total K. & W.	Officers.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
7th . .	1st flank .	920	15	52	1	68	Major-Gen. a	0	1	0
9th . .	1st & 2d D.	832	17	44	3	64	Colonel . .	1	0	0
10th . .	3d Det. .	2463	62	221	60	343	Captains . .	4	2	0
Artillery.	4th Det. .	675	28	48	5	81	Lieutenants.	2	8	1
Engineers	. . . . .	47	0	4	1	5				
		4937*	122	369	70	561		7	11	1
								19		

\* Of these, 467\* were detached to the Tête de Flandre, and 3 forts, leaving 4470 for the citadel.



## SIEGE OF ANTWERP IN 1832.

**No. 8.—PRISONERS SURRENDERED BY CAPITULATION,**  
(Exclusive of 300 Wounded.)

Citadel, Rank and File . . . 3926 including 129 Officers.  
 Forts . . . . . 467  
 Crews of Gun-Boats, &c. . . . 352

Total . . 4745 marched into France.

**No. 9.—KILLED AND WOUNDED—BESIEGING ARMY.**

	Killed	Wounded	Total	Officers.	Killed	Wounded
Infantry . .	75	636	711	Lieut.-Gen. .	0	1
Artillery . .	18	31	49	Lieut.-Cols. .	0	2
Engineers . .	15	28	43	Majors . . .	1	0
				Captains . .	5	7
	108	695	803*	Lieutenants .	3	8
					9	18
					27	

\* Of these 108 belonged to Sebastiani's and Achard's divisions.

**LIST OF BATTERIES**

FORMING THE DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE MEANS OF THE CITY OF ANTWERP,  
24th Dec. 1832.

Batteries.	Guns.		Mortars.		Howitzers.
	No.	Pounders.	No.	Inch.	
In Montebello . . . . .	6	24	—	—	3
Right flank of counter-guard [2] . .	2	48	—	—	—
Extreme left of bastion of esplanade .	2	48	—	—	—
Left flank of bastion [2] . . . . .	4	36	—	—	—
Terre-plein of do. . . . .	—	—	6	12	—
Malines' Gate . . . . .	—	—	7	8	—
Right flank bastion to the left of gate.	4	48	6	10	—
Ravelin do . . . . .	2	36	5	12	—
Fort Carnôt . . . . .	—	—	10	12	—
Counter-guard of bastion [3] . . . .	—	—	6	12	—
Quay de l'Escaut . . . . .	6	36	—	—	—
Porte de l'Escaut . . . . .	4	36	2	8	—
Quai Planten. . . . .	4	48	—	—	—
Werf Battery. . . . .	8	36	8	10	—
Quay Ortelius . . . . .	6	24	—	—	—
Left of Locks . . . . .	4	24	4	8	—
Right of do. . . . .	6	24	—	—	—
Battery of St. Laurent. . . . .	—	—	6	10	—
„ Imperiale. . . . .	6	36	4	12	—
„ de l'Escaut . . . . .	10	36	—	—	—
„ des Anguilles . . . . .	22	48	2	10	—
„ Tickem. . . . .	8	48	—	—	—
„ Bonnet de Pretre. . . . .	20	36	—	—	—
„ Fort du Nord . . . . .	38	0	4	12	—
	162*		70		3

\* Independent of these, there were about 140 pieces of cannon mounted in the Intrenched Camp, Barrièredes, and other points not bearing directly on the citadel or forts.

MEMOIR OF THE SERVICES OF ADMIRAL LORD VISCOUNT  
EXMOUTH, G.C.B., VICE-ADMIRAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

THE Royal Navy of England has just been deprived of perhaps its ablest seaman, by the death of this distinguished officer, who, full of years and honours, expired on the 23d of January, at his house at Teignmouth, in the 76th year of his age.

Like many others of our most celebrated commanders, Lord Exmouth was the architect of his own fortune. Born to no inheritance, he, with God's blessing, raised himself to great and well-merited reputation by the steady application of all his powers to the duties of his profession, supported by that undaunted and indefatigable spirit which carried him triumphantly through every service of difficulty or danger in which he was engaged.

Edward, second son of Samuel Pellew and Constance his wife, was born 19th April, 1757, at Dover, where his father then commanded the government packet-boat. At his death, in 1765, the young sailor was deprived of his natural patron, and had to struggle against those difficulties in attaining a nautical education which are now removed by a liberal public provision for such as are destined for the King's service. At the age of thirteen he began his career at sea in the Juno frigate, commanded by Capt. Stott, with whom he sailed to the Falkland Islands, and afterwards accompanied him in the Alarm to the Mediterranean. At the opening of the war with the American colonies, he became midshipman of the Blonde frigate, with Capt. Pownoll; and was detached, in Feb. 1776, to serve under the late able and intelligent Admiral Schank (then a lieutenant), to take part in the struggle for naval supremacy on Lake Champlain. During this arduous service they cut down trees from the neighbouring forests, and in a few weeks converted them into vessels of war, with which they succeeded in driving the force under General Arnold from the lake; and in giving this effectual support to the British army, Mr. Pellew gained great credit from his admiral, whose testimony deserves to be recorded:—

“H. M. S. Eagle, New York, 20th Dec. 1776.

“SIR,—The account I have received of your gallant behaviour from Capt. Charles Douglas, in the different actions upon Lake Champlain, gives me much satisfaction, and I shall receive pleasure in giving you a lieutenant's commission when you may reach New York.

(Signed)

“HOWE.”

“To Mr. Edward Pellew,  
Commanding the Carleton schooner, Lake Champlain.”

With this rank of acting lieutenant, which could not be confirmed till he returned to England, he continued to co-operate with the army under General Burgoyne, and shared in all the toils and dangers of the disastrous campaign of 1777. A letter from that general may properly be inserted here, to show the high sense which was entertained of his services —

“Camp at Saratoga, 14th Oct. 1777.

“DEAR SIR,—It was with infinite pleasure General Phillips and myself observed the gallantry and address with which you conducted your attack on the provision-vessel in the hands of the enemy. The gallantry of your little party was deserving of the success which attended it, and I send you my sincere thanks, together with those of the whole army, for the important service you have rendered them on this occasion.

(Signed)

JOHN BURGoyNE.”

“Lieut. Edward Pellew, Royal Navy.”

The éclat of this little exploit was speedily merged in the unfortunate issue of the battle of Saratoga, and the subsequent surrender of the whole British force to the American army under General Gates. Soon after the

convention was signed, Mr. Pellew, being released on his parole, returned to England, bearing a letter from Sir Guy Carleton, expressing such high commendation "of his gallantry and merit during two severe campaigns," that on his arrival he was immediately confirmed in his rank of lieutenant.

After some intermediate service, he was appointed first lieutenant of the *Apollo* frigate under his old commander, Capt. Pownoll, who, in the spring of 1780, while closely engaged with an enemy's ship of equal force, fell mortally wounded, and shortly expired in the arms of his attached friend and follower. His last words were, "Pellew, don't give his Majesty's ship away." Nor were they uttered in vain; for immediately assuming the command, he continued the action with such determined resolution, that his opponent fled from the contest, and, having gained the neutral anchorage of Ostend, thus disappointed him of his prize. This gallant service was promptly rewarded by the following letter from the Admiralty:—

"Admiralty-Office, 18th June, 1780.

"SIR,—After most sincerely condoling with you on the loss of your much lamented patron and friend, Capt. Pownoll, whose bravery and services have done so much honour to himself and country, I will not delay informing you, that I mean to give you immediate promotion, as a reward for your gallant and officer-like conduct.

(Signed) SANDWICH."

"Lieut. Edward Pellew,

H. M. S. *Apollo*, Sheerness."

Being appointed to command the *Hazard* sloop-of-war, he was very actively employed in her till March, 1782, when he removed to the *Pelican*, in which he shortly after attained the rank of post-captain, by the spirited services mentioned in the following letter:—

"Admiralty-Office, 25th May, 1782.

"SIR,—I am so well pleased with the accounts I have received of your gallant and seamanlike conduct in the sloop you command, in your spirited attack on three privateers inside the Isle of Bass, and your success in driving them all on shore, that I am induced to bestow on you the rank of a post-captain in the service to which your universal good character and conduct do credit; and for this purpose I have named you to the command of the *Suffolk*.

(Signed) KEPPEL."

"To Capt. Edward Pellew,

H. M. S. *Pelican*, Plymouth."

The cessation of hostilities having restored him and others of his gallant comrades to the more peaceful occupations of home, he remained on shore until 1786, when he proceeded, in command of the *Winchelsea* frigate, to Newfoundland, and remained on that station till 1789. In the following year he was appointed to the *Salisbury*, bearing the flag of Admiral Milbanke; and was at length paid off in December, 1791.

At the commencement of the war of the French Revolution, Capt. Pellew was among the first officers who were called into active service, being appointed, on the 11th Jan. 1793, to command the *La Nymphe* frigate of 36 guns. Being by descent a Cornishman, his popularity in the neighbourhood of Falmouth, where he resided, enabled him to man his ship principally with miners, and put to sea with his usual activity; but he had no opportunity of proving their spirit until the summer of that year, when, having prevailed on his brother to accompany him as a volunteer, he sailed from Falmouth on the evening of the 17th June, and before the day closed, when off the Start, they descried a large vessel, to which they gave chase, and followed her through the night. At day-break next morning she appeared again standing towards them; and on her approach proved to be the French frigate *La Cléopâtre*, of equal force, and both parties being eager for the

contest, the action began at close quarters with great fury. The gallant French captain was cheering on his crew to board his opponent, when he was shot dead before them, by which they were so disheartened that his Second vainly endeavoured to rally them, and Captain Pellew, seizing the advantage, ordered his men to board *La Cléopâtre*, which was carried after a short struggle. He proceeded with his prize directly to Portsmouth, and was received with acclamations on entering the harbour, this being the first important capture made since the declaration of hostilities. As such it was distinguished by peculiar reward; Capt. Pellew, on being presented to the King, received the honour of knighthood, and he had the further satisfaction of seeing his brother advanced to the rank of post-captain for his voluntary services in the action.

Sir Edward was now removed to the command of the *Arethusa*, of 44 guns, and employed in co-operating with the French loyalist troops upon their unfortunate enterprise on the coast of France. In the following year (1794), while serving with a squadron of frigates under Sir John Warren, he shared in the honour of taking the *Flora*, *Pomone*, and *Babet*, and the destruction of another frigate, *La Felicité*, with several smaller vessels of war. Sir Edward was directed to set fire to some of these, which were driven on the French coast; but finding them filled with wounded men, incapable of being moved, his benevolent spirit revolted at their destruction, and he preferred to abandon the ships rather than debar these poor fellows from the relief afforded them in their extremity by their countrymen on shore. Not long after this, the western squadron of frigates, now under his command, captured *La Révolutionnaire*, of 44 guns; and in the year 1795 he had the further fortune to make prize of a large convoy of fifteen of the enemy's vessels.

But justly as his conduct in command was entitled to distinction, nothing gained him more deserved honour than that union of prompt resolution with constitutional philanthropy which personally endeared him to his followers. Twice already, when captain of the *Winchelsea* frigate, this heroic spirit had been signally displayed by his leaping from the deck, and thus saving two of his drowning sailors. A more conspicuous example of this noble feeling was shown on the 26th January, 1796, when, by his great personal exertions, he preserved the crew and passengers of the *Dutton* transport, which, crowded with troops and their families proceeding on the expedition to the West Indies, was driven on the rocks under the citadel at Plymouth. The writer of this slight memoir cannot refuse his readers the pleasure of seeing the hero's own modest account of this act of benevolence, contained in a private letter which he received from him many years afterwards (1811), when commander-in-chief in the north seas.

"Why do you ask me to relate the wreck of the *Dutton*? Susan (Lady Exmouth) and I were driving to a dinner party at Plymouth, when we saw crowds running to the Hoe, and learning it was a wreck I left the carriage to take her on, and joined the crowd. I saw the loss of the whole five or six hundred was inevitable without somebody to direct them, for the last officer was pulled on shore as I reached the surf. I urged their return, which was refused, upon which I made the rope fast to myself, and was hauled through the surf on board,—established order, and did not leave her until every soul was saved but the boatswain, who would not go before me. I got safe, and so did he, and the ship went all to pieces; but I was laid in bed for a week by getting under the mainmast (which had fallen towards the shore); and my back was cured by Lord Spencer's having conveyed to me by letter His Majesty's intention to dub me baronet. No more have I to say, except that I felt more pleasure in giving to a mother's arms a dear little infant only three weeks old, than I ever felt in my life; and both were saved. The struggle she had to entrust me with the bantling was a scene I cannot describe;—nor need you, and consequently, you will never let this be visible."

This injunction has been scrupulously observed until now that the seal of secrecy is removed by his death. It is due to the merits of a deserving offi-

cer, to supply one omission in this interesting letter. Soon after Sir Edward reached the wreck, a small boat belonging to an Irish brig got alongside, with two persons who greatly assisted him in this work of benevolence. One of these young men was the mate, whom Captain Pellew on the following day received into his own ship, the *Indefatigable*, and thenceforward became his steady friend and patron. It is almost unnecessary to add, that this officer is now Captain Coghlan, R. N.

Sir Edward being now commodore of the western squadron, they had the good fortune to capture *L'Unité* frigate on the 13th of April, and a week afterwards fell in with *La Virginie* of 44 guns, commanded by the gallant Captain Bergeret, who after a chase of fifteen hours, and a very able resistance to the heavy fire of the *Indefatigable*, struck his colours on the approach of two other frigates of Sir Edward's squadron.

On the 13th of January, 1797, the *Indefatigable*, in company with the *Amazon*, fell in with, and chased *Les Droits de l'Homme* of 74 guns, having 1500 soldiers and seamen on board, on her retreat from the disastrous expedition to Bantry Bay. It blew a hard gale, with a heavy sea. The *Indefatigable*, being the fastest sailer, got first into action; but the Frenchman's topmasts being carried away soon after, the *Amazon* came up to take her share in the contest, which lasted through the whole night; the French ship was unable to keep open her lower-deck ports owing to the heavy sea; and even on board the English frigates, the men fought the main-deck guns often up to the waist in water. All the ships were much crippled in masts and rigging; *Les Droits de l'Homme* lost her mizen-mast; and having expended nearly all her shot, latterly returned the fire of her opponents with shells, still making a formidable resistance, though steadily pursuing her course for Brest. At length the moon breaking through the clouds about half-past four in the morning, Lieut. Bell, first of the *Indefatigable*, descried the land within two miles distance, and presently after breakers were seen right a-head. The two frigates at this time were on either side the bows of their enemy, and instantly wore on opposite tacks. The *Indefatigable* providentially succeeded, by very skilful seamanship, in weathering the *Penmarks*, and had hardly passed that dangerous reef, when they saw their gallant opponent on her broadside, and the sea beating furiously over her. Sir Edward got safe to Plymouth, and soon after had the mortification to learn that the *Amazon* was also stranded in the Bay of Audierne, but that Captain Reynolds and his brave crew, though prisoners, were providentially saved. The fate of *Les Droits de l'Homme* was truly deplorable. Such was the fury of the gale, that only a few of her men got to land on the day the ship struck; the rest being drowned in the attempt, or dying of famine and fatigue during the five days of their protracted sufferings, when at length the wind and sea moderated, and the small number who remained alive were taken off on rafts from the wreck.

In the following year the success of the *Indefatigable* and the western squadron was remarkably shown by the capture of fifteen of the enemy's cruisers. In 1799 Sir Edward Pellew removed into *L'Impétueux* of 74 guns, and served in the Channel fleet, and subsequently co-operated with the second ill-fated expedition of the French royalists, in the Morbihan, and afterwards, as commodore of a division of line-of-battle ships, blockaded the French squadron at Rochefort. In 1801 he received the honorary rank of colonel of marines, and in the year following he was returned to Parliament as representative for Barnstaple.

The short and feverish peace that now followed afforded but a transient respite to the services of our naval officers. On the resumption of hostilities Sir Edward was appointed to *Le Tonnant*, of 80 guns, and hoisted a broad pendant in command of five sail of the line, with which he blockaded the French force at Ferrol. Being soon after advanced to the rank of Rear-Admiral of the Blue, he received the chief command in the East Indies, and, hoisting his flag in His Majesty's ship *Culloden*, of 74 guns, proceeded to that station on the 10th of July, 1804.

The reduced state of the French marine at the Isle of France presented no hope of any general action, although the activity of their frigates and inferior cruizers gave constant occupation to Sir Edward's squadron. In February, 1805, Captain Lambert, in *H. M. S. St. Fiorenzo*, fell in with and captured off Vizagapatam, after a very hard-fought action, *La Psyche*, of 32 guns, commanded by the Admiral's former antagonist, Captain Bergeret, who did not surrender until half his officers and men were killed and wounded. We were at the Admiral's side when his gallant prisoner was presented to him on the *Culloden's* quarter-deck. They embraced with lively feelings of sympathy; and the manly tears then shed found an honest welcome in every heart which witnessed the interview. Three years after, the *St. Fiorenzo* had the good fortune to capture another French frigate, *La Piémontaise*, of 46 guns, off Ceylon. The chase continued, with a running fight at intervals, for three successive days, when she was at length brought to close action; but Captain Hardinge (who now commanded her, and had, on a former service, gained much distinction) was killed at the second broadside; and after a very bloody contest the victory was won by his brave first Lieutenant William Dawson.

These and several privateers were the captures made from the French in India. The Dutch, then under their dominion, were more unfortunate. Sir Edward, with part of his squadron, destroyed their men-of-war at Batavia, and subsequently sailed up to Griessee, on the east of Java, with the same object. On his approach, the commodore of the Dutch ships (a wretched American) fled from his duty, and thus deserted, the governor gladly compounded for the safety of the town by surrendering two line-of-battle ships and an old frigate which lay dismantled and aground; and these being set on fire, Sir Edward returned to Madras. The conquest of the Danish settlements in the East was among the last of his successes on that station. In February, 1809, he set sail for England, having under charge a valuable convoy of Indiamen. Off the Isle of France they encountered a violent hurricane, in which four of the richest ships foundered with all on board, and the flag-ship had well nigh suffered the same fate, had not God's blessing rested on the great exertions of the Admiral and his fine crew, which carried them safe through the gale, and enabled them to reach England with the surviving ships, just five years from the date of his departure.

Sir Edward had by this time attained the rank of Vice-Admiral; and a few months afterwards he was recalled into active service as commander-in-chief of the fleet then blockading the Scheldt, and hoisted his flag on board the *Christian the Seventh*, of 80 guns. While intent on watching the movements of the French fleet at Flushing, many anxious months passed, without gratifying his very sanguine hopes of a battle, until the spring, when the Admiral was appointed to the more important and interesting command of the Mediterranean fleet, and hoisting his flag in the *Caledonia* of 120 guns, proceeded to relieve Sir Chas. Cotton on that station. The various successes achieved by the ships under his command throughout the Mediterranean are recorded elsewhere. But the great wish of his heart was a general action. Twice, indeed, the *Caledonia*, with a part of his squadron, had a partial engagement with the rear of the French fleet, while exercising off Toulon, which served but to whet his appetite for a decisive battle. How long and earnestly Sir Edward maintained the blockade of the enemy's superior force at that port, unconscious that their imperious master had forbidden them to attack him—how well he provided for the perfect equipment and supply of his own fleet, which was necessarily employed at very distant points throughout that extensive station, every officer employed in his high disciplined fleet can bear ample testimony. But less generally known to those under his command was the anxious and incessant occupation of his mind in upholding the patriot cause on the eastern coast of Spain, and co-operating with the British forces, employed in that quarter, while at the same time he was engaged in measures for reviving the loyal spirit of the southern provinces of France in favour of their rightful sovereign, and in endeavouring to detach

the Italian states from their alliance with Napoleon. At length the progress of events once more united the great powers of Europe, which, in the course of the war, had successively yielded to the rule of the usurper; and while Sir Edward was preparing for the immediate attack of Genoa and Leghorn, he received the unexpected intelligence that the French emperor was already a fugitive from his capital; and shortly after that he had been embarked as a passenger on board one of the Admiral's own frigates, on his way to Elba. Genoa meanwhile was invested by the British forces from Sicily, under Lord William Bentinck, supported by Sir Edward Pellew, with a considerable portion of his line-of-battle ships; but the siege had scarcely commenced, when on the second day the French commandant proposed terms of capitulation; and a few days after, the joyous tidings of the treaty of Paris restored our soldiers and sailors to their own shores, this being the last exploit of that eventful war.

To mark the high approval of the Admiral's general conduct which was entertained by his sovereign, he was soon after raised to the peerage by the title of Baron Exmouth of Canonteign, with the usual pension of 2000*l.* per annum. Upon his return to England his lordship was further honoured with the ribbon of the Bath, and a year after, he received the Grand Cross of the same order.

On the escape of Napoleon from Elba (which all foresaw from the moment the Allied Powers appointed that island for his residence), a squadron was hastily despatched to the Mediterranean under the command of Lord Exmouth, who proceeded thither in his Majesty's ship *Boyne*, of 98 guns, and placing himself immediately in communication with the Bourbon interests in the south of France, and with the Austrian general in Italy, effectually prevented any hostile movement of the French fleet at Toulon, and mainly contributed to the restoration of the legitimate sovereign of Naples. The decisive battle of Waterloo at length extinguished every hope of the fallen Napoleon, and peace was once more restored to Europe. Early in 1816 the British government had directed Lord Exmouth to proceed to the several states of Barbary, and insist upon the liberation of all Christian slaves who were subjects of our allies. The negociation was managed with much address, and when conciliation failed, he placed his ships with such judgment, to enforce compliance, as to obtain an unreserved engagement to comply with the terms of his proposition. This being accomplished, the Admiral set sail for England, but had scarcely been welcomed to his own home, when tidings were received that the Barbary powers had violated all their engagements almost as soon as the British squadron had quitted the Mediterranean; and that the whole object of his negociation must now be carried by force of arms. For this purpose, another expedition was equipped without delay. Lord Exmouth hoisted his flag on board the *Queen Charlotte*, and proceeded to Gibraltar, where he was joined by the Dutch Admiral Capellen, with five frigates, and thence sailed direct for Algiers. Negociation was now vain. The gallant admiral anchored close to the heaviest batteries off the Mole, and was so ably seconded by all his ships in bombarding the works, that on a renewal of the terms, the Dey yielded all the points he had previously resisted. Every Christian slave was delivered up to the Admiral, together with the whole of the plunder which had been brought in by his corsairs during the preceding year; and the other Barbary States immediately followed the example. This highly important service secured to his lordship the distinguished approbation of his Sovereign, by whom he was advanced to the dignity of Viscount, on the 21st September, 1816. The several Powers whose subjects had been thus set free by this brilliant achievement, acknowledged the obligation by sending him their several insignia of knighthood; and he received the still more flattering testimonial of the thanks of both Houses of Parliament. Even these honours were hardly more acceptable to a heart like his, than the spontaneous gratitude of 1200 Christians, whom he had thus delivered from bondage.

In the year 1817, the chief command at Plymouth was conferred on his

Lordship, for the usual period of three years; at the conclusion of which he finally retired from the active duties of his profession; and, except when attending his more important functions in the House of Lords, he passed the remainder of his days at his beautiful retreat at Teignmouth. There, while enjoying repose in the bosom of his own family, he looked back on the chequered scene of his former services, with unmingled gratitude for all the dangers he had escaped,—all the mercies he had experienced,—and all the blessings he enjoyed. Retired from the strife and vanity of the world, his thoughts were raised with increasing fervour to Him who had guarded his head ~~at~~ the day of battle, and had led him safely through the hazards of the pathless sea. No longer harassed by the cares and responsibility of public service, Religion, which he had always held in reverence, now struck deeper root in his heart, and nothing was more gratifying to the contemplation of his family and his most attached friends, than the Christian serenity which shed its best blessings on his latter days.

From the foregoing hasty and imperfect sketch of Lord Exmouth's active life, the principal features of his character may be readily traced. His talents, though peculiarly devoted to his profession, were distinguished by quick perception and prompt judgment, which, notwithstanding the defects of early education, were displayed, whether in speech or writing, with a native force and eloquence highly characteristic, and wholly exempt from all tincture of affectation. The warmth of his heart shone forth in all his conduct; and, if sometimes its excess affected his temper, the ebullition was soon over, and rarely survived the occasion which produced it. It should be remembered, that when he first entered the royal navy, a severity of discipline, and a coarseness of language and deportment prevailed among sea-officers, even of the highest rank, which is now almost (we wish we could say altogether) banished from the profession. No commander more cordially encouraged the growth of this better spirit among his followers than did Lord Exmouth. His steady patronage of those who depended solely on him for promotion, though often prejudicial to himself, was highly creditable to his heart, if not always rewarded with success. When such failures occurred, he would sometimes say, "If I desert them, nobody else will take them up,"—and in thus yielding to a benevolent feeling, he thereby lost much of the advantage of worldly policy, which seeks its own interest by the dexterous distribution of preferment. The selfish principle inherent in every human breast seems to have been early subdued in this generous man. Few parents are disposed to relinquish their possessions while living, but Lord Exmouth, as his children successively married, gave each so liberal a portion, that his fortune must have been greatly reduced many years before his decease. In this generous conduct he had the example of the illustrious Newton, who, when his friends remonstrated upon his giving away most of his possessions, calmly replied, "If I defer it till my death, they will not be mine to give."

As a commander-in-chief, Lord Exmouth kept a very hospitable though unostentatious table, from which a liberal portion was daily set apart for the sick, whom he visited with constant and unaffected kindness. His reception of his guests was peculiarly frank and cordial, and while in all essentials he did the honours of reception with the true feelings of an English gentleman, there was a sufficient remnant of the blunt seaman of the old school to give a characteristic *naïveté* to his general deportment.

The writer of this article was a near observer of Lord Exmouth's character for the space of ten years, during which he had abundant opportunities of marking his conduct under every variety of circumstances and situation, and while he gladly avails himself of this occasion to express the grateful attachment to him which was generated by that long and intimate association, he can truly say that the qualities of the Admiral's head and heart never appeared to such advantage as when placed under the most trying and difficult emergencies. At such times his mind appeared at once to expand in proportion to the demand upon its powers. His manly aspect, his cool, col-



lected manner, and encouraging expressions, spread a magic effect among his officers and men, who, while they obeyed him with zealous promptitude, looked up to him with unreserved confidence in his skill and intrepidity. Twice when the Culloden (which bore his flag) was on fire, we witnessed his remarkable self-possession. He quietly assumed the direction, and allayed the sudden panic which this terrible disaster too often spreads among the crew. The same calm determination was equally conspicuous amidst the fury of the hurricane or the thunder of the broadside. All who have had the advantage of beholding the conduct of our lamented chief will cordially acknowledge that, on such occasions, Lord Exmouth had no superior.

But the consciousness of this rare constitution of mind excited no vain glory to taint the natural simplicity of his character. As he gradually descended into the vale of years, Religion became the habitual guide and consolation of his life; and as he approached his end, no man more clearly saw the miserable error of those who, in their last hour, strive to hush the warnings of a long-neglected conscience by what is called "the retrospect of a well-spent life." More than one conspicuous example of this fatal mistake has been held up to the admiration of our naval officers, but none has been more injurious to their religious principles. The hope of a true Christian, whether in life or death, is founded not on his own merits, but in his Redeemer's atonement. Happily Lord Exmouth well knew the defects of his own heart, and rejected all self-righteousness; and his family and friends have now the satisfaction of his own dying testimony, that all his hopes were founded on a rock, "and that rock was CHRIST."

R. H. G., 18th Feb. 1833.

E. H. L.

A TRIBUTE OF AFFECTION AND RESPECT TO THE MEMORY OF ADMIRAL  
VISCOUNT EXMOUTH, &c.

*By an Officer of high rank who served with his Lordship at Algiers.*

A mighty chief has sunk to holy rest,  
A chief amongst the bravest and the best;  
Deep-rooted sorrow speaks from shore to shore,  
And Britain mourns her Exmouth now no more  
If intrepidity of hand and heart  
In British seaman ever formed a part,  
With skill to guide, or manly soul to dare,  
None, none could boast a greater, nobler share!  
'Twas his the raging elements to brave,  
O'er rocks stretch forth the ready hand to save,  
And snatch despairing hundreds from the grave.  
The bright achievements of his arduous race  
Cold, lifeless marble can but faintly trace;  
While modesty, humanity, and zeal,  
A life devoted to his country's weal,  
Religion, charity, a fruitful mind,  
At once declared him of the noblest kind.  
Such was this matchless seaman's proud career,  
Showing the course for Britain's sons to steer,  
And, like that chief, a life of glory end,  
The pious Christian, tender father, friend.  
Throngs flocked around his unpretending bier,  
While fond affection poured the honest tear.  
Peace to his manes, in their last abode,  
Surrendered through his Saviour to his God!

Jan. 31, 1833.

## FOREIGN MISCELLANY.

## MONTHLY RETROSPECT OF MEMORABILIA.

4th March, 1590.—The only quarter of the United Provinces into which the Prince of Parma, as governor of the Spanish Low Countries, had not, at this time, carried his victorious arms, was the provinces of Holland and Seeland; but he wrote to the Spanish monarch, "We have devised a curb for both; for Seeland, by the capture of Sluys and Gertruidenberg, and for Holland, inasmuch as we are at her gates and threaten her from Bois-le-Duc and Breda." The affairs of the infant commonwealth were reduced to so critical a condition as this, when Providence, as if taking the cause of civil and religious liberty into his especial favour, raised up a champion to its rescue. Count Maurice, though scarcely three and twenty years of age, inherited from his father, William of Orange, the founder of the Batavian republic, and from his mother, the daughter of that Maurice who established religious liberty in Germany by the peace of Passau, the wisdom and prudence of the one and the science and heroism of the other. As generalissimo of the Dutch forces and stadtholder of Holland and Seeland, it devolved upon him to open and conduct the campaign of 1590. The first blow which he struck was aimed at the fortress of *Breda*; and with this view, he called in to his aid one Heraeigiëre, a Dutch colonel, and Admiral Van Bergen, the master of a turf-vessel, who was freely admitted into the place by the Spaniards for the sake of his supply of fuel. Heraeigiëre and seventy chosen followers concealed themselves beneath the turf. An easterly wind, however, first retarded their progress, and then brought a frost with it; the incarcerated band of heroes consequently suffered horribly from cold, hunger, and confined quarters, independent of a leak in the vessel's bottom; yet their courage was more than proof against these aggravated evils. In the meanwhile, the Spaniards themselves came forward to extricate the ship, and dragged her through the frozen ice to the very walls of the fortress. At this critical moment, one of the seventy was attacked with incessant fits of coughing. The brave fellow insisted that his companions should put an end to his existence, in order that their own might not be endangered; but from this extremity they were happily extricated by a device of the master, who set his men to working and hallooing away at the pumps without intermission. The vessel having been half unladen, he gave his crew a respite from labour until the next morning, under pretence that they were wearied: and the gallant seventy, taking advantage of the shadow of night, made good their footing in the fortress. In a twinkling every sentry-box was cleared of its guard. By break of day the town heard the foeman shouting above their heads. The coup-de-main was effected during the absence of Lanza-vecchia, the commandant, to whom Parma previously had reason to repent of intrusting two other fortresses; and before he could be apprized of it, Maurice had thrown himself into the citadel with his troops. The garrison having taken to their heels, the town surrendered, and were well content to be mulcted two months' pay to the Count's men as an exemption from plunder. The story of the "*Turf-Boat of Breda*" has to this day retained its olden popularity amongst the common people in Holland.

30th March, 1814.—The allied armies, rapidly advancing upon the French metropolis, came within sight of the golden cupola of the "Invalides" before the last splendour of the setting sun had died away, on the evening of the 29th. In vain was Napoleon hurrying the remnant of his gallant forces, by forced marches, from Doulevant to Troyes. On that very day the Imperial Guard had covered a distance of six and thirty miles, and couriers flew before them to raise the drooping spirits of the Parisians with the tidings of their sovereign's approach. After a few hours' halt, Napoleon, early in the forenoon of the 30th, advanced with his troops to Villeneuve on the Vannes; at this place he threw himself into a light postchaise, hastened forward with the rapidity of lightning, and reaching Fromenteau, a distance

of ten or eleven miles from the capital, at ten in the evening, was on the eve of making his way into it, when he was met by the appalling intelligence, that Paris was on the point of capitulating to the Allied Armies, who were to make their entry into it on the ensuing morning. The earliest dawn of this eventful day was the signal for the commencement of the "Battle of Paris." The handful of troops under Mortier and Marmont, even strengthened as they were by the dépôts of several corps, the pupils of the Polytechnic, and ten thousand National Guards, mustered scarcely thirty thousand men; yet they maintained their position in the villages of Pantin and Romainville with signal bravery until noon. By this time, however, the combinations of the Allies were in full course of development. Blücher took charge of the attack on the left wing, stormed Montmartre, and drove Marmont back to the barrière of Belleville, whilst the Crown Prince of Wurtemberg overthrew the right wing by the approach through Vincennes, and a division of Austrian grenadiers carried the bridge of Charenton by storm. Further resistance on the part of the French generals would have exposed Paris to irremediable ruin: an offer to capitulate was readily accepted, and the terms having been adjusted by two o'clock the next morning, at noon of Saturday the 31st, the conquerors took possession of a city, from which Europe had been deluged with impiety, bloodshed, and misery for the preceding twenty years. The Napoleon dynasty had ceased to reign; and it was one of the first acts of the victorious sovereigns to pronounce sentence upon them, by solemnly declaring, that no consideration should ever thereafter move them to treat either with Napoleon or any one of his family.

#### HOLLAND.

##### THE NAVY.

According to an official enumeration, the number of ships of war, including fifteen which are on the stocks, amounts to seventy-two, whereof two are of 84, and five of 74 guns. This number is independent of a long list of gun-boats and other vessels, which the patriotism of individuals has placed at the disposal of the Dutch Government.

*Fort Liefkenshoek*, or *Lievenhoek*, lies opposite to Fort Lillo, on the left bank of the Scheldt, and was constructed simultaneously with it in the year 1584. In conjunction with Forts Frederick-Hendrick and the "Cross-redoubt," it is one of the dependencies of Fort Lillo. Its distance from Fort Perle is somewhat less than four miles, and from Antwerp rather more than eight. During the siege of Lillo and Lievenhoek in 1584, the Marquis de Risbourg, after firing some three hundred shot, attempted to carry the latter of these forts by storm, but was driven back with considerable loss. He was, however, more successful in the stratagem which he devised in a subsequent attempt; this consisted in setting fire to a large collection of combustible materials, the smoke of which being carried in the direction of the fort, compelled the besieged to abandon their posts on the ramparts. In this way, Lievenhoek fell into the hands of the Spaniards, who cut down every individual in it whom they found with arms in his hands. The fort was retaken by the insurgents in 1585; and the Duke of Parma ordered the commandant's head to be struck off in consequence of his pusillanimous defence. Siege was again laid to it, and a breach effected; but even this did not avail against the bravery of the garrison, who at length compelled the Spaniards to abandon their operations.

#### BELGIUM.

The budget of the kingdom, as laid before the Chambers on the 28th of January last, gives the subsequent items of expenditure

	Ordinary.	Extraor.		Ordinary.	Extraor.
Public Debt . .	£1,097,260	£31,500	Dep. of War . .	1,000,000	38,660
Dotations . . .	125,540	"	" Finance . .	441,040	24,780
Dep. of Justice .	221,400	"	Leopold Order .	4,650	800
" For Affairs . .	29,800	5,000	Incidentals . .	26,080	
" the Navy, &c. .	30,300	11,850			
" the Interior .	344,640	38,780			
				£3,320,710	£149,170

## SAXONY.

## THE ARMY.

At the close of the year 1832 the Saxon forces consisted of 13,308 men and 1708 horses, besides 656 *non-combatants*; whereas in 1812, previously to the incorporation of Lusatia and other districts with the Prussian dominions, the numbers were 31,650 men and 6388 horses. Two years before the latter period the peace expenditure for the military department averaged 490,000*l.*, but for the twelvemonth just elapsed it was not originally estimated at more than 223,700*l.*, inclusive of 31,260*l.* for half-pay, pensions, &c., and 6750*l.* as a reserve fund. The contingent, which Saxony furnishes to the federal army, amounts to 12,000 men, and she is bound to maintain it in so efficient a state, that it may be brought together and marched off to the quarters assigned to it within four weeks after the requisition has been received. Independently of this contingent, she is required to form a *corps-de-réserve* of four thousand men, who are gradually to join the former. The army list last year mustered 15 generals, (of whom there were three not of patrician descent,) 19 colonels, and 51 lieutenant-colonels and majors, (23 of whom were not of noble blood,) 115 captains, and 294 lieutenants; but of the latter 409 there were but 130 who were not of the nobility. The total number was 494; in 1812 it was 1057.

## PRUSSIA.

It is the custom, in most parts of Germany, for the nearest relatives to make a formal announcement, under their own hands, of births, marriages, and deaths; and this occasionally occurs, so far as deaths are concerned, in the name of whole regiments. Two instances to the purpose follow one another in a Prussian newspaper of recent date, and one of them deserves to be recorded, both as a novelty to the British reader, and as doing equal honour to the memory of the departed and the hearts of his surviving brethren-in-arms. It runs as follows:—

“On the 15th of this month died Charles Von Gilsa, major in the 31st regiment of Prussian infantry, knight of the Iron Cross, and of the Imperial Russian Orders of St. Anne and St. Vladimir, &c. &c. During a period of service, which extended to thirty years and nine months, our departed brother was present in the campaigns of 1809, 1813, 1814, and 1815. The honourable part which he took in these campaigns, and the unswerving loyalty and integrity with which he discharged his duties, no less than the estimable qualities of his private character, acquired him, under every change in his military career, universal attachment and esteem. It is, therefore, with feelings of no common affliction, that we now deplore the premature deprivation of one, whose memory will ever remain endeared to his brother officers; and it is under the influence of such sentiments as these, that we make this intimation for the consolation of his numerous and distant friends. —Erfurt, the 21st of January, 1833.” (Signed by the corps of officers of the 31st regiment of Prussian infantry).

## RUSSIA.

## THE ARMY.

The length of service for soldiers of the line is two and twenty years, and for those admitted into the guards two years less. Every soldier is considered a free man, and is treated as such from the day of his discharge. The whole amount of the Russian military has been variously estimated; by some at scarcely more than four hundred thousand, and by others at nearly one million of men. We have reason for believing, however, that the subsequent details are better entitled to credit, than any which have yet been brought before the public.

The levies ordered in 1827 and 1828 raised the army to 870,000 men, inclusive of the reserve of 150,000, formed under the ukase of August, 1829, and the augmentations between that period and 1830 would have given it a strength of 1,020,000; but the combined effect of disease, and the losses

experienced in the Turkish and Polish campaigns must have more than absorbed the amount of the levies raised since 1829. At all events, the effective strength of the Russian army in 1832, as derived from an authentic quarter, was as follows:—

19 Divisions of Cavalry of four regiments each, or in all 76 regiments of 1000 men	76,000
35 Divisions of Infantry of six regiments each, or in all 210 regiments of 3000 men	630,000
105 Batteries of Foot Artillery . . . . . 1280 cannon.	
38 Batteries of Horse Artillery . . . . . 456 ditto.	
Number of cannon . . . . . 1736	
Number of men enrolled in the Artillery, Engineers, and Baggage Train	34,000
	740,000
The abuses prevalent in the management of the army reduce, however, its effective strength at least ten per cent., or . . . . .	74,000
	666,000
To this number must be added for Officers of all ranks . . . . .	20,000
	686,000
Effective strength of the Russian Army in 1832 . . . . .	

#### BIVOUCAC IN THE CAUCASUS.

Temir-Shan-Shura, 25th October.—There is something out of the common way in a bivouac under such a sky as this, in the depth of autumn. The troops lie about in small masses at the feet of the Liliputian pyramids, they have formed with their fire-locks; one is snoring against his calf skin knapsack, another breaking his biscuit and steeping it in his leathern mug, some are just come in, laden with brushwood and dried branches, and others are grouped round some jovial fellow, splitting their sides at his gibes and crotchets. The subs are breaking their fast with the field-officers, or busy going snacks with a brother-sub, whose save-all is better lined than their own. The Cossack has thrust his lance into the ground, and lies stretched out at full length on the verdant couch. Parti coloured troops of Asiatic horsemen are galloping backwards and forwards; true to no law but that of perpetual motion; whilst the jaded animals, who have dragged the baggage of the army to the appointed station, have been stripped of leathern boudage, and are greedily masticating the scant allowance of dried grass handed out to them. Those used to Eastern campaigning will deem the tremendous line of baggage we drag after us no marvel, it draws, and spreads, and stretches out into length interminable. The Trans-Caucasian regiments, in fact, are a migratory band, constantly moving from one region to another, and their entire goods and chattels, therefore, shift their quarters inseparably with them; they never hide but in a hostile country, often, nay almost always, destitute, not merely of the conveniences, but the very necessaries of life, and on many occasions are compelled to transport even their fuel with them. The drums are beating to arms; all is in motion, horses neighing and pricking their ears; the drivers loading their vehicles afresh; the artillerymen piling bundles of grass on their pieces; the men falling into their ranks; grooms buckling their saddle-girths; all around hum and bustle, even to the very cocks and hens, which have contracted military habits, and run off to their quarters, where the poor animals are made prisoners with a string to one leg, and learn to ride and practise saltatory and equilibrial movements. Again the drums are pealing; we must break ground. "Now, men, left shoulders forward! March!" Pankratieff is at our head, and we are off to Erpila.—*Letter from a Russian Officer.*

\*.\* The extract from a letter on the subject of the Russian sailors, inserted in our last number, should have been dated from "Revel."

## THE HISTORY OF THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS.

MILITARY biography at all times has been instructive, and of late from the general spread of education and information giving more means of description to the soldier; highly agreeable and amusing. This kind of writing is most useful in furnishing the best materials for military history, and adds greatly to the value and authenticity of the more general annals of a country. These remarks are with reference to the general reader, but to the professional man it is highly important. If to offer example be one of the advantages of history, nothing is more advantageous than the perusal of works showing the gradual advancement of the art of war, and of the economy and organization of its followers, particularly where principles are so completely obscured in the blind obedience and habit so speedily inculcated in the soldier. These, however requisite, often prevent inquiry and research; and cause the officer, who sees all around proceed with calm regularity, to supinely join with the despairing lieutenant of the navy, who, in a joint military and naval expedition, finding himself in command of detachments of both services, and called upon to give to the former an order, expressed his wishes, though doubtless uncertain of the consequence, by an *ad libitum* command of "doing as they used to do!" But when he advances to the higher grades, he will feel the disadvantage of not being aware on what foundations system and regulation are based, and will find himself incompetent to command, from ignorance of the origin of discipline and organization, and the steps through which they have advanced to modern perfection. Military biography opens to him many details and examples, which are developed by being brought home to him hourly in his intercourse with his men, or in active operations against the enemy. For although none can be so ready as ourselves to admit, that practical information far surpasses theory, we are nevertheless satisfied every man will be the better for illustrating his own experience by the recorded conduct or the intelligent writings of others; and hence, tracing the growth and development of the present organization of our army is not less useful than the history of a campaign; and a connected history of one of our regiments, which has been in continued existence (thanks to Providence for our internal tranquillity) for nearly two centuries, highly valuable. A history of a regiment implies a vast extension of the word biography; and a corps, offered under this aspect, is like the constitutional existence of our sovereign, who never dies; while its possible disbandment may be compared to the extinction of the dynasty, both, we hope, equally distant, though perhaps more dependent on each other than may be generally imagined.

Colonel Mackinnon, with a rare spirit of research and *esprit de corps*, has given such a history to the world, in his fitting capacity of its colonel,—a qualification not sufficient in itself, if he did not possess others of a higher nature, and which are proved in this invaluable and most interesting military book, which we fearlessly class with any yet come from the press. The Coldstream Guards are, perhaps, the most interesting regiment on record; calling to our recollection many incidents in our history, from which we might well take warning. Its history is equally interesting to the soldier and politician, and carries with it a moral highly satisfactory to all well-disposed and reflecting minds. It is a memento of the times when England was hurried by revolutionary faction, through misery and blood, and regicide, to military despotism; under which she groaned till the factious flame was wasted, and good sense and right feeling restored.

Here is one of those regiments that domineered over these free lands, but stands expiated from offence by its active exertion in restoring order and the throne to its rightful master. For bad as was the reign of Charles, still the change to monarchy, under any circumstances, was a vast blessing;

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\* The Origin, and Services of the Coldstream Guards. By Colonel Mackinnon. Dedicated, by permission, to His Majesty. Two vols. 8vo. Bentley.

and we invite any sceptic on this point to compare England, under Cromwell, and the counties under the military rule of major-generals, with the regular government, after the year 1660. Here is the corps, once commanded by him whom Charles so justly called his political father, who put an end to the misery of twenty years, and which, but for the existence of the Royals (who were all but disbanded in Flanders) before the Restoration, is the father of our present army.

If we could find fault with Colonel Mackinnor, after the obligation, as a soldier, we owe him, we should say a succinct history of the personal defenders of sovereigns might have well preceded its history as a preface; and we are prompted to fill up the vacuum, as acknowledging our feeling to him, and as further illustrating his work "which we delight to honour."

All sovereigns, whether for state or security, have been surrounded with guards, more or less organized. In the East, this was carried early to a great extent, as they well suited its despotism, and may be considered, from their number, as the standing armies, particularly as the latter have not increased, and the national militia still, as from time immemorial, forming the major part of the force around their standard in the field. Oriental authors give ten thousand horse to the Syrian or Arabian conqueror of Western Asia, who preceded the Kikanian race, who so feebly defended themselves against the Greeks. The Hebrew sovereigns of tribes had a mercenary guard of Philistine archers; offering an early example of the eastern desire to employ foreigners, who, only attached to the king, and having no common feeling with his subjects, were the sure tools and instruments of his will and power. Under the once free government of the ancient Persians, the Greeks found a guard of ten thousand men, known to them as the Immortals. The Parthian feudal sovereigns, and their surena or vizier, were personally protected; while the Sassenians re-established the ancient corps of ten thousand, under its former appellation. It is impossible, at such a distance, to define their nature and establishment, but, judging from analogy, this powerful dynasty, so long the opposers of the Romans, divided them into bodies of armed domestics. For they were not only avowedly copied from them by their neighbouring European contemporary rivals, settled on the site of ancient Byzantium, but retained by other eastern dynasties, and continued, till of late, under the same system at the court of the Osmanli. The guards of the khalifs were numerous, and in distinct corps; and not less than four thousand armed veilers or porters, half black and half white slaves, were in constant attendance. They consisted principally of foreigners, of Negros, Abyssinians, Berbers, and Egyptians. In the third century of the Hegira, the khalif Moatazem so increased the northern Tartar slaves, that they ruled, for many years at Bagdad, the weak sovereigns, through their officers becoming the *maitres du palais*.

The two dynasties of Mamalukes of Egypt owe their origin to the establishment, mutiny, and usurpation of two corps of body guards. Saladin's successors sunk under the "Fluvial slaves," being so called from their barracks on an island in the river Nile; and these again shared the same fate from a similar Circassian corps. All the petty dynasties that arose on the fall of the Khalifat rested their hopes and safety on Tartar slaves, who were generally armed, as many indeed of the foregoing, with maces, often of the precious metals. The Osmanli perfected the system of slave guards in selecting Christian children; these they educated, making choice of the most able to fill the highest offices of the state; while the refuse filled the corps of porters, guardsmen, huntsmen, &c., all under military organization, and formed with the rest the corps of Janissaries and Sephases, the more active and combative foot and horse guard. The Persians have even had Georgian guards; and Abbas the Great, at the commencement of the seventeenth century, had a guard of musketeers. At Delhi, the Mogul had nearly forty thousand men solely for the guard of his person and the capital; and Russia, the connecting country of Asia and Europe, and with reference to their fall and to chronology, of ancient and modern

history, the Strelitz. These consisted of forty thousand men, and had been raised by Philaret, father of Czar Michael Feodorowitz, to curb the nobility and great men of the country; but, like the Turks of Bagdad, and the Janissaries of Constantinople, turned their arms and influence into aspiring to power, and sometimes succeeded in giving away the crown. On the first great European connexions with the East, Alexander created a guard, armed with silver shields, who were continued by the successors of his dismembered monarchy. In Italy, the licitors were the civil serjeants-at-arms of the consuls; while in camp a selection of the best and oldest troops ever guarded the Prætorium. But this did not satisfy the Roman emperor, who, on making the legions permanent, created the Prætorians, who became as often the enemies as the friends of the monarch. Dioclesian borrowed, with the oriental court ceremonial, the whole system of guards from his antagonists, the Persians, whose division into schools of armed domestics, illustrate and confirm the existence among the Sassaneans, of a similar establishment.

When the Fluvial Defence of the Roman empire gave way to the northern barbarian, the free institutions created by the allodial tenure allowed but little guard to the western sovereigns, but they were ever surrounded by Fidoles and Lendes, who were alike their companions and safeguards. At a more advanced time, they had archers within the immediate precincts of the palace; and the Spanish sovereign, a corps of Alabarderos or Halberdeers. These were without organization; and it is curious, that the Danes in England should be the first to raise a considerable force of three thousand men for this purpose, called the Thingamanna. The Spaniards, before the revolution of 1808, claimed as a guard for their kings, their Regimento del Rey, which they say was of *creacion inmemorialia*; while the French dated their Serjeants-at-Arms, or Porte-Masses, from "la fondation de la monarchie Française." Our Royals claim to be the Scottish Guard, with reference to their sovereign, of a similar early origin, though the link is not proved by sufficient evidence. But these epochs of the Spaniards and French may well be doubted; and, in the latter country, we must place the above mentioned corps, upon historical facts, far later than 420.

These Porte-Masses, or Serjeants-at-Arms (*servientes armorum*) were formed in the Holy Land, by Philip Augustus, to guard him against the attack of the Old Man of the Mountain. If historical notice did not bear this out their arms bespeak them of eastern origin. This is confirmed by their being employed individually, like the Chibak of the Turks, and the Argentes in Rebus of the Constantinopolitan court, in posts of trust and command. They were of high respectability, and though appointed as officers on the castles of the frontier were nevertheless a positive corps, from being mentioned at Bovines, in 1214, as defending a bridge. Another class, called Huissiers, perhaps light armed, are found in the household of Charles VI., 1386 and 1388. Both bear a strong resemblance, as being domestic guards, to those in the East, and particularly the latter, who were porters, from *Porte*, a door, in old French. These French Guards were gradually increased, and, in 1271, Philip II. added a Compagnie des Gardes de la Prévôté de l'Hotel du Roi, who were for the police of the palace. The first step to standing armies, by the establishment of companies of ordonnance of France, in 1440, which put down the ravages of Europe by the mercenaries of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, allowed the rise of the Scotch company of Gens d'Armes, or Hommes d'Armes, four years after; and who carried a motto, *In omni modo fidelis*, on their standards,—a sentiment which should be engraven on the hearts of all who bear arms immediately around their sovereign; whom, they should reflect, in relying on their fidelity in case of danger, present or in prospect, implies a confidence which should make his safety their paramount object, superior to all other ties. Should any one feel a doubt in subscribing to this doctrine, founded on moral and honour-



able feeling, as well as duty, let him never become enrolled to prove the worst of traitors.

Their formation was closely followed up by two companies of French in 1474 and 1475. The Cent Suisses were formed in 1490, and another French company of Gardes du Corps in 1514. They gradually increased in number and importance with the decline of feudalism and the growth of permanent armies. The French Foot Guard, marking the improvement and adoption of infantry, was first established by Charles IX., in 1563, of ten ensigns, or companies, and which were gradually increased, under the ancien régime, to six battalions. In 1596 they added a company of Guards, and three years later a company of Light Horse; the latter indicative of the decline of the heavy armed cavalry. The connexion of France, since 1474, with Switzerland, which had tried the fidelity of the natives of that country, allowed a guard to be formed in 1616, by Louis XIII., and who had gradually increased to four battalions. They continued near two hundred years, till they sunk under the demoniac fury of the revolution.

Louis XIII., in 1622, instituted a company, armed with the now greatly improved fire-arms, and called the Mousquetaires de la Garde du Roi; two more being added by Louis XIV. It was this monarch who put the French Guard on a permanent footing, and added to it fifteen companies of Gens-d'Armes, or of Light Horse, subsequently called the Garde du Corps, of which all the privates were officers. These establishments continued, without further addition, to the revolution. The Gardes du Corps were carried into Spain, by the throne of that country passing to Philip; and one, if not more, of these companies were in Cuesta's army at Talavera. In Germany, with the exception of Austria, who has never had troops exclusively attached to the emperor (three petty corps excepted), the princes of the more considerable and petty states were anxious to have, and boasted of, their fine regiments of this description. The Saxons had a Guard in the sixteenth century; the Hanoverian Guard, when disbanded in 1804, was said to be of three hundred years standing; and before 1640, the Elector, George William of Brandenburg, formed a corps of eleven companies, and which was followed up by a second within the next ten years. It was not till long after that Peter, in Russia, overpowered (as Selim attempted, and Mahmoud has succeeded with the Janissaries) the Strelitz; on whose fall, in 1697, he formed the nucleus of the present Imperial Guard. These now in number exceed the strength of the Strelitz, and within the last six years have attempted to imitate their conduct, in daring to dispose of the crown. The reader only requires to be remembered of the French Consular, and still more celebrated Imperial, Guard of Napoleon, whose downfall allowed a brief reappearance of the Garde Royale, but whose dissolution, like that of the Swiss, on the 10th of August before, are brilliant examples of honour, fidelity, and military and moral feeling.

England (scrupulously avoided in the foregoing statement, in order to be exclusively described) has not been without a Guard for her sovereign. Our first English Guards were the same, and coeval with the Porte-Masses of France, being dated from the Crusades, and instituted by our Richard Cœur de Lion, the rival of Philip Augustus. They bore maces, at times, of silver, and were termed Sergeantes at Arms. These were, again, more domestic Guards than holding military appointments, and their number never exceeded (in the reign of Edward VI.) twenty-two, and they were reduced by James II. to eight. The Yeomen of the Guard were appointed by Henry VII., in 1485, and though called Archers, the appellation was not applicable to their arms, that word having become synonymous for Guard. Their dress, which is still the same as worn in the reign of Henry VIII., has escaped the innovating taste of intermediate sovereigns. It is the same in regalia as that of Francis I. in white, whose crest, the Salamander, on the back and breast, was as prominent as the rose beneath the crown on the broad shoulder of our modern Beefeater. The Band of Gentlemen Pensioners was instituted by Henry VIII., and shared

the same fate as those preceding, of suspension during the disturbances and Protectorat<sup>o</sup>. Beyond these corps there was no other Guard in England before the civil war; and Charles I., without aid or assistance, was forced to succumb to the boasting insults and mockery of the miserably organized trained-bands of London and the counties. England at this time, and indeed has ever been, from its insular position, behind the Continent in war; and but for the courage of her soldiers, and their address in the field, would often have made a sorry figure. The civil war thus swept away no Guard except those petty corps; or even military system, but the old, unwieldy, and obsolete feudal organization, or the miserable substitutes in its room. Charles II., at the restoration, at the same time he re-established these three ancient corps, had to create an army, and which took its character from that of France, where he had so long lived. It would be supposed that the subject of Colonel Mackinnon's book was of this date, but, strange to say, it was raised ten years antecedent, and by Cromwell, and would necessarily, but for a little finesse and much casuistry, be the only corps in Europe of republican origin, since the fall of the French army after Waterloo, and the still existing petty Guard of the Swiss Cantons. It does not date, as has been suspected, from "the new model," or reforming organization of the parliamentary army of 1643, which, though scoffed at by the royalists, and termed in allusion to the Roundheads, "the new noddle," led directly to the king's death. This celebrated reformation in the army was brought about by a removal of all the right-thinking officers, to be replaced by the desperate and worthless, who made the country groan under the worst of despotism, that of an army. The Coldstream was formed from the two regiments of Haselrigge and Fenwick, raised to garrison Newcastle and Berwick, when these commanders received charge of those places; the first dated from 1647, the latter from the following year. Cromwell, in going to Scotland in 1650, brought forward Monck as his lieutenant, little thinking he was thus taking by the hand the restorer of the sunken monarchy; and nothing is more remarkable than Providence working out its own ends, in the Protector himself thus preparing the way for order and legitimacy. Five companies of each of these regiments were drafted and formed into a regiment for the future Albemarle, and which, for the next ten years, bore the title of Colonel Monck's.

From the year 1650 may be dated the history of this interesting regiment, and which is now one of the oldest in existence, though it must, previous to the revolution, have ceded, in priority of standing, to many in the Spanish, French, and Austrian, and to some in the Saxon, Hanoverian, and Prussian services. But since the *bouleversement* of Europe, within the last forty years, it is only preceded by the 24th and 26th Regiments of Infantry, dated from 1632; the 5th Chevaux Legers of 1640; the 50th Infantry of 1642; and the 8th Infantry of 1647; all of the Austrian army: leaving it (permitting the Royals to be of the year of 1633) the seventh in Europe.

However the discipline of the parliamentary army had been invaded by their deliberative and dictatorial tone in ruling their masters, the Parliament, Cromwell, after the king's death, restored them to order; and perhaps no army from 1650, to his death, was, previous to that time, in higher discipline. This was most severe; and Colonel Mackinnon gives some curious details of their means of punishment,—while an instance is on record of these Puritans condemning soldiers to death for incontinence. Punishment extended to women; and though there may be ungallant instances of shaving heads, and ejection from camp and barracks, modern times offer no instance of the divorced wife of a Lieutenant, "formerly whipped out of Leith" for profligate conduct, being sentenced by a court-martial, "to be led with her face uncovered, her back bare, with a rope about her, in one hand of the Marshal, and a whip in the other, &c. &c." Rewards were bestowed in promotions, and thus early by *Medals*, as at the victory of Dunbar, 1650; and is the first example we know in Europe, of their being given to both officers and men, though the Moguls used them, for civil and military rewards in the twelfth century. This regiment served all the Scotch campaign,

and partook of the excellent discipline which Monck introduced, and whose *foot* were said, by the writers of the day, to be the best ever seen; giving his army a great advantage over that in England, which degenerated in discipline after Cromwell's death. Its history for some years is that of Monck; and Colonel Mackinnon has judiciously given a curious life of that great man, who it appears had learned his military knowledge wherever it was to be found in those proverbially peaceable times of England; and amongst others in the Dutch army, a service much connected, from the first insurrection of that nation, with our military history, and from whence it is possible, like the French in the American war, many wild notions were learnt, producing on return home, though not so rapidly, similar results. When some mighty biographer of the army shall combine all these materials, now fast finding the light and growing into strength, into one combined history, he must seek the rise and career of those regiments; and till within the last few years this history existed in the College Library, at Dublin. On Richard's incapacity becoming evident, Monck determined to make England his own, but his further intentions must ever remain doubtful. From their not being declared or boasted of after, his subsequent conduct probably only arose from circumstances, on his arrival in London, and it is likely he crossed the frontier with no other defined object. He first removed all the officers, whom he could not consider as his creatures, and commenced this operation with his own regiment of foot. As soon as this was completed, he marched them, in the autumn of 1659, to the English frontier, and joined them to the best of his army, at Coldstream. The *whole* corps, thus assembled, and whose advance into England tended to so much good, were hence called the *Coldstreamers*, from the head-quarters being there for several months before they commenced their celebrated march on the 1st January, 1660. Their first act on their advance towards London was to remove, from overawing that city, the disorderly army of Lambert, and the next, of equal importance, which Colonel Mackinnon considers their first, to "destroy the gates, port-cullises, and other means of defence of the city, which, as there was no danger of foreign invasion, could only have been made subservient to factious purposes,"—though both equally remarkable, "as tending to repress anarchy, enforce due obedience to the laws, and secure that respect for the civil government, with which the welfare and happiness of a country are at all times so closely interwoven." The corps seems to have taken its tone from this moment, and has ever upheld its high character for right feeling, loyalty, and its attachment to order and discipline.

They received the king at Blackhoath, and marched into town as his escort. It would be natural to suppose Charles would wish to be rid of the army, many of whom had fought against him at Worcester; and in this he was backed by the country, whose recollections of their overbearing conduct were anything but agreeable. It was owing to this general feeling, that however discontented were the reformed troops, this was done without trouble or disturbance. All bearing on this subject is highly remarkable and curious, and we are disappointed that Colonel Mackinnon has not entered on it, for, though not solely connected with the regiment, yet with his steady research, and command of materials, we think an-episode on its disbandment would have been more than allowable. Perhaps, with the ulterior object of having some guards about the king's person, parliament allowed the regiments of the Dukes of York and Gloucester, (at Dunkirk,) and the Lord General's horse and foot, (the Coldstream,) "by particular indulgence," to be the last left to be disbanded. This must have been carried into effect, unless some expedient had been found for its postponement, had not their activity in putting down the rebellion of Venner, in 1661, proved their continuance necessary.

It has been often stated, that the regiment was disbanded to give precedence to the regiment of guards of Russell, raised after the restoration; but this assumption may perhaps have originated, from a like story in the French service of the old regiment of Picardy being thus disbanded to give priority

to the French Guard. But this fact is not borne out, and from the "Mercurius Publicus" of February, another and better reason is given :—

"That this regiment, as it was the first of all the army, who promoted his Majesty's glorious Restoration to his crown, so it hath this signal badge of honour now put upon them, to be the last regiment disbanded; and although they were ordered and declared to be disbanded in relation to the kingdom's pay, yet they were immediately to be advanced to his Majesty's service, as an extraordinary guard to his royal person, whom God long preserve in health and happiness."

Which implies, that they should, on the principle acknowledged by Parliament, be organized by the king direct, and not from his subjects: thus by their new birth and regeneration they were placed, agreeable to the constitution. For the parliament, at the same time they did away the old feudal duties owing to the crown, wisely and promptly acknowledged the rights, prerogatives, and necessity, indissoluble from a monarchy, of being supreme over the army, and which, while it would be inefficient without, could not, has not, nor cannot, in a limited rule like our own, the laws controlling its abuse, ever endanger its liberties.

This momentary disbandment, however, did give the seniority to the regiment of Russell, and thus early gave the right to the Coldstream of bearing *Nulli Secundus*, as their motto; a title, however at first it may have been given to soothe their self respect, they have ever since morally and virtually retained through six generations; but this disbandment was not necessary, as, subsequently, the regiment in the Netherlands, which had followed Charles's fortune, and suffered so severely, both in the French and Spanish armies, and at the restoration (under the command of Lord Wentworth) was removed to Dunkirk, came to England on the disgraceful sale of that place, and by amalgamation with that of Russell, gave the latter the rightful precedence. That this disbandment was not with this avowed object is proved by the Coldstream not tamely giving up their precedence, which occasioned much discussion and trouble, as is noticed in James II.'s Memoirs. In 1666, an express order was given out by Charles, for the prevention "of all questions, and disputes that might arise for, or concerning the ranks of the several regiments, troops and companies which now are, or at any time hereafter shall be employed in our service"—in which the regiment of Guards alone takes place of the "General's Regiment." It is curious, and which continues in other services though lost in ours, that this document gives the infantry the precedence over the cavalry. This same opportunity of Venner's insurrection was seized as an excuse to raise a regiment of horse of Lord Oxford and a troop by Lord Gerard, while the Duke of Gloucester's troop was ordered from Dunkirk. But for this evident necessity, no doubt as great objections would have been found, as it is curious were advanced on the first establishment of the French Guard in 1563, which was highly unpalatable to many, particularly the Huguenots, who held at that time the same language as we have so often heard in England. "Ils disoient qu'il ne convenoit point que le roi eut tant de gardes surtout quand il faisoit sa résidence au milieu de son royaume; que de tout temps la plus sùre garde des rois François avoit été le cœur de leurs sujets et que c'étoit une nouvelle dépense superflue dont on chargeoit l'épargne." These feelings (we learn from Brantome) had so much effect, that though not broken, the regiment was sent and distributed in companies through the province of Picardy, allowing the opportunity for the attempt of the Huguenots to seize the King's person in 1567, and which was only thwarted by the Swiss regiments, who carried the monarch safe within their squares to Paris.

They are not called the Coldstream Guards (a glorious name, absorbed in them from the whole corps of Monck) till after Albemarle's death; and this appellation is first found on a warrant, dated March, 1674. Colonel Mackinnon follows the history of the regiment through all its long and arduous career, carefully separating the service of the two battalions, for the only paradoxical exemplification of Sir Boyle Roche's bird being in two places at once, is offered in

a regiment thus divided into two equal bodies on different services, yet one and indivisible. They served as marines in both the Dutch wars; the first under Monck, who acted as commander of the fleet, offering an example, though reversed, for the Russian admiral in 1812, who led the army of that nation from the Turkish frontier to the Beresina. On the death of the Duke of Albemarle, they passed under the command of Lord Craven, the hero whose name is still in remembrance in the Palatinate, as was evinced lately to his present representative on his passing through that country: a command well chosen, and most agreeable to Charles, as he had, at his own expense, upheld his sister's sunken fortune, and after, perhaps, become his brother-in-law. They were actively employed in James's reign in putting down Monmouth's rebellion, 1685, and were encamped at Hounslow in 1686, when the shouts of the troops reached James's ear, and which made him remark, on its being explained that it was "nothing" but "on account of the acquittal of the bishops,"—"Call you that nothing?" At the revolution, when the Dutch Blue Guard marched into the Park on William's approaching London, old Craven, nobly, and he would no doubt have carried it into effect with his Coldstreamers, (whose after banishment to Holland prove their fidelity to their King) offered to drive them out—and, be it recorded, they were the last regiment that marched out of the town, and were so unwilling as to be mutinous,—many throwing down their arms, and several officers resigning their commissions.

Craven's fidelity cost him the regiment, which was given to Colonel Talmash; and the gallant old earl on losing it, said, "they might as good take away my life, since I have nothing else to divert myself with." Its fidelity made it be exchanged against the Dutch Blue Guard, and, from its absence at the Hague, did not serve in the next campaign against James in Ireland, but was present in all William's wars in Flanders. At the celebrated attack at Namur, 1695, they, in common with the other Guards, gave an opportunity for William to remark, in his correspondence with the Duke of Shrewsbury, that "all the troops displayed considerable courage, and particularly the five battalions of Guards, the English, the Scotch, and one Dutch, who attacked on the right."

Their permanent existence was sanctioned, in common with the seven thousand men of the standing army, first allowed by parliament in this country at the peace of Ryswick. They were called, as usual, into active service in the War of Succession, and a battalion was with Lord Peterborough at Barcelona, in his celebrated defence of that city; and drafts from the three regiments formed into a battalion of guards (a practice common at that day) was destroyed at Almanza, that most unfortunate day—disaster, as our neighbours would say, of the British army—throughout a series of a thousand years.

The first battle they were present at under Marlborough, was Malplaquet, and were at Dettingen and Fontenoy, where at the latter, an old gentleman, lately dead, was told by an officer, then a lieutenant, that after the battle he commanded the regiment. They returned home from Flanders for Cullodén, and were under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. Their blood was shed in America, Holland, Egypt, Copenhagen, Spain, Portugal, and, with an account of the splendid achievement at Waterloo, Colonel MacKinnon wisely concludes. Their conduct, with the rest of the Guards, has been ever excellent: at all times, and under all commanders, they have been held up as an example, to the rest of the army, of discipline, interior economy, and general good conduct, and (need we say more?) were the favourites of Wellington. It has abroad ever drawn the attention of the strictest disciplinarians of the continent; and the Grand Duke Constantine, who was supposed to have possessed almost unequal general military information, was struck with its appearance at the review of the allies in 1818. His Imperial Highness demanded its name; and the Coldstream sounding novel to his ear, he caught the last syllable, and, with the association of idea which had prompted the question, exclaimed, "*La crème, oui c'est la crème de l'armée Anglaise!*" He placed himself at its head during the mock combat, and always

mentioned it as his beau-ideal of infantry. Colonel Mackinnon has introduced many curious details explanatory of the military habits of the times. When the expression "Household Troops" was introduced, does not appear, but it is evidently borrowed from the French, where, though as old as the time of Francis I. and noticed by the Marquis de Fleurange, who mentions an *officier de la Maison du Roi*, it was only applied to the troops, by Louis XIV., in 1671. The Guards differ little in our service from the rest of the army, except some battalions being ever ready for any service; and as to the jealousies from their privileges, they must be small, as Colonel Mackinnon never once alludes to them. This originates, no doubt, from his good taste; but although the French Guards had many, the English can scarce boast any beyond that, in common with other nations, the officers being of higher rank—the captains of companies in both services having the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel—given in 1691, by Louis, and in 1687, by James II.

They take the right of all troops, and are supposed to be exempt from working, of which they do not appear before the enemy ever to have availed themselves,—the general orders in Spain recording their being over the most active in the trenches. They do not compliment other regiments and officers with a full salute, which they retain to the Royal Family and their own officers. What the uniform was before Charles I. is not known, though probably scarlet, which has been ever the colour of the English royal livery, and naturally became the national uniform. In the wars in Brittany in Henry VII.'s reign, some of the natives were disguised in red to pass for English, and the yeomen of the guard have not changed since the same period. In 1610, at the siege of Ostend, Francis Vere's regiment were "*habillez de casques rouges*." The six old regiments of the republic with Lockhart, at the battle of Dunkirk, were in that colour, though Cromwell's own regiment was in grey. The Coldstream were red and green in 1669, when the first guards were faced with light blue, then the royal livery. Thus scarlet was not the colour brought to England (as Colonel Mackinnon supposes) by William for his household, although he ordered no one else to wear it but his servants. The crimson livery of the younger branches of the royal family (perhaps not generally known) is that of Prince George of Denmark, the husband of Queen Anne, and still that of the family of Holstein. The lace of the Coldstream was gold at James II.'s coronation, while the First Guards was silver. They wore red stocking-hose, the first regiment being of blue, and the facings had become blue, which, if dark, proves how little they have since changed. Colonel Mackinnon gives incidentally interesting details of other regiments, and will be the great pioneer for other writers, in pointing out the place where he has gained his authorities. But let not the reader suppose his account of the Coldstream Guards is a dry chronicle. Colonel Mackinnon occasionally enters on the history of the wars, and for which we think he most unnecessarily apologises, (p. 426,) and which, if demanded, would equally apply to other parts of his work; on the contrary, we thank him for the accounts of his campaigns, which we do not know elsewhere in so succinct a shape. His account of the battles carries him occasionally into a style perhaps not inapplicable to the soul-stirring subject; but in general, it is smooth, and well judged, and occasionally elegant.

The account of the conduct of the Guards at Waterloo is most interesting, and well done; and reminds us of the system in India of, each regiment, after a general action, sending to the adjutant-general a detailed account of the events in which it was personally engaged.

The end of the Talavera campaign we think peculiarly happy:—

"The confident expectation expressed by the Emperor of France at this period, that 'the Leopard would fly to the sea,' was not the result of a too sanguine temperament fondly bent on giving reality to its own unfounded wishes; the anticipation was that of a skilful soldier, founding his calculations on the ordinary rules of military science, and allowing his adversary, whose future movements he

sought to divine, a fair portion of courage and talent. The Spanish army was annihilated; the spirit of that people appeared crushed; and no adequate force remained in Spain to impede the successful progress of the Emperor's legions. Wellington, outnumbered by the French, retired through Portugal, a country deemed indefensible against the power of Napoleon. Everything seemed to indicate that the Peninsula would become the prey of the invader, and that the British were making for Lisbon to repeat the embarkation of Corunna: but the mind of their General rose above the difficulties of his situation; the Leopard did not fly to the sea; he only drew back and took a more deadly spring."—Vol. ii., p. 128.

Judicious and sensible remarks are occasionally interspersed, not absolutely bearing on his subject; as, in winding up the Culloden campaign, he alludes to the present state of Ireland:—

"Wherever disinterestedness and true patriotism exist, they will be found to reside with those who value the general tranquillity, and abhor agitation and bloodshed, whether it be to change a dynasty, or to divide a people. The selfish motive for disturbing the public repose, and desolating a country, remains unchanged, although the form in which the guilty purpose exhibits itself may sometimes vary. At the present moment Ireland can boast of patriots who would hazard the peace of a mighty empire to dissolve a union which, however little it may suit their own secret purposes, has married a poor country to a rich one, and placed the sister Isle on the same footing as Wales and Scotland. To be identified with England in her prosperity was all that Ireland had to ask; but neither the advantages arising from that which is established, nor the calamities of civil war attendant on its overthrow, enter into the calculations of men whose object is their own aggrandisement. A few months terminated the enterprise of Charles Stuart; but it has required more than half a century to repair the mischiefs it occasioned."—Vol. i. pp. 385, 6.

The very questionable expedition against Copenhagen draws forth a remark, that

"No Englishman can desire to perpetuate the remembrance of this expedition, which laid the capital of a neutral state in ruins, and carried war and desolation among an innocent people. Its policy was doubtful, and its morality more than questionable. If the principle of making war by anticipation, without waiting for an overt act of hostility, be once admitted, there can be no repose or security among the nations of Europe; the existence of the false principle of anticipatory warfare will generate and justify fear, and fear will magnify danger. It is far from the interest of the civilized world to multiply the causes of war, or that neutral nations should be subjected to fire and sword, their ships seized, their towns destroyed, their fields ravaged, and their crops annihilated by one belligerent to prevent the other from making use of them. The bombardment of Copenhagen, and the seizure of the Danish ships, were contrary to the most obvious principles of justice, and cannot even be vindicated on the treacherous plea of necessity; for at sea England ruled supreme: it was a fierce imitation of the ruthless, unhesitating policy of Napoleon."

But let us congratulate Colonel Mackinnon on his having seized and portrayed the true character of the British soldier: no one hitherto but their sensitive opponents have placed it in a truer light; and dull and obtuse must be his intellects, who can rise from Colonel Mackinnon's book without justly appreciating the British infantry soldier. Calm and collected, he contemplates death without a pang; his tranquillity covers a consciousness of his own power, of his moral energy, and physical strength, which he feels must gain the victory. His officer knows that he unites in his person the impetuosity of the French and the dogged courage of the Russian; and that he may, from discipline, resort to either, at a word or signal—a conjunction of zeal and determination, coupled with discipline founded on conviction, united in no other human being. The documents in the Appendix are highly valuable and detailed, and the whole work does infinite credit to the Colonel's publisher, Mr. Bentley.

## THE LIFE OF A SAILOR\*.

As there is no composition more useful when well digested,—so there has been none more generally popular through all ages, than biography. Like history, it confers on the young, the studious, and the recluse, an artificial experience—and furnishes food for amusement, reflection, and example. The soul of many an infant hero has been kindled by Plutarch's *Lives of Illustrious Men in Ancient Times*; and the fire is constantly fed by similar contributions to our knowledge of moderns, eminent for humanity, magnanimity, patriotism, and loyalty. This subject is the most eagerly read, as Johnson truly observed, because it is the most easily applied to the purposes of life. Volney thinks it the only kind of history fit for young people. 'Still more is this pleasure felt in auto-biography, for there we make a personal acquaintance with the hero of the tale,—and under the steerage of an honest, temperate, and sensible writer, always with advantage, provided he be divested of that besetting sin—flippancy. David Hume began the memoirs of his own life thus: "It is difficult for a man to speak long of himself without vanity; therefore I shall be short." Accordingly the whole narrative is comprised in fifteen pages. Such a motive for brevity may be suitable in the career of a mere author; but can have no relation to men who have battled, travelled, and "sailed for it." We always hail such productions as additional materials for history and instruction; and are more especially pleased when they are signed by the author's name, because we then feel assured that he has been the more careful.

Under these impressions we therefore perused the anonymous "Life of a Sailor" with considerable satisfaction; not, however, unaccompanied with a wish that more time and pains had been devoted to the subject. Owing, we suppose to haste, he tells us, that when a midshipman he got drunk, but "from that day to this I have never been in so disgraceful a state;" yet afterwards describes a scene, where his friend Peters leads him home in a state of inebriety; and another, wherein he was so completely "done over," that a mock wake was held around his body. He cannot often have seen midshipmen of forty-five years of age who had really and meritoriously bestirred themselves in their duty; and we are not aware which of the first lords of the Admiralty admitted the desponding reefer to his levee. We see no real good in bruiting the foibles of poor Bathurst, or the "laughable" lunacy of Captain Preston. He is incorrect in describing Belzoni's sarcophagus as consisting of alabaster;—it is still more valuable from being arragonite. Captain Charles Thurlow Smith, he designates as Captain Sydney Smith. And the fate of the nun who escaped from St. Michael's, which he would "blush to mention," does not strike us as particularly deplorable, since we have frequently met her with her husband in the most respectable circles, and they are now residing in a magnificent mansion near Oxford, with an income of 6000*l.* per annum. We hope and trust, that he is equally erroneous in his statements of the late warfare in America.

The "Sailor" sets out with disclaiming piracy from Basil Hall's *Fragments*, asserting that he published before the latter, in these words, "The first number of the *Metropolitan Magazine*, which began in May, 1831, had the first chapter of this work in its pages. Captain Hall's work did not appear until two months afterwards." This however is another error, for the first series of that admirably written narrative was published on the 2d of April, 1831;—besides this, the style of the anonymous writer is so much more sprightly than correct, that he must be content to drop altogether into the wake of his graphic precursor.

The story, in the usual way, opens with a school-boy joining a midshipman's berth,—the horrors of which have lately become rather hacknied, while to make the description humorous, they are very considerably exaggerated.

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\* *The Life of a Sailor. By a Captain in the Navy.* 3 vols. Bentley, 1832.



gerated. Those who look for surpassing elegance at sea, had better remain amongst their father's "butlers and footmen;" but those who have embraced the profession in sober sense, find the accommodation to be as good as "could be expected." The picture of the shoemaker's cancelment of outstanding debts, and the consequent race of midshipmen, is libellous towards both parties; for, whatever may be the result of reefers drinking champagne, hunting, and challenging their superior officers, men of as high honour and principle served before 1809, the assigned epoch of the rascality, as there can possibly be in 1909. In the remarks on education, extreme cases are given of a gentleman and a brute. Now the fruit of the "March" has not been able to eclipse the attainments of such excellent men and good sailors as Thompson, Bolton, Heywood, Knowles, or Collingwood;—and it is somewhat singular, that the names of those whom he cites as an honour to the service, are all "old stagers." Research would prove to him that the British navy has abounded in an eminent degree with men of consummate skill in their profession, of ardent enterprise, of great attainments, and in numerous instances not less amiable and respectable in private character, than distinguished in public service.

Yet while we regret these, and several other blemishes, we must also notice various atoning points of interest. The author's ideas on discipline are so excellent, that had we space we would insert them; but we hope Mr. J. Hume, the *Coughes*, has studied them, in order that he may not endeavour to arouse any more sympathy in favour of the lazy, the drunken, and the thievish friends who appeal to him. Equally observant are the statements upon the "new lights" of the navy, and the monstrous evil of hypocritical and skulking psalm-singers injuring the hard-working men.

Those who have embarked their fortunes in Columbian and Mexican speculations, will not find many "crumbs of comfort," but they will gather the naked fact:—and many who require to have a film removed from their eyes, should be obliged to read the sensible, and at the same time humane remarks on West India slavery. Let your Macaulay-Brawleys read this,—let them ponder on liberated St. Domingo, with its free blacks, and "mud-coloured" mulattoes driven at the point of the bayonet to till a soil which once largely repaid the cultivators; let them again consider whether specious liberty and equality may not be assigned as the cause of the poor being abandoned to want, and the infirm to sink unregarded into their graves;—or rather let the Macaulay-Brawleys run their tether. But, should the legislators of these realms risk the loss of the West Indies,—the loss of five millions of annual revenue,—and the loss of a valuable nursery for seamen?

Nor are these the only merits of the work before us,—for with the tone of a gentleman, there are proofs of an amiable disposition; and we were agreeably struck by the grateful feelings with which Mr. Pitt, the master attendant at Port Royal, and the late Dr. Lang are mentioned: such passages reflect honour on the heart of the writer. The pathetic account of the French soldier who lost his child, is absolutely touching,—though we should bear in mind that "crapaud" had first had his "lark" in killing and wounding from his ambuscade.

An imperious sense of duty compels us to conclude this notice by appending a couple of letters which we have received, concerning the "Life of a Sailor;" first inserting, however, the following extract, as one therein alluded to, and at the same time, one of the most spirited descriptions in the book; so that if not quite correct, we are inclined to exclaim with the Frenchman, who, on being asked whether some Anglicism was not French, replied,—*pas tout à fait, mais il mérite bien de l'être.*

"The private signals were placed on the the capstan, and Sir Peter took up his position on the carronade slide on the larboard side, abreast of the wheel. The men all stood to their quarters, and the minute rapidly approached which was to decide our fate. We were within about two miles of our adversaries when the leading ship tacked and shortened sail. This was followed by the whole fleet," (*consisting of*

thirteen sail of the line, amongst which were three 3-deckers,) "which tacked in succession, and brought their rear ship as our nearest opponent. As we were obliged to steer about a point and a half from the wind, the French line looked to windward of us, and we were sailing upon that angle, which would have brought us exactly in contact with the centre ship. We were about a mile distant from the sternmost ship, when the French fleet edged away, and steered on a parallel with us. To have borne up would have been madness, because the whole line would have been outside of us, and might have run us either on shore or on board, as they thought best. Our enemies being under their topsails and jib, progressed about five knots through the water, while the Menelaus, being under all sail she could bear, was advancing at the rate of nine. We were now a long pistol-shot distant, and abreast of the enemy's rear ship. Calmly did we stand the broadside of her—to return it was useless; besides, firing puts down the wind, and the harder it blew the better for us. We passed ship after ship, each firing as we came abreast, and each ceasing when her second a-head commenced. Had they made more sail, and luffed to the wind, nothing in the world could have saved us—the capture was inevitable. At last we came alongside of the head-most ship. Hope now began to dawn; provided our masts escaped, we had a chance of escape. Not a word was heard on board the Menelaus as the broadside of this eighty-gun ship whistled over our heads. The master himself was steering the ship with the steadiness of a fearless sailor, determined not to lose an inch of ground, and we had passed the beam of the enemy before he relinquished the helm to the quarter-master. At this moment the enemy ceased firing, and the whole fleet began to make all sail in chase. It seemed as if they had just awakened to a reality scarcely conceivable—that their enemies were slipping through their fingers, merely from want of common energy in closing their hands. We edged away about a point, in order to get right a-head of our antagonist; which having effected, we began to fire our stern-chasers, in hopes of wounding a spar of the eighty-gun ship. As, however, the weight aft did not assist our speed, but had evidently altered the trim for the worse, the guns were removed to their proper stations; the men were directed to lie down at their quarters; and very shortly we, thanks to the long legs of the frigate, were a mile and more a-head of our enemies.

"As nothing but the greatest good fortune had kept the fore-topmast standing, which now began to complain in consequence of the increased force of the wind, we edged away about two points more; and the *soi-disant* sailors of France, instead of bearing up and cutting us off at an angle, or nearing us again, which they must have done by this simple evolution, kept on the same course until in our wake, and then edged away in chase. By following this plan, we shortly were sailing right before the wind, and began immediately to shift the fore-topmast, keeping all our studding-sails upon the main-mast. This was our worst point of sailing, and it was evident that the two leading ships of the enemy's line closed us a little. We were by no means out of the scrape, and all our activity was required to get ready for making more sail. It was magic to our enemies. We had another fore-topmast, and all a-taunt forward with the sails set, in an incredibly short time; on seeing which the French fleet hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, then tacked and stood towards Toulon.

"One would have supposed that Sir Peter Parker had had enough of battles and of blows for one day; but no! the hands were turned up, 'reef topsails.' Two reefs taken in, and we in chase. We soon got a very nice situation on the lee quarter of the sternmost ship, and hammered away at her until we had made some few holes in her sails and hull. Suddenly, however, the French fleet bore up; and we, like good boys, did the same."

The following are the letters alluded to:—

"There is a time, as Solomon the wisest of men teaches us, 'when a fool should be answered according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit,' and lest others too easily yield up their faith and reason to the imperious dictates —"

"—— we know that a triumphant assurance hath sometimes supported gross falsehoods, and a whole company have been captivated to error by this means.

ISAAC WATTS, D.D."

MR. EDITOR,—My attention having been directed by some of my worthy brother officers to the sixth chapter, in the second volume of a late publication, entitled "The Life of a Sailor," I lost no time in giving the chapter alluded to a patient and careful perusal; and I trust that, through the medium of your Journal, I shall

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be enabled to counteract the injurious tendency, that such a distorted, and gravely avouched-for relation of circumstances, must create in the well-regulated minds of all those who are unacquainted with Sir George Cockburn.

In any observation I may find myself called upon to make in the course of this notice, and which may not strictly apply to the events under discussion, let it not be supposed, that I constitute myself censor of the work now *lying* before me. It is my object only, to render harmless some very unwarrantable assertions, by the exposition of a circumstance, which, in the opinion of every naval officer and reflecting man, must at once pronounce its own condemnation.

During the course of our hostilities in the Chesapeake, but more particularly in those pursued in the Potowmac, at Washington, and Baltimore, when I was first-lieutenant of the Albion, I invariably attended the Rear-Admiral as his aide-de-camp, in all the incursions that were made into the enemy's country. I have taxed my memory to the utmost; I have consulted dates, and records; and I feel at a perfect loss to account for the publication of the startling scene described by the author of "*The Life of a Sailor*." The whole detail of circumstances is totally opposed to our usual mode of proceeding; it is alike repugnant to the honourable feelings of Sir George's nature, and to the line of conduct adopted by him, towards the unoffending inhabitants; and this allegation I am ready to substantiate by a multiplicity of proofs. Had such a violation of the rights of humanity taken place, as has been represented, I could not possibly have been excluded from the knowledge of an event, that would have stamped itself with a painful fidelity upon my memory.

In answer to the author's statement respecting the mode of procuring stock, &c., which he avers as having witnessed a hundred times, [but for this positive avowal, I should have supposed that the total amount of his visits to the shore could not have exceeded a round dozen,] I beg leave to observe, I was frequently engaged in the performance of this duty; and that I never quitted the ship without taking with me a bag of dollars, accompanied by strict orders to pay the full Baltimore market price for every species of stock taken away. In most cases, this was quietly arranged; but when on the advance of our men within forty or fifty yards of a farm-house, the windows were thrown open, and rifle shots discharged, killing and wounding some of our best men—the farmer and his servants, then retreating to the back of the premises, mounting their horses, and galloping away,—these were the instances in which such a treacherous mode of warfare was rewarded by the destruction of the house that sheltered its poltron owner. We reaped the benefit arising from these severe, but necessary examples, in the additional protection they afforded to the lives of our own men.—But to wantonly destroy private habitations, and the immediate property appertaining thereto, without any just cause, or reason—I *deny it—solemnly deny it*, on the part of not only myself, but on the part of the many honourable and gallant spirits, who shared in the dangers and severe fatigues attendant on the operations carried on in that quarter. It is a libel on the service: instead of the exertions of the gallant chief, and the brave men he commanded, being a blot on the "escutcheon of the Arms of England as long as she exists," the foul blot rests with the man, who, after a lapse of twenty years, insidiously casts upon a distinguished admiral and his own brother officers a heap of stigmas, alone suited to barbarians.

I appeal to those captains and officers who acted under Sir George Cockburn, whether they have not always witnessed his anxiety to prevent as much as possible, the miseries, attendant on war in an enemy's country, from falling upon the more harmless portion of the community; and the ready attention and remuneration he always granted to an aggrieved or injured party. That war has its inconveniences, no one can doubt. We were sent there for the express purpose of making the Americans fully aware of those inconveniences. When mischief was committed where protection had been previously promised, I have frequently known Sir George to make good the damages from his private purse; and in one instance, I saw him devote the sum of 20 doubloons (80*l.* sterling) to that purpose. As an irrefragable proof, that we were not the savages depicted by the author, we latterly traversed all parts of the surrounding country, unmolested by the annoyance of concealed foes, the inhabitants trusting themselves to the generosity of the admiral, in preference to the protection of the militia-men of the country, at the same time furnishing us with an abundance of provisions.

In the author's preface to his work, he says, "every scene is a scene of real life,

not exaggerated, but the events which are here recorded actually occurred, and I may say truly

‘These eyes—these eyes beheld the fact.’

I beg the author's pardon, but the narrative of the Chesapeake affair, with its blazing fires, and attendant horrors, has excited, if possible, more astonishment in my mind, than the marvellous statement to be found page 34 of the second volume, wherein the *Menelaus* a thirty-eight gun frigate [in which the author was a midshipman] is described as having passed the whole of the French fleet, from *rear-to van*, consisting of thirteen line of battle ships, of which, three were 3-deckers, within *long pistol-shot*; receiving their fire at that distance, each enemy's ship only ceasing, when her second a-head commenced firing; wounding the leading ship, and, after shifting her fore-topmast, again taking up a position on the lee-quarter of the sternmost line-of-battle ship, and hammering away at her till the whole fleet bore up. Frigate, and line-of-battle ships, be it remarked, were during this hot fire, sailing on the same parallel; allowing our enemies were not over-smart at their guns, each vessel must, on the smallest possible calculation, have been enabled to discharge three broadsides. One thousand seven hundred 32 and 18-lb. shot must therefore have been launched against the *Menelaus*, within *long pistol-shot*, not taking into the account those previously expended upon her from the batteries and frigate, and the action afterwards with the sternmost line-of-battle ship.

Lord de Saumarez at the battle of the Nile, with one broadside, sent a French frigate as large as the *Menelaus*, to the bottom.

The author adds, “It was magic to our enemies.” Truly, some such spell must have enveloped the *Menelaus*; for not one shot of the French line hulled her, nor does it appear she was otherwise damaged by their fire.

With justice might all on board the *Menelaus* have exclaimed,

“Adjvante Deo en Hostes.”

The one statement seems worthy of the other. I remain,

Mr. Editor,

Your obedient humble servant,

JAMES SCOTT, Captain R.N.

United Service Club,  
Pall Mall, January 23, 1833.

To the Author of “*The Life of a Sailor*.”

SIR,—“Never believe yourself a proficient in any art, until you have practised that art in all its different bearings, and in every possible way.” Excellent advice, as far as it goes; and I prefer these, your own words, to express my opinion, that you might profit by your own advice, or even if you did not, you would be wise in keeping your own counsel.

You offer to the public a work *expressly* for their amusement and instruction; but that public were not led from its title, “*The Life of a Sailor*,” to find an angry critique in its pages upon a contemporary author's opinions, which happen to be at variance with your own; nor did the sister profession expect the compliment of a sneering allusion to one of its most gallant and distinguished corps, for appearing in his Majesty's uniform on his Majesty's service. Still less were the inoffensive yachtsmen prepared for your *fling* at them, after a perusal of your disastrous shipwreck in your friend's yacht. Yet with the above quoted words do you close the chapter of your errors.

For an author to step out of his course for the mere sake of eliciting a smile at the expense of another, is to tamper with the patience and abuse the confidence of his reader. It is the wanton act of a schoolboy, who cannot suffer another to pass him unmolested; and equally unamiable. It is in such passages, I maintain, that the public are deceived, inasmuch as they are neither calculated for the instruction of the young nor the amusement of the old. Believe me, you are more at home in the “common scenes of a sailor's life,” than in your wanderings between Joe Miller, of facetious memory, on the genial coast of Portugal, and the learned Doctor, in the colder climes of Russia. But if this is and must be “your style,” why,—

“Rode caper vitem; tamen, hinc, cum stabis ad aras,

In tua quod fundi cornua possit, erit.”

Indeed, I am strongly of Dean Swift's opinion, that “whoever makes the fewest persons uneasy, is the best bred.”

You were rather in a scrape with your yachting friend, and agreed, no doubt, with the poet, and not without reason,—

“Sero respicitur tellus; ubi, fune soluto,  
Currit in immensum panda carina solum.”

Now, by your description of that cruise, I am inclined to think you are not much of a cutter sailor. There are many little points which lead me to offer you your own advice—before, with one sweep of your goose-quill, you annihilate our little conceits. I will allow that you had a miserable craft,—“Pitching, and tossing, and rolling, like a dismasted collier,” under a close-reefed sail and spit-fire jib; and I am inclined to think that your cutter rather took the command, and, with your unmanageable craft, you were lucky, admiralty chart and all, to weather the breeze.

The next time we fall in with you it is with a better prospect—slipping along your three and four knots, and making short miles of it with the tide. Soon after, according to custom, the tide comes to windward, and knocks up a ripple, which becomes inconvenient; for there occurs something very like “blowing the gram-pus” in your berth. By the time you get on deck, you find much noise and confusion; of all things, I grant you, the most perplexing in bad weather or a difficulty. Finding breakers a-head, you cry “Hard-a-starboard!”—“Port it is!” says Paddy, at the same time ducking his head to avoid the boom as the sail jibed. Quickness is everything in a cutter: you were wrong not to suit the action to the word, knowing, as you did, your men. Your vessel had been running, and was, at the time, nearly before the wind, and sailing by the lee, because your lee-runner was not overhauled. This I presume is a fact, because, when your helm is a-starboard, by some unaccountable gambol the sail jibes again—“away went the boom against the lee-swifter\*.” There is no such imprudence, as keeping a lee-runner fast; and nine booms out of ten are carried away, from bad handling. Excuse me, therefore, if I give you a care in point: it may be of service to you, and convince you of the attention at all times necessary for your runners and tackle.

One dark winter's night, I was upon a wind in a cutter of above 100 tons. She was a powerful Hastings built vessel, and heavily sparred, which you will allow when I tell you her boom was a 13-inch spar, 63 feet long. The wind was about S.S.W., blowing very fresh, with a regular “Bay” tumbling sea. We were under a two-reefed mainsail and third jib, which would work from the large topsail down to the second reef. Observing it brighten up suddenly, for the weather was thick and rainy, and that the sky lifted towards the northward and westward, I resolved to shorten sail. I must request you to observe that, according to my invariable practice, my lee-runner was overhauled (we were on the starboard tack); so the hands were turned up to get another reef down, and shift jibs, which entailed slinging the bowsprit well in to the mast. Expecting the wind in at N.W., I put my helm down, allowing the jib to come in, set the foresail, with the sheet a-weather, head to wind; and a hand was overhauling the other runner, when away went the kevil of the mainsheet, and the boom for a moment took charge of the deck; the other jib was just out, and the sheet still to the stay. The cutter paid off, and that boom, in a heavy sea, jibed twice before we could secure it; but the sail invariably took aback, from its own impetus, before it touched the shrouds, or rather the runners, for they were not unhooked. But for this practice the boom must have gone, and probably the mast; and I will add, more booms are lost in jibing, by attempting to gather in the mainsheet when there is not time, than by letting all go together, just keeping the parts clear, without any check whatever.

So much for my ideas on that point. In the next place, you should have kept her upon the starboard-tack, instead of wearing her again. You can stay a cutter in no time; and you would have got her clear without touching a halyard. After she is washed over the reef, she comes head to wind, and bumps ashore again—*more Hibernico*—to leeward. However, you must try cutters in many bearings before you will be well acquainted with them; and, after that, you will find a yacht quicker still and more skittish, till you get acquainted with her.

Now take this in the good humour with which it is written. The world is big enough to hold us all. Many of us are in pursuit of honour and distinction; and though we take different roads, our ultimate point is the same. Let us, therefore,

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\* For *swifter*, read “runner.”

landsman and sailor, meet on that neutral ground, the deck of a yacht, cordially. Our gracious King is our patron—your admirals, our fellows—and your captains, our playfellows. Under such auspices, might we not reasonably have hoped to lead “the life of a sailor?” We should like your advice, divested of its gall. I, for one, regret that you have not diffused your honey to the world, unimbittered by your sting. Your work is of itself too light in its construction to be a proper vehicle for criticism or sarcasm; and be assured that Democritus, laughing at the follies of mankind, was of more service as a philosopher, more amiable as a man, than “Diogenes, surly and proud, who snarl’d,” &c.

You are a sailor to the life—love the sea—swear by your ship—yet you like to come ashore after a cruise. You hunt, shoot, and share in all our terrestrial amusements. Do we object? do we ridicule your natural indulgence? No. Why, then, should we dusty, weary, and town-sick landmen be denied the sea for our recreation, without being served with your unceremonious notice, as unqualified sportsmen, trespassers on your boundless manor?

I am, Sir, with great respect,

Jan. 12, 1833.

A YACHTSMAN AFLOAT.

#### CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE PRINCIPAL PORTS AND STATIONS.

Portsmouth, Feb. 19, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—My last Monthly Journal ended on the 20th of January.

Jan. 21.—Notwithstanding a sharp breeze from E. N. E., which prevailed for twenty days, the Briton came up from Plymouth on the evening of the 20th, and this day ran into harbour to be paid off. She had been relieved off the Western Islands by the Druid, had a remarkable quick voyage home, having made the Eddystone Lighthouse in sixty-two hours after departing from Vigo. She brought no information but what was well known from the constant communication kept up with Lisbon, Oporto, and Great Britain.

Every small vessel in the shape of a man-of-war was ordered (at the requisition of the agent for Lloyd's, during the east wind) to cruise in the chops of the Channel, to assist such of the homeward-bound merchant-ships as might be short of water and provisions with those essentials. The Rover was only in Plymouth an hour before her signal was made to proceed on that service.

For nearly a week after the funeral of the late lamented Admiral Sir T. Foley, all sorts of speculative arrangements and news were afloat among the naval people as to his successor. Some fixed on Admiral Sir W. Hargood, it being remembered he was a lieutenant with his Majesty in the Hebe, when commanded by Admiral Sir Edward Thornborough; then again, others appeared certain that Sir P. Durham, or Lord A. Beaclerk, was to come; but on the 23rd of January it was finally settled, Sir Thomas Williams' appointment having been transmitted to the Admiral Superintendent. This nomination gives general satisfaction; he is a fine, gentlemanly officer, stands very high in the service, and I apprehend the same feeling will prevail with him as did with his predecessor, namely, to make everyone happy and comfortable under his orders. Sir Thomas will occupy the house in the Dock-yard formerly appropriated to the Commissioner, and it is admirably adapted to the purpose; it is spacious, and fit for a Commander-in-Chief. The offices for the secretary, &c., are annexed to it, and the business can be transacted with more facility than at Portsmouth, as communications to the Superintendent had to be conveyed from thence to the Dock-yard; whereas, by the new arrangement, the naval Commander-in-Chief and the Admiral Superintendent's offices are within a stone's throw (the latter took possession of his new ones on the 21st of January): moreover, the Admiral's office in Portsmouth was always surrounded and assailed by hosts of loungers and idle folks; sometimes it was difficult for naval officers to get in, and caused

great interruption to business: this, in a great measure, will cease, as all "sorts and descriptions" of persons will not be allowed to enter the Dock-yard.

Some extensive alterations and improvements have been made, and are in progress, in the Dock-yard, to add to the comfort and respectability of the residences of the Port-Admiral and the Superintendent; and some of the numerous idle and disaffected in this place have magnified them, both in degree and amount, to seven times their extent. People may decry these alterations, and exclaim at the expense as much as they think proper; but I am one of those individuals who would have all men of rank, holding responsible situations, accommodated in the best possible manner—it adds weight and dignity to the appointment. If the Government think it necessary that an admiral should be at the head of the Dock-yard, he ought to be placed in an exalted situation as to residence and other comforts, that he may be looked up to and respected. There will, it is true, be some extra expense incurred in these alterations, but not to the exaggerated amount proclaimed by the grumblers. An estimate of every fraction of new work is sent to the Admiralty before commencement, and a clear and explicit statement made of every item.

An excellent arrangement is to be adopted relative to furnishing the house for the Port-Admiral. The Government intend to do it in future, and charge the occupier 10 per cent. upon the value. It has been proved in numerous instances the great expense and trouble occasioned by an admiral either moving furniture from a distance, or being compelled to lay out a considerable sum of money in the purchase of new things, or the hire thereof for three years. This has deterred one or two officers of moderate private fortune from accepting the situation of Commander-in-Chief, as the chances are ten to one the successor will take what the other leaves: hence the dissatisfaction and mortification which must ensue. Moreover, if the officer resides in Ireland, Scotland, or any considerable distance from Portsmouth, the double removal of a large houseful of furniture causes a great expense and some damage. The new plan of the Admiralty obviates all this. The house will be amply and respectably furnished at the expense of the Crown; and if 1000*l.* worth of furniture is placed in it, the admiral knows he has to pay 100*l.* a-year for the loan thereof, and he lets or disposes of his own as he thinks right.

It is said the Admiralty-house in Portsmouth will be given up to the Lieutenant-Governor of the garrison, and his residence most probably appropriated as an infirmary for the troops: all sick soldiers are now removed into Portsea, and there ought to be two places for their reception in case of contagious disease.

The Hyacinth sloop, recently returned from the West Indies, has had a thorough repair, and was undocked on the 23rd of January. She is ready for being commissioned. A small alteration has been made by coppering the whole of the keel, instead of using lead, as heretofore, and also using copper up the stem, and having very thick copper plates fixed in the hause-holes. These last are to prevent the wear upon the lead by the chain-cables, it being found that the constant friction soon wastes it away. The Hyacinth is, I believe, the first man-of-war so done.

H. M. ship Prince Regent has been coppered on one side with copper as it comes from the rollers, and on the other with copper steeped in very strong brine. It is an experiment merely to try if the metal undergoing the latter process will not wield better and become more pliable to fix on, without decreasing its fitness or durability.

Some small men-of-war in this harbour were sold by public auction the other day (the *Espiegle* and *Ontario* were among them), and purchased by merchants for the South Sea trade, to the mutual advantage of both Government and trader. They were unfit any longer for men-of-war, and must have been broken up, and consequently would not have realized so much as

they did. I think they were purchased at about 2*l.* a ton: in the Thames the price for new ships is about 12*l.*, and in the north of England nearly 7*l.*; whereas, a little more money laid out, and a deck raised, will make these ships most effective for the South Sea fishery, as their sailing qualities are very good.

The Galatea has been taken into dock for inspection, and, if fit, for repair.

January 28.—The *Serpent* (16), Captain Symonds, returned from cruising off Dartmouth.

January 29.—Admiral Sir Thomas Williams arrived in the town, and his flag (blue at the main) was hoisted on board the *Victory*, and the next morning saluted by the men-of-war at Spithead and in the harbour. Sir Thomas immediately assumed office.

An order has been issued by the Admiralty that such ships or vessels as may require considerable repairs are in all cases to proceed into the harbour to have them done, and not, as in many instances, have gangs of workmen sent off to Spithead. The powder will be all that is requisite to take out; and a great saving of time and expense will ensue by the adoption of this regulation. Owing to the state of the weather, and in winter to the shortness of daylight, the Dock-yard people have been days, and sometimes weeks, on board ship; whereas in harbour the transit backwards and forwards will be but trifling; great wear and tear of boats obviated, and considerable quantities of stores saved, as well as the victualling of the workmen. It is probable that, if the *Spartiate* had been ordered into harbour, her fittings would have been done in half the time it took.

February 1.—A court-martial\* was assembled this day on board the *Victory* for the purpose of trying Second Lieutenant Lamont of the Royal Marines, embarked in his Majesty's ship *Briton*. I send you the particulars and result in a separate paper. Arising out of the same business, Second Lieutenant Parke, also of the Marines, was ordered to be tried at the barracks. I also forward an account of what has transpired in that quarter. You will perceive that Mr. Parke's legal friend advised his raising an objection to the competency of the Court to try him, and in consequence it was adjourned to the 7th of February, and in the interim the matter referred to the Admiralty: and here I cannot help remarking the prevailing plan, adopted by those who have the ill luck of being subject to a court-martial, of employing an attorney to conduct their defence. I think it the worst thing a man can do, and I am not singular in the opinion. One good, sensible, clear-headed military or naval friend, of experience, is in such a case worth a dozen attorneys, as the latter only bother the members, and spin out the proceedings to a most unconscionable length\*.

February 4.—The *Briton* was this day paid off.

The conduct of Admiral Sir H. Neale has been approved by his friends and constituents at Lynnington. An address from the principal inhabitants and voters, expressing their high gratification of his having preferred the retention of his seat in parliament to the appointment of Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth and the required resignation of that seat, has been presented to him by a deputation of twelve of the respectable supporters of the gallant Admiral, at his residence at Wallhampton.

Several seizures of contraband spirits, &c., have been made this month. The *Cameleon* captured a lugger, with four men and one hundred tubs of spirits on board; the *Experiment* a lugger, with one hundred and five casks of brandy and one man (there were three others on board, but they escaped after a desperate resistance, in which the mate of the *Experiment* was much hurt); and the *Tartar* chased and captured a vessel with one hundred and sixty tubs on board—her crew of four Englishmen and three Frenchmen have been lodged in prison. These captures fully exemplify my observation

\* The courts-martial on Lieutenants Lamont and Parke, which were to have appeared under their appropriate heads, are unavoidably postponed till our next.



of last month as to the extent of the system of smuggling in this neighbourhood. The Badger cutter has detained the Atlas Dutch brig, and sent her into Cowes, to wait the release of the other vessels in this harbour!

H. M. ship *Spartiate* was paid wages on the 5th. Sir Michael Seymour embarked on the 7th instant, and the ship shortly afterwards proceeded to her destination.

In your Number for February there is a letter from a gentleman named Dewhurst, on the subject of a Naval and Military Lunatic Asylum, approving of the suggestion of Sir A. Halliday for its erection, and proposing a subscription to be raised throughout the service for the payment and endowment of it. Without wishing to throw an impediment in the way of so benevolent and meritorious an object, I beg to mention that perhaps it is not generally known all naval and marine officers suffering under that dreadful malady, insanity, can be received into Haslar Hospital. An application must be made, and a certificate furnished to the Secretary of the Admiralty from the patient's medical practitioner, that he is a proper object (I don't mean as to pecuniary matters, for all ranks, rich or poor, are eligible); and upon this certificate an order is generally forwarded to the Captain Superintendent at the hospital (Captain Garrett) to admit him. If the patient should be in a most violent state of mental bereavement, the Superintendent, on a proper representation, will send a person to the residence of the party to take charge of him to the hospital (of course at his friends' expense); but generally the patient is conveyed to Gosport or Portsmouth, and moved into the hospital by the friends. The Government deduct 1s. 6d. a day from the pay of every patient, whether he be captain, commander, lieutenant, master, surgeon, purser, boatswain, gunner, or carpenter (I don't think midshipmen are admitted, unless they are seized with the affliction on service). Sailors and marines are also in the Lunatic department at Haslar. In January last there were upwards of twenty officers and one hundred and twenty private men.

I very much question if any lunatic asylum could bestow care and medical treatment for a less sum than 1s. 6d. a day; but perhaps your correspondent means that the intended Naval and Military Lunatic Asylum should be upon the plan of the London hospitals—gratuitous admission. In that case it is a delicate matter to talk upon. Very few of the friends and relations of naval officers would hesitate sending their unfortunate subject to a king's hospital, having a certain sum to pay; but many, from a sense of pride (perhaps misplaced), would not like to see their father or brother in a public hospital, maintained by voluntary subscription. While on the subject, I have just to add, for general information, that all half-pay officers can obtain admission and medical treatment at Haslar, on the payment of 10d. a day, which is deducted from their quarterly bills: they have the same care, accommodation, and treatment as if they had been moved to sick quarters from on board ship, only being required to conform to the rules and regulations of the Captain Superintendent, and to the diet prescribed by the medical officers. Numbers avail themselves of the indulgence, particularly those unmarried. There is a museum and library in the hospital, open at proper hours, that the convalescents may be relieved from the monotony of a sick chamber by seeking amusement in books, &c.

The *Victory* was paid-off by Captain Hyde Parker on the 6th, and recommissioned the next day by Captain Williams.

The *Spartiate* was obliged to put back to St. Helen's on the 8th, but got away again on the 9th; the strong westerly gales, however, compelled the Buckinghamshire, Thames, Herefordshire, and Warren Hastings, outward-bound East India ships, to anchor at Spithead to wait a lull.

Three ships of the line, the *Bellerophon*, *Ganges*, and *Edinburgh*,—and three frigates, the *Vindictive*, *President*, and *Galatea*, are ordered to be brought forward, and got in readiness by the Dock-yard, for equipment;

there are, of course, a variety of reports as to their destination, and also who is to command them; probably, after all, they may only be required for the relief of some of those whose three years' service is nearly expiring, viz., the *Asia*, *Belvidera*, *Britannia*, *Blanche*, *Rainbow*, *Revenge*, *Talbot*, and *Undaunted*.

H. M. ship *Hyacinth* (18) has been commissioned, and Commander F. P. Blackwood appointed to her.

The depôts of the 7th, 12th, 51st, 84th, 86th, and 94th regiments are still here and at Gosport. A major, captain, and four subalterns of the 51st, are ordered to Corfu to join the head-quarters of the regiment. To relieve the tedium of winter-quarters, the officers of the garrison intend to get up some amateur plays: the first will take place this evening. The detained Dutch ships are in the harbour, and there appears little probability of release.

Of the combined squadron, as it is the fashion to call the ships under the orders of Vice-Admiral Sir P. Malcolm, I can only say none have been here since I last wrote. I believe the *Donegal*, *Talavera*, *Malabar*, *Conway*, *Satellite*, and *Emerald*, composing the English part, are in the Downs, and three of the French ships with them: the *Castor*, *Stag*, and *Larne* are cruising. I think I heard the *Revenge* had gone to Plymouth, to embark and convey a regiment to Cork. The *Creole*, a French corvette, on her way from the Downs to Cherbourg, was compelled to put in to Spithead for shelter, during the heavy S.W. gales which prevailed during the middle of the month.

The following midshipmen have passed for lieutenants, at the Royal Naval College, since those last published in the *United Service Journal*:—

Mr. J. D. C. Ross . . .	of the <i>Vernon</i> .
— Atkinson . . .	late of the <i>Volage</i> .
— W. Pridham . . .	of the <i>Vernon</i> .
— Smith . . .	of the <i>Briton</i> .
— Branch . . .	late of the <i>Crocodile</i> .
— Madden . . .	late of the <i>Sulphur</i> .
— R. W. Otway . . .	of the <i>St. Vincent</i> .
— Edward Heathcote . . .	late of the <i>Briton</i> .
— Cudlip . . .	late of the <i>Sulphur</i> .
— A. Heseltine . . .	of the <i>Asia</i> .
— C. O. Hayes . . .	of the <i>Victory</i> .
— F. Andrew . . .	of the <i>San Josef</i> .

P.

Devonport, 20th February, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—The flattering hopes which we naval men were some weeks since led to entertain of soon having something more to do, having now subsided, we have but little that is novel or interesting to write upon. From our shipping list we have to inform you, that on the 24th ult. his Majesty's ship *Revenge* arrived from the eastward. On the 25th, the *Vernon* went out of Hamoaze, to the Sound. The *Griffin* and *Forrester* sailed for Africa on the 26th. The flag of Vice-Admiral Sir G. Cockburn, G.C.B., was hoisted and saluted on board the *Vernon*, on the 29th! The *Revenge*, *Comus*, and *Vernon*, sailed on the 30th. The *Comus* returned on the 1st February. On the 6th, the Plymouth Royal Naval Club dined together to celebrate the anniversary of Sir John T. Duckworth's victory over a French squadron at St. Domingo, the whole of which were captured or destroyed; thus completing a series of four naval victories in the short space of eight months, by which thirty ships of the line were wrested from our nautical antagonists. On the 9th, the *Rover* sloop sailed for the Mediterranean, having embarked Col. Campbell, Consul for Egypt. The *Comus* was taken into dock, having been a-ground upon the Tinker shoal, and knocked off the foot of the stem and fore end of the keel. On the night of Wednesday, the 13th, it blew a gale from S.W. with heavy squalls, during which a Spanish schooner, laden with nuts, drove on shore in Deadman's-bay, Catwater, and went to pieces; the crew were fortunately saved. Another vessel, likewise drove on shore in the gale, but was after-

wards got off with but little damage. On the 14th, the Rover and Griffin put back to the sound. His Majesty's ship Spartiate, with Rear-Admiral Sir M. Seymour's flag, came in on the 16th, and the Vernon was seen passing by from Torbay, whither she had been driven for shelter during the late gales. The Spartiate disabled two of her anchors when riding in Torbay, and has been supplied with new ones from this dock-yard; it is stated, that her topmast rigging is defective, though just fitted new from the store-house. The Comus was undocked the 19th. The Pyraus frigate is nearly ready for proceeding to Halifax, where she is to lie as a receiving and guard-ship.

As you have inserted, in former Numbers of your Journal, the proposals for forming a Naval Annuitant Society at Portsmouth, as well as those for a Military Fund, perhaps you will permit those who have had some experience in the working of such institutions, to call the attention of such as may be about to constitute the societies proposed, to the excellent work of Mr. Babbage upon that subject, and to the fundamental principle laid down by him, namely, "that the scale of subscriptions, and other payments into the Society, should be so equitably and so nicely adjusted to the number and amount of the annuities and other claims to be paid out of it, that whenever it may happen to decline, the funds shall be just sufficient to meet the ~~first~~ demand which can be made upon them." As this incontrovertible principle does not recognize anything like a *permanent unappropriated capital*, and both the Royal Naval Annuitant Society established here in 1823, and all others erected after its model, do create such *unappropriated capital*, it follows that the principal error of those societies arises therefrom; while the Royal Naval Annuitant, in particular, has committed an irretrievable mistake in paying to its first Annuitants a vast deal more than they were equitably entitled to. It has been asserted in the Portsmouth papers, that the large number of shares allowed to be taken by any one member in the Royal Naval Annuitant Society, is the cause of its declining annuities: but this is erroneous, because, if no member held more than one share, the amount of the annuities would continue to decline while its present mode of distribution is followed; but, on the other hand, if the annuities were equitably proportioned to the subscriptions, it would be as safe to allow ten shares as one.

It is contended by an anonymous writer here ("Q in a Corner"), "that the inequitable payment of annuities by this society will eventually reduce them below 4*l.*, and when subscribers cease to enter, below 1*l.* 12*s.*" (presuming, we suppose, that the Society's capital remains untouched); but without going the full length of this gloomy anticipation, the correctness of the principle upon which it is founded cannot be denied; and, therefore, while annuitant societies founded upon correct principles would be highly beneficial both to Naval and Military officers and their families, any attempt to erect them, without strictly adhering to the doctrine of Mr. Babbage, must be pregnant with delusion, mischief, and ruin.

The Portsmouth Naval Annuitant Society professes to pay 25*l.* reversionary annuity for an annual subscription of 1*s.* for each year of the age of the subscriber on his entrance into the Society, if his nominee be of his own age; and when the ages differ, a fine is to be paid to cover the difference. The first question here is, will the subscription bear out the annuity? And secondly, is there any necessary connexion between the progression of the age and the subscription? In reply to the first, it is said if the Portsmouth Annuitant Society can pay 25*l.* to the nominees of a member, each aged forty, the Equitable Insurance Office must get an enormous profit, as it will not insure an annuity under the same circumstances of more than one-fourth of that sum. Now allowing the full force of great profits to the Equitable, and great saving in management to the Naval Societies, yet it is pretty well understood, that when a more than common profit can be obtained, there will be great competition in that trade—three hundred per cent. would, therefore, be a strong inducement for other insurance associations to compete with them; but we do not find that any of the number which have come into the field

cut much under the Equitable, taking all circumstances into consideration as shewn by Mr. Babbage; and thence it may be concluded *they cannot safely do so*, and that the Naval Societies are acting on fallacious principles. If such societies pay from their funds in the early years three or four times more than they ought to do, it will be evident that the future annuitants must suffer thereby, and probably at the end of forty years, they would only be able to pay 3*l.* instead of 25*l.* The Portsmouth Naval Annuitant Society has it in its power now to retrace its steps before it gets entangled with conflicting interests; and it is hoped its managers will *see* the necessity of doing so, before Time, the great reformer, makes them *feel* it.

In justice to myself, it is necessary I should remark upon the note appended to my communication in your last Number, that whoever may have sent you the "*authenticated communication*" you mention, he appears to have been induced to do so by the desire to conceal the paucity of those who supported his unfortunate friend; an offence which, in charity, I would not have too severely visited upon a discomfited opponent. My statement that the Resolution alluded to "was carried by a large majority," was made from personal observation, and supported by the testimony of many others, particularly that of the most respectable witness who stood forward upon that occasion, and who told me on the following day, that he considered the number in favour of Sir Edward Codrington to have been *two-thirds of those in the hall*. In corroboration of this, I would ask how it happened, if my statement was incorrect, that "*the prevailing opinion in the borough*" was, as you admit, in coincidence with mine? Public opinion is seldom at variance with truth; and it cannot, in this instance, be supposed to have been guided by any other influence. I therefore cannot permit any supposed inaccuracy of mine to be attributed to partiality for a particular person, however exalted his character; and while I can fearlessly defy your "*authentic informant*" to disprove my statement by any respectable and unbiassed testimony, I cannot succumb, even to so impartial a person as yourself, Mr. Editor, in either the "*desire*" or the endeavour "*to be just.*"

ALPHA.

Pembroke, February 17, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—The African, Admiralty steamer, has been for some time employed in Milford Haven, removing the Dragon and Hannibal, line-of-battles, hitherto employed as lazarettos, from the quarantine ground, to moorings opposite the Royal Dock-Yard at Pater. It is still understood that these ships are to be fitted up forthwith for the reception of three hundred convicts, and a guard of one hundred and fifty marines. Be this as it may, they are finally removed from the Quarantine Establishment, the reduction in which has now reached what the Privy Council conceive ought to be its utmost degree of retrenchment; the only vessels remaining as lazarettos at this port, being the Ville de Paris, Milford, Gibraltar, Triumph, and Saturn. Captain Henry Bouchier, R.N. still retains the superintendence of this service, with Lieutenant George, R.N.; Mr. Davies, Master, R.N.; and Mr. Williams, Purser, R.N., as assistants.

The launch of the Royal William, of one hundred and twenty guns, is fixed to take place at six o'clock, p.m., on the 2d of April next. It is expected that the concourse of spectators will be immense; as this is known to be the largest ship ever built in Great Britain, her dimensions having been increased since she was laid down. Much interest has been created, throughout the Principality of Wales particularly, relative to the launching this noble vessel. His Majesty had at first contemplated being present in person, and we believe had signified his intention to honour Earl Cawdor with another visit at Stackpole Court upon this occasion; but state affairs will now, in all probability, alter the royal determination. Persons of distinction, however, from all parts, have made arrangements for witnessing the splendid spectacle. Steam-boats will, it is said, start from Liverpool, Bristol, and Ireland, carrying passengers.

from those places, to see this stupendous specimen of Naval Architecture rush to "her home upon the deep."

The Rodney, to carry ninety guns upon two decks, upon the plan of the American second-rates, is nearly finished building at Pembroke-yard, and will be launched shortly after the Royal William. The repairs of the Blenheim, seventy-four guns, now in dock at this port, are almost completed; but she has not been cut down to a frigate as was at first contemplated.

"One of the most afflicting grievances of the Royal Naval Service, at this moment, admits of so simple a remedy, that we feel confident it is only necessary to bring the same under notice of the Admiralty, through the valuable medium of the United Service Journal, to put a stop to the evil. There are hundreds of midshipmen now out of employ, from wanting interest to obtain ships; and hundreds of others, pining with that "hope deferred which maketh the heart sick," unable to obtain advancement in their profession, from the circumstance of there being *too many midshipmen in the service*. Surely if the Admiralty are compelled to withhold preferment from these officers, or are even at a loss to afford them employment, it is highly unjust to keep admitting fresh victims in this capacity. Sir James Graham evidently means to act fairly, impartially, and honourably by the Navy—than Sir Thomas Haitley, there is not a better officer, an abler seamen, or a more honest man in the profession: we submit, therefore, to the justice of these gentlemen, whether it may not be an act worthy of their administration, to issue directions, that *no more volunteers of the First Class shall be entered, till every midshipman and mate is furnished with a ship, who may be desirous of continuing in the service*. A year or two of an embargo like this will be sufficient; and after that, by limiting the admission of volunteers according to the promotion of mates and lieutenants, all redundancy will be avoided—a great source of discontent removed—thousands of worrying applications to the Admiralty extinguished—and fair play given to every midshipman who has already served, or may hereafter enter on board any of "His Majesty's ships or vessels of war."

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Milford Haven, 14th Jan. 1833.

"Nothing extenuate nor set down aught in malice."

MR. EDITOR,—It is a customary thing with adults, when children will not do what they are desired, to stimulate them by contradiction, or even dare them. For instance, if one be asked to say the little piece his mother with great labour and much anxiety has taught him, and he refuses, he is immediately upbraided with inability, and told he never could repeat it;—now such, I calculate, is just the situation of "Vindex," who dates his communication in your last Number from Ilfracombe. He has a smattering—aye, and but a smattering—of the proceedings taking place at this port for the Anglo-Hibernian packet communication, and he endeavours by *daring* me to obtain further information on the subject. His efforts, however, will prove abortive, nor will he by any of his *taunts* cause me to afford him one iota of intelligence.

And now, Mr. Editor, I have done with the eligibility or ineligibility of the station, as I plainly see my opponent "Peregrinator" is unable to contend, or even write for public inspection. This is evinced both by his permitting another to take up the gauntlet thrown down for himself, and by the admission made by his friend "Vindex." My end is answered: "Vindex" acknowledges the communication of "Peregrinator" was hasty, and that a *little allowance* would *probably* have rendered the queries more intelligible, and *perhaps* the compositor had a difficulty in deciphering the composition," leaving the sense of the author still in a state of doubt: all this but establishes the statements in my last, and having them thus confirmed by the indicator of my opponent, I consider myself doubly victorious.

Pardon my lengthy epistle, of which, in justice to my reputation, I claim the insertion, and am yours, &c.,

NAUTICUS,

## GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL.

*Naval and Military Sinécures.*

MR. EDITOR,—It is difficult to say whether the dull cant of Mr. Hume, the lively boasting of Sir James Graham, the gentlemanly and soldier-like bearing of Sir Francis Burdett, or the personality of Mr. M. O'Connell predominates most in the reports of the speeches of these gentlemen, on the late motion to abolish what they are pleased to brand as "Naval and Military Sinécures;" but it is very certain that Sir James Graham is as competent (and in no greater degree) to delineate the feelings of a soldier and analyse the military profession, as Mr. Hume is logically to discuss any question, or rationally to demonstrate any proposition.

With Mr. Hume's logic, however, we soldiers have little to do; the Speaker may indeed hardly earn his pension, if there be any great addition to the prating portion of the House of Commons; but how the lavish application of a pension to the Speaker of the House can legitimately afford an argument by which to wrest from his majesty the prerogative of conferring military rewards, is a subject fit for the ingenuity of Mr. Hume himself.

Sir James Graham's vaunting as to what he has done, or, more correctly, *undone*, is much on a par with Mr. Cobbett's professions as to what he intends to do. It would be well if the Baronet's speech were only remarkable for the vanity and egotism evinced in it; but he has presumed—a civilian at the head of the Admiralty of Great Britain—to enunciate a libel upon the military profession, he has volunteered the assertion, that the *military profession is considered a mercenary one*, and has ventured to declare, that they who enter it are "*actuated by motives of a compound nature*," and is of opinion that "*the members of that profession will not make great exertions, unless sufficient pay be secured*." Mr. Editor, and is it come to this? are we to be told by a member of his Majesty's Government that we belong to a *mercenary profession*—that our exertions are to be measured by the pay we may expect—that we encounter the privations, the difficulties, and dangers incidental to the service for the sake of gain, for the pittance which is secured to us on retiring from the service? Well may the *Lay First Lord of the Admiralty* prate in this strain; no doubt he encounters all the dangers to which his high office exposes him, looking forward to home, to retirement, to ease and competency granted by a grateful country; he nobly ventures his beloved person (but in a carriage) to the piercing cold, the chilling damps which he may encounter between the Admiralty and the House of Commons, no doubt he estimates the dangers and privations of a soldier's life light in comparison to those; he thinks that men as well bred, aye, and as highly educated as he, are content to separate themselves for years from their families, from their homes, from their connexions, from their country, and to pass such periods in pestilential climates at the almost certain loss of health; to drag many a wearied but cheerful step over hundreds of leagues of country; to encounter hunger, and thirst, and privation of every kind;

to court death and danger, and mutilation and wounds—thus to act and thus to suffer, not from the unalloyed stimulus which a love of country, and the noble ambition of serving it in arms affords, but from a *compound feeling*, from a desire to obtain “a competency.” Does the Lay-lord really fancy that motives of this “compound nature” will induce a man to expose his person on a breach, and energetically and cheerfully to lead his followers to all but certain death? Sir James Graham’s love of economy, or love of competency, or love of ease, or love of money, may induct him to it—we are sure his soldier-like feeling or his love of Fatherland never will. We doubt, however, its ever having been the urging principle with a British officer, at all events since the day of the Baronet’s countryman, Major Dugald Dalgetty: and here we wrong the Major; he felt as a soldier for the honour of the profession he had embraced, but Sir James cannot evidently understand such an incentive.

What a contrast do the speeches of the Baronets, Sir James Graham and Sir Francis Burdett, present! How differently constituted must those men’s minds be which could evolve opinions so opposite! Sir Francis feels, and thinks, and speaks like a soldier; Sir James like a Free Trader to India, forward to the fifth voyage to realize a fortune.

But, Mr. Editor, we may seem to admit that competency awaits every man “who makes great efforts”—that such men may, at all events, reasonably expect “ease and comfort in old age”—whereas it is notorious that many men do not secure the interest of the money expended to attain their rank; that not one-tenth of the men who enter the army attain the rank of Captain, the half-pay of which is 127*l.* 15*s.* a year; that not one-fiftieth attain the rank of Major, the half-pay of which is 173*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.*; and that not one in many hundreds are appointed to those few “sinecures” which Mr. Hume, *ad captandum vulgus*, (Sir Francis Burdett has well defined the motion,) would in his zeal annihilate. Sir Francis justly remarked that British officers, to whom regiments and governments are given, are *emeriti* and not sinecurists; and it would be well if the classic Baronet had further enlightened the plodding economist, by informing him that *emeritus* designates a man who has served faithfully and honourably, and has therefore purchased and has a moral right to that which, in the House of Commons, is often misnamed a sinecure.

The sinecures Mr. Hume would abolish are then, strictly speaking, not sinecures, but *stipendia emerita, præmia vel commoda militiæ*; the abuse or misapplication in a few solitary cases of the funds, which belong to and constitute the *vested* right of the veteran officers of the British army, affords no argument by which to cut them off and annihilate them altogether.

The British army may indeed feel hurt when they see the favoured brother of an *enfant gâté*, who never commanded a troop or company in action, decorated with the highest insignia of an order intended to mark the veteran leader of many a well-fought field; and they may reasonably deprecate any misapplication of funds which can be ill diverted from more veteran comrades in arms. Never, however, will the officers of the British army think with Sir James Graham, who, in effect, says:

“O cives, cives, quærenda pecunia primum,  
Virtus post nummos.”

Rather will they feel with Sir Francis Burdett,—

"Virtus

*Intaminatis fulget honoribus ;*

*Nec sumit aut ponit sécures*

*Arbitrio popularis auræ.*

*Virtus, recludens immeritis mori*

*Cælum negatâ tentat iter viâ ;*

*Cætusque vulgares et udam*

*Spernit humum."*

I am, Mr. Editor, yours,—AN OLD SOLDIER.

### *The Maltese.*

MR. EDITOR,—The writer of an article in your December Number, entitled "The March of Intellect at Malta," having appealed to the officers of the garrison in support of his opinions, and, as silence on their part might be construed into an approval of the same, we, the undersigned, individually beg that you will, in an early Number after the receipt of this letter, publish our dissent from the opinions offered by the author of the article alluded to, as to the character, dispositions, and habits of the Maltese.

"We must express our regret, that you should have so far deviated from the professed principles of your Journal, as to have permitted the insertion in its columns of an article by an anonymous author, containing such low and scurrilous matter, neither founded on facts, nor evincing a knowledge of those whom he has thus so gratuitously and ungenerously abused; and between whom and ourselves there exists the greatest cordiality and friendship.

We subscribe ourselves, Mr. Editor, your obedient Servants.

F. Ponsonby, Maj.-Gen.

H. Elphinstone, Bt. C.B., Colonel commanding Royal Engineers.

Thos. Briggs, Rear-Admiral.

H. Balneavis, Lieut.-Col., Town Major.

W. Thynne, Maj. Royal Fusiliers.

S. Holmes, Maj., Assist.-Mil. Sec.

Harry D. Jones, Capt. Royal Engineers.

J. McNair, Lieut.-Col. 73d Regt.

J. Prestwood Lucas, Ord. Med. Dep.

A. Wright, Capt. Royal Artillery.

C. Sievwright, Lieut. Royal Fusiliers.

Richard Shiel, Lieut. 9th Regt.

A. H. Frazer, Lieut. Royal Artillery.

J. Gamble, Lieut.-Col. Royal Artillery.

William Eyre, Capt. 73d Regt.

John Bewes, Paymaster, 73d Regt.

J. Gray, Capt. Royal Artillery.

B. Browne, Lieut. 73d Regt.

G. W. Paty, Lieut.-Col. com. 94th Regt.

F. Meek, Capt. 94th Regt.

G. T. Lindsay, Capt. 94th Regt.

J. W. Randolph, Capt. 94th Regt.

T. Tulloch, Lieut. 94th Regt.

W. H. Fisk, Paymaster, 94th Regt.

Frederick Dix, Surgeon, 94th Regt.

R. McCleverty, Lieut. 94th Regt.

T. R. Baker, Capt. Royal Fusiliers.

W. G. Eyre, Lieut. Royal Fusiliers.

H. St. John Mildmay, Lieut. Royal Fus.

J. Hutchinson, Maj. Royal Fusiliers.

G. B. Hamilton, Lieut. Royal Fusiliers.

H. Chichester, Lieut. Royal Fusiliers.

J. Stuart, Capt. Royal Fusiliers.

J. Barton, Capt., Dep. Barrack Mast.

T. Cramer Roberts, A. D. C.

Charles Gordon, Lieut.-Col. 42d Regt.

J. O'Brien, Royal Fusiliers.

Malta, 10th January, 1833.

\*\* We insert the foregoing testimonial with great pleasure, but beg leave to protest against the assumption, that by giving a place to the letter from which it dissents, we have deviated from the "professed principles" or the proper course of this Journal—namely, to afford impartial access to general opinions upon relevant subjects. It does not follow that all observers are to think alike, or judge correctly of the objects they view and attempt to describe. Where distance intervenes, and the power of verifying facts is necessarily remote or unattainable, much must be taken on credit—always excepting *personalities*. In the present case, the remarks of our incidental correspondent were general and plausible, and might have proved as correct as they are above represented to have been wrong. The very appeal to the officers of the garrison suggested a *prima facie* presumption of credibility. The antidote, however, is equally ready; and we repeat our satisfaction in publishing this document, which confutes error, and confirms the fairness of our practice,—Ed.



## TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS.

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THE detailed narrative of the SIEGE OF ANTWERP, which we this month offer to our readers, has, it will be perceived, absorbed the *whole* space usually devoted to varieties, the unavoidable exclusion of which will be understood and excused by our numerous contributors. Even the addition of an *extra* sheet has only enabled us to bring in a portion of our regular records; but we have deemed "The Siege" a subject of direct concern to all branches of the Service, and claiming priority over less prominent though equally interesting topics.

The account has been derived from authentic sources; and, having been transmitted from abroad in detached portions, has cost, in preparation, no inconsiderable share of labour and time. If, from the above cause, and the consequent impossibility of reference during correction, minor inaccuracies should be detected, or should any points in the general operations described, seem at variance with the experience of other eye-witnesses, we shall feel indebted for any authentic correction or competent opinion upon the subject, —our aim being to furnish the most accurate information attainable upon this interesting and singular event. We are enabled to pledge ourselves for the accuracy of the Plan, which is a reduced *fac-simile* of the original in the possession of General Haxo.

Our Narrative forms the only existing history of the Siege of Antwerp.

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Amongst the matter excluded, as we have above stated, from our present Number, besides the mass of diversified articles usually classed in the body of the work, we regret to enumerate nearly a volume of Correspondence, a score of Reviews, many Memoirs, Courts-Martial, Parliamentary Debates, the new Warrant for the pensioning of Soldiers, Annals, &c. &c.

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We would willingly reply in detail to our Correspondents and Contributors, had we time at our command, or were our friends less numerous or considerate than they are:—*Our* post, at least, is not a "Naval and Military Sinecure;" and we frankly assure our Correspondents that *every* communication which reaches our hands meets with its due share of consideration; but to write letters in reply, or furnish a *catalogue raisonné* of each communication in this scant corner, would far exceed our mortal powers. We, therefore, hope that involuntary silence on our part, or the temporary omission of contributions, may, in no case, be construed into undeserved neglect. The perusal of crabbed manuscripts, and the judgment upon them, is not the affair of a moment; it is, moreover, our province to choose the fitting time and place for bringing forward each subject, with a view to the professional objects of the Journal, the writer's credit, and our own.

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We shall in future devote a corner to condensed notices of Letters which we may be unable, from want of room, to insert entire.

# EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;

OR

## NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

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### AFFAIRS AT HOME AND ABROAD.

ON Tuesday the 29th ult., the first Parliament under the New Act met, and proceeded to the election of a Speaker,—the candidates proposed being the late Speaker, Mr. Manners Sutton, and Mr. Littleton. The former was chosen, the numbers being 241 to 31, and was immediately installed, amidst nearly unanimous acclamation. On Tuesday the 5th instant, Parliament was opened by the King in person. A brawling and prolix debate on the Address was carried on by adjournment to the fourth sitting, when two amendments were thrown out by majorities of 388 and 333 respectively; the numbers on the first being 40 to 482,—on the second 60 to 393.

The subsequent proceedings of the new assembly have been distinguished by marked evidence of *change*, without any symptom of "reform"—a phrase which, if it mean anything, should signify improvement. The general discussions of the House are extraneous to our pages, but we cannot refrain from adverting, however briefly, to the insulting and virulent tone assumed by the party of *DESTRUCTIVES*, headed by Hume, towards the members and establishments of the United Service.

We have been long accustomed to trite and tricky declamation on this subject by the same parties, both in and out of Parliament; and, hitherto, thanks to generous and national predilections, not yet cast into utter shade by the glare of the new lights, these senseless schemes and sorry vituperations have been taken generally at their real value. We regret, however, to observe a growing tendency on the part of the mere herd of our new-fangled legislators to listen with complacency to insult or encroachment directed against the military profession, to degrade and despoil which, fresh ground is broken and new batteries are unmasked upon every opening that presents itself. This fire of the banded *Condottieri* of St. Stephen's is not, we are pained to admit, always replied to with the spirit and unanimity expected from those who, *inter alia*, specially represent our "order" in Parliament; and who, from the justice of their cause, the strength of their ramparts, and the halo of their glory, are so capable of a triumphant defence. Upon a recent occasion, however, we observed with satisfaction the prompt and practical effects of that latent *esprit de corps* to which we appeal, roused till it smote and repulsed the insolent foe.

To what the increasing audacity of these attacks may be directly owing we can only surmise. That the claims, rights and national importance of the Services have not undergone diminution is palpable—that they are subject to a designing process of depreciation is equally clear, and easily accounted for with reference to the quarter from which they are

assailed. If the Government be weak enough, which we can hardly conceive possible in so critical a state of public affairs, to encourage, by even the semblance of acquiescence, these premeditated aggressions upon establishments which we are justified in styling the bulwarks of the country, a heavy and hopeless responsibility will be theirs.

In the mean time we earnestly recommend the Services to be united and true to themselves—in the confident assurance that we shall aid in fighting their battle and our own to the last drop of our ink.

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A Bill conferring almost unlimited powers upon Government for the suppression of the disturbances in IRELAND, which have grown to a frightful and intolerable pitch of unbridled crime and terrorism, has passed the Lords, and awaits the decision of the Commons. That country will, effectively, be placed under Martial Law—the “*ultima ratio*” of every form or re-form of Government that ever was or ever shall be. This measure, the absolute and instant necessity for which cannot be doubted, is a pendant for the *état de siège* of our very excellent friends and Mentors—the French.

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The affairs of DON PEDRO, who is still shut up in Oporto, are stated, with increasing confidence, to be desperate. It is certain that he is not desired in the country he has invaded. Colonel Solignac, a French officer, having been appointed to the chief command of his forces, with the preposterous title of Marshal, attempted, on the 24th of January, a sortie or reconnoissance in the direction of San João da Foz and the mouth of the Douro;—but, being foiled, as he states, owing to a failure of co-operation on the part of the reserve and fleet, he was compelled to withdraw with loss. Mutinies were frequent and serious amongst the Ex-emperor's motley partisans. The bombardment of the city continued.

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IBRAHIM PASHA has unwillingly halted in his career; an armistice for forty days having been concluded with the Turks, by the mediation of the Russian and French ministers. Ibrahim was expected to advance at the expiration of the truce, should not instructions to the contrary be received in the interim from his father.

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The BATAVO-BELGIC question remains in *statu quo*, spite of some fresh *fanfaronnade* on the part of the Anglo-Gallic Protocollists.

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FRANCE is principally occupied with ministerial squabbles, while the army at présent repose on its laurels, and dreams of refreshing them.

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The young King of GREECE (the Bavarian Prince OTTO) has reached his classic dominions, escorted, however, by a safeguard from his Fatherland.

**PRESENTATION OF COLOURS TO THE 90TH LIGHT INFANTRY.**—The imposing ceremony of presenting a new stand of colours to the above regiment took place in the square of the Royal Hospital, Kilmainham, on the 21st of January last. After the usual preliminaries, of consecration, &c., the Commander of the Forces, Lieutenant-General Sir Hussey Vivian, upon whom this gratifying duty devolved, addressed the regiment to the following purport:—

“Colonel Arbutnot, Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Soldiers of the 90th Light Infantry:—The purpose for which we are here assembled this day, is to perform one of the most solemn, one of the most interesting, and one that ought to be rendered one of the most imposing of our military ceremonies. But if the description I have now given of it, is that which is applicable to it on all occasions, how much more so must it be on the present occasion, when we look to the situation in which we are now assembled, surrounded by a building, appropriated by a munificent and grateful nation, to the residence of its brave old soldiers;—when we consider by how many of those brave men we are attended, who fought and bled in their country’s cause, in that long and arduous struggle, so triumphantly, and so gloriously concluded, and amongst whom, this day, I had hoped to have enumerated that gallant soldier now at the head of the Government in this country—that brilliant leader, who placed himself in the front of the British cavalry, and led it against that of France, in some of the most successful charges made during the late war—that brave man, who, in the command of that cavalry, fought so nobly, and suffered so severely, in that great battle which hurled Napoleon from his throne, and gave peace to Europe—(but for his absence, occasioned alone by his illness, I am requested to express his regret)—when I see by my side a General Officer, who, during the whole of the Peninsular campaign, in the command of a most distinguished regiment, did himself immortal honour, and his country invaluable service, and in reward for such service, a considerate

and kind Sovereign has marked his approbation, to the delight of the whole army, by naming him Colonel of the Fusileers—when also we look around us and see how much we are honoured by the company of numbers of that fair sex, ambitious of whose applause, and influenced by whose charms men have been encouraged to deeds of valour almost superhuman; I say, how much more interesting becomes the ceremony on the present occasion—how much more imposing ought it to be rendered, and, I may add, how much must I feel, and how deeply regret my own inadequacy to do justice to it.—On such an occasion it is customary, it is right to refer to those opportunities the corps to which the colours are to be presented has had of distinguishing itself before its enemies. It is right, I say, that this should be the case: it brings to the recollection of the old soldiers, days of honour and of glory, of which they have reason to be proud—it stimulates the young soldiers to emulate the conduct of the old in those days that are to come; and in referring to such opportunities, although in the case of this regiment they have not occurred so frequently as in the case of some of its more fortunate fellow-soldiers, still, it is gratifying to recollect that when such opportunities have occurred, they have been nobly taken advantage of, and the steadiness and courage of the corps has been proudly asserted. At an early period of my military life, it was my good fortune to become intimately known to that distinguished individual who raised this regiment; who, at an advanced period of his own life (I mean advanced for first commencing that of a soldier), quitted his home at his country’s call, and whose whole career was one of continued and eminent services—who, to use the words of the Duke of Wellington, ‘closed that career in the Peninsula, after having established within the French territory the troops of the allied British and Portuguese army, which had been so frequently distinguished under his command,’ and who afterwards having been again called into service, planned and carried into effect that most extraordinary military enterprise, the surprise of Bergen-op-Zoom—an en-

6, which may said to have been completely successful as far as regarded the General under whose orders it was undertaken, and which failed solely from some unfortunate and accidental misunderstanding of orders by the troops engaged—an enterprize designated by Buonaparte as one of the boldest and first military exploits ever imagined or attempted. It was my fortune also in early life to be quartered for two years with this regiment in the garrison of Gibraltar—that I had the happiness to form an acquaintance, and I may add, a friendship—a friendship that I am proud to say has existed, and exists up to the present time, with that most amiable and excellent man and admirable officer at the head of his Majesty's army. I there also became intimate with the other officers of the corps—I there became acquainted with the merits of the corps itself. The friendship thus established led me naturally, when parted from it, still to regard its progress with anxiety, and to look with interest to all such events as were conducive to its success and its honour. It was therefore with great pleasure that I learnt it was one of those regiments brought together to form the army when England put forth that wonderful instance of her power, and assembled her legions from the four quarters of the globe, in order to expel the invading enemy from the territories of an ancient and faithful ally. This regiment then formed, I say, part of that force so assembled on the burning plains of Egypt—on those burning plains, where, in days of yore, the lion-hearted king of England led his chivalry to feats of arms—by which they have been immortalized. On that holy land where, for the first time, a check was given to the career of that extraordinary man, whose victories in Italy had already rendered him so celebrated, by a British naval chief, a Christian knight, who raised the union flag of England on the walls of Acre. It was, I say, on the burning sands of that country, that this regiment, under the command of Colonel, now Lord Hill, forming the advanced guard of the army, and for the first time meeting the enemy, whilst severely engaged and under a fire of artillery and of musketry suddenly

finding themselves assailed by a large body of the enemy's cavalry, received the attack with all the coolness of veterans, gave their fire—defeated and dispersed them. After that in the great victory in which fell one of the oldest and bravest of our Generals—nobly fell at the head of the army he commanded, and from which resulted the evacuation of Egypt by the enemy—this regiment again was eminently distinguished by its valour, its steadiness, and its good conduct; the proud memorials of these two occasions are borne on your colours. Subsequently, I find its services were called for in the West Indies, that inhospitable climate, to which, in support of her commercial interests and political power, England is under the necessity of calling for the services of her soldiers—that climate in which, although honour was not so readily to be gained, as it was by those who had the good fortune to serve elsewhere, danger was infinitely greater. There I find this regiment composing part of the few which wrested from the power of France those important colonies of Guadeloupe and Martinique, and there also was the regiment distinguished for its discipline and good conduct, the honourable testimony to which is most handsomely expressed in the orders of the civil and military authorities of the country, and borne on your record books. In Ireland, also, where the regiment during the war was for many years stationed, the same flattering and highly honourable testimony is borne to its admirable conduct on all occasions, and under all circumstances.

Having thus referred to the discipline of the corps, let me impress on your officers, that discipline is best preserved by a constant and vigilant attention to those under your orders. Let me beg of you at all times to recollect that the British soldier, who at an early period quits his home, his parents, and his friends, to serve his country, is entitled to expect that you will as far as possible replace those parents, and those friends; it is your duty to administer to his wants, to look to his comforts, to consult over his wishes as far as you possibly can, consistent with the good of the service, to watch over his conduct, to control those who misconduct

themselves, and to indulge those who merit to be indulged.

Soldiers, it is your business to look to the officers as your parents and your friends, let your only fear be the fear of offending them; but why do I refer to discipline? is it that the regiment now before me requires such a reference? No, Colonel Arbuthnot, it stands a proud instance—a proud and honourable testimony, to you and to your officers and men—of the perfection to which discipline may be carried with the smallest degree of punishment; it stands, as does the army, giving a proud contradiction to those who speaking of matters of which they can know nothing, charge us with cruelty in our punishments; those who thus pretending to be the soldier's friend, never that I am aware of stepped forward in any way to prove that they really were such, on the contrary, they are those who are always the first to exclaim against the weight of that provision a liberal country has made for the maintenance of those old soldiers, whose services have well and truly deserved it; they are those who, if unhappily any instance does occur in which there is a lapse of discipline, are the first to come forward and loudly to complain of it. But so far is it from being true, that the punishments of the British army are severe, there is not in Europe an army in which they are so light—there is not in Europe an army in which the soldier is in every respect, and at all times, so well and so kindly treated—there is not in Europe an army in which such perfect discipline is so constantly preserved. I refer to discipline, also, in order that I may have an opportunity of pointing out its advantages. Who is there amongst us, let me ask, that does not look back with pride to the many glorious occasions, in which, during the late war, the discipline of our army shone triumphantly victorious? Who is there that does not exult in the discipline and good conduct of the army under that great captain, who placed the fame of the British soldier on a pinnacle it had never before attained? That great captain, whose victories rivalled those of Cressy, of Agincourt, and of Blenheim—that great captain, who, by his talents, had divested the

path to honour, for all those who had the happiness to serve under his orders, of all its difficulties, it was to escape its dangers only to attain it—that great captain, before whose genius the laurels withered and the power fell of that soldier who, but for the exertions of England and that genius, might have dictated laws to Europe. I say, who is there that is not proud of the discipline and conduct of that army, who led victoriously a pursuit of the flying foe, over whom they had so constantly triumphed in the Peninsula. They raised the British standard in the territories of France, and by their conduct and their discipline, caused such a feeling in their favour, that the French people themselves received them as protectors, and the French writers, in describing the invasion, admit that the admirable behaviour of the British soldiery valued the army, in its effects, at least ten thousand men. And may I be permitted to add, who is there amongst us that, now belonging to the army in Ireland, is not proud of the results which have arisen from the excellent conduct it has everywhere observed? Called upon to perform the most vexatious and harassing duties, subjected at times to insult and even to outrage such has been the temper and the forbearance—such the firmness of the troops, that they are everywhere looked upon as friends, and from one end of Ireland to another, are respected and admired. Such, then, are the advantages of preserving discipline—it is by this alone, officers and soldiers, that you can hope to do justice to your king and country—it is by this alone that you can do credit to yourselves—it is by this alone that you can do honour to your colours.

I will now detain you but a very short time longer, but before I conclude, I must impress upon you, that at all times the watchword of a soldier ought to be '*Honour and Fidelity*.' To attain this, the governing principle of his conduct must be—'obedience to the orders of his superiors.' I will remind you of the last, that most impressive order of that great naval commander, who fell in the most glorious victory ever gained by the navy of England, and who in falling sealed the

maritime ascendancy of the country, annihilating the fleets of France and Spain—I say, I must remind you of that last, that most impressive order, which he issued to those brave men under his command, calling upon them to recollect that ‘England expects every man to do his duty’—an order so nobly given, and so gloriously and triumphantly executed, that the remembrance of it can never be effaced from the annals of our country; and lastly, I must beg of you never to forget when marching against the enemy to victory and glory, as I have no doubt you will do, should an opportunity offer—I say, when marching against the enemy under those colours which I now place in your care, I call on you never to forget that they are to be stained only with your blood, to be surrendered only with your lives.”

After the address, the two Majors delivered to the Lieutenant-General the new colours, and he handed them to Lieutenant-Colonel Arbuthnot, by whom they were given to the Ensigns, they returning him the old colours, which the Majors received. A general salute followed.

Colonel Arbuthnot then proceeded to address Sir Hussey Vivian in the following appropriate terms:—“It is impossible for me, Sir, to express the gratification I have derived from the address you have just delivered to the regiment under my command; a gratification, which I see on looking around, has been shared by all. Our good fortune, Sir, has been great, in having these colours presented to us by an officer so distinguished, by an officer, the chief part of whose life has been spent in the camp and the field, who by his own exertions has risen through all ranks to his present high station, who has so frequently received the thanks of his King and his country, and gratified as he must have been at these marks of approbation and of honour, still that could not have been equal to the consciousness which he must have felt how justly he merited them, and how richly he had earned them.

For me, Sir, this is a proud day, and I have reason to be proud, but, however great my pride may be, it is far and far increased, when I bear in

mind, that from the day I assumed the command of this regiment, to the present period, every individual, whether officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier, has not only exerted himself to meet my wishes, whatever they might be, but, anxious as I must be for the reputation of it, every one has shewn even greater anxiety, if possible, to maintain and uphold the high character the government so justly deserves, and has so long obtained.

In presenting these colours, you have imposed a sacred trust on us, the honour of our regiment is in our own hands; I am well aware, Sir, if circumstances should require us to act in defence of our King and our country, that in the face of the enemy it will be more difficult for me to restrain their ardour, than to inflame their courage; but should a stimulus be wanting, that stimulus would be, ‘Remember, Sir Hussey Vivian confided these colours to your charge.’

The recollection of this day will never be effaced from the memory of any here present, for depend upon it, Sir, that in whatever quarter of the globe it may be our fate to serve, or in whatever position we may be placed, the 21st of January, 1833, will always be remembered, and the name of Sir Hussey Vivian will often be mentioned with pride, I hope I may say with affection, and certainly with pleasure.”

A close column was then formed right in front, and the troops marched past in slow and quick time—their splendid band playing

“The garb of Old Gaul.”

The companies then formed in two columns, at half distance on each side of the quadrangle, piled arms, divested themselves of accoutrements, and retired to the dining-hall of the Hospital, where a dinner, given by the officers of the 60th, to the non-commissioned officers and privates of the regiment, their wives and children, was prepared in a style which reflected the highest credit upon the gallant and hospitable donors.

Nearly eight hundred men, with their families, sat down to a most substantial entertainment, consisting of roast beef, plum-pudding, hams, turkeys, &c., &c., furnished in a style the most neat, and in an abundance,

beneath the weight of which the tables almost literally groaned.

The spacious hall was crowded with spectators. At the head of it were all the most distinguished officers of the garrison, amongst them the Commander of the Forces, while the long side gallery was crowded with ladies of the first distinction.

The following toasts were pledged on the occasion, and with enthusiasm :—"The King"—three times three. Tune, "God Save the King." "The ladies who have honoured us with their presence this day."—"O happy Fair." "The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland." "The Duke of Wellington."—"Britons strike home." "The old Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment, Lord Hill."—"Hurrah for the Bonnets of Blue." "Sir Hussey Vivian."—"See the conquering Hero comes." "The 90th Regiment, and success and honour to it\*." "Lord Lynedoch, the old Colonel of the Regiment." "Major-General Sir Edward Blakeney and the Officers of the Garrison." "Lieutenant-Colonel Arbuthnot, and the Officers of the Regiment."

The Officers entertained Sir H. Vivian, his staff, and a numerous company in the evening at dinner.

The Commander of the Forces gave a splendid ball afterwards, at which was present, with the military officers, the principal of the nobility and gentry of the city, and surrounding locality.

The Serjeants and Corporals of the 90th gave a ball at Richmond Barracks to the *non-commissioned* Officers of all the other regiments in garrison—and thus terminated what we will call a proud *fête* to the military serving in the Dublin Garrison.

#### CHANGES IN THE STATIONS OF CORPS SINCE OUR LAST:—

8th Foot Service Companies from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to Bermuda, to be ready to proceed to the West Indies.

10th Foot Service Companies from Vido to Corfu.

11th Foot Service Companies ordered from Zante to the West Indies.

34th Service Companies from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to New Brunswick.

42d Foot Service Companies remain at Malta.

51st Foot Service Companies from Corfu to Vido.

53d Foot Service Companies from Gibraltar to the West Indies.

67th Foot Service Companies from Gibraltar to the West Indies.

69th Foot Reserve Companies from Bandon to Kinsale.

7th Dragoon Guards from Newbridge to Kilkenny.

8th Hussars from Newcastle to York.

12th Lancers from Cork to Newbridge.

8th Foot Service Companies from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to Bermuda.

8th Foot Reserve Companies from Hull to Stockport.

15th Foot Reserve Companies from Newcastle to Carlisle.

23d Foot Reserve Companies from Naas to Fermoy.

24th Foot Reserve Companies from Carlisle to Newcastle on Tyne.

36th Foot Service Companies from Barbadoes to Antigua.

36th Foot Reserve Companies from Ballinabey to Cork.

53d Foot Reserve Companies from Stockport to Hull.

1st Batt. 60th Foot Reserve Companies from Newbridge to Naas.

94th Foot Service Companies from Malta to West Indies.

1st Batt. Grenadier Guards from Portman-street to Westminster.

2d Batt. Grenadier Guards from King's Mews to Knightsbridge.

3d Batt. Grenadier Guards from the Tower to Windsor.

1st Batt. Coldstream Guards from Knightsbridge to the King's Mews.

1st Batt. Scots Fusileer Guards from Westminster to the Tower.

2d Batt. Scots Fusileer Guards from Windsor to Portman-street Barracks.

\* Given by Sir Hussey Vivian. •



# **DISTRIBUTION OF THE ROYAL NAVY** **IN COMMISSION.**

[ NORE.

Vice-Admiral Sir John Poo Beresford, Bart. K.C.B.

SHIPS.	GUNS.	COMMANDERS.	DISTRIBUTION.
OCEAN . . . . .	80 .	Capt. S. Chambers .	Sheerness
Prince Regent (yacht) .		Capt. G. Tobin .	Deptford
William and Mary (yacht)		Capt. S. Warren .	Woolwich
Sail 3	Guns 80		

## **PORTSMOUTH STATION.**

Admiral Sir Thomas Williams, G.C.B.

Excellent . . . . .	58 .	Capt. T. Hastings .	Portsmouth
Portsmouth (yacht) .		Lieut. J. Maitland	
Royal George (yacht) .		{ Capt. Right Hon. Lord	Portsmouth
		{ A. Fitzclarence	
Seaflower . . . . .	4 .	Lieut. Morgan .	Falmouth
Serpent . . . . .	16 .	Com. W. Symonds .	Cruiser
Sparrow . . . . .	10 .	Lieut. W. C. Riley .	Cruiser
Sylvia . . . . .	1 .	Lieut. T. Spark .	Cruiser
Victory . . . . .	104 .	Capt. C. R. Williams .	Portsmouth Harbour. FLAG-SHIP
Sail 8	Guns 193		

## **PLYMOUTH STATION.**

Admiral Sir Manley Dixon, K.C.B.

Pike . . . . .	12 .	Lieut. A. Brooking .	4th Feb. sailed for Lisbon
Plymouth (yacht) . .		Capt. C. B. H. Rows, C.B.	
Royal Sovereign (yacht)		Capt. C. M. Bullen, C.B.	
Royalist . . . . .	10 .	Lieut. Williams .	Falmouth 7th Feb.
Spredy . . . . .	10 .	Lieut. J. F. Roepel .	Cruiser. Falmouth
Viper . . . . .	6 .	Lieut. H. James .	Cruiser
Sail 6	Guns 38		

## **NORTH-SEA SQUADRON.**

Vice-Admiral Sir P. Malcolm, K.C.B.

Rendezvous, Downs.			
Castor . . . . .	36 .	Capt. Right Hon. Lord John Hay	
Dongal . . . . .	74 .	Capt. J. Dick .	FLAG-SHIP
Larne . . . . .	18 .	Com. W. S. Smith .	North Sea
Malabar . . . . .	74 .	Capt. Hon. J. Percy .	Downs
Satellite . . . . .	18 .	Com. R. Smart .	Do.
Snake . . . . .	16 .	Com. Robertson .	Do.
Talavera . . . . .	74 .	Capt. S. Brown	
Sail 7	Guns 810		

## **MEDITERRANEAN STATION.**

Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Hotham, K.G.B., G.C. St. M. & G.

Actmon . . . . .	26 .	Capt. Hon. F. W. Grey	Malta
Alfred . . . . .	50 .	Capt. R. Maunsell .	Do.
BANHAM . . . . .	50 .	Capt. H. Pigot .	FLAG-SHIP. Malta
Belvidera . . . . .	42 .	Capt. Hon. R. S. Dundas	1st Jan. at Tripoli
Ceylon . . . . .	2 .	Lieut. H. Schomberg .	Malta. Receiving Ship
Champion . . . . .	16 .	Com. Hon. A. Duncombe	Malta
Cordelia . . . . .	10 .	Com. C. Hotham .	10th Jan. Malta
Curacoa . . . . .	26 .	Capt. T. Dunn .	25th Aug. sailed from Singapore for Manilla
Madagascar . . . .	46 .	Capt. E. Lyons .	12th Jan. at Napoli di Romania
Pelican . . . . .	18 .	Com. J. Gape .	Corfu
Sail 10	Guns 288		

# DISTRIBUTION OF THE ROYAL NAVY.

441

SHIPS.	GUNS.	COMMANDERS.	DISTRIBUTION.
Philomel . . .	10 .	Com. W. Smith . .	Gibraltar
Rainbow . . .	28 .	Capt. Sir J. Franklin .	Patras
Raleigh . . .	18 .	Com. A. M. Hawkins .	Napoli di Romania
Rapid . . .	10 .	Com. C. H. Swinburne .	Malta
Seylla . . .	18 .	Com. Hon. G. Grey .	Napoli di Romania
Sail 5		Guns 84	

## NORTH AMERICAN AND WEST INDIA STATION.

Vice-Admiral the Right Hon. Sir G. Cockburn, G.C.B.

Arachne . . .	18 .	Com. W. G. Agar . .	Jan. at Demerara from La Guayra
Ariadne . . .	28 .	Capt. C. Phillips . .	10th Jan. at Jamaica
Blanche . . .	46 .	{ Capt. A. Farquhar, .	18th Dec. sailed for Jamaica; 10th Jan. at
		{ K.H. . . . .	Jamaica
Columbine . . .	18 .	Com. O. Love . .	{ 18th Dec. arrived at Barbadoes from Antigua; .
			{ 1st Jan. at Port Royal
Dispatch . . .	18 .	Com. G. Daniell . .	30th Dec. sailed from Jamaica for Havana
Dromedary (convict ship)		R. Skinner, Master .	Bermuda
Firedy . . .	2 .	Lieut. J. M'Donnel .	Bahamas
Gannet . . .	18 .	Com. M. H. Sweeney .	Port au Prince. 10th Jan. at Jamaica
Kangaroo . . .	3 .	Lieut. F. Hickey . .	8th Dec. at Honduras
Magnificent . . .	4 .	Lieut. J. Paget . .	Port Royal
Mink . . .	3 .	Lieut. J. Russell (b) .	10th Jan. at Jamaica
Nautilus . . .	10 .	{ Com. Rt. Hon. Lord .	1st Jan. at Jamaica
		{ G. Paulet . . .	
Nimble . . .	5 .	Lieut. J. M. Pothbury .	Bermuda
North Star . . .	28 .	Capt. E. Paget . .	1st Jan. at Barbadoes
Pallas . . .	42 .	Capt. W. Walpole . .	20th Dec. at Barbadoes
Pearl . . .	20 .	Com. R. Gordon . .	Jamaica
Pickle . . .	5 .	Lieut. C. Bagot . .	Bahamas
Pincher . . .	5 .	Lieut. J. Hookey . .	Bahamas
Racehorse . . .	18 .	Com. F. V. Cotton . .	2d Oct. sailed for Jamaica
Sapphire . . .	28 .	{ Captain Hon. W. G. .	14th Nov. Bay of Fundy
		{ Trefusis . . .	
Shipjack . . .	5 .	Lieut. W. Shortland .	Bahamas
Sparrowhawk . . .	18 .	Com. T. Maitland . .	
Speedwell . . .	5 .	Lieut. W. Croker . .	Barbadoes
Tweed . . .	20 .	Com. A. Kertram . .	1st Jan. at Jamaica
Vexnon . . .	50 .	Capt. Sir G. A. Westphall .	10th Feb. put back to Torbay
Victor . . .	18 .	Com. R. Russell . .	1st Jan. at Jamaica
Winchester . . .	52 .	Capt. Hon. W. Wellesley .	1st Jan. at Jamaica
Sail 27		Guns 487	

## SOUTH AMERICAN STATION.

Rear-Admiral Sir T. Baker, K.C.B.

Algerine . . .	10 .	{ Com. Hon. F. F. .	{ At Bahia 8th Dec. from Rio
		{ De Roos . . .	
Clio . . .	18 .	Com. J. J. Onslow . .	{ Rio 5th Dec. transhipped 800,000 to the packet,
			{ and sailed for Falkland Islands
Cockatrice . . .	6 .	Lieut. W. L. Rees . .	Rio
Dublin . . .	50 .	{ Capt. Rt. Hon. Lord .	{ 25th Dec. at Valparaiso
		{ James Townsend . .	
Hornet . . .	6 .	Lieut. F. R. Coghlan .	20th Oct. sailed
Eylades . . .	18 .	Com. E. Blankley . .	Rio Janeiro
Rattlesnake . . .	28 .	Capt. C. Graham . .	23d Dec. sailed for Lima
Samarang . . .	28 .	Capt. C. H. Paget . .	10th Oct. Monte Video
Tyne . . .	28 .	Capt. C. Hope . .	28th Nov. arrived at Rio
Warspite . . .	76 .	Capt. G. Talbot . .	Dec. at Rio.
Sail 10		Guns 268	

## EAST INDIA STATION.

Vice-Admiral Sir John Gore, K.C.B.

Alligator . . .	28 .	Capt. G. R. Lambert .	Malacca
Challenger . . .	28 .	Capt. C. H. Freeman .	Swan River
Harrier . . .	18 .	Com. H. L. S. Vassal .	25th Sept. left Ceylon for Bengal
Imogene . . .	28 .	Capt. P. Blackwood .	Aug. at Malacca
Magicienne . . .	24 .	Capt. J. H. Plumridge .	25th Aug. arrived at Singapore
Undaunted . . .	46 .	Capt. E. Harvey . .	29th Oct. at Mauritius
Wolf . . .	18 .	Com. W. Hamley . .	Penang
Zebra . . .	18 .	{ Com. Right Hon. Lord .	{ Penang.
		{ F. C. P. Beauclerk .	
Sail 8		Guns 208	

## DISTRIBUTION OF THE ROYAL NAVY.

## LISBON STATION.

Rear-Admiral William Parker, C.B.

SHIPS.	GUNS.	COMMANDERS.	DISTRIBUTION.
Asia . . .	84	Capt. P. Richards	Flag-Ship. Tagus.
Britannia . . .	120	Capt. P. Rainier	Tagus
Caledonia . . .	120	Capt. J. Hillyar	Tagus
Druid . . .	46	Capt. S. Roberts	Tagus
Nautilus . . .	10	{ Com. Right Hon. Lord G. Paulet }	Oporto
Nimrod . . .	20	Com. Lord E. Russell	Oporto
Orestes . . .	18	Com. W. N. Glascock	Oporto
St. Vincent . . .	120	Capt. H. F. Senhouse	Tagus
Sail 8 Guns 538			

## AFRICA AND CAPE OF GOOD HOPE STATION.

Rear-Admiral Frederic Warren.

Badger . . .	10	Com. G. F. Stowe	Simon's Bay
Brisk . . .	3	Lieut. J. Thompson	Gold Coast
Charybdis . . .	3	Lieut. R. B. Crawford	Gambia
Curlew . . .	10	Com. H. D. Trotter	3d Nov. arrived at Mauritius from Ceylon
Favourite . . .	18		Gold Coast
Forester . . .	3	Lieut. W. H. Quin	{ 30th Jan. sailed for Africa from Falmouth. Re- ported lost.
Griffin . . .	3	Lieut. J. Parilly	9th Feb. sailed for Africa from Falmouth
Isis . . .	50	Capt. J. Polkinghorne	4th Nov. sailed for Mauritius
Pelorus . . .	18	Com. R. Meredith	Simon's Bay
Talbot . . .	28	Capt. R. Dickinson, C.B.	Mauritius 29th Oct.
Trinculo . . .	18	Com. J. R. Booth	{ 18th Dec. arrived at Bahia on her way to Mauritius
Sail 11 Guns 164			

## PARTICULAR SERVICE.

Conway . . .	28	Capt. H. Eden	30th Jan. sailed from Plymouth for the westward
Revenge . . .	78	Capt. D. H. Mackay	30th Jan. sailed for Lisbon
Rover . . .	18	Com. Sir G. Young, Bart.	9th Feb. sailed for the Mediterranean
Savage . . .	10	Lieut. R. Loney	27th Jan. sailed for Oporto
Scout . . .	10	Com. W. Hargood	Downs
Spartiate . . .	76	Capt. R. Tait	Torbay
Stag . . .	46	Capt. N. Lockyer	
Sail 7 Guns 266			

## SURVEYING VESSELS.

Ætna . . .	8	Com. Belcher	Oporto
Beacon . . .	8	Com. Copeland	Archipelago
Beagle . . .	10	Com. Fitzroy	2d Nov. Buenos Ayres; 24th Nov. Monte Video
Fairy . . .	10	Com. W. Hewett	Sheerness
Investigator . . .	16	Mr. Thomas	Sheerness
Jackdaw . . .	4	Lieut. E. Barnett	Chatham
Mastiff . . .	6	Lieut. J. Graves	Archipelago
Raven . . .	4	Lieut. W. Arlett	Oporto
Sail 8 Guns 66			

## STEAM-VESSELS.

Alban . . .		Lieut. Kennedy	On way from Lisbon
African . . .		Lieut. J. Harvey	Milford
Carron . . .	2	Lieut. J. Duffill	22d Jan. arrived at Falmouth
Columbia . . .	2	Lieut. Com. R. Edz	Woolwich
Comet . . .			Woolwich
Confiance . . .	2	Lieut. H. F. Belson	17th Feb. Downs
Dee . . .	4	Com. R. Oliver	30th Jan. arrived at Woolwich
Echo . . .	4	Lieut. Com. R. Otway	Oporto
Firebrand . . .	6	Lieut. W. G. Buchanan	Falmouth
Firefy . . .		Lieut. T. Baldock	9th Feb. sailed for Mediterranean
Flamer . . .		Lieut. R. Bastard	Woolwich
Hermes . . .		Lieut. J. Wright	Mediterranean
Lightning . . .		J. Allen	13th Feb. at Portsmouth
Messenger . . .	1		Woolwich
Meteor . . .	2	Lieut. Symons	Malta
Pluto . . .		Lieut. G. Buchanan	Bight of Benin
Rhadamanthus . . .	4	Com. G. Evans	
Salamander . . .	4	Com. H. T. Austen	Woolwich
Sail 18 Guns 27			

## PACKETS.

SHIPS.	GUNS.	COMMANDERS.	
Astrea .	8	Capt. W. King	Falmouth
Barracouta .	6	Lieut. R. B. James	On way from Jamaica
Briseis .	6	Lieut. J. Downey	Sailed for Mexico
Calypso .	6	Lieut. R. Payton	On way from Halifax
Goldfinch .	6	Lieut. E. Collier	16th Feb. sailed for Halifax
Lapwing .	6	Lieut. G. B. Forster	16th Feb. sailed for the West Indies
Leveret .	10	Lieut. W. F. Lapidge	18th Jan. arrived at Lisbon from Falmouth
Lyra .	6	Lieut. J. St. John	21st Jan. sailed for Leeward Islands
Mutine .	4	Lieut. R. Pawle	23d Feb. at Falmouth
Nightingale .	6	Lieut. G. Fortescue	On way from West Indies
Opossum .	4	Lieut. F. R. Peter	21st Jan. sailed for Mexico
Pigeon .	4	Lieut. J. Binney	At Falmouth, fitting
Plover .	4	Lieut. W. Downey	At Falmouth, fitting
Sheldrake .	4	Lieut. A. R. L. Passingham	At Falmouth, fitting
Swallow .	6	Lieut. S. Griffith	On way from Brazil
Thais .	4	Lieut. C. Church	On way from Mexico
Royalist .	4	Lieut. R. N. Williams	18th Feb. sailed for Lisbon
Skylark .	4	Lieut. C. P. Ladd	At Falmouth, fitting

Sail 13 Guns 98

## TROOP AND STORE-SHIPS.

Atholl .	Mr. A. Karley	4th Dec. sailed for Dublin
Buffalo .	Mr. F. W. Sadler	Woolwich
Jupiter .	Mr. R. Easte	7th Jan. sailed for Mauritius
Romney .	Mr. C. Brown	Cork

Sail 4

## FITTING FOR SERVICE.

Comus .	18	Com. W. Hamilton	Plymouth
Hyacinth .	18	Com. F. P. Blackwood	Portsmouth
Magpie .	4	Lieut. J. Moffat	Sheerness

Sail 3 Guns 40

## ' PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

## NAVY.

## PROMOTIONS.

## CAPTAINS.

John Lihou.  
Wm. Burnett.

## COMMANDERS.

Hon. Hervey Keppell.  
Henry Stroud.

## LIEUTENANTS.

Hon. G. F. Hastings.  
Joshua Hutchinson.

## SURGEON.

P. Martyn.

## APPOINTMENTS.

## CAPTAIN.

E. R. Williams.....Victory.  
James Noble, out-pensioner of Greenwich Hos-  
pital.

## COMMANDER.

F. P. Blackwood.....Hyacinth.

## LIEUTENANTS.

Thomas Watkins.....Victory.  
C. Richards.....Do.  
A. Slado (Sup.).....Do.  
J. W. Brown.....Sylvia.  
John Gore.....Hyacinth.  
Wm. Dickey.....Do.  
Jno. Wilson.....Melville.C. J. Rooke.....Victory.  
E. Barnett.....Jackdaw.  
C. Serjeantson.....Conway.

## MASTERS.

Yulo.....Victory.  
W. White (b).....Spartiate.  
T. Baseley.....Hyacinth.  
R. Browne.....Talbot.  
D. Quantom.....Pelorus.  
R. Hooper.....Rover.

## SURGEON.

C. Pattison.....Hyacinth

## ASSISTANT-SURGEON.

C. Alison.....Spartiate.  
O'Neil Ferguson.....San Josef.  
J. H. Hamilton.....Buffalo.  
A. Muirhead.....Hyacinth.  
W. W. Wright.....Victory.

## PURSERS.

P. Bailey.....Victory.  
A. Murray.....Plymouth Ord.  
J. Colwell.....Hyacinth.  
H. Brenton.....Alfred.

## CHAPLAIN.

Rev. G. Fisher.....Victory.

## ROYAL MARINES.

Second Lieut. George Logan, to be First Lieut.  
vice Gray, deceased.  
— March to be Second Lieut. vice Lamborne,  
resigned.  
J. T. C. McCarthy, to be Second Lieut. vice  
Lamont, cashiered.

## ARMY.

## PAVILION, BRIGHTON, Jan. 22, 1833.

The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood upon Rear-Admiral Edward Durnford King, Military Knight Commander of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order.

## WAR-OFFICE, Feb. 12.

Memorandum.—The half-pay of the undermentioned officers has been cancelled from the 12th instant, inclusive, they having accepted commuted allowances for their commissions, viz.:

Lieut. R. Miller, h. p. 86th Foot; Ensign T. R. Davis, h. p. 61st Foot; Lieut. T. Smith, h. p. Rifle Brigade; Ensign F. Angerstein, h. p. 44th Foot; Capt. G. T. Greenland, h. p. unattached; Assist.-Surgeon R. Berry, h. p. 60th Foot; Lieut. F. J. Graham, h. p. 2d Dragoon Guards; Lieut. E. L. Daniel, h. p. 7th West India Regt.; Assist.-Surgeon S. Gilder, h. p. 2d Life Guards; Quartermaster J. Jackson, h. p. 67th Foot; Ensign W. Murray, h. p. 30th Foot; Lieut. J. K. Gray, h. p. 8th Foot; Capt. P. Lewis, h. p. 29th Foot.

Royal East Middlesex Regiment of Militia.—Wm. Reed, Gent., to be Lieutenant; Edward James Dyson, Gent., to be Ensign.

Forfar and Kincardine Regiment of Militia.—John Hay, Gent. to be Lieut.

## OFFICE OF ORDNANCE, Feb. 11.

Royal Regt. of Artillery.—First Lieut. H. G. Ord, to be Second Captain, vice Hawkins, retired on half-pay.

## FEB. 14.

Corps of Royal Engineers.—Second Lieut. St. G. L. Lyster, to be First Lieut. vice Blackiston, retired.

## WAR-OFFICE, Feb. 15.

Royal Regt. of Horse Guards.—G. T. Quin, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Tyrell, prom.

6th Regt. of Drag. Guards.—Lieut. J. W. D. Hebson, to be Adjut. vice Gerard, who resigns the Adjut. only.

1st Foot.—Ensign W. Landreth, to be Lieut. by p. vice Macleod, prom.; A. C. Sanderson, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Landreth.

4th Foot.—Ensign M. Fortesque, to be Lieut. without p. vice Darke, dec.; Ensign J. Greatham, from h. p. of the 30th Regt. to be Ensign, vice Fortesque.

7th Foot.—Lieut. C. T. Fr  r, from h. p. to be Lieut. paying the diff. vice Byng, app. to the 29th Regt.

11th Foot.—Capt. B. V. Derinzy, to be Major, without p. vice O'Kelly, dec.; Lieut. F. Marsh, to be Capt. vice Derinzy; Ensign E. L. Wolley, to be Lieut. vice Marsh; Gentleman Cadet E. A. K. Keane, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, vice Wolley.

14th Foot.—Surgeon D. Henderson, M.D., from the 78th Regt. to be Surgeon, vice M'Andrew, who exch.

26th Foot.—Capt. W. Senhouse, from h. p. to be Capt. vice A. Calder, who exch. rec. the diff.

29th Foot.—Lieut. W. F. Byng, from the 7th Regt. to be Lieut. vice J. O'Neill, who ret. upon h. p. rec. the diff.

38th Foot.—Ensign H. Close, to be Lieutenant, without p. vice Whittell, dec.; H. W. Bace, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Close.

42d Foot.—Assist.-Surgeon A. T. Jackson, from

the Staff, to be Assist.-Surgeon, vice Maguin, who exch.

45th Foot.—Major E. F. Boys, to be Lieut.-Colonel, without p. vice Shaw, dec.; Brevet-Major R. Moore, to be Major, vice Boys; Lieut. J. Macintyre, to be Capt. vice Moore.

55th Foot.—Ensign J. Coates, to be Lieut. without p. vice Mardonald, dec.; Ensign H. M'Caskill, to be Lieut. without p. vice Morrison, dec.; Ensign T. de Havilland, to be Lieut. by p. vice M'Caskill, whose promotion, by purchase, is not to take place; S. Campbell, Gent. to be Ensign, without p. vice Coates.

78th Foot.—J. F. Haliburton, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Alvares, who ret.; Surgeon J. M'Andrew, from the 14 Regt. to be Surgeon, vice Henderson, who exch.

87th Foot.—Capt. J. B. Graves, from the h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice Wood, who ret.

Unattached.—Lieut. A. L. Macleod, from the 1st Foot, to be Capt. by pur.

Hospital Staff.—Assist.-Surgeon D. W. Maguin, from the 42d Regt. to be Assist.-Surgeon to the Forces, vice Jackson, who exch.

## WHITEHALL, Jan. 23.

The King has been pleased to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, granting unto Admiral Sir George Martin, G.C.B., the office or place of Rear-Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Admiralty thereof, and also of Rear-Admiral of the Navies and Seas of the said United Kingdom, in the room of Admiral Sir Thomas Foley, dec.

## DOWNING-STREET, Jan. 24.

The King has been graciously pleased to nominate and appoint Admiral Sir Davidge Gould, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, to be a Knight Grand Cross of the said Order, in the room of Admiral Sir Thomas Foley, dec.

## WAR-OFFICE, Jan. 25.

Memoranda.—His Majesty has been pleased to approve of the 13th Regiment of Light Dragoons being permitted to retain on the chaos and appointments the motto "Vivet in ætænum," which is stated to have been borne by the regiment for many years.

His Majesty has been pleased to permit the 91st Regiment to bear on its colours and appointments, in addition to any other badges or distinctions which may have been heretofore authorized to be borne by the regiment, the words "Roleia," "Vimiera," and "Corunna," in commemoration of the gallantry and good conduct of the Regiment in action with the enemy at Roleia, on the 17th of August, 1808; at Vimiera, on the 21st of August, 1808; and before Corunna, on the 16th of January, 1809.

6th Regt. of Drag. Gnafils.—Lieut. Henry Hayhurst France, to be Capt. by p. vice Heathcote, who ret.; Cornet Charles Joseph Trueman, to be Lieut. by p. vice France; John A. Cruikshank, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Trueman.

16th Regt. of Light Drag.—Cornet Henry Garrett, to be Lieut. by p. vice Pitman, who ret.; William Stamer O'Grady, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Garrett.

31st Foot.—Ensign Robert T. Eager, to be Lieut. by p. vice Durnford, who ret.; Arthur Du Bourfieu, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Eager.

42d Foot.—Ensign Collin George Campbell, to be Lieut. by p. vice Inglis, who ret.; James Wolfe Murray, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Campbell.

Rifle Brigade.—To be Second Lieut. by p.—William Leigh Mellish, Gent. vice Fitzherbert, prom.; William Henry Beresford, Gent. vice Cavendish, prom.

Unattached.—Second Lieut. Honourable George Henry Cavendish, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Lieut. of Infantry, by p.

Memorandum.—Lieut. Ronald McDonald, of the late 7th Royal Veteran Battalion, has been allowed to retire from the service, by the sale of an unattached commission.

#### DOWNING-STREET, Jan. 29.

The King has been graciously pleased to nominate and appoint Admiral Sir Charles Tyler, Knight Commander of the Most Hon. Military Order of the Bath, to be a Knight Grand Cross of the said Order, in the room of Admiral Viscount Exmouth, deceased.

His Majesty has further been pleased to nominate and appoint Admiral Sir Charles Hamilton, Bart., to be a Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, in the room of Admiral Sir Charles Tyler.

#### OFFICE OF ORDNANCE, Jan. 25.

Royal Regt. of Artillery.—First Lieut. Richard Newton King, to be Second Capt. vice Speer, ret. on h. p.; Second Lieut. Robert Wynter, to be First Lieut. vice King.

#### WHITEHALL, Jan. 29.

The King has been pleased to appoint Colonel John Ready, to be Lieut.-Governor of the Isle of Man, in the room of Cornelius Smelt, Esq., dec.

#### JANUARY 30.

The King has been pleased to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal, granting unto Admiral Sir Edward Thornborough, G.C.B., the office or place of Vice-Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and Lieutenant of the Admiralty thereof, and also Lieutenant of the Navies and Seas of the said United Kingdom, in the room of Admiral Viscount Exmouth, deceased.

#### WAR-OFFICE, Feb. 1.

7th Regt. of Light Drag.—Cornet Arthur Shirley, to be Lieut. by p. vice Wykeham, who ret.; John Henry Sutton, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Shirley.

21st Foot.—Lieut. Alfred Mundy, from the 60th Regt. to be Lieut. vice Fordyce, who exch.

39th Foot.—Ensign Robert Spencer Boland, to be Lieut. by p. vice Temple Frederick Sinclair, who ret.; John Harvey, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Boland.

60th Foot.—Lieut. John Fordyce, from the 21st Regt. to be Lieut. vice Mundy, who exch.

75th Foot.—Major Gerard Quill, from h. p. unatt. to be Major, vice Frederick Hammond, who exch. rec. the diff.

77th Foot.—Molyneux Hyde Nepean, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Stratton, prom.

82d Foot.—Gentleman Cadet Thomas Wynn Hornby, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, without p. vice Silver, dec.

85th Foot.—Ensign Thos. Montgomery McNeill Hamilton, to be Lieut. by p. vice Blackall, who ret.; Newcome Edward Blackall, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Hamilton.

98th Foot.—Lieut. John Henry Armstrong, to be Capt. by p. vice Mahon, who ret.; Ensign John Rainer, to be Lieut. by p. vice Armstrong; Samuel William Russell, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Rainer.

The undermentioned Major of Cavalry has retired upon the unatt. rank of Lieut.-Colonel of Infantry:—

Major Henry Edward Porter, from the 9th Light Drag.

Brevet.—Capt. Edward Drury, of the 6th Regt. to be Major in the Army.

#### OFFICE OF ORDNANCE, Jan. 31.

Royal Regiment of Artillery.—Major-General Spencer Claudius Parry, to be Colonel-Commandant, vice Lieut.-General Sir John Macleod, dec.

Royal Montgomeryshire Militia.—Lieut. M. E. Lewis, to be Capt. vice Charles Gardner Humphreys, resigned; C. H. Garrett, Gent. to be Second Lieut.

#### FEBRUARY 1.

Erratum in the Gazette of the 1st of January last.—for Gentleman Cadet "Peter Macbeau," read Gentleman Cadet "Peter Macleau."

#### WAR-OFFICE, Feb. 5.

8th Regt. of Light Drag.—Lieut.-General Sir W. K. Grant, K.C.B. to be Colonel, vice General Sir B. Tarleton, dec.

Garrison Major-General Sir James Bathurst, K.C.B., to be Governor of Berwick, vice Sir H. Tarleton, dec.

Royal Anglesey Militia.—Charles Stanhope Jones, Esq. late Captain in the 59th Foot, to be Adjut. vice Crotty, dec.

Adjut. Charles Stanhope Jones, to have the rank of Captain.

16th or Invernesshire Regt. of North British Militia.—Ensign Wm. Gray, to be Lieut. vice Dunbar, resigned.

#### DOWNING-STREET, Feb. 7.

The King has been pleased to appoint J. Lyons Nixon, Esq. to be Lieut.-Governor of the islands of St. Christopher, Nevis, Anguilla, and the Virgin Islands.

The King has been pleased to appoint Capt. Sir Charles M. Schomburg, R.N. to be Lieut.-Governor of the island of Dominica.

#### WAR-OFFICE, Feb. 8.

7th Regt. of Drag. Guards.—George John Holmes, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Singleton, promoted.

8th Foot.—Ensign Walter Ley, to be Lieut. by p. vice Senhouse, prom.; Francis Saunders Holmes, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Ley.

16th Foot.—Lieut. John Keating Taylor, from h. p. of the 17th Light Drag. to be Lieut. vice Andrew Richard Evans, who has received a commuted allowance.

17th Foot.—James Ferneaux, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Edwards, app. to the 74th Regt.

18th Foot.—Lieut. Nicholas R. Tomlinson, to be Capt. by p. vice Reel, who ret.; Ensign William Langmead, to be Lieut. by p. vice Tomlinson; Henry Charles Stratford, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Langmead.

74th Foot.—Ensign Richard Maxwell, to be Lieut. by p. vice Grant, who ret.; Ensign Cadwallader Edwards, from the 17th Regt. to be Ensign, vice Maxwell.

Unattached.—Lieut. William Senhouse, from the 8th Regt. to be Capt. by p.

Memorandum.—Capt. Alexander Cheyne has been allowed to retire from the service, by the sale of an unattached commission.

## DOWNING-STREET, Feb. 13.

The King has been pleased to appoint Major-General Sir Lionel Smith, K.C.B., to be Governor and Commander-in-chief of the Islands of Barbadoes, St. Vincent, Grenada, Tobago, and their dependencies.

The King has been pleased to appoint Captain Tyler, R.N., to be Lieut.-Governor of the Island of St. Vincent.

The King has been pleased to appoint Major-General Middlemore, to be Lieut.-Governor of the Island of Grenada.

Commission signed by the Lord Lieutenant of the county of Kent:—

West Kent Yeomanry Cavalry—Charles W. Minet, Gent. to be Cornet, vice Waldo, resigned.

Commission signed by the Lord Lieutenant of the county of Lincoln:—

Royal North Lincoln Militia.—John Uppleby, Gent. to be Lieut.

## WAR-OFFICE, Feb. 22.

1st or Gren. Regt. of Foot Guards.—Ensign and Lieut. Hon. B. Bruce, to be Lieut. by p. vice Dunlop, who ret.; Hon. G. Cadogan, to be Ens. and Lieut. by p. vice Bruce.

8th Foot.—Capt. J. Laing, from h. p. to be Capt. vice T. H. Davis, who exch. rec. the diff.

24th Foot.—Lieut. E. S. James, from the 69th Regt. to be Lieut. vice Griffiths, whose app. has not taken place.

35th Foot.—Capt. J. R. Heyland, from h. p. to be Capt. vice B. Kerr, who exch. rec. the diff.

38th Foot.—Ensign W. Martin, to be Lieut. without p. vice Close, whose promotion has not taken place.

39th Foot.—Second Lieut. C. Van Straubenzee, from the Ceylon Regt. to be Lieut. by p. vice Hon. J. Sinclair, who ret.

45th Foot.—Ensign O. B. Roche, to be Lieut. without p. vice M'Intire, prom.; Ensign J. Leslie, from the 1st West India Regt. to be Ensign, vice Roche.

49th Foot.—Lieut. W. S. Norton, from h. p. of the 19th Regt. to be Lieut. vice Dutton, app. to the 60th Regt.

53d Foot.—Ensign J. Scott, to be Lieut. by p. vice Wigley, who ret.; E. C. Moore, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Scott.

69th Foot.—Lieut. C. Dutton, from h. p. of the 49th Regt. to be Lieut. vice James, app. to the 24th Regt.

73d Foot.—Ensign E. E. Langford, to be Lieut. by p. vice Skeue, who ret.; T. Douglas, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Langford.

78th Foot.—Capt. T. B. Wall, from h. p. to be Capt. vice M. Macgregor, who exch. rec. the diff.

87th Foot.—Lieut. C. F. Parkinson, to be Capt. by p. vice Graves, who ret.; Second Lieut. W. R. Preston, to be First Lieut. by p. vice Parkinson; William Percy Lea, Gent. to be Second Lieut. by p. vice Preston.

Ceylon Regt.—W. T. Layard, Gent. to be Second Lieut. by p. vice V. Straubenzee, prom. to the 39th Regt.

## BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

## BIRTHS.

At Halifax, Nova Scotia, Lady Georgiana Cathcart, wife of Lieut.-Colonel Hon. G. Cathcart, 8th or King's Regt. of a son.

At Gibraltar, the Lady of Lieut. H. A. West, 12th Regt. of a son.

At Dartmouth, the Lady of Lieut. A. W. Forbes, R.N. of a daughter.

At Ilfracombe, the Lady of Lieutenant Robinson, R.N. of a son.

The Lady of Lieut. J. Wolfe, R.N. of a son.

Jan. 27th, at Winchester, Sussex, the Lady of Lieut. G. W. Tomlin, R.N. Coast-Guard Service, of a daughter.

Jan. 27th, in Hertford-Street, May Fair, the Lady of Capt. St. J. Mildmay, R.N. of a daughter.

Jan. 28th, at Woolwich Common, the Lady of Major H. W. Gordon, R.A. of a son.

Jan. 28th, at Blechingly, Surrey, the Lady of Robert Allan, Esq. surgeon, R.N. of a daughter.

The Lady of Capt. R. Cernae, of a daughter.

At Southdown, the Lady of Capt. Wm. Walker, R.N. of a daughter.

Feb. 1st, in Sackville-street, the Lady of Lieut.-Col. H. Seymour Blane, Sc. Fus. Gds., of a son.

Feb. 4th, at Peckham, the widow of D. B. Conway, Esq. Surgeon, R.N. of a daughter.

Feb. 7th, at Southsea, the Lady of Capt. Simpson, R.M. of a daughter.

Feb. 8th, the Lady of Lieut.-Col. Leslie Walker, C.B. of a son.

Feb. 9th, at Calverleigh Court, Devonshire, the Lady of Col. Chichester, of a son.

Feb. 10th, at Alington, near Exeter, the Lady of Capt. H. G. Bayley, 65th Regt. of a son, since dead.

Feb. 11th, at Swanage, the Lady of Dr. Carruthers, Surgeon, R.N. of a daughter.

Feb. 12th, the Lady of Lieut. Walker, R.N. of a son.

Feb. 15th, at the Admiralty, the Lady of the Right Hon. Sir James Graham, Bart., M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty, of twins, a son and a daughter.

At Leamington, the Lady of Capt. Smith, 93rd Highlanders of a daughter.

At Torrington, the Lady of Captain Colby, R.N. of a son.

## MARRIAGES.

Jan. 10 Capt. Algernon Capel, R.N. to Caroline, second daughter of Admiral the Hon. Sir Charles Paget, and niece to the Marquis of Anglesey.

Jan. 22d, at Armagh, W. L. Kidd, M.D. surgeon R.N. to Margaret, relict of the late Colonel Walker, R.A.

In Dublin, Capt. I. E. Acklom, 28th regt. to Margaret, daughter of John Butcher, Esq. Ordnance storekeeper.

Feb. 5th, at Deal, John Ferrier, Esq. Admiral of the Blue, to Elizabeth, relict of Commander James Leach, R.N.

Feb. 5th, at Hascragh church, Co. Galway, Lieut. R. Shepperd, 76th regt. to Anna Maria, third daughter of Stephen Masters, of Cregan in the county of Galway, Esq.

Feb. 7th, at West Bromwich, Ensign John A. de Balinhard, 92d Highlanders, to Ellen, daughter of Joseph Halford, Esq. of Charlemont Hall.

At Cork, Lieut. M. S. H. Lloyd, 2d or Queen's Royals, to Maria Louisa, daughter of the late John Nesbit, Esq. of Fermoy.

Feb. 9th, at St. Pancras, London, Capt. W. Pittman, 49th regt. to Sarah, widow of the late S. Baker, Esq. of Rochester.

Feb. 12th, at Sithney, near Helleston, Lieut. Brewer, R.N. to Miss Mitchellson.

Feb. 14th, at Mylor, Lieut. Downey, R.N. commanding the Brisels Packet, to Miss Symonds, daughter of R. Symonds, Esq. of Little Falmouth,

At Kingston, Upper Canada, Capt. C. L. Wingfield, 86th Regt., to Jane Eliza, eldest daughter of Colonel Mitchell, Com. of Royal Artillery in Upper Canada.

Feb. 19th, at Padstow, Captain S. Paddon, R.N. to Miss P. Richards.

## DEATHS.

## GENERAL.

Jan. Sir B. Tarleton, Bart. G.C.B. Colonel of 8th Dr. Gov. of Berwick.

## LIEUTENANT-GENERAL.

Jan 8th, John M'Kensie, Scotland.

## MAJOR-GENERAL.

Jan. 1st, Jas. Geo. Scott, E. I. Comp. Service, London.

Jan. 20th, Richard Payne, h.p. Hompesch's Mounted R.

## LIEUTENANT-COLONELS.

Jan. 2d, H. Cameron, h.p. 9th Foot.  
Dec. 30th, Dunbar, h.p. Unat. in North Brit.

## MAJOR.

Dec. 27th, J. E. Grant, R. Art. Woolwich.

## CAPTAINS.

Aug. 24th, Pender, 69d Foot, Bangalore.  
Dec. 8th, J. Cox, h.p. 18th Foot, London.  
Jan. 5th, Given, h.p. 18th Dr.  
Dec. 24th, White, h.p. 3d Ceylon Regt. Guerrilla, near Irvine.  
July 23d, Von Losecke, h.p. 7th Linc. Ger. Leg. Lunenburg.  
May 7th, Von Doring, ditto.  
Nov. 25th, Luderitz, h.p. 2d Dr. Ger. Leg.  
Nov. 22d, Klossius, h.p. R. For. Wag. Tr.

## LIEUTENANTS.

Dec. 28th, White, 50th Foot, Birr.  
—9th, Lely, h.p. 5th Foot.  
Sept. 19th, 31, Macpherson, h.p. 15th Foot.  
—1st, 29, Mansell, h.p. Unat.  
Dec. 26th, Mosqua, h.p. Brunsw. Inf.  
Nov. 29th, Lee, h.p. 24th Dr.  
May 14th, Williams, h.p. Chass. Brit.  
Aug. 28th, Von Losecke, h.p. 7th Line, Ger. Leg.  
Sept. 24th, Thälman, h.p. For. Vet. Bat.  
Jan. 23d, Whittell, 38th Foot.

## ENSIGN.

Jan. 17th, Silver, 82d Foot, Edinburgh.

## PAYMASTER.

Dec. 23d, C. Gordon, Rec. Dist.

## QUARTER-MASTERS.

Jan. 20th, Scott, h.p. 1st Dr. Gds.  
Jan. 11th, 32, Pearson, h.p. 2d Dr.  
Dec. 13th, Sweeten, h.p. 52d Foot.

## MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dec. Dep. Insp.-Gen. Joberna, h.p.  
—13th, Surg. Edwards, h.p. 1st Vet. Bat.  
Nov. 16th, —Herring, h.p. 7th Line Ger. Leg. Göttingen.  
Dec. 26th, Purv. Thos. Hume Bowles, h.p.  
Surg. Bell, M.D. h.p. Meuron's Regt.

N.B. The names of Lieutenant Wade of the 13th Foot, and Ensign Martin of the 38th Foot, were improperly inserted in the list of Deaths for the month of February.

Jan. 14th, at Newcastle, Castletwellin, County of Down, Capt. W. Daniell, R.N.

Jan. 20th, at Dover, Colonel Payne, C.B. late second in command of the Army Depot, Isle of Wight.

Jan. 23d, at Dublin, Capt. C. G. Stanhope, h.p. 29th Regt.

Jan. 24th, at Hoopern Villa, Exeter, Capt. Robt. Waite, of the Bombay Establishment.

Jan. 26th, at Woolwich, Capt. A. F. Glubb, late of the Royal Artillery.

Jan. 29th, at Shoebury, Essex, Capt. C. R. Milbourne, R.N.

Jan. 29th, at Annfield House, Fifehire, Ens. J. T. T. Mackenzie, 46th Regt.

Jan. 31, in London, Lieut.-Col. A. Wolfe Macdonell, late 25th Regt.

Capt. J. Oakes Hardy, R.N.  
Feb. 1st, at Gosport, Capt. T. Mackrell, Royal Vet. Batt. and formerly of the 44th Regt.

At Inverary, N. B. Lieut.-Col. Colin Campbell, late of the Royal and 34th Regt.

At Ramsey, Isle of Man, Lieut. W. Monk, R.N.  
At Shannon Grove, co. Limerick, Lieut. R. M. Waller, R.N.

Feb. 2d, at Exmouth, Lieut.-Gen. Boye, of the Bombay Establishment, aged 69.

Feb. 4th, Lieut. M. H. Hloctor, late of the 59th Regiment.

Feb. 8th, at Jersey, Lieut. Benj. Chester, R.N.

At Boyle, Capt. Luke Dillon, h.p. 34th Regt.

Feb. 9th, at Greenhills, co. Limerick, Captain John Franklin, late of the 95th Regt.

Suddenly, from the bursting of a blood-vessel, Serj.-Major Purdon, of the Royal Marines. This respectable non-commissioned officer was held in such great respect and esteem by the corps, that with permission of the Colonel-Commandant he was buried with public honours on the 5th of Feb. The body was attended to the grave by a funeral guard of a sergeant, a corporal, and twenty men upwards of twenty drums and fifes of the Marine Band; six sergeants of marines were pall-bearers the deceased's two sons and a brother followed as chief mourners, and after them marched in military procession, about forty rank and file, with side-arms, 90 corporals of the Royal Marines, and 120 sergeants, three quarter-master sergeants, and five sergeant-majors from the division and the different regiments in the garrison.

Feb. 14th, Lieut. P. F. Hughes, R.N.

In London, Capt. T. Wilson, R.M.

At Woolwich, Lieut. M. Gray, R.M.

At Bushy Park, County of Wicklow, Cornet Robert Howard, 8th Hussars.



## METEOROLOGICAL REGISTER,

KEPT AT THE OBSERVATORY OF CAPT. W. H. SMYTH, AT BEDFORD.

DEC. 1832.	Six's Thermometer.		At 3 P. M.			Pluvio- meter Inches.	Evapora- tor Inches.	Winds at 3 P. M.
	Maxim. Degrees.	Minim. Degrees.	Barom. Inches.	Thermo. Degrees.	Hygrom. Farts.			
1	49.5	43.6	29.78	47.7	840	.450	.040	S.S.W. fresh breezes & hazy
2	52.8	42.3	29.48	50.0	583	.150	.056	S.W. a gale, fine day
3	50.0	44.6	29.55	47.4	683	.080	.045	W.N.W. blowing very hard
4	50.2	43.4	30.06	46.8	667	.100	.036	N.W. blowing fresh, squally
5	44.8	41.0	30.12	43.6	665	.130	.040	W. by N. light breezes
6	44.5	41.2	30.03	43.8	720	.050	.030	N.W. fresh breezes & clear
7	43.3	40.4	30.23	42.0	740	.064	.034	S.S.W. light airs, dense fog
8	44.2	40.3	30.29	44.2	762	—	.028	— Calms, with fog
9	46.4	43.2	30.31	45.0	780	—	.025	S.W. light airs
10	46.8	45.1	30.25	46.2	795	—	.038	S.S.W. gentle breezes, cloudy
11	46.4	42.3	30.36	44.8	790	.070	.052	W.S.W. very light airs
12	45.0	44.1	30.37	44.0	792	—	.025	— Calms, hazy
13	45.1	43.4	30.03	43.4	765	—	.022	S.W. fresh breezes & fine
14	46.3	41.2	30.00	44.6	764	—	.035	W.S.W. fresh breeze, fine day
15	46.7	36.8	29.80	40.4	616	.110	.036	S.S.W. light airs and cloudy
16	46.3	37.6	29.62	43.6	678	.380	.015	S.W. by S. fresh gale, squally
17	47.5	38.1	29.64	44.3	715	.374	.018	W.S.W. blowing hard
18	48.4	40.0	29.60	45.0	748	.025	.030	S.W. fresh breezes and fine
19	45.3	37.2	29.69	43.8	686	—	.060	W.S.W. light breeze, fine day
20	39.2	35.5	29.17	36.4	713	—	.062	W. by N. steady breezes, fine
21	45.2	35.3	29.64	41.6	878	—	—	S.W. light winds, and fine air
22	47.8	35.4	29.80	47.8	886	.030	.048	W.N.W. fresh breezes, rainy
23	47.7	34.3	29.77	47.6	888	.125	.045	N.W. by W. breezes, squally
24	48.6	43.8	29.91	45.6	810	.253	.056	S.S.W. fresh breezes, & fine
25	49.2	43.6	29.80	46.4	653	.430	.040	S.W. squally weather
26	44.3	40.4	30.08	43.5	850	.320	.036	W. by N. blowing fresh, fine
27	43.6	37.4	30.9	40.2	815	.084	.040	N.N.W. steady breezes, fog
28	37.8	35.6	30.01	47.0	783	.050	.036	N.E. light airs, thick fog
29	36.5	33.8	30.00	34.8	806	.270	.025	N.E. by E. squally, light rain
30	37.4	35.3	30.10	37.4	836	.362	.030	N.N.E. light breezes, cloudy
31	37.6	34.8	30.22	37.2	838	.040	—	W.S.W. light airs, fine day
JANUARY 1833.								
1	38.3	34.6	30.35	37.0	840	.025	—	S.W. fresh breezes & fine
2	38.7	34.8	30.38	36.4	846	.088	—	N.N.W. squally weather
3	41.4	36.7	30.48	40.3	853	.170	—	N. by E. light breeze, foggy
4	40.9	33.3	30.36	35.4	948	—	—	N.E. by N. light airs & fine
5	39.8	35.2	30.30	36.6	854	—	—	N.N.E. nearly calm
6	39.5	31.7	30.40	37.6	836	—	—	N. by E. light breezes, cloudy
7	39.2	32.3	30.54	37.0	834	—	—	N.E. by N. fresh breezes, fine
8	38.3	32.0	30.61	35.7	831	—	—	N.N.E. light airs & foggy
9	38.4	31.6	30.35	34.2	785	—	—	N. light breezes & cloudy
10	38.0	31.8	30.12	31.8	718	—	—	N.W. fresh breezes & fine
11	37.1	30.8	29.96	33.7	763	—	—	N. by E. light airs, fine day
12	37.3	30.0	29.37	34.8	805	—	—	N.N.E. light winds, cloudy
13	36.8	34.2	29.97	36.8	820	.100	—	N.K. by N. light airs, misty
14	38.3	35.8	29.85	36.0	796	—	—	N.E. light breezes, dense mist
15	38.5	35.4	29.93	36.2	807	.025	—	N. by W. gentle breezes, fog
16	39.7	36.2	30.19	37.6	815	—	—	N.N.E. moderate breezes, fine
17	39.3	35.4	30.18	36.8	820	—	—	N. by E. gentle breezes, hazy
18	38.6	36.8	30.20	36.4	826	.010	.010	N.N.E. light airs, showery
19	38.4	35.8	30.24	37.4	832	.040	.010	N.E. light airs, fine weather
20	37.0	35.2	30.30	35.2	825	—	.008	N. by E. fresh breezes, cloudy
21	37.9	32.3	30.34	35.4	784	—	—	N.N.E. gentle breeze, fine day
22	37.3	30.6	30.39	34.3	712	—	—	N. light airs, magnificent day
23	36.4	30.4	30.33	34.2	750	—	—	N. by E. light breezes, frosty
24	36.8	31.2	30.20	34.5	793	—	—	N. by W. gentle breeze, fine
25	37.5	34.2	30.15	35.2	800	—	—	N.W. light breezes, cloudy
26	37.1	35.2	30.08	35.7	808	—	—	S.W. light airs & hazy
27	36.0	30.4	29.86	34.2	785	—	—	N. by W. light breeze, fine
28	39.3	34.7	29.54	37.6	810	—	.015	N. by W. fresh breezes, cloudy
29	40.0	36.4	29.88	40.0	840	—	.025	N.N.E. gentle breezes, fine
30	38.6	32.0	29.26	37.2	847	.283	frozen	N.N.W. fresh breeze, snow
31	37.2	31.4	29.20	36.5	854	.140	.016	N.W. a gale, snow, & frost

## PRESENT CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE OF THE ARMY,

WITH REMARKS ON CORPORAL PUNISHMENT.

“Ceux qui pour intriguer ou critiquer, trouvent mal quantité de choses de notre Constitution Militaire, peuvent ils decider, en passant, et sans etre a même d'approfondir ce qui à été fait, le resultat de tant de calculs? Celui qui *fait*, est obligé de voir tout sous toutes les faces; celui qui *censure* ne le voit que sous celle qui lui convient.”—*Memoires du Prince Ligne*.

At an eventful time like the present, when so many parts of Europe are agitated by intestine broils and foreign dissensions, of which the wisest statesmen cannot pretend to foresee the consequences, and when the constitution of our own country is still reeling under a shock from which her recovery seems yet alarmingly doubtful, it is with confidence and pride that the officers and men of the British army can appeal to all her patriots to bear witness to their conduct during the disturbances of the public peace in England, and the more general and violent commotions of Ireland. That fearful spirit which, under the insidious name of Reform, has produced these dangerous convulsions,—which has carried division into the homes of the most united families, severing the ties of relationship and the oldest bonds of friendship; which has made the wild ambition of the young deaf to the warning of the old, teaching men to despise the page of history, and to set their faith on the speculation of the theorist, to mistake passion for political wisdom, and to disturb and confuse all those interests the union of which had carried the country through every peril—in vain has this spirit of reform, as it is so grossly miscalled, assumed every delusive shape to infuse its doctrines into the British army, which, to its lasting honour, has kept aloof from the baleful contagion.

The sanguinary riots of Bristol, and the rebellious and desperate condition of Ireland, have put to the most severe and satisfactory proof the high and loyal feeling which pervades the army, causing it to maintain that “*esprit de corps*” and respect for the laws and existing Government, in which alone consists the true patriotism of the soldier. Nor is it surprising that such a spirit should be found among them, when we fairly consider what has lately been the treatment and condition of our troops. Officered by gentlemen, and governed by the most equitable discipline in the world, how different has been the feeling of the soldier from that which lately showed itself among the agricultural classes. When the veteran is worn out by the severity of service in distant climates and the fatigues of the duty at home, which the low establishment of the army renders unavoidable, he leaves his regiment with kind words from his officers, a pension to secure him from want, a testimony to produce of his character, and, above all, a conscious feeling that he has been worthy of his hire. How different must be his sensations from those of the worn-out labourer, who is driven to seek support from the parish authorities for his declining years and increasing infirmities. Where are the kind words and the tribute of praise for his past industry? That very farmer who has perhaps had the best of his labour while he was yet able to work, is now the man who uses his selfish influence to get his old servant's allowance reduced to the very lowest proportion by which life can be supported.

But here, with infinite pain and reluctance, we must advert to the impolitic disposition recently shown by the civil authorities of the army, to depreciate the value of the soldier's services, and to shake his confidence, by making every change in the regulation respecting his pay and pensions, a descent in the scale of his present remuneration and future prospects. The soldier's caste should be raised, not depreciated.

The warrant of 1829, though framed on principles of the utmost economy, yet, from its just and wise distinctions as to good or bad conduct in the soldier discharged under its provisions, and from the equitable and (as was expected) permanent character of its regulations, gave general satisfaction to the army, who knew the difficulties of the times, and acquiesced in the necessity of retrenchment. By that warrant the soldier who had served twenty-one years in infantry, or twenty-four in cavalry, might, at his option, retire on the modified rate of 10*d.* a-day, or remain till age or want of health made him unfit for service, in which case he retired with the full rate, amounting to 1*s.* or 1*s.* 2*d.* It was not surprising that this excellent regulation was received with satisfaction by the army. Many a good soldier, whose parents required assistance in their declining years, or who had other equally cogent avocations, took advantage of it, and went home. Nor could anything tend more to raise the pride and spirit of the men actually serving, or offer greater inducement to respectable youths to enlist, than the return of these men to their native places, satisfied with the past, and secured from want for the future, besides being yet free from infirmities, and able to lay up some store for old age by mechanical or agricultural labour.

Suddenly this part of the warrant was directed, in September, 1832, to be *suspended*. Are there any soldiers in the world but our own who would not have murmured at so severe a trial of their patience as this? But not a word was said;—and will it be believed that their very patience and silence were afterwards quoted against them: “*I am happy to learn that no complaint has reached your lordship,*” is the argument which was actually urged as a vindication of this harsh measure in the official letter by which, after much representation from all the military authorities, it was mitigated, (though partially and with a very bad grace,) by the provision, that a few men of each corps might annually be recommended for the *indulgence* of retriving on the modified pension. Though the retrospective operation was thus, in a sort of way, given up, yet by the new warrant the position of the soldier enlisting after the present year is materially altered, by the reduction of the modified rate from 10*d.* to 6*d.*, and by not allowing it to be claimed at all till after 25 years' service in the infantry or 28 in the cavalry,—thus adding four years' further service to be worked out for a reduced pension.

They who thus recklessly legislate for distant periods will, in the course of nature, be removed from their responsibility long before their laws come into operation. The term of twenty-four years will wear out many a stout soldier and many a weak government. One might really suppose that the author of these regulations may have said (like Sir Boyle Roche, in his celebrated speech in the House of Commons), “Why should we care about posterity? what did posterity ever do for us?” It will be argued, perhaps, that if enlistment does not come to a stand, it is a proof that these regulations will answer their end,

Certainly, the ordinary class of recruits are an unthinking race, and make little inquiry at the time they enlist; but in some parts of the empire, especially Scotland, from whence come so many of our best non-commissioned officers, there has already appeared a reluctance to enlist on account of the late alterations in the prospects of the soldier. And that very best class of recruits who are induced by friends and relations in the ranks to join the same regiment where their brothers and fathers are serving, will certainly be greatly diminished in number.

And these are the enactments of those who announce themselves as the soldier's friends; who would persuade him that the only way to raise his character from debasement, is to do away that restricted system of corporal punishment by which those alone are affected who are disposed to act unworthily of their profession, and to bring it into disgrace. To such animals as Somerville their friendship may be as valuable as that of the Birmingham Political Union; but the true soldier has too much spirit and sense to be deceived by men who, under the specious and flimsy pretext of humanity, have endeavoured to undermine the loyalty of the British soldier by raising a cry in Parliament against the wholesome system of discipline by which our troops have made themselves as terrible to their foreign enemies during war, as they are respectable from their peaceable and domestic conduct when quartered among their fellow-citizens at home. Indeed, it required no wonderful quickness of perception to discover that these false friends, while they declaimed one day with all the cant of morbid sensibility against the supposed barbarities of corporal punishment, were to be found voting on the morrow for the reduction or abolition of the soldier's pension on discharge, and would gladly turn him adrift in his old age, to rot on a dunghill or pine in the sick ward of the parish workhouse. Many rumours have gone abroad that the new Parliament will do away with corporal punishment; but it is hardly possible to suppose that so rash and desperate a step can be taken. Not one practical argument has ever been adduced against it; the reasoning put forth has been grounded on no one basis of tolerable solidity. Prison floggings have, from the earliest periods, been the law of the land; and there is not a magistrate of experience but will bear testimony to their efficacy even when so many other modes of punishment are at the option of the civil authorities. But in the army, where the loss of the soldier's service by long imprisonment is so exceedingly inconvenient at home, and so utterly impossible on foreign service, what available substitute can be found? Look to the armies of France, selected as they are by conscription, and consequently recruited by a better description of persons than where money-bounty is the sole means of enlistment. Poverty, idleness, love of change, and sometimes loss of character and employment, are in reality the causes of enlistment, in five cases out of six, in the British service; and yet the world cannot show such an army in point of discipline and regularity of conduct. What can be more conclusive in favour of a system obtaining such results? Even at the close of an exhausting war, when the very dregs of society were of necessity admitted into the ranks, the behaviour of the army both while invading the French territory, and afterwards while occupying it under treaty, was the wonder and admiration of European nations. To compare the number of men put to death by military law in the French and English

armies, in the Peninsula, would astonish those who are not aware of the extraordinary disproportion: for one English soldier put to death in this way, at least six of the French suffered; and even then their discipline was such that their officers could not control them in the wanton outrages and cruelties towards the wretched inhabitants, by which their progress or retreat was invariably marked. Such were the blessings of dispensing with corporal punishment! Even in the latter times of peace, without any of the hard trials of dispersion in small detachments at home, or the supply of numerous colonial garrisons in every quarter of the globe, to which the British troops are subject, what has been the behaviour of the French soldiers, collected as they invariably are in home garrisons, with very few detachments or harassing duties, and under constant inspection of old experienced officers? Let him that would have the question practically answered, repair to the military prisons at Brest and Toulon, which he will find filled with hundreds, nay with thousands of reckless desperadoes condemned for ten, fifteen, twenty years—ay, and many hundreds *for life*—to suffer chains and misery, sufficient to brutalize every feeling of a human creature, not to mention the impossibility of any man issuing from such villainous association, without being completely and irretrievably contaminated and debased.

But some of the mischievous political theorists who have meddled with this question, will endeavour to prove that we may dispense with corporal punishment at home, though they do not deny its necessity abroad, arguing that although on the line of march in a foreign country you can find no adequate substitute for this mode of punishment, yet that in the British territory recourse may always be had to imprisonment. Such reasoning shows very little acquaintance with the character and habits of the British soldier. There could not be a more rash and dangerous experiment than to establish two distinct systems of discipline, one for home and the other for abroad. Unvaried routine is the very essence of true discipline; and when once unsettled, no one could say what consequences might follow. The sensation which would be produced by the first flogging in a foreign country, after it had once ceased to be the military law of the army during peace, might produce a sudden impression on the unthinking mind of the soldier, which might lead to mutiny and disaster at a moment when the approach of a formidable enemy called for all the energies of the army, actuated by the utmost unanimity and good spirit. A recent instance of insubordination and violence, on the part of thirty or forty soldiers of the Guards, sentenced to imprisonment in the Brixton House of Correction, is an illustration of the effects of "prison discipline."

Of all the times that could have been selected for the insidious attempts to do away corporal punishment, never was a period so ill chosen as the present. For the last fifteen years it has been the earnest endeavour of officers of all ranks to diminish the frequency of flogging by zealous attention to the detail of duty, by looking to the comforts of the soldiers, and by every encouragement in their power to those whose conduct merited approbation. Order upon order has been issued from head-quarters, to stimulate the zeal of officers, if any stimulus were wanting, in perfecting, by unremitting attention, the discipline of their corps. The Duke of Wellington's Orders on these subjects brought the army in the Peninsula to a perfection

which enabled it to immortalize itself and its leader. The principles inculcated by him took deep root in the minds of all those officers of sense and judgment who had the fortune of being formed in his school, and the spirit of true discipline, equally remote from tyranny and pedantry, has gone on ever since bringing forth its good fruit under the fostering care of impartial inspectors and active regimental officers. The diminution of corporal punishment has naturally kept pace with the improvement of general discipline; and the high respectability of the officers' conduct has enabled them to exercise far greater control over their men than they ever before possessed. The great fault of the soldier was his addiction to drinking; and it was in vain for the officer who was carried drunk to bed by the mess-waiters three nights out of seven, to preach to his men against the vice to which he was himself a victim. But a drunken officer is now as rarely to be met with as it was formerly common; and those who unhappily have that taste can no longer venture to expose themselves in the eyes of their men, but conceal as a weakness what at one time was esteemed rather a display of spirit than any cause of reproach.

Much has been said of the officers of some foreign nations possessing a more national military spirit than our own, especially as regards regimental duty? There cannot be a more unjust or empty assertion. In the first place, where is the army in the world, in which you find regimental officers of more gentlemanlike and honourable feelings than in our service. It is not at all too much to say, that the army, as at present composed, is an excellent school for the sons of the British gentry, both as regards absence of dissipation, and gentlemanlike habits and conduct. How very rarely do we hear of duels in our regiments, and yet how perfectly well maintained are those observances of society, from the forgetfulness of which, among young men especially, such events are usually produced. Our regimental officers live together for the most part with all the good fellowship of schoolboys, and yet how seldom does this familiarity lead to quarrels or challenges; and when such unfortunate occurrences do happen, with what forbearance, moderation and good judgment do the senior members of the corps intermeddle in the matter, with the sole and earnest endeavour to prevent the last resource of personal conflict, as long as it can be avoided without injury to their character and honour. What a contrast to the habits of the French and many other foreign armies, with whom a duel is almost a necessary part of the introduction of the cadet to his brother officers, and who are so accustomed to mingle bravado and impertinence with their social intercourse among each other, that the practice of duelling is as common as that of boxing at English public schools, and the senior officers think themselves no more concerned in the prevention of such disgraceful scenes, than if they were strangers, instead of associates and friends of the parties.

Now it will be readily allowed by every one who has had experience of command, that a true spirit of honour among the officers under his authority, is the only real security upon which the colonel of a regiment can depend for attention to those details of discipline and duty which are in themselves so tiresome and uninteresting in time of peace, and so harassing and fatiguing on service, that no ordinary incentive would ensure a proper and unremitting attention being paid to them. Reproaches and severity in such matters may produce what is called *eye*

*service*, and keep up, with the help of an active and vigilant staff, a sort of barrack-yard discipline and appearance; but he who trusted to such a system would find himself bitterly deceived in the hour of need, and acknowledge, too late, that the judicious treatment and management of the officer, by appeal to his sense of honour and self-respect, is the only means of establishing that graduated system of responsibility, without which no corps can be made efficient for the purposes of foreign service, or proof against the temptations arising from the removal of the barrack-yard restrictions, by which a fallacious appearance of good order may be kept up at home.

In considering the merits and efficiency of the British officers of the present period, it must not be forgotten to notice the attention which has of late years been paid to the education of the young men intended for the army. The routine of Marlow College, in its old times, in which too much injudicious imitation of the discipline of the private soldier was mixed with the useful parts of the instruction of the officer, was so little fitted for the purpose and design of the institution, that many lieutenant-colonels preferred receiving an ensign from Eton or Westminster schools, than from the military college at Marlow, where the chief organs of authority, except during the hours of study, were a set of ill-conditioned tyrannical old serjeants, who were permitted to watch behind hedges for the boys going out of bounds, and to use other equally absurd and improper means for supporting what was falsely supposed to be an early inculcation of military discipline. Happily, this mistaken system has long since been completely altered and improved, and the young men at Sandhurst, under the careful eye of one of the most superior officers and thorough-bred gentlemen in the army, are governed and encouraged by such rules and good management, as render them valuable acquisitions to the regiments they join, both as officers and members of society. From the universities, also, there come into the army every year many young men, who, from time being of less object in peace, have wisely been passed through the whole course of education usual for the English gentleman, bringing in many cases studious dispositions and cultivated minds to begin the profession they have adopted. Such advantages never have been, nor ever will be, thrown away; and when opportunities offer, the well-educated man is quite as sure of turning them to account in the military life as in any other pursuit. The habit of arranging his thoughts, and the early acquired power of application, are of infinite service to the officer, who has probably more leisure hours, though at broken and uncertain times, than any other class of men, if he have the resolution as well as inclination to turn them to profit, and can bring himself not to suppose that because his morning is interrupted by the ordinary detail of attendance at parade, he is on that account to waste the remainder of it, by lounging in the barrack-yard or mess-room.

Except those who are on the Staff, or in the Artillery and Engineers, it is surprising to observe the frivolous idleness of French officers in garrison, and at the same time satisfactory to compare this with the present habits of the young men in our own regiments in quarters, who, while they mix in the most creditable way with the best society in their neighbourhood, and are great lovers of field sports, still find time, in most cases, to follow up in one way or other the advantages of their

education. Yet so far from this leading to any neglect of exclusive military acquirement, there is no service where the younger members are more conversant with regimental detail, or more safely to be trusted with the conduct and discipline of the numerous detachments into which our corps are so universally dispersed over the country, than which dispersion there can be no greater trial both of the merits of officers and soldiers. The order lately issued in Ireland to the troops, conveying the approbation of the authorities of their behaviour, does not at all overrate the admirable judgment and discretion shown by the officers of detachments, nor the forbearance and steadiness of their men. Great as have been the calamities arising from the rebellious spirit so wickedly fostered in Ireland by the demagogues who have led the deluded people of that country onward in their frantic career of violence, still the scenes of outrage would have been carried to more desperate lengths by far, and would have been more universally spread, but for the extraordinary activity, vigilance and decision shown by the officers of detachments called out to aid the civil power, or, more properly speaking, to prevent the utter annihilation of that power. No foreign service could have been more harassing to troops than their duty in those parts of Ireland, where that frightful state of anarchy has prevailed. Neither glory nor gain awaited them in success; the slightest want of precaution rendered them liable to the tender mercies of the bigoted and furious rabble; the least momentary yielding to the impulse of temper under aggravated insult, exposed them to the chances of public trial, where almost every spectator in the court would have been gazing on them with the eagerness of a wild beast expecting his prey, and an intimidated jury would hardly have dared to vindicate and maintain the due course of law. And while upon this part of the subject, let the Irish Catholic soldier receive his due meed of praise,—never did brave and true men endure temptations with such constancy and devotion to their colours and to their country, as those gallant Irishmen. The exertions of the priests have been unremitting and incessant to shake their fidelity, and every most ingenious means of getting round them, through their religion, has been attempted. But there they stand, as they ever will stand, as faithful as brave, despising the instructions of those who would pervert their sense of religion to the worst of purposes, by persuading them from their duty, and ready at all times to prove their attachment to it by every pledge of the patriot and the soldier.

Most fortunately for themselves and their country, neither the Irish nor the English soldier is a politician. The outcry against taxes on knowledge, or, in other words, against any sort of check upon the dissemination of mischief, and the seeds of discord and commotion, appears to have been either entirely unheeded by them, or treated with wise contempt. Little does the soldier care for imaginary rights and revolutionary theories, protected as he feels and knows himself to be, in all those just and lawful privileges, of which, if wantonly or unjustly invaded, he would be as jealous and tenacious a guardian as if he had studied the Rights of Man from his infancy. Total ignorance of his habits can alone lead some people to imagine that his ready and cheerful submission to the rules of exact discipline, and his attentive respect towards his officers, arise from any want of independence in his honest and manly character. He is influenced by far higher motives; he



honours and obeys the authorities set over him from that same *sense of duty* (which, when opposed to his enemies in the field, has led him to the foot of the breach, and to the mouth of the cannon, without either the stimulus of reward or the incentives of ambition\*. His courage depends on no external aids or excitements; and in this he seems to stand almost alone among the military nations of Europe, for it may be confidently and proudly affirmed, that there is no service but our own, where such acts of undaunted gallantry have been performed under the sole and single influence of *sense of duty*. This feeling among our soldiers is so analogous to what is called *sense of honour* in the mind of the officer, that the distinction appears to lie merely in the name and in the relative habits of the upper and lower classes of society; and as long as they shall continue their present reliance upon each other, the soldier upon the honour of his officer, and the officer upon the sense of duty of his men, neither foreign foes, nor still more insidious and treacherous enemies at home, will be able to shake the loyal and truly patriotic spirit of the British army.

There is a paper of Steele's which so beautifully illustrates the character of the British soldier, that the following extract from it will be pardoned by the reader. Mr. Steele introduces his remarks by a letter, which he says his servant showed him, from a certain Serjeant Hall, of the Guards, written after the battle of Malplaquet to his comrade. It was addressed to Serjeant Cabe, of the Coldstream Guards, at the sign of the Red Lettuce, in Butcher Row, near Temple Bar, and is as follows:—

“ From the Camp before Mons, Sept. 26, 1709.

“ COMRADE,—I received yours, and am glad yourself and your wife are in good health, with all the rest of my friends. Our battalion suffered more than I could wish in the action. But who can withstand fate? Poor Richard Stevenson had his lot with a great many more; he was killed dead before we entered the trenches. We had above two hundred of our battalion killed and wounded. We lost ten serjeants; six are as follows:—Jennings, Castles, Roach, Sherring, Merrick, and my son Smith. The rest are not your acquaintance. I have received a very bad shot in the head myself; but am in hopes, and please God I shall recover. I continue in the field, and am lodged at my colonel's quarters. I will not pretend to give you an account of the battle, knowing you have a better in the prints. My love to poor Mrs. Stevenson. I am ~~very~~ sorry to send her such ill news. Her husband was gathering a little money for her, and put in my hands seven shillings and threepence, which I shall take care to send her. Wishing you all happiness,

“ Your assured Friend and Comrade,

“ JOHN HALL.

“ P.S.—We had but an indifferent *breakfast*, but we gave the Mounseers such a *dinner* as they never had in all their lives.”

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\* Probably there have been more medals and rewards conferred on the French troops during the late siege of Antwerp, than fell to the British soldier during the whole Peninsular war.

Mr. Steele goes on to remark—"This is truly a letter, and an honest representation of that cheerful heart which accompanies the poor soldier in his warfare. Is there not in this all the topic of submitting to our fate as well discussed as if a greater man had been placed like Brutus in his tent at midnight, reflecting on all the occurrences of past life, and saying fine things on BEING itself? What Serjeant Hall knows of the matter is, that he wishes there had not been so many killed; and that he had himself a bad shot in the head, and should recover *if it pleased God*. But be that as it will, he takes care, like a man of honour as he certainly is, to let the Widow Stevenson know he has got her seven shillings and threepence for her. I doubt not that all the company at the sign of the Red Lettuce drank his health with as much real esteem as we do any of our friends'. If we consider the heap of our army utterly out of all prospect of rising or preferment, as they certainly are, and such great things executed by them, it is hard to account for the motive of their gallantry. But to me, who was a cadet at the battle of Coldstream in Scotland, when Monk charged at the head of the regiment now called Coldstream from the victory of that day,—I remember it as if it were yesterday,—I stood on the left of old West, who, I believe, is now at Chelsea;—I say, to me, who know very well this part of mankind, I take the gallantry of private soldiers to proceed from the same, if not from a nobler impulse, than that of gentlemen and officers. They have the same desire of being honoured by their friends; and go through the difficulties of their profession by the same irresistible charm of fellowship, and communication of joys and sorrows, which quickens the relish of pleasure and abates the anguish of pain. Add to this, that they have the same regard to fame, though they do not expect so great a share as men above them hope for. But I will engage, Serjeant Hall, of the Coldstream Guards, would die ten thousand deaths rather than a word should be spoken at the sign of the Red Lettuce, or any other house in Butcher Row, in prejudice to his courage or honesty."

Let it not be said that too favourable a view has been taken of the present state of the Army, or that partiality has gone beyond what facts will warrant. The "*laudator temporis acti*" may rest assured that no disparagement is intended to those who earned their honourable fame prior to the Peninsular war. Never was more gallantry shown than in the unfortunate campaigns of Holland, or the triumphant ones of Egypt and India; but we may safely aver, that the long and uninterrupted habit of *maintaining the ground on which they had fought* through that successful, though severe and trying service under the greatest general of modern times, could alone have laid the foundation of that military system which has since been matured and brought to perfection by those who acquired, under the eye of the Duke of Wellington, the truest and most practical notions of discipline, at the same time that they learned to apply that discipline to drawing out and using to the best purpose, when before the enemy, the constancy, courage and energy of the British soldier.

## IRELAND AND THE BRITISH ARMY.

"Der staat ist despotisch, wo das gesetz kraftlos dem willen eines oder mehreren menschen weicht." Fichte.

"The state is despotic wherever the law is powerless, and yields either to the will of the one or the many."

We really believe that few but military men have means and opportunities of forming just estimates of the true situation of Ireland. They are at least the only class of persons who visit that country uninfluenced by political views, and who are looked upon by the different parties, not merely as neutral in the strife of factions, but as friends to the people generally; so that, as a body, they are popular, and willingly trusted by the lower and middling classes of Irish, who, so far from being of the frank and easy character usually described, are, on the contrary, of a very mistrustful disposition, mostly endeavouring to conceal their thoughts under a plausible openness of exterior manner, likely enough to deceive a superficial observer: a habit that, owing to the fierceness of party feuds, as well as from real and imaginary danger, has almost become a fixed trait of national character. Under this impression we shall here offer a few remarks on the state of that distracted country—we claim for them no other merit than having been suggested by personal, and, we hope, unbiassed observation. As soldiers we are of no party, and though, as individuals, we prefer one set of principles to another, we care just as little for the Tories who were in power, as for the Whigs who have supplanted them. We endeavour to judge of men by their measures, and not of measures by the men with whom they originate,—a rule that now seems hardly to admit of exception: for though there have been individuals, whose range of thought extended so far beyond the grasp of ordinary minds, that they could justly claim confidence for primary measures, before even the benefits anticipated from their application became apparent, the time for such characters seems to have gone by. The aspirants for power, now unable to sway opinion by that superiority of virtue and of genius, before which the respectable part of mankind bow with pleasure, and the despicable crouch with awe, endeavour, on the contrary, to bribe and deceive men into an approval of measures by delusive promises, the extravagance of which would make even mountebanks blush, and, incapable of attaining the renown of Cheristophon, would prefer the fame of Herostratus to honourable obscurity.

"The cosmogony of the world" never puzzled Goldsmith's sage more than our sages have been puzzled by the state of Ireland: a country possessing advantages equal to England, and far superior to Scotland, but yet so sunk in poverty and barbarism, as to form a constant source of alarm to the government of the country at large. It was not to be expected that parties would agree about the causes of this mighty evil: but then every individual had some infallible nostrum for its cure; all of which, from the illicit still penalties, down to the repeal of the Catholic disabilities, have proved alike ineffectual, because the remedies, instead of striking at the root of the disease, were only so many plasters, good and bad, applied to the exterior sores the malady had occasioned. We shall not attempt to augment the number of the

plastering quacks; but certain that the first step towards amendment is a knowledge of the true causes of the evil, we shall here content ourselves by pointing out some of its most evident and fertile sources, leaving to others the task of discovering and applying the proper remedies.

The causes that have operated to retard the progress of Irish civilization are of a very old date. The grievances resulting from the first partial conquest, and gradual submission of the island, together with those which arose from rebellion of various sorts and degrees, could not, as in other conquered and pacified countries, be confined to particular districts, and suppressed, or allowed to die out with the generation who were actors and sufferers in the scenes of civil strife; for, with peace and tranquillity came English freedom of speech, and full permission to direct every species of invective against the government and their supporters. To the real sufferings, naturally resulting from war and rebellion, imaginary ones were added, and carefully handed down, with additions and improvements, from father to son, even in times of profound peace, so that a counter current, hostile to repose, was constantly setting in under the unruffled surface of exterior calmness. Religion itself, taking in Ireland an Irish direction, augmented instead of soothing the irritation,—all amalgamation of the hostile factions was prevented, and a fierce war of opinions kindled, which the Government invariably failed to put down, by its ill-directed attempts at conciliation, and as constantly aggravated by its feeble attempts at forcible suppression. Agitators, too, men mostly bred to the bar, and knowing consequently how far they could go without any personal danger, setting up as patriots, took upon themselves the character of defenders of their country's rights; preached hatred to England, and disaffection to the Government, as a means of improving Ireland; and forgetful of the immense progress their country had made, particularly since the Union, in consequence of its English connexion, they fearlessly charged the Government with the very evils their own inflammatory harangues tended to create and perpetuate.

In this most melancholy world of our's, men not born, like the fortunate few, to good estates, cannot earn their bread, even with the sweat of their brow, unless by steady perseverance in the pursuits of industry. But the lower orders of Irish are neither steady nor industrious: they are a quick, jovial and imaginative people, naturally generous, but like all nations in the same degree of civilization, easily roused to fierceness, and just as improvident as they are kind and hospitable. Such a character in a country of strife, where the Government and holders of confiscated property might always be abused with safety, could not fail to place the people completely at the disposal of the regular traders in agitation: a profession that crime, folly and disappointment, as well as many other circumstances, besides the love of notoriety, and the practice of a feeble Government, too often disposed to purchase the silence of successful demagogues, naturally tended to foster.

For reasons best known to Providence, a certain quantity of poverty, suffering and ignorance is attached to every part of this our little world of mighty men. Most countries are naturally anxious to conceal this sort of nakedness; but in Ireland it has been constantly cherished, boasted of, and brought forward in the face of day, in support of the doctrines advanced by the Irish patriots, instead of serving to illustrate

their power and evil influence. Men were desired to look, not to their own exertions for amendment in their condition, but to the effect of agitation: they were told, that rights or privileges, certain of bestowing immediate ease and affluence, were unjustly withheld from them by the Government, whose object it was to crush Ireland for the benefit of England: as if the ruin of one part of the empire could improve the rest, or the destruction of the left arm invigorate the right. A credulous people, completely under the control of an interested priesthood, and without a resident gentry to advise and assist them in their distress and difficulties, did not consider of these contradictions, but constantly clung to the hopes of the wealth that was to come without toil, more desirous, of course, to see manna fall from heaven than be at the trouble of working for it. Agitation and improvidence were thus encouraged: the people laboured only from hand to mouth, always expecting that some great event or other would come to pass and improve their condition; whilst an augmenting population, without a proportionate augmentation of the means of comfort, naturally added to the grand total of poverty, leaving Ireland, in the general march of prosperity, far behind the sister kingdoms, on whose resources her suffering people too often became a heavy burden.

This mischievous dependence on measures that agitation is to force on the Government of England, is further encouraged by the call of all parties, in and out of Parliament, that "something must be done for Ireland." Irish members, also, too often forgetting that they were legislators of a large empire, of which Ireland forms an integral part, looked upon themselves as mere delegates sent over to represent some Irish faction; so that Irish logic and agitation not only found a voice within the walls of St. Stephen's, but was loudly backed, both in and out of Parliament, by all who, from various motives, happened to be opposing the Government of the day; and as the real poverty of the people gave a sort of plausibility to the constantly repeated calls that "something must be done for Ireland," none liked to oppose, and fairly to call upon Ireland to do something for herself. What would be said were we, session after session, to demand that something should be done for Scotland? Yet Scotland is much inferior to Ireland in soil and climate, is more heavily taxed, has its full share of absentees and harsh landlords, and distress and poverty are far from being strangers to the land; but with us, men look only to their own exertions for improvement in their condition, and place not altogether their trust in demagogues.

The evils that we have here attempted to ascribe to regular and professional agitation, are, we know, attributed by radical politicians to what they are pleased to term mis-government, asserting that, under a wise system of administration, agitation cannot prevail to any mischievous extent. This is going on the old Utopian doctrine, so dear to liberal simplicity, that all the ruled are good and wise, and the rulers invariably unwise; whereas the truth is, that men are but moderately good, and wise only in a very moderate degree; always more inclined to throw the blame of their misfortunes on the shoulders of others than on their own folly and improvidence.

"O Fortune, Fortune! all thy boasted powers  
Would shrink to nothing were but prudence our's." JUVENAL.

To attribute the evils of Ireland to constant misgovernment, would be to suppose, what is scarcely comprehensible, that the many wise and able men who have at different times governed England have invariably been unwise in regard to Ireland. All those who, for the last half century, and we might go farther back, have been at the head of affairs, have, by universal admission, been actuated by a sincere desire of promoting the welfare of the empire at large: and leaving virtue entirely out of the question, it was their interest to do so; for what can give public men greater means of forwarding even their own views of personal aggrandizement than the prosperity of the country over which they preside? To say, therefore, that the English Government purposely misgoverned Ireland, and forced it into rebellion, merely to gratify selfish and sinister views, is an assertion fit only for mob orators, always ready to sacrifice truth and libel honour, for the purpose of inflaming those who do not suspect the extent to which low and designing men will go in ascribing unworthy plans and motives to their superiors in station, wisdom and virtue.

It is one of the misfortunes of Ireland, that we receive most of our information respecting that country from the Irish themselves, who, owing to the fierceness of party feeling, happen, of all men, to be the least capable of forming a just opinion of the wants and situation of their native land. Before the year 1829 the Catholic disabilities were pleaded as the great cause of the poverty and misery that afflicted Ireland; and though plain men could not well see how the repeal of these disabilities was to feed the hungry and clothe the naked, yet the plea prevailed, and what was inapplicable termed emancipation was granted: a boon that has as yet served only to show the falsehood of the grounds on which it was claimed, and the folly of all the brilliant expectations anticipated from its bestowal. We say the falsehood of the grounds on which it was claimed, because the very word emancipation means relief from thralldom, whereas the Catholics laboured under no restraint whatever, and the permission, so whiningly asked, for all Christians to worship at the same altar, was mere deception, Catholics, like all other sects, having the most perfect freedom of worship. It was power and notoriety that was wanted by the leaders; and for this, the lower orders were instigated to agitation, under a promise that some distinct and tangible benefit was to result to them from the success of their superiors. When the poor found that they got no good from this fondly-anticipated measure, another source of agitation was started, and "another, and another," will succeed even to the end of the chapter, as long as professional agitation shall be encouraged and rewarded. The misery thus occasioned to the people, together with the crimes and excesses they commit under the excitement into which they are hurried, is never considered or thought of, unless as furnishing good matter for fresh harangues: for in no country of the world is the melancholy truth that

"Man's inhumanity to man  
Is cause that man must mourn,"

so strongly verified as in unhappy Ireland.

We have been stationed in Ireland, and have seen a good deal of the lower orders of the people; for during the intervals of service we often made excursions into retired districts, where we were entirely at the mercy of the peasantry for the trifling comfort required on such jour-

neys. The blue frock-coat and regimental button showed that we belonged to the army, and often, when the direction of our journey had been known at quarters, our arrival at some distant fair, patron, or retired glen was as regularly anticipated and provided for, as if previously discovered by aid of the second sight; and it is a justice we owe the people to say, that we never on such occasions experienced the slightest rudeness, but were invariably treated with the greatest kindness and hospitality. As a military man and as an idler, the writer of this article has visited most countries of Europe, and some even beyond the tropics, but in no rank or country has he seen so much genuine politeness as amongst the lower orders of Irish peasantry; unless, perhaps, amongst the few highlanders whom the unerring science of political economy has yet left to wander amidst the hills of the North. Of the boasted hospitality of the higher orders in Ireland we saw nothing whatever,—a circumstance we mention only by way of illustrating the difference existing between Irish sayings and Irish doings. The Irish are an excellent and an amiable people, but they have a way of speaking in the superlative degree of themselves and their country, that is apt to deceive the uninitiated, even when no deception is intended: we should be wrong in concluding from this style of oratory that Ireland is wretched merely because the people of Ireland carry all the cardinal virtues to extremes.

In addition to the knowledge acquired in our excursions, chance opened to us another and a curious channel of information respecting the character, habits and opinions of the lower orders of Irish. It is the duty of the captain or field-officer of the day to inspect the prison guards in Ireland; and when the writer of these lines was, on one occasion, going his rounds accordingly, a prisoner desired to speak a few words in private with him. The object of the man's request, to which he added a full confession of a crime too lightly looked upon in Ireland, was to obtain his liberation through our intercession, under a promise of enlisting in the regiment to which we belonged. The trifle that was given him, to atone in some measure for our inability to serve him, made our generosity famous within the walls of the jail, where we soon had a numerous acquaintance; and as an Irishman, whether at liberty or in durance, loves to hear himself talk, and as we proved a good listener, and one who, as a soldier, could be trusted, many were the tales of folly, crime and sorrow that, in our visits to the different jails, where we made acquaintance with the prisoners, came to our knowledge. That many such tales were embellished, and others altogether invented for our peculiar benefit, is likely enough, but these very fictions were founded on the habits and manners of the people, so that, like pure metal at the bottom of the crucible, truth was, after all, found concealed beneath the dross.

We mention this circumstance merely to show that the means of acquiring some knowledge of Ireland have been within our reach. Many persons will say, for their own consistency, that we have profited but little by our opportunities: for we must declare, that with the aid of this knowledge, we have vainly sought in the general system, or particular acts, of Government, for sufficient causes of that excess of crime and suffering by which Ireland surpasses the sister kingdom, as well as the other civilized countries of Europe. We have heard of the misgovernment of Ireland, of the evil influence exercised by a Protestant

ascendency party. We have heard, of course,—for who has not?—a good deal of Irish rigmarole about acts

“To men remote from power but rarely known.”

But we have heard of no act on the part of Government, nor of any statutes that Government could remove, that can at all account for the miserable state of the lower orders of Irish. Nor need the cause of the evil be sought for amidst the dust of mouldy parchments, when it is staring us full in the face; and deafening us by constant noise and bluster;—its name is agitation,—and the wonder only is, that acting constantly on the lively and inflammable temperament of the people of Ireland, it has not long since driven the country into open rebellion.

Ask an Irish peasant, with whom you may happen to have a gossiping acquaintance, and who knows he has nothing to apprehend from you, what are his principal grievances? and he will tell you at once that they are high rents and tithes; the latter of which, if he is a Catholic, he is taught to look upon, not as part of the rent he agrees to pay for his land, but as a sum extorted from him by the power of a hostile church. Follow up the inquiry, and ask him how he can expect to pay or obtain a profitable return from such high rent? his reply will be, “Indeed, what your honour says is perfectly true; but what are we poor people to do if we cannot get it cheaper? but something may happen yet,” or, “perhaps we may get our rights, and then, your honour knows, all will be well.” What he understands by “something that may happen,” he never explains, and probably does not altogether know himself; for the Catholic peasantry seldom speak of the possibility of a rebellion, though many of them, who certainly would take no share in it, consider such an event as more than probable. We are here speaking of times immediately preceding the emancipation act: what the feeling on the subject may be at present we pretend not to say, though no very favourable change is understood to have taken place. But if the Irish peasant will not dwell on the subject of rebellion, he is willing enough to speak about his fancied rights; and whenever he enters upon that favourite topic with any one in whom confidence can be reposed, a regular display of Irish eloquence—a torrent of pure agitation rigmarole, is sure to follow: it proves superior only to what is spouted in and out of Parliament, by the natural politeness which prevents the simple peasant from directly contradicting you, or from insulting or vituperating your country or the government to which you owe allegiance. The ultimate tendency of all this oratory is to show, that strangers cannot possibly have as much right to the land as the original possessors; that it must, in some shape or other, revert to the first proprietors, or must be held at whatever rent the farmers deem fair, and equitable. This, and the restitution of the church lands to the Catholic clergy, though looked upon as a matter of less consequence, is exactly what the lower orders of Irish understand by “our rights;” and to obtain these fancied rights, in pursuit of which the alienations of property by sale, or its possession for centuries as the result of conquest or confiscation, is entirely overlooked; they follow the blustering banner of agitation, always expecting the “rights” to arrive before the next half-year’s rent is due; so that whenever term-day again brings disappointment in its train, the unhappy victim of factious eloquence is forced into the ranks of Rockites, Raparees, or Whiteboys, enters into



illegal combinations, and carries on a predatory war against all who submit to, or help to uphold the hateful institutions that drive him from his potato-garden, and from the shelter of his humble cabin.

No legislative act can remedy these evils; nor is it easy to dispel the erroneous views from whence they principally emanate; for every nation brings with it, from its earlier state of barbarism, certain superstitions and opinions, on which the habits, actions, and modes of thinking of the people continue to be founded, till knowledge and civilization gradually expel the phantoms of darkness. The most deeply-rooted superstition of Ireland, and one that has, unfortunately, outlived fays, fairies, and luricorns, has been a belief in the hostile spirit entertained by the Government of England against the Irish people. This belief demagogues have not failed to foster; and it can now be put down only by a general and generous resolution of all public men, as well as public writers, to use their utmost exertions to convince the people of Ireland that it is, and naturally must be, the most ardent wish of the Government of England to see Ireland happy and prosperous. We must have no more miserable party barking on this dangerous and unhappy subject; and your regular agitator, instead of being praised, honoured, and pensioned, must be held up to universal indignation as the principal author of a noble nation's crimes and sufferings. Educate the people, we shall be told, and they will see their own errors; but this is merely one of the rapid phrases of the march-of-intellect slaug; for nations, like men, can be instructed but slowly, and, at the best, in a very imperfect degree. All that Government can effect is to throw the school-door wide open; and in no country are there more means of acquiring instruction than in uninstructed Ireland. Having, by the Bill now before Parliament, so far strengthened the hands of Government as to admit of their affording protection to life and property, our next step must be the introduction of a modified system of poor-laws into Ireland, not merely in order to benefit her own starving population, but also to prevent England from being assessed for that purpose. We say modified system of poor-laws, because the rental of Ireland is small, and the demand on the assessment will necessarily be great; but it must nevertheless be fairly met. To confiscate the wealth of the Protestant church for the benefit of the Irish poor would, in fact, be to impoverish or expel a well-educated and well-affected resident gentry, who mostly spend their money in the country, for the purpose of sparing the incomes of absentee landlords and Irish buckeens.

Many have supposed that the disturbances in Ireland were entirely of a religious nature, occasioned solely by the hostility of the people to the Church of England and to the tithes system. This is taking a partial view of the subject only: the hostility in question is the result, and not the cause, of agitation; for the people are made to believe that the tithes would revert to them, could the claims of the Church be destroyed. They are not allowed to see that the Protestant Church is (and has been for upwards of two centuries) a part-proprietor of the soil, and as much entitled to its rent as the landlord under whom a farm is held. If the tithes were taken from the Church to-morrow, they would not revert to the temporary tenant of a farm, but to the owner of the other nine-tenths of the land, who would naturally raise the rent accordingly. If confiscated for the use of the State, they

would be collected by the tax-gatherer; or if appropriated to the benefit of the poor, they would be collected by the overseer of the parish. In no case would the present complaining tithe-payer be a gainer to the amount of a single potato, and Ireland, as a country, would be the loser. To confiscate the Church property for the benefit of the poor would be to hold out a premium to poverty and idleness, at the expense of learning, education, and good conduct,—would, in fact, be permanently settling a certain number of paupers on the rent of the land, without diminishing the amount of that legitimate poverty resulting from feebleness, old age, and want of employment. We are of the number of those who think the poor entitled to support from the country in which the hand of property has placed them; but such a burden must never fall upon any particular class of persons or property; it must be borne by the general mass of the property of a county; and the taxes collected to meet it must be so contrived as to give the payers an interest in diminishing the causes from whence the evil results.

Absenteeism and the want of capital are frequently mentioned as the causes of the misery of Ireland; but both these result, in a great measure, from agitation; for few men of wealth will reside in a country constantly looked upon as on the eve of revolution, and still fewer will think of investing capital in it. Thus causes and effects go on multiplying each other; agitators excite the poor to extravagant expectations, and to idle habits, that naturally lead to recklessness and crime, thus driving from the land the peace and security which can alone bring in their train the wealth and ease so unwisely sought after by turbulence and riot. Your Irish patriots have, after all, but half the merit of Tom Thumb: that doughty hero could kill at least the giants he himself had raised; whereas the mighty of lungs can but raise, and not allay the demon of discord.

As to habitual absenteeism, whether from England or Ireland, it is in these times little short of treason, and bears evident proof of the callous and unpatriotic feelings that liberalism and a despicable tone of fashion have diffused over the land; and though we cannot well tax or punish men for preferring the low and sensual pleasures of Rome and Florence to an honourable sharing of their wealth and incomes with their suffering countrymen, we can at least ask such individuals, whenever they seek public favour or employment, on what grounds they advance such claims after having for years imbibed, or having been trained up in the anti-British feelings so carefully instilled into the minds of all who have long resided abroad, or who have been educated in the virtuous seminaries of France and Italy. We certainly have the right to visit on the children the unpatriotic sins of the fathers, even to the third and fourth generation; and, in the present state of the country, it is perhaps our duty to use that right. The money spent abroad by English absentees has been reckoned at from five to nine millions a year; an estimate that, taken at the medium of only seven millions, would give a "*tottle of the whole*," as Mr. Hume says, of more than one hundred millions of money unprofitably drawn from Britain since the peace, and in itself almost sufficient to account for the distress lately so much complained of; for this hundred millions added to the wealth now in the country, would be upwards of four pounds to every individual in the empire; and think what a treasure that would be in

the poor man's cottage! and though we well know that it would not have been equally divided, yet as capital increases instead of diminishing, and as the hoarding of gold has not lately been much in vogue, we should have had it pretty fairly distributed throughout the land; for where there is money spent there must be money earned. This immense sum is now aiding to bring forward the rival manufactures of France—a country that, be it recollected, takes nothing whatever from us in the way of trade, but hard cash. Let men travel for instruction, health, or recreation, but let the regular absentee, who ceases to be a Briton in feeling, cease also to share the honours and advantages of a British citizen.

This article has already grown to such a length that we have hardly left ourselves room to speak of the repeal of the Union. The pretence on which the measure is to be agitated for is, as usual, totally destitute of any just foundation. It is asserted, viz. that an Irish Parliament, assembled in Dublin, must be better informed as to the wants and wishes of the people of Ireland, than a British Parliament assembled in London; as if it could be seriously maintained, in these days of mail-coaches and steam-boats, when nothing escapes, even for a moment, the searching activity of the newspaper press, that any piece of useful and advantageous information could possibly come to light in Dublin, or in the most retired parts of Ireland, without being transmitted to London by regular course of post. If we take a military view of the subject only, we fully agree with Mr. Stanley that it is a measure which must be resisted even “unto death.” That a separation of the crowns would soon follow a separation of the legislature, needs hardly any proof. Let any one say what would have been the consequence if, in 1798, Ireland had been governed by a Catholic Parliament (as an Irish Parliament must now be), and had been as well disciplined to agitation as it is at the present moment:—and may not such a crisis again return? Besides, we need not look far back into history for evidence to show what are likely to be the measures of a Catholic Parliament: they would alienate the property of the Church of England in favour of the Roman clergy, and by degrees confiscate the lands held by Protestants, in order that they might revert to those who pretend to a prior or better right of possession. Measures of this nature, to which fifty others might be added, would necessarily be resisted by Britain, and lead to a collision certain to bring about a separation, unless successfully resisted by arms. As an independent country, Ireland would be a citadel, or *tête-de-pont*, from whence the forces of France, Spain, and America, whenever the latter country should be strong enough to carry on distant military operations, could assail our shores, and strike at the very root of our life and power. Her excellent southern and western harbours might receive the armaments of our enemies; her rich soil would refresh, her resources equip them, and her eastern ports would vomit them upon any part of our long and indefensible coast, from Cape Wrath to the Land's End. Without a navy, but merely by the aid of a few miserable privateers, she might effectually blockade Glasgow, Liverpool, and Bristol, rendering St. George's Channel almost useless for commercial purposes, and endangering even the whole of our western navigation. Ireland, as a separate kingdom, would in fact be a shield in the hands of our enemies, beneath the shelter of which

a sword might be constantly kept pointed at the very heart of the empire; and the repeal of the Union, being the first step towards such a position, must therefore be resisted even "unto death!"

Though this is not the place for discussing the merits of the Bill now in its progress through Parliament for the pacification of Ireland, we feel ourselves called upon by the peculiar circumstances of the times, as well as by the novel situation in which the army is about to be placed, to address a few words—that we may term words of warning—not merely to the friends of the profession, but to the country at large.

Very painful and responsible duties, totally at variance with military habits and pursuits, are about to devolve upon the officers of the army. That our comrades will bring to this melancholy task not only zeal, patience, and forbearance, but the utmost kindness of feeling towards the unhappy victims of unprincipled agitation, we may safely assert; to these they must now add, difficult as it proves for men possessed of a keen sense of honour, a sufficiency of impassibility to make them persevere in the straight line of justice, unmoved by the insults and abuse that will be heaped upon them, however well they may perform these new and distressing duties. A consciousness of upright conduct and intention must support them; and enlightened patriots, who know how closely the interest of the country and the services are connected, particularly since all the great nations of the world have grown to maturity, and come within arm's length of each other, must not allow their opinion to be swayed by the fierce attacks that, in spite of our present unmasking of the enemies' batteries, will not fail to be directed against our order. Justice, at the hands of the army, will be termed oppression; every act of necessary severity will be magnified into a deed of wanton and profligate cruelty; and the monstrous and outrageous falsehoods circulated after the rebellion in 1798, will be repeated with ample augmentation. In order to ruin the character of the profession, and to sink the service to the miserable state of inefficiency in which it was at the commencement of the late war, every species of invective will be directed against the officers by the enlightened band of statesmen and philosophers, who think hostility to the army a sufficient proof of that patriotism of which they make so loud a boast. There will be the clever sophistries of the *Examiner*—the frothy rant of the Agitators—the spouting of popularity-hunting novices, down even to the soporific bathos of the economists.

At the time when the high compliment of trusting the pacification of an entire kingdom to their zeal and exertion is to be paid to the army, it may be as well to remind the country how little either Whig or Tory governments have done to improve the condition of the soldier, and to raise the military in order to fit them for the important duties that, as we now see, may at times devolve upon them. It must be always recollected that the army owe their present character, which the Suppression Bill itself declares to be a high one, solely and entirely to the conduct and good feeling of the officers themselves, totally unsupported by Government, who aided them no farther than merely by keeping them together, because they were indispensable. As a body, the army have been ill paid and worse rewarded. Service, conduct, and professional acquirements are left unvalued, and go for nothing when pleaded.

in opposition to wealth and influence, as grounds of distinction and preferment. Almost proscribed before the Peninsular war, officers and men were sent into the field with their best energies shackled, owing to the feeble military policy of the Government.

At the close of the contest, Mr. Hume and his party, calling to their aid the blind, but ever-active passion of human avarice, forced upon the executive a line of miserable and penurious policy, intended to curtail the few comforts the army ever possessed, and to crush every hope of honourable reward or distinction. Only a few days before the Irish pacification measure was submitted to Parliament, the member for Middlesex, who had acquired a fortune in India under the protection of the British bayonets, actually proposed to abolish the few situations of moderate emolument to which naval and military men can still look forward, after passing a long life of severe and active service on the wretched pittance of professional pay; going so far in his enlightened wisdom, as to express a wish of entirely excluding the members of the two services from the honour of sitting in the House of Commons. As this motion was rejected by an ordinary majority only, it would be a curious calculation to ascertain how many of those who supported it afterwards voted with Ministers for trusting the pacification of Ireland to that very army which they had just endeavoured to render utterly inefficient by breaking the high pride and bearing of its officers. If by their own exertions, military men had not raised themselves to a station in public opinion far above what might have been expected from the conduct pursued by the Government towards the profession at large, his Majesty's Ministers would not at this day have been proposing measures for the pacification of Ireland to a British Parliament; the chances are, that they would have been negotiating, under the *friendly* mediation of France and Russia, about the terms on which a free trade to the West Indies and the untaxed navigation of the Caledonian canal, should be granted to the citizens of the Hibernian Republic. Some may deem this to be exaggerated, but let them recollect the situation of prostrate Europe before the British army took the field in 1808, and the change that immediately followed its success. Or, to revert to later times,—ask impartial or well-informed foreigners what saved the Continent from becoming one scene of anarchy and confusion after the Jacobin revolution of 1830; and they will answer at once, that it was the confidence universally placed in the army and navy of Britain, and the conviction felt that they would remain true to the cause of honour,—and form, in case of need, a rallying point to the friends of loyalty and order.

Let us look back only to the wild years 1831 and 1832, and then, hand on heart, tell us what security then existed for one hour's continuance of public tranquillity, but the reliance universally placed on the unshaken fidelity of the army. Some philosophers, *a l'eau sucrée*, will say, that the "good sense" of the country may always be relied upon in such extremities: this is a pretty phrase, no doubt, and well suited to an age not over famous for distinguishing between sound and sense in its political declamations. But was there no good sense in France, during the reign of terror? Was there none at Bristol, when that fine town was burnt by a drunken rabble? Or, was good sense passive, whilst the evil propensities of men were fierce and active, as they always are when freed from restraint? Where is good sense in the hour of

emergency? Perhaps he is in bed, or at dinner, occupied in his workshop, or behind the counter driving a good bargain,—and if pleasantly or profitably employed, it will take some time to convince him (for good sense is always cautious) of the necessity of moving, however rapidly the flames may be raging. When started at last, good sense has to be armed, drilled, and organized before he can be made available; and, if he is to be sent on a distant or a dangerous service, he has his affairs to settle, and a long and affectionate leave to take of his wife and family, who become particularly dear on such occasions. To avoid these interruptions, that would in the end constitute a complete bar to the ordinary pursuits of life, good sense declares that there must be an efficient armed force, so composed, as to admit of its being depended upon in every extremity,—capable, not only of resisting foreign foes and climates, but proof also against the dangerous snares and illusions spread by more insidious domestic enemies. Folly and presumption willingly agree to the necessity of having their goods, chattels, and precious persons preserved from harm and molestation,—but expect that the toils, dangers, and years of expatriation to which sailors and soldiers must be exposed in order to afford such protection to the rest of the community, shall be encountered without holding out to either profession the least prospect of honour or reward. Men, familiar with history, and acquainted with human nature, naturally laugh at the ignorance that would reap without sowing, and grieve for the country that calls to its councils the authors of such miserable proposals.

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NARRATIVE OF THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE POTOMAC,

BY THE SQUADRON UNDER THE ORDERS OF CAPTAIN SIR JAMES A. GORDON,  
IN 1814.

WHEN the war with France terminated in 1814, by the overthrow of Napoleon, Government determined to carry on vigorous operations in America, and bring the war to a conclusion in that quarter, by severely chastising a nation who had declared against us when our hands were full in Europe, and who, by their maritime successes, had astonished themselves as much as they had surprised us.

It is not my intention to enter into a history of our naval disasters; but I cannot help observing, that the Americans owed their success, in a great degree, to our Government and naval officers holding them too cheap, and instead of sending out large and well-manned frigates to crush them at once, we trusted to our supposed naval superiority, without taking proper precautions to secure it. We never took the trouble to reflect, that there was no instance on record of a 12-pounder English frigate capturing a French one mounting 18-pounders, and we had no right to expect an 18-pounder English frigate should capture an American carrying 24-pounders. We, unfortunately, considered them far below the French in naval knowledge and gunnery, when they were actually superior to ourselves, having devoted much attention to that science which we had shamefully neglected. We forgot there had been an embargo for a considerable time on American shipping, and that their ships were, in consequence, manned with picked men, and com-

manded by old officers, well-experienced in seamanship, although totally inexperienced in war. They held our navy in great respect, I had almost said dread, and they zealously exerted themselves to render their ships as perfect as possible. Nevertheless, I apprehend, it never once entered into the head of the commander of the *Constitution* that he could by any chance capture a British frigate; and I intend nothing disrespectful to the *Constitution*, when I observe, that had she fallen in with the *Shannon*, who was well manned, and in a superior state of discipline, she would, in all probability, have met the fate of the *Chesapeake*.

Their first action being successful, gave them confidence; this was confirmed by the capture of another frigate, and several sloops of war, with equal ease, but all of inferior force; they thought themselves invincible, and, in an evil hour, determined to try their strength with the *Shannon*, and so sure were they of success, that many of the inhabitants of Boston went out in pleasure-boats to see the fight, and welcome the *Chesapeake* back with her prize; when, to their surprise and dismay, a short quarter of an hour showed the United States' flag struck, and the British colours flying as usual over those of their enemy. The action was short, but it was a hard fought and bloody battle; the Americans behaved with great bravery, (and why should they not?—they are our children,) but nothing could withstand the discipline of the *Shannon*.

It is difficult for a naval officer to write about America without touching on our disasters, and the reader must pardon this natural propensity, and I will carry him, with as little delay as possible, across the Atlantic to the scenes of action I am about to describe. I was in the *Euryalus* in those days, cruising off Marseilles, under the orders of the Undaunted, and plans were laid for various enterprises during the summer. On standing in one night we observed brilliant illuminations, and concluded that Napoleon had gained a great victory, or that the Allies had entered Paris, and made peace—either of which events would have caused rejoicings. At daylight in the morning the white flag was seen flying on the forts, and we stood in to ascertain what had taken place, and were rather surprised at receiving a few shot from chateau D'If. The Undaunted was not slow in returning the compliment, not exactly understanding what to make of our reception. A boat with a flag of truce soon made its appearance, and the Mayor of Marseilles came alongside to apologize for the firing, and to inform us the Allies were in Paris, and Buonaparte dethroned. He invited us to anchor in the road, regretting at the same time that the sanitary laws would prevent him having the pleasure of seeing us on shore. We accepted the invitation most readily, with the secret intention of profiting by the general joy and enthusiasm, and outwitting the quarantine officers. After the complimentary salutes we rowed into the harbour, and were so clamorously invited by the people to land, that it was impossible to resist. The moment the boat touched the wharf, a rush was made by men, women, and children, who embraced us with the most lively joy, and finally carried us in their arms to the town-hall, where the municipal body were assembled, and, totally forgetting the quarantine laws, received us with the greatest enthusiasm. The first alderman had got half through a long complimentary speech, when he was interrupted by a deputation from the Board of Health, expressing their surprise, that the first act of

the English should be setting the sanitary laws at nought,—laws that had never been infringed but by Buonaparte, who was now dethroned. We spoke French badly, and, in the present instance, were inclined to speak but little, and understand less. After a good deal of shrugging our shoulders, shaking our heads,—vociferation on the part of the sanitary officers,—attempts to calm them on the part of the municipality and bye-standers,—it was finally decided, the ships were to be put in quarantine, and the captains be allowed to remain on shore. Orders to that effect were given, but too late to be effectual; every boat at Marseilles had been put in requisition, and the ships were fairly boarded by men, women, and children of all classes,—this continued for two days. Representations were made to the Board of Health to grant *pratique*, as it was quite impossible to keep the people out, but they were inflexible. The governor was at last obliged to lay the boom across the harbour, and call on the inhabitants by proclamation to respect the law; this farce went on for a week or ten days, when the flag was hauled down, and the officers were invited to share in the gaieties of the town.

The governor, Count Du Mui, an old general upwards of seventy, treated us with great kindness and hospitality; his example was followed by the principal inhabitants, who vied with each other in their attentions and entertainments. In the midst of this gaiety the Undaunted sailed for Frejus, to embark the fallen emperor, in consequence of a requisition from Sir Neil Campbell, the English commissioner; her place was, however, supplied by several line-of-battle ships and frigates, who had heard of our reception, and came for the double purpose of recreation and embarking the numerous English prisoners who had been released, and were flocking in from all parts of France, and who had their full share of the hospitalities of Marseilles. The sanitary laws were considerably relaxed, in consequence of the length of time the ships had been at sea, and great harmony prevailed. Entertainments were given on board to the authorities and principal inhabitants; and French and English, who had been so long at war, seemed to forget their animosities, and were only anxious to contribute to each other's enjoyments.

Business was not forgot in the midst of these gaieties. The caulking-iron, which had been many years silent, was again heard, ships were seen rigging, repairing, and taking in cargoes, and every inhabitant appeared to feel prosperity had again smiled on their town. The military alone seemed dissatisfied; but still they were polite and attentive to their former enemies, which was both pleasant and agreeable. It was most amusing to see our weather-beaten tars, who had been long shut out from any rational amusement, except what they found at Minorca, figuring away in quadrilles, with all the good humour and awkwardness of John Bull, quite unacquainted at that time with French dancing. The ladies of Marseilles were beautiful and most fascinating, and not a few officers left their hearts behind them. From this dream of pleasure—for it was but a dream—we were awakened by an order to proceed forthwith to Mahon. We hardly had time to bid adieu to our fair friends; nothing was further from our wishes than a trip to America, which was our ultimate destination: we had been long most actively employed in the Mediterranean, and looked forward to a relaxation from all our toils and troubles, with unfeigned pleasure; that prospect, however, was at present at an end, and we left Marseilles, with heavy hearts.



to proceed to Minorca, where we arrived in a couple of days. The *Iphigenia*, *Bacchante*, and *Furieuse*, were already there, refitting for the American station; we were put under the orders of Captain King, the senior officer, and we followed their example with all the alacrity that could be expected from a disappointed ship's company. The *Euryalus* was the oldest frigate in the Mediterranean, and officers and men had fully made up their minds to be ordered home from Marseilles: they, however, bore their disappointment with great good humour; the worst hands were ordered to be discharged, and our complements were filled up from the squadron. Somehow or other we managed to receive worse men than we discharged; and I believe I may safely say, the other frigates were in the same predicament, and we all sailed from Minorca with ships' companies by no means fit to cope with the picked men of America. On our arrival at Gibraltar we received orders to take under convoy between three and four thousand men, under General Gosling, who were daily expected from Genoa, and who were destined to carry on offensive operations in America. Five three-deckers and the convoy soon arrived,—the latter had to provision and water,—and with so strong a naval force, and two admirals' flags flying, it might be supposed that completing them was no difficult task; be that as it may, little or no assistance was given, and an easterly wind coming on, we were ordered to sea, short of everything that was necessary to perform a voyage across the Atlantic—every necessary representation was made, without effect, and even after being under-way, <sup>outside the Gut,</sup> a telegraphic signal was made to the squadron, which had also sailed, that we had neither water nor provisions, which was answered by the word "supply."

A favourable wind brought us to the Canary Islands, where we obtained, with much difficulty, a scanty supply of water; three days were passed at Santa Cruz in obtaining this, and the convoy sailed from that port on short allowance of water. The trade wind conducted us within a couple of hundred miles of Bermuda, where we were met by a westerly breeze, and the water becoming short, it was a question whether we should not be obliged to proceed to Halifax. After beating about a few days, it fortunately changed, and we soon arrived at Bermuda. I mention this circumstance, to show how much maritime expeditions depend upon weather, and how necessary to their success are good and proper arrangements at their commencement: in this instance, for want of management, an expedition, intended to close the war with America, fitted out at an enormous expense, must have failed had not the wind changed to the eastward. Officers who were there, and read these pages, will well recollect this circumstance; who was to blame it is not for me to say, nor do I know: all that our commodore could do, by way of remonstrance and application, was done, and yet we sailed in the manner I have described. At Bermuda we found Sir Alexander Cochrane, the commander-in-chief, and Sir Pulteney Malcolm, who had arrived from Bordeaux a few days before, with a squadron of troopers, having General Ross, and between two and three thousand soldiers and artillery on board. Part of these troops were destined to act in the Chesapeake, and part on the coast of New England; but, by some unaccountable mistake, the despatch containing the distribution of the troops, and the officer who was to command them, was

nowhere to be found. General Ross, on leaving Bordeaux, had reason to suppose he was to have a separate command. General Gosling, who commanded the Mediterranean troops, and was the senior officer, made his appearance with no orders at all. Search was made for the ill-fated letter, and, after a couple of days' perplexity, it was found, either on board a transport or troop-ship. General Ross had orders to carry on the war in the Chesapeake, and General Gosling the operations in New England—this arrangement was most agreeable to the Wellingtonian troops, who were again to serve under one of their own generals.

Sir Alexander Cochrane, having made all the necessary arrangements, put the convoy under Sir Pulteney Malcolm, and sailed for the Chesapeake, taking the Euryalus with him; Sir Pulteney, after provisioning and watering the fleet, was to follow with the greatest despatch. The commander-in-chief, after a tedious passage, arrived off the Capes of Virginia, in the beginning of August, and soon after joined Sir George Cockburn, who had been actively employed, feeling his way with a battalion of marines, and had kept the coast in a constant state of alarm. A flotilla of gun-boats was blockaded in the Patuxent, but the military force under him was not sufficiently strong to make any impression on their position, and he had been anxiously looking for the arrival of the chief, and the army destined to act in the Chesapeake.

Sir Pulteney arrived a few days after, having, by singular good fortune, met with a fair wind, which led him from the Capes of Virginia to the entrance of the Potomac without the possibility of the enemy receiving information for some days after. No time was lost in making the necessary arrangements: the troops sailed the day after for the Patuxent, accompanied by the admirals, and the greater part of the squadron; the Euryalus, Devastation, Etna, Meteor, Erebus, and Anna Maria tender, were put under the orders of Captain Gordon, of the Seahorse, with the following instructions:

“SIR,

“You are hereby ordered and directed to proceed up the Potomac river as high as you may find practicable, without endangering the ships, for the purpose of keeping the country bordering the river in a state of alarm, and to bombard and destroy, if possible, such fortifications as the enemy have erected for the protection of its navigation; and you will continue on this service until you receive further advices from me, but sending to me in the Patuxent any intelligence you may deem it important for me to be acquainted with by the Manly.

“Given under my hand, &c.

“ALEXANDER COCHRANE.”

“To Capt. Gordon, H.M.S. Seahorse.

The River Potomac is navigable for frigates as high up as Washington; but the navigation is extremely intricate, and nature has done much for the protection of the country, by placing one-third of the way up very extensive and intricate shoals, called the Kettle Bottoms; they are composed of oyster-banks of various dimensions, some not larger than a boat, with passages between them. The best channel is on the Virginian shore, but the charts gave no marks, very bad directions, and no pilots could be procured. A frigate had attempted some time before to effect a passage, and after being frequently aground, gave it up as impossible. The American frigates themselves never attempted it with

their guns in, and were several weeks in the passage from the naval yard at Washington to the mouth of the Potomac.

The evening of the second day brought this little squadron, without any accident, to the entrance of the Kettle Bottoms; we were fully aware of the difficulties we had to encounter, but were determined to conquer them if possible. The Seahorse, keeping the Virginian shore on board, led, the Euryalus and the rest of the squadron following; the wind was light, and several boats were ahead sounding. As long as the soundings were good, no apprehension was entertained, not being aware of the smallness of the obstructions, and it appeared almost impossible, if the ship ahead found a passage, that those immediately astern should be brought up. We were, however, mistaken: the Euryalus opened the ball, and struck, or rather, was suddenly brought up, for nothing was felt, and the lead gave us plenty of water; the signal was made to anchor, and boats and hawsers were sent to assist in getting her off. No one could tell where she hung; there was abundance of water ahead, astern, and all round, and yet the ship was immovable; a diver went down, and found, to the astonishment of all on board, that an oyster bank, not much bigger than a boat, was under her bilge, the boats had missed it with the lead, and the Seahorse had passed, perhaps by a few feet on one side. After some hard heaving, we floated, and the squadron weighed. We proceeded with great caution, having several boats abreast of each other, with leads going ahead of the ships; but, notwithstanding all this care, the Seahorse grounded on a small bank; every effort was made to get her off, without lightening, in vain; the tide appeared flowing, and no difficulty was anticipated, but she was immovable; a strict examination showed that, though the tide was apparently running up, the water was actually diminishing; and not until it had flowed several hours was there any perceptible increase of depth. Her water was started, a great part of her provisions, and eight or ten guns were hoisted out before she floated; several of the other ships were also on shore, but got off with more ease. Next day was employed in getting in her provisions and guns, sounding the channel, and preparing to warp in the event of a foul wind.

On the 19th, the squadron again weighed with a favourable breeze, and the Kettle Bottoms were cleared before dark, without any serious difficulty, each vessel acting independent, and picking her way to the best of the commander's judgment; all were occasionally ashore, but got off with more ease than the Seahorse did two days before.

The following morning, the wind being foul, the signal was made to warp. Each ship divided her boats in two divisions; one using the stream and the other the kedge. The stream was first laid out, and all the hawsers bent to it, and as the ship was warped ahead, the hawsers were coiled in the boats of the second division, which laid out the kedge; and it was so arranged that the end should be on board as the other anchor became short, stay, or peak. When the tide was favourable and the wind light, we warped by hand; with the ebb, and the wind strong, the hawsers were brought to the capstan. This operation began at daylight, and was carried on without intermission till dark, and lasted five days, during which time the squadron warped upwards of fifty miles; and on the evening of the fifth day anchored off Maryland Point. The same day the public buildings at Washington were

burnt; the reflection of the fire on the heavens was plainly seen from the ships, much to our mortification and disappointment, as we concluded that act was committed at the moment of evacuating the town. It was nevertheless decided to proceed; and as the next reach was sufficiently wide to beat through, though the water was very shoal, we anticipated some little relaxation from our toils. Warping all day was not our only occupation: at night the boats were rowing guard in every direction, and the hammocks were never piped down. It is true the enemy gave us no trouble, either with fire-vessels or with light troops, who might have been stationed in such a manner on both banks of the river as to have rendered the laying out anchors totally impossible; but, considering we were several hundred miles in the interior of an enemy's country, the utmost precaution was necessary to provide against any unforeseen attack.

The strictest discipline was observed in the guard-boats: no landing or plundering was permitted; the numerous flocks of geese swam undisturbed in the river; the bullocks and sheep browsed unmolested; the poultry-yards were respected; and every act that might irritate the inhabitants was most industriously avoided. In one instance only a boat did land in the night, in search of stock, and the breach of discipline was justly punished by an American wounding one of the seamen, which served as a salutary example to the rest.

In the course of this day I landed with a flag of truce at an agreeable-looking residence, the first indeed we had observed on the banks of the river, for the country was thickly wooded, and few habitations visible. The owner was an American farmer, not the most polished man in the world. He had two daughters, rather homely, and as uncouth as himself. They *guessed* we would not go farther than Maryland Point, as the water was shoal; seemed to know and care very little about what was going on; offered us a glass of peach brandy; and hoped the Britishers would not carry off their negroes, which appeared to be their only apprehension.

On the morning of the 22d the squadron weighed, and were beating up Maryland Reach, in about the same water the frigates drew, and sometimes less, but the bottom was soft and we dragged through it, when the sky became suddenly overcast, and everything portended one of the severe north-west squalls. We had heard much of the violence of these gusts, but always concluded them exaggerated, and were not quite so cautious as we ought to have been; we, however, took in the top-gallant sails, main-sail, jib, and spanker. The squall thickened at a short distance, roaring in a most awful manner, and appearing like a tremendous surf. No time was to be lost: everything was clued up at the moment it reached us; nevertheless we were nearly on our beam-ends. A couple of anchors were let go; and as we swung to the wind the bowsprit rose right up; this slackened the stays, and away went the heads of all three top-masts; this saved the fore-mast, which, in another moment, would have fallen. The bowsprit being relieved, sunk back to its place, but broke completely through. The Seahorse sprung her mizen-mast; and all the squadron suffered more or less: the Meteor was lying on a bank, and was fairly blown over it, and brought up in deep water. This catastrophe took place a little after noon. We piped to dinner, leaving the wreck as it was. The squadron was all together,

with the exception of two, who were four or five miles lower down the river. <sup>6</sup>

Captain Gordon thought the game up; but he was assured we should be refitted before the other ships joined. At half-past one, the hands were called, the wreck cleared, bowsprit hoisted on board, a new one made out of a top-mast; new cross-trees and trussle-trees made and fitted; and although we did not work after dark, next day at one o'clock we were all afloat, and weighed as the two sternmost vessels passed; it was calm. The boats, manned with the marines, towed the ship, as the seamen were setting up the rigging. At dark the squadron anchored for the night.

The following morning, to our great joy, the wind became fair, and we made all sail up the river, which now assumed a more pleasing aspect. At five o'clock in the afternoon Mount Vernon, the retreat of the illustrious Washington, opened to our view, and showed us, for the first time since we entered the Potomac, a gentleman's residence. Higher up the river, on the opposite side, Fort Washington appeared to our anxious eyes; and to our great satisfaction it was considered assailable. A little before sun-set the squadron anchored just out of gun-shot; the bomb-vessels at once took up their positions, to cover the frigates in the projected attack at day-light next morning, and began throwing shells. The garrison, to our great surprise, retreated from the fort; and, a short time after, Fort Washington was blown up, which left the capital of America and the populous town of Alexandria open to the squadron, without the loss of a man. It was too late to ascertain whether this catastrophe was occasioned by one of our shells, or whether it had been blown up by the garrison; but the opinion was in favour of the latter. Still we were at a loss to account for such an extraordinary step. The position was good, and its capture would have cost us at least fifty men, and more, had it been properly defended; besides, an unfavourable wind and many other chances were in their favour, and we could only have destroyed it had we succeeded in the attack.

At day-light the ships moored under the battery and completed its destruction. The guns were spiked by the enemy; we otherwise mutilated them, and destroyed the carriages. Fort Washington was a most respectable defence: it mounted two 52-pounders, two 32-pounders, eight 24-pounders; in a battery on the beach were five 18-pounders; in a martello-tower, two 12-pounders, with loop-holes for musketry; and a battery in the rear mounted two 12, and six 6-pound field-pieces.

A deputation from the town arrived to treat; but Captain Gordon declined entering into any arrangements till the squadron arrived before Alexandria. The channel was buoyed, and next morning, the 27th, we anchored abreast of the town, and dictated the following terms:

The town of Alexandria, with the exception of public works, shall not be destroyed, unless hostilities are commenced on the part of the Americans; nor shall their dwellings be entered, nor the inhabitants molested in any manner whatever, if the following articles are strictly complied with:

1. All naval and ordnance stores, public or private, must be immediately given up.

2. Possession will be immediately taken of all shipping, and their furniture must be sent on board by the owners without delay.

3. The vessels that have been sunk must be delivered up in the state they were in on the 19th of August, the day the squadron passed the Kettle Bottoms.

4. Merchandise of every description must be instantly delivered up ; and to prevent any irregularities that might be committed in its embarkation, the merchants have it in their option to load the vessels generally employed for that purpose, when they will be towed off by us.

5. All merchandise that has been removed from Alexandria since the 19th instant, to be included in the above article.

6. Refreshments of every description to be supplied to the ships, and paid for at the market price by bills on the British Government.

7. Officers will be appointed to see that Articles Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 are strictly complied with ; and any deviation or non-compliance on the part of the inhabitants of Alexandria will render this treaty null and void.

The following decision of the common-council was sent to Sir James Gordon, and it was strictly observed by the general commanding the camp before Alexandria :—

“ The forts erected for the defence of the district having been blown up by our men, and abandoned without resistance, and the town of Alexandria having been left without troops or any means of defence against the hostile force now within sight, the Common Council of Alexandria have with reluctance been compelled, from a regard to the safety of the inhabitants, to authorise an arrangement with the enemy, by which it has been stipulated that, during their continuance before the town, they shall not be molested. No superior force having, in this emergency, appeared to defend or direct, the Common Council has considered itself authorised, from extreme necessity, to make the above stipulation,—they, considering it binding on themselves and the nation, require a faithful observance of it from all the inhabitants of the town.

“ Resolved, that copies of the above resolution be transmitted to Brigadier-General Winder, of the 10th military-district, and to Generals Young and Hungerford, with the request of the Common Council, that proper measures may be used to secure a strict observance of the public faith which the Common Council has been compelled to pledge.

“ THOS. HERBERT, President.

“ JOHN GIRD, Clerk *pro tem.*”

By the 1st, the greater part of the vessels had been hove down, caulked, repaired, and loaded ; several that had been sunk were raised ; and the whole were in a fit state to quit the anchorage ; one vessel alone we found it impossible to raise, and she was in consequence set fire to. Unfortunately there were only 21 sail, all of whom were loaded with flour and tobacco ; and 200,000 barrels were left behind for want of transport.

Alexandria is a large well-built town, and a place of great trade. It is eight miles below Washington, where few merchant ships go, and is, in fact, the mercantile capital, and before the war was a most flourishing town, but at the time of its capture had been going rapidly to decay. Agricultural produce was of little value ; the store-houses were full of it. We learnt that the army, after destroying Barney's flotilla, had made a forced march on Washington, beat the Americans at Bladensburg, destroyed the public buildings and naval-yard, and retreated to their ships. Had our little squadron been favoured by wind, the retreat would have been made by the right bank of the Potomac, under our protection, and the whole country in the course of that river would have been laid under contribution.

In justice to the squadron, I must observe, that the whole of our operations at Alexandria were conducted with the greatest order and regularity: the inhabitants were quite undisturbed; no plundering was permitted; and, with the exception of one occurrence, nothing tended to disturb the good feeling between the inhabitants and the squadron.

The occurrence I allude to was neither more nor less than an American midshipman's lark; and it appears they have larking minds as well as us; but it had well nigh put the town in a blaze.

We had been in the habit of walking about the town, and even to the part nearest the camp, without fear of interruption, which, I suppose, had been communicated by some person in the town. An enterprising midshipman thought it would be fine fun to carry off an officer; and with that intention dashed into the town on horseback, and meeting no officers in the streets, came boldly down to the boats, and seized a midshipman by the collar. The fellow was strong, and attempted to get him on his horse. The youngster, quite astonished, kicked and squallered most lustily; and, after being dragged a hundred yards, the American was obliged to drop his brother officer. This operation, which was like lightning, created a considerable alarm: the men retreated to the boats, and prepared their carronades, expecting every moment to be attacked by cavalry, and were with some difficulty prevented from firing. This occurrence soon found its way to the mayor, who came off in great alarm for the town. Capt. Gordon, with great good humour, admitted his apology, and treated it, as it was, a midshipman's spree; but recommended that proper precautions should be taken, as a repetition of such amusement might lead to the destruction of the town.

Contrary winds delayed us at Alexandria longer than we expected. Capt. Baker, of the *Fairy*, who had been obliged to fight his way up the river, confirmed the report that batteries were building below and a large military force collected, to intercept, if possible, our descent. He had been fortunate, and passed the Kettle Bottoms without getting once on shore; and was sailing up the river, and had got within sight of Mount Vernon, when, to his surprise, a large portion of underwood suddenly disappeared, and a severe fire of guns and musketry opened upon the *Fairy*. They were cleared for quarters, and returned it briskly; the high bulwarks of the brig saved them from a severe loss, as the Americans are generally excellent shots.

It now became necessary to check as much as possible the workmen of the enemy; and the *Meteor* bomb, a gun-boat, and a mortar-boat were sent down, together with the *Fairy*, to interrupt their operations; but, notwithstanding all our exertions, they succeeded in mounting eleven guns, and building a furnace for heating shot. This, together with a foul wind, was no welcome news for the squadron; and we found it necessary, after waiting a day or two, to recommence the operation of warping. The *Devastation* grounding a few miles below Alexandria, obliged us to anchor above Fort Washington to give her protection; and it is lucky we did; for, taking advantage of her situation and the ebb-tide, an attempt was made with three fire-vessels, covered by five row-boats, to burn her. Capt. Alexander pushed off with his boats, and was soon followed by others from the squadron, who towed the fire-vessels astern, and chased the row-boats up to Alexandria.

On the 3d, the *Etna* and *Erebus* were sent to the assistance of the

ships who were stationed to interrupt the construction of the battery ; and the following day, the whole of the prizes and the squadron, with the exception of the *Devastation*, who was still five miles up the river, were assembled under Mount Vernon, and about four miles from the White House Battery as it was called.

Another attempt was made to destroy the *Devastation* at night ; and the boats, under the orders of Captain Baker, were sent to her assistance. The fire-vessels were discovered in a creek close to her, and vigorously attacked ; but it was found impossible to dislodge them from the strong position they had taken up, covered by a number of soldiers in a thick wood. A lieutenant and eight or ten men were killed and wounded in this attempt ; but the *Devastation* was brought down to our anchorage.

On the 8th, at noon, the wind became fair, and the signal was made to weigh. The *Seahorse* and *Euryalus* led. A heavy but ill-directed fire was opened from the battery ; both ships anchored within musket-shot, and soon silenced them ; but it was quite impossible to dislodge the numerous body of sharpshooters, who were under cover of the trees, and did considerable execution through the ports. The frigates were followed by the bombs, who discharged, in passing, their mortars loaded with musket-balls, and took up a position to cover the retreat. The *Fairy* took charge of the convoy, and passed them all without damage. The Americans fought under a white flag, bearing the words "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights," and behaved remarkably well ; but their efforts were useless.

As the prizes passed, we slipped our cables ; the bombs followed, and we calculated all was over for that day. We were mistaken. The *Fairy* and prizes were observed to anchor suddenly a few miles farther down, having descried fresh batteries ; and the *Erebus*, in endeavouring to pass, grounded, and drew a sharp fire upon her from the defences that were constructed along a high ridge of hills. We had just time to prepare to anchor as we got within range ; the *Seahorse* went farther, and was obliged to move ; boats were sent to the *Erebus* ; and the *Fairy* took up a position to draw the fire from her ; but before she was afloat she suffered considerably.

From fourteen to eighteen guns were mounted in this new position, and a considerable interruption was expected. In the morning we weighed, the *Seahorse* leading, and the *Euryalus* bringing up the rear ; and were agreeably surprised at being allowed to pass quietly. We ascertained afterwards that the batteries were hardly finished, and the powder and shot had been expended the night before.

No further interruption took place on the part of the Americans, and the squadron and prizes repassed the Kettle Bottoms without grounding, with the exception of the *Euryalus*, who, though as nearly right astern of the *Seahorse* as possible, struck upon one she missed, and was two days before she was disengaged, having been ashore on different banks four or five times.

This expedition lasted twenty-three days. The hammocks were only down twice ; each ship was ashore at least twenty times ; but nothing could exceed the patience and good conduct of the ships' companies ; and, though every encouragement was held out by the inhabitants at Alexandria to induce the men to desert, there were only four or five out



of the whole squadron who remained behind. The total loss was seven killed, thirty-five wounded.

Sir Alexander Cochrane was so pleased with the enterprise, that he issued the following order to the fleet, and letter to the Admiralty: The first-lieutenants of both frigates, and two midshipmen, were promoted; and at the conclusion of the war, the commanders were all made post, and Captain Gordon was made a Knight-Commander of the Bath.

“Tonnant, Chesapeake, 19th Sept. 1814.

“The Commander-in-Chief, having this day received the report of the proceedings of the detachment of his Majesty's ships, sent up the Potomac to co-operate with the combined forces in the Patuxent, feels it incumbent to offer his warmest congratulations to Capt. Gordon, and the other captains, commanders, officers, seamen, and marines, on the success which crowned their zealous exertions.

“Five days successively, with the exception of a few hours, the ships were constantly warping a distance of fifty miles, in order to act against the enemy, through a navigation so shallow and so intricate that, in spite of every exertion in buoying the channel, the ships were not less than twenty times aground.

“Fort Washington and the batteries adjacent were deserted by the garrison upon the bursting of the first shell from the bombs, after exploding their powder-magazine, and the whole of the twenty-seven guns which they contained and their carriages were effectually destroyed by our people.

“The populous city of Alexandria, awed by the bold and determined approach of our ships, sent out an offer to capitulate, and yielded instantly to the terms dictated by Captain Gordon.

“Twenty-one vessels full of merchandise were the reward of this dexterous enterprise, several of which, having been previously sunk, to prevent their removal, were weighed, masted, hove keel out, caulked and paid, fitted and loaded, in the short period of three days, during which the squadron remained at Alexandria.

“Two different attempts to destroy our shipping by fire-vessels were defeated by British gallantry.

“And the different batteries, mounting altogether from twenty-five to thirty guns, constructed in the narrowest parts of the river, in the confident expectation of effectually preventing the return of the ships, upon a range of commanding cliffs, under which they were necessarily exposed to the efforts of a numerous musketry, also were silenced by the fire of his Majesty's squadron, the whole of which, with their prizes, were brought out of the river in safety, with a loss very inferior to that of the enemy, who, at length beaten into a conviction that he could no longer hope to control their movements, let them pass down the river without further molestation.

“The Commander-in-Chief, not wishing to discriminate minutely where all appear to have done even more than their duty, offers his thanks to Captain Gordon, who so well fulfilled the confidence placed in his zeal and ability; to Captains Napier, Alexander, Bartholomew, Baker, Kenah, Roberts, and the whole of the officers, seamen, and marines of this gallant detachment, for the conspicuous zeal and unremitting exertion which distinguished their conduct on this brilliant occasion.

“And he is desirous of calling the attention of the fleet under his command to this further proof, that there is scarcely any difficulty which may not be surmounted by a cordial support of each other, and a steady determination to conquer.

“By command of the Commander-in-Chief,

(Signed) EDWARD CODRINGTON,

Rear-Admiral and Captain of the Fleet.”

"H. M. S. Tonnant, Chesapeake,  
Sept. 12, 1814.

"SIR,

"In my despatch of the 2d inst., recounting the success of our expedition against Washington, I acquainted you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the winds had been unfavourable for the return of the ships which were detached up the Potomac, under Captain J. A. Gordon, of the Seahorse, to co-operate against the capital, but that I had heard of their having accomplished the destruction of Fort Washington. I have now the honour not only to confirm this report, but to transmit, for their Lordships' information, a copy of Captain Gordon's detail of his proceedings, in which his further success has exceeded my most sanguine expectations, having forced the populous city of Alexandria to capitulate, and having brought down the river in triumph, through a series of obstacles and determined opposition, a fleet of twenty-two enemy's vessels. The difficulties which presented themselves to these ships in ascending the river, impeded by shoals and contrary winds, and the increased obstacles which the enemy had prepared against their return, with a confident hope of obstructing their descent, were only to be overcome by the most indefatigable exertions.

"I trust, therefore, that the resolution and gallantry displayed by every one employed upon this service, which deserve my warmest applause, will be further honoured by the approbation of their Lordships.

"I have the honour to be,

&c. &c.

"To J. W. Croker, Esq.

"ALEXANDER COCHRANE."

"Tonnant, off Chantelour Island,  
1st Feb. 1815.

"The Commander-in-Chief is desirous of communicating to the Flag Officers, Captains, and Commanders under his orders, the following extract of a Letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty:—

"Having laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a copy of a letter and its enclosures from Captain Gordon, of the Seahorse, who had been detached up the Potomac, with the ships and vessels named in the margin, to act as a diversion to the expedition proceeding against the city of Washington, in which are detailed his operations against the Fort of Washington, and his subsequent proceedings against the city of Alexandria, which terminated in the capture of the fort and the surrender of the city by capitulation, and the capture and destruction of several of the enemy's vessels, twenty-one of which were safely brought down the river, notwithstanding the many obstacles and oppositions he had to encounter from the enemy;—I have, in return, received their Lordships' commands to signify their direction to you to express to Captain Gordon, and the other Captains and Commanders employed on this occasion, their Lordships' high approbation of the zeal, exertions, and gallantry displayed by themselves their respective officers, and ships' companies upon this service."

"By order of the Commander-in-Chief,

(Signed)

"EDWARD CODRINGTON,  
Rear-Admiral and Captain of the Fleet."

The following is the list of killed and wounded:—Seahorse, 3 wounded, Euryalus, 3 killed, 10 wounded; Fairy, 1 killed, 6 wounded; Erebus, 1 killed, 16 wounded (2 died); Meteor, 2 wounded.

## MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF GERMANY.

## No. I.

THE aspect of political affairs in Europe at this moment, and the apprehensions which are entertained respecting the turn they will ultimately take, confer a more than ordinary value upon information derived from authentic sources, explanatory of the military institutions of the continental powers. We therefore purpose, in the present and in succeeding numbers of our Journal, to offer to our readers a concise Survey of the Military Establishments of the States forming the Germanic Confederation; containing a sketch of the composition, formation, dress, arms, standards, and honourable decorations of their armies; with the amount of the contingent force each state is required to furnish by the Federative Constitution of Germany in a season of foreign war; together with the names of the fortresses and the depôts of military stores which they severally possess.

The little that is known here in public upon these subjects, and the difficulties which prevent the generality of our countrymen abroad from gaining access to particulars of this nature, will, we conceive, secure to our communications an ample share of interest.

The exact details which will be found of the dress and equipments of the troops, are chiefly intended to enable British officers who may visit the Continent with an intention of assisting at military parades, to distinguish at a glance the regiments of each country, and to what branches of the service they respectively appertain.

We commence with

## AUSTRIA.

*Composition of the Army.*

The Austrian land force is composed of the regular army and the troops of the frontiers.

The empire is divided into fourteen great military commands, each of which has a governor-general, under whose orders are placed all the troops stationed within the province, comprised in the command, the military districts, and the military authorities.

In the tactical arrangement of the army, two regiments, whether of the same or of different arms, form a brigade; two or three brigades a division; and several divisions an army corps.

The military force for the service of the frontiers, whose duty, in time of peace, is confined to the protection of the extensive line of boundary of the empire, comprehends seventeen national frontier regiments, one Czschaikisten battalion, which serves in small gun-boats, called czschaikisten, upon the Save and Danube, in the generalate of Peterwardein, and one Szekler hussar regiment.

With the exception of Hungary and Transylvania, where the levy and granting of recruits for the imperial army is subject to the management of the states, the army is recruited from all parts of the empire, by means of a ballot or conscription, though not unfrequently by levies.

The guards are not classed amongst the troops of the field. They consist of—

1st. *The Body Guard of Noble Archers*, called *Arçiren*, having one

captain with the rank of general of cavalry, and one captain-lieutenant, a general of infantry, with a number of guards, all of whom must have served and held rank in the army as captains or first or second lieutenants. The uniform is scarlet, with black collar and facings, gold epaulettes, gilt buttons, gold-lace ornaments, hat and feather, white breeches, long boots, and sword.

2d. *The Body Guard of Hungarian Nobles* is composed of individuals who have served as first-lieutenants in the army. Dress:—A light-red dollman, white embroidery and buttons; calpak, or hussar cap, with a plume of heron's feathers; red pantaloons and yellow-boots; sabre.

3d. *The Trabanten*, or, as the term literally signifies, *the Satellites of the Body Guard*, consisting of eighty men, is composed in the same manner as the preceding; their uniform is scarlet, with black collar and facings, yellow buttons, lace and epaulettes; white breeches, high boots, helmet, and halberd.

4th. *The Hofburg Guard* consists of one captain with 200 men, who are selected from the half-invalided non-commissioned officers of regiments. Uniform:—Light grey; black collar and facings, yellow buttons and epaulettes; white breeches, high boots, hat, musket and bayonet.

5th. *The Royal Hungarian Crown Guard of Ofen (Buda)*, in many respects answering to our Band of Gentlemen Pensioners, wears a white uniform, with grape-red collar and facings, yellow buttons, red Hungarian trowsers, grenadier cap.

#### INFANTRY.—*Strength and Formation.*

The service comprises, exclusive of the regiments of the frontiers,—

- 58 Regiments of the Line.
- 1 Regiment of Tyrolese Chasseurs.
- 12 Battalions of Chasseurs.
- 70 Battalions of Landwehr.

Two Landwehr battalions, each of six companies; the first, comprising men fit for immediate service, and the second, consisting of those who are liable to be called upon, are formed within the circle of each regiment of the line, with the exception of the Italian, Hungarian, and Transylvanian regiments; where, in consequence of the kingdom of Hungary being required by the terms of its constitution to raise an annual contingent of troops for the imperial army, a Landwehr force becomes unnecessary; and in Croatia and Transylvania, the frontier regiments partake of the character of a military colony, which likewise renders it needless to maintain a permanent militia.

Each regiment of the line has two grenadier and sixteen fusilier companies. These last form three battalions; the first two having six, and the third, in time of peace, only four companies. Two companies form a regimental division. The grenadier battalions, of which there are at present twenty, consist usually of three divisions or six companies: they are taken from the grenadier companies of regiments.

The light infantry comprises one regiment of Tyrolese chasseurs, of four battalions, and twelve battalions of chasseurs of the line, each battalion containing six companies, being of the same strength as those of the Landwehr.



With reference to the Hungarian Insurrection, it is an extraordinary levy in answer to a call from the crown in a season of emergency, and stands in lieu of a regularly organized landwehr.

On the advance of the French into Germany in 1800, a call of this nature took place, and produced 40,000 infantry and cavalry; and in 1809, when the national spirit ran high, the levy exceeded 80,000 men.

**UNIFORM.**—The whole of the infantry, except the light and frontier regiments, is dressed in white, with different coloured collars and facings, and a single row of buttons, white breeches, and long black gaiters;—with the exception of the grenadiers, all of whom have bearskin caps, plain shakos and short plumes are adopted throughout the infantry. The Hungarian regiments have tight blue pantaloons and laced shoes. The national frontier regiments are dressed in dark brown coats, with collars and facings of various colours, as will presently appear. The light-infantry wear light-grey coats, with grass-green collars and facings, yellow buttons, light-grey breeches, and black gaiters; Corsican hat and feather; black leather cross belts. The frontier regiments have also black, but the remainder of the troops of the line wear cross belts of white leather. The dress of the Czshaikisten battalion is a small blue-coloured coat and breeches, black gaiters, light-red collar and facings, white buttons, white leather cross belts; Corsican hat without any plume.

The infantry regiments of the line and the frontier regiments are armed with muskets and bayonets; the grenadiers have, besides, short sabres. In the frontier regiments 120 men (but in the Transylvanian only 96) carry rifles, and are named sharpshooters. The two first ranks of the chasseurs have carbines with smooth barrels, and sabres; the third rank men carry rifles with cutting bayonets. The Tyrolese corps of chasseurs are armed with rifles and bayonets of the same description, which they carry in the bandolier.

The subjoined list presents an accurate view of the dress of every regiment of infantry in the service, exhibiting their respective numbers and names, with the colours of their collars, facings, and buttons:—

Those marked with an asterisk [\*] are Hungarian Regiments.

Regts.	Names.		Collars and Facings.	Buttons.
1st	Emperor	the same as the	18th deep red	yellow
2d	Emperor Alexander*		31st imperial yellow	
3d	Archduke Charles		4th azure	white
4th	Deutschmeister		3d azure	yellow
5th	} none			
6th				
7th	Latterman		12th dark brown	white
8th	Archduke Lewis		28th grass green	yellow
9th	Bentheim		54th apple green	"
10th	Mazzuchelli		26th poplar green	white
11th	Archduke Rainer		24th dark blue	yellow
12th	Lichtenstein		7th dark brown	"
13th	Wimpffen		38th rose	"
14th	Richter		58th black	"
15th	Emperor Don Pedro		44th grape red	"
16th	Lusignan		41st sulphur yellow	"

Regts.	Names.			Collars and Facings.	Buttons.
17th	Hohenlohe	the same as the	63d	light brown	white
18th	Lilieaberg		1st	deep red	"
19th	Hesse Homburg *		32d	light blue	"
20th	Hoehenegg		35th	saffron	"
21st	Albert Giulai		25th	sea green	yellow
22d	Prince Leopold of the Two Sicilies		27th	imperial yellow	white
23d	Soldenhof		43d	crimson	"
24th	Strauch		11th	dark blue	"
25th	Trapp		21st	sea green	"
26th	King of Holland		10th	poplar green	"
27th	Luxembourg		22d	imperial yellow	yellow
28th	vacant		8th	grass green	white
29th	Nassau		40th	lead blue	"
30th	Nugent		49th	light grey	yellow
31st	Leiningen		2d	imperial yellow	white
32d	Esterhazy *		19th	light blue	yellow
33d	Baconi *		51st	dark blue	white
34th	Benczur *			grape red	"
35th	Herzogenberg		20th	saffron	yellow
36th	Palombini		57th	red lead	white
37th	Mariassy *		39th	light red	yellow
38th	Haugwitz		13th	rose	white
39th	Prince Regent of Portugal *		37th	light red	"
40th	Wurtemberg		29th	lead blue	yellow
41st	Wallet		16th	sulphur yellow	white
42d	Wellington		59th	orange	"
43d	Geppert		23d	crimson	yellow
44th	Archduke Albrecht		15th	grape red	white
45th	Mayer			scarlet	yellow
46th	none				
47th	Kinsky		56th	steel green	white
48th	Gollner *		60th	"	yellow
49th	Langenau		30th	light grey	white
50th	none				
51st	Meczery *		33d	dark blue	yellow
52d	Archduke Francis Charles *		53d	deep red	"
53d	Radossewich *		52d	"	white
54th	Prince Emilius of Hesse		9th	apple green	"
55th	none				
56th	Furstenwarther		47th	steel green	yellow
57th	Minutillo		36th	red lead	"
58th	Archduke Stephen		14th	black	white
59th	Grand Duke of Baden		42d	orange	yellow
60th	Prince Vasa *		45th	steel green	white
61st	St. Julien *		62d	grass green	yellow
62d	Wacquand *		61st	"	white
63d	Bianchi		17th	light brown	yellow

## NATIONAL FRONTIER REGIMENTS.

Regts.	Names.	Collars and Facings.	Buttons.
1st	Litcan	imperial yellow	yellow
2d	Ottochan	"	white
3d	Ogulin	orange	yellow
4th	Szluin	"	white
5th	Warasdin Cross	saffron	yellow
6th	Warasdin St. George	"	white
7th	Brod	red lead	yellow

Regts.	Names.	Collars and Facings.	Buttons.
8th	Gradiscan	red lead	white
9th	Peterwardein	greyish blue	yellow
10th	1st Banal	crimson	"
11th	2d Banal	"	white
12th	Deutsch Banat	azure	"
13th	Wallachian Illyria	greyish blue	"
14th	1st Szekler	rose	yellow
15th	2d Szekler	"	white
16th	1st Wallachian	poplar green	yellow
17th	2d Wallachian	"	white

The military frontiers extend through a tract of country which stretches from the Adriatic along the confines of Illyria, Croatia, Sclavonia, Hungary, and Transylvania, as far as the Carpathian mountains. They form a sort of military colony, and are severally subject to a code of laws and regulations adapted to this mode of government.

*Landwehr*.—White uniforms, with coloured collars and facings; shakos, with the initials L. W., instead of a brass cockade; white breeches and long black gaiters; white leather cross belts; muskets, with bayonets.

#### CAVALRY.—*Strength and Formation.*

This arm comprises 37 regiments, of the following denominations,—

8	Regiments of Cuirassiers	} heavy.
6	" Dragoons	
7	" Chevaux Legers	} light.
12	" Hussars, with the Szekler	
4	" Lancers	

The regiments are organized by squadrons, of which the cuirassiers and dragoons have six, but all the others eight.

The uniform of the cuirassiers consists in a white coat, coloured collar and facings; white pantaloons, and high boots; helmet; cuirass in front; pallash, or long straight sword; pistols. Sixteen men of each squadron carry carbines and pistols.

The following table describes the names and the colours of the collars and facings, which distinguish the regiments one from another:—

Regts.	Names.	Collars and Facings.	Buttons.
1st	Emperor	deep red	white
2d	Archduke Francis	black	"
3d	Prince Frederick of Saxony	deep red	yellow
4th	Crown Prince	grass green	white
5th	Auersperg	light blue	"
6th	Wallmoden	black	"
7th	Henry Hardegg	dark blue	"
8th	Ignatius Hardegg	scarlet	yellow

*Dragoons*.—Uniform:—White coat, breeches, and high boots; helmet; pallash; a long carbine and pistols.

Regts.	Names.	Collars and Facings.	Buttons.
1st	Archduke John	black	white
2d	King of Bavaria	dark blue	"
3d	(vacant)	deep red	"
4th	Tuscany	light red	"
5th	Savoy	dark green	"
6th	Figuiemont	light red	"



The *Chevaux Legers* have coats of different colours, as described beneath; white breeches, high boots, helmet, pallas, a light sort of carbine; and eight men per squadron carry rifles.

Regts.	Names.	Coats.	Collars & Facings.	Buttons.
1st	Emperor	dark green	light red	yellow
2d	Hohenzollern	"	"	white
3d	(vacant)	white	"	yellow
4th	Vincent	dark green	dark red	"
5th	Schneller	white	light blue	"
6th	(vacant)	"	dark red	"
7th	Nostitz	"	scarlet	white

The uniform of the *Hussar* regiments is composed of a dollman, pelisse, coloured calpack, pantaloons, Hungarian boots, sabre, a light carbine; and eight men in each squadron carry rifles.

Regts.	Names.	Calpacks.	Pelisses.	Dollman and Pantaloons.	Buttons.
1st	Emperor	black	dark blue	as pelisse	yellow
2d	Archduke Joseph	grape red	light blue	"	"
3d	Archduke Ferdinand	ash grey	dark blue	"	"
4th	Geramb	light blue	dark green	deep red	white
5th	King of Sardinia	grape red	"	crimson	"
6th	King of Wirtemberg	black	smalt blue	"	yellow
7th	Lichtenstein	grass green	light blue	"	white
8th	Saxe Coburg	grape red	dark green	grape red	yellow
9th	Wieland	black	"	crimson	"
10th	King of Prussia	grass green	light blue	as pelisse	"
11th	Szekler	black	dark blue	"	white
12th	Palatinal	"	smalt blue	"	"

The *Lancers* wear dark-green kurtkas or jackets, and overalls; scarlet collars and facings, yellow metal buttons, and scale epaulettes. They are armed with sabres, pistols, and lances with black and yellow flags; in each squadron eight men have short carbines, and eight others rifles. These regiments are recognized by the colour of their czapkas, or caps, thus —

Regts.	Names.	Czapkas.
1st	Coburg	imperial yellow
2d	Schwartzenberg	dark green
3d	Archduke Charles	scarlet
4th,	Emperor	white

#### ARTILLERY.

This important branch of the service is composed of five regiments of field artillery, a corps of bombardeers, and a corps of fire-workers. The bombardeer corps comprises five companies, exclusive of the staff, and it is usually considered as a school of instruction for officers of artillery. Individuals serving in the artillery, who evince a more than ordinary capacity in the discharge of their duty, pass into the bombardeer corps, to pursue a course of mathematical study, and to complete the education essential in this branch of the profession.

The rank of bombardeer is succeeded by that of fire-worker, and afterwards upper fire-worker; and it is only by proceeding through these several grades that the rank of officer of artillery (lieutenant) can be attained. Fire-workers of both classes are occasionally employed as store-keepers and inspectors in fortified towns, or at places which

were once reputed such, but which have since fallen into decay, without however the loss of their original designation.

Each battery has generally a number of fire-workers attached to its service, who are capable of being entrusted with the management of one or two detached pieces—a duty formerly reserved for the non-commissioned officers of artillery.

A regiment of field-artillery consists of four battalions; one of six and the remainder of four companies, or eighteen in all. The field-pieces comprehend guns of the calibre of three, six, twelve, and eighteen pounds, and seven-pound howitzers.

The horse-artillery comprises guns of three and six pounds, and seven-pound howitzers; the gunners ride upon the carriages.

A battery is composed of four pieces of cannon and two howitzers; to each brigade of infantry belong two batteries; but to a cavalry brigade only one is attached. Each field-piece has its appropriate ammunition waggon; and every battery is accompanied by a forge-cart and two haversack waggons.

The six-pound guns of the foot-artillery, the howitzers, and tumbrels, are drawn by four horses; the twelve-pounders are harnessed by six horses, as are also the six-pounders of the mounted-artillery.

The corps of fire-workers at Vienna new town, consists of one commandant with a proportionate number of officers and workmen. This corps comprises five rocket and one dépôt company; and the whole establishment has been formed since the year 1810, for the fabrication of Congreve rockets, and is quite distinct from the fire-workers spoken of above.

Besides the preceding there is a garrison artillery distributed through the frontier government commands, for the service of the fortresses; also a waggon-train corps, divided into twelve carriage transport divisions (each of ninety horses), and twenty battery harnessed sets.

*Uniform*.—Of the bombardeer corps consists of a fawn-coloured coat, light-red collar and facings, with a single row of yellow buttons; white breeches, boots to the knee; black Corsican hat, with a black and yellow heron plume; white leather cross belts for a sword, and a set of mathematical instruments, in a black leather case.

The artillery regiments are likewise dressed in fawn-coloured uniforms, with light-red collars and facings; yellow buttons; swords with white belts, and the number of the regiment on the buttons.

*The Waggon-train corps* wears a white uniform, with imperial yellow collar and facings; white buttons; white and grey mixed trowsers; shako without any feather, and white belts.

*The Garrison Artillery* has a G, and the rocket-companies a grenade embroidered upon the coat collar.

#### ENGINEER CORPS.—*Strength and Formation.*

The Engineer department comprehends,—

1. The Corps of Engineers.
2. " " Miners.
3. " " Sappers, and 1 Battalion of Pontoneers, which is placed under the control of the department of the Marine.

The engineer corps is appointed to the service of the fortifications. Within the circle of each general command there is one fortification

district, with a district inspector, who is selected from the general and staff officers of the corps; and to every fortified town local-inspectors are appointed.

*Uniforms.*—Dark-blue, crimson collar and facings; yellow buttons; white breeches and high boots; hat and feather.

*Corps of Miners.*—Dress: dark-grey, crimson collar and facings; yellow buttons; white breeches, and boots.

*The Pioneer Corps* does not exist in time of peace, but is only organized in war time, when it is attached to the staff of the army. The patronage of the commissions rests with the quarter-master general, who fills up the appointments from amongst those officers or cadets of ability, whom he desires to protect.

Their dress is blue, with red collar and facings; white buttons; blue trowsers, and boots; a Corsican hat with an anchor upon it.

The garrison troops consist of six battalions, of which Nos. 3 and 4 are Hungarian.

*Uniform*—White, with black collar and facings; white buttons; blue trousers; muskets and bayonets, the same as the infantry of the line.

*National Standards*—Black and Yellow.

#### CONTINGENT.

The amount of the contingent of troops that Austria is engaged to furnish under the Federative Constitution of Germany, may be computed at 94,822<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> men, which force forms the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps of the army of the Confederation.

#### *Military and Civil Decorations.*

Golden Fleece.	Gold and Silver Medal of Valour.
Maria Theresa, (3 classes.)	Gold and Silver Medal of Honour.
Hungarian Order of St. Stephen,	Elizabeth Theresa.
(3 classes.)	Military Cross for 1813 and 1814.
Leopold, (3 classes.)	Tyrolese Medal.
Iron Crown, (3 classes.)	Vienna National Guard Medal.
Gold and Silver Civil Cross of Honour.	Cross of Honour for the Clergy.

#### *Fortresses.*

LINZ, unfinished.	} Austria Proper.
(Hohen-Salzburg.)	
(Gradisca) Capo d'Istria, fortified	} Kingdom of Illyria.
on the side next to the sea.	
(Kuffstein.) County of Tyrol.	
PRAGUE—Theresienstadt—	} Kingdom of Bohemia.
Koniggratz—Josephstadt.	
OLMUTZ. Margrave of Moravia.	
Ofen, & Buda—KOMORN.	} Kingdom of Hungary.
SZEGEDIN—TEMESVAR—ESSECK.	
(Arad, Munkats.)	
(Bellovar—Alt Gradisca—Brod—New Orzowa.)	} The Military Frontiers.
Carlstadt—Peterwardein.	
Karlsberg (Citadels of Clausenburg and Cronstadt.)	} Grand Principality of Transylvania.

MANTUA (Peschiera)} Lombard Venetian Kingdom.  
(Legnago.)

(Zara), Sebenico, and Cattara, respectively, } Kingdom of Dalmatia.  
are fortified on the seaside.

N. B. The places whose names are in small capitals are fortresses of the first class; the remainder are of the second, except, however, all those within parentheses, which are of the third and fourth class.

#### *Principal Depôts of Military Stores.*

*Arsenals*—Vienna, Prague, Buda, Temeswar, Milan.

*Foundries*—Ebergassing, Trieste, Ferlach, Troppau, Teschen, Dobschau, Karlsberg, Brescia.

*Manufactory of Small Arms*—Steyer.

*Powder Factories*—Krems, Wels, Kaschau, Neusohl.

#### No. II.

### OLDENBURGH.

The military strength of this small state (containing only 255,000 inhabitants) is formed of a brigade of infantry, comprising two regiments, and a corps of artillery, consisting of one battery.

Each regiment has eight companies, exclusive of two of reserve, and comprehends, in time of peace, about 800 men. The uniform is blue, with red collar and facings,—(the 1st regiment has white, and the 2d yellow shoulder-straps)—blue trousers; shakos; white cross belts; muskets and bayonets.

The artillery consists of one battery of four six-pound guns, and two howitzers, each having its accompanying ammunition waggon; all being drawn by four horses. The uniform is blue, with black collar and facings; red shoulder straps; yellow buttons; black leather belts

*Standards*—Blue, Red, and Yellow.

*Military Decoration*—A Medal for the Campaign of 1815.

*Military Establishment of Stores*—Arsenal at Oldenburg.

The amount of the contingent of troops furnished by this state to the army of the Germanic Confederation, is 2178 men, and forms part of the 10th corps.

#### No. III.

### WALDECK.

This little principality maintains a force consisting of three companies of infantry, and a detachment of chasseurs. It is required to hold at the disposal of the Confederation of the Rhine, a contingent of troops amounting to 518 men, which forms part of the 10th corps of that army. In 1815, this state engaged to employ in the field, for the defence of the common cause, the number of 800 men.

The uniform is green with red collar and facings; gray trousers; black gaiters, white cross belts; shakos, ornamented with white cords and tassels; muskets and swords. The chasseurs are dressed in green with light green collars and facings; black belts; rifles and hangers (*couteaux de chasse*).

*Standards*—White and Green.

## REMARKS ON THE DECAY OF THE PORT OF HYTHE.

OBSCURITY is the inseparable companion of antiquity, around which she throws her veil of impervious darkness. The origin of towns and cities, nay, even of nations and empires—their progress from germination to the first buddings of prosperity and greatness, lie hid beneath its ample folds, and offer subjects for the penetration and research of the enlightened inquirer of after-times. The same interest, the same placidity of feeling, which take possession of the mind while contemplating the grey and massive ruins of ages long passed into eternity, are alike experienced in the prosecution of inquiries into the origin and early history of towns and cities. The little intelligence which history affords stimulates desire; the paucity of data invigorates research; but the mind of man, limited in power, speculative by nature, and impatient of obstacles, too frequently calls in the aid of gossip tradition, and, blending truth and fiction together, replaces, with a base alloy, the golden links which time has broken in the chain of history. History and fable, thus blended together, present a mass of events discrepant in philosophy and opposed in fact, and it becomes almost impossible, now, to disunite them. The documents that can alone produce this end are long since buried in oblivion, and although the pursuits of the historian and the antiquary are sometimes cheered by the discovery of a charter or a record, still their light is partial and their scope confined: like the transient sunbeam of a winter day, they illumine partially and for a moment, and then all is dark again.

Immersed in this state of obscurity is the early history of the town and port of Hythe. Let us endeavour to elucidate it—let us place the matter in the clearest point of view which authentic evidence warrants; and it will become quite apparent that the present town is not the Hythe of the earliest periods of our history; that the present town was in existence previous to the Norman conquest; and that all the ancient documents which time has spared to intelligence, relate to the present and not to the older town. It appears that the ancient town of Hythe, as well as the present one, for many centuries was an appurtenance to the manor of Saltwood, a village about a mile distant, and still celebrated for the ruins of its fine castle. In the year 1036, when acts of piety and benevolence to the church were common, Halfden, a Saxon thane, gave Hythe and Saltwood, with all their appurtenances, to Christ Church, Canterbury, in the presence of King Canute. The archbishop, in consequence of the gift, became lord of the manor; and the lands were held of him, by the tenure of knight's service, by Earl Godwin, who appears to have continued to hold them till the Norman conquest, at which period that great and powerful nobleman was deprived of them, in favour of one of the Norman knights who had followed the fortunes of their victorious leader. The borough remained an appurtenance to the manor, the lands of which were held by Hugo de Montfort at the time of the Domesday Survey, which, as it throws much light on the progress of the town towards prosperity, is inserted. At the end of the description of the manor, and under the title of *Terra Militum Archiepi*, or lands held of the archbishop in knight's service, it says, "*Ad hoc M. (viz. Saltwood) ptin. 225 burgses, in Burgo Hedde. Int. Burgi et M.*

val. T.R.E. 16 lib. 2do recep. 8 lib. mo. int. totu 29 lib. et 6 sol. et 4 den." To this manor belong 225 burgesses in the borough of Hythe. Between the borough and the manor, in the time of King Edward the Confessor it was worth 16*l.*; when he received it, 8*l.*; and now (that is, in 1080, the time when the survey was taken) in the whole 29*l.* 6*s.* 4*d.* The gift of the manor of Saltwood and the borough of Hythe to Christ Church, Canterbury, is the only historical fact remaining that can, with any probability, be supposed to allude to the ancient town; which was situated, according to Lombard, to the westward of the present town, at the distance of about two miles, and was known, in his day, as the old port of West Hythe. Even the period when its haven choked up and became useless, although a circumstance of great interest in a national point of view, is nowhere recorded, and is consequently one of those facts over which Oblivion has thrown her mantle of forgetfulness; but that the extract from Domesday applies to the present borough, and establishes the date when it first ranked as one of the principal Cinque Ports, appears equally certain; although the facts contained in that extract have not before been adduced to prove the point. History attributes the rise of the present port to the decay of the ancient one, which Kilburn says had, together with that of Limne, (the Portus Lemanus of the Romans,) become banked up with sand; and that after the sea retired, the town of West Hythe fell into decay, lost all its former consequence, dwindled into a small village, and, what is a very remarkable fact, became an appurtenance to the modern town. Domesday records as before observed, that when King Edward the Confessor received the manor and the borough, it was worth 8*l.*; that during his reign its value became doubled; and that in the year 1080 it had increased in amount to 29*l.* 6*s.* 4*d.*; and to what cause was this rapid increase in value attributable? The most probable answer is, that the port of Old Hythe had become nearly useless at the accession of Edward the Confessor, and that during his reign many of the burgesses removed to the present town, the harbour of which was good, and rising into reputation; and that on the arrival of William I. the sea had completed the destruction of the old haven, and that that sovereign first removed the franchise and privileges to the present town, and chartered it as one of the principal Cinque Ports. Admitting this conjecture to be true, the great number of burgesses which inhabited it in the time of William the Conqueror is easily accounted for, they having quitted the ancient town on the destruction of its harbour: and my Lord Coke's assertion, "that Hythe, together [with Hastings, were made cinque ports by William the Conqueror,"\* although erroneous, is capable of explanation. William removed the privileges from the old to the new town, but could have done no more; because King John, in his charter, says that the Barons of the Cinque Ports had in their possession charters of most of the preceding kings, back to Edward the Confessor, *which he had seen.*† It therefore appears probable that the present town of Hythe became one of the chief ports in the reign of William the Conqueror; but that it was still an appurtenance to the manor of Saltwood, and being in the bailiwick of the archbishop, he appointed a bailiff, annually, to act jointly for the govern-

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\* Inst. lib. 4, cap. 42.

† U. S. Journal, No. 47, p. 218.

ment of the town and liberty. This officer continued to act with the mayor, jurats, and commonalty of the town, the senior jurat on the bench always sitting as president, till the 31st of Henry VIII., when the archbishop exchanged the manor of Saltwood and the bailiwick of Hythe with the king for other estates. A bailiff was still appointed by the crown till the 17th of Elizabeth, who granted to the town a particular charter of incorporation, by the name of mayor, jurats, and commonalty of the town and port of Hythe, and under this charter they are still governed. She also granted her bailiwick of the town to the mayor and his successors for ever, at a fee farm rent of 3*l.* per annum. Such was the origin of the present borough of Hythe, and such the origin, the nature, and the termination of its connexion with and dependence upon the manor, and not the village of Saltwood; points on which very erroneous opinions are entertained.

As soon as Hythe received its charter, it rose to prosperity very rapidly; houses and population increased so fast, that it was a large and well-peopled town in very early times, and its harbour became as noted and as frequented as the decayed one of the ancient port. For several centuries it continued to possess a safe and commodious haven, which finally, in its turn, shared the fate of its predecessor; and so completely is it destroyed, that no vestige of it remains to mark its former situation. In the time of Henry VIII. it was reduced to a small narrow inland channel, as appears by Leland, who says, "the havyn is a prety Rode, and lieth metely strayt for passage owt of Boleyn: yt croketh yn so by the shore along, and is so bakked fro the mayne Se with castynge of shingil, that smaui shippes may cum up a large myle towards Folkestan as in a sure gut." The attention of Elizabeth was called to the state of the ports along this coast, and in the eighth year of her reign they were ordered to be surveyed. Probably the decayed state of most of the ports which remained, and were once so famous; the total loss of others, equally large and convenient in their day; and the necessity of a harbour in the Downs, which had been pressed upon the notice of the government from the time of Edward VI., gave rise to this survey; the return to which shows a still further reduction in consequence to the port of Hythe; for it gives the number of inhabited houses at only 122. It also states that there belonged to the town at that time, 17 tramellers of 5 tunne, 7 shoters of 15, 3 crayers of 30, and 4 crayers of 40 tunne; and that the persons belonging to these boats, and employed in fishing, amounted to 160 men and boys. The haven is not described in the return, which merely states that there are "creeks and landing places 2; th'one called the *Haven*, within the liberties; th'other called the *Stade*, without the liberties." How great the contrast between Hythe under the reign of Elizabeth, and Hythe under the reign of the Plantagenets; between Hythe with a few fishing boats, and a narrow creek for a haven; and Hythe, one of the principal Cinque Ports, possessing a large, safe and commodious harbour, and furnishing, as her quota to the fleet of the ports, 5 ships of war, 105 men and 5 boys, at her own cost, for the defence of the kingdom! Soon after this survey was made, the little inland channel, the wreck and shadow of the former extensive haven, choked up, notwithstanding the advantage which it had in the sea-brook as a backwater. Many attempts to reopen the channel have

been made, at great trouble and no small expense ; but the efforts were for the most part ill-directed, and failed in consequence. The loss of a port is a circumstance which is viewed with too much indifference ; but it is not the less a loss to be deeply deplored. It was the cause of prosperity to the town at which it was situated ; and it was an asylum against the storm to the seamen of all nations. As sources of individual benefit, as the causes of national prosperity, as asylums of benevolence, humanity, and civilization, the ports of a nation claim a just, an indisputable preeminence as objects of care and of safe preservation. View the long line of coast from Hastings to Sandwich, once rich in commodious harbours, nay, celebrated for their number and safety ; and where are they now ? Hastings, Winchelsea, Limne (the Portus Lemanus), Romney, and Hythe are gone ; Rye, Folkstone, Dover, and Sandwich remain at the present time ; of these, Rye and Sandwich, preserved at great difficulty and expense, are fast verging to destruction ; Folkstone is an ill-formed and an ill-finished construction ; and Dover, the grand port of embarkation to the Continent, is often useless during strong south-westerly gales, in consequence of the bar of shingle which forms directly across the mouth of the harbour\* : none of these, therefore, deserve the appellation of good and commodious. The tendency to decay, which so particularly marks the harbours along this extensive line of coast,—a line which contains the once celebrated Cinque Ports, and many of their limbs and dependencies,—has been fully accounted for in a former paper, where it is attributed to the mischievous practice of inning, or gaining land from the sea. By this attempt to exclude old Ocean from his ancient bounds, the extensive pastures known as Romney Marsh were gained ; but they were not gained with impunity, for the erection of the sea-works, and the commencement of the decay of the harbours just enumerated, are events coeval with each other. It may be here remarked, that the erection of extensive works into the sea is always attended with other results than those proposed as the objects to be effected by the erection : for the water, turned out of its natural course by the obstruction of the works, takes a new direction ; and while it falls with increased force upon the more distant parts of the coast, and creates destruction, its power behind the works, and along the coast in their immediate vicinage, is greatly decreased : but the consequences are equally destructive, and the destruction is equally certain ; because the current water, reduced in velocity, is no longer able to hold in solution the sand and detritus with which it is always abundantly charged ; and it therefore deposits this destructive matter in all the adjacent bays and harbours, reducing the depth of water in the one, and finally choking up the other. The haven of the port of Hythe might, however, have been preserved, with the advantage which such a backwater as that of Seabrook presents, provided that the remedies had been well conceived and timely applied ; but the good burghesses suffered the evil to grow till it became uncontrollable, and then, when it was too late, they commenced active exertions to overcome it. Such a course of proceeding is, however, by no means uncommon ; but surely the preservation of the ports of the kingdom ought not to be left to the mercy of individuals, to be wholly neglected, or trifled with

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\* See U. S. Journal, No. 51.



by the application of ignorant and senseless experiments for improvement and preservation. It has frequently been asserted that the inhabitants of a sea-port town, in consequence of the powerful interest they must feel in the well-being of their harbour, are the most fit and proper persons to watch over its safety,—an argument which, at first sight, appears very plausible, on account of the truth of one part of the proposition, viz. that their interests are connected with its preservation; but whoever is acquainted with the state of society in these towns, with the ignorance and prejudice which pervade them on all subjects connected with science, with the abject servility of the great body of the population, and the lordly domination assumed by a few, often by a single individual—who arrogates to himself universal knowledge, and not only the power but the right to order, arrange, and settle all the concerns of the town and the port, be their difficulty, their variety, or their importance ever so great, by his single fiat—will readily perceive and candidly allow the fallacy of the argument. In some ports it is the practice to expend as small a sum of money as possible upon the works, to apply only palliatives instead of remedies, and the mischief being only partially overcome by such means, increases in the end, till it becomes too mighty for removal except at an enormous expense, and the utility of the harbour is destroyed.

A very simple means of remedying this evil, in all its parts, presents itself in the appointment of a proper person for each maritime county, whose duty it should be to inspect the different harbours situated on its coast; to make occasional surveys of them; and to report, at stated periods, on their condition:—the quota paid by each port for such services would be little compared with the heavy outlay now often expended in experiments as absurd as they are inapplicable. The time of peace is the time for improvement: to what more useful object of general interest can the attention of the nation be directed, than to securing the preservation and increasing the utility of the ports and havens around her shores? It would be like the thrift of the prudent man, who, during the hours of quiet, provides against the day of struggle and of difficulty. The sad consequences attendant on the loss of a haven are powerfully illustrated in the present state of Hythe; thinly populated, reduced in importance, and void of commercial speculation, it has dwindled from its former consequence into the dulness and insignificance of an obscure country town.

The early accounts of Hythe describe it as a large, populous, and flourishing place, containing several parishes; but through accidents and misfortunes, arising out of natural causes, it became reduced to a single parish. The ruins of four of the churches were seen by Leland, who visited the town under the commission of Henry the Eighth, and who thus describes it in his Itinerary:—"Hyth hath bene a very great towne yn lenght, and conteyned iiii paroches. To cownt fro West Hyth to place wher the substan of the towne ys now, ys ii good myles yn lenght, al along the shore, to which the Se cam ful sumtyme, but now by bankinge of woose, and great castynge up of shyngil, the Se is sumtyme a quarter, sumtyme *dim.* a myle, (half a mile,) fro the old shore. In the tyme of King Edward the Second, ther wer burnat by casuelte .xviiij score houses and mo, and strait followed a great pestilene, and thes ii things minished the towne. Ther remayne yet the ruines

of the chyrches and chyrch yarges, and it evidently appereth that wher the paroch chyrch is now, was sumtyme a fayr abbey." Another account records the loss by the great fire at two hundred houses and five ships, and that one hundred men were drowned. • It also states that "the inhabitants were so dispirited by this great calamity, that they thought of deserting the spot, and building a town in another situation." Thus the inhabitants of the town appear to have been peculiarly marked by misfortune; both natural and accidental causes attacking their prosperity, and finally accomplishing their downfall. The parish church is a large handsome structure, adjoining which is a charnel-house, celebrated for the collection of a large number of human bones which it contains. These bones, remarkable for their gigantic size, were found on the sea-shore, where they had lain for a very great length of time, and had bleached to perfect whiteness. They are supposed to have been the bones of the Britons slain in a battle fought with the first Saxons, on the shore between Hythe and Folkstone, about the year 546. The arm, leg, and thigh bones are of extraordinary length; and many of the skulls, which are very large and of great thickness, exhibit deep cuts as if inflicted by an axe or some such heavy weapon of early warfare. This pile of bones measures 8 feet in height, 8 feet in breadth, and 28 feet in length, and contains 1792 cubic feet.

As Hythe continued an appurtenance to the manor of Saltwood through so many centuries, it may be interesting to have some little account of its once magnificent castle, one of the finest specimens of castellated architecture remaining to modern times. It is said to have been built by Escus or Oisc, king of Kent, who succeeded his father Hengist in the year 483. Killurn, however, gives it a Roman origin; but as there are no bricks or other materials which usually mark the buildings of that grand and warlike people, it may be safely concluded that he was in error on the point. As has been previously stated, it became the property of the Church in the reign of King Canute; and the manorial lands were first held, on military tenure, by Earl Godwin, whose successor, Hugo de Montfort, repaired and strengthened it. In the time of Henry the First, it was held by Robert de Montfort, and became an escheat to the crown with the other estates of that nobleman, who had gone into voluntary exile on account of his having joined the party favourable to the cause of Robert Curthose. At this time it changed masters; the records stating it to have been held by Henry de Essex, Constable of England, and hereditary standard-bearer to the king, who rebuilt the castle, on his being appointed Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, and made it his principal residence. Engaged in a skirmish in Wales, whither he had attended King Henry the Second, his conduct was so pusillanimous, that he was declared a coward, and all his estates became, in consequence, forfeited to the crown, and this among the rest were taken possession of by Henry. But De Essex was only the tenant; the lordship and right in the property belonged to the archbishop, at that time Thomas à Becket; who made the seizure one of the charges of sacrilege against the king to the pope. It remained, however, in the hands of the crown till the reign of John, who restored it to the archbishop. It afterwards became the residence of the archbishops of Canterbury; and was by Archbishop Courtnay, in the time of Richard the Second, enlarged, and enclosed in a fine park, as his chief

residence in the county of Kent. From this period it continued to increase in beauty and magnificence, till at last its grandeur excited great murmuring, and Cranmer was obliged to exchange it with the king for other estates. Henry gave it to Thomas Cromwell, Earl of Essex, on whose attainder it again escheated to the crown, since which time it has been in the possession of many ancient families. It has, however, long since been shorn of its ancient splendour, and a portion of it is, at the present time, occupied as an ordinary farm-house.

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ON THE ARTILLERY PRACTICE AT THE SIEGE OF THE CITADEL OF ANTWERP.

IN the "United Service Journal" for the last month, a detailed and satisfactory journal, or rather history of the late siege of the citadel of Antwerp is given; it affords ample matter for much professional as well as political disquisition. We soldiers will leave Lord Palmerston to discuss the political part of the thesis, and trust he may ultimately discover a satisfactory solution to the important questions involved in it, without having recourse to our interference. Professionally speaking, we ought, perhaps, to hesitate in promulgating such a wish, but though soldiers, we feel as Englishmen, and would prefer a legitimate war against *quasi* legitimatists, to a *quasi* war against *quondam* allies.

Many incidents in the siege are interesting as connected with the construction of works, their attack, the necessity of flanking support, the advantage of retired flanks, the importance of enfilading and ricocheting fire; and, particularly, the opinions said to be entertained by the Commandant of the besieging artillery, and the remarks made on these opinions in the course of the narrative, seem to invite discussion.

It appears that the Lieutenant-General commanding this arm "perpetinaciously adhered to the principle, that it is at point-blank that cannon fire is most efficacious, and that nothing is gained by that of mortars at close range; that is, that the impetus of the former does not increase by reducing the distance between the point-blank and a given object; and were it not for intervening glacis and counterscarps, revetments could as speedily be breached at full point-blank as at fifty yards; whilst, in regard to the latter, their execution is rendered less certain by the necessity of diminishing the charge and fuze."

Before we hazard any remarks on this subject, we must observe that, by full point-blank appears to be intended that which the French term *le but en blanc*, distinguished from the *but en blanc primitif ou naturel*: which the English term the line of metal elevation, namely, the elevation of the axis of the bore resulting from the dispart of the gun, a plane passing over and touching the superior part of the breech and muzzle, being coincident with the object at which the gun is laid. We have entered more at length upon the meaning to be assigned to this term in a former number, (vol. vii. page 76);—it is sufficient for the present purpose to guard against misapprehension. If the definition now assumed be admitted to convey the meaning of the phrase point-blank, as applied to the opinions of General Neigre, the distance in question will be, when referring to a 24-pounder English, about seven hundred yards, such being its line of metal range.

Now, at this distance, it is very certain that a breach may be effected against an ordinary revetment, if not covered by a counterscarp or some intervening object, without any difficulty. We learn from the very useful memoir by Sir John May, of the artillery, that at Ciudad Rodrigo breaches, of one hundred and thirty feet in extent, were rendered practicable at ranges of from five to seven hundred yards, in thirty-two hours and a half; the greatest number of guns employed being thirty 24-pounders, and two 18-pounders. Sir John Jones says, that "at Badajos the extent of front of the three breaches open was above five hundred feet, the greater part of which was as good as can be formed." This was effected from distances of between six and seven hundred yards, and with fourteen 18-pounders, and twelve 24-pounders, in one hundred and four hours; firing, on an average, nine rounds in the hour. The curtain-breach was rendered not only practicable, but particularly easy, by fourteen guns, in thirteen hours; but this cannot be produced as a criterion, since the wall was very bad and came down in two hours' firing, at a range of six hundred yards; at St. Sebastian, twenty 24-pounders caused a practicable breach of one hundred feet in extent, in thirty-three hours; and these guns rendered a smaller breach, at the same siege, practicable in fifteen hours and a half; on an average, twenty rounds a gun were fired in an hour.

Thus, at the three sieges, assuming the data they afford, and supposing fifty guns employed, a breach of one hundred feet might have been effected at a range of from six to seven hundred yards; at Ciudad Rodrigo, in fourteen hours, twelve minutes; at Badajos, in ten hours; at St. Sebastian, in twelve hours, fifty-six minutes; and the time might have been reduced to ten hours, as it has been proved that English battering-guns will admit, without injury, twenty-four rounds an hour.

There are, doubtless, advantages and disadvantages in breaching and counter-breaching at a distance, where the revetment is seen sufficiently low to permit it. The shot from the guns can neither be projected with that precision, nor will the effect of those which strike the wall be so great, as from the crest of the glacis, the revetment will not be cut out in masses; but it is to be observed, that, at the greater distance, the number of guns may be unlimited; whereas it would be difficult to find space, at the regular breaching range, for more than ten or a dozen guns to bear on a hundred feet of escarpe. The want of precision and the loss of momentum may, therefore, be compensated by multiplying a converging fire. The ricochetting batteries are tolerably efficient at six or seven hundred yards; and, proceeding according to rule, it is expected that the fire, of the faces and flanks of all collateral defences shall be much impeded, if not in a great degree silenced, by their effect, and that of vertical fire, before the breaching batteries open; we are therefore inclined to coincide in the opinion, that "cannon fire" is sufficiently efficacious, where there is no intervening object to prevent the breaching of guns at the line-of-metal elevation, where a sufficient number of them can be brought to bear upon the escarpe, and where time is of importance, as it always is, except in such an unusual case as that of quasi hostilities. The French, *en règle*, took Ciudad Rodrigo by capitulation from the Spaniards, after thirty days of open trenches; the English, *hors de règle*, took this same place from the French, by

storm, in eleven. The Spaniards surrendered Badajoz to the French, after *thirty-nine* days of open trenches, a breach of *twenty-five feet* only being formed, *en règle*; the English wrested it from the French, after *twenty-one* days of open trenches, *five hundred feet* of breach being practicable, *hors de règle*\*,—that is, the English opened twenty times as much revetment as the French. In carrying breaches formed from a distance, a greater expenditure of life may be the consequence, because the men advancing to their attack will not be brought under cover to the edge of the ditch, nor will the descent into it be prepared, and therefore the column, which ought to carry the breach unbroken, may be shaken by leaping into the ditch before the actual escalade be attempted; yet the certain loss to be incurred in constructing the intervening parallels and crowning the covered-way is altogether spared, as well as the great exposure to vertical fire, where the besieged are provided with bomb-proofs for mortars, as advised by M. Carnôt.

The very great loss of men at the sieges in the Peninsula happened in the very breaches; and where a resolute defence under such circumstances takes place, such loss must ever be looked for, though the attack be carried forward on the most approved principles. It is extremely problematical whether the French would not have lost as many men as the British did in the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, had the breaches been contested; and that with as much energy and devotion, by the Spaniards, as the French themselves evinced when attacked by the British. Indeed it seems ridiculous to suppose that a column with a front of twenty-five feet—about eight or nine men *in a breach*—could ever have carried Badajoz at all, however determined it might have been.

Although, in this qualified degree, we assent to the advantage of breaching at a distance, we are by no means prepared to admit, nor can we believe that any well-informed officer of the French artillery has ever ventured to assert, "that impetus" (used in a popular sense) "is not increased by reducing the distance between the point blank and a given object." Strictly speaking, indeed, *impetus*, when applied to gunnery, means the height to which the projectile would ascend if projected vertically; this, obviously, has no connexion with the horizontal range, however the horizontal range may depend on it, and therefore cannot be affected by it. *Impetus* is also sometimes used for *velocity*, and it is occasionally intended to imply the force with which a projectile strikes its object. It appears to be in this sense that it is used in the history of the siege of Antwerp. To maintain the affirmative of the position, "that impetus is not increased by reducing the distance between the point blank and a given object," it must therefore be shown that the velocity of a shot is not lessened in its passage through the air—the fallacy of which every boy who has delivered a ball from a cricket-bat may detect; he must have observed that the ball moves with less velocity at the end of its course, and he may have been led to attribute a portion of this loss of swiftness to the resistance of the air;—at all events we are not left to mere conjecture as to the amount of this resistance, as Dr. Hutton has satisfactorily shown that it increases in a higher ratio than the squares of the velocities with the

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\* Jones's Sieges in Spain, p. 22.

same body; and, adopting his practice and formula, we shall find, supposing a 24-pounder loaded with powder equal to half the shot's weight, which it appears was the charge of the breaching guns at the late siege, that an initial velocity of 1640 feet will be obtained, which, on the shots passing over 50 yards,—the range, according to rule, of breaching-batteries against a regular work, and the distance of that at Antwerp,—will be reduced to 1578 feet; after 300 yards, being the regular distance of counter-batteries, to 1299 feet; after 500 yards, to 1119; and after 700, to 970 feet. Now the momenta of the shot at the several ranges—that is, the shot's power to injure the revetment—being in the compound ratio of the mass and velocity, it follows, since the weight of the shot is always the same, that the destructive power of 24-pounder breaching-batteries, at 50, 300, 500, and 700 yards, respectively, will be as the numbers, that is the final velocities, 1578, 1299, 1119, and 970, and discarding minute fractions, as  $5\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $4\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $3\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $3\frac{1}{2}$ .

It may be observed that this, and every other calculation in gunnery, is only an approximation, and not minutely to be relied on. The fact cannot be questioned; but, as an approximation, it affords the means of judging, in some measure, of the relative effect of shot, which is all in this case that we are aiming at. If, indeed, the object to be breached were a screen of masonry, as the *façade* of a building, we might promise ourselves some advantage by a velocity less than the greatest; but not so against the mass of a rampart, or the solid projections of counterforts or buttresses, until, at all events, the revetment be brought down, and the work of the breaching guns be reduced to that of improving the ascent.

With reference to the opinion, that “nothing is gained by the fire of mortars at close range,” and that “the execution is rendered less certain by the necessity of reducing the charge and fusc,” we are inclined, to a certain extent, to concur in this doctrine; or rather, we prefer to state our view of the case. It is this. If the primary object of mortar-batteries be to force through bomb-proofs, to spring the arches of magazines, and to destroy the shelter which the bombarded spot might offer, we think that, to a certain extent, the distant mortar-battery may be more efficient than one more near. The greatest penetrating effect of a vertical projectile must obviously be obtained by projecting it to such height as would be requisite, in its descent, by gravity to attain its terminal—that is, its greatest velocity; but, as with the heavier projectiles the altitude necessary to generate the terminal velocity is such as can only be produced at protracted ranges, or at elevations above  $45^\circ$ , the principle must be modified, so that, in endeavouring to secure the greatest momentum for the shell, too much may not be surrendered in point of accuracy of fire. Now the altitude to produce this terminal velocity, with an 8-inch shell, is 2678 feet; with a 10-inch, 3335; with a 13-inch, 4340; and with the Antwerp monster, 6030 feet, supposing its diameter to be 21 inches, and the corresponding solid to weigh 2447 pounds English. But these altitudes require, at  $45^\circ$  elevation, ranges to which shells cannot be thrown with great accuracy; very satisfactory practice may, however, be made with 13-inch and 10-inch mortars, at 800 and 1000 yards—the ranges of the principal mortar-batteries at Antwerp. We may, therefore, confidently say, that decreasing these distances would lessen the

efficiency *against permanent works* in a degree not compensated by the superior accuracy of the fire; and we are not prepared to prove but that the advantages at these ranges even may be much increased by projecting the shells at higher angles than  $45^{\circ}$ . If the time be "not far distant when the art of attack and defence will be reduced to struggle between bombs and bomb-proofs," it is highly probable that this will be brought about by so combining the elevation with the range, as to produce, at the shortest possible range, the *maximum* effect.

If the intention of the mortar-battery be to annoy troops or working parties, much less velocity is necessary; and, as the accuracy of the practice would increase by lessening the range, it would evidently be desirable to do so; should, however, the projectile be of little weight, as four-ounce balls, recommended by M. Carnôt, there is still a point beyond which disadvantage might result from lessening the range. From actual practice we are inclined to believe that little advantage would result from using such balls, projected at  $45^{\circ}$ , at a less distance than 250 yards; this range is necessary to obtain such an altitude as will produce a sufficient velocity; but similar results have been obtained by projecting these small balls on a horizontal range to 100 yards, with  $75^{\circ}$  elevation; and at this distance we can but believe that their use is highly important.

We think it highly probable that the great effect of the vertical fire in destroying the shelter of the garrison, in the late bombardment, may be attributable to the distance of the mortar-batteries. The advantages of close ranges *opposed to a fortress* cannot be estimated by the superior accuracy of the fire of the besieged, and the greater inconvenience occasioned to the attacking force at reduced distances. The momentum necessary to pierce a blindage or an expense magazine, and for making way into a parallel or the epaulement of a battery, is very different from that required to take effect on the cover of permanent works. The effect of a bombardment on such a work, though, from its position much stronger than the citadel of Antwerp, was seen during the late war, in the attack of Fort Bourbon, Martinique; and it might be brought in proof of the efficiency of vertical fire at considerable ranges. Thirty-one mortars and nineteen guns opened on this work; the mortars ranged at from 1000 to 2000 yards; an uninterrupted fire of about eight shells an hour from each mortar, for the space of four days and five nights, left not a building standing; the interior of the fort was blown to pieces, and a large proportion of the guns dismounted. The main arch of the principal magazine was also injured. This fact formed the prominent feature in the defence of the governor, who was subsequently tried for giving up the place. On the surrender, there appeared little fuel for vertical fire; the guns and platforms which remained uninjured might have been destroyed: but as to shelter for the garrison from splinters, proofs, blindages, or ordinary buildings, there was none. The interior of the fort might be truly said to have presented "an unparalleled chaos of black and mouldering destruction." The garrison having suffered severely during the bombardment, their loss was greater than that of the Dutch at Antwerp; and were so crowded together in the casemates, galleries of the countermines, and other souterrains—(upwards of three thousand marched out of the fort)—as to render the air quite pestilential, so much so, that a medical board, convened for

the consideration of the subject, declared that they could not be occupied without risk; indeed so destitute was the place of shelter, that cover could not be found for a detachment which might hold possession of the works, in consequence of which the troops were encamped in the immediate vicinity; and guards, which were relieved daily, were posted in the outworks.

As to any advantages connected with the fuse, resulting from long ranges, we must confess our inability to appreciate them. It may be possible that the French artillery have not adopted those contrivances for fixing fuses, when the time of flight is small, which have been introduced with spherical case-shot. If we may judge from their more recent works on artillery, they certainly do not know what a Shrapnel shell is, nor in what its peculiarities consist\*; it would, therefore, be the less surprising, if they had neglected the means for fixing fuses which this invention has rendered particularly necessary.

The predilection of the French for brass battering-train may, probably, be accounted for from their having no iron foundries at all to compare to that of the Carron Company, or, indeed, to many similar English establishments. Very efficient brass battering-guns may, however, be made; the *Aide-memoire* speaks of four 24-pounders, cast at Seville, in 1786, each of which were fired with unfixed shot, and eight pounds of powder, five thousand three hundred times, without injury to the bore or vent, and were subsequently used and perfectly serviceable, at the late siege or rather blockade of Cadiz. It is strange then, that, as the French prefer brass guns, they do not take sufficient care in casting to render them more efficient than they now are, as indicated by the rate of the firing in their breaching-batteries. The weight of their 24-pounder battering-gun is 6860.1 lbs. English; of its shot, 29.611 lbs.; its length of bore is precisely equal to our 24-pounder, of ten feet, which weighs 5572 lbs., and its shot of the latest pattern 24.696 lbs.; the relative weight, therefore, of the French and English guns is as 239 to 227, a difference scarcely to be taken into consideration, in deciding as to the preference to be given to the one gun or the other. The impression which appears to prevail as to the great comparative weight of the French gun over the English, of the same length, probably arises from their being both 24-pounders, and it not being remembered that the difference of the calibre of the shot bears almost as great a proportional disparity as the weight of the guns themselves. We are quite at a loss to discover what is meant by a remark, that a brass gun requires "a larger quantity of powder," than an iron gun, at least in proportion to its shot. The French, as the English, allot one-

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\* In a translation of the Prussian work of Captain Decker, by Colonel Ravichio de Petersdorf and Captain A. P. F. Nancy, is the following remark by the translators;—in the text it is said, "*Les Anglois prétendent devoir le gain de la bataille de Talavera à l'usage qu'ils y firent de cette espèce d'obus.*" The translators add,—"Cette assertion est loin d'être exacte, et ces projectiles ne peuvent pas être, à beaucoup près, aussi terribles qu'on les représente. Les balles n'étant point serrées sur la petite quantité de poudre renfermée dans l'obus, celle-ci ne peut leur communiquer, par suite de l'explosion, une quantité de mouvement capable de les porter assez loin et avec assez de force pour les rendre vraiment meurtrières. Des expériences faites à Vincennes sont venues à l'appui de ce raisonnement, et ont démontré que les *Schrapnels* étaient réellement de fort peu d'effet."



third of the weight of the shot, as the ordinary charge, for heavy guns ; and one-half when breaching.

The monster mortar, hitherto, appears remarkable only for the extreme bad shells which were cast for it, and the time taken in loading it. Our 12-inch shells stand the explosion, the mortar being loaded with twenty, and even thirty pounds of powder. The monster appears to have been served with twelve and a half only. It is remarkable that Colonel Paixhans' guns should not have been used, particularly as the attack appears to have been carried on as for display ; to have been spun out, particularly in the attack of the lunette, as a *siège de Polygone*. Never was a citadel attacked by such immense means, both in the *personnel* and *matériel*,—never, perhaps, such an expenditure of engineer stores,—nor such multiplied, and apparently, unnecessary communications and approaches. And, after all, the passage of the wet-ditch, and the carrying by storm an unflanked, and, as to the breach, undefended lunette, is the only *coup d'éclat*, always excepting the courageous deeds of Antoinette, the *brave cantinière*. It is, nevertheless, no small credit to the besieged, though no great daring in the attack, that “such an insignificant outwork should have held out sixteen days.” In a former paper we have referred to the Paixhans guns (vol. vii. p. 477),—doubtless every species of the lengthened howitzer will be more and more adopted. They appear particularly calculated for the attack of works which may be constructed on the Carnôt system ; and it is probable, that a gun or howitzer of about 6-inch calibre, will henceforward be much used in the defence. The 12-pounder too, on a field-carriage, affording sufficient momentum, at its line-of-metal elevation, to pierce an ordinary trench, is a good and handy weapon, but not such as to supersede 18 or 24-pounders during the early operations of a siege ; or light field-pieces throughout every stage of it.

We did not sit down to write a critique on the operations of the siege of the citadel of Antwerp, but have been led into a much longer discussion than we intended, on subjects connected with artillery. So far as our feeble opinion may go, we can but concur in the sentiment expressed in the narrative of the siege, that the Dutch artillerymen appear, in every point of view, to have eclipsed their brethren of the same arm of the Polytechnic school. The transport of their guns by the latter, without the cover of the trenches to arm No. 7 and No. 8 batteries, seems to have been made the most of. A similar exploit has been performed by the British, and stands recorded in a late number of this journal ; it occurred too, at a season of the year, and in a climate where no favouring fog propitiated the attempt : the exploit was never fulminated forth in orders, nor did it form the subject of an express communication to the Commander-in-chief or Secretary of State. This might have been making too much of a daring expedient : the justness, however, of the remark of the narrator of the siege of Antwerp must be concurred in ; the custom of the British army is, to trust to the indigenous spirit of the junior ranks, rather than to apply the ordinary stimulus adopted in other armies.

# DOINGS IN THE BONNY—THE SLAVE TRADE.

Few things have, of late, excited more interest among general readers than simple narratives of sea-life,—the one here offered, however, is an “o’er true tale,” by an eye-witness; not related to feed mere curiosity, but to call the public attention to the insufficiency of England alone persecuting the slave-trade.

On the 8th of September, 1831, his Majesty’s brig *Black Joke* boarded a *French Slaver*, and learnt that there were two Spanish brigs in the River Bonny, in the Bight of Biafra, ready to receive their slaves on board,—the one, mounting eight guns, was formerly a sixteen gun man-of-war, and the other having four broadside guns, and one mounted on a pivot. They were said to intend sailing together, in order to be a match for the *Black Joke*, which they suspected to be prowling near; and the latter vessel, confident in her oft-tried prowess (not only in capturing the *Marinerito*, but even before she became the *Dryad’s* tender), longed to pounce on such a tempting quarry. On the following day she was joined by the *Fair Rosamond*, also tender to H.M.S. *Dryad*, commanded by Lieutenant Huntley. To sharpen the eyes of the “lookouts” at the mast-head, the officer rewarded the lucky fellow who first spied a prize, and the commodore on the station gave a dollar per hundred on the slaves captured. The *Kroomen*, having a very penetrating sight, were generally the first to give the joyful tidings; and, accordingly, at half-past eight on the morning of the 10th, while our two cruisers were at anchor, in order to preserve their station about twenty miles from the mouth of the river, one of these *Kroomen*, perched on the mast-head of the *Fair Rosamond*, exclaimed, “Sail, ho!” In a few minutes two large rakish brigs were distinctly made out, and, as they were evidently approaching, Lieutenant Huntley, the senior officer, desired that the tenders should get everything ready to weigh, but not stir till the strangers ceased to near them.

About half-past nine the enemy anchored, just inside the outer bar of the Bonny, upon which the tenders instantly weighed, and made all sail to get at them; the *Fair Rosamond* leading half-a-mile ahead. At one o’clock the two strangers were observed to be signaling; shortly afterwards they hoisted Spanish colours, weighed, and stood to sea. All now on board the tenders were elated with the hopes of an action; but, when they were within three or four miles of them, the Spaniards bore up, in order to run back to the Bonny, setting their studding-sails in a manner, however, that would not have disgraced a British man-of-war; and, indeed, performed all their manœuvres with a quickness and precision that has long disappeared from their Government vessels.

It is necessary here to mention, that the mouth of the Bonny is surrounded by shoals, and that there are two dangerous bars to pass, but, when once in the river, nothing can be finer; the water deepens to about ten fathoms, and for the first seven or eight miles the breadth is about four, when it receives a large tributary stream, which vessels, not drawing more than thirteen or fourteen feet, can ascend for some miles. Vessels trading for palm-oil lie two miles below this stream. Thus, the Bonny ought never to be attempted without good pilots on board, and Mr. Huntley was aware of it; yet, acting with that decision and

resolution which on almost every occasion are so essential in the naval officer, he bore up, and made all sail after the slaves; the Black Joke of course following her leader. The bars (thanks to Captain Owen's excellent surveys) are passed in safety—the river is entered—they gain upon the chase—the Fair Rosamond still a quarter of a mile a head of her companion, and about a mile and a half astern of the Spaniards:—the tributary stream is now reached—the slavers trim their sails and haul up it—the tenders quickly follow, when a sight of unalloyed horror presents itself!—the Spaniards actually throwing their slaves overboard, shackled two and two, and a great number of the small sharks, which infest these rivers, attacking their helpless victims, who, thus encumbered and wounded, chiefly perish; some few, indeed, reach the shore, and others are landed by canoes; but the shrieks of the drowning, and the contest of the sharks for the bodies of the dead and dying, formed so harrowing a scene, as to be almost too horrid to recur to it\*.

The boats of the tenders were immediately sent to try to save some of the poor negroes, but could only pick up two with their boat-hooks, who were just sinking. Meanwhile, the largest slaver ran aground, upon which the Fair Rosamond, knowing that she would be taken care of, dashed on after the other, and the Black Joke coming up immediately, laid her on board, to prevent any more negroes being thrown overboard. She took possession without any resistance, for most of the Spaniards, thinking that we should take vengeance upon them for their cruelty, jumped overboard of their own accord, as our men boarded, and several shared the same shocking fate to which they had consigned so many of the blacks. The captured vessel proved to be the Spanish brig *Regalo*, with two hundred and twenty slaves still on board, having sailed in the morning with four hundred and sixty. She was pierced for sixteen guns, but had only eight mounted, with a crew of fifty-six men.

The Fair Rosamond also quickly came up with her antagonist, and took possession of her in the same way. She proved to be the Spanish brig *Rapido*, of five guns and fifty men, and had sailed that morning with four hundred and fifty slaves on board,—*all of whom she had now got rid of*: but the two who had been picked up, as before-mentioned, and were now on board the Black Joke, had, fortunately for the slaver's condemnation, been embarked in the *Rapido*. When taken to Sierra Leone, they gave so positive and distinct an evidence, and, in spite of the large offers made them by the opposite party, adhered so strictly to the truth, that the Court was obliged to condemn their vessel as well as the *Regulo*. These two poor lads had something so amiable and kind in their disposition, that those who would have consigned them to a watery grave must have been very demons. They had not been many hours on board of us, before they endeavoured to make themselves useful; thus, observing a couple of brooms, of their own accord they began sweeping the deck. The sailors, who always delight in assisting the distressed, gave them clothes, encouraged them in every way in their power, and showed considerable regret at their departure. The quick

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\* The master of a palm-oil ship, who was there during this occurrence, touched at Fernando Po a month after, and stated, that having occasion to pass the beach off which these wretched slaves were thrown overboard, he counted upwards of one hundred bodies, shackled together by twos, emitting an intolerable stench.

manner in which they learnt our ways was extraordinary; particularly when it is considered that they were probably brought from the interior of Africa, as no one at the Bonny knew where they came from, or understood their language. Another little trait in their conduct testified the warmth of their gratitude, for soon discovering who commanded the vessel, they insisted on kissing his hand whenever he came on deck, and then returned smiling to their work—for they were never idle.

But to return:—the assistant-surgeon, as is customary, examined the captured slaves in the *Regulo*, and reported that there were three very ill of the small-pox; adding, that if they were not removed, not only all the rest, but many of our own men would soon catch that fatal disease, doubly dangerous in a tropical climate. They were, therefore, ordered to be immediately unshackled and sent on shore; but now another distressing circumstance took place, for, dreading the infection, none of the villagers would receive them, and about midnight they crawled back to the swamps, off which the vessels were lying, and great indeed must have been their distress, when, in pitiable language not to be misunderstood, they supplicated to be taken on board again. This, however, could not be complied with, although their heart-rending wailings lasted all night; in the morning they were heard no more,—nor could we learn what became of them; but death alone it is to be feared could put an end to their miseries.

All the four vessels were now aground, and during five days and nights we were almost constantly at work, getting into the fair way, and preparing for sea. Nearly everything had to be got out of one of the prizes before she would float, and the labour was very trying—sometimes under a deluge of rain, and directly after under a vertical burning sun; besides which, let it be recollected, that during the few hours of repose that could be allowed the crew, they had no comfortable bed to go to, for on board these tenders the only sleeping-place is the hard deck. It is gratifying to mention, that there were two English palm-oil vessels lying in the river, whose officers and men, with characteristic good feeling, gave all the assistance they could, and one of the masters being an excellent pilot for the place, rendered us most essential service.

Two days before sailing, Lieutenants Huntley and Ramsay\* waited upon the king, who received them with much politeness, and made them partake of a repast; but, although good-natured, he is unfortunately addicted to drinking palm-wine, and negligent in wielding the sword of justice; whence he is not esteemed by his subjects. One of the principal men in the place, who speaks a little English, said to Mr. Ramsay, "He no proper king like his father,—he never hab cut off man's head." And when Mr. Huntley expressed to his sable majesty in strong language, the cruelty of the slave trade, and that he ought to put an end to it in his dominions, all he answered was, "Spaniard man did very wrong to drown poor black man," and put an end to the conference by saying, "Make my compliments to my brother, King William, and tell him to send me 'dash'"—the African word for "present," and immediately retired. His subjects are, in general, a quiet, industrious race of people, exporting a large quantity of palm-oil. There is,

\* This is the officer who won his promotion by boarding the Spanish slaver *Marinerito*, in April, 1831; the particulars of that gallant exploit are recorded in our *Journal*, Part II. for 1832, p. 63, to which we refer the reader.

perhaps, more trade from the Bonny than any river on the coast ; and if, as is now supposed, it is the principal mouth of the Niger, its commerce will increase rapidly. Although the people have made some progress towards civilization, they are still very superstitious and ignorant relative to religion. Formerly they principally worshipped two large live lizards, until thinking that domesticating one might be sufficient, they commissioned a large brass one from Birmingham about three years ago, which now shares their worship with its live partner ; yet, ridiculous as this is, no nation along this coast is so advanced in general knowledge.

A few remarks will now be added, addressed to those who take an interest in the cause of humanity, and yet may not have been fully informed of the real state of the slave-trade. Scenes of such atrocity constantly take place, that none can imagine but those who have witnessed them. How dreadfully these poor creatures must suffer during a long and tedious chase, when five or six hundred are crowded together in a small space, not four feet high ; their owners, being afraid that their moving about would impede the progress of the vessel, withhold both water and provisions for a whole day, and this under a hot vertical sun. In one instance, after a chase of twenty hours, twenty-seven were found dead upon the lower deck—the dead shackled with the living ; and the remainder were nearly all in a state of madness, occasioned by heat and thirst ; fifty died before the expiration of three days, and upwards of a hundred in less than three weeks ! Many more examples of the same kind could be given, but on so painful a subject probably these are sufficient.

It may be remarked—" But have not these cruelties been increased by our interference ?"—Undoubtedly they have ; and all our efforts have scarcely diminished the number of negroes exported from Africa : an assertion which can be easily proved. There is a market at Cuba and in the Brazils, to be supplied with slaves, requiring about thirty thousand annually ; and, up to this time, that number has been supplied. No doubt the risk that is run, owing to our cruizers, increases the price of the blacks to the planters, thereby diminishing their profits, but it appears very doubtful, supposing the trade to have been free, that many more could have been carried over with any profit to the importers, since the fall in the price would not suffice to increase the demand much. How far the present system raises the expense of importing negroes, is a matter of calculation which we possess data sufficient to determine : the average of slaves captured is one in ten, which has raised the insurance from eight to fifteen per cent. ; another increase of expense arises from the Spaniards now employing very fast-sailing, well-armed vessels, with a numerous crew, to facilitate their escape. This again adds to the misery of the poor slave ; for these vessels are so sharp, that they afford very little accommodation in proportion to their tonnage. Again, if the trade were free, the price of a negro in Africa and at Cuba would be more equalized ; for that reason greater care would be taken of them, or the importer would be ruined. As an example, let it be supposed that a man fits out a schooner from Cuba, and sends her to Africa for two hundred slaves ; their cost on the coast, and his other expenses are eight thousand dollars ; his cargo would fetch twenty thousand ; but, from cruelty and neglect, one-half

die on the passage: his gain would still amount to two thousand dollars. But let free trade be now supposed, when the price of two hundred slaves at Cuba would fall to fifteen thousand dollars; then, if the same man is so cruel and negligent that half his cargo die, he will be an actual loser of five hundred dollars, instead of making a profit by his voyage. This is not only a correct statement, but what is known to take place.

By an agreement that we made about four years ago, the Portuguese are permitted to carry on their slave trade uninterruptedly to the south of the line, and negroes are consequently much dearer there than to the north of the line. Ten thousand are annually exported from those latitudes; yet the vessels are all so much better formed and so much more roomy, that they have not one-fourth of the deaths that occur on board vessels of equal tonnage to the northward. In the year 1831, about twenty thousand slaves were exported from the northward of the line; and in 1832, there appears, from all accounts, to have been considerably more! So that for the sake of humanity more efficient means should be taken to put down this dreadful traffic; and there are but two ways: either all the powers of Europe must declare it piracy—in which case our present squadron off the coast of Africa would suffice; or, if we are to act alone, such a number of fast-sailing vessels must be sent out, that the risk of capture may overbalance the remunerating price which the planter could afford to pay. Supposing the second plan to be adopted, another dozen of men-of-war on that station would probably get the slave-trade fairly under; and then the Spaniards and Portuguese, no longer finding it their interest to struggle, might consent to declare it piracy.

The case, we confess, is beset with serious difficulties; and while, on the one hand, our measures are chargeable with insufficiency and quixotism, on the other, they are obviously harsh and unjust. We will close this distressing statement with an extract from a letter written in 1808 by the late intelligent Captain Beaver from Antigua:—

“Many years have rolled over my head since I first visited these regions; and I know not whether the manners of the people have altered, or my own taste has changed—perhaps both may have felt the influence of the interval. I admire the matchless tints of the scenery and the heavenly splendour of the climate more than formerly; but I no longer relish the boisterous cheer and lax hospitality which once did not incommode me. The chatter of the negro is as vociferous, and the piccaninies gambol as wildly as ever, while Sunday is still the happy day which they call their own. But the planter is certainly less gay; and he appears already to suffer under the interference of our legislature. I apprehend the result of our measures will ultimately prove of greater benefit to our enemies than either to our own subjects or the slaves. It seems to me but reasonable that those who so warmly discuss this question in the House of Commons should first take the trouble to make a trip across the water, and ascertain the truth; for the inquiry has hitherto been borne down more by sophistry than by fact. I would rather see the wisdom and philanthropy of England exerted to ameliorate the condition of the blacks, which she can do, than witness her efforts at what she cannot do. I abhor slavery; but feeling that, constituted as mankind are, it ever has existed, and perhaps ever will, I cannot surrender the evidence of my senses to mere speculative morality. Everything I now meet with fully confirms me in the opinions which I have already expressed on this topic, in my narrative, or ‘African Memoranda.’”

UNPUBLISHED LETTERS FROM LORD RODNEY AND SIR CHARLES  
DOUGLAS, TO THE LATE LORD BARHAM,  
WITH A NARRATIVE, BY SIR CHARLES DOUGLAS, OF THE BATTLE OF THE 12TH APRIL.

*To the Editor of the United Service Journal.*

Barham Court, Kent. March 5, 1833.

SIR,

Having long been under a promise to the family of my late respected friend and patron, Admiral Lord Barham, to dedicate the first leisure time I had to the arrangement and revisal of his voluminous papers and correspondence on naval and other public subjects (which have not been opened since his death in 1813); I have, in the prosecution of this duty, met with documents which appear to be of sufficient importance to be submitted to the public.

With the permission of his grandson, the present Lord Barham, I now send for insertion in your useful and interesting Journal copies of the two following letters—the originals are in the handwriting of the distinguished officers themselves, viz., one from Admiral Sir George Bridges Rodney, dated St. Lucia, 5th April; and the other from Sir Charles Douglas, the Captain of his flag-ship, the *Formidable*, dated Jamaica, 4th May; both addressed to Sir Charles Middleton, (afterwards Lord Barham,) Comptroller of the Navy, from 1778 to 1790.

In the first, Sir George anticipates the success which so soon followed; in the latter, the operations of the fleet during the important battle of the 12th of April, 1782, are given with apparent accuracy and precision.

I regret that I have not yet fallen in with the first account of the engagement to which Sir Charles Douglas alludes—but if I do hereafter, or find any further documents connected with that memorable day, or the proceedings of the fleet, at that eventful period, I may be induced, if the present are acceptable to your readers, to put you in possession of them.

It is well known that the Peace of Paris, in the following year (1783), was greatly accelerated by the victory of the 12th of April; and the terms on which it was concluded, it has been asserted, were materially influenced by the brilliant achievement of our arms on that important occasion.

I am Sir, your very obedient servant,

J. DEAS THOMSON,

Private Secretary to Lord Barham when first Lord, in 1805-6, and late Senior Commissioner and Accountant General of the Navy.

[Letter from Admiral Sir George Bridges Rodney to Sir Charles Middleton.]

“MY DEAR SIR, “Formidable, St. Lucia. April 4th, 1782.

“It is impossible for me not to snatch a few minutes to tell you how we go on in this part of the world. All our diligence availed not, the enemy fought very shy, and when I concluded they intended to come in full force, and was prepared to receive them, as you will perceive by the disposition I made of the fleet, behold they then made Antigua, and crept close along Guadaloupe and Dominick; what provokes me, is, that the whole fleet was at sea; Sir S. Hood and his division off the north end, mine and Drake’s division to windward of Point Salines, and several frigates between Martinique and Antigua; at the very worst time the enemy made the islands—and yet not one saw them! ’tis provoking, but never mind it, their fate is only delayed a short time, for have it they must and shall. Thank God! by the arrival of the convoy from England, the fleet are now complete in their stores and provisions—and in the highest spirits; and by my intelligence this day, the enemy have embarked their troops, and are near

ready to sail. You may be sure I shall watch them attentively—and, notwithstanding the very great repairs that many of the fleet I have found here were in want of, such has been the diligence of each officer, in his different department, that all will be ready and complete this very night, though many boltsprits and several lower masts were wanting when we arrived from our cruise.

"The *Intrepid* and *Shrewsbury* are found unserviceable; I propose to send them with the convoy to Port Royal, to try, if possible, to put them in a sufficient repair, so as to go home with the first convoy, and to assist in the defence of the island, for keep the sea they cannot.

"The great event which must restore the empire of the sea to Great Britain is near at hand; let me but live to hail my most gracious monarch but sovereign of the ocean, and then my happiness will be complete.

"The whole business of the fleet is transacted here. English Harbour is of little use, and in its present situation not to be trusted with the naval store-ships:—for their better security I have directed R. Admiral Drake to keep them at St. Lucia. It was absolutely necessary for me to appoint a store-keeper; I wish your boards would appoint all the necessary officers. I really do not like to be answerable for any person. Adieu and be assured that I am, with the utmost sincerity,

"Your most faithful, and obedient humble servant,

"G. B. RODNEY."

"SIR CHARLES MIDDLETON."

[Letter from Sir Charles Douglas, Flag-Captain to Sir G. B. Rodney,  
to Sir Charles Middleton.]

"Formidable, Port Royal, Jamaica. May 4th, 1782.

"DEAR SIR,

"In consequence of the more exact information I have had, and of my own recollection, the account I now send you differs a little—particularly as to the point in the French line-of-battle, where we broke through, and which I had not then seen upon paper, from my last; as also in some other inconsiderable respects; some further interesting anecdotes, and remarks too, are in this interspersed, or thereunto subjoined. The more I hear of the late battle, the more am I satisfied, even to my own surprise, of the conclusive efficacy of the oblique fire, of such ships as could give it.—The *Ville de Paris*, for example, edging down towards our friend *Cornish* (thought secure in being, as was supposed by them, out of the *Arrogant's* line-of-fire, because four points on her bow) did, to their infinite surprise, in that direction receive such a broadside as had a wonderful effect. Captain Gardner, of the *Duke*, told the admiral in my hearing, that from the improvement alluded to, he is sure that he annoyed the enemy with at least twice as many shot as he should have done according to establishment. Upon the whole, I think I may safely pronounce, that if every ship in the fleet had been so appointed, and without standards like the *Arrogant*, fewer—possibly very few—of the enemy's ships would have escaped! But withal, the victory, if every ship had been taken, could not have been more clearly and decidedly ours than it was: I only allude to probable consequences: presuming that had such oblique fire been general, few, if any, of the enemy's ships masts had been left standing. Lieutenant Butler (now most deservedly captain of the *Alicto*), says, that from the middle deck of the *Formidable* he never fired less than two, sometimes three broadsides at each passing Frenchman, before such Frenchman could bring a gun to bear on him, from such guns excepted as standards are in the way of.—Our admiral informs me that he has written for the appointment of an inspector-general of naval artillery, and of Captain Cunningham as ship captain to the *Formidable*. I beg leave to recommend both such appointments to your support and acceleration, should opportunity serve, and should it be with your pleasure. I pray you read the account I now trouble you with, to Lord Mansfield and Lord Lough-



borough—and be further pleased to recommend it to the perusal of General Carpenter, his lady, and Mrs. Carr, to all of whom I, for so many years, have been so much obliged—and to whomsoever else you please. Can Lord Sandwich and Lord North have time to honour it with a reading?—as you please. Gracious Heaven! what a labouring oar I have got to manage! Anything whereby I may contribute my mite towards the welfare and glory of Great Britain! That you, Lady Middleton, Mr. and Mrs. Edwards, may long and in health enjoy the unspeakable happiness of seeing her wrongs avenged to the uttermost farthing, most religiously prays,

“Dear Sir, your obliged and most affectionate friend and servant,

“CHARLES DOUGLAS.”

“SIR CHARLES MIDDLETON.”

[Narrative alluded to in Sir Charles Douglas's letter.]

“Formidable, at Sea, 28th April, 1782.

“On Monday, then, the 8th inst., at 8 A.M., or a little after, being in the bay of Gros Islet, in the island of St. Lucia, refitting and rewatering with unremitting assiduity, but in momentary readiness for sailing, the signal was repeated in the offing, by the Alert, from the ships watching the motions of the enemy, that the French fleet in great force, and numerous transports or trading ships, was coming out of Port Royal. Sir George instantly weighed, proceeded outward, and we soon got sight of twelve or fourteen sail of the sternmost ships alluded to, from the mast-head, standing to the northward, under the lee of Martinico, which from their fast sailing must have been ships of war. We followed them all night under as much canvas as we could in prudence carry; the wind blowing very fresh at N.E. b. E., at 2 A.M., of the 9th; the St. Albans hailed and told us, that the enemy's fleet was distinctly seen from the Valiant, she being to windward of us. Off the north end of Dominica we had just got sight of them ourselves, having been sufficiently aware of their proximity, from the frequent nocturnal signals they had made. At 3 A.M., we brought to by signal; the weathermost of the islands called the Saints bearing N.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W., and the north end of Dominica, N. b. E.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E., five or six leagues. The French fleet bearing from N. b. E. to N., at half past 5 A.M., made signal to prepare for battle, and for the line a-head two cables' lengths asunder. As also to fill and stand on; Sir Samuel Hood, with the van division, having a fine breeze and a glorious prospect, making sail a-head to his station. At about forty or fifty minutes after 9, the French fired upon the Alfred, she returned it, and the signal for battle was displayed. Thus began that day's partial engagement, between his Majesty's fleet, commanded by Sir George Rodney, consisting of thirty-six sail of the line, and that of France of thirty-three or thirty-four, (I speak from recollection, and from information since gathered, for we had not time to count them,) which bereaved Great Britain of that excellent citizen and officer—Captain Bayne, the (late) gallant commander of the ship named. I say partial engagement, most of his Majesty's ships having been quite becalmed; the whole of our rear and most of the sternmost of the van division utterly so, insomuch as never to have had it in their power to come in for any of that fight; while the fleet of France enjoyed a commanding breeze, within the limits whereof, and to windward, they kept themselves as much as possible, with scrupulous attention, and at their much-loved long cannonading distance. Nevertheless, divers ships of Sir Samuel Hood's division were roughly handled, having had to cope with so many more of the enemy than ought to have fallen to their share. Providence ever being about mighty events by means undiscernible to man beforehand; and this day's fight, though our enemies, everything considered, had nothing to boast of, encouraged them so far as to dare to risk that general engagement which they had avoided before, and which proved their ruin—on, be it ever sacred to fame, the 12th of April, 1782; to give you some account of which glorious day's proceedings I am posting.

“After, then, having endeavoured to keep our fleet to windward, and

transposed in the line-of-battle, and order of sailing, the van and rear divisions, because of the damages the former had sustained, to the end that our next attack might have its full vigour—if ever the enemy should give us opportunity. On the 11th, in the morning, one of Mr. De Grasse's fleet, being of the line, was seen bearing away for Basseterre Road, (where we saw another,) and was chased, but got in. Soon after, two ships more of the enemy were discovered far to windward, having also suffered damage in the affair of the 9th: for one was employed in getting up his fore yard, and the other in getting up a main top-mast. To make his Majesty master of the ships alluded to, or bring Mr. De Grasse to leeward, and thereby draw him yet, if possible, into a general engagement, the signal was made for a general chase, and we all chased accordingly.

"In the afternoon, the *Agamemnon*, and some others of our weathermost ships, gained ground so fast, that the two mutilated ones of the enemy in question, began to make signals, only three or four of the body of the French fleet being in sight, from our mast head: in consequence of which signals, Mr. De Grasse bore down *en corps*, our chasers still menacing their game until the Count's headmost ships got very near them, when they, as well as all the rest of the fleet, were called into close order by signal, and closed accordingly.

"On the 12th, be it consigned to perpetual record in the annals of our long injured, and I hope shortly completely avenged country, at break of day, the enemy's fleet was discovered broad on our lee bow, the wind blowing E.S.E., our heads to the northward, and one of Mr. De Grasse's ships, towed by a frigate, square under our lee with his bowsprit and foremast prostrate athwart his fore-castle. To draw him still further to leeward, the *Valiant* and *Monarch* were sent in chase thereof, and my old acquaintance, (of thirty-five years' standing,) the high-spirited *De Grasse*, edged down accordingly; Rear Admiral Drake now to lead on the starboard tack, pushing on with his transport division to secure to us the weather gage, and thereby a general and decisive battle. When the French admiral had got far enough down for this, our purpose, the signal was made to call in the *Valiant* and *Monarch*, and they took their places in the line of battle, with promptitude. The signal for the line of battle ahead, and for Rear Admiral Drake to lead with his division, having been displayed some little time before. The French now also forming their line, and extending themselves on the larboard tack, to regain the weather gage, which they thought they had fully secured, because their van from the wind having reverted to the eastward, lay up rather to windward of ours. Rear Admiral Drake stood firmly on, in close impenetrable order, the ships composing his Majesty's line of battle being drawn up at the distance of the length of one cable from the one to the other. At forty minutes after 7 a. m., the leading ships of Admiral Drake's division were fired upon by the enemy, whereupon the signal for battle, and close battle, was made, the *Marlborough*, our leading ship, having fetched the six or seven ships of Mr. De Grasse's line. By the time the foremost ships of the centre division had begun to engage, the fire was heavy indeed, and well supported, our ships sliding down slowly, (the wind being very moderate,) and closely along the enemy's line, and under their lee. In stemming towards them the Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's fleet was fired upon by the eight or nine ships of Mr. De Grasse's line, but did not return it, the distance being too great, but began with the next, and by giving some little elevation to his guns, to good effect; still standing in a straight line, with a full sail, and angling in upon the enemy, in order to penetrate his line of battle, which was, under favour of the vigorous impression Rear Admiral Drake had made by the smoke, and the most dreadful fire of the *Duke*, our immediate second ahead, the *Formidable* keeping up a most insupportable quick and well directed fire, happily effected; behind the third or fourth ship astern of the *Ville de Paris*, was the point where we cut through, the almost silenced

intermediate ship having passed close to our starboard side, one almost in contact therewith, about a ship's breadth from us. The immediate effect which this penetration produced, was the bringing altogether, almost, if not quite, in contact with each other, the four ships of the enemy, which were nearest the point alluded to, and coming up in succession. This unfortunate group, composing now only one large single object to fire at, was attacked by the Duke, the Namur, and the Formidable; wearing round upon her heel; all at once receiving several broadsides from each, not a single shot missing, and dreadful must have been the slaughter.

"From this moment victory declared for the juster cause; and the Count De Grasse, who defended himself with so much courage, found himself separated from all his ships, which were astern of the point of intersection in question, never to join them again. All was now a scene of disorder and confusion, throughout the enemy's fleet, from end to end, whereupon the signal for the line was hauled down, and the victors stuck so close to their flying (late) antagonist, as to leave them no time to rally or repair any part of their damages. But it would require a volume, and more time than I am master of, to recount all the handsome performances of this mighty day. Shortly after sunset the French admiral's flag and ensign, were struck on board the Ville de Paris, he having been abandoned by all the ships of his fleet, such excepted as were taken or otherwise destroyed;—notwithstanding the signals made by the Count de Grasse, often repeated and long kept flying to the contrary. Such ships as have their guns fitted accordingly, derived unspeakable advantage from some improvements lately made in the use of naval artillery, their fire having been so very quick and so very well directed, and extending so far to the right and left, that the French cannot comprehend how they came to lose so many men, and we so few, on the late bloody day; for they were generally so mauled by the ships alluded to, as to be most partly driven from their quarters, before they could bring their guns to bear upon us.

"The fire of our centre, consisting of three three-deckers, was astonishing indeed, and the morment the Formidable penetrated the enemy's line, as many of his Majesty's ships as saw her after she got through it, gave three cheers; at the same instant the French seamen, even on board the Ville de Paris herself, fled from their quarters, crying out, we have lost the day, our line of battle is cut asunder, or words to such effect. Some little time after the Count De Grasse struck his flag, our signal for continuing the engagement was hauled down, and an end put to the celebrated General Battle of the Saints, by which name certain islands, situated between the north end of Dominica and Guadeloupe, are called.

"P.S. The moment the Ville de Paris struck, her worthless disorderly crew broke open the chests and trunks of all their officers, and with lighted candles in their hands, stove in the doors of the store rooms, in quest of wine and other liquors, to the very great danger of all on board from fire—and moreover, killed and destroyed for their own use, the major part of the live stock belonging to the Count De Grasse, consisting of bullocks, sheep, and poultry of different kinds. It is very extraordinary, and no less true, notwithstanding some thousands of men and forces having been on board the French fleet, only one single musket, in the best of my recollection, was fired at the Formidable. So complete were their soldiers, as well as seamen, driven from their quarters before we came abreast of us. As to the loss sustained by his Majesty's fleet, I refer you \* \* \* \* to the public account; but I think I may pronounce from theattered condition the flying enemies were in when they left their general, that their loss cannot be less than seven or eight thousand men, killed and wounded; the number of prisoners borders upon six thousand, including those taken near the east end of St. Domingo since the battle by the detached van division of the fleet, under the command of Sir Samuel Hood in the Catq and Jason of sixty-four guns each, the Amiable, of thirty-six, and the Cirus, of eighteen. Deducting,

however, the number slain on board the ships taken, and the very many of those burnt in the *Cæsar*, of seventy-four guns, she having unfortunately caught fire shortly after she struck. Not a single goose quill fitted, nor did a gun require being wormed, so long as the flannel-bottomed cartridges lasted on board the *Formidable* or *Duke*; nor of the one hundred and twenty-six locks on board the latter, (every lower decker having two,) did a single one fail. One Kentish black flint to each, served during the whole engagement, in one lock excepted. Though about eighty men short at quarters, the *Duke*, from the improvements alluded to, fired sometimes fully from both sides, and even with as much ease as if they had been exercising. Nor did a single atom of gunpowder catch fire by accident on board of her, she having, as usual, and as now is becoming the practice, as well as the *Formidable* and divers other ships, used wetted wads. Reckoning the strength of the French fleet according to its weight of metal, it was stronger than his Majesty's, by a force equal to that of four French eighty-four gun ships. I say nothing of their several thousands of supernumerary soldiers; I mean on the 9th. On the 12th, the *Zele*, of seventy-four, the *Caton* and *Jason* of sixty-four each, were absent, having sustained damages, so that on the 12th, according to the above standard, the fleet of France was superior to his Majesty's, by the strength of two common ships of the line. In frigates they far outnumber us, and two of them, the *Sagittaire* and *Experiment*, were of fifty or fifty-four guns each.

“N.B. For some little time after, we got sight of the French fleet, on the 12th, in the morning, the wind was unnatural, and therefore unexpectedly at S.E., of which fortunate circumstance we availed ourselves, by pushing on, in order to make sure of fetching up the enemy. It then reverted to E.S.E., and gradually afterwards to E.”

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#### ANECDOTE OF BAROSSA.

AFTER the battle of Barossa, the wounded of both nations were, from want of means of transport, necessarily left upon the field of action the whole night and part of the following day. General Rousseau, a French general of division, was of the number; his dog, a white one of the poodle kind, which had been left in quarters upon the advance of the French force, finding that the General returned not with those who escaped from the battle, set out in search of him; found him at night in his dreary resting place, and expressed his affliction by moans and by licking the hands and feet of his dying master. When the fatal crisis took place, some hours after, he seemed fully aware of the dreadful change, attached himself closely to the body, and for three days refused the sustenance which was offered him.

Arrangements having been made for the interment of the dead, the body of the General was, like the rest, committed to its honourable grave; the dog lay down upon the earth which covered the beloved remains, and evinced by silence and deep dejection his sorrow for the loss he had sustained. The English commander, General Graham, whose fine feelings had prompted him to superintend the last duties due to the gallant slain, observed the friendless mourner, drew him, now no longer resisting, from the spot, and gave him his protection, which he continued to him until his death, many years after, at the General's residence in Perthshire.

MEMOIRS OF THE SERVICES OF GENERAL OFFICERS LATELY  
DECEASED.

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GENERAL SIR BANASTRE TARLETON, BART., G.C.B.

THE military career of this veteran of the British army commenced in 1775, when he purchased a cornetcy in the King's Dragoon Guards. In 1776, he proceeded, on leave, as a volunteer to America, and in December of that year, he commanded the advanced guard of a patrol which made General Lee prisoner. During the years 1777 and 1778, he witnessed the whole of the actions of great and little moment, in the Jerseys, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, until the return of the King's army to New York, on which occasion, although possessing only the rank of captain of infantry, in an absent regiment, he commanded the rear-guard of Sir Henry Clinton's army. Immediately after this service, he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of provincial cavalry, and soon rose to the command of the British Legion. His services from this period are stated by himself in a letter addressed to Earl Bathurst, (a copy of which he placed in the hands of the writer of this sketch,) on the extension of the Order of the Bath :—

Leintwardine, Ludlow, 27th January, 1815.

"MY LORD,—If something stronger than common report had not pointed out the Principal Secretary of State in the war department as the chief engine in the new formation of the Military Order, I should not have made this address to your Lordship. And, although my feelings were severely smitten by that circumstance, I forbore to trespass upon your Lordship, until I had collected the best intelligence upon the subject.

"I beg leave, my Lord, to premise, that I entertain no sentiments of hostility to your Lordship, and that I am solely actuated by a sense of injury; conceiving (I think with justice) that a great stigma has been fixed upon my professional life, by the Supplement to the London Gazette, dated 3d of January, 1815. I could have been contented to have descended into my grave with the honourable rank of General in the British army, earned by activity and courage, unassisted by money, noble birth, or powerful interest, if an instrument, to which I have alluded, had not given additional dignity to several of my contemporaries, and lifted into precedence many officers who have served under me.

"Your Lordship's feelings will, if I am not mistaken, in this instance accord with mine, that this letter cannot be deemed an intrusion or aggression upon you, or upon any other person whatsoever, but a fair vindication of my own conduct and character, to which I am impelled by a laudable sense of honest ambition. What is so dear to a soldier as his military reputation? Is not that reputation founded upon gallant exploits, honourable wounds, and military records? If such foundation is valid, I appeal to the Government Gazettes of my country, during the years 1780 and 1781. Sir H. Clinton (the commander-in-chief) and Earl Cornwallis (the second in command) have mentioned my name, with singular distinction, in every public despatch during that period; and I hope it may, in this case, be esteemed venial, if I refer your Lordship to a conversation held in the House of Lords, in which it was proposed to thank me, as Lieutenant-Colonel-Commandant, ~~and~~ (according to usage) not allowing that honour.

had not nearly outlived the recollection of the American war, it would be necessary to point out the different military enterprises in which I have personally concerned; but the object I have in view obliges me to go to a detail, irksome, perhaps, to us both.

To the siege of Charlestown I attended Sir H. Clinton; having received and of the cavalry upon that expedition, with the rank of Lieutenant-

Colonel-Commandant of the Legion. I purposely pass over all my previous services—such as the direction of the advanced guard of the party which captured General Lee in 1776,—and intend only to state my conduct after I had attained the command of the cavalry.

“During the siege of Charlestown, three regiments of the enemy's horse (Washington's horse, Palaske's legion, Bland's or White's dragoons) were surprised and destroyed at Monk's Corner and Lenew's Ferry; and all communication with the country was cut off by the light troops, although the place was not completely invested by the army.

“At the Wacsaws, on the frontier of North Carolina, the cavalry, with part of the legion infantry on horseback, at the distance of a hundred and thirty-six miles from Lord Cornwallis's army, defeated a superior body of continental infantry, with great slaughter, and took four pieces of artillery, five colours, and all the baggage of the Americans, which contained valuable stores and clothing for the garrison of Charlestown.

“At Camden, a charge of cavalry was made against infantry and cannon, and a pursuit continued for upwards of twenty miles from the field of battle, in which several prisoners, all the baggage, and the last piece of cannon, were taken from the enemy.

“At the Catawba River, General Sumpter was brought to action two days after the battle of Camden: his force, of upwards of 1000 men, continentals and backwoodsmen, was surprised at mid-day; two cannon, and many prisoners, and all the baggage, fell into the possession of a very inferior party. A considerable number of British soldiers were retaken, and loyal Americans redeemed from captivity.

“At Blackstocks, on the Tiger River, General Sumpter, with superior numbers, was dislodged from blockhouses, in which position he threatened Ninety-Six, a British post: some prisoners were taken, his corps dispersed, and the general placed *hors de combat* by a wound.

“At the Cowpens, the British were defeated with loss, by superior numbers, consisting of continentals and backwoodsmen, under General Morgan. The reverse of fortune is principally attributable to the want of the co-operative movements of Lord Cornwallis. [Vide *Tarleton's Campaigns*, c. iv.] In a letter which I have in my possession, Lord Cornwallis says, ‘Your movements in bringing the enemy to action were masterly—your dispositions unexceptionable; nothing but the total misbehaviour of the troops under your command could have robbed you of the glory which was so justly your due.’

“At Guildford Court-House, the two armies were long and closely engaged, when the cavalry towards the end of the action, extricated the right wing from the enemy, which had surrounded it. In that charge I lost a considerable part of my right hand.

“In short, all the movements of the British army were covered, through a woody and difficult country, by my legion, from the fall of Charlestown to the melancholy catastrophe at Yorktown, in Virginia. In that circuitous march of more than 1200 miles, many prisoners, cannon, and colours, fell into my hands, whilst detached from the main body of the army; a great proportion of the forage and provisions was provided for the British, and all the risings and assemblies of the American militia were suppressed by the sword. The rank of Major and of Lieutenant-Colonel in the English army came to me for services in the field, by brevet, in 1780, and early in 1781.

“That my employment since the conclusion of the American war has not been upon the same active scale of operation, (having been only sent, as a Major-General to Portugal, in 1798, a time of inaction; and as Lieutenant-General to Ireland, in 1803,) is not imputable to me, as during my life, my professional talents have been cultivated by study, and my military zeal to distinguish myself in the cause of my king and country has not abated.

“And now, my Lord, I will not detain you much longer; but a word or two upon the limitation to 1803, in the instrument I have already mentioned, I cannot omit. No rule or regulation of that kind can be supported by argument, as military services and military records must, at the tribunal of,

reason, be equally valid in the last or present century,—under the reign of his majesty, George III., or the government of the Prince Regent. The rule even hitherto has not obtained observance, as in various instances I can point out; those facts, however, I will not dwell upon, or discuss upon the present occasion. If the rule were literally observed, the article of exclusion is of so rigorous a nature, that it is morally impossible to carry it into effect. Look, my Lord, well at the consequences it must eventually produce. If you exclude me as a veteran, you must come to the decisive avowal, that age incapacitates me from the enjoyment of any military distinction.

"But, my Lord, I never can believe that a gracious and high-minded Prince, after hearing a full exposition of the services of his military servants, can adopt or even countenance the decree of exclusion, which tells me in plain language, that my toils and dangers are not regarded, and that the honours I have achieved, and the wounds I have endured, are neither remembered nor regretted.

"I have, &c.

"BAN. TARLETON, General."

Though this letter did not produce, at the time, the effect of promoting him to the Bath, the General was in the same year honoured with the dignity of Baronet; and he was subsequently created a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath.

Sir Banastre was in his 79th year, and has died without issue. He was Colonel of the 8th dragoons, and Governor of Berwick; and previous to his appointment to the 8th, he was Colonel of the 21st dragoons. He sat in Parliament several years.

#### • LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CUPPAGE.

At the early age of 27 General Cuppage commenced his services to his country as lieutenant of artillery; and in the year 1772 was detached to Gibraltar, where he shared in all the duties of the protracted siege of that garrison, and acted a conspicuous part in the memorable sortie in April, 1780, which led to the destruction of the enemy's works, and probably forms as brilliant an event as the annals of British prowess contain. In 1782, in consequence of a severe wound which endangered his life, occasioned by a casualty, as reported in Colonel Drinkwater's narrative, he was permitted to return to England; and, on his recovery, was selected for the adjutancy of the battalion of artillery which had served in the siege, his predecessor having been killed there. In the performance of the duties of adjutant, Lieut. Cuppage had the good fortune to obtain the notice and favour of the Duke of Richmond, at that time Master-General of the Ordnance. Under the Duke's patronage, after he had attained the rank of captain, he was appointed aide-de-camp to the Lieutenant-General of Ordnance, the late Lord Howe, and continued in that situation until he was appointed by the Duke of Richmond to a troop of horse-artillery, in the year 1794. He was soon after promoted to the rank of major; and in the year 1796 was placed in the command of the artillery in the Kentish District. Sir Charles Grey was general-in-chief at that period in the Southern District, comprising Kent and Sussex; and the proximity of Kent to the shores of the enemy made that portion of the command a post of great importance. Sir Charles Grey soon found that he might place an unreserved confidence in his commanding officer of artillery, and did not withhold it. In 1797 the mutiny at the Nore afforded Major Cuppage an opportunity of exercising his prudence and judgment, in giving facility to Sir Charles's plans and operations on shore during that painful crisis.

He now reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel; and in the spring of 1798 had the anxious pre-eminence, under the orders of Sir Charles Grey, of preparing the local arrangements on the coast for the expedition against Ostend. In a memorandum of his own relating to the occurrences of that time, he expresses himself in the following emphatic manner:—"Those

who have experienced such situations, where the success of a great object depends not only on the efficiency of the measures adopted, but also on the absolute necessity of inviolable secrecy, can properly estimate the anxiety and difficulties to be encountered by an individual entrusted with prominent duties in such a service." The writer of this sketch was an eye-witness of the intenseness of Colonel Cuppage's exertions on that occasion, and of the sagacity he exercised in all his movements to keep secret the destination of the assembled forces, known then in Kent only to Sir Charles Grey and Colonel Cuppage; and so well was the veil secured, that, excepting in one unlucky instance after the embarkation of the troops, the secret was kept, and the object of the expedition was only known in this country from its failure. His Majesty George III. expressed to an officer of rank at the time his high approbation of Colonel Cuppage's conduct, both during the mutiny at the Nore, and on the occasion of the expedition to Ostend.

Colonel Cuppage's character as an active, zealous, intelligent, and able officer, was now quite established; and in the autumn of the same year (1798), when a secret expedition, under Sir Charles Stuart, was directed to be prepared at Gibraltar, Col. Cuppage was ordered to relinquish his command of the artillery in Kent, and to join Sir Charles at the Rock. He hastened thither, but found on his arrival that Sir Charles had sailed. General O'Hara, then commanding at Gibraltar, not knowing the object of the expedition, which was the capture of Minorca, detained Col. Cuppage at Gibraltar until after Sir Charles had taken possession of the Island. He then followed; and in a MS. memorandum made by himself at the moment, he says, "I joined, however, in time to unite with that first of officers, Sir Charles Stuart, in establishing the means for the future defence of Minorca."

In 1801, after the peace of Amiens, Col. Cuppage returned to England; and on a vacancy occurring in 1802, he resumed the command of the artillery in the Kent District. In 1803 hostilities recommenced with France; and those who recollect the fears of this country at that time respecting invasion, can well appreciate the arduous duties shared by officers who then superintended the military branches of the ordnance. The alarm of invasion, however, at length subsided; and in the year 1806 Col. Cuppage was appointed Inspector-General of the Royal Carriage Department at Woolwich. Here an ample field was afforded for the display of his ardent mind and active energies in the management of that very important branch of the ordnance. How admirably he acquitted himself in the performance of his duties, the recorded testimony of the different Masters-General and Boards under whom he acted, amply shows. In the detail of his department, his combination of economy with efficiency, his reduction of all the subordinate branches, abroad and at home, to the immediate control of the chief at Woolwich; and his application of machinery, which enabled the department to prepare and promptly to yield such an increase to the issues of military stores at critical periods as were unparalleled in the same service previously, called forth not only the repeated commendations of the Master-General and Board in private communications, but received the gratifying testimony of the official organ of the Ordnance in Parliament, when he moved the Ordnance estimates in 1814. Mr. Ward's speech on that occasion is thus reported:—"On the great article of Woolwich, the Hon. Gentleman descanted much on the immense results of all that had been laid out in improvements, particularly in the wharf and in the machinery. The former had done honour to the commanding engineer, Col. Pilkington; the latter was chiefly made use of in the carriage department, the most extensive of all, and he might say, the admiration of all. He had more than once mentioned the head of this department, General Cuppage; but at the close of the war, when he and others were about to rest from their labours, he could not help paying them the compliments they deserved. It was owing to General Cuppage that, by the introduction of this stupendous machinery, the production



of this important branch (the carriage department) had been multiplied, with less expense, perhaps he might say fifty fold. As a proof he would only mention the circular and vertical saws : the cost of both was under 16,000*l.*, and the saving of manual labour of last year alone, without using above two-thirds of their power, was 8000*l.*" Mr. Ward's eulogium was received by the House with cheers, and was of course highly gratifying to the subject of it.

After the cessation of war in 1813, General Cuppage retained the inspection of the carriage department, comprehending the management of the gun carriages of the whole navy of England, as well as of those of the artillery. The peace of course led to very extensive reductions in the department, which the Inspector-General effected with the most solicitous attention to economy, as well as to the protection of the interests of the country in case of sudden emergencies. He was scarcely ever absent from the arsenal, except when occasionally engaged in official tours of inspection to the subordinate branches in England, Scotland, and Ireland, when directed to make them by the Board. Until within a very few weeks of his death, his zeal and talents were unremittingly exercised in the department : and during his last illness, when confined to his couch, and daily losing strength, his devotion to the public service kept him in constant communication, either personally or by letter, with the officers under him, to whom, from the highest to the lowest, by his urbanity, and the active part he took in promoting their comfort and welfare, he was universally and deservedly endeared.

Lieut.-General Cuppage was the son of the Rev. Burke Cuppage, Rector of Coleraine, Ireland, where he was born in October, 1756. An intimate friendship and no remote consanguinity with the family of the celebrated Edmund Burke, introduced General Cuppage in his earliest days to the patronage of that illustrious man ; who, forming a favourable opinion of his young *protégé*, obtained a nomination for him to a cadetship in the military academy at Woolwich. During Mr. Burke's life, General Cuppage enjoyed pre-eminently the friendship and regard of his early patron, and was much in his confidence to the latest period of that great man's existence. In the year 1792 General Cuppage married the widow of Lieut. Colonel Cairnes, of his Majesty's 36th Regiment, with a family of three daughters and two sons, all of whom he adopted and ever treated as his own. By this marriage, which terminated in the lamented death of Mrs. Cuppage in Feb. 1832, he had three sons and one daughter : Burke, the eldest son, an officer of artillery, who married in Feb. 1828, Emily, the second surviving daughter of Sir John and Lady Emily Macleod ; William, now a post-captain in the navy, who lost his leg in a partial action with the French fleet off Toulon, in Dec. 1813 ; and John, who died at Penang in 1825, in the civil service of the Hon. E. I. Company ;—the daughter died in infancy. Of Mrs. Cuppage's sons by her former marriage, the elder, Major Robert Cairnes, of the Horse Artillery, was killed at Waterloo ; and the younger, Capt. James Cairnes, R.N., died suddenly at Newcastle, in Feb. 1831, while employed in the Northern Coast Guard service.

The personal friends of General Cuppage, at Woolwich and elsewhere, would think this sketch imperfect unless a tribute of respect was added to the kindness, affability, and cheerfulness constantly displayed in his demeanour, and especially as a member of the excellent society of the officers of artillery at head-quarters. His residence at Shooter's Hill was the frequent scene of unassuming hospitality, rendered doubly valuable by the presence of sensible, intelligent, well educated, and scientific men, whose powers of conversation were admirably drawn forth by the good taste and judgment of the host, and from which neither he nor his guests ever departed without seeming pleased with each other.

General Cuppage died at his residence at Shooter's Hill, Kent, on the 24th, 1832, in his 77th year.

**MAJOR-GENERAL SIR GEORGE RIDOUT BINGHAM, K.C.B. AND K.T.S.**

GEORGE RIDOUT BINGHAM, fourth son of the late Colonel Bingham\*, of the Dorset Militia, entered the service in 1793, as an Ensign in the 69th foot, in which corps he obtained a Lieutenantancy in 1795; was thence promoted to a Company in the 81st regiment, in 1796; to a Majority in the 82d, in 1801; and to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the 53d, in 1805. In 1813, he obtained the Brevet of Colonel; and in 1819, that of Major-General. In 1831, he was appointed Colonel-Commandant of the second battalion of the rifle brigade.

He served one year and a half in Corsica and on board the fleet in the Mediterranean; two years at the Cape of Good Hope; eight months at Minorca; and throughout the Peninsular war.

For his services at the battles of Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria, Pyrenees, and Nivelle, he was honoured with a Cross and one Clasp, and appointed a Knight of the Tower and Sword of Portugal. Subsequently, his services were rewarded by his Sovereign, with the proud distinction of a Knight Commander of the Bath.

Sir George had charge of Napoleon from England to St. Helena, and he remained in that island several years on the Staff, and in command of the 53d foot. On his promotion to the rank of Major-General, he was sent to Ireland, and placed in command of the Cork district, where he remained till last year, when he was compelled to resign the command in consequence of the state of his health; and on the 3d of January last, he died at his house in Cumberland Terrace, in his fifty-sixth year, universally respected by a large circle of friends and acquaintances, for his talents as a soldier and his many amiable qualities in private life.

The "Cork Constitution," in noticing the death of this officer, observes,—“For an eulogy upon Sir George Bingham, a reference to the memories and to the feelings of all respectable men in this quarter of Ireland,—of the religious, the loyal, the informed, and the truly just,—would be one of the most emphatic; for all such persons marked with honour and with gratitude, his wise and pure and noble conduct, in trying times,—observed his sound good sense, his admirable temper, his great presence of mind, his clear conception of the very thing which the emergency peculiarly called for, and the amiable and even-handed fairness with which every trait and duty was executed, which the public necessity required. These great and valuable qualities were conspicuously displayed, when this city was thrown into a greater degree of danger,—when life and property were more directly involved,—than at any former period since it had been besieged during the civil wars,—and to that most excellent man is to be ascribed the common deliverance of the citizens of Cork, from the frightful perils of that disgraceful and most alarming occurrence. In every relation of life, whether the greater or the more sweet and domestic virtues were to be called into action, Sir George Bingham would not be out-rivalled: as a brave and faithful soldier—a tender husband,—a sterling, warm-hearted friend,—open, candid, and courteous, with the bearing of a high-bred gentleman, no man could rate above this lamented man,—and to his numerous and admired qualities, the grace of all graces was added, that which religion alone can bestow upon the highest moral excellencies.”

The following memorandum was issued to the troops in the southern district:—

Assist.-Adjt.-General's Office,

Cork, 7th January, 1833.

**DISTRICT MEMORANDUM.**

It is with extreme regret, Major-General Sir James Douglas announces to

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\* The family pedigree for military achievements, from William the Conqueror to the present era, is remarkable in the annals of this country.

the troops serving in the southern district, the death of their late commander, Major-General Sir G. R. Bingham, K.C.B. He is quite satisfied that it will be in unison with the feeling of all the officers to shew a mark of respect to an officer who so long and so honourably commanded this district, by wearing the prescribed mourning for a fortnight, from the receipt of this memorandum.

By order,  
(Signed) CHARLES TURNER,  
Colonel and Adjut.

Sir George married the youngest daughter of Edmund Morton Pleydell, Esq., of Whatcombe House, Dorset, the oldest family in that county.

#### LIEUT.-GENERAL C. BOYÉ, OF THE HON. E. I. C. SERVICE.

In the early part of his military career, which commenced in 1776, the late Lieutenant-General Boyé, as Lieutenant on the Bombay establishment, was actively employed in three campaigns under General Goddard, Major Forbes, and Brigadier M'Cloud: he served at the siege of Mangalore, and the assault of Cannanore, and subsequently at that of the fortress of Darwar, in 1793, under Colonel Frederick. In 1798, having attained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, he proceeded, in command of the second battalion of his regiment, on field service, under Lieutenant-Colonel Little, to Jyjur, to co-operate with the Mahrattas against Tippoo Sultaun. In April following, being appointed to command a detachment of two battalions of Sepoys, he proceeded to the Malabar coast, and joined Colonel Wiseman's brigade, and was actively engaged in taking possession of the lower country and forts on the sea-coast in Canara, from Neejsaram to Sedashugar; he was also employed against Doondia Waugh, and took possession of Hydergur Ghaut. In July following he was appointed to command the district of Cundapoor: in January, 1800, he was removed, and appointed to raise the second battalion 6th N. I., at Surat, where he commanded the garrison. In 1802, he was transferred to the first battalion 3d N. I.; he proceeded to Bombay, and obtained the command of a field force, consisting of detachments of his Majesty's 84th and 88th regiments, a company of artillery, complete field train, first battalion 3d N. I., and first battalion 7th N. I. With this force he marched to Bassein, under the orders of Sir Barry Close, the resident with his highness the Peishwa Badjee Row. In April following, Colonel Murray, of his Majesty's 84th regiment, succeeded, as senior officer, to the command of the field detachments. Lieutenant-Colonel Boyé proceeded with the forces to Poonah, where he commanded a brigade of Native Infantry, and joined the grand army under the Duke of Wellington, then Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley.

At the conclusion of the war with Scindia, and other refractory Mahratta chieftains, Lieutenant-Colonel Boyé was removed to the second battalion 4th N. I.; he proceeded to Goa, and commanded a brigade in the Portuguese district of Salsette. He was next removed to the first battalion 8th, which corps he joined at Ahmednaggur, and commanded that district: he afterwards proceeded to Poonah, and commanded that station, and next to Surat, where he commanded the garrison till promoted to the rank of Colonel in 1806, when he was appointed commandant of the 9th N. I., and the garrison of Tantha. In 1810 he returned to England on furlough. In 1811 he was promoted to Major-General, and in the following year, appointed to the Staff. In 1816, he obtained the command of the army at the presidency of Bombay, with a seat as President of the Military Board. Major-General Boyé's limited time of four years on the Staff having expired in 1816, he was relieved by Major-General Laurence. In 1820, he returned to England, and in 1821; was promoted to Lieutenant-General.

## ON THE METHOD OF MEASURING BRITISH SHIPS.

An improved method of measuring ships, to approximate their nominal tonnage to their real burthen, being universally admitted to be desirable, and no such method having yet been found practicable, the old objectionable plan seeming without any hopes of being removed; it has occurred to me, that this serious objection which continues to operate as an effectual bar to an improvement in dimensions, might most easily be remedied; by at once abolishing every charge upon a ship collected upon her register tonnage, and substituting in its stead, a per centage upon the whole of the duties upon imported goods, equal to the amount. Dock charges in like manner, to be collected wholly upon the cargoes.

It is quite evident that this would not add one farthing of expense upon goods imported, as a reduced freight would ensue, at least equal to the amount of increased duties, and thus every one would be left free to adopt such means of proportioning a ship, as common sense and science might point out to be the best; and the consequence would most unquestionably be a material alteration for the better, which the practice of collecting so many heavy charges upon a nominal tonnage has hitherto prevented—the same method of measuring might still remain in use, and perhaps in the end would be found pretty correct, as ships would be constructed with more beam, and less depth; and the probability is, that somewhere about the present register tonnage of a ship is, in point of fact, what she ought to be found capable of carrying.

I can see but little difficulty in carrying this plan into execution if all goods were of the same bulk and value, one rate of per centage would suffice, in making an addition to the customs and dock charges; but as goods of different descriptions would be differently affected by the reduced freights, some scale would have to be arranged in this respect, to bear fairly. Lights, &c., to be accounted for to the Trinity House from the Customs.

Port charges are but in few foreign countries collected upon a ship's tonnage, according to her English measurement: in many there are no charges having reference to tonnage at all, and when these exist, the foreign custom houses generally adopt a mode of measurement of their own, which, knowing the great burthen of British ships, they frequently contrive to make fall very heavy upon them, by taking into account their depth.

It is not my purpose here to make more than a general remark or two, upon the proportions observed in constructing British merchant vessels under existing restrictions, the evident effects of which are, to make them carry the utmost possible quantity, with the least possible measurement tonnage; a mode of construction so clearly preposterous, in reference to every other good property, that it is quite clear no one would pursue it, were he left unfettered by the removal of the restrictions, which the collecting of charges upon the *measurement* (without any reference to the burthen) force upon him.

Reference to the shipping of all countries, where no such erroneous mode of collecting charges exists, might be made, to shew what improved dimensions would be adopted; for should these fine British ships sail upon their bottoms, with little ballast, and when loaded be able to carry a full cargo, of the same weights throughout, without witnessing the absurdity of floating bodies made to carry burthen, being so formed as to be obliged to carry along with the cargo (generally sufficiently heavy) a large quantity of kentledge, to obtain stability; and when without cargo, to require half a loading of ballast, and after all that can be done, being rarely made safe against bad weather, or generally adapted to any: if amongst a large number of ships of different nations, (on a wind,) you select those that are sailing mostly on their broad-sides—they are English; there are other symptoms by which they may be easily known, but not being very flattering, I will omit them. But I cannot help observing, that notwithstanding I am ready to admit, that the soundness and strength of the hulls of our ships,

are beyond all comparison the best in the world, my conviction is, that owing to their construction, they more frequently damage their cargoes, and that they are upon an average more frequently lost than foreign ships. This last would be a curious fact, worth inquiring into, and if true would be conclusive as to the bad form of British merchant ships, as their superiority in all other essential points cannot be called in question.

‘A MASTER OF A BRITISH MERCHANT SHIP.’

#### SUGGESTIONS FOR THE GUIDANCE OF SECONDS IN DUELS.

Having been frequently called upon as a second in duels, and from my own experience in such affairs, as well as the want of it in others who have been requested to act for the first time in such cases, I had long since written out some instructions for the general guidance of persons who may be called upon to act as seconds. They have been thought proper and correct by many who have applied to me for copies of them; but as a greater publicity of them may be advantageous to civilized society, I have been strongly recommended to offer them to you for circulation in your valuable professional Journal. In doing so, I shall make no apology to you, or the public, for aiding or explaining rules relative to a proceeding so revolting as a duel; but as it is an evil which has existed in all ages, and an evil productive of great eventual good in keeping the forms of society within its proper limits, the rules attending such proceedings should be as well known as possible by those who may be called upon to perform the duties of seconds.

#### *Instructions.*

The message having been carried by a friend, the seconds are appointed. They are immediately to put themselves in communication with each other, and from that moment are not to have any direct parlance with each other's principals. The principals are in the hands of their seconds.

The seconds are to appoint the place and time of meeting, which must be subject to no change after the principals are informed of them, unless the seconds think proper to alter either to prevent interruption. So soon as the time and place shall be appointed, the seconds will each provide pistols, and have a surgeon ready.

On arrival on the ground the seconds will select the spot, taking notice that there shall be as little advantage as possible to either side in the position of the ground, the sun and the wind. The seconds will measure the ground, twelve paces, marking the extremities. The seconds will toss up for ends, and the principals will be placed accordingly. The pistols having been loaded by the seconds in the presence of each other, the brace will be separately given by them to their principals. The principals will stand right hand to right hand, each with the pistol cocked—this being done, the seconds will move wide off the centre, where, on arriving, they will stand together. One of the seconds, previously appointed with the knowledge of the principals, will give the word “ready,” upon which the principals will each bring their pistol to the “present.” The same second will then give the word “fire.” The seconds will be at liberty to cry “stop,” in the event of either of the parties not having fired directly after the word “fire.” Either of the parties firing after this word “stop,” must be liable to the consequences before a court of law.

In the event of the party who has offended or provoked the challenge not returning the fire, or firing in the air—this is to be considered as an apology, and the challenger's second must be satisfied, unless a blow or any such violent insult may have been the cause of the challenge.

If neither of the parties be killed or so severely wounded as to prevent further proceedings, the second of the principal who conceived himself aggrieved, or who sent the challenge, will be asked whether he is satisfied:

if he should be, the affair ceases: if he should not be, the second of the adversary will be asked whether, after his principal having received the fire of the other whom he has offended or aggrieved, he will acknowledge it, so as to render further proceedings unnecessary—the affair may then be arranged by the seconds. Should, however, the intervention of the seconds be without success, a second round is to be fired with the other brace of pistols—the same words being given, but by the other second.

If a blow should have passed, which can hardly be supposed between officers, the second of the party who struck the blow must consent that his principal shall be fired at so long as the second of the party struck shall think proper, unless a written apology is made by the offending party.

The evading the operation of the civil law, in fatal cases, must be left entirely to the judgment of the parties concerned: but in the event of the duel being fatal to either party, it is the first duty of the seconds to proceed immediately together, and make written note of the proceedings of the whole transaction, which should be signed by both of them, each keeping a copy.

#### THE DEFENCE OF IRELAND.

A writer in the January number of the United Service Journal having been pleased to animadvert on, "Recollections respecting the Defence of Ireland during the late War," the writer of that article submits the following observations.

The appointment of Colonel Napier to the situation of field engineer to the forces was certainly of short duration; it did not exist for a week, a fact well known to the army in Ireland, and therefore no imputation could apply to him, respecting the engineer defences of the country—General Vallancy being then at the head of that department, and of course responsible for the operations of that service.

With respect to Lord Cornwallis, the writer in question seems to be extremely anxious to vindicate his Excellency's proceedings in the command of the army in Ireland, at the period of General Humbert's landing with a small force at Killala. Where Lord Cornwallis acquired, as a military man, "*his great and deserved reputation*," I am yet to learn. It could not have been in America, where he was opposed in general to country gentlemen as officers, and undisciplined militia, whose numbers seldom exceeded that of the King's troops under his command. His Lordship, it is true, gained the battle of Guilford, but the consequences were most disastrous and disgraceful, his army being obliged to quit the field, and retreat with the utmost precipitation for a distance of upwards of one hundred miles.

It could not be at York Town that Lord Cornwallis acquired "*his great and deserved reputation*;" his defence of that post was marked by no operation which reflected the slightest credit on the general; but perhaps the fault in choosing a bad position, and fortifying it without either military skill or judgment, should be attributed to the engineer—be that as it may, his Lordship, as commander of the forces, took very little care of their security, and evinced no talent in his endeavours to extricate his troops from an ill-chosen position. It is true he had a French general, united with Washington, to contend with, and a body of French regular soldiers to oppose; but if he found that York Town was untenable, he had the command of the river, and the American general having only a corps of observation on the Gloucester side, he might have passed the whole of his army over the river, attacked and routed the American corps—and extricated himself from the grasp of the combined army. Lord Cornwallis should have recollected Washington's admirable retreats from Long Island to New York, and from Trenton to Brunswick, and have profited by experience. It is

unnecessary to enter into any detail of Lord Cornwallis's operations in India : his advance to Seringapatam with a numerous army—his precipitate retreat from an Hindoo fortress, and an inexperienced force, commanded by a native chief, who could have no pretensions to the character of a general, the destruction of his artillery and military stores, are circumstances upon which it would be painful to dwell, and with which had the writer been acquainted, he would not have ascribed to Lord Cornwallis "great and deserved military reputation."

With regard to the operations against General Humbert's corps, it is pretty evident that your correspondent had no personal knowledge of facts—his information seems to have been gleaned from an apologetic pamphlet written by one of Lord Cornwallis's aides-de-camp, in explanation of the measures which his Excellency adopted to repel a French corps of about 850 rank and file. Your correspondent says, "that he *believes* Humbert's corps was nearer 1800, than 800;" but having no evidence to produce in support of his belief, he very properly sets that point aside. The detail into which he enters is little to the purpose : no insurrectional movement had taken place on the landing of the French troops at Killala, and when Lieutenant-General Lake, second in command to the Lord Lieutenant, was ordered to assemble a sufficient force to encounter the French General. It may be reasonably supposed that when Major-General Hutcheson and Brigadier General French joined General Lake at Castlebar, that the troops under their command were greatly superior to those of the enemy. Your correspondent states, from Lord Cornwallis's apology, that General Lake joined Hutcheson at Castlebar late at night, and had, therefore, no time to correct the position of the troops—which, he adds, "was bad." Now the fact is, that no position was thought of by either Lake or Hutcheson : they spent the night over the bottle, and had not the most distant idea that Humbert, with so small a corps, would venture to advance against three times his force of regular troops, fencibles, and militia. The strong pass of Barnagee was not occupied, which a single company might have defended against thousands ; no disposition was made by either Lake or Hutcheson. The troops marched out of Castlebar without a general, and formed to receive, and not to attack, the enemy. Your correspondent states, "that General Hutcheson had weakened his garrison at Castlebar, by detaching a good many troops in observation;" and "had not more than eleven or twelve hundred infantry engaged,"—yet he admits that Humbert's force was inferior, "because he left men in Killala, and lost nearly half his troops upon the march, by straggling." Thus your correspondent believes the French force to be nearer 1800 than 800—but he afterwards gives up the question of numbers : he states, that General Hutcheson had detached many troops from Castlebar, but they could not have been sent to observe the enemy, otherwise they would have fallen back upon the garrison, and given timely information of his approach ; then he admits that Humbert's corps lost half its numbers upon the march, and of course attacked the King's troops with only a few hundred combatants. In short, your correspondent seems to know very little of the transactions in question, his only authority being derived from the apology written by the Lord Lieutenant's aide-de-camp, for the extraordinary measures adopted to repel the invasion of 850 Frenchmen.

The feeling in the army in Ireland, during these contemptible operations, was truly humiliating. The Lord Lieutenant left Dublin to join the large army which had been ordered to assemble, and nine or ten other generals were employed to act under his Excellency—but all this time no insurrectionary movements took place, and Humbert was permitted to march and countermarch without receiving any effectual check. The army which Lord Cornwallis put into motion upon this occasion was admitted by his apologist to be about 10,000 men ; but as all the troops in the north of Ireland were directed to move towards the south, there can be little doubt of upwards of 15,000, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, having marched towards

a central point on this occasion to meet a small body of Frenchmen, and to put down an insurrection which never existed.

General Humbert, it appears, had no idea of meeting with the success which he experienced; his object was to penetrate as near to Dublin as possible, and to yield to any respectable force which might appear in his front; and, after the slight action with the Limerick militia at Coloonney, had his object been to prolong military operations, he had nothing more to do than to march to Sligo, which would have opened to him the route by Ballyshannon to Londonderry, where he might have fortified himself, and defended that city against Lord Cornwallis for several months.

Your correspondent, in summing up his remarks, pretends to have shown that General Lake was not sent to Castlebar to fight the French troops with militia: now let it be asked for what purpose 2500 men, consisting of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, were assembled at Castlebar? was it only to retreat before one-third of their number of Frenchmen? and would the government of England or the country have approved of such a dastardly proceeding?—which would have inflicted indelible disgrace on the generals and the army.

Your correspondent asserts, “that the 10,000 men were not put in motion in consequence of the affair at Castlebar, but to prevent a great insurrection:” now no insurrection existed either before or during Humbert’s invasion, and, therefore, your correspondent has fallen into a palpable error, which I hope he will have the candour to acknowledge.

Your correspondent lastly assumes, “that every effort, warranted by prudence, was made by the employment of masses and moveable columns to inclose Humbert.” Indeed, masses and columns were employed, but very injudiciously, and the fact is notorious. The cavalry in Ireland, at that period, were numerous, but the troops of that arm under Colonel Crawford, were Hompesch’s mounted riflemen: the regular regiments of infantry were in good order, and I have no doubt the 29th regiment, at that time in the garrison of Kilkenny, consisting of about 1000 rank and file, would have been quite competent to meet and defeat Humbert’s corps—but the regular troops were not employed—the infantry of the advanced guard being composed of the Essex fencibles, &c.

Lord Cornwallis’s conduct on this occasion, your correspondent asserts, was “*vigorous*, prudent, and military:”—where the *vigour* was manifested I am unable to discover; and as to its being *military*, it has no other claim to that appellation than having been that of a nobleman who had arrived at the rank of a general.

Your correspondent states, that he knows that Lord Cornwallis’s conduct was approved of by Sir John Moore at the time, and by other able and practised professional men. Sir John Moore, at the period in question, had not much experience of military operations upon an extended scale, and situated as he was, it could not be expected that he would freely criticise the conduct of his commander-in-chief; and as to the opinions of the other able and practised military men, I do not recollect a name, except that of Colonel Robert Crawford, entitled to much consideration.

Your correspondent has written a great deal without fortifying himself by any military principle—his remarks are founded on other persons’ opinions, and upon assumptions which cannot be maintained; and I recommend it to him, when he again enters the field of controversy, to endeavour to find better data than he has laboured to bring forward in his reply to the article on “The Defence of Ireland during the late War.”

January, 1833.

ALFRED.

[The following letter having reference to the same subject, we append it here.]

MR. EDITOR,—Having seen in the “United Service Journal” for January last, a defence of Lord Cornwallis and his proceedings relating to the re-



ception given by him, and those immediately under his command, to the French on their marching into the interior of Ireland, perhaps a few particulars relative to the manner in which they were received on their landing may be acceptable to some of your readers.

On the 20th of August, 1798, Lieutenant Sills of the Prince of Wales' or Leicester Fencibles, marched into Killala, with one serjeant, a corporal, and nineteen men, to the surprise of the inhabitants of that quiet and retired place,\* as there had not been a soldier quartered there within the memory of the oldest inhabitant. Early on the morning of the 22nd, Lieutenant Sills was apprised by the corporal of the guard, that there were three frigates in sight. Having assured himself that the report was correct, he placed a corporal and six men on a hill within a mile of the town, to watch the movements of the ships, and then dispatched a mounted yeoman to Ballina, to inform the commanding officer in that town of the suspicious appearance of the frigates. About noon, Captains Armstrong and Applegate of the 6th, or Carbineers, arrived at Killala, and rode within a mile of Kilcuming,\* where the frigates had anchored. On their return they ordered the guard, that had been stationed on the hill, to return to the town, and all to remain at the guard-house, which was in the castle, the residence of the bishop, till further orders. About six o'clock an alarm was given that the French were marching into the town. The two cavalry officers were dining at the bishop's, and Lieutenant Sills at Dean Thompson's. The latter immediately hastened to his men, who were stationed in the castle-yard, and met Captains Armstrong and Applegate in the act of mounting their horses. They desired him to make the best defence he could, and they would bring him reinforcements as soon as possible; they then rode off. Under the impression that troops would be immediately sent to his relief or support, he marched his men into the town, accompanied by ten dismounted yeomen, the bishop, and five clergymen, (on the 23rd there was to have been a visitation of the clergy of the diocese, and in consequence several clergymen were at the castle, on the 22nd.) On gaining the main street, Lieutenant Sills took the best position he could for defence at the head of a street the French had to come up. He did not wait long, the first division, of about five hundred men, soon showed themselves, and advanced up the street, where they encountered this gallant little band, who stood ready to oppose them; but on perceiving a large reinforcement of French advancing: he ordered a retreat to the bishop's house, in the hope of there making a better stand. The French pressed hard upon them, the ranks were broken, and the whole was thrown into confusion, so that only Lieutenant Sills, one corporal, and ten of his men, got inside the castle, with the bishop and some of the clergymen; the others made their escape. Two of the yeomen were shot; one was the surgeon of the town, and Rev. Dr. Ellison, of Castlebar, wounded. The French had three men killed, one officer and six men wounded, the officer severely: he was on horseback, and engaged Lieutenant Sills personally.

The French troops soon drew up in front of the castle, and demanded its instant surrender, threatening, in case of refusal, to force an entrance: further opposition was useless; the gates were opened, and all made prisoners. Lieutenant Sills, one corporal, and ten of his men, were sent at three o'clock the following morning on board the French frigates.

Should the above meet your approbation, the insertion will oblige,

Sir, your obedient servant,

A CONSTANT READER.

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\* Kilcuming is situated about four miles north of Killala; it was here the French actually did land, and not in Killala, as is generally believed, it being impossible for a larger ship than a merchant vessel to cross the bar, which is two miles from the shore. In Kilcuming they were able to send their boats from the frigates, under shelter of the land, and far from the observation of any but those immediately near the place. Killala is the nearest town.

## FOREIGN MISCELLANY.

## MONTHLY RETROSPECT OF MEMORABILIA.

Gunpowder first came into use in Christendom about the middle of the fourteenth century; and the oldest instance on record of the use of artillery in France occurred in the year 1338. Our own troops used cannon at the battle of Crécy, eight years afterwards; and about the same time the Italians began to employ gunpowder. But the Arabians had long before been in the habit of turning this tremendous engine to account, for Al Makin, the historian, tells us that Hadshi Ali, when laying siege to Mecca in the year 680, set fire to a part of the sanctuary there by means of a species of bombs; and Alamreb, the secretary of Malek al Saheli, the Egyptian emir, even before the middle of the thirteenth century, describes a certain missile in the following terms: "Scorpions (a projectile), which are bound round and ignited with powder made of saltpetre, whirl about and hiss; they afterwards burst and burn. The object which had been discharged spread itself in the air like a cloud, made a frightful noise like thunder, and, vomiting fire, destroyed everything it met with, set them on fire, and laid them in ashes." It is evident that the writer is not speaking merely of Greek fire in this passage, for this is called *milph al barad* in Arabic, i. e. saltpetre, or salt-stone, which the Arabians still make use of instead of gunpowder. Proofs of a still more decisive nature may be found in the Spanish Chronicles; for instance, that of Alfonso VI., which was written by Pedro, Bishop of Leon, observes, in a narrative of a sea-fight in the eleventh century between the emirs of Seville and Tunis, "The vessels of the King of Tunis had on board a number of iron pipes, out of which volumes of thundering fire (*truenos de fuego*) were discharged." A letter, also, from Alfonso VI. of Arragon, in which he advises the authorities of Alicant of the advance of the Moors, mentions, in the Arragonian dialect, that the King of Granada brings with him "*moltes pilotes de fer per gitaries Unys ab foch*,"—a number of balls to be thrown to a distance by fire. The letter is dated in 1331. •

## FRANCE.

## INTREPIDITY OF THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER.

Some very interesting light has lately been thrown on the occurrences of the campaigns in the years 1814 and 1815, by the "Reminiscences" of those years from the pen of Lieutenant-General Michalewsky Danilewsky, formerly one of the Emperor Alexander's adjutants. It is from this work that the following singular narrative is extracted. "I saw and observed the Germans," says the General, "during the days of their thralldom (1809—1811); but their spirit was never so completely cowed as is that of the French, who neither like to open their lips on politics, nor to read a newspaper. \*\*\* When the Emperor Alexander was at St. Dizier, he received advices from Paris, which had been occupied by the Prussians and English, urging his immediate appearance there in order to allay the fermentation which agitated the public mind. Now, St. Dizier is nearly one hundred and fifty miles from Paris; our troops could not accomplish the distance under seven or eight days; and although every moment was of importance, with a view to prevent the sanguinary occurrences which might have arisen out of the feverish state of the French capital, yet it seemed nothing better than the height of temerity to undertake so long a journey as that, through districts which were unoccupied by the allied forces. The Emperor, however, made up his mind to it. His head-quarters continued to move with the army, by the route of Sezan and Colonnier; but he set off himself, in company with the Emperor Francis and the King of Prussia, taking the road through Chalons to Paris. The Austrian sovereign had Prince Metternich and Count Wrona with him; the Prussian monarch, Prince Hardenberg; and in the Emperor Alexander's suite were Counts Nesselrode and Capo d'Istria, Prince Wolkonsky, and myself. In all we filled nine carriages, which were ordered to keep together.

At every stage, as far as Meaux, there were fifty Cossacks posted, who were thrown forward under Count Orlov Denissou as our escort: the Count rode by our side, and, in spite of our rapid progress, never changed his horse until we reached Chalons. A crowd of people collected round us at every stage on the road; they appeared to eye us without much concern, and at some places surrounded Alexander's carriage, crying out 'Long live Henry IV.!' or—else 'the King of Rome,' or 'Maria Louisa,' or 'Lewis,' just as the whim took them; nay, here and there were heard cries of 'Napoleon!' but the commonest greeting was 'Long live Alexander!' It was really surprising to witness the intrepidity with which the Emperor bore himself on this expedition, for livescore dashing Frenchmen would have had it in their power to have changed the whole aspect of things at a single blow. We made a détour through scarcely passable dells and hollows to avoid the fortress of Vitry, which was garrisoned by several thousand troops, and had not struck its flag. A mere handful of our dragoons were posted opposite to it, and the French could discover our vehicles from the ramparts; two of their columns were even thrown forward, and I trembled for the consequences; but in a short time they were happily recalled. We arrived at Chalons in the evening, and lay there for the night. Multitudes crowded the streets, for the people were astonished to see us there, and could not make out, for the life of them, how we came to venture amongst them without bringing troops with us."

The *Moniteur* contains, in twenty-one columns, a report from the Minister of War to the King, giving minute details of the state of every different branch of the French army from September 15, 1831, to January 25, 1833; its organization, its administration, with explanations as to the different services, its movements and present positions in the north, the south, and the west, in Paris, in Africa, and at Ancona.

The following particulars are condensed from this official paper:—"The effective force of the army on Sept. 15, 1831, was 400,271 men and 36,951 horses. Important modifications have been made in the *Etat Major Général* since the ordonnance of April 5, 1832. By admissions to the retired list, or by deaths, the *Etat Major Général* is reduced to 49 Lieutenant-Generals, of whom 12 are in active service and 37 in reserve, and 71 Major-Generals, of whom 43 are in active service and 28 in reserve. For the numerous special commissions, which amounted to thirty, has been substituted a permanent commission of infantry and cavalry, composed of 8 Lieutenant-Generals, 3 Major-Generals, and 1 Military Intendant. This commission, in conjunction with those of the engineer corps and the artillery, will suffice for all purposes. The Gendarmerie has been augmented by two provisional regiments. The 45th and 51st regiments of the line, and 16th light infantry, which were in the colonies, have been ordered back to France. One half of these corps have already returned, and the others are expected in the course of this year. The foreign legion in Africa consists of 151 officers and 5000 privates. There are four German battalions, one Italian, one Spanish, and a company of 251 Poles. By an ordonnance of June 3, 1832, the infantry has been augmented by two battalions of African light infantry, formed of soldiers taken from the *Compagnies de Discipline*, and of such as had been under correctional punishment. Two regiments of Horse Chasseurs have been formed at Algiers and Oran, and a third is about to be raised at Bona. This cavalry, which has already rendered important services, is composed of Frenchmen and Arabs. The latter, on receiving a certain pay agreed upon, mount, equip, and provide for themselves. They have, moreover, a reserve, called *Chasseurs Spahis*, who can only be called out on extraordinary occasions. By an ordonnance of October 15, 1832, a special corps has been created, called *corps de la remonte générale*, composed of 90 officers, 220 non-commissioned officers, brigadiers, trumpeters, and farriers, and 900 horsemen. This corps has been divided into fifteen dépôts: it has been created with a view to put an end to the purchase of foreign horses, and to

encourage the breed of them in France by purchasing French horses. The creation of a direction of artillery at Algiers has increased the number of the artillery staff-officers by 37; their total number now is 333: this number will probably be yet augmented by the establishment of a school at Vincennes, which was ordained on September 29, 1832. The departmental companies of Veterans have been amalgamated, and reduced to thirty. The effective force of the army on January 1, 1833, was 421,494 men and 82,057 horses. Of this number, 280,000 men belong to the infantry, 39,000 to the artillery, and 52,000 to the cavalry, but the latter has only 37,000 horses, instead of 49,000, which it should possess. Thus there were 12,000 horses lost in 1832. Of the 80,000 conscripts called into the service in 1831, there were but 1,105 refractory men. The number of voluntary enlistments was 12,000. The price of the ration of bread for 1833 is fixed at 17c. 35m., and of the ration of forage at 1f. 28c. During the expedition to Algiers, the latter was at the high rate of 3f. 42c. New military hospitals have been founded at Lyons, Valenciennes, Versailles, Douay, Briançon, and Pont à Mousson. There were constructed in the arsenals in 1832, 1,190 gun-carriages and field-waggon, 512 siege do., 674 fortress and coast do., 32 mountain gun-carriages, and 400 mountain ammunition-waggon. The reserve of muskets necessary for the army and the National Guards must be 2,000,000. Half that number will be obtained in 1833. There were manufactured in 1832, 191,000 muskets, musketoons, and extra bayonets. Since August 1, 1830, 417,189 muskets have been delivered by private manufactories. The straight-bladed sabre has been substituted for the *sabre-briquet*, but the exchange cannot be completely effected till the end of 1833. The *sabre-briquets* will serve for arming the National Guards. Orders given for 200,000 sabres of the new model have led to an improvement in French steel not before attained; and the manufactories of the Saut du Sabo, department of the Tarn, may now rival any foreign manufactory with regard to the quality of its steel. The forges and foundries afforded, in 1832, 144 pieces of heavy calibre, 284 field-pieces, and 9,800,000 kilogrammes of projectiles. The orders for 1833 are 600 pieces, principally destined for the field-works of Paris and Lyons. The price of gunpowder for the army in 1832 was 2f. 18c. a kilogramme (2lbs.); for 1833 it will be 2f. 24c. The field-artillery ready to enter into line consists of 834 pieces, divided into one hundred and thirty-nine batteries, seventeen of which are mountain. The National Guards have also 625 pieces of artillery. There are five equipages of besieging artillery of 100 pieces each: two only are completely mounted. The five equipages of pontoons are entirely organized. Nothing is wanting for the armament of the fortresses on the coasts. The town of Algiers, in particular, has been put into a formidable state of defence. The National Guards have been furnished with 918,968 muskets and musketoons, and 247,087 sabres and other swords. This expense, added to that of the artillery and ammunition, amounts to 35,000,000f. The engineer service has executed important works at Grenoble, Besançon, and Befort. The nature and extent of the fortifications of Paris not being fully decided upon, the credit granted for that purpose has been employed upon the works at Lyons: those executed at Paris are confined to a vast entrenched camp, established between St. Denis and the Marne, and the defence of which is connected with the fortress of Vincennes." In that part of the report which relates to Ancona we find the following:—"The moment approaches when these troops may return to France."

## BELGIUM.

### HEBREW MILITANTS.

Among the 4,000 or 5,000 Dutch troops employed in the defence of the citadel of Antwerp, were about 500 Jews; they were the sons of some of the most affluent citizens of Amsterdam, and many of them were volunteers, whose devotion to their country had impelled them to encounter the hardships and perils of war. It should be observed, however, that in Holland the Jew enjoys the same civil rights as the Christian.

## HOLLAND.

## NAVY.

On the 1st of January last, the list of naval officers comprised 4 Vice-Admirals, 6 Rear-Admirals, 23 Captains, 32 Captain-Lieutenants, 243 Lieutenants (of whom 53 of the first class), 108 Ensigns of the first class, 4 Surgeons-general, 60 Surgeons, and 42 Quarter-Masters. The officers of *Marines*, exclusive of the Rear-Admiral in command, were composed of 9 Majors, 9 Captains, 21 Lieutenants, and 1 Captain Quarter-Master. The number of cadets in the academy at Medemblik amounts to 85.

## PRUSSIA.

## MUSCULAR OSSIFICATION.

Dr. Hasse, a Prussian physician, has called public attention to a curious fact, which occurs in the pectoral region, as well as in the tendon of the deltoid muscle on the left side, with many of the conscripts in the Prussian army. It appears that the disease is of common occurrence in its ranks, and is there known by the name of the "*exercise bone*." In six hundred such conscripts, of whom one-half had been a twelvemonth, and the other six months under arms, Dr. H. found eighteen cases of this disease in various stages. Men of weak and debilitated frames do not seem to be more subject to it than others. Some days subsequently to the commencement of military exercise, those whose constitutions are predisposed to it discover a small red, painful tumour on that part of the left shoulder against which the musket leans. If this tumour be neglected, the muscle becomes charged with a number of hard and moveable ones, like glands, which grow rapidly into large masses, of a solid, cartilaginous consistency. After a lapse of six weeks, or even as few as four, from the first irruption of the disease, the whole tumour becomes a solid, bony mass, according to the extent and size of which the motion of the arm is more or less impeded; and it then becomes necessary to make an incision in the tumour. The bony pieces, which are then extracted, are from three to five inches in length, and, from one to two inches in width; they sometimes weigh as much as an ounce, and their surface is irregular, with exhibition of several cores of ossification. The latter is frequently incomplete; in one and the same case the eye detects the various transitions of the red, muscular fibre into a shining, tendinous body on one side, whilst on the other a cartilage is observed, which exhibits points or bony kernels of a regular, cellular structure at different points of their substance.

## BAVARIA.

## PRINCE WREDE.

The whole corps of officers of the Bavarian army have lately presented the veteran field-marshal with a sword of honour, on the blade of which is inscribed, "The officers of the Bavarian army to their leader, Field-marshal Prince von Wrede." The scabbard is of massive gold, beautifully enriched with trophies and arabesque work, chiselled in the gold itself. Upon its presentation, the venerable warrior replied, with evident emotion, that, although the winter of life had already blanched his locks, he should draw the sword with cheerful confidence in the host whom he had so often led to victory, on whatever occasion the cause of his king and country should require him to wield it.

## RUSSIA.

## ASTRONOMY.

Professor Struve, of Dorpat, is engaged in arranging the series of astronomical observations made by Russian officers and others during the campaign against Turkey. They afford a variety of interesting results with respect to Mount Ararat, Erzerum, Kars, and a number of spots along the Danube and Black Sea, as far as Adrianople. The materials were very liberally placed at his disposal by the *Etat Major* of his Imperial Majesty.

## REVIEWS AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Memoirs of CAPTAIN SIR WILLIAM HOSTE, Bart. R.N. &c. 2 vols. 8vo.*

THE paying our tribute of esteem and respect to departed worth is always so grateful a duty, that we are little inclined to find fault with the bridge that carries us towards that object. Yet we are somewhat taken aback by these volumes,—but though no author's name appears on the title-page, it is well-known that the widow of this lamented officer has produced the work; and even were the fact less loudly rumoured, there is internal evidence—in prodigal admiration and affectionate regard—which would have betrayed the secret. Honouring the motive, therefore, we cannot find it in our hearts to criticise the pages minutely—and will merely say, once for all, that so public a character, as Sir William Hoste was, should have had a more strictly professional memoir; and that his letters ought to have undergone a judicious and copious weeding. The latter is a point we would particularly enforce, for, though the publishing of private correspondence is possessed of some peculiar advantages, it is at the same time liable to many and serious objections. They usually contain the unguarded and unpremeditated effusions of friendship, communicated under the implied condition, if not of absolute secrecy, yet at least of discretion; and, in the printing of them, much uneasiness may be given to persons incidentally mentioned or alluded to. High literary powers, or peculiar political advantages, occasionally confer sufficient interest to keep such objections in the distance; but we really think the public may dispense with a midshipman's remembrances to his relatives, and his ideas on affairs of which he can seldom know the cause or imagine the consequences. Rejoicing in prosperity, lamenting crosses, and eulogizing kindnesses, were interesting topics to friends when written, but have little claim to public sympathy at the present moment.

The services of Sir William Hoste are too recent not to be pretty generally known; therefore, although, from our long personal acquaintance with him, it is a theme on which we could dwell with pleasure, our notice shall be short. And, moreover, we feel aware, that every one interested in that excellent officer's career, and the incidents of his time, will not neglect reading the *Memoirs* before us.

Young Hoste was descended from a Flemish family, which was driven from Walcheren during the persecution of the Protestants by the Duke of Alva, in 1569, and was the second son of the Rev. Dixon Hoste, rector of Godwick and Sittershall, in Norfolk. He was born on the 26th of August, 1780, and, at the request of the now venerable Mr. Coke, was taken into the *Agamemnon* by Lord Nelson, at the commencement of the Revolutionary War, in 1793. It was thus that he became connected with the Great Sailor, who soon found reason to grow attached to his *protégé*, since we find that he wrote to his father, in the following year, in these terms:

“You cannot receive much more pleasure in reading this letter than I have in writing it, to say that your son is everything which his dearest friends can wish him to be, and is a strong proof that the greatest gallantry may lie under the most gentle behaviour. Two days ago, it was necessary to take a small vessel from a number of people who had got on shore to prevent us; she was carried in high style, and your good son was by my side.”

• The *Agamemnon*, after playing a noble part at Bastia and Calvi, joined Admiral Hotham, and soon fell in with the enemy's fleet. On the 13th of March, 1795, Nelson got near enough to engage the *Ca Ira*, of 84 guns; this brought on a general action on the following morning, in which the French were defeated, with the loss of two fine line-of-battle ships, the *Ca Ira* and *Censeur*. In the autumn of the same year, young Hoste gallantly cut out a vessel from her moorings under the batteries of Alassio, on

the coast of Genoa; but, in bringing her out, he unluckily fell down a scuttle and broke his leg. This was very vexatious, as it deprived him of the command of his prize; nor did this accident come alone, for having followed his enterprising patron into H.M.S. Captain, a few months afterwards, he again broke his leg, and with a double fracture, which ever after gave him occasional pain. These misfortunes, joined to a constitution naturally delicate, must have tended to curtail his years, besides which, a blow he received on the breast from a beef-cask, as it was being hoisted on board,—an accident omitted in his “Memoirs,”—gave him serious inconvenience.

The youthful midshipman, after serving at the evacuation of Bastia, was in the memorable battle off Cape St. Vincent, and Nelson thus addressed the Rev. D. Hoste on the occasion:—“You will be anxious to hear a line of your good and brave William after the sharp services of the Captain on the 14th. I have hitherto said so much of my dear William, that I can only repeat, his gallantry never can be exceeded, and that each day rivets him stronger to my heart.” Who would not brave “the battle fire, the wreck,” for such an eulogium as this?

While his patron was bombarding Cadiz, Hoste received a wound in the right hand, and considerable fears were apprehended of the horrible tetanus ensuing, but happily he recovered. He then accompanied his gallant commodore into the *Theseus*, and sailed on the luckless expedition to Teneriffe, where the vacancy made by the death of his friend, Lieutenant Weatherhead, gave him an acting commission ere he had passed.

On returning to England, Nelson left his *protégé* under the care of Capt. R. W. Miller, “the only truly virtuous man he ever saw,” who commanded the *Theseus*, and gave him so warm a recommendation to Lord St. Vincent, the commander-in-chief off Cadiz, that his promotion was secured. Early in 1798 the Naval Hero again joined the fleet, and was detached with a squadron, in which the *Theseus* was included, into the Mediterranean. The result is universally known, and after “the conquest rather than battle” of the Nile, as Nelson emphatically termed it, he immediately promoted Hoste to the command of the *Mutine*, the only small vessel attached to his squadron. This appointment being confirmed by the Admiralty in December following, he continued in her till the close of the war, and, among several other services, cut out an armed polacca from under Sorrento, and assisted in the capture of Cività Vecchia, the capitulation of which included the surrender of Rome also! On this occasion the castle was entrusted to the *Mutine*’s marines, when the inhabitants thought of avenging their wrongs by murdering the French prisoners, who were to be embarked the next morning: the adventure must be given in the young commander’s own words:

“On the 12th, we both dined ashore, and soon after dinner were alarmed by the firing of musketry, and the report that the inhabitants had risen in the town with the intention of putting their design in execution. We instantly left the room, and ran to the place where the mob were assembled. If you have ever been at the quelling of a riot in England, you may imagine a little the confusion and discord that prevailed, but with us it was far worse. We were strangers to the language, and were afraid of bringing the military from the castle, as in that case it would have been left defenceless, and as it was the only place we could retire to in case of necessity. Thus situated, everything depended on a moment: the mob had possession of two field-pieces, loaded with grape, they had surrounded the French general’s house, and in another instant would have stormed it. I will now call your particular attention, to convince you what idea the people of this country entertain of an Englishman. The Neapolitans had three hundred troops in the town, but from neglect of duty, and the want of confidence in them on the part of the mob, they were not able to quell the riot, and, believe me, only made things worse. The troops had not courage to charge the mob, and the mob paid not the smallest attention to the troops. We were only three Englishmen, and, on our appearance, they applied to us to lead them against the French; but as our intentions were far otherwise, we, partly by menaces, and partly by persuasion, got the two pieces of cannon, and kept them tolerably quiet. We now thought we had

gained our chief point, but the town was as yet far from being in a state of tranquillity. The French sent us word that, if they did not immediately see their general, they should attack the town. Their force, which was three or four hundred men, was fully adequate for their purpose; and though it was contrary to every article of the treaty, we well knew that a Frenchman's word of honour was of no avail when compared to the advantage that might be gained from a superiority of force. In this situation we waited on the French general, and acquainted him with the intention of his troops, and the state of the mob; that it would be dangerous to walk through the streets without a guard we well knew, and therefore offered our services to escort him to the French barracks, which he accepted, and we marched through the midst of the mob with him, arm-in-arm, until we arrived at the troops. I confess, I expected a ball of some kind or another through me, but luckily we arrived safe. He then harangued them, and desired all to repair to the barracks, which was immediately complied with; and the other party, finding nothing was to be done, retired quietly to their respective homes. Thus finished quietly an evening which, in the beginning, had so contrary an appearance; and, I assure you, during the whole course of the service I have been in, I have never suffered more anxiety than in this business."

Captain Hoste grew weary of his station after the departure of Nelson, but could not prevail on Lord Keith to send him home. "The general way," said he, in a letter to his father, "of getting over difficulties like these, is pretended sickness, and consequent discharge to sick quarters, but that is what I am determined never to practise; and rather would I remain another ten years from England, than be guilty of such a step, which, believe me, is as foreign to my character, as it is from the true discipline of the service;"—a service, which he afterwards says, "I shall ever think myself the luckiest fellow in the world for having embraced, and which I am determined to stick to as long as this frail body will hold together."

On the 7th of January, 1802, Captain Hoste received his post rank, and in June commissioned the *Greyhound*, at Malta, in which ship he returned to England in March, 1803, that is, within ten years of his having joined the *Agamemnon* a mere schoolboy. He did not long indulge in the solace of domestic life, for in November, 1804, he was appointed to the *Eurydice*, and we soon find him writing the following characteristic anecdote from Gibraltar:—"A man-of-war brig, about the size of the *Mutine*, which I fell in with a few days ago, has really taken so much specie, that the brig would not carry it, and it was obliged to be put on board the *Swiftsure*, 74. I think the weight was estimated at thirty tons of hard Spanish doubloons and dollars. It is really a fact, and yet the man is not happy or contented who has certainly made an immense fortune; and, what makes it more extraordinary, he had not sixpence of his own six weeks ago."

We cannot forbear also subjoining an extract from a letter, dated Port Praya:—

"A remarkable instance of a monkey's sagacity and feelings happened to two of our officers shooting, and which has determined me never to shoot one as long as I live. Coming home after a long sag, the purser saw a female monkey running along the rocks, and immediately fired. She fell with her young one in her arms. On the purser coming up, she grasped the little one close to her breast, and with the other hand pointed to the wound which the ball had made, and which had entered above the breast. Dipping her finger in the blood, and then holding it up, she seemed to reproach him with being the cause of her death, and consequently that of the young one, to which she frequently pointed. I never felt so much as when I heard the story; and it serves to show how strongly the parental feelings are implanted by nature, even in the brute creation."

On the 13th of October, 1805, Lord Nelson took the opportunity of appointing his protégé to a larger frigate, the *Amphion*; and under the idea that the combined fleets would not immediately venture from Cadiz, dispatched him to Algiers with some presents for the Dey. Owing to this, he was absent from the proudest battle in our naval annals, but one which robbed him of his beloved patron. Lord Collingwood endeavoured to soften this irreparable loss by every attention in his power. He dispatched him to



reinforce Sir Sidney Smith on the coast of Calabria; and in 1807, when the *Amphion's* defects rendered it absolutely necessary that she should return to England to be docked, his Lordship made a request to the Admiralty that she should be sent out to him again, with the same captain,—“for,” said the veteran, “he is active, vigilant, and knows the coast; and more depends upon the man than the ship.”

After undergoing a thorough refit, the *Amphion* returned to Lord Collingwood; and on the 12th of May, 1808, she attacked and drove on shore a large French frigate, which was flanked by three heavy batteries at Rosas. This exploit procured him a cruise in the Adriatic, where, early in 1809, he became the senior officer; and his unremitting vigilance against the enemy's naval operations and trade were testified by numerous captures, many of which were taken under the most dashing circumstances, and led to the promotion of many of his lieutenants and midshipmen.

Meantime a squadron of six frigates and smaller vessels, under the command of M. Dubourdieu, one of the ablest naval officers of France, had for some time endeavoured to get the supremacy; and though he warily declined fighting, harassed the whole station by occasional *coups-de-main*. But this was not to last. On the 13th of March, the French were discovered before dawn, close in with the isle of Lissa; and though they consisted of six large frigates, a corvette, two schooners, a xebec, and a gunboat, they were immediately chased by Hoste, with only three frigates, one of which was large, and a 20-gun ship. At about six A.M. the enemy began to bear down in two divisions upon our squadron, which now proudly displayed its colours, and just before the opponents got within gunshot, the *Amphion* telegraphed “REMEMBER NELSON.” Loud cheers responded to the talismanic signal, and confidence and ardour compensated for the obvious disparity of force. The English were now in a compact line, which the enemy tried to break, but, though almost aboard of it, was foiled in the attempt, and met so warm a reception that Dubourdieu was killed, and his ship driven on the rocks in the greatest possible confusion. The battle then raged with fury, under various beautiful manœuvres, for six hours, when it was ended by the capture of the *Corona* of 44 guns, and the *Bellone* of 36; the *Favorite*, of 44, was driven on shore, and there blown up; and the *Flora*, of 44 guns, after having struck her colours to the *Amphion*, basely stole off while that ship was closing the *Bellone*; and it appears that she might have been sunk had her intentions been suspected. The corvette made all possible sail to the N.W., the two remaining frigates crowded sail for Lesina, and the small craft fled in every direction; nor had we a ship in a state to follow them.

The comparative forces in this brilliant affair may be stated thus:—The British squadron mounted 156 guns, and went into action with only 879 men; that of the enemy had 284 guns and 2655 men, including 500 troops. The slaughter in the French ships was prodigious, and ours was also severe, being 50 slain and 150 wounded, in which last was the heroic commodore: on being asked to go below for surgical assistance,—“Never, but with death,” was the reply. It was very fairly remarked that such splendid success against such numerical superiority inculcated the enemy with the old axiom—“*Fus est et ab Hoste doceri.*”

Having escorted her prizes to Portsmouth, the *Amphion* was paid off on the 12th August, 1811, and he was decorated with a gold medal; but appeared, and very justly, to feel that he deserved a greater mark of distinction.

In the following November, Capt. Hoste was appointed to the *Bacchante*, a fine new 38-gun frigate; and being requested to name any station he might choose to select, he preferred his old field of laurels, and returned to the Adriatic. The enemy's ships of war there now confined themselves entirely within their ports; the operations of our hero were therefore directed to intercept the coasting trade and supplies which were necessarily carried to the numerous garrisons along its shores. This led to many of the

smartest boat actions that occurred during the war, and the destruction of great numbers of the enemy's convoys and armed flotilla. In the fall of 1813, the line of conduct assumed by Austria threw the affairs of the Adriatic into another form. Our active officer now assisted the Allies in their great movements, by acting along the coast in conjunction with their armies; and Karlopatzo, Fiume, Porto Rê, Rovigno, Citta-Nova, Lesina, Cattaro, Spalatro, and Ragusa, bore testimony to his address and bold originality in their capture. Even that extraordinary and intrepid race, the Montenegrinos, who themselves stormed places that were deemed almost impregnable, were struck with astonishment when they perceived that the English sailors had rowed two 18-pounders and two 11-inch mortars up the mountainous range of Teodo, which faces the castle of Cattaro, in defiance of rugged precipices, inclement gales, and drenching torrents of rain; a feat which soon produced the surrender of the place. The spot was shown to us five years afterwards with as much admiration as if the affair had happened but the previous week,—and a laugh still existed at the incredulity of General Gauthier, the French governor, of the possibility of scaling such ravines. Indeed the lessons of Nelson at Bastia and Calvi seem to have been deeply engrafted into his pupil.

These arduous and constant exertions, in a man of stronger mind than constitution, made serious havoc upon his health, and commenced his "death-stroke." For in March, 1814, having garrisoned the town of Parga, he shortly after lost the use of his legs, and was obliged to quit the command of the *Bacchante*. The incident is so feelingly related by his late first lieutenant, S. T. Hood, that its length alone prevents our inserting it.

Shortly after his arrival in England, Capt. Hoste was created a baronet; but it was a tardy acknowledgment of his services. He had already received the Austrian order of Maria Theresa; and in 1815 was nominated a Knight-Commander of the Bath, with an intimation that his gold medal would be in consequence withdrawn. But he declined relinquishing what was the sole distinction of the conflict of Lissa, and the demand was not enforced.

Sir William continued in delicate health, but rallied sufficiently to command the *Albion* 74, stationed as a guardship at Portsmouth, and afterwards the Royal Sovereign yacht. It seems that he married twice. His widow, to whom he was united the 17th April, 1817, was the third daughter of Horatio Earl of Orford, by whom he has left three sons and three daughters. After a tedious and painful illness, which he bore with resignation and religious confidence, he yielded his breath without a struggle on the 6th Dec. 1828, and his remains were deposited in the church of St. John's Wood.

To the playful amiability of Sir William we can bear testimony; and the volumes of Lady H. Hoste afford ample evidence of his affectionate regard for his parents, and all branches of his family; nor can we do otherwise than warmly admire the filial piety and noble generosity with which he devoted nearly the whole of that property which his own hard services alone had procured to relieve the necessities of a parent. As a public man, it may be remarked that he never planned any enterprise without its being followed by success. "In short," says the brave and accomplished Sir Jahleel Brenton, "were I called upon to name any character whose example the youth now rising in the Navy should take for their model, I should unhesitatingly say SIR WILLIAM HOSTE."

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*Records of Travels in TURKEY, GREECE, &c. By Adolphus Slade, Esq.*

MR. SLADE, a Lieutenant in the Royal Navy, has produced, without any trace of pretension, one of the most sensible and agreeable books of travel we have ever had the pleasure to peruse. In the abundance of similar publications, many of them relating to the same scenes, and most possessing merit in a greater or less degree, it argues no ordinary qualities in a work to be favourably distinguished. The volumes of Mr. Slade undoubtedly

deserve this distinction, both on the score of subjects and their treatment. They are like honourable to the writer and to the Naval Service, which now develops its due share of literary as well as professional skill.

In 1829, the author, traversing France, Italy, and the Greek Isles, reached Constantinople at the commencement of the second campaign between the Turks and Russians. Entering at once *in medias res*, this somewhat hack-nied portion of the author's travels is sketched with felicity, and is sprinkled with judicious observations on the mongrel Greeks and their piratical war of liberation. Upon all occasions the comparisons drawn by the writer between these absurdly puffed people and the genuine Turk are, upon the clearest grounds, eminently in favour of the latter, who wants but the aid of education to qualify him for a high station among the races of man. As it is, the natural qualities of the Turk in some degree counteract the habitual influence of the system under which he vegetates.

The author visits the Capitan Pasha and his fleet, anchored in the Bosphorus off Bujukderé, and draws a graphic picture of the flag-ship, the Selimier, its chief and crew.

Upon this occasion the British Lieutenant is invited by the Capitan Pasha to accompany him in the cruise he is on the point of undertaking in the Euxine, to manœuvre against the Russian fleet. To dart back to Per for necessities, and again "row gallantly" up the Bosphorus in the same caïque, "outstripping the porpoises," was but the affair of a couple of hours: but, to our author's dismay, the fleet had just cast and was standing out, making steady way. His adventurous pursuit in a frail caïque through the long swell of the Euxine, till by dint of an *agro-dolce* sauce of mingled threats and bribes applied to his boatmen, he was at length enabled to spring on board the Selimier, which had lain to, is described with infinite animation.

"The Selimier steered like a cutter, and sailed like a frigate. 'What a beautiful ship!' I exclaimed to his Excellency. 'By God's grace,' he said, 'she is.' A poor compliment, I thought, to the architect. 'Who built her?' I asked. 'Who knows?' was the answer. 'She must do your Excellency honour,' I continued. 'Please God,' he answered. Alas! I thought, man gets little credit among these people, Allah takes all. I elicited, in five minutes' conversation, that it would not be his fault if we met the enemy. He had left the Bosphorus in compliance with the Sultan's orders; but his private opinion, backed by his officers, was, that it would be madness to engage."

The incidents of the cruise are skilfully related, and afford a characteristic and original view of an operation upon which much stress was laid at the moment. The arrival off Constantinople of the Blonde, with the English ambassador, Sir Robert Gordon, and the memorable fête which ensued—as well as the various political considerations and local impressions resulting from this embassy—are severally and ably treated. The Russian campaigns are sketched in a summary and perspicuous manner: the author's voyage in the Blonde to Sevastopol—and his subsequent excursion through the theatre of war, passing by Adrianople to Schumla across the Balkan and back to Constantinople, adhering generally to the Russian line of operations, traversing their actual cantonments, and partaking their hospitality—are detailed with freshness and force. His return to Genoa affords further room for the exercise of no ordinary powers of observation.

Our very limited space prevents our bestowing an extended notice on this clever production as its merits would justify and invite. Mr. Slade's reflections, whether in discussing the characteristics and policy of the several people he visited or encountered, or the nature of the scenes he traversed—in describing events which fell under his own observation, or which he gathered from other sources, as well as in commenting upon the collateral topics incidental to his course of travel—are marked by a just discrimination and good sense. The respective reforms of Mahmoud and Mehemet—the effects of forced civilization—the pretensions and *res gestæ* of the Greeks—the

plague, the Russians, or the ladies—are handled with equal success. 'Respecting the Russian invading army and its resources, we have more especially derived the most valuable information from these volumes, which, on the whole, allowing for occasional lapses of style—the probable result of haste—do great honour to the talents and judgment of their author, who, we observe, has been recently appointed to the Victory.

Before concluding this notice, we will take the opportunity of rescuing Mr. Slade's reputation from any trace of a stigma which conjecture, in gasting about for the real culprit, had been erroneously led, by the similar direction of his travels, to whisper in the profession as attaching to him—we allude to the authorship of "Cavendish." This being an imputation in which, as applied to himself, no gentleman would be thought to acquiesce, we are happy to be enabled to defend Mr. Slade from the degrading affiliation of that spurious production.

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### *Twenty-Five Years in the RIFLE BRIGADE.*

THE Light Division has proved as prolific of print as of prowess; the Rifles contributing their full quota of both. If we enjoyed and commended the raucous humour and soldierlike execution of KINCAID and LEACH, we are no less moved to acknowledge the sober sense and graphic fidelity which distinguish the posthumous contribution of the late Quarter-Master SURTEES, whose character and services, as portrayed in these unassuming pages and acknowledged by the testimony of his superiors, claim the full need of our respect.

From the station of a private soldier, Mr. Surtees had the merit of having raised himself through the intervening gradations to the rank of Quarter-Master. Though a non-combatant, *ex-officio*, he continued, after a very prevalent fashion, both among the Lights and other Divisions of the army, to volunteer his person wherever powder could be smelt. He consequently participated in most of the active scenes of the war, from the expedition to Holland in 1799, to the second occupation of Paris; including the episodic brushes of Copenhagen, New Orleans, &c. His career, in point of distribution of service, nearly corresponds with the variegated "Life" of Colonel Leach. We need not recapitulate the busy and brilliant items.

Under the more sober pen of Mr. Surtees, the inexhaustible subject of the Peninsular war loses nothing of its interest. His descriptions, usually original, are conveyed in a style of veracious simplicity which at once guarantees and recommends them. His sentiments are always sound, manly, and soldierlike, with a tinge of piety becoming those whose lot is cast by flood and field. There is much novel anecdote and information dispersed through this volume. The Dutch business of 99, and Barossa, are fresh and faithful sketches. The author, indeed, writes much as the Dutch painter, but without their vulgarity.

We heartily recommend this book to all ranks: it is peculiarly suited both to instruct and amuse the intelligent amongst that class of the army from which the writer rose to rank and credit when living, and insured respect for his memory when his mortal wafers were done.

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### REGULATIONS for the use of YEOMANRY CORPS. \*By Lieut.-Col. De Roos.

THIS complete manual, comprising much more than the merely necessary instructions for the guidance of YEOMANRY CAVALRY, has been as judiciously executed as it is seasonably presented to that loyal and efficient body. There are indications at the present moment that the Yeomanry of these realms may at no distant period be called upon to co-operate with their comrades of the Regular Service in performing the home duties; nor could a more uniform and effectual course of preparatory or general training be adopted by that patriotic force than may be practised in conformity with the excellent compilation of Colonel De Roos.

The Yeomanry must at all times be guided by the existing regulations of the Cavalry; these, however, may be rendered more applicable to the former body by certain modifications, which, in the present instance, have been suitably accomplished, both with reference to the peculiar nature of the service, and the various organization and degrees of discipline of the Yeomanry corps themselves.

With this view, and embracing many other objects which will be better learned from the explicit Preface of the author, Colonel DE ROOS has abridged and adapted the Regulations for the formation and movements of the Cavalry, as last corrected by the Board, and now definitively adopted by the military authorities.

To these details, illustrated by numerous plates, are appended suggestions upon various points of discipline and economy, forms of Returns, Government Regulations specially addressed to the Yeomanry, offences and penalties; in short, every document with which it may be desirable that a Yeoman should be furnished. Some valuable notes on the measures to be pursued by Yeomanry, when called out in cases of riots or general disturbances, which formerly appeared in this Journal, are also introduced in the appendix, by permission of their author, Sir HUSSEY VIVIAN.

No Yeoman, whether officer or private, should be without this manual of his duties.

*An Historical and Practical Treatise upon ELEMENTAL LOCOMOTION, by means of Steam-Carriages on Common Roads. By Alex. Gordon, Civil Engineer. 8vo. 1832.*

The attention of many able engineers has of late been earnestly directed towards the improvement of loco-motive machines; and, as the full accomplishment of the several skilful projects now in hand must be felt through all departments of the state, we cannot but notice the progressive stages of its advance. It is, therefore, with great interest that we have perused the ideas of Mr. Gordon upon the subject of steam-conveyance.

We have already touched upon the advantages likely to accrue from the substitution of an inanimate for an animate power, as to an increase of food, at p. 92 of Part II. 1832; and it is a point which Mr. Gordon very strenuously insists upon. In a great commercial country like this, extending its ramifications to every branch of natural and artificial produce, it will be seen that a vast capital is sunk annually in the mere transport of marketable commodities: any means, therefore, that will accelerate the conveyance, and at the same time reduce the expense of carriage, bears upon its surface a great public gain. Besides the difference to individuals of the community, it is reckoned that, in the various departments of the revenue, the saving of expediture, by the substitution of inanimate for animate power, will also be immense. In the post-office alone, for instance, it will amount to upwards of half a million. Whilst, from the cheapness of food which the substitution will produce, the Army and Navy Estimates are expected to be essentially reduced. The author says,—

“ If, instead of 20,000 horses, we keep 30,000 fat oxen, butchers' meat will be always cheap to the operative classes, whilst the quantity of tallow will of course make candles cheap: and so many hides lower the price of leather, and of shoes, and all other articles made of leather. Or the same quantity of land may then keep 30,000 cows, the milk of which will make both butter and cheese cheaper to the poor, as well as the labouring manufacturer; all which articles are very considerable, and of material moment in the prices of our manufacturers, as they, in a great measure, work their trade to rise and fall in price, according to the cheapness of their materials and the necessities of life. The same may be said in favour of more sheep and woollen cloths.”

Malthus would smile at us for uttering a truism, in declaring that the quantity of commodities which the nation has hitherto enjoyed, has always been proportioned to the national industry. But our object is to assure him

that, from the prospective views of Mr. Gordon, Colonel Torrens, and others, we have nothing to fear from the increase of population, which he is so terrified at,—but to which, we understand, he is largely contributing. Much, however, can be done, before horse-draught is annihilated; and, when the spouters of the Commons will allow time for business to be attended to, we trust some revision of the Corn Laws will be considered, both on account of the shipping interests and the community. It is true, that the advantage of the landholders ought to be largely considered; yet their preponderant influence in the legislature should not be hostile to the benefit of every other class of the people. But, instead of healing the real evils of the state, we expect our patriots will merely lick the sores; and, instead of sifting the impolitic restrictions and prohibitions which fetter the national subsistence, they will busy themselves in breaking a few petty clerks, and clipping a few petty pensions.

In enforcing his arguments, Mr. Gordon produces a mass of very curious and entertaining matter upon horse-draught; he also clearly demonstrates the political and social benefits which arise from the employment of the new and mighty agent; and his descriptions are illustrated with lithographic plates of loco-motive engines, which are thereby rendered easy to every capacity. We therefore recommend the book to those officers who are “scrapping acquaintance” with the subject, and take our leave of the author, by submitting a specimen of his style and reasoning:—

“Let us consider, also, how far humanity is outraged by the present system of quick travelling. The short average life of stage-coach horses (three years only!) shows how dreadfully over-wrought and *out-wrought* they are by the great speed now in practice. Driven for eight or ten miles, with an oppressive weight, they tremble in every nerve. With nostrils distended, and sides moving in breathless agony, they can scarce, when unyoked, crawl to the stable. 'Tis true they are well fed; the interest of their owners secures that. They are over-well fed, in order that a super-natural energy may be exerted. The morrow comes when their galled withers are again to be wrung by the ill-cushioned collar, and the lumbering of the wheels. But we do not witness all the misery of the noble and generous steed. When the shades of night impend, the reproaches of the feeling, or the expostulations of the timid, traveller, no longer protect him from the lash; and the dread of Mr. Martin's Act ceases to effect for a time its beneficent purpose; when the stiffened joints—the cracked hoofs—the greasy legs—and stumbling gait of the worn-out animal, are all put into agonized motion by belabouring him *upon the raw!* The expression is Hibernian, but the brutality is our own. A few-ill gained pounds reconcile the enormity to the owner—and the cheapness and expedition of the conveyance give it public sanction; but humanity is outraged by the same: human sympathies are seared; and the noble precept, that ‘the merciful man is merciful to his beast,’ is trampled under foot.

“Thus, then, by substituting elementary for physical power, we have comfort for comparative inconvenience—the inside of an elegant apartment, where books, amusement, or general conversation may occupy agreeably the time, for the outside of a hard, unsafe stage conveyance, and exposure to all changes or varieties of atmosphere. Nay, we see no reason to prevent such improvement in steam-carriages as shall fit them up like steam-boats, the campaigning carriage of Napoleon, or the travelling long coach of the present Duke of Orleans, with beds and a furnished table. We have besides, safety for danger—accelerated speed without inhumanity—gain of time—of accommodation—of money—and, over and above all, as a non-consumer of food, we have by the substitution what will remove the host of Malthusian ills to a period of almost indefinite duration.”

*Treatise on STEAM NAVIGATION. By Robert Otway, Lieut. R.N., commanding his Majesty's Steam Vessel, Echo. 8vo. 1832.*

THE introduction of steam-vessels, and their general adoption, have followed each other so rapidly, that the superior despatch, regularity and security

of this new mode of conveyance are decidedly acknowledged. In such a vast innovation upon the former system of navigation, it is plain that there is much for the officer to learn, and there are but few teachers,—because, however the stable engine of a factory may admit of easy management, there is an additional knowledge required for the floating one. We are, therefore, glad that Lieutenant Otway has presented the Service with this unassuming but clever practical treatise,—because it is just the one which was much wanted,—and its form and price are such as to place it in every one's power. Called to the command of a steam-vessel, he dedicated his attention to the management of engines, boilers and furnaces; and, steering clear of theoretical disquisition, he clearly proves the truth of his title-page, by describing the various portions of the engine—the nature and properties of steam—the manner of its introduction into the cylinders—its condensation, and final discharge; together with a general account of the operations of the engine-room.

In enumerating the qualities which an officer ought to possess who would really command a steam-vessel, Lieutenant Otway smiles at those gentlemen who think of making themselves mechanics for the purpose, by an apprenticeship at a forge. “I have been led to this remark,” says he, “from having heard of officers who are actually at this moment wielding the sledge-hammer in certain factories of celebrity in the steam-engine department.” These remarks are particularly valuable in our approaching state towards a steam navy; and we have no doubt whatever that England will rise triumphant, as she always has done, in exemplifying the superiority of knowledge and tact to physical power.

It is true, that numbers of our officers are apprehensive that France will be vastly beforehand with us in the equipment of steam war-ships; but there seems to be no solid ground for the alarm. With our extensive means and industry we can always build a dozen engines for every one that the French can put out of hand,—for the materials, the manufacture, the invention, are substantially our own. We suppose the croakers were as much deceived as was the French legislative body by the absurd rant of General Lamarque, as spouted before the Chamber of Deputies in 1829. This gallant orator opened his speech by the advice that, in the event of a war with England, the first object should be to attack her commerce at all points: so thought Napoleon—a greater man than Lamarque. “If,” said the General, “the attack directed against commerce should not be sufficient, the enemy must then be grappled with hand to hand, and for this—steam will afford the means.” *Ah, mon General!* but how would you teach French sailors to grapple hand to hand with those of England? “Naval tactics,” he continued, “would be rendered useless. It will set aside the advantage of a windward position,—of breaking the line,—or doubling a line,—and of all those complicated evolutions, which, at Les Saintes, Aboukir, and Trafalgar, secured to our rivals triumphs which our mariners might otherwise have wrested from them.” The countrymen of Lamarque were much indebted to him for thus broadly acknowledging their naval inferiority; and it must have puzzled the Deputies to recollect when or where the French seamen showed such inclination to our cutlasses, boarding-pikes, or other “hand-to-hand” tricks. The peroration of the unhappy orator must be given in order to show what had “got his steam up” for the occasion: “Ah! had not he, who from the heights of Boulogne so long threatened England, rejected the offers made to him for four years by the American Fulton, it would not have been as a captive that he would have visited the banks of the Thames. Other destinies would then have been reserved for the world; and had Providence, which has willed that France should be free, brought back amongst us the ancient race of our kings, they would not have returned with a foreign chief, who, stripping our museums, violating capitulations, trampling on our national pride, proved to us, as Closterseven proved to our fathers, that the traditions of Punic faith had survived Carthage.”

We must conclude our notice of Lieutenant Otway's essay, by submitting his novel and interesting facts upon the boilers of steam-vessels : —

"The greatest attention is imperatively necessary relative to the boilers. Whilst at sea they require to be blown off at regular intervals, in order to prevent any accumulation of salt or other sediment. That is to say, where there are three boilers, for instance, one of them has to undergo this process within two hours; then another; and the third within the sixth hour. The engine-room is attended by six men, in addition to the engineers and their apprentices; four as stokers, and two as coal-trimmers: the four stokers relieve each other in succession at the end of every two hours, making two hours on and six hours off duty; the coal-trimmers are at watch and watch for four hours each. During the watch of each successive relief this operation is performed, and one of the fires raked off, and the bars cleared of clinkers, &c. The 'blowing off,' which is a matter of the greatest moment, is thus done: before opening the cocks of the blow-pipes, care must be taken that the 'feed' (the water destined to supply the place of that blown off) is on the boiler\*, and not only continued during the whole operation, but sufficiently long after the operation is completed to ensure the water in the boiler again attaining its proper height: that is, midway between the two gauge-cocks (but previous to blowing off the water should be run up as high as the upper gauge cock). By taking this precaution, a sufficiency of cold water will be supplied to allay the ebullition caused whilst in a boiling state, and enable the engineer to ascertain the true gauge of water. The valves of the blow-pipes are opened at the same time, when the steam within the boiler, by its pressure on the surface of the water, forces it from thence into the blow-pipes, and through the ship's bottom, carrying with it the sediment of the salt, &c., which the water, on being converted into steam, leaves behind, and is precipitated to the bottom. But, in the performance of this duty, the nicest care is requisite; and not more than six or eight inches depth of water should be suffered to escape, as the fire-flues, which lead through the centre of the boiler, and surrounded with water, might be left bare, in which case they would inevitably sustain damage of the most serious nature, from such exposure to the joint effects of fire-heat acting on the underside, and the pressure of steam on the upper. Such an exposure, if but for a few moments only, would effectually destroy the flues, and probably burst the boilers.

"The object, likewise, of 'blowing off' is to free the boilers from the sediment which is constantly forming, and which, lodging on the fire-flues and the bottom of the boilers, would, if suffered to accumulate, not only corrode the iron, but likewise have a tendency to form itself into a succession of thick layers of a very calcareous substance, which would prevent the heat of the fire from penetrating with sufficient force to keep the steam up: an increased consumption of coal would then follow, with a view to effertuate the latter. Hence, a neglect of this highly important operation would lead to the progressive destruction of the boilers, and to a wasteful expenditure of fuel at the same time.

"Where steam of a very superior elastic force is used, this accumulation is not so likely to take place, as under the influence of low-pressure steam; because there is not the same probability of the steam going down so low, as, by the admission of atmospheric air, to generate salt†. But independent of the above attention to the practice of clearing the boilers whilst the vessel is performing her voyage, as soon after her arrival in port as the diminished heat of the boilers will admit of it, the sub-engineer should himself go into each of them in rotation, examine most minutely, and see that every particle of this or any other sediment is carefully removed. The boilers cannot be kept too clean, whether inside or outside.

"That some of my brother-officers, in command of steam-vessels, may possibly have fallen under censure for a supposed neglect of this indispensable duty, I can readily imagine; but, that such an imputation has not been merited, I feel assured; especially those who have had the conveyance of the mails to and from the Medi-

\* This should never be altogether off, but a constant uniform supply, in proportion to the evaporation, kept up, by regulating the valves of the feed-pipe accordingly.

† "Dr. Ure, in his experiments for the discovery of the principles on which depend the formation of saline matter into crystalline masses, found that crystallization is effected by 'agitation' solely, and not by the chemical, nor by the mechanical effect of the surrounding air; and, certainly, the salts which are generated in the boilers would seem to corroborate this opinion."



terranean; and on them particularly would such imputation be most likely to fall, from the circumstance that, in a greater or less degree, an accumulation of the destructive sediment is always found in the boilers on their return to England. But, from my own personal experience, I well know that steam-vessels so employed have too little time allowed them in the various ports they touch at, to admit of the proper examination of the engines, and the cleaning of the boilers; or for the discovery and repair of any hidden defect which may have arisen on the passage."

**MECHANICAL IMPROVEMENTS connected with the ROYAL NAVY.** By *Joseph Bothway, R.N.* Third Edition. 8vo. 1833.

IN our Journal, Part I. for 1831, we noticed Mr. Bothway's ingenuity and success in having obtained two Vulcan medals and the large silver one from the Royal Society of Arts, in the years 1821, 1826, and 1829, for an easy bed to remove the sick and wounded in, - for an improved cat-block, - and for a method of securing a man-of-war's lower yards. In the present little volume, or rather *brochure*, the author, who is a gunner in the Royal Navy, has enumerated the various ideas which have struck him as to mechanical improvements in naval gear, from the year 1814 to 1830; and he has accompanied his descriptions with explanatory drawings. A perusal of these pages proves that Mr. Bothway to an observant spirit has added very considerable talent, - which is further shown, from many of his suggestions having already been adopted with advantage to the service; and others are under experiment. By the list of subscribers we are glad to observe that he will not experience pecuniary loss by his printing; though he seems to have gained but little in that way by his inventions, for, from public motives, he has neglected to avail himself of secrecy or patents. In justice to his exertions, we will subjoin a list of his proposals: -

1. A Method for destroying Powder in the Ship's Magazine, in the event of Fire.
2. A Cartridge for Great Guns.
3. To facilitate the Working of Carronades.
4. Machine for setting up a Ship's Lower-rigging.
5. A Cover for a Musket-lock.
6. An Anchor fitted with Span-shackles.
7. Metal Cat, and General Purpose Blocks.
8. A Machine for training Young Seamen to the use of the Lead while the Ship is stationary.
9. A Vent-stopper for Great Guns.
10. A New Method for slinging the Lower Yards, and also with Portable Metal Gear Blocks.
11. A Signal Haulyard-block, with Swivel.
12. Sheave working in the Mast on a Pivot, for Top and Top-gallant Haulyards or Ties.
13. To prevent the Hoards of the Top-gallant-mast being injured.
14. Metal Gun-tackle-blocks.
15. Hauling up Lower-deck Ports.
16. New Method for Top and Top-gallant-sheet Blocks.
17. Two Machines for the use of the Royal Naval Hospitals.
18. A Machine to facilitate the lifting of Carcases in the Slaughter-houses of the Victualling Department.

Of these, the one, which more immediately connected Mr. Bothway with the Service, as an improver, is the cat-block, which, by acting fairer to its work, in keeping the fall from bearing against the shell, causes a considerable reduction of men in *catting* the anchor, and must ultimately prove a great saving of rope.

## CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE PRINCIPAL PORTS AND STATIONS.

Portsmouth, March 20, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—My diary this time commences on the 23d February.

Feb. 23.—His Majesty's ship *Hyacinth*, of 18 guns, was this day commissioned by Commander F. P. Blackwood, who succeeded in getting all her seamen on board the same day,—an event which I apprehend has rarely, if ever occurred before: the fact is, through the praiseworthy and kind aid of a naval friend of Captain Blackwood's, the seamen had been selected for some days, were held in constant readiness, and as soon as the pendant was up, were shipped. The *Hyacinth* is sitting in the harbour, for the East Indies.

The amateur performance of the Military officers of the garrison, at Portsmouth theatre, was most admirably got up. The house was crowded to an overflow, and through the polite attentions of the officers every one was accommodated and appeared gratified: at the particular request of numerous individuals, the gentlemen were induced to repeat their performance on the 14th March, on which evening the comedy of 'The Rivals,' and the farce of the 'Merry Monarch,' were represented with equal success, and witnessed with the same delight. The Committee who undertook the management of the business, have generously appropriated the overplus of the expenses to charitable purposes, and their worthy Treasurer (Dr. Mahony, of the Fusiliers) sent 10*l.* the morning after the first performance, towards the relief of the widows and children of the four men who were unfortunately drowned at Haslar-ferry.

In consequence of the accident, a public meeting was convened at Gosport, and most numerously and respectably attended by the inhabitants, to take measures for considering the propriety of erecting a bridge across Haslar-lake. Resolutions were proposed and agreed to:—first, representing the necessity of the bridge; second, to request the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty would order one to be erected at the public expense, but if that Board should not consider themselves justified in putting the country to the charge, subscriptions to be entered into by the inhabitants of Gosport and the neighbouring towns to do it themselves, the recent loss of life having shown the absolute necessity of a bridge. A second meeting took place on the 1st March, when the addresses which had been prepared to the Government were submitted by William Grant, Esq. and recommended to be subscribed to by the residents and those interested in getting the bridge erected.

To the surprise of almost every inhabitant of Portsmouth, the house and premises in High-street, which for many years has been the residence of the Port-Admiral, were advertised to be sold by public auction on the 15th March in detached lots; it was afterwards postponed to the 29th March; but whether Government will then allow these capital premises to be taken out of their hands for the sake of realizing a few thousand pounds will then be known. I should hope the mansion and offices will yet be appropriated to the Lieutenant-Governor of the garrison, and his house sold, if money is the object to be attained.

A schooner called the 'James,' bound to St. Michael's, parted from her best bower-anchor at Spithead in a gale of wind which we had on the 15th February. On giving her chain upon the second anchor, that parted also, at about three fathoms from the ring. The schooner then drove towards the edge of the Horse shoal. The people on board, not imagining she had parted from her anchors, but thinking she was driving, veered away to the extent of seventy fathoms of chain cable, which luckily brought her up. To the astonishment of the master, the schooner's anchors were next day got up nearly a mile from the spot where she had been moored, having drifted that distance in the gale. This occurrence has occasioned some surprise among naval people here.

Her Majesty's birth-day this year occurring on Sunday, the 24th  
U. S. JOURN. No. 53, APRIL, 1833.

February, the customary demonstrations of respect from the Government authorities, were postponed to the next day, when the troops of the garrison were assembled on the lines and fired. His Majesty's ships *Victory* and *Excellent* saluted, at one o'clock, and the Royal Standard was hoisted the whole of the day at the Dockyard, Gun-wharf, Haslar-hospital, and Royal Clarence Victualling-wharf.

February 27.—The *Serpent*, (16,) Capt. Symonds, was taken into harbour in consequence of her bowsprit being sprung; it was replaced, and she sailed on the 2d March to the westward, without anchoring at Spithead.

On looking over the Naval estimates for 1833-4, it appears the Admiralty have granted the sum of 2000*l.* to Mr. T. T. Grant, for the invention and the superintendence of the construction of the great improvements relative to the bakery, which have taken place in the Victualling-yard at Gosport; this sum is very properly bestowed, as all parties, after looking through that building, and the way the biscuit-baking is now managed, must admit that Mr. Grant richly merits the reward. Thousands of pounds will be saved in the course of a few years, and what perhaps is more valuable in war, time and expedition in getting biscuit baked and sent to the fleet at Spithead, as well as having large quantities always in store for other ports. Your readers may probably recollect the admirable description of that establishment which appeared in the *United Service Journal* last year—to those who have not read it, I recommend a perusal, as the account is correct in every particular.

There is also in the Naval estimates a charge of 900*l.* for preparing a museum and library at the Naval Hospital at Plymouth, similar to the one at Haslar-hospital, and an annual allowance of 100*l.* to each for providing books, specimens, &c. It is to be hoped the Admiralty will grant them an assortment of books of general literature, instead of confining them principally to Medical and Philosophical works; then the 100*l.* a year will keep up the stock and pay for binding, repairs, &c. As the Library and Museum have been generously opened by the Admiralty Board to convalescent officers, a variety of books carefully selected would without question be a desideratum most beneficial to all parties. Unless some donation of this sort is made, 100*l.* per annum will go but a little way either in furnishing new works or specimens.

March 2.—His Majesty's ship *Warspite*, Captain Charles Talbot, with the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Baker, K.C.B. arrived this day from Rio. She left on the 13th January, and had a run home of only 48 days. The British squadron on the South American station were disposed of as follows: the *Algerine*, Honourable Capt. De Roos, refitting at Rio with all speed to take despatches to Rear-Admiral Warren at St. Helena. The *Tyne*, Capt. Hope, and *Clio*, Commander Onslow, were on their way to the Falkland Islands to take possession on behalf of the English Government: a dispute relative to the right of these islands had occurred between the Government of the United States and that of Buenos Ayres, and to settle the matter, two British men-of-war had been ordered to proceed and occupy in consequence of a prior claim. The *Dublin*, (Capt. Lord J. Townsend, the senior officer until Sir M. Seymour gets out,) *Rattlesnake*, and *Samarang*, were in the Pacific Ocean, and the *Pylades* in the River Plate. The *Samarang* and *Challenger* are ordered home, and may shortly be expected. A. Aston, Esq. late Chargé d'Affaires at the Brazils; his secretary, Mr. Scott; Mr. Pennell, late Vice-consul, and Mr. Dewal, a merchant, came home in the *Warspite*.

Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Baker struck his flag on the 3d March, and on the 15th was invested as a Knight Commander of the Bath by his Majesty at St. James's.

Captain Talbot brought home about 460,000 dollars on merchants' account. The *Warspite* did not get into harbour until the 11th March. She was detained at Spithead six days in consequence of foul winds, and there not being a King's steam-vessel in the port to tow her in; on the 8th March she

made an attempt, but did not succeed. It is to be hoped the Admiralty will now see the necessity of always having a steam-vessel adapted to *do* ships in and out of harbour, stationed at Portsmouth: in the instance of the *War-spice*, six or seven days' pay and victualling of her crew would have been saved to the public. She is stripping preparatory to being paid off and laid up in ordinary.\*

The *Flamer Steamer*, commanded by Lieutenant Bastard, R. N. came up on the 2d March, embarked Major Elliot, Capt. Hawley, and Lieut. Foreman, of the 51st Regiment, for conveyance to the head-quarters at Corfu, and went away on Sunday the 3d, to Falmouth, to take the Mediterranean mail of Wednesday, the 6th March: three other officers of the 51st Regiment, viz. Ensigns Leigh, Holden, and Hopwood, went overland.

Great activity prevails in the Dockyard among the ship-building department in getting ready for service the *Ganges*, *Edinburgh*, *Bellerophon*, *Vindictive*, *President*, and *Galatea*; some of them are quite prepared, and will be in a fit state to receive their crews in a very short period. The *Volage* is also nearly ready.

March 8.—His Majesty's ship *Conway* has detained and this day sent in a fine large Dutch East India ship, principally laden with tea. This frigate has been particularly active in detaining ships; and should a war take place after all said and done, and the vessels be made droits of Admiralty, a pretty considerable proportion will no doubt be awarded to the officers and crew. The seamen of the Dutch ships are quitting them very fast, whether from fear of being eventually made prisoners, or from not receiving pay very regularly, I cannot say; but they have discovered they can get back to Holland by entering on board American, Danish, or Swedish vessels which constantly trade from England to the Dutch ports. On the 11th March, the *Conway* came into the harbour to refit, and is expected to rejoin Sir P. Malcolm.

The Admiralty purpose doing away with the Semaphoro at Lump's-fort, which is situated on Southsea-beach, and substituting one on the Riggings-house of the Dockyard, to be handy to the Commander-in-chief's office. On the 14th March the lieutenant who is stationed at the Admiralty semaphoro in London came down to make arrangements about the erection. I trust it will not be the means of abolishing the one o'clock signal which is made from the tower on the Riggings-house; a description of which I send herewith.\*

The depots of the Fusiliers, 12th, 51st, 84th, and 86th Regiments, are still here. The Marquis of Huntley transport is expected, to convey a detachment of the last-named to Plymouth.

The system of practical gunnery on board H. M. S. *Excellent*, under the direction and superintendence of Captain Hastings, continues to improve and extend daily. I believe the Admiralty, with most praiseworthy consideration, direct all officers' plans for improving guns and gun-carriages, &c. &c. to be tried, if anything novel or beneficial is likely to accrue from the adoption, and provided the expense is not considerable, and the plan new. There are now, or have been, guns and gun-carriages on board suggested by Admiral Sir T. Hardy, General Miller, Major-General Sir Howard Douglas, the late Sir W. Congreve, and Captains Marshall and Pole, as well as the old gun and carriage which have been in use for years. I send you an account of what the armament of the *Excellent* was some short time ago:—1 gun with a pendulum, the invention of Sir Howard Douglas; 3 guns of General Miller's; 2 guns of Admiral Sir T. Hardy's; 1 gun of Commander Pole's; 15 guns of those commonly in use in H. M. ships; 2 guns of the late Sir W. Congreve's; and 1 gun of the French General Officer, the inventor of the large mortar, which I think was tried on board the *Dée* steamer. These were on the main, lower, and upper deck of the ship, and constantly used

\* This will appear hereafter.

occasional changes take place. From this statement, which I believe to be authentic, you will perceive no pains are spared to render this branch of service perfect, as far as variety of guns and gun-carriages are requisite; and also that the different gunners and first-class petty officers may see the various plans and inventions, and know how to apply and use them when they embark in sea-going ships. Twice a week the Lieutenants, Midshipmen, and part of the crew of the Excellent, with a large proportion of warranted gunners from the ships in ordinary, attend at the Fire-barn, on Southsea-common, to see the general process of filling shells, cartridges, rockets, and in fact every sort of laboratory work, and have matters explained by Captain Stevens, of the Royal Marine Artillery; and if one may judge from the interest excited on all hands to attain the knowledge so promulgated, a race of experienced gunners and gunners' crews will very shortly be fit for introduction into his Majesty's naval service.

The actual firing from the Excellent, at the different targets placed on the mud north of the Dockyard, must in a great measure depend on the state of the tide, but no opportunity is ever lost of doing so.

I conclude one specific system of gun-practice, and also one sort of gun and carriage, will eventually be adopted in the service, for however good it may be to *try* all inventions, the final *adoption* of them is a very different affair; and if half a dozen descriptions of guns and carriages are used in the Navy, it will be likely to puzzle some of the blue jackets, who, good honest souls! are special hands at working when they know what the object is, but apt to be bothered by new-fangled machines.

At the March monthly examination for Lieutenants, the following officers were found qualified in Navigation, &c.

Mr. John Foote, Mate . . . . .	} H. M. S. Warspite.
„ Charles Hougham Baker, Mate . . . . .	
„ John Tyssen, Acting Lieutenant . . . . .	
„ William Henry Bridge, Mate . . . . .	
„ John Ramsay, Mate . . . . .	
„ John Ross Ward, Mate . . . . .	} H. M. S. Castor.
„ Charles Bullen, Mate . . . . .	
„ B. C. Whyte, Midshipman . . . . .	
„ Herbert Lloyd Griffiths . . . . .	
„ Thomas Heard, Mate . . . . .	
„ John Henry Crang, Mate . . . . .	H. M. S. Talavera.
„ Robert Seppings Moore . . . . .	H. M. steam-ship Rhadamanthus.
„ Walter Grossett Everest . . . . .	H. M. C. Viper.
	} Midshipmen—no ship.

A new code of Naval Regulations and Instructions has within these few days been issued to his Majesty's ships; but I have not had an opportunity to peruse them with sufficient attention to point out the parts in which they differ from the old orders.

P. S.—Accounts have been received of the safe arrival of Sir Frederick Adam and suite at Madras, on the 27th of October, in the Lady Flora, Captain Ford, having taken her departure from this port last July. The passengers were so pleased with Captain Ford's conduct that they voted him a piece of plate, value 120 guineas. She spoke H. M. S. Magicienne, Captain Plumridge, off Ceylon, "all well," on her way to Madras. There has been some disturbance at Malacca, where the Magicienne had been blockading the river; but all was quiet when the Magicienne sailed. The disturbance arose from some of the native chiefs refusing to pay their tribute: 5000 troops had been sent to quell it.

Devonport, 20th March, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—As your time for publication draws nigh, I must inform you that on the 21st ult. the day after I last addressed you, H. M. S. Rover sailed again for the Mediterranean; and on the 25th, the Spartiate, with Sir M. Seymour's flag, also left us.—On Thursday, the 28th, the Rhadamanthus steamer returned from Scilly with the Forester in tow, which latter vessel, when taken into dock, was found to have knocked off her keel from stem to stern-post, and to have injured some planks and timbers in her bilge.—On Tuesday, the 1st of March, the Maitland transport arrived from Lisbon; and Lieutenant Sanders, the agent on board her, was ordered to join the Marquis of Huntley at Deptford. The Maitland takes provisions from hence and Portsmouth to Deptford, preparatory to her being discharged from the service.—The Deo, Salamander, and Flamer steam-ships, arrived on the 4th. The Griffon sailed on the 5th. The Serpent arrived on the 10th. The Comus sailed on the 12th, and the Serpent on the 13th.

An interesting experiment was put in practice in this dockyard a short time since, to prove the fallacy of the novel doctrine that a floating body conically shaped may be more easily immersed in water with the apex upward, than if it were reversed. A new buoy, accurately shaped, and which your naval readers know is formed like two hollow cones united at their base, was carefully marked round the centre, and loaded with iron until it sunk to the middle; it was then taken up and weighed against as much more iron as would exactly balance it, and on being put again into the water it appeared that the whole of the iron weighed against it was required to immerse the other half of the buoy, which then floated with its top just under the water's edge; thus proving that precisely the same weight was necessary to immerse the upper half of the buoy or cone with its apex uppermost as that required to sink the lower half or cone in the inverted position.

ALPHA.

Milford Haven, 17th March, 1833.

THE great gale at N. W., which occurred on the 20th of last month, has given a lamentable interest to this part of the kingdom. Our shores have been strewn with wrecks from St. David's Head to Lundy Island. The storm was more terrific than any gale in the memory of our oldest seamen. It came on by a sudden shift of wind at about 3 A.M., and blew instantly a furious hurricane, driving on shore and upsetting coasting vessels, dismasting huge ships, unroofing houses, tearing up mighty oaks, whirling the waves like a boiling cauldron, and spreading ravage in all directions. A noble East Indiaman and some other vessels were shivered to splinters upon the rocky coast near Fishguard and Ramsey Sound: every soul perished! A Sicilian brig, homeward bound, which had quitted Milford the day before, in attempting to return, was driven on shore *within the harbour*; yet, such was the fury of the tempest, in an instant she overset, the heel of the mainmast burst through the bottom, and her young captain, with six of his crew, were either drowned or beaten to pieces upon the crags, by a tremendous surf. An Irish brig drifted upon the sands at Freshwater West, near Lenny Head, and of all her crew but one poor fellow was saved! Off Swansea several vessels foundered, while a fine schooner was seen to upset, and drift away keel upwards, not one person on board of which escaped! A small sloop, called the Barleycorn, of Milford, disappeared during the gale, and has not since been heard of, having doubtless gone to the bottom, whereby two large families are left fatherless. A large American ship, from Charlestown, bound to Liverpool, reached Milford Haven without foremast or bowsprit, having drifted through the dangerous rocks called the Hats and Barrels in almost an unmanageable condition. The Vixen, Post-office steam-packet, from the wind changing with such extreme violence, carried away the head of her foremast, but performed the voyage from Ireland without further difficulty, and landed the public mails in safety. But the most afflicting case, perhaps, was that of

the *Erin*, a large steam-ship from London, bound to Dublin. Her voyage had been unfortunate from its commencement. On leaving the river Thames, she by some means got foul of an East Indiaman, and suffered damage. At Plymouth, a Lieutenant Watt quitted her to proceed by land to Holyhead, leaving his luggage on board for conveyance to Dublin. Several other passengers, however, disregarding the injury the vessel had sustained, embarked at Plymouth. During the dreadful gale that ensued, the *Erin* was seen by the *City of Waterford* steamer off Milford, about 30 miles N. W. of Lundy Island. She appeared to be in imminent danger, with her engines immoveable, and her foresail hanging over the bows; but with her mast apparently un-injured, and *topsail-yard across!* Why this superfluous weight had not been taken from aloft, in such a gale, can never now be ascertained, nor is there any means left to discover what occasioned the stoppage of her engines. We have been informed, however, that the *Erin* was built with a high fore-castle and poop, and *remarkably deep waisted*, so that upon shipping a heavy sea she might have experienced great difficulty in getting rid of the water. Indeed, a surge may have broken over the gunwale, injured the machinery, swamped the engine-room, driven the tattered foresail overboard, and filled the deep-waist deck between the poop and the fore-castle. This appears to have been her condition when seen by the *City of Waterford*, as she then lay rolling about like a log, with but three or four persons on the deck, from whence it may reasonably be inferred that a sea had already broken over her and swept away part of her crew and passengers. The effect of a second sea falling on board at such a moment must have been immediately fatal; and the unfortunate *Erin*, in all probability, foundered by such a catastrophe. The waves ran too high for the *City of Waterford* to render any assistance. But too certain evidence has been obtained to warrant our conjecture. The Lieut. Watt who, as before mentioned, saved his life by quitting the *Erin* at Plymouth, has since been in Pembrokeshire, and found one of his boxes washed on shore in St. Bride's Bay. A bed has also been picked up near Solva, addressed to *Captain Foote, Passenger by the Erin to Dublin*. Thus, therefore, has this large steamer, of nearly 400 tons, with engines of 160-horse power, together with all her crew and passengers, men, women, and children—fathers, mothers, and their offspring,

"All sunk into the depths, with bubbling groan,  
Without a grave, uncoffin'd, and unknown."

It is now fully determined that the Royal William, *the largest first-rate ship of the line ever built in Great Britain*, is to be launched at 4 P.M. on the 2nd of next month (April), being the anniversary of Nelson's victory at Copenhagen. The greatest interest is excited by this memorable event, not only in Pembrokeshire, but throughout the kingdom. No doubt it will be a spirit-stirring spectacle. Arrangements are making for several large parties to attend the ceremony. Captain Bullen, Superintendent of Pembroke-yard, will entertain a large assemblage of distinguished persons on board the Royal Sovereign yacht upon this occasion.

The *Xarifa* brig yacht, belonging to the Hon. Captain Greville, arrived at Milford on the 14th instant from Portsmouth, on her way to Madeira and the Caribbee Islands. This beautiful vessel forms the perfect *beau ideal* of naval architectural symmetry. The long low rakish look and airy tracery of Cooper's fanciful Water Witch, appear realized in the *Xarifa*; whilst within, all her equipments evince the simplicity and elegance of the proprietor's taste. It has never fallen to our lot to inspect a more beautiful vessel; and we are persuaded, notwithstanding Captain Chamier's hit at the Yacht Club, that had he seen the *Xarifa* he would have suppressed his sarcasm. She was built at Philadelphia expressly for the slave trade, but captured by the Pelorus on her first trip; and sent to England under name of the *Dispatch*, having originally been called the *Theresa Secunda*. During the late tremendous hurricane she was upon a lee shore off Brighton, but carried sail admirably, and worked herself out of the scrape without difficulty.

## GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL.

*Mr. Holdsworth's Revolving Rudder.*

Dartmouth, December 24, 1832.

MR. EDITOR,—I observe in your Journal of this month, a letter from Captain Nixon, R.N., respecting my revolving rudder, which he trusts that I shall not take amiss. I can assure him, that I should feel obliged by his observations, if I could be satisfied that those persons who see the objections which he makes to the use of my rudder at sea, could read my reply. But if such opportunity does not present itself to them, as men are more ready to catch at an objection than to take the trouble to make themselves masters of the real merits of any thing that is new to them, Captain Nixon will see, that, by raising such doubts, much mischief may sometimes be unintentionally done to an inventor.

It appears to Captain Nixon, that there are insurmountable objections to the adoption of my rudder for any but river craft. On these vessels, he thinks it may be used with the advantages I have anticipated. This is particularly satisfactory, because it shows, that he who has weighed the subject in every point of view, is convinced that my principle of action is correct, (as that is the same on all vessels, whether at sea or in rivers,) but that he anticipates difficulties for sea-going ships, which he thinks cannot be got over. I trust, however, that I shall be fortunate enough to remove them from his mind.

Captain Nixon's first objection is to what I have written, rather than to what I have done, as he expresses his conviction, that I have exaggerated the inconveniences arising from the present mode of hanging the rudder. I am not aware that I have done so; and if he will call to his recollection the simple fact, that rudders are wrenched off by the pintles and braces being broken, and that this arises from the bearding of the rudder being brought violently in contact with the stern-post, when struck by a sea, I ask nothing more. This mischief, he believes, would be prevented by bearding the post, as well as the rudder; he does not, however, remember, that if the ship is struck when scudding, such bearding would allow the rudder to come to a position at right angles with the keel, which must have the effect of making the blow more violent, and consequently more destructive. It is true, as Captain Nixon says, that this is the principal evil which I propose to remedy, but he does not appear to see, that, by finding a remedy for this evil, I produce all the beneficial results which those who are acquainted with the properties of steam-vessels will fully appreciate. •

One objection which Captain Nixon thinks insurmountable is the weight which the rudder will be upon the stern-frame of the vessel? to this I can safely reply, that this rudder will be much lighter than any at present in use; that the partners will rest upon, and may be secured to the head of the stern-post, which might take the whole weight, as it does at present, and that the stern-frame would be as free from that weight, as from that of the common rudder. A careful examination of the print, or of the models in the exhibition-room, in Adelaide-street, Strand, will confirm what I have stated. The position upon the partners, if collars are placed under the fid, could not be material; but if these were not found to work pleasantly, a few friction rollers might be used under the collars, of the most simple construction, which would last as long as the ship. The same models will show that the rudder will work with a wheel, without the slightest confusion in the ropes; that the tiller might be much shorter and lighter than those in ordinary use, as the different position of the axis on which the rudder moves is more favourable to the man at the helm. The apparatus of the wheel and



pinion, which is used in steam-vessels, would be still lighter than the wheel and tiller.

Captain Nixon's most serious objection is to the elongated keel, because it would not be safe if the ship struck abaft. She might certainly strike so hard upon the ground, as to break it off, but the ship would be safe; which an ordinary vessel, under similar circumstances, would not be; as the blow which would break off a piece of the keel, secured as this can be, with the rudder upon it, would beat an ordinary vessel's rudder off the post, injuring the pinches and braces, and the heel of the post as well, and would thereby leave her in a situation of great distress; whilst in a ship fitted with my rudder, it would only be necessary, if the rudder was injured, the moment she was in deep water, to withdraw the fid and let the rudder drop off, and ship another without the keel-piece, the absence of which would not endanger its security, which will be quite intelligible to those who are acquainted with the vessels of China, whose rudders are of the most clumsy construction, and yet are hung much less securely than mine, though upon the same principle, and without the keel-piece to keep them steady. It will be found that the advantage which mine possesses over the Chinese arises from the circumstance that mine is of the common European form, and fitted to make an entire revolution, whilst that of the Chinese can describe only half a circle. If Captain Nixon is not acquainted with these rudders, he will find the model of a junk so fitted, at the exhibition-room which I have mentioned, where he can compare it with mine. Or he may see several Chinese models at the Navy Office, which the man who has the care of the model-room will point out to him; and when he has inspected these, all fear of losing my rudder under ordinary circumstances of weather, though the ship should be deprived of that portion of her keel, will I think be removed from his mind.

Captain Nixon questions the ground of my belief that a vessel will steer better with my rudder, which is at a distance from the stern-post, than with that in common use. His remarks which follow in support of his doubts are so natural to a seaman of the present day, that I can quite enter into his ideas upon the subject. I am aware that it has for some time been believed, as he states, that if the water comes in between the bearding of the rudder and the stern-post, it is an obstacle to the ship's progress; that various means have been tried to overcome this supposed disadvantage; and although I could never find any man who attempted to prove that it made any perceptible difference, I fell into the same fashion; my own sailing-boat, which was built a few years ago, has her rudder fitted as nicely as the hinge of a Scotch snuff-box. I shall, however, alter it to my present mode, when I again prepare her for sea.

Captain Nixon, on inspecting my models, will see that the fore-part of the rudder is bearded to a fine edge, and being directly in the wake of the post, it can make but a very slight resistance, when, in a line with a keel; but when its position is altered, to change the course of the ship, in consequence of the situation of the axis on which it turns, the ship must at once be affected by it. He will see also why my rudder will act more powerfully than that in common use, the cause of which I will endeavour to explain. It is well known that when the helm is put hard a port, the head of the ship appears to turn towards the starboard hand; the truth being, that the stern inclines away from starboard to port, and in doing so, the water must act with less force, as the rudder recedes from it, and particularly in a vessel which has not a clean run; but with my rudder, as there is a large opening between it and the post, in proportion as the stern falls off more rapidly to port, will the water be drawn in an increasing current through that opening from the larboard side of the ship, pressing upon the starboard side of the rudder as it passes, by which the power of this rudder is increased beyond that of rudders in common use. The water which appears to lie inactive under the stern of an ordinary vessel will be drawn away from the post, the rudder being in that which may be said to be alive. This fact I have witnessed in a boat on

which I used my rudder, and the inspection of the model, with a fair consideration of the subject, will fully demonstrate the cause. I may add, that on so turning the rudder, the front edge, in place of being in the middle of the post, will be in line with that side of it, towards which the *steer* is moving, and that the water acts upon the rudder as the wind does upon the sails of a wind-mill, or the smoke upon the vanes of a jack in the chimney.

Captain Nixon is no doubt aware that the circle which a vessel describes in turning, greatly depends upon her length: if you can diminish that by the whole breadth of her rudder, and still keep the rudder in the same situation as if the post was upright, it seems reasonable that the keel should not only describe a smaller circle, but that the power of the rudder will be greater on account of its position, as an oar over the stern of a boat appears to turn her more easily, the farther the blade is extended behind it.

I trust I have met all the objections to the use of my rudder at sea, which are mentioned by Captain Nixon; but if I have failed in doing so, and he will point out the omissions, I shall be most happy to discuss the matter with him in any mode that may appear to him best adapted to accomplish the object we have in view; and when he reflects upon the rapid progress which steam-navigation is making, whether employed for the purpose of commerce or war, he will agree with me, that there is not any part of the vessel which has a greater demand upon the attention of those who have the prosperity of the naval service at heart, and who can apply their minds scientifically to the subject of shipping, than the rudder of the steam-vessel, which, if permitted to revolve, will allow the engines to propel her with equal velocity by either end which may be required by her commander; whether it be to advance by the head, or to make a sudden retreat by the stern, an advantage of which she is at present completely deprived.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

A. H. HOLDSWORTH.

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*The Author of "the Life of a Sailor" to his Critics and Commentators.*

MR. EDITOR,—In your last Number I perceive a review of the Life of a Sailor; and, with the exception of the trifling inaccuracies which you have detected, I have no reason to feel annoyed at your remarks. Your praise is of greater value than if you had unhesitatingly commended the whole work. But if I undertook the task of a reviewer of reviews, I might point out to you that you have fallen into the very error you censure in me.—For instance, in the *laughable* lunacy you have imagined a name, and printed it, when in my work only an initial appeared. Neither am I inclined to subscribe to your opinion relative to the sarcophagus. In Belzoni's Travels, 1st edition, are these words:—"It is a sarcophagus of the finest *Oriental alabaster*, nine feet five inches long," &c.; and to the third edition the following note (p. 366) is appended:—"Dr. Clarke, the Professor of Mineralogy at Cambridge, found the quality of the stone to be *Aragonitic*—much rarer than alabaster." Aragonite consists of carbonate of lime, with occasionally a little carbonate of strontia. The colours of Aragonite are greenish and pearl, often violet and green, in the middle, and arranged in the direction of the fibres; so that the longitudinal fibres are green, the transverse violet blue. The above is the character of pure Aragonite. Now Dr. Clarke does not say that the sarcophagus is pure Aragonite, but uses the generic term and says it is *Aragonitic*, in which is always included the finest species of alabaster. It is well known to every tyro in mineralogy, that stones of a veined and coloured appearance have been classed as alabaster, and are of the *Aragonitic* species of alabaster—pure alabaster being of a dull white colour, which any person who has seen the sarcophagus now in Sir John Soane's museum may remember is its character.

To the half-seas-over accusation I reply, that I was not on board *my ship* when it occurred. To Sydney instead of Thurlow, I plead guilty; but to the

Nun, I plead not guilty. My story relates to a gentleman now in New South Wales, who is invited to stay some years longer.

Once more allow me to thank you for noticing me at all, and to accept my best and warmest thanks for the praises you have bestowed and leniency you have observed. I have enclosed a letter in reply to that of Capt. Scott; assuring you that I shall not trespass on your columns at any future period, and only now fire the paper bullet as an exchange shot at my companion in arms.

I am, Mr. Editor, your very obliged Servant,

THE AUTHOR of the *Life of a Sailor*.

Paris, March 15, 1833.

TO CAPTAIN SCOTT, R.N.

SIR,—I have seen a letter written to the Editor of the *United Service Journal*, commenting upon the account given in the *Life of a Sailor* of the various conflagrations during our operations against the Americans in the Chesapeake, and in no very courteous manner accusing the author of being 'a foul blot' on an escutcheon. To answer this very unfortunate production I now resume my occupation, and commence with an exculpation of myself in regard to the character of Sir George Cockburn.

I defy you or any other man to trace in the *Life of a Sailor* one word in any way reflecting improperly upon the character of the Admiral. I have mentioned him as a man firm of purpose—strong in feeling, but *constrained* to sacrifice those feelings to a sense of duty; and you, Sir, who have been all your life a follower of Sir George, know as well as myself, or any other officer of the Navy, that his character stands 'sufficiently high in our estimation as scarcely to require the support of a pen not very much accustomed to place its owner's ideas in the clearest of all possible lights. If I had said that Sir George was an overbearing, cruel man, that he laughed while the shores of the Potomac blazed,—if I had said that he was a tyrant, and that he threatened publicly to flog his first-lieutenant, or any other such improbable events, then *you* might have been justified in the remarks you have made, and would have been the best person to vindicate his character.

Although you state that your friends drew your attention to the chapter in the *Life of a Sailor*, which occasioned your remarks, yet you have omitted to state that they approved of them. Allow me to correct your 'readings' a little. You say, "It is a libel on the service: instead of the exertions of the gallant chief and the brave men he commanded being a blot on the escutcheon of the arms of England as long as she exists, the foul blot rests with the man who, after a lapse of twenty years, insidiously casts upon a distinguished Admiral and his own brother officers a heap of stigmas alone suited to barbarians."

Why, Sir, who ever did cast the insidious stigmas? You have conjured up a phantom, and then dressed it to suit your own convenience: and I presume this phantom is one of the gallant *spirits* mentioned in the preceding sentence. "The *fault* of that villainous mode of warfare was never attributed to Sir George Cockburn;—on the contrary, it was expressly stated as a species of revenge *ordered* to be acted upon in consequence of the like aggressions having been practised by the Americans in the Canadas. "The disgraceful savage *mode of warfare*" (see p. 135, vol. ii.) is called the *blot* on our escutcheons as long as the arms of England may exist, and *not* the conduct of Sir George or the honourable and gallant spirits who executed the order. 'You have built a very fine house upon the sands,' and lo!—of course you know the rest.

Well, I congratulate the Americans with all my heart that my eyes deceived me; and I hope they found their houses untouched by their enemies. I am quite certain, from your statement, that we never did burn a house—that we never did steal the sheep, ducks, and geese; and I must have been dreaming when I thought I remembered a certain man in the

foretop of a frigate being exchanged for a much better man, merely because he knew how to drive geese. Mind, Sir, I do not doubt that you carried the money-bags,—the purser of course held a sinecure,—and that the *Admiral himself* did pay a price. As for the Baltimore “last current,” the ready Gazette, the reference, &c. &c., I of course never saw them; and I am very certain that most of my companions will subscribe to this remark, notwithstanding your letter which is now *lying* before me.

You make mountains of molehills—you speak always of *yourself* and the Admiral; but the next time you stand as Sampson's post with Argus's head, do allow your eyes to range a little beyond your own ship. When the Havannah's men landed in the Rappahannock, to filch some geese left as decoy ducks, and were taken themselves instead, do you think they carried a dollar bag, or asked for the Baltimore Gazette? When Dr. Bolinbroke's house was sacked, in real good style—(I have some of his books now)—do you imagine that we ran over the country to pay the poor medico, or left an equivalent for the plunder?—Not a bit of it, I promise you;—why we put the staircase clock in the midshipmen's berth, as a memento of *past time*, for it never went, and his knife and fork case adorned our buffet. Now pray, Sir, do undeceive the public. I assure you we are all labouring under a most serious delusion; for the public papers mentioned and reprobated the unnatural mode of warfare; and I, having always believed my eyes and ears, readily lent a credulous attention to their statements; and until your very able letter, with the beautiful quotation of Isaac Watts at the top, and the little Latin hit at the tail, appeared, upon my honor and word I did give credit to our having stolen bullocks, ducks, sheep, geese, &c., and likewise to our having practised Mr. Swing in America, very much to the astonishment of the natives, and very little to their satisfaction or remuneration.

As your friends directed your attention to the Life of a Sailor, allow me to direct it again, not only to that Life, but to the Life of Sir Peter Parker; then, perhaps, your credulity will be a little aroused at the escape of the Menelaus, and you will find that I have not *much* exaggerated the number of ships, the distance, or any of the circumstances. After you have read that Life; perhaps you will favour the public with another letter; and do continue the motto, for it is most applicable, and I hope will strike the reader as forcibly as it did myself, for that motto caused this reply.

Believe me yours very obliged,

THE AUTHOR OF THE LIFE OF A SAILOR.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL, AND TO THE  
YACHTMAN AFLOAT.

DEAR GENTLEMEN,—Allow me to trespass on the pages of the one and the patience of the other;—I have a right to the former, since they have sent to the world a very able pleasant letter, all about myself; and to the latter, because I have exercised my own patience in reading his letter three different times.

Now then you shall have “some of my honey divested of its gall.” Why, Mr. Yachtman afloat, you are just the man after my own mind; you appear fond of frolic and fun: and you think, with Dean Swift and myself, that “whoever makes the fewest persons uneasy is the best bred;” therefore I shall not make you uneasy, because I have no reason to do so, and because I would not return evil for good.

Your second paragraph, about his Majesty's uniform on his Majesty's service, I do not understand. I wrote the Life of a Sailor, and kept myself awake by so doing. If ever I want to sleep (yet cannot), I take a dose of my own opium, by reading some of my own sheets, and I always fall into gentle slumbers *between them*.—I tell you truly I cannot fancy at what you aim by that said second paragraph.

For the third paragraph, I regret to have fallen under your displeasure. I have only attacked Dr. Granville on account of his having drawn a parallel

between an executioner with a knout and a boatswain's mate; as I have had both cat and knout in my own hand, and seen the effect on men's backs, I cannot withdraw one word on that subject. I know I am correct; although I cannot say that I am feelingly alive either to the cut of the one on the back, or your counter cut for the other in the third paragraph.

I agree with you much better than with your Latin. I left my dictionary in England, and have been obliged to hunt up a translator;—a dead language is a *dead eye* to me; no lame man was ever more completely brought to a dead halt than I was at your "*Sero respicitur tellus*"—I wish you would *tell me* the meaning.

I commanded a cutter for six months during the winter off Orfordness, and I only run her on shore once, and then of course I laid the blame to the pilot;—but never mind; if I don't understand cutter sailing, I am quite *awake* to cutters, either on paper or afloat, and I therefore take your hint as it was meant.

Now, can you think me such a lout, notwithstanding my acknowledged ignorance, as to think that, because a man is a yachtman, he cannot be a good sailor and a jolly companion? I wish you could only see me on board of your own craft, and then perhaps you would be fully convinced that a man with my light heart could hardly construct a heavy work—(see the last paragraph but one in your letter)—"to be a proper vehicle for criticism or sarcasm."

Many a day may you live to sail your cutter, without another Hastings gibe; and when you have lived the life of a sailor to your heart's content, I hope you may be the author of another more amusing, less snarling, and, according to Scott, with more truth, than the one which has called forth your honey, your gall, and our correspondence.

Yours with much respect, as in duty bound,

THE AUTHOR.

### *Captain Peake on the Qualities of Ten-Gun Brigs.*

His Majesty's Dockyard, Portsmouth, March, 1833.

SIR,—The number of the "*Metropolitan Magazine*" for this month having again brought before the public the demerits of the ten-gun brigs, with that sort of spirit which cannot be misunderstood, I feel induced to trouble you with the following observations, which, should you deem worthy a place in your valuable Journal, will, I trust, set at rest, and I hope for ever, the point so far as relates to the safety of this description of vessel of war.

The ten-gun brigs were constructed by order of the Admiralty, for Channel service, and expressly for a lieutenant's command, to have the crew of a gun brig, a description of vessel found inadequate for the service. They were to be built as light as possible, and stow but six weeks' provisions of every description; in fact every other consideration was to give way to the quality of sailing. These directions were strictly attended to, and the launching weight of those first built, which was in 1808, did not exceed one hundred and thirty-five tons.

Instead, however, of the equipment of men and stores for which they were constructed, these vessels were, from the first, commissioned by commanders, with a complement of seventy-five men and six boys, and, with some exceptions, were stored and provisioned for ten or twelve weeks. Notwithstanding the disadvantages produced by these departures from the original plan, which can only be appreciated by those who are *really conversant in the science of naval architecture*, these delicate little vessels were described by the officers commanding, in their official reports, as fast sailers, weatherly, easy, good roadsters, stiff under canvas, and very safe vessels under all circumstances. Those which have been built within the last fifteen years have, from various causes, been increased in weight of hull at least thirty tons, a very considerable portion of which has been placed above the line of flotation, yet the official returns continue equally favourable as regards their safe and

easy qualities, although, as might be expected, they do not appear to be such fast vessels as they were originally; these assertions the following extracts from the sailing qualities of the brigs afternamed will confirm.

The "Calliope," Alexander M'Konnochie, Esq., Commander; paid off in 1815. At the end of the printed form, which is throughout filled up in the most favourable manner as regards her qualities for sailing, safety, and stability, is attached the following:—"The very superior qualities of the Calliope as a sea boat will be best appreciated by a reference to the services on which she has been employed, and the fact of the main rigging and the fore-topmast now got down having been the same with which she went to sea in 1808. This, when I joined her, was nearly the case throughout; but in March last, she was struck with lightning, and her mainmast shivered to the deck. Until June, 1814, she was constantly in the north sea, principally off the Scheldt; and in the course of several very severe winters, without accident, and without having ever been under the necessity of sacrificing anything to safety, she kept the sea, and her station in shore, when the finest men of war, frigates and others, were frequently reduced to the greatest distress. After being struck with lightning, we gained the port of Havannah, in Cuba, where we were bound with important dispatches, only by means of her performing every necessary manœuvre in the most satisfactory manner, without other after-sail than a close-reefed main top-sail set on a top-mast fastened to the stump of the mainmast, and the main try-sail."

"From the Rosario's, paid off in 1822.—Frederick Marryatt, Esq., Commander.

"Steers well, carries her helm a little a-weather, very easy as a roadster, and a very safe vessel under canvas, under all circumstances."

"From the Espoir's, paid off in 1831.—H. G. Greville, Esq., Commander.

"Steers easy, and stays well under topsails and courses, carries her helm a-weather, lies to easy in a heavy gale of wind under a close-reefed main top-sail; she rides easy at her anchors, and is stiff under sail."

Looking at these extracts, taken from official returns, from numerous similar reports, the whole of which state the capability of this description of vessel to carry sail, without a solitary remark applying to them as being *unsafe*; it is not, perhaps, venturing too far to *assert*, that the fault (if any does exist to render them *unsafe*) must rest with those who have commanded them, and not in the construction of the vessel—for what one of them has been found capable of performing, all the others would, if managed with equal skill.

The writer on naval papers for the Metropolitan, with an appearance of candour, admits that the ten-gun brigs are "pretty models, but not good ones, because they are too narrow for flush-decked vessels;" but if flush-decked or any other vessels are very stiff under canvas, and also weatherly, would it add to their good qualities to shorten them? but whether good models or not, the writer continues, "as *certain they constantly go down*." And he gives a list (thirteen) of those which have already foundered, with all the crew, in various parts of the world: in this list will be found the Drake, Cynthia, Jasper, Bermuda, Busiris, and Parthian, which have been wrecked on the shore, and the crews generally saved. Of some of the remainder of the vessels said to have foundered, may not such casualties have occurred to them, as does occasionally to other vessels, viz., by fire, or capture by a stronger force, and then destroyed? Such, I believe, was the end of the Redpole, a Falmouth packet.

The remark of the same writer, that these vessels were invaluable to the late Board of Admiralty, "as they not only increased their patronage, but, by occasionally going down with the officers, they to a certain extent reduced the number of claimants," is so *base* and *heartless*, that it excites no other feeling than disgust, and the conviction, that the man who can form such a low estimate of his fellow-men is himself capable of anything.

If seven or eight of these calumniated vessels have foundered in the course

of twenty-four years, and one hundred and seven have been built, surely the very few which have been so lost or unaccounted for, bear so small a portion to the whole, that it speaks volumes in their favour for safety; and their return into port from the stations they are employed upon, instead of being an event of uncertainty, as insinuated by the Metropolitan writer, may be judged quite the contrary.

The wisdom of the advisers of Sir James Graham, in inducing him to countenance the building of such of the vessels as were ordered, and not too far advanced, I cannot dispute; for as foreigners have introduced into their navies a larger description of vessel, as vessels of war, for purposes which these vessels were heretofore employed upon, it would be worse than supine to continue to build them; and of course the ten-gun brigs will and ought to disappear, precisely as the old gun-brigs disappeared, when these vessels were introduced into the service.

These brigs, when first introduced into the packet service, were viewed with jealous and prejudiced eyes by those who were interested to keep things as they were; they are now better appreciated, and are acknowledged as superior to and more efficient than the description of vessel they have superseded; in short, the ten-gun brigs, although far from perfect, were the best vessels of their size for many years as vessels of war, and being such, were perpetuated.

There is one more assertion which I must give the most direct denial to: not a single ten-gun brig was ever converted into a steam-vessel, neither do I believe their conversion to such a purpose was ever even contemplated. The vessels alluded to by the writer in the Metropolitan were built at Deptford and Woolwich, and named the African, Constance, Echo, Albion, Carron, and Columbia, vessels whose midship sections bear no resemblance to the ten-gun brigs, and they have but one dimension in common, which is, the main breadth: in short, they are wholly dissimilar, so much so, that the timber cut out for the ten-gun brigs in Woolwich yard would not mould for the steam-vessels, which are asserted to have been converted from ten-gun brigs.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

THOMAS LADD PEAKE, Captain R.N.

*Colonel Middleton on the relative effect of Brevet Rank in the King's and Company's Service.*

Cavalry Depot, Maidstone, 20th March, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—The attention of all officers connected with Indian affairs has been called to the recently published evidence given before the Military Committee of the House of Commons.

The evidence, however, of four officers has only yet been published to the world, viz. Major-General Sir Jasper Nicolls and Sir Thomas Reynell of the King's service, and Colonel Salmond and Major-General Sir John Malcolm of the East India Company's service.

It is not my intention to offer any comments on the vast difference of opinion, and that, too, on points of essential importance, which is so remarkable in the evidence of these four distinguished officers. I address you solely for the purpose of adverting to what I consider to be an erroneous opinion given in the evidence of Major-General Sir Jasper Nicolls, on the subject of brevet rank conferred in India on subalterns of fifteen years standing, and its relative effect as regards the interests of the officers of both services.

In the "Asiatic Journal" of the present month, (page 213,) Sir Jasper Nicolls is stated to have said, "that the effect of granting a brevet rank of captain to subalterns of the King's and Company's service of fifteen years standing, the witness does not see has any injurious effect upon either service, the rank being given with impartiality. It is of equal advantage to

King's as to Company's officers, if anything more beneficial to the former, their promotion being slower;" and in page 217, referring to Sir Thomas Reynell's evidence, it is stated, in respect to the grant of brevet rank to subalterns, this witness concurs with the preceding; the effect is felt triflingly, and is of little advantage to either service."

I consider the advantages of this rank to be exclusively, at least permanently, in favour of the Company's officers, and to be injurious in its operation as regards those of the King's. In order to illustrate my view on this subject, I shall here submit a case: supposing a subaltern belonging to each service, of the standing of fifteen years, receives the brevet rank of captain at the same time, the King's officer returning to Europe reverts of course to his simple rank of lieutenant, but succeeding subsequently to a troop or company he again goes back to India, where he then (although actually a captain) becomes junior in rank in that army to all the Company's brevet captains, whose senior he may have been as a brevet captain previous to his attaining that actual rank in the King's army.

I may be here told that an officer so circumstanced might also take rank from the original date of his commission as brevet captain on returning to India. I answer that such could not be the case, without subverting the regular course of seniority in his Majesty's army in India; as the assumption of any rank antecedent to the date of his captain's commission might and would be sure to give him seniority over older officers belonging to his own service: they, not having served previously in India as brevet captains, would only be permitted to rank from the date of their captains' commissions in the King's army; still they could not submit, nor could such an indignity be offered to his Majesty's commission, as to suppose that junior officers in their own service could assume a seniority over them by virtue of a rank not acknowledged or sanctioned in his Majesty's army. I maintain therefore, that brevet rank which India gives the officers of the Company's army, is a decided and permanent advantage over those of the King's, as it accelerates their subsequent promotion by brevet, until they attain the permanent rank of full colonels.

I believe that the foregoing observations are equally applicable as to the effect of a more recent system adopted in India; of conferring the local rank of colonels on King's lieutenant-colonels, to give them corresponding rank, during the time they continue in that country, with the Company's officers, who now become full colonels, as a matter of course, on succeeding to the command of regiments.

I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient humble servant,

CHARLES MIDDLETON, Lieutenant-Colonel.

### *Captain Napier on Naval and Military Governments.*

Purbrook Lodge, 6th March, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—I was fortunate to be in the House and heard the debate on Mr. Hume's motion for the abolition of naval and military sinecures, and I was sorry to observe that several members (who supported his motion), by an indiscreet avowal that Parliament, and not the King, ought to reward merit, furnished Ministers with an excuse for treating it as a great constitutional question, and thereby gained over many who would otherwise have voted with Mr. Hume.

Sir James Graham, in a very able speech, showed that there were only nine sinecures in the navy, costing the country little more than 4000*l.* a year, and that he had converted two yachts into efficient offices, by appointing their captains superintendents of Woolwich and Pembroke dockyards, and paid off the Irish yacht with the concurrence of the Lord Lieutenant. He also read the names of our best and most distinguished officers who had filled the situations of vice and rear-admirals of Great Britain; and I suppose, out of delicacy to his predecessor, omitted the name of an admiral



who had filled the office of major, lieutenant, and general of marines, and never saw a shot fired in his life; merely because he was a Lord of the Admiralty, and was preferred to Lord De Saumarez, who had been in four or five general actions. He was succeeded in the office of major-general by two other Lords of the Admiralty in succession, both distinguished officers, but junior, and not to be compared in point of service to Lord De Saumarez.

The Secretary at War went into various arguments to prove that the governors of forts and castles ought not to be abolished, because it was the only means the crown had of rewarding meritorious officers: and he also read a list of several officers on whom these sinecures had been lately conferred, and who, he showed, were deserving, but at the same time omitted others, and some of them in the House, who had governments conferred upon them in addition to regiments.

Now, sir, if it is absolutely necessary that these offices should be preserved for rewarding officers, is it not natural to expect that they should be conferred on naval and marine officers as well as military ones—which never does take place? The marines, particularly, are shut out from any reward whatever; therefore, if the naval and marine service can be carried on without sinecures, surely there is no good reason for preserving them in the army.

I would not abolish the offices of vice and rear-admirals of Great Britain, but I would render them efficient; I would confer them on the two senior naval Lords of the Admiralty, who ought to be frequently dispatched to inspect the fleet, and hoist the flag of vice or rear-admiral, not as a Board but in their individual capacity, and carry on a real instead of the nominal inspection which is done by a Board, and which never can be so efficient as the inspection of a Lord of the Admiralty in uniform, and with his flag flying; and the small salary attached to the office should be his indemnity for the expense attending such visits. The general, lieutenant, and major-general of marines, together with the few colonels, should be given to marine officers; they have neither regiments nor governorships to look forward to. When they arrive at the rank of general officer, they are sent to the right about; and surely these seven appointments would not be considered too great a reward for the whole marine corps, who have been sadly neglected under all administrations. The governorships of forts and castles—purely sinecures—ought to be entirely abolished; but as the Secretary at War declares they are intended for meritorious officers, in order to ensure that they should not go without their just reward, I would create the same number of unattached general officers, in addition to those already existing, which would effectually prevent the minister for the time being conferring sinecures on officers who already have regiments, and oblige them to seek out the most deserving officers, who are only receiving the pay of the rank they held when included in the brevet. As for real governments, such as Portsmouth and Plymouth, the governors should decidedly be resident, as much as the port-admirals are, and who cannot perform their duty by deputy.

Another argument made use of by the ministers in favour of sinecures was the power the House of Commons had of refusing the salary on the estimates being laid before them. On this I must observe that it would be a most disagreeable task for a naval or military man to give a silent vote for the salary against his conscience, or to have the alternative of bringing before the public the services of the sinecurist in comparison with those of others more deserving, but with less interest.

In the course of the debate an observation fell from the first Lord of the Admiralty which I am sure was very pleasing to naval men, viz., that he had reserved for the King's use two yachts, and that he would never think of reducing them, as it would be very hard if his present Majesty, being a naval King, should be deprived of the recreation which had been so much

enjoyed by his predecessors. I confess I was pleased to hear such an observation, for an idea is certainly abroad that the ministers have set their face against his Majesty's going afloat; and I feel satisfied nothing is more conducive to the well-being of the naval service, or to the encouragement of ship-building and seamen, than the occasional presence of royalty on an element that so particularly belongs to this country—it encourages gentlemen and noblemen to turn their minds to aquatic excursions, creates a rivalry amongst them, and a wish that their yachts should beat others. This brings forward men of talent to construct vessels, encourages shipwrights, and finally saves the government much expense in experiments. It is certainly owing in a great measure to the Yacht Club that so much attention has been lately paid to ship-building; and since the Royal Family have discontinued going afloat, the club has very much fallen off, and it requires the sunshine of Majesty to again revive it.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,  
 CHARLES NAPIER.

*Obnoxious Order issued to the Coast Guard.*

5th March, 1833.

MR. EDITOR.—From the very extensive circulation of your valuable Journal, and your known readiness to advocate the interests of the sister services, I am induced to forward a general memorandum bearing date 2d of January, 1833, and signed by Captain Bowles, R. N., Comptroller-General of the Coast Guard, to which, with this letter, I beg you will give a place in your columns.

It will be obvious to every one how much such a document must tend to create feelings of the utmost dissatisfaction, as well as deep regret, amongst the naval officers of every rank employed upon this service; and in referring to the first paragraph of it, viz. the false entries, &c. I beg to remark, that an officer so far committing himself would, by the existing regulations of the service, be amenable to a Court of Inquiry, and could not long escape the punishment so deservedly merited. I scarcely need comment upon the latter part of this obnoxious order, where the inspecting commanders are held responsible for the due execution of it, and consequently are reluctantly obliged to assemble the whole crew of each station, and, in the presence of their commanding officer, ask them if they are satisfied that the contents of their officer's journal is correct, and that the general memorandum in question has been complied with; and these men in many instances can neither read nor write. I could make many further remarks upon the impolicy of this order, as well as upon the indignant feeling that pervades the officers subject to it, but am fearful of trespassing too much upon the time of your readers: and in conclusion, I know I am only expressing the unanimous opinion, in stating that, from the high estimation in which the officers in general hold the character of the Comptroller-General, for his uniformly officerlike and gentlemanly behaviour to all those under his command, this general memorandum could not originally have emanated from him.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,  
 J. C., in the Coast Guard Service.

GENERAL MEMORANDUM.

Coast Guard Office, 2d January, 1833.

Several instances having recently occurred of chief officers making entries in their journals of the duty performed by themselves, and of the conferences said to have been held with their crews on their guards during the night, which on examination have been proved to be false, and such conduct being disgraceful and unbecoming the character of an officer, I have to call the attention of the inspecting commanders and chief officers to this subject; and in order to prevent a recurrence of this nature, to direct that in future the

chief officers do assemble their whole crew at one of the periods fixed on for signing the journal each day, and read to them the remarks of the preceding day, as well as the number of the guard each person had, the number of the patrol visited by the chief officer, the guard he was on at the time, and the hour of such visit or conference; and at the end of each journal the chief officer, chief boatman, and all the commissioned boatmen, are to certify that this memorandum has been complied with. And as the inspecting commander will be held responsible for the due execution of this order, he is, on his inspection of the stations under his command, to ascertain that the whole crew are satisfied that the entries made are correct.

(Signed.) WM. BOWLES.

To respective Inspecting Commanders.

*Collections in Natural History brought home in H. M. S. Sulphur.*

MR. EDITOR,—In perusing your Journal for last month, I was not a little astonished at observing, under the head of Portsmouth correspondence, a paragraph alluding to the specimens brought home under my charge in his Majesty's ship Sulphur—"Botany, conchology, mineralogy, and zoology, not particularly well preserved." I must beg leave to differ from your correspondent, with the exception of the zoological, which, from many of them having been nearly three years on board, and for four months previous to their being landed having been in the hold, may easily account to any nautical man or collector for their not being in the most perfect state; as for the mineralogical and conchological part, I am at a loss to comprehend what is meant; but as for the botanical, by far the most valuable part of the collection, I may safely say, that it was certainly in that state that any botanist could have arranged and classified it with ease. My own collection, a very minor one, which was preserved in the same manner, I presented to my esteemed friend and late preceptor Dr. Hooker, Professor of Botany, Glasgow, who expressed his high approbation both as to their state of preservation and value as rare plants.

Mr. Editor, I should not have troubled you with these remarks, but in justice I consider myself bound to relieve the character of my much-valued friend, Mr. Collie, the indefatigable collector and preserver, from this unfounded imputation.

Your most obedient servant,

J. WINGATE JOHNSTON, M. D.,

Late Surgeon of H. M. S. Sulphur.

92, Renfield-street, Glasgow,  
13th Feb. 1833.

*Bow Rudder.*

Payne's Hotel, Hand Court, Bedford Row, 14th March, 1833.

MR. EDITOR,—My attention has just been directed to a description of a bow rudder contained in your February Number, and signed W. Aldersey. I think it right to inform you and your numerous readers, that I took out a patent, some years since, for an invention precisely similar.

I have made several trials of this rudder attached to a sailing boat of four tons burden; these trials have completely answered my expectations: the vessel was found to be altogether more manageable, sailed much nearer the wind, with scarcely any lee-way; she went about in much less time, and I consider missing ways as almost impossible. With the wind aft, the rudder is fixed straight, acting as a cut-water, and diminishing the resistance against the bows. I will not occupy your space by enumerating other advantages, but shall be most happy to answer any inquiries that may be addressed to me.

Trusting to your kindness for the insertion of this,

I am, Mr. Editor, your obedient servant,

CHARLES HANSEN,

## ABRIDGED CORRESPONDENCE.

The overwhelming quantity of our Correspondence compels us to subject a portion to a digesting apparatus, by which we hope to extract the marrow, although at the sacrifice of a portion of sinew and some bone.

"A FRIEND OF JUSTICE" points out the iniquity of the late regulations affecting the widows of naval officers.—The same may be urged in the cases of the widows of army officers. They are subjects we have intended to discuss.

"W. M. L." recommends that the separate appointment of master in the navy should cease, and the duties be performed by the junior lieutenant. To effect this purpose, which W. M. L. conceives would be productive of considerable advantage to the executive branches of the service, the complement of all frigates and vessels under that class should be augmented by an additional lieutenant.

"A FRIEND TO THE NAVY" will perceive that he has been anticipated in his strictures upon "a most disgraceful document issued from the Coast Guard Office," which, we have reason to believe, will be investigated and redressed in the proper quarter.

The inattention to soldiers' comforts, and the threatenings of the great destroyer, as manifested by marching a party in Ireland, in the month of February, dressed in white linen trousers, has called forth "ATTENTION."

We have no doubt that "PLAIN TRUTH," with such of our readers as may be acquainted with the fact, will be quite satisfied with the antidote contained in our last Number to the letter entitled "March of Intellect at Malta."

We have devoted so many "small spaces" to the subject of service decorations, that we can only revert to the subject in acknowledgment of the communications from "AN OLD SOLDIER," and "W. C." We, however, freely insert the last paragraph of W. C.'s letter. "I read with pleasure in your February Number a letter relative to the establishment of a military fund for the provision of officers' widows and orphans. It is a measure that deserves your most warm, early, and active advocacy, and its neglect is a reflection upon the service."

"H. F." suggests, with reference to the letter from Sir Andrew Halliday upon the establishment of a Naval and Military Lunatic Asylum, that sailors and soldiers labouring under this awful affliction, should be provided for in a lunatic ward respectively at the Greenwich and Chelsea Hospitals.

"A LOOK-OUT MAN FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE NAVY" recommends attention to the safety tubes for ships proposed by Mr. Ralph Watson, a model of which may be seen at the National Gallery for Patent Inventions, Adelaide-street, Strand.

"FAIR PLAY" calls upon us to point out the impossibility of a military M.P., on full pay, attending in person in the councils of the state, without imposing his military duties on the other officers of the regiment to which he may belong. It is a point of some nicety—we may revert to it when times for such a discussion may be more favourable than the present.

"CREDE MIHI" complains of the injustice sustained by old lieutenant-colonels in the appointment of their juniors of that rank to be aide-de-camps to the King, obtaining thereby the rank of colonel, and consequently passing over their heads—also of the privileges on the score of rank and promotion conferred exclusively on officers belonging to the regiments of foot-guards.

"M. J." deploras the substitution of the blue frock coat, now worn in undress by officers of heavy cavalry, for the jacket formerly in use; and also deposes to the inconvenience of the stiff "forage cap."

"P—F—K—" asks why the d—l the cap lines of mounted infantry officers have been done away with?

We entertain no doubt that Sir James Graham is duly impressed with the snail-like pace of promotion in the royal marines, as illustrated in the letter addressed to him by "AN OFFICER OF THE CORPS ON HALF-PAY." We must, however, point out to the latter, that the clause wherein he states that,

"previously to any reduction being made in every other corps or regiment in the King's service, it is, and always has been, an invariable rule to fill all vacancies," is conceived in error, as we know to our cost.

To the following queries of "W. P. T.," we append replies:—

"1st. Is the sum arising from 'fees payable to the public on military commissions' annually credited in the public accounts? and if so under what head?"

"2nd. What is the average annual amount of the sum arising from the deduction from every officer's pay made at the regimental agent's, under the head of 'poundage'; to what applied, and where accounted for?"

The fees arising from military commissions are annually credited in the public accounts—thus—the principal portion is paid over to the secretaries of state, and credited in their office accounts towards the expenses of the office; another proportion is disposed of in like manner in the War-office, and appears in the printed army estimates of each session; and the third portion (*viz.*) for stamps is paid to the Stamp-office.

No deductions have been made by regimental agents, under the head of "poundage," since 1797, when pay and arrears were consolidated. A sum is allowed by the public for agency. EDITOR.

#### NOTICES TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS.

If we have again been compelled to postpone very many articles of acknowledged value, their contributors will, we doubt not, perceive that they have given place to subjects pressing for immediate discussion, or of historical interest to the United Service. We have wrought hard to bring up the arrears of our Correspondence, which still overflows, but which we hope to reduce materially, and to the satisfaction of our Correspondents, in our next Number. Considering the great mass of communications with which we are honoured, we again refer to the impossibility of our making specific, still less immediate replies to *all*—but we shall always endeavour to do so in *special* cases. It would be a great relief did our contributors retain copies of the minor articles sent to us, as much valuable time—which, Heaven knows, we can ill spare—is lost in seeking and returning such papers; yet we are unwilling to destroy what may be precious in the eyes, at least, of the writer.

H. will discover from the foregoing, if he have not already done so, that delay does not always mean rejection.

Σ— Yes; because, from experience, we feel confidence. Σ does not seem aware that in *every* former instance, as well as the last (in which we did not fail to recognize the source), we exercised our privilege—evidently to the unconscious satisfaction of Σ.

I.W.— (Porchester) has been received, and remains for our early attention. I.W.— will have perceived the unavoidable preoccupation of our late Numbers.

Our old friend, Le C<sup>de</sup>, is on the roster for next month. Not a corner to be found as yet.

We trust G. (St. Helier's) will not ascribe our silence to a disregard of his communication, which has been noted for insertion every month since its receipt, though still unavoidably omitted. We shall at all times be happy to hear from G. upon appropriate subjects.

R.D.M. (Master of a B.M.S.) is requested to inform us if at present ashore. We were unable to communicate with him before the period announced for his going to sea: we should be happy to do so, on ascertaining how.

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Notwithstanding the extent of our Reviews this month, a profusion of books and works of art await notice, which they shall receive, we trust, in our next.

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;  
OR,  
NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

AFFAIRS AT HOME AND ABROAD.

PROTRACTED debates in the House of Commons have retarded the pressing business before Parliament. The Irish Disturbance Suppression Bill, although it has passed through a Committee of the House, has not yet become law. The clauses relating to trial by courts martial have been so changed and qualified, as to leave little of the characteristics of that species of tribunal beside the profession of those to compose them. The efficacy of the remedy, if originally adapted to the desperate nature of the disease, has been allowed to evaporate in its preparation. Meantime, the evil becomes aggravated by delay and impunity.

These topics and others of current concern to the service are treated at length in another part of this Number.

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IN FRANCE, the predicament of the imprisoned Duchess de Berri, stated to be *enceinte*, and the struggles of party for ephemeral power in the Chambers and Ministry, principally engross attention.

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An accommodation has been effected, by the mediation and demonstrations of France and Russia, though not conjointly, between the Porte and Ibrahim Pacha; MEHEMET ALI retaining Syria—a splendid conquest. Upon this occasion RUSSIA has put herself forward as the voluntary protector and ally of TURKEY, which power, in her decadence, had no resource but to decide between the specious friendship of the former and the friendly menaces of the French, who carried their point; and the aid of Russia, which had dispatched a fleet and troops to the Bosphorus, was declined. The hollow truce of the antagonists of 1812 is not likely to be more firmly secured by this throwing of the handkerchief.

The part played by ENGLAND in this obvious crisis of the great interests of the East, is inscrutable. Her fleet blockades the ports of a friendly nation; and in seeking to ruin the commerce of HOLLAND, obstructs her own. The Dardanelles, however, and the Bosphorus are exempt from her vigilance, and Russia or France may consummate their ambitious views, without fear of her "intervention." *Tempora mutantur.*

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An attempt has been made to revive the spirits of those interested in the success of Don Pedro, by garbled accounts of a new victory obtained, on the 4th inst., over the forces of Don Miguel, with a loss to the latter of 600 men. It appears that General Sta. Martha having, on account of ill-health, as it is stated, been superseded in the command of the Portuguese forces by San Lorenzo, the War Minister, the latter signalized his accession to command by a combined *reconnaissance* on the position of the Pedrites, in the direction of the Foz. Having effected his purpose, he retired;—so says the Lisbon Gazette. Admiral Sastorius, it was said, had resigned his command—probably in disgust.

In corroboration of the general impression as to the desperate state of the invaders, we conclude with the following communication, which has just reached our hands, from a native correspondent at Oporto, whose language is retained with slight alterations:—

Oporto, March 2d, 1833.

EVENTS have fully realized my predictions; Don Pedro is reaping the fruit of his folly and ambition. He was led to believe by some flatterers that his presence in Portugal would suffice to conquer a crown, not for his daughter, but for himself; and now, to his great confusion, he is quite satisfied that the soldiers he ordered to be flogged at Rio Janeiro, for their desiring to be sent back to Portugal, have not forgotten neither the lashes nor the executioner. The army of Don Miguel would have perhaps abandoned their master for Donna Maria, but never for Don Pedro. Even the courtiers and myrmidons of Don Pedro are now of opinion that his pretending to command an army, the first time he saw one in his life, was the real cause of the failure of the expedition. All the *sorties* he planned failed; and the *échec* experienced by Solignac, on the 24th of January last, is also to be attributed to Don Pedro and his Adjutant-General Valdez, who crossed the wise dispositions of the General. If Don Pedro's ignorance in point of war has caused so many misfortunes, it is now proved that his usurping the Regency, the political discredit of the gentlemen he called to his council and ministry, his mean and despotical behaviour against those who dared to protest and denounce his ambitious plots, to re-assume a crown he had abdicated three times; his arbitrary and ill-timed subversion of all the ancient laws, were the only motives that determined a great number of Portuguese to stand by Don Miguel, instead of joining the partisans of Donna Maria, as they intended to do, if the expedition had landed under the command and direction of the patriotic leaders.

Now, Mr. Editor, General Solignac, Saldanha, Stubbs, Pacheco, and some other patriots, are endeavouring to repair the faults and blunders made by Don Pedro and his staff; and would to God, it be not too late, for the enemy's concentration is already too solid, and is pretty well flanked and garrisoned to be easily broken through; but whatever may be the result, a battle shall be fought, *depend upon it*,—a Culloden-day will give a crown to Donna Maria, or a tomb to her partisans, before Don Miguel may be able to take possession of our strong entrenchments. Perhaps Don Pedro will leave us before this day arrives; no matter, his absence will not be regretted.

This is, Mr. Editor, our situation—not a pleasant one—but in a civil war a trifle sometimes changes the face of a campaign.

Encouraged by your kindness in admitting my first letters, I dare to forward you this to inform you of our affairs, and confess myself,

Your most obedient Servant,

PORTUGUESE.

PANORAMA OF THE SIEGE OF ANTWERP.—Mr. Burford, the indefatigable panoramist, has completed a panoramic representation of the Siege of Antwerp, painted from actual observation. The view is taken from an eminence immediately behind the breaching battery—the time, the last day of the siege, immediately before the firing ceased. We took advantage of a private view of the Panorama, which appears faithful, and exhibits the usual skill of the painter in producing effect; though, from local circumstances, not to the same extent as we have observed in former exhibitions of a similar character by the same artist. The obscurity of the atmosphere—the proximity of the breaching battery to the high walls of the place—and the comparative tameness of the operations, which have, as it were, an air of languor and exhaustion towards the final moment, tend to diminish the expected spirit of the scene; while the “bloodshed and battery” department is hardly marked enough for the taste of amateurs and ladies who like horrors.

By the by, we observe that the “Description” drawn up to explain the view is principally taken from this Journal.

**NAVAL AND MILITARY LIBRARY AND MUSEUM.**—The anniversary general meeting of this institution took place on Saturday the 3d of March; the particulars are detailed in the printed report, since circulated by the Council. Plans of the building, now in progress of alteration and repair, in Middle Scotland-yard, Whitehall, have also been put into circulation; an account of this grant from the government has appeared in a former Number. The report states that it will be out of the builder's hands by the 10th of May. We shall give the earliest intimation of the period when it will re-open for the use of the members; and on that occasion we may again urge on the attention of the service, the utility and importance of the institution. We shall meanwhile continue our practice of inserting, as opportunities of space offer, the continued additions to its various departments.

Contributions received since our last publication:—

#### MODEL ROOM.

Capt. Hon. Alex. Jones, R.N.—Model of a Boat.  
Capt. C. B. H. Ross, C.B. R.N. Captain-Superintendent of Plymouth Dock Yard.—Model of Plymouth Breakwater; Model of a Ship's Hull, with double Sheers.

Lieut. Claudius Shaw, h. p. R. A.—Model of the City of Edinburgh, made from a map of a survey by himself.

#### LIBRARY.

The Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, through Capt. F. Beaufort, R.N., Hydrographer.—The following Charts, &c. published by the Admiralty:—Strait of Magellan, and Directions; Milford Haven; Nassau Harbour; Fleeming and Six Shilling Harbour, to supersede; Harbour of Valentia; English Channel, E. of Beachy Head; Schelde, Flushing to Antwerp; E. Schelde, Roompot to Bergen op Zoom; Ostende, Inner Roads; Entrance of the Schelde; Texel and Helder Channels, to supersede; North Sea Directions; British Light Houses; Abbreviations for Charts; Directions, Bar of Bayonne; Tables of Distances and Heights; Chagros, to supersede; Navy Bay, or Bay of Limon, to supersede.

Sir James M. Giegor, Bart. M.D. Director Gen. of Army Hospitals.—Major-Gen. Stewart's Letter to the Directors of the East India Company, 1 vol. 4to.; History of the Marhatta War, 1 vol. 4to.; Moor's Narrative, 1 vol. 4to.; Campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough, 1 vol. 8vo.; Seale on Cholera, pamphlet, 8vo.; Observations on Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War, pamphlet; Sir Rufane Donkin's Letter on the Cape of Good Hope, pamphlet.

Capt. W. Ramsay, R.N.—*Eléments de Géométrie*, avec des Notes, par A. M. Legendre, 1 vol. 8vo.

Lieut.-Colonel W. Campbell, late 23d Regt.—Three Copies of the Standing Orders as given out and enforced by the late Major-General Robert Crauford, for the use of the Light Division during the years 1809, 10, and 11, then serving under his command in the army of the Duke of Wellington,

edited by Brevet Major W. Campbell, 23d Regt. late D. A. Q. M. Gen. to the Light Division, and Capt. Shaw, 23d Regt. late A. B. C. to General Crauford, 12mo. London, 1814. •

Master Charles Piazzi Smyth.—Description of some Fossil Bones of the *Plincomurus* (accompanied by Sketches of the same), found near Bedford in January, 1833.

The Committee of the Society of Arts and Sciences.—Part I. of vol. 49 of the Transactions of the Society.

Board of Ordnance.—Nos. 26 and 61 of the Ordnance Map in continuation of the Trigonometrical Survey of Great Britain.

Lieut. A. T. Tulloch, R.N.—72 Numbers of Martyn's Dictionary of Natural History; an Engraving of the Roman Urn found in Carlton Wood, near Woolwich, 1809.

Mrs. Forster.—Parish's Flora of North America, 2 vols. 8vo. 1814.

Capt. J. Mangles, R.N.—Travels in Egypt, Nubia, Syria, and Asia Minor, by the Hon. C. L. M. Mangles and J. Mangles, Commanders in the Royal Navy, 1 vol. 8vo.

Capt. Macaulay, R.E.—Description of Chasse-loup de Loubat's System of Fortification, as executed at Alexandria, by an officer of the Corps of Royal Engineers.

General Fiad. Maitland.—Copy made by himself of the Survey of the Island of Martinique by the French Engineers, which was verified by the English Engineers when the island was in our possession.

S. Read, Esq. Foreman at Chatham Dock Yard.—Memoir on a New Armament for 42 and 46-gun frigates, pamphlet; Observations illustrative of the above, pamphlet, by S. Read, one of the Foremen of Chatham Dock Yard, and formerly of the School of Naval Architecture.

W. M. Hollis, Esq.—*Maritæ Bettini Recreaciones Mathematicarum*, 1 vol. folio, 1639.

Society of Antiquaries of Scotland.—Account of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, by Smellie, F.S.A., 2 vols. 4to. 1782 and 1784; *Archæologia Scotica*, 6 vols. and parts from 1782 to 1831.

Major H. Skelton, late 19th Light Dragoons.—*Military Manœuvres*, containing the Orders, &c. of the renowned General Wolfe, 1 vol. 8vo. 1770.

Lieut. A. B. Becker, R.N.—*The Nautical Magazine*, vol. i. 8vo. 1832.

#### MUSEUM.

Capt. Hon. Alex. Jones, R.N.—A Box of Shells.

Capt. A. Macdonald, h. p. 62d Regt.—An Arab Shield, used by a Chief of Handitt.

Lieut. H. P. Dicken, R.N.—A stuffed Ant-Eater; ditto Pelican; ditto Fish from Jamaica; three Bottles containing various Specimens in spirits.

Commander Fred. Rogers, R.N.—An Axe formed of brass, used in war by the ancient Britons, found in Cornwall.

Major H. W. Gordon, R.A.—A Marble Statue of Bhudda, from Rangoon, 3ft. 7in. high.

Major Cole, h. p. late 45th Regt.—Bow and Arrows used the South Sea Islanders.

Mr. John Nutland.—An African Pipe which belonged to Boobucker-Boob-Khaloom, commanding the party of Arabs that escorted the Mission under Dr. Oudney, Capt. Clapperton, and Major Donham, from Timipol, to El Kanemy, Sheikh of Bornou, in 1822-23.

Commander M. H. Sweny, R.N.—A Humming-Bird's Nest, containing two young ones; bunch of artificial Moss Roses, made with shells and moss.

The late Lieut. M. H. Hoctor, 59th Regt.—A Javanese Kris, scabbard sheathed with gold, blade and handle richly ornamented.

Lieut. Edw. Garrett, R.N.—A Snake contained in a bottle.



Capt. Peter Rainier, R.N.—Two Sea Gulls and two Terns, shot in the Tagus.

Capt John Smyth, R.E.—A small Alligator; an Armadillo; Wild-geese Hive; a Bird's Nest, bird unknown (supposed small owl), formed of the cotton of the silk-cotton tree, and taken from the interior of the roof of a sugar boiling house; Nest of a Humming Bird; six Sections of Nest of common American Wasp; Specimens of Gum of the Hiaivally; ditto of the Sliana, or Creeper of the Boarie.

John Potts, Esq. Q. M. 25th Regt.—Skin of an Alligator.

James Baikie, Esq. R.N.—A Snuff-Box made from an oak-beam of York Minster, after the fire of 1829.

Capt. W. P. Cumby, C. B., R.N.—Two specimens of Fossil Fish, from Heighington, county of Durham.

Lieut. A. T. Tulloch, R.N.—A Roman Urn, found in Carlton wood, Woolwich; a Coin found at the same time and place (1809); a part of the ship "Fame" (a South Sea Whaler), pierced by the horn of the Sea Unicorn; a Staff carried in front of the Chiefs of New Zealand in their processions; a specimen of Cloth made by natives of Madagascar.

Capt. John Norton, late 34th Regt.—"The Chucker," a quoit-shaped missile, used by the Maharrattas and other natives of the East Indies.

Lieut.-Col. Oldfield, R. E.—Model of a Canoe, made by an Esquimaux.

Lieut.-Col. W. Bush.—A Guinea of the reign of Queen Anne.

Capt H. S. Hodges, late 7th Drs.—Fifty Greek and Roman Coins (copper).

Capt R. Innes, h. p. 2d Drs.—A Talisman worn by an Arab Chief, and presented by him to N. S. Baldwin, Esq. late Consul-General of Egypt.

Major H. Skelton, late 19th Drs.—A Bullet found by Major Skelton on the Plains of Abraham, near Quebec.

Charles Wray, Esq. Chief Justice British Guiana—A Tube and Arrows used by the Indians of the Demerary and Essequibo Rivers for shooting small birds.

Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Baker, K.C.B.—A large case containing Entomological Specimens from the Brazil, many of which are rare and valuable; a Pair of Horns of the "Chobock," Cape of Good Hope.

#### LIST OF FLAG OFFICERS WHO HAVE RECEIVED THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL OFFICERS IN THE ROYAL MARINES SINCE THE FIRST ESTABLISHMENT.

GENERALS.	LIEUT.-GENERALS.	MAJOR-GENERALS.
1760 Hon. E. Boscawen	1760 Sir C. Saunders	Established 1794, after Lord Howe's Victory, 1st of June.
1761 Hon. John Forbes	1776 Sir H. Palliser	1794 Sir Alan Gardner
1790 Earl Howe	1780 Sir Thom's Pye	1809 Lord Collingwood
1790 Lieut. S. Barrington	1786 Hon. S. Barrington	1810 Sir R. Bickerton
1800 Lord Bridport	1789 Lord Bridport	1821 Sir G. Cockburn, present
1814 Earl St. Vincent	1800 Earl St. Vincent	Major-General.
1823 Duke of Clarence	1814 Sir R. Onslow	
1830 Sir R. Bickerton	1818 Sir R. Bickerton	
1832 Lord De Saumarez, present	1830 Sir Sydney Smith, present	
General.	Lieut.-General.	

#### LIST OF CAPTAINS OF THE ROYAL NAVY WHO HAVE RECEIVED THE APPOINTMENT OF COLONEL OF THE ROYAL MARINES SINCE THE FIRST ESTABLISHMENT.

1759 Sir Piercy Brett	Hon. G. Berkeley	1812 Pultney Malcolm
Hon. A. Keppel	1797 Sir A. S. Douglas	C. V. Peurose
Lord Howe	J. Duckworth, vice Douglas, deceased	James Bisset
1762 Sir T. Stanhope	1799 E. Thornborough	H. C. Fleming
Hon. A. Hervey	Sir W. G. Fairfax	1813 Hon. H. Hotham
1769 Hugh Pigot	Sir James Saumarez	George Burlton
1770 Hon. S. Barrington	1801 William Domett	Sir J. Rowley
1775 Thomas Graves	Sir Edward Pellew	Edward Codrington
Robert Digby	Sir T. Troubridge	1814 W. T. Lake
1777 Joshua Rowley	1804 George Martin	W. C. Fahie
1779 John Elliot	Sir Richard Strachan	Sir George Eyre
Hon. B. Walsingham	Sir W. S. Smith	John Talbot
William Hotham	1805 R. G. Keates	1819 W. H. Broughton
1780 Sir John Lindsay	Edward Buller	Sir Edward Berry
1787 Philip Cowey	Hon. Robert Stopford	William Prowse
George Bowyer	1807 William Lechmere	Thomas Baker
Hon. W. Cornwallis	Thomas Foley	1821 Thomas Harvey, vice Broughton, dec.
1790 Sir H. Parker	1808 Charles Boyle	Askew Hollis
1793 Hon. G. Murray	Sir T. Williams	Sir Edward Owen
Robert Linzee	William Hargood	George Scott
Sir James Wallace	Robert Moorsom	Sir Thomas Hardy
April	1809 Henry Curzon	1825 L. Hardyman
1794 Hon. W. Waldegrave	Sir C. Hamilton	Edward Brace
Thomas Fringle	1810 Ben. Hallowel	Sir J. Brenton
Sir Roger Curtis	Geo. J. Hope	T. W. Austin
July	Lord A. Beauclerk	1830 William Skipsey
1794 William Young	J. N. Morris	H. F. P. Digby
James Gambier	1811 W. J. Hope	Sir C. Cole
Lord W. Seymour	Lord H. Paulet	Hon. B. P. Bouverie, present
1796 Horatio Nelson	George Cockburn	Colonel.
Hon. T. Pakenham	1811 T. H. Linzee	

**A RETURN OF ALL VESSELS LOST THROUGH SHIPWRECK IN THE ROYAL NAVY** since January 1, 1816, to the latest period the same can be made out; stating likewise the Lives that were Preserved, and the Places where the Vessels were severally Lost.

Names of Vessels.	Lives preserved.	Where lost, and when.
Phoenix .....	All .....	Port Chesme, near Smyrna, 1816.
Dominica (sch.) ..	None; never heard of..	On her passage to the W. Indies, 1816.
Whiting (sch.) ...	All .....	Padstow Bay, Sept. 15, 1816.
Comus .....	Do .....	Coast of Newfoundland, Oct. 24, 1816.
Briseis .....	Do .....	West Indies, Nov. 5, 1816.
Tay .....	Do .....	Gulf of Mexico, Nov. 11, 1816.
Bermuda .....	Do .....	Near Tampico Bar, Nov. 16, 1816.
Misletoe (tender)..	None .....	Off Brighton, Jan. 1817.
Jasper .....	{ None; except Capt. Ca- rew, who was on shore }	In Plymouth Sound, Jan. 20, 1817.
Telegraph .....	All .....	Ditto, ditto.
Alceste .....	Do .....	Straits of Gaspar, Feb. 8, 1817.
Julia .....	29 out of 84 .....	At Tristan d'Acunha, Oct. 2, 1817.
Martin .....	All .....	West Coast of Ireland, Dec. 8, 1817.
Porcupine .....	Do .....	Bahamas, 1817.
Shark .....	Do .....	Port Royal Harbour, Jan. 3, 1818.
Carron .....	Do., except 18 .....	Bay of Bengal, July 6, 1820.
Speedwell, R.C. ..	All .....	Near Fraserburgh, Feb. 1, 1819.
Erne .....	Do .....	Off Cape de Verd Islands, June 1, 1819.
Vigilant, R.C. ...	Do .....	In Torbay, Dec. 1819.
Hardwick, R.C. ...	Do .....	Dundrum Bay, Oct. 1820.
Sprightly, R.C. ...	Do .....	Blacknor (Portland), Jan. 1821.
Confiance .....	{ None, except five men who were not on board }	Coast of Ireland, April, 1822.
Drake .....	All, except 20 .....	Newfoundland, June 23, 1822.
Ranger, R.C. ....	{ None, except seven men who were not on board }	Hasbro' Gap, Oct. 13, 1822.
Racehorse .....	All, except five .....	Off the Isle of Man, Dec. 14, 1822.
Arab .....	None; never heard of ..	Coast of Ireland, Dec. 1823.
Columbine .....	All, except two .....	Island of Sapienza, Jan. 25, 1824.
Dwarf .....	All .....	Kingstown Harb., Dubl., Mar. 3, 1824.
Delight .....	None; never heard of ..	Off the Mauritius, 1824.
Partridge .....	All .....	Island of Ulic, Nov. 1824.
Fury .....	Do .....	Polar Seas, Aug. 5, 1825.
Algerine .....	None; never heard of ..	Foundered in the Mediterranean, 1826.
Martin .....	Do. do. ....	East Indies, 1826.
Magpie .....	Do. except two .....	Off Cuba, Aug. 27, 1826.
Nimrod .....	All .....	Off Holyhead, Jan. 1827.
Cynthia .....	Do .....	Barbadoes, 1827.
Hearty (packet) ..	None; never heard of ..	West Indies, 1827.
Redwing .....	Do. do. ....	On the Coast of Africa, 1827.
Cambrian .....	All .....	Off Caraboussa, 1828.
Union (sch.) ....	Do. except six .....	{ Off Rose Island, New Providence, Mar. 17, 1828.
Parthian .....	All .....	Off the Coast of Egypt, May 15, 1828.
Acorn .....	None; never heard of ..	Coast of North America, 1828.
Contest .....	Do. do. ....	Ditto, ditto.
Jasper .....	All .....	Santa Marta, Oct. 11, 1828.
Redpole (packet) ..	None; never heard of ..	{ Returning to England from the Bra- zils, 1828.
Kangaroo .....	All .....	{ On the Hogstier, off Cuba, Dec. 18, 1828.
Nightingale .....	Do .....	Off South Yarmouth, Feb. 7, 1829.
Ariel (packet) ....	None; never heard of ..	Off the Coast of N. Amer. 1828 or 1829.
Myrtle (packet) ..	All .....	Coast of North America, April 3, 1829.
Thetis .....	Do. except 20 .....	On Cape Frio, Dec. 5, 1830.
Monkey (tender) ..	All .....	Bar of Tampico, May 13, 1831.
Recruit (packet) ..	None; never heard of ..	{ On the passage from Halifax to Eng- land, 1832.

# STAFF AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE KING'S FORCES AND THOSE OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY ON THE BENGAL ESTABLISHMENT.

## GENERAL STAFF.

His Excellency General Sir Edward Barnes, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India.—Maj.-Gen. James Watson, C.B. (H.M.S.), Presidency Div.; Maj.-Gen. Sir S.F. Wittingham, K.C.B. and K.C.H. (do.), Meerutt Div.; Maj.-Gen. Sir J.W. Adams, K.C.B., Sirhind do.; Brig.-Gen. G. Carpenter, Cawnpore, do.; Brig.-Gen. John N. Smith, Saugor, do.; Brig.-Gen. J. O'Halloran, C.B., Dinapore, do.; Brig.-Gen. Martin White, Benares, do.; Brigadier David Ximenes, (H.M.S.) Meerutt; Brigadier John Daniell, (H.M.S.) Cawnpore; Brigadier J. Burnet, C.B., Eastern frontier; Brigadier J. R. Lumley, Meywar field force; Brigadier E. P. Wilson, Rajpootana field force; Brigadier Wm. Richards, C.B., Agra and Muttra frontier; Brigadier A. Duncan, Malwah field force; Brigadier R. Patton, C.B., Oude; Brigadier C. Browne, C.B., Dam Dum; Brigadier G. R. Penny, Barrackpore; Brigadier Col. C. S. Fagan, C.B., Rohilcund; Brigadier Edm. Cartwright, Delhi; Com. Gar. Lieut.-General Bennet Marley, Allahabad; Lieut.-Col. W. Chas. L. Bird, Buxar; Agra (no appointment); Col. Robert Townes, C.B., Adj. Gen. of the King's Troops; Col. Sir Jeremiah Dickson, K.C.B., Qr.-Mas.-Gen. of do.; Major George Brinow, Brigade-Major of do.

## PERSONAL STAFF TO THE RIGHT. HON. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Thos. Pakenham, Esq., Private Secretary; Capt. Rich. Benson (11th N. I.), Military Secretary and Aide-de-Camp; Major Hugh Caldwell (49th N. I.), Capt. Henry Mansell (H. M. 14th Foot), Capt. Ant. Troyer (H. M. S.), Capt. E. Ross (H. M. 54th Foot), Capt. John Byrne (H.M.S.) Aides-de-Camp; Surgeon John Turner.

## PERSONAL STAFF TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Lieut.-Col. C. H. Churchill (H.M.S.), Military Secretary and Aide-de-Camp; Lieut. W. M. Ramsay (62d N. I.), Persian Interpreter and Aide-de-Camp; Lieut. R. Faykes (H.M.S.); Lieut. W. E. F. Barnes, (H.M.S.); Assist.-Surg. A. Wood, M.D. (do.), Surgeon.

## QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Col. Robert Stevenson, C.B., Qr.-Mas.-Gen., Presidency; Lieut.-Col. E. Barton, Dep. do., Cawnpore; Major J. N. Jackson, 45th N. I., Assist. do., Presidency; Capt. W. Garden, 38th do. do., Karnaool.

Dep.-Assist.-Qr.-Masters-Gen., 1st class; Capt. R. Bercher, 62d N. I., Cawnpore; Capt. F. C. Robb, 22d do., Saugor; Lieut. Thos. Fisher, 48th do., Sylhet; Capt. J. G. Drummond, 6th do.

Do. do., 2d class: Capt. John Patan, 58th do., Neemuch.

## ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Lieut.-Col. W. S. Beatson, 10th L. C., Adj.-Gen. of the Army; Major W. Pasmore, 19th N. I., Dep. do.; Capt. P. Craigie, 38th do., Assist. do.

Assistants Adjutant-General.—Capt. J. H. McKinlay, 63d N. I., Cawnpore division; Capt. D. D. Anderson, 29th do., Sirhind do.; Capt. G. D. Stoddart, 8th L. C., Meerutt do.; Capt. R. Bayldon, 71st N. I., Benares do.

Deputy Assistants Adjutant-General.—Capt. N. Penny, 69th N. I., Dinapore; Presidency (no appointment); Capt. J. D. Douglas, 53d do., Saugor.

Brigade-Majors.—Capt. E. A. Campbell, 3d L. C., Meerutt; Capt. H. Hay, 2d do., Rohilcund; Lieut. C. D. Dawkins, 2d L. C., Meywar field force; Capt. D. Thompson, 56th N. I., Muttra; Rajpootana field force (no appointment); Capt. W. Parker, 10th L. C., Malwah field force; Capt. J. Fitzgerald, 1st L. C., Oude; Capt. W. Ramsey, 41st N. I., Delhi; Capt. L. N. Hull, 16th do., Cawnpore; Lieut. W. G. Cooper, 71st do., Barrackpore; Eastern frontier (no appointment); Lieut. Wm. Edm. Hay, Euro. Regt., Agra; Lieut. Alfred Arabin, 7th N. I.; Lieut. R. Wille, 6th N. I.

## AUDITOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Col. J. A. P. MacGregor, 54th N. I., Military Auditor-General; Major W. Kennedy, 8th do., Deputy do.; Capt. B. Armstrong, 73d do., 1st Assist. Military Aud. Gen.; Capt. H. B. Henderson, 8th do., 2d do. do.

## PAY DEPARTMENT.

Lieut. Jas. Higginson, 58th N. I., Paymaster, Pres., &c.

Deputy-Paymasters.—Major J. Thompson, 31st N. I., Dinapore; Lieut. H. Clayton, 4th Cav., Benares; Capt. H. L. Werrall, 1st do., Cawnpore; Capt. W. Turner, 54th N. I., Muttra; Lieut. the Hon. H. Gordon, 23d do., Meerutt; Capt. J. Fagan, 9th do., Rajpootana.

Family Money and Native Pensioners.—Capt. R. W. Poyson, 47th N. I., Agent for Family Money, Barrackpore; Paym. of Pensions in Oude (no appointment); Lieut.

B. Bygrave, 5th do. Paym. Nat. Pens., Allahabad; Capt. J. Hoggan, 53d do., do. do., Haupper; Capt. A. Goldie, 47th do. Sup. and Paym. of lav. for the stations of Benares, Dinapore, and Monghyr.

#### JUDGE ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Lieut.-Col. Sir J. Bryant, Kt., 65th N.I., Judge-Advocate-General.

Deputies Judge-Advocate General.—Capt. Nath. Jones, 57th N. I., Cawnpore division; Capt. J. S. H. Weston, 31st do., Meerutt do.; Capt. W. Hough, 48th do., Sirhind do.; Lieut. R. J. H. Birch, 17th do., Presidency do.; Lieut. C. G. Ross, 19th do., Neemuch do.; Capt. T. Angelo, 7th L. C., Dinapore do.; Capt. Charles Rogers, 20th N. I., Saugor do.

#### SURVEYOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Capt. J. Everest, Artillery, Surveyor-General; Capt. Jas. Bedford, 48th N. I., Deputy do.

#### COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.

Lieut.-Col. Sir R. H. Cunliffe, Knt., Commissary-General, Presidency; Major H. Edm. Peach, Deputy Commissary-Gen., Cawnpore.

Assistant Commissaries General, 1st Class.—Major John Taylor, 19th N. I., Meerutt; Capt. W. Barnett, 53d do., Nusseerabad; Capt. W. Burton, 4th Cav., Cawnpore.

2d Class.—Capt. J. Satchwell, 29th N. I. (Timber Dept.), Bareilly; Capt. Jas. Parsons, 50th do., Supervisor Hissar Est.; Capt. W. J. Thompson, 12th do. Kurnaul.

Deputy Assistant Commissaries-General, 1st Class.—Capt. Wm. Gregory, 61st N. I., Saugor div.; Lieut. Geo. Huish, 26th do., Benares; Lieut. Chas. J. Lewes, 50th do., Mhow; Capt. F. T. Boyd, 65th do., Hissar Est.

2d Class.—Capt. F. Hawkins, 38th do., Presidency div.; Lieut. H. R. Osborne, 54th do., Agra; Capt. W. J. Gairdner, 14th do., Dacca.

Sub-Assistant Commissaries General.—Lieut. D. Williams, 45th N. I., Arracan; Lieut. Henry Doveton, 4th do., Berhampore; Lieut. W. Brownlow, 46th do., Allahabad; Lieut. F. R. Oldfield, 25th do., Bareilly; Lieut. W. Foley, 10th do., Neemuch; Lieut. Alex. Watt, 27th do., Cawnpore; Lieut. James Ramsay, 35th do., Meerutt; Capt. J. G. Tudgr, 46th do.; Lieut. C. Haldane, 32d do.; Lieut. R. Woodward, 2d do.; Lieut. W. Jones, 3d do.

#### DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS.

LOWER PROVINCES.—Lieut.-Col. R. Tickell, Eng. Superintendent; Capt. W. R. Fitzgerald, do., ex-officer, Fort William; Capt. J. R. Colnett, 17th N. I., barr. master, do.; Capt. J. W. Patton, 37th do. ex-officer,

1st or Dum Dum div.; 2d or Berhampore do. (no appointment); Capt. J. H. Warner, Pension, assist. at Baulah; Capt. Wm. Sage, 48th N. I., do. 3d or Dinapore, do.; Lieut. W. H. Terranean, 24th N. I. do. 18th or Dacca, do.; Capt. H. R. Murray, 73d do. assist. at Burrisaual.

NORTH WESTERN PROVINCES.—Major J. Taylor, Eng. Superintendent; Capt. J. T. Boileau, do., ex-officer 10th or Agra div.; Capt. R. M. Mullin, 44th N. I. do. 11th or Meerutt, do.; Lieut. W. H. Graham, Eng. assist. do. do.; Lieut. H. Goodwyn, do., ex-officer, 12th or Kurnaul do.; Lieut. F. Abbott, do. do., Neemuch, do.; Lieut. B. Y. Reilly, do. do., 13th or Rajpootana, do.; Lieut. J. W. Robertson, do., do. Mhow do.; Capt. H. De Bude, do. garr. and ex. officer Delhi, do.

CENTRAL PROVINCES.—Superintendent (no appointment); do. 4th or Ghazepore div. (no appointment); Capt. W. Grant, 67th N. I. do. 5th or Secrole do.; Capt. E. J. Smith, Eng. ex. officer, 6th or Allahabad do.; Edw. Sanders, do. do. 7th or Cawnpore do.; Lieut. G. T. Greene, do. do. 8th or Rohilcund do.; 9th or Bundelcund do. (no appointment); Lieut. W. Buttanshaw, 20th N. I. do. 14th or Saugor do.; Lieut. E. Swetenham, Eng. do. Kemaon do.

CUTTACK PROVINCE.—Major J. Cheape, Eng. Superintendent; Capt. W. Bell, Art. Ex. officer, Burdwan road; Capt. G. A. Vetch, 54th N. I., Sup. Burdwan new road.

#### STUD DEPARTMENT.

Capt. Edw. Gwatkin, 13th N. I., Superintendent general provinces; Capt. John Mackenzie, 3d L. C. do. Haupper; Capt. Jas. Persons, 50th N. I. do. Hissar; Vet. Surgeons; , general provinces; J. T. Hodgson, Haupper; F. Rogers, Hissar.

#### STATIONS OF THE REGIMENTS.

##### HIS MAJESTY'S TROOPS.

3d Light Dragoons, Meerutt; 16th Lancers, Cawnpore; 3d or Buffs, Berhampore; 13th foot, Dinapore; 16th do. Chinsurah; 26th do. Meerutt; 31st do. Kurnaul; 38th do. Ghazepore; 44th do. Cawnpore; 49th do. Fort William.

##### COMPANY'S TROOPS.

1st Light Cavalry, Nusseerabad; 2d do. Neemuch; 3d do. Sultanpore (Benares); 4th do. Kurnaul; 5th do. Muttra; 6th do. Cawnpore; 7th do. Mhow; 8th do. Cawnpore; 9th do. Meerutt; 10th do. Kurnaul.

##### HORSE ARTILLERY.

1st Brig. 3 Eur. Troops, Meerutt and Dum Dum; 1 Nat. do. Meerutt; 2d Brig. 3 Eur. Troops, Cawnpore and Meerutt; 1 Nat. do. Loodianah; 3d Brig. 3 Eur.

Troops, Kurnaul, Mhow, and Muttra; 1 Nat. do. Neemuch.

#### FOOT ARTILLERY.

1st Battalion Eur., Secole (Bernares); Dinnapore, Mhow, and Saugor; 2d do. Nusseerabad, Meerutt, and Kurnaul; 3d do. Cawnpore and Allahabad; 4th do. Dum Dum; 5th do. Agra and Dum Dum; 6th Batt. Golundauze, or Native, Cawnpore, Neemuch, and Delhi; 7th Batt. Golundauze, Cawnpore and Dum Dum.

#### INFANTRY.

European Regiment (right and left wing), Dinapore; 1st Native Infantry, Futteh Gurh; 2d do. Dinapore; 3d do. Nusseerabad; 4th do. Saugor; 5th do. ditto; 6th do. Allahabad and Jaunpore; 7th do. Goruckpore; 8th do. Kurnaul; 9th do. Agra; 10th do. Cawnpore; 11th do. Chittagong; 12th do. Lucknow; 13th do. Barreilly; 14th do. Loodianah; 15th do. Shajehanpore and Mooradabad; 16th do. Mhow; 17th do. Nusseerabad; 18th do. Baitool; 19th do. Barrackpore; 20th do. Seetapore (Oude); 21st do. Cawnpore; 22d do. Lucknow; 23d do. Kurnaul; 24th do. Bernares; 25th do. Arracan; 26th do. Gurwarah and Hussingabad; 27th do. Harsing; 28th do. Agra; 29th do. Jubbulpore; 30th do. Almorah; 31st do. Barrackpore; 32d do. Nusseerabad; 33d do. Barrackpore; 34th do. Midnapore; 35th do. Jumal-pore; 36th do. Mhow; 37th do. Neemuch; 38th do. Bernares; 39th do. Delhi; 40th do. Allyghur; 41st do. Pertaubghur (Oude); 42d do. Delhi; 43d do. Secore; 44th do. Barreilly; 45th do. Muttra; 46th do. Neemuch; 47th do. Cuttack, 1 com., camp Secunderabad; 48th do. Barrackpore; 49th do. Loodianah; 50th do. Barrackpore; 51st do. Neemuch; 52d do. Meerutt; 53d do. Dacca; 54th do. Nusseerabad; 55th do. Barrackpore; 56th do. Saugor; 57th do. Muttra; 58th do. Sultanpore (Oude); 59th Allahabad; 60th do. Cawnpore; 61st do. Neemuch; 62d do. Delhi; 63d do. Mullay; 64th do. Dinapore; 65th do. Mhow; 66th do. Benares; 67th do. Etawah and Bandah; 68th do. Mynpoorie; 69th do. Meerutt; 70th do. Bandah; 71st do. Meerutt; 72d do. Berhampore; 73d do. Benares; 74th do. Mizapore.

#### EUROPEAN INVAMDS.

Artillery, Allahabad and Chunar; Infantry, Chunar.

#### EXTRA CORPS (OFFICERS FROM THE REGULARS.)

Gover.-Gen.'s Body Guard, Upper Provinces; Sappers and Miners, Delhi; Pioneers, Kurnaul, Nusseerabad, Camp Landour, Mhow, Almorah, and Soobathoo.

#### LOCAL INFANTRY.

Calcutta Native Militia (Civil Force) Allypore; Ramburgh Batt. with two 4 and two 6 pounder guns attached, Hazarebaugh; Hill Rangers, Bhaugulpore; Nusseeree Battalion, Soobathoo; Sirmoor do., Deyrah Dhoon; Kemaon do. (Civil), Almorah; Assam Light Infantry, Jorchath, in Assam; Mhairwarah Batt. (Civil), Beawr; Sylhet Light Infantry, Sylhet.

#### LOCAL CAVALRY.

1st. Reg. Local Horse (Skinner's), Hansi; 2nd do., Neemuch; 3d do., Barreilly; 4th do., Saugor; 5th do., Bhopawar; Mugh Sebundies, Akyab (Arracan); Bheel Corps, Mundlaiser; Nerbudda Sebundies, Jubbulpore.

R. M. GRINDLAY,  
East India Army Agent, and Agent for Passengers to and from India and the Colonies.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH ARMY AT HOME AND ABROAD.

##### GREAT BRITAIN.

	Rank and File.
Cavalry . . . .	1,451
Foot Guards . . . .	3,974
Infantry of the Line . . . .	12,459
Recruiting Troops, and Companies of Regiments in India . . . .	350
On Passage Home . . . .	400
	<hr/> 21,634

##### IRELAND.

Cavalry . . . .	2,409
Foot Guards . . . .	575
Infantry of the Line . . . .	20,090
	<hr/> 23,074

##### ABROAD, EXCLUSIVE OF INDIA.

Infantry of the Line, excluding a Regiment and Detachments of Regiments on passage . . . .	27,367
Royal Veteran Companies . . . .	239
West India Regiments . . . .	1,818
Colonial Corps . . . .	2,276
	<hr/> 31,700
	<hr/> 76,408

##### EAST INDIES.

Cavalry . . . .	2,699
Infantry of the Line . . . .	15,078
	<hr/> 17,777
Deduct Recruiting Troops and Companies at home . . . .	350
	<hr/> 17,427

JOHN HOBHOUSE.

War-office, Feb. 25, 1833.

## COURTS-MARTIAL.

*Lieutenant Lamont.*

A Court-martial was held at Portsmouth, on Friday, Feb. 1, on board his Majesty's ship *Victory*, to try Second Lieut. J. D. C. Lamont, Royal Marines, of the *Briton*, on charges preferred against him by First Lieut. Patten of the same ship.

The Court was composed of Rear-Admiral Sir M. Seymour, President; Rear-Admiral Sir F. Maitland, Captain Hyde Parker (Victory), J. Duff Markland (Briton), R. Tait, (Spartiate), and T. Hastings (Excellent). J. Hoskins, Esq. Judge-Advocate.

The Judge-Advocate read a letter from Lieut. Patten to Capt. Markland, which contained the following charges against Lieut. Lamont:—

First, For swearing at him in a most provoking, insulting, and disrespectful manner at the gun-room table, on or about the 8th of Nov. 1832.

Second, For sending a verbal challenge to him by Second Lieut. Edward Parke, R. M., on the 21st of Jan. 1833, or thereabout.

Third, For threatening him on the quarter-deck, when ordered under arrest by Capt. Markland, on or about the 22d of Jan. 1833, that he should demand satisfaction of him on the ship being paid off.

Lieut. Patten appeared as prosecutor, and the prisoner was assisted in his defence by Mr. Minchin.

The evidence on the part of the prosecution being closed, the prisoner was, at his own request, allowed till the following morning to enter on his defence.

The Court again met on the 2d, and after hearing the defence, returned the following verdict:—

"The Court having deliberately weighed and considered the evidence in support of the charges, and having heard what the prisoner had to say in his defence, the Court is of opinion that the whole of the charges have been proved, and the Court doth adjudge Lieutenant (J. D. Lamont), Second Lieutenant of the Royal Marines, to be dismissed his Majesty's service, and he is hereby dismissed accordingly."

*Lieut. E. Parke, Royal Marines.*

A Court-martial was held at the Royal Marine Mess Room, Portsmouth, on Monday the 4th of Feb., to try Second Lieut. Parke, of this division of Royal Marines, on charges preferred against him by Lieut. Patten, First Lieut. of his Majesty's ship *Briton*. The court was composed of Col.

George Lewis, C.B., R.M., President, Lieut.-Col. Hornby, R. M., Major Jones, R. M., Major Jones, 12th regiment, Capt. St. Maur, 51st, Capt. Robinson, R.M., Capt. Gibson, R.M., Capt. Morshead, 7th, Capt. Colthurst, 12th, First Lieuts. Ludington and Finmore, R.M., Lieut. Whitmore, 7th, and Ensign Hopwood, 51st. Lieut. and Adjutant Brown officiated as Deputy Judge Advocate. T. A. Minchin, Esq., attended as the professional adviser of Lieut. Parke. The usual preliminaries having been gone over, a letter, written by Lieutenant Patten, addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, was read, containing the following charges—to which Lieutenant Parke pleaded Not Guilty.

First, For being the bearer of a challenge to him, Lieut. Patten, from Second Lieut. Lamont, Royal Marines, belonging to his Majesty's ship *Briton*, on or about the 21st of Jan. 1833.

Second, For making use of most disgusting, indecent, and ungentlemanly language before the young midshipmen, in the larboard berth of his Majesty's ship *Briton*, on or about the 21st of Jan. 1833.

Third, For speaking of him (Lieut. Patten) in a most disgraceful, ungentlemanly, and unofficerlike manner, tending to defame his character, on or about the 24th day of Jan. 1833, in the starboard berth of his Majesty's ship *Briton*.

Lieut. Patten was the first witness called and examined; and on being asked to state all the circumstances relating to the first charge, said, that on the *Briton's* arrival in the harbour, on the 21st of Jan. Mr. Parke came on board, when I was busily engaged unbending sails, and asked to have a few words with me. I told him I was very busy, but that I would hear what he had to say. He then told me that Mr. Lamont had sent him on board respecting an insult he had received from me, and requested me to appoint my friend, with whom Mr. Parke might consult.

At this stage of the proceedings, the prisoner submitted a paper to the Court, in which he protested against the Court present assembled taking cognizance of the charges, as he was not doing duty on board the *Briton*; and that the offence was only cognizable by a court of law. The Court was accordingly cleared, and on being re-opened, the President told the prisoner that his protest would be sent to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for their decision, and the Court would therefore adjourn till Thursday morning at eleven o'clock.

Thursday, 7th Feb.—The Court re-assembled this morning, and the names of

the members having been called over by the Deputy Judge Advocate, the President rose and said, that the objection and protest made by the prisoner, upon the ground of the incompetency of the Court to try him, had been sent to the Admiralty for their consideration, and had been by them referred to the law-officers of the crown, who had transmitted their decision to the effect, that the prisoner, Lieut. Parke, being the bearer of a challenge, had committed an offence which came under the 10th section of the Mutiny Act, and the Court therefore was enabled to take cognizance of, and try Lieut. Parke for the offence.

Evidence was then heard in support of the charges; and on the following day the prisoner entered on his defence.

*Sentence.*—The Court, having heard the evidence in support of the prosecution, with what the prisoner has stated in his defence, is of opinion that he is guilty of the first and second charges, and not guilty of the third charge; and doth therefore sentence him to be cashiered.

*Lieut. T. C. Walker, 26th Bengal Native Infantry.*

Head-Quarters, Simlah,  
Aug. 23, 1832.

At a European General Court-martial, assembled at Nusseerabad on the 10th of July, 1832, of which Lieut.-Col. J. Robertson, of the 45th regt. N. I., is President, Lieut. T. C. Walker, of the 26th regt. N. I. was arraigned on the following charge:—

“Lieut. Thomas Caldecott Walker, of the 26th regt. N. I., charged with conduct unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, in the following instance:—

“Having, at Nusseerabad, some time about the 6th of Jan. 1832, entered into a disgraceful personal conflict with Lieut. William Barrington Reade, of the 1st regt. I. C.; and having, some time subsequently, exhibited the most degrading instances of falsehood, in several relations of the above affairs, and at a Court of Inquiry held on his own application at Nusseerabad, about the 30th of March, 1832, on the subject, deliberately exhibited the same disgraceful violation of truth.”

Upon which charge the Court came to the following decision:—

“The Court, having maturely weighed, and considered the evidence before it, is of opinion, that the prisoner, Lieut. Thomas Caldecott Walker, of the 26th regt. N. I., is not guilty, and does acquit him of the charge preferred against him.”

*W. A. Butler, 22d Bengal Native Infantry.*

Head-Quarters, Simlah,  
July 6, 1832.

At a European General Court-martial assembled at Cawnpore, on the 2d of April, 1832, of which Col. H. Faithfull, of the artillery, is President, Lieut. W. Augustus Butler, of the 22d regt. N. I., was arraigned on the following charge:—

“Lieut. William Augustus Butler, of the 22d regt. N. I., charged with disobedience of orders and breach of military discipline, and conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman in the following instance:—

“That he, Lieut. W. A. Butler, being in charge of the 5th company 22d regt. N. I., did, on or some time previous to the 4th day of June, 1829, authorise or allow Ramdeen Sing, pay-havildar of the company, to disburse the sum of 290 rupees, either in payments on his, Lieut. W. A. Butler's, private account, or in advances to himself; such money, or parts thereof, being due to men on leave, or to men transferred to the invalid establishment, or to the heirs of deceased men of the company; for which sum of 290 rupees, he, Lieut. W. A. Butler, gave a note of hand to the pay-havildar, Ramdeen Sing, dated the 4th day of June, 1829, which has not yet been paid, although the said Ramdeen Sing, pay-havildar, has been compelled to make good the amount thereof.”

Upon which charge the Court came to the following decision:—

“The Court, having maturely weighed and deliberated on the charges against the prisoner, is of opinion, that he is guilty of the matter alleged against him, with exception of the words ‘ungentlemanly conduct,’ and of ‘such money,’ and of the following, ‘which has not yet been paid, although the said Ramdeen Sing, pay-havildar, has been compelled to make good the amount thereof,’ of which it does fully acquit him.

“The Court, having found the prisoner guilty, with the exception of the words set forth in its finding above, sentences him to be reprimanded.”

GENERAL ORDERS, CIRCULARS,  
&c. &c.

ARMY.

War Office, 19th Jan. 1833.

SIR,—The Secretary at War having decided that, from the commencement of the present year, the accounts of military hospitals, which were heretofore submitted to the army medical department, shall be

examined by the War Office, I am accordingly directed to request that you will transmit your monthly expenditure returns, and other accounts, with the vouchers which usually accompany the same, direct to this office.

The accounts are to be despatched at the time required by the regulations of the medical department, and are to be put under a cover addressed "To the Secretary at War, War-Office, London;" the words "Hospital Accounts" being written on the cover.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

E. MARSHALL.

The Surgeon of the — regiment of —.

War-Office, 22d Jan. 1833.

SIR,—With reference to the deductions made from time to time in the Quarterly Pay Lists of regiments on foreign service, under the instructions contained in Article 28 of the Infantry Clothing Warrant, I am directed to acquaint you that payment of the sums so deducted may be made in future without a Special Authority from this Office, immediately on the receipt of the Separate General State, specifying the deductions, provided care be previously taken by you to ascertain that the individuals to whom the said sums may be assigned are duly entitled thereto for regimental supplies.

The amount of these payments may be inserted in your Monthly Estimates and Quarterly Accounts, with a reference in both documents to the General State in which the deduction is made, and the charge being supported by the tradesman's receipt.

I am,

Your obedient humble servant,

E MARSHALL.

War-Office, 23d Jan. 1833.

SIR,—As the period for which the regimental clothing of the current year is required to be worn under the existing assignments of offreckonings for Cavalry and Infantry, respectively, will expire on the 31st December. 1833, I have the honour to signify to you His Majesty's pleasure, that the said clothing shall nevertheless be continued in wear until the 31st March, 1834, when the new Military Year terminates; and that every non-commissioned officer and soldier, who may be actually effective between that day and the 1st January previous, shall accordingly be allowed compensation, agreeably to his rank, and the rates prescribed by the regulations.

It is His Majesty's further pleasure, that the deliveries of regimental clothing shall,

after the present year, be made to the men on 1st April, being the commencement of the military year, when all future assignments of offreckonings are to commence, and in consequence of which, colonels of regiments shall not acquire a vested interest in the said offreckonings, nor be entitled to make assignments thereof before the 1st May, instead of the 1st February, as heretofore, preceding the period for which the clothing is to be provided.

I have the honor to add, that His Majesty is likewise pleased to order compensation to be granted to the respective colonels for the quarter during which, by the present arrangement, they will not be allowed offreckonings; and that further instructions will be communicated to you on the subject.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN HOBHOUSE.

The Colonel of the — Regt. of —.

Horse-Guards, 1st March, 1833.

THE frequency of appeals from officers, when ordered from the reserve to the service companies of their respective regiments, suggests the belief that the chief principle laid down in the Adjutant-General's circular letter of the 1st of December, 1825, and in the General Order of the 8th December, 1828, is not sufficiently understood. That principle is, that each officer should take his just share of foreign service, and that the reserve or depot service should be so watched as to preclude the possibility of its being, in any case whatever, made available for purposes of private or personal convenience.

It is, henceforth, to be an invariable rule, that no officer who may have joined the reserve of his regiment, after having taken his tour of foreign service with the service companies, shall be sent back to these companies, until every officer of his class at the depot shall have joined them. A strict adherence to this rule cannot fail to ensure a perfectly equitable apportionment of home and foreign service. It is conceived that cases in which it may be absolutely necessary to sanction exceptions to this rule, can occur but very rarely, and these may be referred for the General commanding in chief's special consideration and decision, when the general officer commanding the district in which the case of doubt occurs shall not feel himself competent to dispose of it. It is also conceived that, if the general officers charged with the inspection of the troops, make it a part of their duty to examine carefully, at each half-yearly in-



spection, the reserve or dépôt roster of officers for foreign service, and there and then inquires into and determine, according to their own view of the justice of the case, every question of doubt or difficulty which shall be submitted to them under this head, it will seldom, if ever, be necessary to appeal to the General commanding the army.

No officer belonging to the reserve can be suffered to delay his embarkation for foreign service on account of health, unless such delay be recommended by a Medical Board, which, in every such case, must be formed of two or three military medical officers, before whom he must be ordered to appear for examination; and, on whose report, the General officer commanding the district shall decide whether the officer in question shall embark then or not. Except in a case of necessity, such as that of allotting a sufficient portion of officers to a large detachment, another officer shall not be ordered to embark instead of him who shall have been excused on the plea of illness, but the latter shall be ordered to proceed to the service companies as soon as he shall have sufficiently recovered from his illness to enable him to do so.

Every officer who exchanges into a regiment, either from another corps, or from half-pay, and every officer who shall be promoted from one regiment to another, shall take his tour of foreign service before all officers of his class belonging to the reserve which he joins, who have already served abroad with the service companies.

It is foreseen that a case may occasionally arise, in which an officer may be moved to another corps, immediately after having had a long course of foreign service with his former corps, and in which it would therefore be a manifest hardship upon him to be obliged to encounter foreign climates again, when it would become his turn to do so, had he, throughout, belonged to the regiment to which he has been newly appointed. This also is a case for special consideration, and must therefore be determined upon its own merits, when explained to the General commanding the district, or (if necessary, as already provided) to the General commanding in chief.

No officer, however, shall claim an exemption from embarkation upon the last-mentioned plea, unless he shall make it appear that his last course of foreign service has been of longer duration than that of every other officer of his class belonging to the reserve, who has taken his tour of foreign service, and unless he also

shows that he is the last officer of his class then with the reserve, who has returned from foreign service.

As soon as an officer is appointed to the reserve, he is to be officially informed, by the acting adjutant, how he stands upon the roster for foreign service, and when it is probable he will be required for embarkation; it will then be incumbent upon such officer to question the justice of the roster, if he thinks himself aggrieved by it; but every officer thus circumstanced will do well to bear in mind, that he must appear to great disadvantage if he makes any attempt to avoid foreign service upon any ground whatsoever that is not recognised in the foregoing regulation.

By command of the Right Honourable the General Commanding in Chief,

JOHN MACDONALD,

Adjutant-General.

## NAVAL REGULATIONS.

Admiralty, 6th December, 1832.

THE charts, books, and papers issued from the Hydrographical Department of this office, being seldom transferred from one officer to another, or returned into store, without considerable deficiencies, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty hereby give notice, that, in future, a receipt, to be signed by the Hydrographer, stating that the said charts, books, and papers have been returned in good condition, or have been satisfactorily accounted for, will be required to be produced by the commanding officer of each of his Majesty's ships and vessels on passing his accounts.

By command of their Lordships,

JOHN BARROW.

Addressed to all Captains, Commanders, and Commanding Officers of his Majesty's Ships and Vessels.

Admiralty-Office, 11th Jan., 1833.

The following are to be the numbers of Mates, Midshipmen, and College Midshipmen borne on the books of his Majesty's ships under the regulations of their Lordship's Circular Order, No. 65, of the 1st October, 1831, of whom the numbers stated in the second column are to be selected from among the Mates who have passed prior to the year 1830, or from young gentlemen educated at the Royal Naval College, who may have completed two years' time afloat—the latter class, however to be confined, as at present, to sea-going ships, viz.:

Comple- ment,	{ of which to be Mates passed prior to 1830, or College Midshipmen.		
1st Rates . . . . .	24 . . . .	8	
2d . . . . .	20 . . . .	8	
3d . . . . .	16 . . . .	5	
4th . . . . .	10 . . . .	4	
5th . . . . .	10 . . . .	4	
6th . . . . .	8 . . . .	4	
Sloops . . . . .	3 . . . .	1	
Cutters, Gun-brigs, &c. .	2 . . . .	1	
Guard-ships . . . . .	8 . . . .	4	

And the numbers of Volunteers of the 1st class in each rate fixed by their Lordships' Circular Order, No. 59, of the 15th January, 1831, are in future to be as follows:—

	Vol. 1st Class	Coll. Vol.
1st and 2d Rates, Sea-going Ships, &c. . . .	3 . . . .	6
3d Rates . . . . .	2 . . . .	5
4th and 5th Rates . . .	2 . . . .	4
6th Rates, and Sloops with 115 men . . . .	1 . . . .	3
Guard-Ships . . . . .	3 . . . .	0
10-gun Brigs . . . . .	0 . . . .	1

The reduction in the Volunteers of the first class to be effected as vacancies occur.

By command of their Lordships,

JOHN BARROW.

Addressed to all Commanders-in-Chief, Captains, and Commanding Officers of his Majesty's Ships and Vessels.

#### MEMORANDUM.

Admiralty, 6th Feb. 1833.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty desire that the strictest attention be paid to the 30th article of the Purser's Instructions, page 27, in which it is directed that 'When the issue of salt meat is renewed after fresh meat has been served, the salt meat on the first day of issue is not to be of the same species as that issued on the last day before fresh meat was issued,' in order that the issue of salt beef and salt pork on board his Majesty's ships may be equalised, as was intended by the said instructions.

By command of their Lordships,

JOHN BARROW.

To all Captains, Commanders, Commanding Officers, and Purser's of his Majesty's Ships and Vessels.

#### ADMIRALTY CIRCULAR.

The following is the substance of an order recently promulgated, and having in view the diminution of expense in repairs, &c. (No. 88) dated 31st Jan., 1833, and addressed to all Captains, Commanders, and Commanding Officers of his Majesty's Ships and Vessels:—

'The rowing-money, the sleeping-money, and the allowance of provisions

U. S. JOURN. No. 53, APRIL, 1833.

to the shipwrights who are constantly sent off from the Dock-yards to Spithead and Plymouth Sound, and frequently to much shorter distances from the other yards, to examine and make good the defects of his Majesty's ships arriving at these ports, amount, in the course of the year, to so heavy an expense, that, with a due regard to the interests of the public, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty consider it most desirable the practice should be discontinued; which, they are of opinion, may be done, not only without prejudice but with advantage to his Majesty's service, in more respects than the saving of expense. To accomplish this desirable end, their Lordships direct that when the defects of a ship, on her arrival in port, are large, and really require the assistance of a Dock-yard, she shall be towed into harbour by a steam-tug-vessel, to be appropriated to the services of the port; where, on examination, she will either be paid off or have her defects made good in the basins or at the jetties; and thus will the expense of rowing and sleeping-money, and provisions, be saved to the public.

'But when the defects are not of so serious a nature as to require her going into harbour, the Captain or Commander is to transmit a list of such defects as there may be to the Admiral or other Officer commanding at the port ONLY, and not to the Dock-yard, with a certificate signed by himself, the Commander, the First Lieutenant, and the Carpenter, stating whether such defects can or cannot be made good by the ship's artificers.

'When it is considered that the whole squadron on the South American station, most of which are required to pass round Cape Horn in the course of their three years' continuance on that station, have no Dock-yard to resort to, but make good their defects by their own crews, or with the assistance of the squadron; and, on the contrary, when it is notorious, that scarcely a single ship, whether new, or newly fitted at any of the eastern yards, on her arrival at Portsmouth or Plymouth, does not require some defects to be made good at one or other of the Dock-yards at these ports, and sometimes at both; their Lordships deem it high time to put an end to these expensive, and, in their opinion, unnecessary proceedings.

'The attention of the respective Captains and commanding Officers of his Majesty's ships and vessels is, therefore, particularly called to these points of their duty; and the instructions contained in the said Circular, No. 88, are, on all occasions, to be strictly enforced.'

## NAVY ESTIMATES.

## GENERAL ABSTRACT FOR PAY, HALF-PAY, AND DOCK-YARDS.

	1833-34. £.	1832-33. £.	s.	d.
<b>Wages of Seamen and Marines, of the Ordinary, Yard Craft, &amp;c.</b>	955,220	957,527	8	9
Being at the rate of 17s. per man per lunar month for those afloat, and 56s. per month for 4,500 Marines, presumed to be on shore.				
<b>Victuals for ditto, abating Old Stores</b>	538,004	462,469	10	0
Being 27s. 7d. per man per month for those afloat, or 23s. for the whole number.				
<b>Admiralty-Office</b>	104,070	121,196	15	4
<b>Navy Pay Office</b>	21,725	25,054	0	6
We observe a new officer here at 800l. a-year, called "Assistant to the Treasurer."				
<b>Scientific Branch</b>	22,109	20,051	12	6
The accession to this sum arises from a gratuity of 2000l. given to T. T. Grant, Esq. for his invention of the ingenious Biscuit Machinery at Weevil, whereby an actual saving has been effected, and this sum is to the exclusion of all further claims.				
<b>His Majesty's Establishments at Home</b>	114,970	119,036	14	1
... Abroad	23,422	27,211	11	9
<b>Wages to Artificers, &amp;c. at Home</b>	438,426	471,592	10	2
... Abroad	26,905	37,733	0	0
<b>Naval Stores, &amp;c. for the building and repair of Ships, Docks, Wharfs, &amp;c.</b>	423,000	477,733	5	0
<b>New Works and Improvements in the Yards, &amp;c.</b>	63,700	107,000	0	0
<b>Medicines and Medical Stores</b>	31,500	26,260	0	0
<b>Miscellaneous Services</b>	50,380	57,560	0	0
<b>Total for the Effective Service</b>	2,713,431	2,910,306	8	1
<b>Half-pay to Officers of the Navy and Royal Marines</b>	871,858	884,861	11	4
<b>Military Pensions and Allowances</b>	533,403	527,181	7	4
<b>Civil Pensions and Allowances</b>	220,342	191,285	7	10
<b>Total for the Naval Service</b>	4,339,034	4,523,634	14	7
For the Service of the other Departments of Government,—				
<b>Army and Ordnance Departments (Conveyance of Troops, &amp;c.).</b>	200,800	225,000	0	0
<b>Colonial Department</b>	—	1,500	0	0
<b>Home Department (Convict Service)</b>	118,300	128,500	0	0
<b>Grand Total</b>	£4,658,134	4,878,634	14	7

## Wages of Officers of the different Yards:—

	£.	£.	s.	d.
<b>Deptford</b>	630	519	3	8
<b>Woolwich</b>	11,950	11,680	5	5
<b>Chatham</b>	16,327	16,327	3	3
<b>Sheerness</b>	9,200	11,898	17	0
<b>Portsmouth</b>	19,803	21,829	10	2
<b>Plymouth</b>	19,550	20,546	17	1
<b>Pembroke</b>	6,140	5,866	1	6
<b>Deptford, Victualling</b>	7,595	6,829	10	0
<b>Sheerness</b>	830	830	10	0
<b>Portsmouth</b>	2,832	2,885	0	0
<b>Plymouth</b>	2,680	2,458	1	0
<b>Haslar Hospital</b>	5,301	5,168	12	6
<b>Plymouth</b>	4,479	4,391	1	0

## ABSTRACT OF NAVAL ESTABLISHMENTS AT HOME AND ABROAD.

	£.	£.	s.	d.
Naval Yards at Home . . . . .	83,924	88,920	18	1
... Abroad . . . . .	13,952	17,116	11	3
Victualling Yards at Home . . . . .	14,998	14,013	1	0
... Abroad . . . . .	4,955	4,450	0	0
Medical Establishments at Home . . . . .	9,780	9,559	13	6
... Abroad . . . . .	5,415	5,806	0	6
Transport Establishments at Home . . . . .	2,058	2,375	0	0
... Abroad . . . . .	Nil.	339	0	0
Marine Barracks . . . . .	680	813	4	0
Marine Infirmaries . . . . .	3,530	3,354	17	6

## WAGES FOR WORKMEN, &amp;c.

	£.
Woolwich Yard . . . . .	54,885
Chatham ... . . . .	67,971
Sheerness ... . . . .	29,610
Portsmouth ... . . . .	111,550
Plymouth ... . . . .	116,356
Pembroke ... . . . .	23,043

The above sums include the hire of Horses, but none are provided for Portsmouth-yard, all such duty being done by Convicts.

## ABSTRACT OF WAGES FOR YARDS, &amp;c.

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Naval Yards at Home. . . . .	404,756	0	0	442,720	10	2
... Abroad . . . . .	18,550	0	0	32,000	0	0
Victualling Yards at Home . . . . .	29,590	0	0	25,107	10	0
... Abroad . . . . .	5,665	0	0	3,363	0	0
Medical Yards at Home . . . . .	3,200	0	0	3,525	0	0
... Abroad . . . . .	2,090	0	0	2,370	0	0
Marine Barracks . . . . .	40	0	0	—	—	—
Marine Infirmaries . . . . .	540	0	0	—	—	—
Transport Establishments . . . . .	300	0	0	230	10	0
For Timber, Materials, Repairs, Steam-Engines, Coals, &c. . . . .	423,000	0	0	477,733	5	0
New Works and Improvements . . . . .	63,700	0	0	107,000	0	0
38,000/ is granted this year for Plymouth Breakwater; 99,000/ is required to finish it with a light house. The Bermuda Establishment will be completed, in the estimation of the pre-ent Admiralty, for 30,000/— by the original plan 200,000/ would be required.						
Medicines . . . . .	31,500	0	0	26,200	0	0
Packets, Pilots, Distressed Seamen in Foreign Ports, Exchequer Fees, Courts Martial, Float- ing Lights, Semaphores, Head Money, Freight, &c. . . . .	50,320	0	0	57,500	0	0
Half-pay . . . . .	871,858	0	0	894,861	11	4
Pensions to Officers . . . . .	81,954	15	1	83,919	2	4
... Widows . . . . .	186,225	4	14	177,962	5	0
Compassionate . . . . .	14,000	0	0	14,000	0	0
Chaplains' Bounty . . . . .	1,223	0	0	1,300	0	0
Greenwich Hospital . . . . .	250,000	0	0	250,000	0	0

# COMPARATIVE ABSTRACT OF ARMY SERVICES for the Year

SERVICES EFFECTIVE.	NUMBERS.								
	Horses.			Rank and File.			All Ranks.		
	1832-3	1833-4	Less in 1833-4	1832-3	1833-4	Less in 1833-4	1832-3	1833-4	Less in 1833-4
1. Land Forces . . . . .	6,362	6,262	100	78,519	78,503	46	89,478	89,419	59
2. Staff . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3. Public Departments . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. Medicines . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Garrisons . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6. Roy. Mil. College . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7. { Roy. Mil. Asylum . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
{ Hibernian School . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8. Volunteer Corps . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9. Regts. in India, and Troops & Comps. } of do. at home . . . . .	2,801	2,804	—	17,288	17,288	—	19,720	19,720	—
10. Exchequer Fees . . . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Deduct No. of Horses and Men in India, and charge of Regiments in India, and Troops and Comps. at home )	9,166	9,066	100	95,837	95,791	46	109,198	109,139	59
	2,804	2,804	—	17,288	17,288	—	19,720	19,720	—
Deduct 1832-3 from 1833-4, and Increase from Decrease . . . . .	6,362	6,262	100	78,549	78,503	46	89,478	89,419	59
	6,262	—	—	78,503	—	—	89,419	—	—
Remains Decrease . . . . .	100	—	—	46	—	—	59	—	—

Deduct the Charge of the Hibernian School, the Expense of which will be defrayed out of

NON-EFFECTIVE.			
1. Army Pay of General Officers . . . . .	291	272	19
2. Full Pay for Retired Officers . . . . .	602	572	30
3. Half Pay and Military Allowances . . . . .	6,690	6,305	385
4. Foreign Half Pay . . . . .	765	743	22
Retired Officers of Militia, Local Militia and Yeomanry . . . . .	300	—	300
5. Widows' Pensions . . . . .	—	—	—
6. Compassionate Allowances, Bounty Warrants, &c. . . . .	—	—	—
7. In-Pensioners and Out-Pensioners of Kilmainham and Chelsea Hospitals . . . . .	First 81,723 Vote . . . . . Supplementary 7,226 Vote . . . . .	81,723 7,226	7,226
8. Superannuation Allowances . . . . .	—	—	—
9. Exchequer Fees . . . . .	—	—	—
Deduct 1833-4 from 1832-3, and Increase from Decrease . . . . .	90,371 81,889	81,889	8,482
Remains Decrease in Numbers and Charge . . . . .	8,482	—	8,482
Deduct the following transfers to the Militia Estimates, viz. Retired Officers of Militia and Local Militia . . . . .	Numbers 206	—	—
Out-Pensioners from ditto ditto ditto . . . . .	4,465	—	4,465
Deduct also the charge of the Hibernian Military School, which will be paid out of	3,751	—	—
Decrease of Numbers Non-Effective . . . . .	59	—	—
Decrease of Numbers Effective . . . . .	—	—	—

CHARGES.											
1832-3			1833-4			More in 1833-4			Less in 1833-4		
£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
1,170,779	19	2	3,168,216	14	1	—	—	—	2,563	5	1
117,274	19	10	110,835	15	5	—	—	—	6,439	4	5
103,014	15	7	94,627	13	7	—	—	—	8,387	2	0
12,000	0	0	11,800	0	0	—	—	—	200	0	0
33,670	16	2	33,415	9	10	—	—	—	255	6	4
2,638	11	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,638	11	0*
17,489	11	1	15,703	19	0	—	—	—	1,785	12	1
5,396	5	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	5,396	5	7†
99,608	12	4	103,318	13	2	3,710	0	10	—	—	—
698,927	1	3	630,757	12	5	—	—	—	8,169	8	10
17,500	0	0	17,500	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
278,300	12	1	4,246,175	17	6	3,710	0	10	35,834	15	5
698,927	1	3	690,757	12	5	—	—	—	8,169	8	10
3,579,373	10	10	3,555,418	5	1	3,710	0	10	27,665	6	7
3,555,418	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,710	0	10
23,955	5	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	23,955	5	9
Public Money unexpended of former Grants ...									4,578	1	11
									19,377	3	10
125,000	0	0	119,000	0	0	—	—	—	6,000	0	0
90,000	0	0	86,000	0	0	—	—	—	4,000	0	0
666,500	0	0	632,000	0	0	—	—	—	34,500	0	0
88,900	0	0	86,430	0	0	—	—	—	2,420	0	0
26,334	15	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	26,334	15	0*
117,423	0	0	145,943	0	0	—	—	—	1,479	0	0
175,011	0	0	170,516	0	0	—	—	—	4,525	0	0
350,593	6	8	1,211,746	9	2	—	—	—	188,756	17	5†
50,000	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
50,750	16	10	51,374	3	6	623	6	8	—	—	—
14,500	0	0	12,500	0	0	—	—	—	2,000	0	0
781,952	18	6	2,515,560	12	8	623	6	8	270,015	12	6
515,560	12	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	623	6	8
269,392	5	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	269,392	5	10
Charge.....	£23,670	5	0						23,955	5	9
Ditto.....	58,386	16	6						293,347	11	7
			82,057	1	6				—	—	—
Balances as above.....			4,578	1	11				86,635	3	5
									206,712	8	2

\* The Contributions of the Students pay the charge of the Military College.

† The charge of the Hibernian School for the present year is 4,578*l.* 1*s.* 11*d.*; but there is an unappropriated balance sufficient to defray this charge.

{ The decrease of Estimate, including India, is 32,124*l.* 14*s.* 7*d.*

Decrease on Indian Force.

Less in 1833-4.

{ Decrease of Estimate, exclusive of India.

{ Decrease of charge of Effective Services, exclusive of India.—Including Force in India, the Dec. of charge is 27,546*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.*

\* A charge of 33,670*l.* 5*s.* for 266 retired Militia and Local Militia Officers will be included in the Militia Estimate.  
† A charge of 58,386*l.* 16*s.* 6*d.* for 4,465 Militia and Local Militia Pensioners, will be included in the Militia Estimate. In 1832-3 120,000*l.* was granted for Commutation Allowances. In the present year 24,515*l.* 13*s.* 10*d.* only will be required. The appropriation of Unclaimed Prize Money in aid of this charge is 20,000*l.* less in the present than in the last year.

Less in 1833-4.

More in 1833-4.

{ Decrease on Estimate of Non-Effective Services.

{ Decrease on Estimate of Effective Services.

\* Total Decrease of Estimates. Transfer to Militia Estimates. Payment out of Balances.

Decrease of Public Charge.

JOHN HOBHOUSE

# ABSTRACT OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS CONNECTED WITH THE ARMY AND NAVY.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 13, 1833.

*Case of Sir H. Neale.*—The Marquis of Chandos said, that in consequence of the publication in yesterday's papers of a correspondence which had taken place between a Gallant Friend of his and the First Lord of the Admiralty, in which that Right Honourable Gentleman had thought fit to refuse the command at Portsmouth to the gallant officer in question, assigning as his reason for so doing, that he considered a seat in Parliament inconsistent with the holding of such a situation, he (the Marquis of Chandos) wished to put a question to the First Lord of the Admiralty on the subject. He wished to know from the Right Honourable Gentleman, whether there existed any order of the Admiralty that precluded any naval officer holding a command from having at the same time a seat in Parliament; and, if so, whether such an order was not equally applicable to a Gallant Officer, a Member of that House, who had at present his flag in the river, and also to another Gallant Member of that House, whose frigate was at present abroad, with an acting officer on board, as well as to his Gallant Friend the Member for Lymington? If there was not such an order of the Admiralty Board, he thought it rather hard that because a respectable body of constituents had elected his Gallant Friend as their representative, his Gallant Friend should on that account be refused the command at Portsmouth.

Sir J. Graham said, that in reply to the question of the Noble Marquis, he had no hesitation in saying that there was no order of the Admiralty Board disqualifying naval officers who happened to be Members of that House from holding naval commands; but, at the same time, he did not suppose that it would be disputed that a discretion was vested in the Commissioners of the Admiralty as to the individuals whom they should select for the approbation of His Majesty to be appointed to situations with which great public duties were connected. He (Sir J. Graham) conceiving that the discharge of the Honourable Baronet's duties as a Member of Parliament would be inconsistent with the discharge of his duties as the officer holding the command at Portsmouth, certainly refused to lay his name before His Majesty for that situation, and if the Noble Marquis had any fault to find with his so doing, he could bring the matter in the shape of a substantive motion before the House. It was for the Noble Marquis to consider whether such a course

would be consistent with his duty as a Member of Parliament, and whether there had been any thing in this instance in the exercise of that discretion which was vested in the Commissioners of the Admiralty to call for the interference of that House. With regard to the two facts mentioned by the Noble Marquis, he had to state that in the instance of the first of them—namely, that there was a Gallant Officer, a Member of that House, whose flag was at present in the river—the Noble Marquis was perfectly right. In the second case he believed that the Noble Marquis referred to the frigate *Stag*. He begged to state that in that instance the Noble Marquis was in error, for the officer commanding that frigate at the present moment was not a Member of that House. Now, as to the Gallant Admiral whose flag was in the river, he (Sir J. Graham) was sure that the House would at once perceive the difference that there was between removing an officer from a command because he happened to have been chosen by a body of constituents as their representative in that House, and the selecting an officer who was a Member of that House to fill a high naval situation, where a constant residence on the spot was absolutely indispensable for the proper discharge of the duties connected with it.

Mr. Warre moved for a return of all vessels of war in the British navy that had suffered shipwreck from the year 1816 to the present period, specifying the several places where such shipwrecks had occurred.—Agreed to.

Mr. Hume, in alluding to a vacancy which had occurred of Master at one of the out-ports, inquired whether it had been filled up. The Honourable Member gave notice that he should on a future day submit a motion to the House to the effect—“That in future all appointments, whether colonial or otherwise, as vacancies occurred, should, before such vacancies were filled up, be submitted to the revision of the House.”

FEBRUARY 14.

*Military and Naval Sinecure Offices.*—Mr. Hume brought the subject of Military and Naval Sinecures before the House. He should have been glad to postpone it till after the Budget had been produced, had not a recent circumstance—the death of a gallant officer, who held the sinecure office of Governor of Berwick—occurred. To exemplify the evils of these sinecures, he would refer to a return made to the House in 1816. The document stated that the Honourable H. C. Wyndham, the Secretary and Clerk of Enrolments in Jamaica, received for that office a sum of 4500*l.* a year;

that he had been in possession of it since 1763, and during the whole of that time he had resided in England. On the whole that gentleman had received a sum of 238,000*l.* of the public money for a sinecure office. Then his brother, the Honourable Percy Wyndham, held two other sinecure appointments, for which he received not less than 334,900*l.* making a total of about 623,000*l.* received by these two sinecurists alone. If the entire sum received by these two sinecurists, out of a single list of seven, were calculated, as it in justice to the public ought to be, by compound interest, it would be seen that they had cost the public not less than 2,059,300*l.* It had been said that these sinecures were for old gallant officers; but he thought their services should be rewarded by a grant from Parliament. It appeared that civilians sometimes held a military sinecure. In a list which he held in his hand, the aggregate amount of which was 33,000*l.*, there was one of 175*l.* to the Governor of Dartmouth, which was held at one time by a Mr. Holdsworth, who was a civilian, and who, on a motion of a Right Honourable Member, was removed on that ground. General Loftus, Lieutenant-Governor of the Tower, had been succeeded by Earl Munster; and that nobleman, having been appointed Governor of Windsor Castle, had been succeeded by Lord F. Fitzclarence. This Lieutenant of the Tower had entered the Coldstream Guards on the 12th of May, 1814, so that he never heard a shot fired.

Sir J. C. Hobhouse said the battle of Waterloo was subsequent to May, 1814.

Mr. Hume.—True; he had forgotten the battle of Waterloo. Would any Member who cheered so loudly tell him that Lord Frederic Fitzclarence was at Waterloo? This was an instance, therefore, of the manner in which military sinecures were abused. The Governor of Blackness Castle was non-resident; the Governor of Castle and his Deputy were non-resident. At Chester he did not know whether there was or was not a garrison. The Governors of the Leeward Islands, of the Virgin Islands, of Montserrat, of Grenada, St. Kitt's, and Dominica, were non-resident, and two of them, he believed, were civilians. The salary for Dominica was 366*l.* a year, and the others were lower. The Honourable Gentleman said that many Members of the Government had frequently declared themselves in favour of principles of economy. To the Right Honourable Baronet, the First Lord of the Admiralty, he need surely not appeal on a question of this kind; he (Mr. Hume) was sure of his vote; he had been a pillar of reform and retrenchment when, out of office, and his speech on the sums paid to

Privy Councillors would long be remembered. The Honourable Member concluded by proposing—"That it is the opinion of this House, that the utmost attention to economy in all the branches of public expenditure, is, at all times, a great and important duty; and that it is the opinion of this House, that sinecure offices, and offices held by deputy in the army and navy, are unnecessary and inexpedient as a means of remunerating public services."

Mr. Robinson seconded the motion.

Lord Althorp said he had always been opposed to the abolition of the military and naval offices which were called sinecures. He thought it absolutely necessary, unless they were prepared to increase to a very great extent the expenditure for the efficient service of the country, that there should be some means of rewarding individuals who had deserved well of their country. The Honourable Member had said the House of Commons would be always ready to reward cases of merit. He freely admitted that; for he believed the House of Commons, like all popular assemblies, to be but too ready to do so, and would go too far in bestowing rewards upon such public servants as might appear to them meritorious; and he felt persuaded that such modes of granting public money would lead to more lavish expenditure than would ever be attempted by any servants of the Crown. He objected also to the arguments of the Honourable Member upon another ground; it was quite a new constitutional principle for any one to contend that the House should assume to itself one of the prerogatives of the Crown. One source of expense, as connected with military service, had often been made a subject of complaint; he alluded to the appointment of Lieutenant-Governors in the West Indies. He was happy to say that arrangements had been made for effecting a great saving. A certain number of the smaller islands were placed under one Lieutenant-Governor, by which a saving of from seventeen to eighteen thousand pounds a year had been made.

Colonel Davies supported the motion. He trusted that the military sinecures would be done away with, and the officers put upon a footing more generally equal and just than that on which they now stood. The amount of these sinecures, if distributed more equally amongst the body of military servants, would tend to their comfort, and their services well entitled them to such consideration at the hands of their country.

Lord George Lennox agreed with the first resolution, but could not support the second. The question resolved itself into



this—was the House or the Crown to be the dispenser of patronage? He confessed that he could not understand the grounds upon which it could be contended that Major-Generals, who had risked their lives and spent their best years in the public service, should be kept on the small pittance of 17s. a day; and it came to that, if they were not to be allowed to hold regiments or governments. He admitted that his own relative, the Duke of Gordon, had a regiment, the First Royals, which had been now twenty-four years in India, but that, he contended, was no abuse of the patronage most properly vested in the Crown.

Mr. O'Connell said that in his opinion, the command of a regiment twenty-four years in India, possessed by a nobleman of large fortune resident in this country, was a grievous abuse. If an officer deserved well of his country, let him come before Parliament, and let it reward him either by the grant of money, or by an appointment to office. That was the proper way, since the distribution of the public purse was the privilege of that House.

Sir James Graham said, that in that part of the Administration with which he was connected a saving of one million had been effected. He stated this in reply to the Honourable Member for Middlesex, and to show that his pledges were not mere empty boasts. He was of opinion the offices alluded to by the Honourable Member for Middlesex could not be done away without materially impairing the army and navy service. He contended that a stimulus was necessary both to army and naval officers, and he would not be doing his duty either to his country or King if he consented to a motion which would weaken the energy and destroy the efficiency of the service.

Mr. Roebuck supported the motion.

Major Beauchamp was convinced that nothing was more hurtful to the army in general, or more disagreeable to the majority of the officers both of the army and navy, than those sinecures. He knew it to be the case, for nothing could be more disagreeable to them than the collision into which those sinecures brought them with the people, and the bad feelings they created throughout the country.

Captain Yorke said,—that the speech of the Gallant Officer who had just sat down was at variance with the statement of the Right Honourable Baronet who had said that those sinecures were given to those officers of the British Navy who had distinguished themselves in the service of His Majesty. The Right Honourable Baronet had stated that the savings effected in his department had not in the least injured the efficiency of the service. He had effected

a reduction to the extent of two millions, and in so doing he had reduced the most efficient part of the service. He had reduced 1000 marines and 4000 seamen, and he had reduced the expenses of equipments, &c., to the extent of 400,000*l*. He had seen the dockyards at Portsmouth, and he could assure the House that they never were so clean swept as at the present moment. About six weeks ago he visited them, and he could assure the House that, if any of the Government vessels had had occasion to come from Holland to refit, there was not as much as a lower mast, or a topsail-yard, in the whole place to aid them. He was aware that this was foreign to the question, yet, as the statement had been made by the Right Honourable Baronet, he thought it only fair to set the House right as to the efficiency of the service. The Right Honourable Baronet had made a clear statement, and a true one in every sense; but it appeared to him (Captain Yorke) that the Honourable Member for Middlesex was not so desirous of cutting down sinecures as of taking them out of the gift of the Crown. Now, he was of opinion that these were times in which they could not too much strengthen the Crown, and he concurred, therefore, with the Right Honourable Baronet in thinking that these appointments should remain with the Crown. The Honourable Member for Worcester had expressed a desire that sinecure places for military and naval officers should be done away with, and that the half-pay should be increased; but how, he would ask, were the people to be benefited by the adoption of such a plan? It would be only robbing Peter to pay Paul. The Honourable Member for Dublin had said "Divide," in order that the country might see who were for sinecures and who were not; and he (Captain Yorke) would also say "Divide," in order to see who courts popular favour and who does not. He wished himself for popularity as much as any man, but he did not wish to acquire it by truckling to one set of men because they were the strongest, but rather by endeavouring to hold a fair and equal hand between the interests of the country on the one hand, and the honour and dignity of the Crown upon the other.

Mr. Cobbett said that his objection was, that our great expenditure was not paid by the nobility or landed gentry or clergy of the country.

Mr. Sheil said that the question could be decided as an abstract one.

Sir J. Hobhouse observed that the question was, whether the House of Commons should leave the distribution of military rewards in the hands of the responsible advisers of the Crown, subject, however, to its

own annual revision, or take them all to itself without any immediate responsibility? Let gentlemen call to mind the great canvassing which takes place on every question where private interests, rail-roads, and so on, are concerned. Should it result that Parliament was to confer the original grants for this branch of service, it would be impossible to calculate the extent of the invidious cavillings and canvassings which would accompany each detail of every case. The Honourable Baronet said the King frequently used his power to make these grants in adding to the income of meritorious officers whose pay was not sufficient. For instance, a Colonel Dumas, who, after a service of many years, became blind, and by the regulations was not entitled to receive full pay, inasmuch as he had not been wounded in action, lately obtained a small Majorship. The Honourable Member for Middlesex recently said that all men who took a large part in public matters like himself (Mr. Hume) should keep things in a proper train, by making Ministers a little uneasy. Mr. Hume himself had acted most zealously up to this principle, for he had continued to annoy every Ministry he had ever come in contact with. With respect to himself (Sir J. C. Hobhouse) he could assure Mr. Hume that his plan had succeeded to his heart's content; for he could assure that Honourable Gentleman that he (Sir J. C. Hobhouse) had not had an hour's peace since he entered into office. It was no pleasant thing for him to come down every day to the House to be badgered by so ingenious a gentleman as Mr. Hume.

Sir E. Codrington opposed the motion. Sir F. Burdett said some of the speeches he had heard were much better adapted for the Corn Exchange in Dublin, and a promiscuous multitude assembled round Covent-garden. A vulgar view *ad captandum* had been taken of the subject to excite the indignation of the people, by the suggestion that the Government were taking unjustly and unfairly from the pockets of the people. There had been much of exaggeration on the present occasion, but he expected from a Reformed Parliament a calm judgment and a dispassionate consideration.

Mr. M. O'Connell said the Honourable Baronet talked of arguments *ad captandum vulgas*; but if ever there was a man who had made use of such arguments, who had indeed lived upon them, it was the Honourable Baronet. If the Honourable Baronet had left that off, he might at least suffer others to catch the mantle that was falling from his shoulders, now that he was ascending to the third heaven. He begged the Honourable Baronet not to forget, that in one of his addresses to the electors of West-

minster, before he was sitting on the Ministerial side of the House, he not only talked of sinecures as evils, but he told the people not to rest till they had made all the sinecurists disgorge all that they had ever taken in past times of their ill-gotten and enormous wealth.

Mr. Briscoe opposed the motion.

Mr. Hume had never seen sinecures (though he was almost ashamed to say it) half so well defended by the Tories as they were now by the Whigs. The Tories, if ever they came back to office, might learn something from the Honourable Members opposite. If Ministers were anxious to carry on the great work they had begun, they must banish sinecurists from the army, which afforded the means of bribing individuals in this and the other House of Parliament, and of trampling on the rights of the people.

The House then divided—for the motion, 138; against it, 232. Majority against the motion, 94.

#### HOUSE OF LORDS, FEBRUARY 19.

*Lieutenant-General Sir Hudson Lowe.*—Previous to the Committee on the Disturbances in Ireland Bill, Lord Teynham suggested that the Proclamation issued under such bill, declaring any county to be in a state of disturbance, should be signed by a certain number of Privy Councillors, in addition to the signature of the Lord-Lieutenant. To raise a question on the subject, he moved for returns respecting the Privy Councillors resident in Ireland. His Lordship observed that he had the highest confidence in the present Lord-Lieutenant, but he might be succeeded by a Sir Hudson Lowe.

The Duke of Wellington rose for the purpose of defending a most respectable officer in His Majesty's service, who had been attacked, and who could not be present to defend himself. The Noble Baron had thought proper to cast an imputation upon Sir Hudson Lowe. The Noble Baron had said that he was perfectly ready to place confidence in the Noble Marquis, who was at the head of the Irish Government, but that, in order to guard against any abuse, some amendment in the measure was necessary, for that he might be succeeded by some Sir Hudson Lowe. What did the Noble Baron mean by that expression? He (the Duke of Wellington) was acquainted with that Gallant Officer, and he believed there was not in the service of His Majesty a more respectable man than Sir Hudson Lowe.

Lord Teynham disclaimed any intention of aspersing the character of Sir Hudson Lowe. He had not the honour of knowing him, and he only spoke of him as he un-

derstood his character through general report, and this he would say, that Sir Hudson Lowe, as Governor of St Helena, was throughout Europe held up as a man of an arbitrary character, and unfit to be intrusted with the charge he had there.

Earl Bathurst said, perhups by prolonging the conversation it was giving too much importance to the subject, yet he could not sit still and hear such an accusation as that brought forward by the Noble Lord, without rising to offer a word in defence of his gallant friend. He most distinctly denied the truth of the accusation. That gallant officer had performed his duty in a manner which redounded to his honour, and his character was without a stain. This was acknowledged by all well-informed persons both at home and abroad.

The motion was eventually negatived.

#### HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 19

On the motion of Mr Gillon a return was ordered of all offices to which no duty is attached, and of all offices, the duties of which are performed by deputy, in the army and navy, stating the rank of such officers, the names of the individuals filling them, and how long they have been in actual service.

#### — FEBRUARY 22

*Appointments under the Crown—Naval and Military Members.*—Mr Hume moved for the appointment of “a Select Committee to examine and report the number of Members of both Houses of Parliament who hold office, place, and emolument under the Crown or public offices, and the amount of salaries and allowances, present and in reversion.” The Honourable Member expressed his opinion that no individual holding office at the pleasure of the Crown should sit and vote in the House of Commons, and he would even carry his principle so far as to exclude officers in the army and navy. He had stated that opinion before, and he had been considered a very extraordinary one, but it was founded on experience. On referring to documents he found it somehow or other happened that the great majority of the military and naval officers in the House had always been in the habit of voting with the Government in support of measures which were prejudicial to the interests of the country at large. That was the case in the unreformed Parliaments—what might happen now he did not know. The number of persons sitting in that House, who held appointments under the Crown had latterly diminished. In 1714 there were 200 persons of this description in the House; in 1717 there were 257, and in 1822, 143, but this number required to be further reduced.

On the suggestion of Lord Althorp, the motion was so amended as to require an account with respect to antecedent periods.

An Honourable Member thought that the people ought to be allowed to send whom they pleased to represent them in the House of Commons. Although he was an officer, he believed that he should conduct himself with as much temper, judgment, and impartiality, as the Honourable Member for Middlesex himself. Officers who were receiving a small pittance of half pay, the only reward of services performed for their country, were as likely to act independently as persons who were endeavouring to count popularity by appealing to the passions of the people.

Mr Hume said that the last speaker was mistaken if he supposed that he meant to censure any person. All Members of that House were honourable men, and though he found Members voting in one particular way on all occasions, they were still honourable men. He could not suppose that officers would act otherwise than as honourable men, but he knew that they stood in a different situation from himself in that House. The King could not deprive him of a commission, but he could an officer, consequently he was a dependant man. That was on the table of the House a return, which showed that upwards of 1000 officers had been deprived of their commissions without being tried by a court-martial, and without any reason being assigned for their dismissal. It might be recollected that a gallant officer of high reputation, formerly Member for Southwark, was deprived of his commission, without any cause assigned, and when he appealed to the House of Commons he could obtain no redress. He begged it to be understood, that in what he had said respecting officers he meant nothing offensive to any individual.

Captain Birkley said, that if the Honourable Member for Middlesex had not on former occasions cast imputations on those Members who were in the habit of supporting Government he might have felt indignation at what had fallen from him with respect to the officers of the army and navy, of the latter of whom he was one. The Honourable Member could not know what the word honour meant, or he never would suppose that an officer would sell his constituents for the sake of his paltry half-pay. Every officer would throw back upon the Honourable Member the imputation which he had cast upon them. From his supposing that officers could be actuated by such motives as he attributed to them, he could not help thinking, that if the Honourable Member were in their situation he would himself be actuated by those motives.

"An Honourable Member said, that after having served his country for forty years he had been returned to that House by a large constituency. He thought that the Honourable Member for Middlesex should have tried the officers of the army and navy a little longer before he attacked them.

Sir Edward Codrington said he would not condescend to reply to the imputations which the Honourable Member for Middlesex had cast upon the officers of the army and navy; but he wished to say a few words as to the Honourable Member's general proposition. He (Sir Edward Codrington) considered half-pay not as a retaining fee, but a reward for past services. He was ready to maintain that proposition either on the principle on which pensions were granted or by a reference to the opinion of the twelve Judges delivered in the case of the former Duke of St. Alban's, when a lieutenant in the navy, in 1793. It was proposed to deprive the Duke of his half-pay, on account of his not having offered himself for service, but the twelve Judges gave it as their opinion that it could not be taken from him, because it was the reward of past services.

Mr. P. Howard said that some instances of officers being dismissed from the service occurred in the early part of the American war; but such cases had rarely occurred lately. The ground on which Sir R. Wilson was deprived of his commission was one strictly military.

Mr. Roebuck did not think it was a good principle to restrict the choice of the people with respect to their representatives. The existing law declared certain persons ineligible to sit in Parliament. His Honourable Friend (Mr. Hume) had only followed out that principle, and by so doing had shown that it was bad.

Mr. Cobbett said that by the Act of Settlement all officers under the Crown, civil and military, were excluded from that House. For his own part, he would rather see military officers in that House than the landowners, who had pocketed so much of the public money. He agreed with the Gallant Admiral, that the half-pay of officers ought to be regarded as the reward of past services, and that they ought not to be subjected to the same sort of treatment as Sir R. Wilson had received. He was sorry to say that there were in different parts of England several old soldiers and sailors who had been named in the service of their country, and who had had their pensions taken from them without any cause assigned. He had a petition to present from an old soldier, residing in Oldham, who had been wounded in the battle of Waterloo, complaining that his pension had been withheld, in conse-

quence of his being unable from illness to go out, when called on to do so.

Lord John Russell said, that it was a regulation with respect to Chelsea pensioners, that if, when called upon to serve in a veteran battalion, they did not answer the call, they were no longer considered as pensioners. The same rule applied, he believed, to officers on half-pay. If, however, a sufficient reason was given for their absence, they were reinstated in the list of pensioners. He had written a letter to the Honourable Member for Oldham respecting the pensioner to whom he had alluded, and had directed it to Mr. William Cobbett, as he understood the Honourable Member disliked the title of "esquire." The Honourable Member returned an answer, stating that the letter was unsatisfactory, for no other reason that he (Lord John Russell) could imagine than that the Honourable Member had, in this instance, as in others, changed his mind, and was dissatisfied with the mode of address which he had himself prescribed.

Mr. Cobbett said that the part of the letter which was unsatisfactory was the inside, and not the outside.

Lord John Russell said,—that with respect to the question, whether it was desirable that persons in particular situations should be excluded from that House, he was inclined to concur, for the first time he believed, with the Honourable Member for Bath (Mr. Roebuck). He thought it a bad principle to restrict the choice of the people. If a brave and gallant officer, acquainted with the interests of his country, was chosen as the representative of any constituency, he for one was not disposed to put a veto on that choice.

Colonel Torrens could not concur in the principle which had been laid down by his Honourable Friend (Mr. Hume). If that principle had been acted upon, Lord Chatham never could have been a public man. He could not consent to subject himself to the disgrace of his Honourable Friend, and he therefore thought it right to leave the camp as quickly as possible. (The Hon. Member, who occupied a place near Mr. Hume, here took up his hat, and immediately moved off to a distant part of the House, amidst shouts of laughter.)

Mr. Hume said he was very glad his Honourable Friend had left the camp, for he was of very little service in it. With respect to the insinuations cast upon him by an Honourable Member opposite, he begged to say that he threw them back with contempt.

The motion was agreed to, and the Committee appointed.

## PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

## NAVY.

## PROMOTIONS.

## CAPTAINS.

Thomas Catew.  
 COMMANDERS.  
 J. T. Wallen.  
 Wm. Molyneux.  
 Wm. Samwell (retired).  
 John Turner (*b*) ditto

## LIEUTENANTS.

R. W. Otway.  
 J. W. Morgau.  
 E. T. Harries.  
 T. V. Anson \*  
 J. T. Warren

## SURGEON.

P. Martyn.

## APPOINTMENTS.

## COMMANDERS.

C. Cumby ..... Portsmouth Ord.  
 Spencer Smyth ..... Coast Guard.

## LIEUTENANTS.

Adolp. Slade ..... Victory.  
 J. G. Nops ..... Jackdaw.  
 E. Barrett ..... Ditto.  
 W. H. Quin ..... Britomart.  
 G. A. Henry ..... Clio.  
 H. W. Clare ..... Warspite.  
 J. Tyssen ..... Ditto.  
 M. Fitton ..... Out Pension.  
 F. Liardet ..... Snake.  
 E. W. Pitt ..... Portsmouth Ord.  
 R. Dwyer ..... Ditto.  
 J. H. Helby ..... Hound Rev. Cut.  
 J. Langworth ..... Coast Guard.  
 J. Stewart (*b*) ..... Do.  
 J. H. Weller ..... Do.  
 J. D. Ramsay ..... Do.  
 E. Harvey ..... Do.  
 J. W. Morgan ..... Madagascar.

## MASTERS.

J. S. Taylor ..... Vols

## ASSISTANT-SURGEONS.

C. F. Krabbe ..... Skyfark.  
 G. Burn ..... Ditto.  
 J. Clark, M.D. .... Dec Steamer.  
 A. Stuart ..... Salamander  
 J. Peters ..... Rhadamanthus.  
 J. Donovan, M.D. .... Britomart.  
 J. A. Mould ..... Clio.  
 Wm. Duncan ..... Snake.

## PUSERS.

H. Brenton ..... Alfred (acting).

## ROYAL MARINES.

## PROMOTIONS.

R. B. Puddicombe to be Second Lieutenant;  
 W. A. Budd to be ditto

## ARMY.

## ST. JAMES'S PALACE, Feb. 22, 1833.

The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood upon Captain Richard Spencer, Companion of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, Military Knight Commander of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order

## WAR OFFICE, Feb. 26.

The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood upon Lieut-General F. A. Wetherill, of Castlebar, Great Bailing, Middlesex, Military Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order

The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood upon Lieut-General D. L. T. Widdington, Military Knight Commander of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order.

The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood upon Colonel J. B. Savage, of the Royal Marines, Companion of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, and Military Knight Commander of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order.

The King has been pleased to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, granting to Lieut-General J. S. Wood, the office or place of Lieutenant of his Majesty's Tower of London, vice Colonel Lord Frederick Fitz-Clarence.

## OFFICE OF ORDNANCE, Feb. 22.

Ordnance Medical Department—Assist-Surg. T. H. Quigley, to be Surgeon, vice Parker, dec.

Royal South Gloucester Militia.—W. W. Vickery, Gent to be Ensign.

Gloucester Yeomanry Cavalry.—T. Fulljames, Gent to be Cornet, vice Skev, resigned.

Southern Nottinghamshire Yeomanry Cavalry.

—T. A. Campbell, Gent, to be Second Lieut vice

T. Barber, jun. resigned, J. Rolleston, Gent, to be Cornet, vice T. A. Campbell, promoted.

Fife Yeomanry Cavalry.—Hon. J. Bruce, to be Lieutenant; Wm. Glass, Gent, to be Cornet, vice Stewart, resigned.

## WAR OFFICE, March 1.

2d Foot.—Ensign Henry Reynolds, from the 17th Regt. to be Lieut. without p. vice Cahill, app. to the 72d Foot.

7th Foot.—Capt. Wm. Guard, from the 62d Regt. to be Capt. vice Hall, who exch.

24th Foot.—Brevet Col. Francis Skelly Tidy, from the Recruiting Staff, to be Lieut.-Colonel, vice Fleming, app. Inspecting Field Officer of a Recruiting District.

62d Foot.—Capt. Herbert Byng Hall, from the 7th Regt. to be Capt. vice Guard, who exch.

73d Foot.—Lieut. David Cahill, from the 2d Regt. to be Lieut. without p. vice Owgan, dec.

75th Foot.—Capt. Wm. Fowden Hindle, from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice James John Graham, who exch.

90th Foot.—Lord Jas. Heresford, to be Ensign, by p. vice Graham, who retires.

Royal Military College.—Assist.-Surgeon Robt. Dunkin Smyth, from the h. p. of the 85th Regt. to be Assist.-Surgeon.

Unattached.—Lieut. James Davis, from the 98th Regt. to be Capt. without p.

Memoranda.—The date of Lieut. Herbert Taylor Lewis's promotion, in the 40th Regt. is the 9th Nov. 1831, instead of the 17th of that year.

The date of Lieut. Henry Gunton's promotion, in the 50th Regt. is the 29th Dec. 1832, instead of the 18th January, 1833.

### MARCH 8.

5th Regt. of Drag. Guards.—Lieut. Abraham Bolton, to be Capt. by p. vice Hampton, who ret.; Cornet James Fitzmaurice Scott, to be Lieut. by p. vice Bolton; Richard Blackwood, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Scott.

12th Light Drags.—Charles Brett, Gent. to be Veterinary Surgeon, vice Bunbury, whose appointment has not taken place.

1st or Gren. Regt. of Foot Guards.—Lieut. and Capt. Frederick Clinton, to be Adjut. vice Fitzroy, who resigns the Adjutancy only.

8th Foot.—Lieut. Thos. Rutherford Thompson, to be Capt. by p. vice Laing, who retires; Ensign Walter Ogilvy, to be Lieut. by p. vice Thompson; Stephenson Brown, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Ogilvy.

17th Foot.—Arthur Hyde Lucas, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Reynolds, promoted in the 2d Foot.

33d Foot.—Capt. Archibald Robertson, from the 57th Regt. to be Capt. vice Caldwell, who exch.

39th Foot.—Lieut.-General Hon. Sir Robert William O'Callaghan, K.C.B., from the 97th Regt. to be Colonel, vice Lieut.-General Sir George Airey, K.C.H., dec.

55th Foot.—Alexander Campbell, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice De Haviland, promoted.

57th Foot.—Capt. Mark Maria Caldwell, from the 33d Regt. to be Capt. vice Robertson, who exch.; Lieut. Thomas Porter, from h. p. unatt. to be Lieut. vice John Story, who exch.

62d Foot.—Ensign Valentine Langmead Lewis, to be Lieut. by p. vice Hill, who retires; Henry Wells, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Lewis.

75th Foot.—Lieut. Peter Delaney, to be Capt. by p. vice Hindle, who retires; Ensign William Robert Halliday, to be Lieut. by p. vice Delaney.

97th Foot.—Major-General the Right Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge, K.C.B., to be Colonel, vice Lieut.-General Sir R. W. O'Callaghan, app. to the command of the 69th Regt.

Hospital Staff.—Robert Jameson, Gent. to be 1st-Surgeon to the Forces, vice Skelton, dec.

Memorandum.—The date of Riding-master Henry Phillips, app. to the Cornetcy in the 7th Light Dragoons, is the 11th Dec. 1829, but he is to take rank in the Army from the original date viz. 25th March, 1828.

### ST. JAMES'S PALACE, March 13.

The King was this day pleased to invest Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Baker with the ensigns of a Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath.

The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood upon Lieut.-General Henry John Cumming, Military Knight Commander of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order,

### DOWNING-STREET, March 13.

The King has been pleased to appoint Major-General H. C. Darling, to be Lieut.-Governor of the island of Tobago.

### WAR-OFFICE, March 15.

2d Regt. of Drag. Gds.—Lieut. James Salmon, to be Adj. vice Addison, who resigns the Adjcy. only.

7th Regt. of Light Drag. Guards.—Cornet and Adj. Thomas Paterson, to have the rank of Lieut.

15th Light Dragoon Guards.—Cornet Denis Browne, to be Lieut. by purch. vice Riddell, who ret.; Cornet Thomas Naylor, to be Lieut. by p. vice Terry, who ret.; Arthur Baker, Gent. to be Cornet by p. vice Browne; Edmund Carrington, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Naylor.

6th Regt. of Foot.—Morris Hall, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Bailey, who ret.

11th Foot.—Hon. George Augustus Frederick Clarence Graves, to be Ens. by p. vice Keane, appointed to the 33d Foot.

14th Foot.—Ensign Matthew Carlisle Wilder, to be Lieut. without p. vice Maxwell, dec.; Arthur Wellington Campbell, Gent. to be Ens. without p. vice Wilder.

16th Foot.—Francis Roger Palmer, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Irwin, who ret.

33d Foot.—Ens. Francis Todd, to be Lieut. by p. vice Forbes, prom.; Ens. Edward Arthur Wellington Keane, from the 11th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Todd.

37th Foot.—Ens. William John Morritt, to be Lieut. by p. vice Creaghe, who ret.; James Grignon, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Morritt.

54th Foot.—Capt. Roger Stewart, from the 1st West India Regiment, to be Capt. vice John Griffiths Beavan, who ret. upon h. p. 69th Foot.

56th Foot.—Ens. Howell Paynter, to be Lieut. without p. vice Keech, dec.; John Turner, Gent. to be Ens. without p. vice Paynter.

60th Foot.—Capt. Frederick William Hamilton, from h. p. 96th Foot, to be Capt. vice John Baxter Carless, who exch. receiving the diff.

63d Foot.—Lieut. Arthur Cunliffe Pole, to be Adj. vice Montgomery, who resigns the Adjutancy only.

78th Foot.—Lieut. Walter Hamilton, to be Capt. by p. vice Wall, who ret.; Ens. John Burns, to be Lieut. by p. vice Hamilton.

95th Foot.—Lieut. Joseph Carruthers, to be Capt. by p. vice Calcraft, who ret.; Ens. Joshua John Whitting, to be Lieut. by p. vice Carruthers.

1st West India Regt.—Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Andrew Leith Hay, from h. p. 96th Foot, to be Capt. vice Stewart, app. to the 54th Foot.

West India Regt.—William Scott Cooper, Gent. to be Ens. by p. vice Jones, who ret.

Unattached.—Lieut. John Forbes, from the 33d Foot, to be Capt. of Infantry by p.

Memorandum.—Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Robert Campbell, from the 9th Foot, has been allowed to retire from the service by the sale of an unattached company.

Surrey Yeomanry Cavalry.—Mr. W. R. W. Halsey to be Capt. vice Frederick, resigned; J. M. Molyneux, Gent. to be Lieut. vice Halsey, prom.

### OFFICE OF ORDNANCE, March 15.

Royal Regt. of Artillery.—First Lieut. B. L. Poynter, to be Second Capt. vice Talbot, dec.; Second Lieut. H. Hotham, to be First Lieut. vice Poynter.

Corps of Royal Engineers.—Gentleman Cadet J. G. McKerlie, to be Second Lieut. with temporary rank.

## WAR-OFFICE, March 22.

3d Regt. Drag. Guards.—Capt. G. Todd, to be Major, by p. vice Hadden, who retires; Lieut. M. F. Beauman, to be Capt. by p. vice Todd; Cornet J. D. Dyson, to be Lieut. by p. vice Beauman; S. Bomford, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Dyson.

8th Regt. Light Drag.—Cornet J. Robbins, from h. p. 12th Light Drag. to be Cornet, without p. vice Howard, dec.

10th Light Drag.—Lieut. Col. G. Gore, from h. p. 9th Light Drag. to be Lieut. Col. vice H. Wyndham, who exch.

14th Light Drag.—Lieut. C. Barton, to be Capt. by p. vice Gage, who retires; Cornet E. Royds, to be Lieut. by p. vice Barton; C. Jones, Gent. to be Cornet, by p. vice Royds.

1st Foot.—Ensign T. Humphreys, to be Lieut. by p. vice Mackenzie, who retires; D. G. A. Durroch, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Humphreys.

2d Foot.—Lieut. W. M. Lyster, to be Capt. by p. vice Head, promoted; Ensign H. R. H. C. Elwes, to be Lieut. by p. vice Lyster; E. English, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Elwes.

16th Foot.—Ensign M. V. Abbott, from the 89th Regt. to be Ensign, vice Palmer, who exch.

31st Foot.—Ensign R. Boys, to be Lieut. by p. vice Campbell, who retires; R. D. Chamberlaine, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Boys.

35th Foot.—Brevet-Lieut. Colonel C. A. Fitzroy, from h. p. unatt. to be Major, vice Power, who retires.

40th Foot.—Lieut. F. Codrington, to be Capt. by p. vice Butler, prom.; Ensign F. W. Smith, to be Lieut. by p. vice Codrington; J. M. B. Neill, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Smith.

56th Foot.—Lieut. W. Grey, to be Capt. without p. vice Partridge, deceased; Capt. G. Forman, from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. without p. vice Pickering, deceased; Ensign J. Wegg, to be Lieut. without p. vice Gray; Cornet J. I. Lushington, from h. p. Roy. Wag. Train, to be Ens. vice Wegg.

70th Foot.—W. A. Sutherland, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Burns, prom.

89th Foot.—Ensign F. K. Palmer, from the 16th Regt. to be Ensign, vice Abbott, who exch.

92d Foot.—Capt. J. Forbes, from h. p. unatt. to be Capt. vice R. Macdonald, who exch.

98th Foot.—T. C. Ormaby, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Balfour, who retires.

1st West India Regt.—D. Digges, Gent. to be Ensign, by p. vice Ramsbottom, who retires.

2d Ditto.—Ensign W. H. Nicolls, to be Lieut. without p. vice Whitcomb, deceased; Ensign T. M'Manus, from h. p. 101st Regt. to be Ensign, vice Nicolls.

Unattached.—Capt. C. Head, from 2d Foot, to be Major, by p.; Capt. J. Butler, from 40th Regt. to be Major, by p.

Memoandum.—Major A. Bowen, h. p. unatt. has been allowed to retire from the service, by the sale of an unatt. commission.

## BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

## BIRTHS.

At the Cape of Good Hope, the Lady of Lieut. Col. England, 75th regt. of a daughter.

Feb. 25th, at Bandon, the Lady of Major Sweeney, late of the 70th regt. of a daughter.

Feb. 25th, at Southsea, the Lady of Capt. H. A. O'Neill, 12th regt. of a daughter.

At Edinburgh, the Lady of Capt. R. Campbell, 96th regt. of a son.

At Notting Hill Terrace, the Lady of Capt. Machonochie, R.N. of a son.

At Bodmin, the Lady of Capt. E. Gilbert, R.N. of a daughter.

At Monkstown, co. Cork, the Lady of Capt. Westropp, R.N. of a son.

March 3d, at Kipby Overblow, Yorkshire, the Lady of Lieut. Col. Machan, 81st regt. of a daughter.

March 3d, at Dysart, the Lady of Lord Loughborough, Lieut.-Col. 9th Lancers, of a son.

March 3d, the Lady of G. E. Foreman, Surgeon of H. M. S. Excellent, of a son.

At Plymouth, the Lady of Capt. Thorne, R.N. of a daughter.

March 7th, the Lady of Capt. G. Smith, of the Bombay army, of a son.

March 10th, at Woolwich, the Lady of Lieut. Leonard, R.M. of a son.

March 12th, at Beckenham, Kent, the Lady of Major Dickson, of a daughter.

March 13th, at Godmersham Park, Kent, the Lady of Major Henry Knight, of a son and heir.

March 18th, at Stonehouse, the Lady of Capt. Ellis, R.M. of twin daughters.

\* \* We are requested, by the best possible authority, to contradict the following, birth, inserted in our last Number, from a country paper: "At Leamington, the Lady of Capt. Smith, 93d Highlanders, of a daughter."

## MARRIAGES.

At Brussels, Hypolite Ernest, Baron de Poederle, to Emily, eldest daughter of Colonel Webber Smith, R.I.A.

Feb. 23d, in London, Major W. F. Forster, Assist. Adj.-General, to Caroline, youngest daughter of the late Right Hon. Hugh Elliott.

At Lomnay, Aberlenn, Col. Fagan, late Adj.-Gen. in Bengal, to Maria, daughter of the Rev. G. Gibbon, Minister of Lomnay.

In Dublin, Lieut. T. W. Lloyd, 4th Drag. Gds. to Charlotte, youngest daughter of Thos. Knox Magee, of Fairhill, co. Louth, Esq.

March 7th, at Enfield, Lieut. T. Eytan, R.N. to Sarah, second daughter of John Foster, Esq. of that place.

At Kingscourt, County of Cavan, Capt. John F. Gordon, 47th regt. to Essy Dyas, eldest daughter of Philip Ward, Esq.

At Newburn Church, Northumberland, Major R. R. Wilford Brett, 8th Royal Irish Hussars, to Mary Anne, daughter of Alderman A. Reed, of Newcastle upon Tyne.

March 14th, at St Martin's-in-the-Fields, Capt. Joseph Simmons, 41st regt. to Emma, eldest daughter of John Rose Baker, Esq. of Chalk, in the county of Kent.

In Dublin, Capt. Benj. Duff, 92d Highlanders, to Emma, daughter of Gregory Haines, Esq. Dep.-Com.-General.

## DEATHS.

## COLONEL.

Jan. 22. Wm. Smith, h. p. 50th Foot.

## LIEUTENANT-COLONELS.

Jan. 3. O'Kelly, 21th Foot, at Cephalonia, March 29. Charles Aly, K.H. h. p. 2d Line G. L., Col. Campbell, late of the 34th Foot.

## MAJORS.

- March 15, 1832, Victor Muller, h. p. 2d Drag. German Legion.  
Feb. 2, Quin, h. p. 21st Foot, Dublin.  
Dec. 4, Du Cane, h. p. 20th Drag. Hastings.

## CAPTAINS.

- Jan. 26, Glubb, Roy. Inv. Art., Woolwich.  
Oct. 9, Heise, h. p. Ger. Art.  
Feb. 18, Thos. Wilson, h. p. R. Mar.  
Honeybourne, h. p. Indep.  
June 5, Strickland, do.  
Jan. 15, Wood, h. p. 60th Foot, Little Stoke, near Wallingford.  
Jan. 27, Baron D'Eberstein, h. p. 60th Foot, St. Servan.  
Feb. 1, Castell, h. p. 92d Foot.  
Feb. 1, Mackrell, late 9th R. Vet. Batt.  
Aug. 21, Blyth, h. p. 12th Foot.  
Priestley, h. p. 18th Drag.

## LIEUTENANTS.

- Jan. 27, Baldock, Adj. R. W. ag. Tr., Hythe.  
Jan. '53, Dake, h. p. Ger. Art.  
Jan. 5, Meeh, h. 56th Foot, Jamaica.  
Jan. 28, O'gan, 73d Foot.  
Jan. 13, H. Dawson, h. p. 9th Drag.  
Feb. 4, Beauchlerk, h. p. 60th Foot.  
Dillon, h. p. 105th Foot.  
De la Faigne, h. p. 4th Line Ger. Leg.  
July 12, Binton, late 6th R. Vet. Batt.  
June 25, Skerrett, h. p. 48th Foot.  
Napper, h. p. Indep.  
July 7, White, h. p. Plov. Batt.  
Nov. 17, Bell, h. p. Cape Regt.  
Vigouroux, h. p. 74th Foot.  
Feb. 19, Cooke, h. p. 57th Foot.  
Hayley, h. p. 56th Foot.  
Aug. 3, Meredith, h. p. 5th Foot.  
May 1, Dawson, h. p. 2d Foot.  
Nov. 29, Meyers, h. p. 3d Foot Gds.  
Aug. 12, Laycock, h. p. Cape Regt.  
Dec. 17, Playford, h. p. Afr. Corps.

## CORNETS, SECOND LIEUTENANTS, AND ENSIGNS.

- Jan. 11, Streetford, 2d Lf. Gds., Torquay, Devon.  
Jan. 23, Mackenzie, 46th Foot, Falkland, Fife-shire.  
March 21, Higden, h. p. 28th Foot.  
Jan. 28, Brockman, h. p. 22d Drag.  
April 8, Campbell, h. p. 65th Foot.  
Dec. 12, Minard, h. p. Cors. Rang.  
Oct. 28, Kilmington, h. p. 30th Foot.  
Rudyard, h. p. 85th Foot.

## PAYMASTERS.

- Armstrong, h. p. 7th Foot.

## QUARTER-MASTERS.

- June 4, Pitchford, h. p. Brit. Fenc.  
Jan. 5, Bryce, h. p. 15th Foot, Glasgow.  
Jan. 31, Johnston, h. p. 6th Drag., Armagh.

## COMMISSARIAT OFFICERS.

- July 14, Dep.-Assist.-Com.-Gen. Maddox, Van Dieman's Land.  
Jan. 19, Assist.-Com.-Gen. H. L. Gordon, h. p. Ireland.

## MEDICAL DEPARTMENTS.

- Feb. 1, Assist.-Surgeon Gazeley, h. p. 8th Vet. Batt.  
Jan. 6, Surg. Parker, M.D. R. Art., Halifax, N.S.

- Feb. 1st, at Lisbon, Lieut. J. I. Heatley, R.E.  
At Paris, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Geo. Airey, Col. of the 20th regt. A memoir of services will be given in an early Number.  
At Liege, Capt. Whichcote Turner, formerly of the 3d Drag. Gds.

- Feb. 19th, W. P. S. Metge, Esq., late Lieut. 45th regt., aged 36.

- Feb. 23d, at Bath, aged 37, Fred. Bannatyne, Esq., late of the 22d regt., youngest son of the

late Major-General Bannatyne, of the Hon. East India Company's service.

Feb. 25th, Lieut.-Col. Sterling, R.M.  
At Barnacle Lodge, co. Kerry, Major W. P. Cotter, late 8th regt.

At sea, on board the Eamont, Lieut. James Walmsley, R.N.

Feb. 27th, at Dixworth, Leicestershire, Capt. W. W. Cheslyn, h. p. 73d regt.

Feb. 30th, at Ryde, Capt. Chas. Inglis, R.N.  
At Leamington, Lieut. J. B. Mackenzie, 19th regt.

March 1st, at Limerick, Major T. Summerfield, 83d regt.

At Lisey, Commander Mayson Wright, R.N.  
March 5th, at Bath, Lieut. Col. Jabez Mac Kenzie, H.E.I.C. service, Bengal Establishment, aged 82.

At Ballincollig, co. Cork, Capt. Scott, Barrack-Master and Ordnance Storekeeper of that place.

March 8th, at Barton-on-Clun, Gloucester, J. Young, Esq., Vice-Admiral of the White, aged 67, brother to the late Sir W. Young, Vice-Admiral of England. A memoir of service will be given in an early Number.

Lieut.-Col. Disney, late of the 7th or Royal Fusiliers.

March 10th, at Woolwich, suddenly, Major-General Robert Evans, R.A.

March 15th, at Southsea, Capt. Chas. Eyre, unat., late of the 1st Royals, aged 40.

March 16th, at Fareham, Retired Commander Silver, R.N.

March 16th, at Kinsale, Captains T. O. Part-ridge and J. Pickering, both of the 56th regt.

March 20th, perished in the Erin steam-packet on passage from London to Belfast to join his regiment, Ensign W. Godfrey Jervis, 80th regt., in his 18th year.

March 13th, at Douglas, Isle of Man, Murdoch Robertson, Esq., Master, R.N., &c. Mr. R. stood nearly at the head of the list of Masters of the Royal Navy, a rank he held from the time he was about twenty years of age, and his acceptance of which he had cause bitterly to regret till the day of his death; as by the rules of the service it precluded his rising to any higher in it,—a regulation of doubtful utility, and certainly of peculiar hardship in the case of so high-spirited a mind as that of Mr. Robertson, who was so capable of being an ornament to the higher ranks of the service.

When the French Royalists at the commencement of the revolutionary war claimed the protection of the British arms, and prevailed on our fleet then in the Mediterranean to take possession, in the name of the Bourbons, of the town and port of Toulon, Mr. R. was serving as Midshipman on his Majesty's ship *Reuben*, commanded by the Honourable Captain Elphinstone (afterwards Lord Keith), and who, as being the senior captain of the fleet, was appointed by the commander-in-chief, (the late Lord Hood,) Governor of the town, and to command the forces defending it against the Republicans. Napoleon Bonaparte then served in the Republican army, in which, as Captain of artillery, he gave as earnest of his future splendid achievements, in being chiefly instrumental by his extraordinary exertions in compelling our forces shortly afterwards to evacuate this important naval arsenal, leaving the unfortunate Royalists to all the horrors of their infuriated countrymen. Though Mr. R. was very young, Captain Elphinstone felt such an attachment for him, that he appointed him his Aid-de-camp on shore on this occasion. Shortly after the evacuation, *L'Adre* frigate, lately captured from the enemy, being sent to cannonade some forts on the coast, and being manned by volunteers, Mr. R. conspicuously distinguished himself as one of them, by his zeal and gallantry he separated himself from his patron, Capt. Elphinstone, whom he was never afterwards able to reach. It was at this time that Captain Inman,



then commanding *L'Aurore*, being at a loss for an officer to navigate the ship, in a evil hour prevailed on Mr. Robertson to accept a Master's Warrant, which was shortly afterwards confirmed on his undergoing the necessary examinations, at an age younger than had ever been known before or since.

In 1800, in the West Indies, when commanding the boats of H. M. frigate *Melanger*, then commanded by the present Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Ogilby, Mr. Robertson succeeded in cutting out from under strong batteries on the Spanish main several enemy's vessels which had there sought protection. This gallant service could not be expected to be achieved without loss, and he was himself amongst the wounded, being severely hit by a musket-ball on the shoulder, which was not extracted till nineteen weeks afterwards, in England. In 1807, Mr. Robertson was Master of H. M. frigate *Blanche*, when she captured off the Ferroe Islands, after a sanguinary action, the French frigate *La Guerrière*. The late Sir Thomas Larvie, who then commanded the *Blanche*, was so much impressed with Mr. Robertson's gallantry on this occasion, and attributing to the masterly style in which he manoeuvred the ship in the action the great slaughter that took place in *La Guerrière*, and the comparatively small loss sustained in the *Blanche*,—that he (Sir Thomas)

strongly recommended to the present Lord Grey, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, to bestow a Lieutenant's Commission on Mr. Robertson. This, however, Lord Howick declined doing, on the score of Mr. Robertson's services being too valuable in the post he then held. This cold refusal of a reward that he felt he merited preyed much on a mind so sensitive as that of Mr. Robertson, and tended to disgust him with the service, not a little increased by his removal subsequently from a situation he held in the Ordinary, when a change took place in that service, by appointing Lieutenants in the place of Masters—a case of peculiar hardship to the last-mentioned deserving class of officers, as they received no other equivalent appointment.

Mr. R. was for many years in a declining state of health; and by a *post mortem* examination, the medical men gave it as their decided opinion, that his long illness and subsequent death, were occasioned by his wound and the effects of the excruciating operation he underwent in the extraction of the ball. Two of Mr. Robertson's sons are in the naval service; the eldest was sixteen months since promoted to the rank of Lieutenant, and the other is eligible for the same rank, having some years since passed with credit the necessary examinations.

## METEOROLOGICAL REGISTER,

KEPT AT THE OBSERVATORY OF CAPT. W. H. SMYTH, AT BEDFORD.

FEB. 1833.	Thermometers.		At 3 P. M.			Pluvio- meters. Inches.	Evapora- tor Inches.	Winds at 3 P. M.
	Maxim. Degrees.	Minim. Degrees.	Barom. Inches.	Thermo. Degrees.	Hygrom. Parts.			
1	39.7	33.0	29.10	37.9	860	.080	.020	W S W, frost, and fine
2	44.8	33.7	28.86	43.0	882	.054	frozen	S.W. blowing a gale
3	44.0	40.8	29.36	43.3	749	—	.050	W. by N. squally weather
4	45.6	40.3	29.64	45.6	877	.100	.070	S.W. light breezes, & hazy
5	47.8	40.4	29.73	46.4	825	—	.065	S.S.W. fr. breezes, cloudy
6	54.3	40.6	29.86	47.8	786	.150	.068	W.S.W. fresh breeze, fine
7	53.7	42.4	29.75	49.4	678	.043	.075	S.W. a beautiful day
8	54.6	45.3	29.68	53.0	603	—	.086	S.S.W. strong breezes, fine
9	53.0	45.8	29.70	50.2	653	.358	.090	W by S fr breezes, squally
10	50.0	41.5	29.23	48.4	865	.130	.105	S.W. squally, very variable
11	51.7	40.7	29.33	48.3	558	.315	.100	S.S.W. fr. breezes, & fair
12	56.0	43.3	29.60	49.4	640	.363	.105	S.W. blowing hard, variable
13	53.4	43.9	29.53	47.0	662	.168	.090	W.S.W. wind moderating
14	50.8	44.5	29.41	46.3	635	.139	.087	S.W. fresh breezes, showers
15	55.8	40.4	29.39	43.2	637	.084	.040	W. to S.W. light breezes
16	43.7	37.6	29.43	39.4	687	.120	.050	S.S.W. fresh breezes, showers
17	42.9	36.8	29.60	40.0	737	.106	.045	S.S.E. light airs, and misty
18	47.4	38.0	29.72	41.3	732	.215	.036	S.W. gentle breezes, showers
19	49.3	39.6	29.80	39.8	728	.140	.040	E.S.E. light breezes, cloudy
20	48.6	39.4	29.10	45.4	735	.230	.055	E. N.E. strong breezes
21	45.4	37.0	29.60	42.3	742	.160	.060	N. by E. hard squalls of wind
22	47.2	36.8	29.90	43.6	724	.075	.054	N. light breezes, & cloudy
23	46.8	37.0	29.84	42.4	755	.124	.030	N.W. gentle breezes, & fine
24	46.3	36.7	29.72	41.0	776	.306	.026	W.N.W. squally, showers
25	46.6	37.1	29.44	43.8	784	.240	.032	W. by S. fresh breeze, fine
26	46.3	37.3	29.22	43.8	793	.185	.028	S.S.W. light breezes, showers
27	45.4	38.4	29.37	39.7	786	.810	.030	W.S.W. gentle breezes, fine
28	44.9	41.7	28.86	41.7	800	.218	.027	S.S.W. blowing fresh





